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ELECTIONS STRATEGIES OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL COMPETITIONS IN CAMEROON 1990-2013

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То

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My parents of blessed memories Mama Manyi Debora Abid and Pa Tende Chuya Sama

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ABSTRACT

This thesis titled, "Electoral strategies of major political parties during the parliamentary and presidential compititions in Cameroon from 1990-2013" investigates into the different strategies developed by the main political parties in the various parliamentary and presidential elections in Cameroon from 1990 to 2013. This work brings to the fore the question of the influence of the electoral strategies on elections outcome and the lives of political parties. To analyse this subject, primary and secondary sources were consulted. Their exploitation was carried out through the creation of the summary sheets and the transcriptions of the oral data collected. The chronological and descriptive methods, coupled with an analytical approach, allowed the analysis of the facts with an emphasis on their production context. The use of theories of electoral sociology, collective action and rational voters has made it possible to assess the stakes of the strategies adopted by political parties in order to win elections. Analysis of these issues by the major political parties which are CPDM, SDF, UNDP, UPC, CDU, MDR, MLLC, MP and MRC, shows that each political party defined its strategic choices according to the type of elections, the electorate to be conquered and above all, the financial means at its disposal. These strategies were very often developed from established laws and standards, while others were in total opposition to the current regulations. This reality often led opposition parties to challenge the results of elections. The assessment of the different strategies adopted by political parties during presidential and legislative elections in Cameroon since 1992 has led to the conclusion that, the outcome of elections is determined by the type of strategies implemented by political parties, be they conventional or non-conventional. These strategies developed are equally very much a factor of division and resignation within the political movements that bear in most cases the consequences of electoral choices for several years after the electoral consultations.

Keywords: Strategies, political parties, presidential, parliamentary, elections

RESUME

Cette thèse s'intitule : 'stratégies électorales des principaux partis politiques lors des élections parlementaires et présidentielles au Cameroun 1990-2013''. L'objectif de cette recherche est d'analyser les différentes stratégies développées par les principaux partis politiques ayant pris part aux différentes échéances électorales parlementaires et Présidentielles au Cameroun. Ce travail soulève le problème de l'influence des stratégies électorales adoptées par les partis politiques sur l'issue des consultations électorales et la vie de ces partis. Pour analyser cette question, les sources primaires et secondaires ont été utilisées. Leur exploitation s'est faite à travers la constitution des fiches de synthèse et les transcriptions des données orales collectées. La méthode chronologique et descriptive, doublée d'une approche analytique a permis d'analyser les faits en mettant un accent sur leur contexte de production. Le recours aux théories de la sociologie électorale, de l'action collective et de l'électeur rationnel a permis d'apprécier les enjeux des stratégies adoptées par les partis politiques afin de remporter les élections. Il ressort de l'analyse de ces questions par ces parties majeures comme RDPC, FSD, UNDP, UPC, UDC, MDR, MLLC, MP et MRC,, chaque parti politique définit ses choix stratégiques en fonction du type d'élections, de l'électorat à conquérir et surtout des moyens à sa disposition. Ces stratégies sont très souvent élaborées à partir des lois et normes établit, alors que d'autres sont par contre en opposition totale avec la règlementation en vigueur. Cette réalité conduit souvent très souvent les partis d'opposition à contester les résultats des élections. L'appréciation des différentes stratégies adoptées par les partis politiques au cours des présidentielles et des législatives au Cameroun depuis 1992, a permis de parvenir aux résultats selon lesquels l'issue des élections est déterminée par le type de stratégies implémenté par les partis politiques, qu'elles soient légales ou illégales. Ces stratégies développées sont très sont des facteurs de divisions et de démissions au sein des mouvements politiques qui portes dans la plus part de cas les séquelles des choix électorales pendant plusieurs années après les consultations électorales.

Mots clés : Stratégies, partis politiques, présidentielle, parlementaire, election

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SIGLES AND ACRONYMS

ADB:	African Development Bank
ANDP:	National Alliance for Democracy and Progress
ANY:	Archives Nationale de Yaoundé
APF:	Alliance for Progressive Forces
ARC-SNC:	Alliance for the reconstruction of Cameroon through the Sovereign
	National Conference
AU:	African Unity
BBC:	The British Broadcasting Cooperation
BMM:	Brigade Mobile Mixte
CDU:	Cameroon Democratic Union
CHGA:	History-Geography and Archaeology Club
CNI	National Investment Corporation
CNP:	Cameroon National Party
CNRR:	Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction
CNU:	Cameroon National Union
COP:	Coalition of Opposition Parties
CPDM:	Cameroon People Democratic Party
CPP:	Cameroon People Party
CRM:	Cameroon Renaissance Movement
CRP:	Conservative Republican Party
CRTV:	Cameroon Radio and Television
DCC:	Divisional Counting Commissions
DO:	Divisional Officer
EC:	Electoral Commission
ELECAM:	Elections Cameroon
FALSH:	Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences
FNSC:	National Salvation of Cameroon
IMF:	International Monetary Fund

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INEC:	Independent National Electoral Commission
MDP:	Movement for Democracy and Progress
MDR:	Movement for the Defence of the Republic
MIFI:	Ministry of Finance
MINADER:	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MINATD:	Minister of Territorial Administration
MP:	Mouvement Progressiste
MRDC:	Movement for the Liberation and Development of Cameroon
NAB:	National Archives of Buea
NCB:	National Communication Board
NCCOP:	National Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties
NCOPA:	National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Association
NDI:	National Democratic Institute
NEC:	National Executive Committee
NEO:	National Elections Observatory
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHC:	National Hydrocarbon Corporation
NOWEFU:	North West Fon's Union
NUDP:	National Union for Democracy and Progress
OAU:	Organistion of African Unity
PDG:	President Director General
POP:	Patriotic Opposition Party
RFI:	Radio France International
SAP:	Structures Adjustment Programme
SCNC:	Southern Cameroons National Council
SDF:	Social Democratic Front
SDO:	Senior Divisional Officer
UFDC:	The Union of Cameroon Democratic Forces
UPC:	Union des Populations du Cameroun
VoA:	Voice of America
MINATD	Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization
CPP	Cameroon People's Party

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Background to the Study

A number of African countries enjoyed multi-party system before independence notably; South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria and Cameroon as analysed by the interplay by political parties and democracy in these countries. Political pluralism however manifested differently. While in Cameroon and Kenya for instance, political liberalization marked the entrance of multiparty politics, in other countries, it was the transition from military to civilian rule as seen in Nigeria or the end of racial discrimination as was witnessed in South Africa. Although pluralism of opinions, political parties, or candidates to elections was the bases of democracy,¹ suddenly, these countries went back to one-party systems mainly, because of the greed from those in power and the problems that the new countries faced. The one-party system led to the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals who managed the state affairs more like their personal properties rendering accounts only to themselves. This system further led to the mismanagement of government funds, corruption, favouritism, tribalism, underdevelopment and absolute poverty in a number of African countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Cameroon. These weaknesses of a single party system pushed citizens to protest against those in government in most of the countries demanding better reforms, multipartism and separation of power into executive, legislative and the judiciary 2 .

In the case of Cameroon, prominent Cameroonian intellectuals such as Bernard Fonlon criticised the return to one-party system of 1966³. According to him, with the assumption for economic and social development of the continent, the one-party state had to be eliminated. He emphasised that where the one-party system was implemented there was going to be suppression of liberty, elimination of debate and the rise of despotism⁴. Julius Victor Ngoh, like Abraham Lincoln defines democracy as "a government of the people, by the people and for the people".

¹ L. Sindjoun, *Introduction to political Parties and Democracy: Part I: Africa: Which Makes Which?* Published by ABC-CLIO, LLC, California, 2010, p. 1-4.

² V. J. Ngoh, "*Cameroon 1884 – present (2018)*, The History of a people", March 2019, The University of Yaoundé 1, pp. 338-351.

³ Bernard Foulon was absolutely against the returned to one party system in Cameroon. He said this will undermind democracy, he proceeded in advancing the Anglophones will be very much marginalize in such a system.

⁴ V. J. Ngoh, Democracy and democratization in Sub-Sahara Africa: The case of Cameroon 1960-2000, University of Buea, 2006, pp. 10-11.

This was not really effective as seen in the sort of constitutions these African countries had at independence. To elucidate the ineffectiveness of democracy, Ngoh opines that;

These constitutions were, in fact an uncompleted business because they were fashioned essentially to protect and promote the interest of the colonial master and not to effectively address the needs and aspirations of the African masses⁵.

Therefore, the African continent was plagued by economic recession caused by dictatorial governments. Moreover, the adamant refusal of some African leaders to accept the wind of change or multipartism brought their respective economies under hardship and sporadic political imbroglio especially in the early $1990s^{6}$.

In retaliation most of these leaders used the army, police and judiciary to crack down on the activists in order to remain in power. However, at the dawn of the 90s, some of these leaders were obliged to accept some level of multipartism and democracy pushed by both internal and external factors. This unbearable situation led some civil society leaders and politicians to question the excessive powers of the various African leaders. Hence, they started requesting and founding opposition parties even out of the wish of the governments in power. A clear example is the circumstances under which the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was launched in Bamenda on 26 May 1990 without prior authorisation from the government. In the SDF anniversary publication, it is captured that:

Fru Ndi rising with cadences of defiance tinged with sarrow, he told his audience, among other things, that, democracy is about people because we believe that with the non-observance of the fundamental freedoms, namely the freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including the freedom of the press and other media of communication, freedom of peaceful assembly and the freedom of association, the people cannot be expected to enjoy the basic rights which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as human beings. In an act of unprecedented courage by the politician, Ni John Fru Ndi, the leader of the nascent Social Democratic Front, SDF, raised a clenched fist and bellowed that a new party, after decades of a one-party dictatorship, was being born. Waxing belligerent, Fru Ndi blurted: 'I now declare the party launched'.⁷

⁵ Ibid, p. 9.

⁶The demand of criticisms, freedom fighters from a variety of African countries such as in Kenya, Nigeria, Gambia and Cameroon were openly requesting their government for political reforms. They called on the government to give room for multipartism while calling for good governance and the call for the separation of power into executive, legislative and judiciary.

⁷SDF, *The struggle of democracy and good governance*, Presbyterian printing press, Limbe, 2015, p. 16.

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The determination of Cameroonians to get back to multipartism later pushed the government to authorise the SDF party, thus the reintroduction of multipartism in Cameroon with the multipatism law of December 1990⁸.

At the beginning of the 20th century a few African countries had proven some acceptable level of democracy in the conduct of the parliamentary and presidential elections with multiple candidates such as the case of Cameroon which is our area of interest. The citizens had a choice of voting their leaders from various participating political parties, though at times most of the opposition parties complained of election rigging and a lot of irregularities in the process of election management. Nevertheless, based on solid political parties' strategies, there were some victories recorded both by the opposition parties and the government.

These strategies could be considered by other stakeholders as acceptable or unacceptable but they contributed to some parties winning the confidence of the electorate. The candidate selected reflected their party's ideology in parliament as well as in government structure. The legislative and executive arms of government influenced how the country is managed depending on the ideologies of the political parties with the majority in parliament or the governing party. In the case of Cameroon, the Cameroon People Democratic Party (CPDM) has been in power through out the entire period under study. This is highlighted by Ngoh, where he talked on the return of multiparty politics, the making of the Yaoundé Tripartite Declaration of November 1991, the various parliamentary and presidential elections from 1992 to 2013 with a critical view point and the results of the various participating political parties⁹.

A brief history of Cameroon shows that at the defeat of the German mandate after the First World War in 1916, Cameroon was divided between the French and the British as mandated powers. This division separated families and created difficulties as the division was done without consulting the Cameroonian people or taking into consideration natural boundaries or family

⁸Law No. 90/53 of 19th December 1990.

⁹ V. J. Ngoh, "Cameroon 1884 – present (2018), pp. 345-350.

lineage¹⁰. The people under the French control were assimilated to reason like French people with their official language as French as sited by Ngoh;

This stance was at a time when French authorities regarded French Cameroon as part of French overseas colonies and the policy of Association was to enable French colonies archive independence as part of French overseas territory. In fact, French Cameroonians were to think and feel as being part of Metropolitan France. This view or policy was contrary to the political platform of the UPC which advocated immediate reunification and independence and the non interference in the internal affairs of an independent and reunified Cameroon.¹¹

In preparing them for independence, there was the formation of political parties in 1956 as a result of the "loi-Cadre" which led to the formation of a government in French Cameroon headed by Adres Marie Mbida¹². The West Cameroons was handed to the British and to be managed as an integral part of Nigeria. Cameroonian representatives who were members of Parliament in the Enugu House of Assembly till 1956 decided and walked out to form their own house of Parliament in Bueaas they were disgruntledat the treatment they were getting from Nigerians. In 1961, the government of John NguFoncha fought hard and campaigned successfully for the Englishspeaking part of Cameroon to join the French Cameroon to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon¹³. People of the English speeking Cameroon got their political parties' strategies to reason like the British members of parliament strictly following the British system of government which was completely different from the French Cameroon system.

Eastern Cameroon had her independence on the 1 January 1960 and on the 1 October 1961 British Southern Cameroons equally gained her independence. French and English Cameroons maintained their various political party strategies in the Federal Republic of Cameroon with their respective constituent assemblies from 1961 to 1966 when there was the merging of the various political parties to form a unique party. According to Numfor:

In June 1966, Ahidjo called a meeting of the leaders of the KNDP (Foncha), The CPNC (Endeley, the CUC (Muna) and the Prime Minster of West Cameroon (Jua). The meeting was attended by eight representatives from the UC, two from the KNDP and one each from the CPNC and the CUC. The representatives of the four parties finally agreed on the formation of a single party in Cameroon

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¹⁰W. Dze Ngwa, "Boundaries dynamics and the share of geo political space: the case of borrows in the North Region of Cameroon", in D. Abwa, and al, *Boundaries and History of Africa: issues in conventional boundaries and ideological frontiers*, Yaoundé, Department of History, UY1, 2011, p. 16.

 ¹¹V.J. Ngoh, « *The untold story of Cameroon Reunification: 1955-1961* », Presprint Plc Limibe, 2011, Buea. p. 6.
 ¹²D. Numfor, L. Beseka, and al, *An Illustrated History for G.C.E Ordinary Level Candidates*, second edition, Published by Bookhouse, Yaoundé, 2012, pp. 151-153.
 ¹³Ibid., pp. 123-130.

and subsequently dissolved their respective parties. This was accomplished on the following dates; the CUC was dissolved on the 6 August, the KNDP on the 13 August, the UC on 21 August and lastly the CPNC on the 21 August. On the 1 September 1966, the merger was formerly announced and the Cameroon National Union (CNU) was born with Ahmandou Ahidjo as the National Chairman as well as the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon formerly became a One-Party *de facto state*¹⁴.

Cameroon was then governed through a one-party system from 1 September 1966 to 1990s when the opposition parties were launched in Cameroon to end the period of one-party democracy. This led to the creation of so many political parties numbered to 209¹⁵ with ten of them represented in parliament between 1992 and 2013. The number of political parties participating in presidential elections between 1992 and 2013 either consistently or at sometimes are numbered more than thirty. But only few of the parties will be considered as the main political parties in Cameroon based on their results during the elections. The legalisation of many political parties was a strategy to fragment the opposition and make it difficult for them to obtain victory in the various elections¹⁶.

Cameroon runs four types of elections; including, the council elections to elect municipal councillors with a total of 374 local government councils; the parliamentary elections for the election of 180 members of parliament for the Lower House; the senatorial elections for 70 elected senators and 30 appointed making a total of 100 senators for the Upper House and the presidential elections based on one-round and simple majority. Our research area will be concentrating on the parliamentary and presidential campaign strategies of the major political parties that existed from 1990 to 2013.

Parliamentary elections in Cameroon especially at the beginning of the re-introduction of pluralism have played a vital role in the democratic process. The party with a majority of seats in parliament forms the government. Otherwise, alliances are made with other parties in order to run the country in which case, it is referred to as the presidential majority¹⁷. A retrospective look at the various elections in Cameroon puts the parliamentary and presidential elections to be very influential and competitive as oposed to the municipal and senatorial elections. This is because a

¹⁴Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁵S. Tata-Ngenge, *Citizenship for Cameroon Schools and Colleges*, Barak Boo-Nko University Press, ENS-Bambili, 2010, pp. 39-48.

¹⁶Tata-Ngenge Simon, 63 years, Professor at the University of Bamenda, Bambili, 10th January 2018.

¹⁷ In the first multiparty parliamentary election of 1992, there was no political party with absolute majority after the parliamentary election; there was the need for the CPDM to go into alliances with MDR and later on with the UPC in order to secure a confortable majority in parliament and subsequently forming of the government.

party can win a majority of the council seats but will have little influence on how the country is managed at the central administration. On the contrary, a party with a majority number of seats in parliament has a lot to do in the process of enacting laws or forming alliances.

Political party strategies (be they negative and positive) existed during the colonial era as parties strategised for the purpose of outsmarting the others in elections. Such strategies have always been influenced by colonial masters, the ethnic lineage or belief of those in power as they shaped their strategies to suit their objectives and the vision of their political life. This study identifies the various political ideologies represented in parliament, the date of creation, number of seats in the various parliamentary and Presidential elections, presidential candidates and its various leaders and come out with their political party strategies be it open or hidden (both legal and illegal strategies) developed in their winning or losing of elections.

It is worth mentionning that multipartism existed in both East and West Cameroon before the return to one-party system in 1966. In fact, at the Foumban Conference it was agreed by both Eastern and Western Cameroon politicians that, the various political parties that existed in the different parts were not going to be transferred into the other part of the country thereby justifying the existence of pluralism. This explains why we call the period of the beginning of our study as the re-emergence of multipartism in Cameroon.

The resignation of President Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1982 brought Paul Biya to power in a very peaceful transition of power. President Paul Biya proceeded to change the Cameroon National Union (CNU) to Cameroon People Democratic Movement (CPDM) partly as a result of the power struggle within the former party as well as a means for him to consolidate power. The issue at stake was that when the ex-president handed over power to him, he was still the head of the party which President Paul Biya was not comfortable as he had to take all necessary measures to completely put Ahidjo out of power technically¹⁸.

There existed some sort of democracy even within the one-party system which was only managed internally by the CPDM's Central Committee members. In this sort of democracy,

¹⁸ J.M.D Delancy and al, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon*, Fourth Edition, The Carecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, Toronto Plymouth, UK 2010, pp. 29-30.

interested members of the party applied for council or parliamentary list through the central committee of the CPDM as it was the only party existing¹⁹, even with the list system, at times the initial list was modified at the central committee of the CPDM which was a signal of the eminent coming of multipartism in Cameroon²⁰.

The year 1990 in Cameroon History as regards multipartism, comes with the contribution of prominent actors like Ni John Fru Ndi²¹ leader of the Social Democratic Front who fought and launched the party on the 26th of May 1990 in Ntarinkon – Bamenda without the authorisation from the government to make sure democracy was re-introduced in Cameroon.Barrister Yondo Black Mandengue, was arrested for attempting to form a political party in Douala against the government's wish to encourage and promote democracy in Cameroon²².

These efforts of the civil society and many others pushed the government to legalise multipartism with law No.90/053 of 19thDecember 1990. However, the law failed to put in place the instruments that guarantee for free and fare multi-party elections. Elections were still organised by the Ministry of Territorial Administration which was still under the control of the government who is a competitor to the elections making it difficult for her to organise an election and lose as it was collaborated by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Minister of MINATD saying the CPDM cannot organise elections and failed. In spite the introduction of other bodies for the organisation of elections in Cameroon, since the 90s the ruling party till 2013 has been wininng as majority in all the elections within our period of study. It is therefore in our interest to study the various political parties' strategies for elections in Cameroon. We do intend to group them at time as the strategies for CPDM, the major opposition parties, the presidential majority and other minor parties which are either represented by a single family within a very small constituency. This is why we entitle this thesis, "election strategies of major political parties for parliamentary and presidential completitions in Cameroon from 1990-2013.

¹⁹Ibid

²⁰Tata-Ngenge Simon, 63 years, Associate Professor, University of Bamenda, Bambili, 27th June 2018.

²¹ C. Fung Nchia, Party Politics in ..., p. 164.

²² V. J. Ngoh, "Cameroon 1884 – present (2018), p. 39.

Reasons for the Choice of the Topic

In 2016 and 2017 in the international scene, the international community was surprised with political results of elections in a number of countries like Britain, France and United States of America. The British moving out of the European Union with the victory of Theresa May in 2016 led to the resignation of David Cameron²³, the victory of Donald Trump for the presidency of the United States of America (USA) who has never been involved in politics. Similarl, Emmanuel Macron emerged victorious to the presidency of France at the age of 39. These changes were based on modern effective strategies put in place by political parties and individuals to convince the electors to vote for their candidates. This has resulted in a drastic change in these countries because of change of parliamentary and presidential candidates based on different political parties' strategies²⁴. In some of these developed countries, the strategies have been put into question like the Russian interferance in the American election in 2016 with the goal of harming the campaigns of Hilary Clinton²⁵. Those involved in such unconventional strategies aimed at tricking to win elections are booked and taken to court, judged and those found guilty served an imprisonment term. The idea is to submit that, in the Western world those involved in illegal strategies are punished if caught. In a number of African countries, where good political party strategies are put in place and elections duly organised, there is remarkable changes in how the country is managed for the betterment of its citizens.

²⁵ Wikipedia, "Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections". Found:

²³ David Cameron had the conviction of Britain remaining in the European Union, when he was defeated or the British electorates voted to pull out of the European Union, he had to resign leading to the emergence of Theresa May to the post of Prime Minister in 2016. He proceeded in organising general elections in May of 2017 which she was defeated and had to share power making it difficult for her to realise her political strategies.

²⁴ The American did not think Donald Trump was going to be victorious in the American Presidential elections of 2016. Most of the polls had projected Hilary Clinton as the winner but Donald Trump won to the surprise of most of the Americans electorates and the world in general. The same surprising reasons of Presidential elections happened in Francs with the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017 as President of France contrally to the general or popular opinion wherein the electorates were thinking of Foilon and Lepen to be the front runners of the second-round elections in France. But came the emergence of Macron in the second round and the large wining in Presidential and Parliamentaryelections of his party in France. This justifies the influence of political parties strategies in winning of elections.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_interference_in_the_2016_United_States_elections. Consulted 6th June 2021.

The international community is always anxious to see the outcome of elections be it in the developing or developed countries for it has both direct and indirect impact on the way; the global world is managed following the ideologies of those in power²⁶. It is important to note that Cameroon has been one of the stable countries in the Central African sub-region with one of the longest serving Heads of State. It should be known, for close to four decades, there has been a single party governing in Cameroon until the early 1990s. President Paul Biya's²⁷ candidature has never been challenged in his party, the CPDM²⁸. Indeed, prior to the organisation of election in Cameroon, party members of the CPDM do not know if their natural candidate is going to stand or not. But once he finally decides to stand, all the party militants are obliged to endorse his candidature. Likewise, most of the other political parties make elections or endorse their party chair for the presidential elections to compete with the others²⁹. Most head or founders of political parties always struggle to be presidential candidates even at the detriment of the party. They lobby elections for candidates to be elected or accepted be it council, parliamentary or presidential which usually brings a break up in political party management. Some candidates like Ben Muna who did not succeed at the primaries turned to join other political parties. They even formed their own political party like Ben Muna, Kwalla, Issa Ibrahim and many other politicians who lost at the primaries³⁰.

Whenever elections were to be organised, there was usually intense preparation both at the level of the nation and political parties. Cameroon has the parliamentary elections which are organised every five years with a number of criteria to be eligible as of the Cameroon electoral

²⁶ The international communitie from the United Nations, African Union, the major powers like the United States of America, France, Britain, Germany, China and other regional grouping have an important rule in validating or disapproving of elections results or in influencing elections results to an extend.

²⁷ The President of Cameroon from 1982 till 2013 our delimitation of our work in Cameroon did not come to power through elections. He was given the post of the President as his predecessor President Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned. He later on in 1983 organised a Presidential election to legitimate his candidature by winning, he proceeded in organising other five Presidential elections which he has won all and he is still the President of Cameroon even after our period of study.

²⁸In 1984 there was the change of Cameroon National Union, CNU into the Cameroon People Democratic Party, CPDM which took place in Bamenda. This was the period of a return to one party system as the political parties were canceled to one political party.

²⁹ Tamtsua Sidolin, 39 years, CPDM Subsection President for Bafoussam 1, CPDM party house in Bafoussam on 11th March 2019.

³⁰Ben Muna quitting SDF, for he was not giving the chance of being a presidential candidate for the party, he turned and form his own political party APF

code³¹. The senatorial elections for a mandate of five years,³²and the presidential elections with a mandate of seven years renewable³³. In Cameroon be it council, parliamentary, senatorial or presidential elections, the elections are managed by a special election body which has changed from one name to another managed by the state this is; The Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINATD), National Elections Observatory (NEO) and Elections Cameroon (ELECAM)³⁴. These bodies have only the right to organise elections but the right to pronounce the results is reserved for the constitutional council or the supreme court of Cameroon when the latter was not yet created. This usually ends up in most cases with members of the opposition parties submitting suits for electoral fraud³⁵. These elections have a lot of impact on the present and future of the country especially the parliamentary and presidential elections which are our interest.

Scientifically, much has been written on the role and activities of political parties' successes or failures in Cameroon. There are no specialised works focusing on strategies and electioneering of votes. It's this deficency which is one of our motivating factors we wish to research. We have observed that since the event of multipartism in Cameroonthat the parliamentary elections are always very competitive with a lot of tension prior to the organisation, during and after the elections. It is our wish to see how such elections are organised, starting from the selection of prospective candidates, the management of the election and how it influences the enactment of laws. Same as it's important to note that election produces more conflicts than solutions to social welbeing and development in Cameroon.

Again, it is our wish and intention to actively participate in politics in the nearest future and the area wherein we are interested in doing politics that have a combination of multiple cultures. This is an additional motivation for us to see how political parties' strategies and elections are handled in our areas of interest. This is going to give us an in-depth know-how on how political situations in countries with multiple cultures or languages are managed.

³¹The electoral code of the Republic of Cameroon, adopted by the National Assemble, Yaoundé, 2012, pp., 35-38 ³²Ibid., pp. 47-50.

³³Ibid., p. 29.

³⁴ Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights, Volume 5. Number 2. December 2011, p.13.

³⁵Sama Isaac Nde, 65 years, Retired Labour Inspector and Divisional Executive for SDF in Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 26th May 2018.

Lastly, election period in Cameroon is a very important event. During the election period, politicians are developing all sort of political party strategies to get the electorate accept their political agenda as outlined by Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph during a working session at the National Assemble³⁶. It should be noted that a number of political parties' strategies have come and gone or abandoned. It is our wish to collect and conceive all these political parties' strategies for the memories of the society. It's on this basis that we will analyse the history of ideas developed by various politicians with the objective of winning. After, presenting the reason of the choice of this thesis, we focus now on the conceptual framework.

4- Scope and Delimitation of Study

The spatial scope of this study is the Republic of Cameroon. This country is situated in the heart of the African continent, between equatorial Africa and the Guinea lands of West African Plateau and the Atlantic coast. It shares borders with Nigeria on the west, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in the South, Chad in the north, Central African Republic in the East³⁷. Cameroon was ruled as a mandate territory by the French and the British after the defeat of the Germans. The two parts of Cameroon gained independence in 1960 and 1961 respectively. The chronological limit of this study is 1990 and 2013. The year 1990 is chosen as the chronological beginning of the study because the year marks the restauration of multipartism in Cameroon after twenty-four years of one-party system. The restoration of pluralism began the new competitive elections between political parties with the first election being the parliamentary elections of March 1992 and second, the presidential election of October 1992.

The year 2013 being the chronological upper limit of this study is when all the elections as stipulated by the Cameroon constitution being council, parliamentary and senatorial elections were organised. It is important to acknowledge this fact, because since the adoption of the 1996 constitution wherein indirect election of senators was introduced; the first ever organised senatorial elections only took place in 2013³⁸. These amongst other reasons are why the upper limit of this

³⁶ Honorable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 year, SDF, CEMAC and African Parliamentarian, Yaoundé, 27th July 2019.

³⁷V.G. Fanso, *Cameroon History for secondary schools and colleges*, Macmillan Education ltd, Hong Kong, 1989, pp. 7-8.

³⁸ The Senate was created in 1996 after an amendment to the constitution created the upper chamber. However, power to convene the Electoral College and call elections for the Senate remained with the President. He signed decree 2013/056 on 27 February 2013, which set 14 April as the election date for Senatorial election.

research work to be 2013. The preceision of chronological boundaries gives us the opportunity to talk about the objectives of the study.

Definitions of Concepts

The main concepts that are constitute in this study are: Elections, Strategies, Election Strategies, Major Political Parties, Parliamentary Competition and Presidential Competitions.

Elections

According to the Collins English Dictionary, an election is a process in which people vote to choose a person or group of people to hold an official position³⁹. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, views elections as the formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting. It is important to distinguish between the form and the substance of elections. In some cases, electoral forms are present but the substance of an election is missing, as when voters do not have a free and genuine choice between two alternatives. Most countries hold elections in at least the formal sense, but in many of them the elections are not competitive⁴⁰. Therefore, it is important to note that there are many types of elections which could be defined differently including; presidential, parliamentary, senatorial and municipal elections. This work is going to concentrate on the parliamentary and presidential elections in Cameroon.

Strategies

The word strategy is a military term. The term is derived from the Greek word for "generalship" or "leading an army". It can be explained as a method or plan chosen to bring about a desired future, such as achievement of a goal or solution to a problem. It has also been defined as the art or science of planning, and marshalling resources for their most efficient and effective use. According to Mariam Webster, strategy is either the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions or the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of

³⁹Collins Cobuild, "Definition of 'election". Found: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/election. Consulted on 20th June 2018.

⁴⁰Paul David Webb, "Election Political Science". Found: https://www.britannica.com/topic/election-political-science. Consulted on 20th June 2018.

nations to afford the maximum support to adopt policies in peace or war⁴¹. In this work, strategy refers to the various means employed by a political party for the winning of an election. It could be an open strategy or a closed strategy known only by the hierarchy of the party. Such a strategy can change, depending on the type of election, electorate and the people involved.⁴²

Election strategies

The basis of a good campaign strategy is, firstly, to recognize the realities of the campaign or a broader context in which the campaign is being run. Secondly, to set an appropriate goal which if achieved, will win the election. The basis for the campaign helps dictate what the campaign will look like, how it is organized, the role of political consultants in each campaign and the increase in popularity of which gives a rise in more professionalized and strategic campaigns. A campaign strategy is a proposed pathway to victory, driven by the understanding of who will vote for the candidate and why they will do so. Joel Bradshaw, a prominent political scientist, has posited four key propositions for developing a successful campaign strategy. The electorate can be divided into three groups: the candidate's base, the opponent's base, and the undecided voters. Regardless of the path taken into professional campaigns, many strategists have attained greater visibility to the point of celebrity in the recent years though it is hard to determine how much they actually impact contemporary elections⁴³. It's also important to define the concept political parties.

Political Parties

A political party is an alliance of like-minded people who work together to win elections and control the government. Political parties compete against one another for political power and for the ability to put their philosophies and policies into effect.⁴⁴ Robert M. Enema, defines a

⁴¹Merriam Webster, Definition of strategy, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy. Consulted 28th July 2017.

⁴²A summarised definition of strategy by the researcher in a contextual view of this study.

⁴³"A summarised definition of strategy by the researcher in a contextual view of this study.

Sides, Shaw, Grossman, and Lipsitz, Campaigns and elections". Found:

http://www.wwnorton.com/college/polisci/campaignsandelections/ch/05/outline.aspx. Consulted on the 21st June 2018.

⁴⁴ Sparknotes, how political parties work, http://www.sparknotes.com/us-government-and-politics/american-government/political-parties/section1, consulted on 20th June 2018.

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political party as a group of citizen more or less organized, who act as a political unit and who by the use of their voting power, aim to control the government and carry out their general policies⁴⁵.

Parliamentary Competition

The parliamentary competition is an election which generally is regionally or locally to elect those who are going to represent the nation. These are the various means or mediums used by the various contesting parties to win parliamentary seats for its personal gain and at large for the political party in the national territory. In this study, we consider a parliamentary competition as an election aim at choosing Senators and Parliamenterians in Cameroon since 1992. It is the challenge between political parties to have a representative in the Cameroon parliament. It's the time to appreciate the concept of presidential competition.

Presidential Competition is a challenge among candidates at the national level who are appealing to the electorate to vote for them as the leader of the nation. It is the effort put forward by the competing political parties in an election to see its party candidate will be elected. The highest office of the land being the position of the President, wherein he is the head of state, head of the nation, head of the armed forces, head of the judiciary⁴⁶. In this case, the presidential election is a competition with one round election taking place in Cameroon as since 1992 to elect the president of the republic.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to investigate into the different strategies, attitudes and ideas developed by the political parties before and during parliamentary and presidential elections. This study is going to include political parties and civil societies. The aim of this research is also to bring the different electioneering strategies developed by major political parties in Cameroon during parliamentary and presidential elections on one hand, and on the other hand to make a critical analysis of the impacts of all the electioneering strategies and election processes of different

⁴⁵ R. M. Enema, *The Political History of Africa*, Lagos, Pelican Publishers Ltd, 1997, p. 196.

⁴⁶ Attributed tittles of the head of state in Cameroon is the head of all the departments as head of state, head of the arm forces or call it commander in charge of the military, head of the judiciary who makes all the appointments, head of the executive and even the fon of fons.

political parties all over the nation. From this general objective, the following specific objectives will also guide the study:

1) To examine the historical background of the return of multipartism in Cameroon and to present the major political parties which have animated the political life of the country.

2) To discuss the different strategies developed by political parties before and during parliamentary and presidential elections.

3) To analyse the attitude and reactions of political parties from voting to declaration of definitive results.

4) To evaluate, appreciate and criticise the strategies of political parties and bring out the impact of those strategies on the life of political parties and on the state in general.

Summarily, this study is interested in carrying out analyses on the political parties' strategies and how they influence elections in Cameroon. It's also to appreciate how political parties' strategies and elections bodies conduct elections in Cameroon specifically the parliamentary and presidential elections. This is to see which of the strategies put in place by the various political parties which guarantee leads to success or failure be it a hidden or open strategy endorsed or employed by a political party. This study shall proceed to examine why there have been a few changes at the level of parliamentary candidates won by one party or another during the different parliamentary elections and there has been no change at the level of winning for the presidential candidate from the reintroduction of multiparties in Cameroon in the 1990s to the upper limit of our study being 2013. To attain these objectives, it's important to look at similar scientific works concerning the activities of political parties of elections in Cameroon since the beginning of 1990s decades.

6- Literature Review

A study of this nature requires the exploitation of works of previous researchers on the subject in and Cameroon other parts of the world so as to evaluate the level of research and to acquaint one's self with the different methodologies, approaches and conclusions arrived at on the subject. A lot has been written on political parties and elections in Cameroon. These studies have

almost exclusively focused mostly on specific issues without any comparative analysis of political parties' strategies and elections in Cameroon.

Quite some scholarly works exist on elections, party politics and elections management. Our main concern in this section is to review the general and specific works that have handled in part or in whole some of the main and subsidiary themes discussed in this study. By so doing we will be justifying and sorting out the originality of the study as well as its purpose in time and space regarding elections strategies of major political parties for parliamentary and presidential elections in Cameroon from 1990 to 2013. We shall look on the various approaches handled by the previous writers trying to group those who have similar ideas together, those who reason differently to determine our own point of orientation to this study.

Concerning, the return of multipartism in Cameroon there are a number of authors who have written on the beginning and evolution of this situation;

Maimo Anthony Mapri⁴⁷ highlights the causes of the rise of multiparty and reasons for destruction. This was either by the citizens or the government through the response of an open letter written by Father Prosper Abega in *L'effort Camerounaise* of October 1991 on the subject *La liberate et la violence*. He ascertains the fact that, President Paul Biya's refusal to dialogue with the political leaders was the reason for the call of a National Conference and the rise of vandalism in many localities in Cameroon. He proceeds to define violence as the use of strong physical force whether involving arms or not to solve political problems or iron out differences of opinion which can be solved by dialogue, reason, and the rule of law. It is worth noting, he excludes political demonstration without destruction and peaceful political demonstration aimed at pushing the government to yield to their demands cannot be considered as violence. He goes further to explain that violence can be caused by the army, police and gendarmes who are fighting to dispatch peaceful demonstrators like those who were demonstrating peacefully on the 26th of May 1990 in Bamenda for the launching of SDF leading to six deaths. This work provides us an insight on the remote causes of the request of multipartism, the different appreciation of violence either from the side of the civilians or the government during the 1990s.

⁴⁷M. A. Mapri, *Multipartism in Cameroon in the 90s and the phenomenon of destruction*, Cameroon, 2010.

In the same line like Maimo, Julius Victor Ngoh⁴⁸ equally handles the subject of multipartism in an article "Biya and the Transition to democracy". The article explains both the internal and external factors which pushed Paul Biya to finally accept some level of democracy. Internally, Cameroonians were not happy with the manner in which the entire country was managed from the economic, social and political aspects which led to abuses of human rights, unemployment and economic crises. The wind of change was blowing all over and there was the need to embrace democracy and multipartism in Cameroon as the pressure was too high from within and without the country. In spite of this fact, the barons of the CPDM staged a number of matches in almost all major cities in Cameroon, saying Cameroon was not ready for multipartism. The pressure on Paul Biya as well as on a number of African dictators obliged them to introduce some acceptable rules for democracy. This was highlighted in the French President's speech at la Baule when he addressed *La Francophonie*, he made it clear to the members that it was time for them to institute acceptable democracy in their various countries. The United State of America, The Germans, The British, The International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Commonwealth, all these western countries and international organisations told dictators in Africa, their financial assistance shall be based on the respect of Human Rights and democracy. The opposition used this pressure as a strategy to push the powers that be to institute democratic laws knowing the Western powers were behind their activities.

President Paul Biya was not an exception, so because of internal and external pressure he was forced in a CPDM Congress held in June 1990 to tell CPDM barons to be ready for competition. The relative calm that ensuedpushed the President to anticipate Parliamentary elections in March of 1992, but the main opposition parties SDF and Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) boycotted the elections because they were requesting for an independent electoral commission, while the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP) decided to participate in the parliamentary election at the last minute worked positively for its party. This work in spite of its limitation relating to our subject matter, itsshow how the external and some internal facts went a long way to push the president to accept for democratisation and competition in Cameroon.

⁴⁸ J. V, Ngoh, "Biya and the transition to democracy" J. Mukum Mbaku and J. Teikougang, *the leadership challenge in Africa Cameroon under Paul Biya*, Africa World Press, inc, pp. 434-448.

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Similarly, Julius Victor Ngoh⁴⁹ in an article tells us how on the eve of independence, several African countries were trapped for promising political, social and economic advancement to its citizens which was a prerequisite for a democratic society. These countries Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone including Congo Kinshasa, Chad, Central Africa Republic and Cameroon all entered the club of independent African countries in 1960/1. It was in the interest of some Western countries to see African leaders maintain themselves in power through a one-party system for multipartism was bringing about division in the African continent wherein, each country was made up of so many ethnic groups. He proceeds to illustrate how internal and external strategies put in place by pressure groups, International Organisation and some States contributed to the implementation of multipartism in a number of African countries. Ngoh indicated that, the year 1990 in Cameroon is when the wind of change was blowing but it should be noted, the big wing of the CPDM organised a number of matches in almost all the major towns and cities saying "No to multiparty politics" in the month of March and April of 1990. These demonstrations were headed by top government officials. According to them, the civil society was a major force to reckon with in the advancement and re-introduction of multipartism in Cameroon. As corroborated by the chairman of the SDF, they disrespected all the legal administrative procedures and launched the party on the 26th of May 1990 without authorisation from the government⁵⁰. That was against the launching, leading to six deaths in Bamenda. This article treats issues in a global perspective from 1960-2000 and has greatly helped us in the understanding of democratisation in Africa general and Cameroon in particular.

In the same light, to the two first authors, Herman Touo⁵¹ linked the restoration of multipartism in Cameroon to the development and various events of world history that have shaped economic, social, and political relations in many nations such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the fall of communism in 1989. He talks of the importance of democracy which he says is the only system that confers legitimacy upon a government and a widespread agreement that multiparty democracy and promotes human rights, good governance, development and peace. He proceeds to explain, democracy is characterised by the participation and competition, majority rule

⁴⁹ V. J. Ngoh, "Democracy and democratization in Sub-Sahara Africa: The case study of Cameroon 1960-2000" Epasa *Moto*, Volume I, No.5, September 2001, pp. 6-17.

⁵⁰ Ni John Fru Ndi, 76 years, Chairman of the SDF, Bamenda, 10th January 2018.

⁵¹ Herman Touo, Political parties and democracy volume IV Africa and Oceania in his article, multiparty politics and democratic construction in Cameroon, pp. 3-34.

and protection of individual and minority rights. We do enjoy his definition of political party as an association that may take part in elections and present candidates under their own label for political trophies.

The author portrays how Cameroon before independence was already practising multipartism as it was seen from 1945-1966 when East Cameroon experienced the first democratic competitions with 63 political parties but we saw the banning of the UPC on 13 July 1955. We saw the rise of Ahmadou Ahidjo as Prime Minister of East Cameroon in 1958. A similar situation was manifested in West Cameroon with 27 political parties created between 1940-1965. Cameroon returned to a one-party system in 1966 which witnessed a monolithic logic, the absence of competing political parties, absence of multiple candidates, restriction of fundamental rights, civil liberties, the concentration and centralisation of political power and the omnipresence of the ruling party over state organs. This was a situation of autocratic form of government, corruption and accumulation of wealth by an oligarchy. In this article, we got to know how the opposition parties used the strategy of ghost towns, refusal of citizens to pay water bills, electricity bills, social insurance, television contributions, suspension of classes, blockage of the nation capital, closure of banks, Douala port, to force the government to convene a national conference. There was also a call by the opposition for foreign governments to put an end to their financial and diplomatic support for the regime. The article is very important because it gives us the strategies used by the political parties of the opposition to force the Biya regime to accept multipartism.

These three authors focused their analysis on the general internal and external factors that contributed to the restoration of multipartism in Cameroon. They did not talk on the specific issues of this thesis being political parties' strategies for parliamentary and presidential elections but they have given us various elements the restoration of multipartism in Cameroon. In addition, they only appreciate factors of pressure generally. They do not present the rule of single and individual during the restoration of multipartism. If at times they talked about the rule of President Paul Biya, they maginalise the rule of many great figures and civil society during the process of democratization in Cameroon. The second set of literature reviewed concerns, works written on political life in Cameroon before, during and after the restoration of multipartism. This is to appreciate what has been done concerning activities of political parties before during and after the election.

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In this group we have the book published by SDF⁵² which explains in details how the SDF was launched in the 1990s. It proceeds to explain how the party extended its activities to other provinces of Cameroon in spite of the threats from the ruling party. After putting in place a number of strategies like boycotting the parliamentary elections of 1992, the party put on a unifying force for the presidential elections which they claimed the CPDM rigged to their favour. The SDF engaged in the principle of civil disobedience, intimidating the ruling party and as a response to it declaration of the state of emergency in Bamenda and putting its leader Ni John Fru Ndi under house arrest. This book explicitly talks of the activities of SDF and CPDM while they are losing or winning in both parliamentary and presidential elections. This nice piece of work has given us some of the basic strategies of the ruling party and the main opposition party.

Again, the SDF work, EdumVitalis Njoh⁵³, explains in the details, how Cameroon was managed before 1990 which was based on nepotism, tribalism and corruption at all levels. This led to the demand for multipartism as a solution led by Yondo Black in February 1990 that led to national riots. The call for multiparty politics was effectively put in place when Ni John FruNdi braved the odds with the launching of the SDF. This was against all threats from the Governor of the then North West Province, the Senior Divisional officer for Mezam, Sub Divisional Officer, the Commissioner of Public Security, the Legion Commander and the Minister of Territorial Administration who all wrote against the launching of a political party in Bamenda. The author continued to elaborate on how the political life in Cameroon was presented since 1990. He shows all the efforts put in place to have a unique candidate to fight CPDM for 1992, 2004 and presidential elections which was not successful⁵⁴. It is acknowledged that the number of seats or percentage gained by the SDF during the presidential and parliamentary elections from 1992 to 2007 dropped considerably. The SDF and the other opposition parties have made enormous efforts to come out with a unique candidate but because of greedof the opposition parties it has not been possible. In fact, the partial alliances between certain political parties or individual parties beside fraud have made the ruling party more successful in the various elections. Besides the additional advantage, the law remains at the ruling party's disposal for any changes necessary in favour of

 ⁵²SDF, *The SDF @ 25 1990-2015, the struggle for democracy*... Presbyterian Printing Press, Limbe-Cameroon, 2015.
 ⁵³E.V. Njoh., "The social Democratic Front (SDF) in Multi-Party Politics in Cameroon 1990-2010", A Desertation for the Postgraduate tearching diploma (DIPES II) in History, University of Bamenda, 2014.
 ⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 92-95.

their candidate especially at the presidential elections. The Dissertation of EdumVitalisNjoh has given pertinent information on how Cameroon was governed in the one-party system; how multipartism was brought to Cameroon, the structure of the SDF which is his main concentration and the various strategies to come out with a unique candidate to fight the CPDM candidate especially at the presidential elections, which were not very successful. This information has been very instrumental in the understanding of the subject matter which is political parties' strategies for Parliamentary and Presidential elections.

In the same light of understanding of the SDF book and Vitalis Njoh, Diko Delancy et al.⁵⁵ have laid out the history of Cameroon from the colonial period when Cameroon was under the German administration. From 1884, Cameroon divided between the French and the British as a Mandated Territory as the Germans were defeated after the First World War in 1916. They have explained vividly the results of the Presidential elections of 1992 which Biya won by a slim majority over John Fru Ndi. It should be noted; the results were declared so many days after the previewed date which makes the public and international community to think the results have been tampered with by the government. In the 1997 Biya won with a 92.51 % which was boycotted by the main opposition parties while in the election of 2004 incumbent Paul Biya still won with a 72.92% which was criticized by international observers⁵⁶. They explained how instead of the government accepting a Sovereign National Conference to bring a lasting solution to the political situation in Cameroon, the government came out with the 1996 constitutional amendments which were to get administration centralised in Yaoundé and a lot of powers given to President Paul Biya. The proposals of the 1996 constitution were not immediately implemented like the Senate, Constitutional council and decentralisation which the government is still in the process of doing. These authors explained how the first multiparty parliamentary elections were organised in Cameroon since the formation of the CNU in 1966. They say, the opposition parties agreed not to participate as they requested for an independent electoral commission and enough time to prepare for the elections. It concentrated on the presentation of results as well as portraying some strategies of some of the political parties. They equally presented some great figures in the history of Cameroon and the presentation of The Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT-D),

⁵⁵M. Diko Delancey, Rebecca Neh Mbuh, Mark W. Delancey, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon*, The Scarecrow Press. Inc. Lanham Maryland Toronto Plymouth, UK, 2010. ⁵⁶Ibid., p.10.

National Election Observatory (NEO) and Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) which have been the organs responsible for the organisation and supervision of elections in Cameroon.

Nelson Mbile⁵⁷ with the same view of the preceeding author, globally gives an over view of the Cameroon political situation from pre-colonial period through colonisation to independence. He proceeded to explain the movement of Cameroon from multipartism to a single party system and back to pluralism in the 1990s. In fact, this eminent writer handles at the surface level the open and basic political strategies of three major political parties for the parliamentary and presidential elections in Cameroon where he examines parliamentary elections of March 1992, Presidential elections of 11th October 1992, second parliamentary elections of 17th May 1997 and the presidential elections of October 1997. Mbile, made clear some of the natural strategies put in place for the winning of both Parliamentary and Presidential elections of 1992 and 1997 by the CPDM. In 1992 besides the CPDM party's strategies in other provinces, the SDF being the major opposition party did not participate at the parliamentary elections. This gave the CPDM opportunity to win all the 20 seats of the North West Region which gave her a majority of seats in parliament. The SDF, capitalising on the fact, that the rules of the game are not clear, decided to abstain and campaigned for national boycott of the 1992 parliamentary elections. However, the SDF decided to participate in the 1992 parliamentary election and 1997 presidential elections⁵⁸. This book is important because, it gives information concerning how the election have been organised and the attitudes of various political parties during elections since 1992.

Tazoacha Asonganyi⁵⁹ like the other authors treats democracy and politics in Cameroon. This eminent personality puts his personal evaluation and those of other actors in trying to bring democracy to Cameroon which ended up as a failure. He started by presenting his personal life from childhood to a grown-up person and his joining in the struggle for democracy. He portrayed how internal conflicts were managed. Moving to the second part of his book talks on his active participation into the political life of the SDF where he rose to the interim Secretary General and later on to the Secretary General of the SDF, the major opposition party in Cameroon. He was at

⁵⁷ N.N. Mbile, *Cameroon political story, memories of an authentic eye witness*, Langaa RPCIG, Cameroon, 26th July 2011.

⁵⁸Ibid., p.341.

⁵⁹T. Asonganyi, *Cameroon; Difficult choices in a failed democracy,* Published in the United State of America, June 2013.

the fore front of the party in developing strategies and resolving difficulties which at times put his personality in difficulties with the hierarchy of the party. He portrays and explains the strategy of boycott by the SDF and other major parties as he explains:

In spite of their having participated in the parliamentary elections of May 1997, the SDF, NUDP and CDU, the leading opposition parties in Cameroon led a boycott of the presidential election that held in Cameroon on 12 October, 1997. This was because the regime refused to create "a level-playing field." Indeed, by 1997, several elections had been organized in Cameroon (since the advent of multi-party politics in1991) by an election management system that was dominated by the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT). During each of the election, MINAT and its agents in the field ensured victory for CPDM candidates by using administrative power and state authority to manipulate the electoral process and the result of the vote. Such manipulation was made easy by the vagueness of the electoral law, and the so-called "liberty laws" that remained in force during elections and gave administrative authorities the pretext and the boldness to manipulate the electoral process with impunity⁶⁰.

He and other SDF members participated in the CPDM and SDF 1997 and 1998 dialogue which ended as a fiasco for no concrete results came out as the SDF did not succumb to the dictates of the CPDM. Indeed, we got to know of the personal experience put in place to see the party succeed in its objective. It is equally through this eminent personality that we got to know most of the internal quarrels in the SDF party. From his book we are made to know of some hypocrisies of the leader of the SDF, Ni John FruNdi to get himself maintained at the helm of the party at the cost of anything or anybody disturbing him to remain as head of the party. We have gathered vital information from this book which is going to give us the possibilities to treat our subject matter in a more detailed and explicit manner.

The last authors of this part, are Victor Bong Amaazee⁶¹ and Nchia Fung Christopher⁶². The first author gives the important role played by the chief from colonial era to the period of multipartism. He preceise that, the chief of Buea, Manga William who held a number of positions and Fon Agwafor of Mankon who was member of the West Cameroon Assembly played significant roles in politics during the first experience of multipartism and before unification. He affirms that the chief was given less political importance till the eve of multipartism in the 1990s where most of them joined the SDF.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 92.

⁶¹V. B. Amaazee, *Traditional rulers (chiefs) and politics in Cameroon History*, Published by Presses Universitaires de Yaoundé,2002.

⁶² C.Nchia Fung, Party politics in Bamenda Grassfields 1955-2004: Transmutations and Implications, a thesis for the award of Ph. D Degree in History, The University of Yaoundé I, 2013.

The second athor, Christopher Fung Nchia focuses on the the SDF and the CPDM which has given us more details on the movement of politicians from one party to another in the North West. These two last authors and the others treating political life in Cameroon give us some detailed information on the political parties' strategies but are limited in some areas and some political parties, whereas our goal is the entire country and talking of major political parties' strategies and elections competition in Cameroon.

In addition, all the works presented previously in this part, have not been able to specifically handle the subject matter which is election strategies of the main political parties for parliamentary and presidential elections which are the core areas of this study. Majority of these authors said very little about the other political parties engaged in different elections be it parliamentary or presidential. They mainly talk of SDF and CPDM and neglect the activities of other major political parties in Cameroon. If they are talking of electioneering strategies, the only present the general strategies of political parties in the world. They do not look at how locally and in function of the type of election, political parties developed specific strategies. Lastly, the preceeding researches are not interested in the attitude of political parties after the proclamation of the results of election.

It is important to note also that, the precceeding works, have talked the role played by the different argans responsible for the organisation of elections. They did not treat sequarely our subject matter, do the importance of the problematic of this thesis which will present and explan how in Cameroon from the North to the South and from the East to the West, political parties challenges during election are original, specific and dynamic. The last sequency but not the least of this literature review is focus on works concerning electioneering and attitude of political parties after the election.

In his thesis, Zambo Belinga Joseph-Marie⁶³ gives information on elections in Cameroon between the CPDM and SDF the ruling party and main opposition party respectively. He elaborates the various factors enabling the events of multipartism in the 90s, how the two main parties lobbied

⁶³J.M. Zambo Belinga, "Les elections au Cameroun contribution a l'explication du vote dans les localites dites acquises au Rassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais et au Social Democratic Front" Ph.D Thesis, Universite de Yaoundé 1, 2004. It could be worth mentioning that the sociologist zambo belinga is one of the Cameroonian specialists concerning electioneering strategies.

for support which saw the change of politicians from the one party to another and how the various parties tried to maintain the control over their strong holds. Both parties appreciate voting, campaigns using different strategies and at times similar strategies to acceptance of voting results. He proceeded to explain the violence that took place after the proclamation of the results in 1992 which led to the declaration of Ghost Town, blockage of public roads and destruction of public utilities making administration very difficult for the party in power. He proceeded to compare the 1992 to the 2002 elections which were almost similar as it brought a lot of tension in the entire country which equally marked a significant movement of people from one party to multipartism. An important element the author is the strategy of fraud by both the CPDM and SDF in their areas of domination in order to remain as the leading party. He proceeded to treat the issue of electoral fraud during elections especially in the situation of reduction or increasing the number of votes to favour one of the parties by those responsible with the organisation of election which is always with the complexity of one of the parties⁶⁴. He goes further to handle the issue of pressure which the government and the administrative authorities are putting in favour of the government in power and the candidates of the CPDM to make sure they are victorious in the election. We therefore conclude to see how he handle the aftermath of election results which ends up usually with physical violence and destruction of both public and private properties as seen after the declaration of Paul Biya as the winner of the 1992 presidential election. This work has given us a good insight into the two main political parties in Cameroon and some of their strategies. However, the objective of this study is to evaluate how the ten main political parties in Cameroon participated or contributed to the development of political advancement of Cameroon from the reintroduction of multipartism from 1990 to 2013 which was when for the first time the Senatorial elections were organised in Cameroon as indicated in 1996 constitution.

Talking also about electioneering strategies and the aftermath of elections, Julius Ngoh⁶⁵explicitly has written Cameroon History from a global perspective starting from colonial period of German colonization of Cameroon in 1884. The author moves ahead to explain how these two Cameroons had enjoyed multipartism before and after independence which ended in 1966 with a one-party system. He proceeds to explain that, it was because of the weaknesses of a

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 274.

⁶⁵ V. J. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-Present (2018), The History of a People ..., 2019.

one-party system which brought about tribalism, corruption, capital flight, economic crisis, Anglophone marginalisation, high level of unemployment and many abuses of human rights besides external factors that pushed Cameroonians to demand for multipartism when the moment came in 1990. Indeed, the author vividly explained the processes to multipartism in Cameroon, how political activist like lawyer Yondo Black and nine others in the process of forming a political party were jailed by the Cameroon government. He further explains the various strategies put in place by the various political parties for the first multiparty parliamentary elections in 1992 whereby the main opposition parties decided not to participate. They were requesting the government to put in place an independent electoral code which the government refused but at the last moment the NUDP of Bouba Bello Maigari decided to participatein the elections. The opposition strategy of getting a unique candidate to fight the incumbent has never worked because of selfish interests from the different leaders of political parties. The government took this opportunity to divide the opposition parties more either by integrating some of them into government, thereby leading to a split of some of the parties as can be seen in the NUDP, SDF and UPC. The author proceeds to explain how all the other parliamentary and presidential elections were organised with the main opposition party SDF, CDU boycottingin the same number of elections requesting for better electoral conditions. He further explains the efforts of the government moving from one election organising body to another starting from the Ministry of Territorial Administration in 1992, Cameroon Observatory ONEL in 2002 and ELECAM in 2013. Till then all of the election organising bodies have only the duty to register candidates, validation of candidates, conduct and supervise the elections while handing the powers of reading elections results to Supreme court and as of 2018 the constitutional council. We have got vital information from this author regarding the evolution of Cameroon from multipartism to one party system and back to multipartism from a global point of view, same as he has handled some of the strategies of major political parties for parliamentary and presidential elections; which was handled mostly at the level of the government and the opposition party whereas our intention is to come out with individual political parties strategies for the parliamentary and presidential elections.

The book entitled *the Citizen Manual for Participatory Governance* produced by the Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy talks explicitly on the electoral process of the

Presidential Election in Cameroon⁶⁶. It starts by outlining the registration of the electorate, the selection of candidates, depositing of Presidential candidates, voting procedures that is the counting and declaration of results including the deliberation on litigations for election difficulties. This work handles uniquely the period of ELECAM management of election in Cameroon precisely during the presidential election of 2011. The document exploited how the media and the civil society participated in election along encouraging gender participation in the elections and governance. Indeed, it proceeded to talk of the legal frame work of election in Cameroon, the political participation in elections which got extended to the civil society as it absolutely assisted in encouraging gender participation in elections in Cameroon. This work is important for this research as it handles part of the research topic being the Presidential election in details, which has given some important information regarding presidential election processes for 2011 during the era of ELECAM but falls short on evaluating this question from 1990 to 2013. It does not talk of parliamentary elections or strategies within the period of research which pushes us to carry this research work on major political parties' strategies for Parliamentary and Presidential competitions in Cameroon.

After a round off of all these scientific researches done on political life of Cameroon, the elections in Cameroon since the return of multipartism and the situation in the country after the publication of all the parliamentary and presidential elections, it should be noted that, the question of electioneering and election strategies in particular are not welled studied in History. Further more, the authors who study the political and election History of Cameroon are not really interested precisely in the role of the strategies developed to win or lose an election. It is because of this lack and others, that the issue of this research is to complete this lack and bring out with Historical facts, the relationship between types of strategies during an election and the result of election. The problematic presented will clearly explain what is the heart of the study.

⁶⁶The Citizen Manual for Participatory Governance produced by the Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy talks explicitly on the electoral process of the Presidential election in Cameroon.

7) Statement of the Problem

Concerning the wind of change that swept through Africa and other parts of the world, multiparty system of governance became a norm, the road to the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Cameroon was paved by blood shed. Intransigence and justaposition on the part of the governing authorities led to protest and uprising. Inspite of all, the Degree of 12 December 1990 that liberated the public landscape created the space for so many political parties to emerge. Beginning with the authorisation of the UFDC of Victorin Hameni Bieleu, political parties sprouted like mushroom with some barely containing the names of their founders and family members⁶⁷. The second problem was that most of these parties anchored ideologies that hinged on the national character but failed in most parts to spreach tentacres beyond their founding bases. The new parties formed agreed in details to the ideologies of ethno regional formation. This confusing / complicated political environment emerged mostly from a scheme developed by the ruling party to suffocate party growth⁶⁸. Parties therefore responded by deploying systematic and evolving strategies to select candidates, campaign and vote during most elections. This study concentrates on the various strategies used by main political parties both to gain space and seize power in Cameroon from 1990-2013. It therefore holds that, this work affirms that, irrespective of the strategies used be it conventional or unconventional, there are necessary for the wining or losing of an election. Its locates these strategies through elections like Parliamentary and Presidential elections. This affirmation suggests the following research questions:

1) Under what context did major political parties in the Cameroon political landscape emerged?

2) Do different strategies developed by major political parties in Cameroon have an impact on their results?

⁶⁷ Cameroon: The Union of Cameroon Democratic Forces (UFDC), including its leader, its activities, its objectives and the government's attitude toward its members. Found: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4d712d.html. Consulted on 21st June 2020.

⁶⁸ The ruling party developed a strategy to make sure the opposition parties ended their influence felt only at certain regions. This was to ensure that, its only the CPDM that is seen all over the National Territory. A number of politicians affirmed; the ruling party even created some minor parties in some areas as a means to penetrate the major political parties once opposition meetings are organized.

3) Does the attitude and reactions of political parties after elections influence the position of electorate, the international communities and different organs in charge of elections during our period of study?

4) Does elections strategies be it conventional or unconventional the main factors influencing elections in Cameroon?

5) How do the different political parties and individuals come out with various strategies aimed at winning parliamentary election?

6) Are election strategies of any high impact of the results obtained after elections?

Theoretical Framework

A theory is an affirmative construction of ideas and concepts whose ambition is to present the reality in a coherent manner. A theory is the general view of law wherein a phenomenon is concerned and the aim or objective is given a global explanation of a system and establish the relationship concerning the facts observed. In the case of this study, four theories are going to be employed. These include; the theory of collective action, the theory of electoral sociology, the theory of public choice andthe theory of rational elector. All these theories are used interchangeably to analyse facts concerning elections in Cameroon.

The Theory of Collective Action

Developed by Daniel Cefic in the book entitled; *pour quoi se mobilisent on*?⁶⁹, this theory highlights the fact citizens have the right to be regarded in public affairs. They constitute the collective right whose role is criticised in the public space. The theory further explains why people are mobilised or not grouped together for an election. This presents energetic costs and financial risks and goes ahead to explain why the population does not want others to mobilise at their premises during elections. The theory further argues that any group of individuals attempting to provide a public good has trouble to do so efficiently. On the one hand, individuals have the incentives to a free ride on the efforts of others in certain groups and on the other hand the size of the group is of high importance and difficult to optimally determine. This theory helps us to

⁶⁹Mancur Olson, The Theory of collective action, 1965.

understand why people go in to vote and why they engage themselves in an election. It will be used to present an understanding and appreciate the general view concerning the perception of elections and the knowledge of the people in the collective action.

The Theory of Electoral Sociology

Electoral sociology theory developed by a French and American, Andrien Siefried and Parl Lazardsfeld evaluate the part of social existence by citizens who invest in their engagement with their vote or with the refusal to vote.⁷⁰ This is the part of his or her power given or refused to hand to the elected on his or her behalf. This theory helps us to measure the degree of the position theelectorate can have in one election. It helps us to understand the position of electors during electioneering and elections. Electoral Sociology is a theory which tries to explain, who votes for one side or another and why and when he chooses to vote for a candidate or a party⁷¹.

The Public Choice Theory

Tullock Gordon and James Buchanan try to explain how public decisions are made.⁷² It involves the interactions of public voting, the politicians, the bureaucracy and political action committees⁷³. Public choice theory is a branch of economics that developed from the study of taxation and public spending. It emerged in the 1950s and received widespread public attention in 1986, when James Buchanan, one of its two leading architects (the other being his colleague Gordon Tullock), was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics. Buchanan started the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, and it remains the best-known locus of public choice research. Others include Florida State University, Washington University (St. Louis), Montana State University, the California Institute of Technology, and the University of Rochester. Public choice takes the same principles that economists use to analyze people's actions in the

⁷⁰ A. Siegfried and P. Lazardsfeld, *l'information géographique, colloque de sociologie électorale*, Paris 1979, pp. 40-61.

⁷¹Kai Arzheimer, "Electoral Sociology – Who Votes for the Extreme Right and Why – and When?". Found: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267709004_Electoral_Sociology_Who_Votes_for_the_Extreme_Right_an d_Why_-and_When. Consulted on 19th September 2018.

⁷² A. Siegfried and P. Lazardsfeld, *l'information géographique, colloque de sociologie électorale*, Paris 1979, pp. 40-61.

⁷³Thayer Watkins, "Public Choice Theory". Found: http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/publicchoice.htm. Consulted 19th September 2018.

marketplace and applies them to people's actions in collective decision making. Economists who study behavior in the private marketplace assume that people are motivated mainly by self-interest. Although most people base some of their actions on their concern for others, the dominant motive in people's actions in the marketplace, whether they are employers, employees, or consumers is a concern for them. Public choice economists make the same assumption, that although people acting in the political marketplace have some concern for others, their main motive, whether they are voters, politicians, lobbyists, or bureaucrats, is self-interest.

One of the chief underpinnings of public choice theory is the lack of incentives for voters to monitor government effectively. Anthony Downs, in one of the earliest public choice books, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, pointed out that the voter is largely ignorant of political issues and that this ignorance is rational. Even though the result of an election may be very important, an individual's vote rarely decides an election. Thus, the direct impact of casting a well-informed vote is almost nil; the voter has virtually no chance to determine the outcome of the election. So spending time following the issues is not personally worthwhile for the voter. Evidence for this claim is found in the fact that public opinion polls consistently find that less than half of all voting-age Americans can name their own congressional representative.

In other words, because legislators have the power to tax and to extract resources in other coercive ways, as voters monitor their behavior poorly, legislators behave in ways that are costly to citizens. One technique analyzed by public choice is log rolling, or vote trading. An urban legislator votes to subsidize a rural water project in order to win another legislator's vote for a city housing subsidy. The two projects may be part of a single spending bill. Through such log rolling both legislators get what they want. And even though neither project uses resources efficiently, local voters know that their representative got something for them. They may not know that they are paying a pro-rata share of a bundle of inefficient projects! And the total expenditures may well be more than individual taxpayers would be willing to authorize if they were fully aware of what is going on.

In a general election, there is no collective interest but there exist individual interests. This theory will be important for this study because it helps us to appreciate the different factors determining a vote. It shows that, it's not electoral campaigns determining the issue of election or the vote. The issue of the vote depends on the function of different systems in which the elections

take place. This is particularly to demonstrate that, the results of the vote in favour of one party or another depends on the period before and after the Election Day.

The theory of Rational Electors (La theories d'electeur rational)

The theory says the electors have to be considered as a strategy with a rational behaviour when he or she is voting.⁷⁴ The vote is considered as transaction on the market and the candidates are considered in a challenge situation. The electors have to decide on their choice, the function or advantage of economic benefit that they can gain from the election. This theory presents the elector like a consumer on the day of the vote that performs his or her political market. This theory will help us to justify in our society or in Cameroon that the economy is considered as the sovereign form of nationality, this is to say, every elector is searching for his or her economic interest or advantage. In addition, the theory of rational elector is important for new electoral behaviour, this will show us how electors behave in voting.

Research Methodology

For this study to be accomplished, we relied on both primary and secondary sources. As concerns primary sources we have archival, oral and iconographical documents. The archival materials is constituted of documents collected from the *Archives Nationale de Yaoundé* (ANY), National Archives of Buea (NAB), Regionals Archives of Bafoussam, Bamenda, Douala, Maroua and Ngaoundere. Some documents have been collected in Divisional and Sub Divisional offices of more than seven regions of Cameroon. A large part of documents used to write this thesis is collected from the ELECAM, MINATD and many of the political parties. The results of the various parliamentary and presidential elections organised in Cameroon from 1992 to 2013, Reports on elections from the Sub Divisional to National level. These documents are mainly constituted by the reports, campaign documents, process verbal and results different elections which are: CPDM, SDF, CDU, NUDP, UPC, MDR, MRC and MP to know the choice of their candidates, the reason of the choices, their strategies during the elections and their campaigns.

⁷⁴ "L'analyse economique du vote; theorie de l'electeur rationnel". Found: http://cours-de-droit.net/l-ananalyse-economique-du-vote-theorie-de-l-electeur-rationnel. Consulted 20th September 2018

The second set of primary sources used is oral sources. This source is constituted by information collected from five categories of informants. We are beginning the interview with civil servants, Divisional Officer (Dos), Senior Divisional Officer (SDOs) and Governors. We kindly appreciate the interview with the governor of the Western Region, Awah Fonka Augustine which explains the role of administration during an election in Cameroon. The second group of informants is constituted by the people incharge of organising election like ONEL and ELECAM. The interview with them was focussed the role of the different organs during election process. In the same group, we try to have the opinion of the magistrate whose role is to publish the results and to make sure all is done in respected of the law.

The third category of our informants' constututes the leaders of political parties for the opposition and the ruling party. The interviews with them are aimed to bring out the motivation of their strategies and the decision taken by the party during the various elections they are participating in. The fourth categories of informants are the mass of militancy of different political parties who contribute to the campaign in convincing other electorate to vote for their party. There are also, the first victims of the results of an election. The last category of oral sources but not the least is constituted by the civil society members and the general population who are not a member of any of the political party. During our interview with these categories of informant, the objective is to know firstly, how they appreciate election in Cameroon since 1992 and secondly, what motivated them to vote for one political party or another during an election.

Oral sources came to compliment some of the information we got from the written sources. With a methodical selection of informants as presented previously, we can be certain that, after the treatment of the information, the data collected are surely scientific and can contribute to appreciate the issues under study.

The third categories of primary sources are Iconography Sources. A number of images especially population turnout for political rallies at times speak for themselves. We have also the ballot of candidate, posters, membership cards and gadgets used during campaigns by the different political parties. We have also pictured of population and candidate contesting elections on the street and at the Supreme Court. These images come and precise information that we could get from the written and oral sources. It's known that one image is better than one thousand (1.000)

words. As concerns secondary sources, it mainly constituted of documentation like books, thesises, articles and dissertations.

To have the necessary documentation in the completion of this study, we read published and unpublished books, dissertations and articles written in relation to our topic and area of study. Most of these written works were obtained from libraries like the Library of the Faculty of Art, Letters and Social Sciences (FALSH), the Library of the Department of History, the library of History-Geography and Archaeology Club (CHGA), and the library of Philo, Psycho, Socio and Anthropo clubs; all lodged at the University of Yaounde 1.

We also got information on documents taken from the University of Yaounde. The library of MINRESI, some private libraries such as Paul Ango Ella in Yaoundé, my supervisors' libraries Pr. Koufan Markenene, Pr. Ngam Confident, was very important to realise our objectives. The documents provided by our friends, classmates' libraries and other research collaborators played an important role in the success of the study. The Libraries of The University of Bamenda, the University of Buea, the University of Ngaoundere and the University of Yaounde II, helped us to complete information and have a general view of the question of electioneering all over the country.

As a technique of writing, we adopted descriptive, comparative, analytic and chronological approaches. In the descriptive approach we have described and explained the facts observed in the context of election. In the descriptive approach have described and explained the facts observed in relationship with the context of their production. In the analytical approach we have analysed the facts collected, questioned the facts and brought out the conclusion, establishing a relationship and taken a position if deemed necessary. We have made an attempt to ensure that each of these approaches employed, ties with the theme or themes developed. In certain sections, the approaches are used interchangeably with the overall aim of assuring clarity in our expressions in the interpretation of thefacts. In this study we used the methodology of inter-plural discipline such as documents and methodology of political sciences, sociology, anthropology, law to present and analyse the different facts for appreciation. We have as well used the constructivism approach to analyse the materials we have gathered in order to analyse our findings. The chronological method

helps us to study facts in evolution from the return of multipartism to proclamation of the results of parliamentary elections of 2013.

11- Significance of the Study

This study is realised on a period of twenty-three years of political life of Cameroon in general with fifteen elections ranging from council, parliamentary, senatorial to presidential elections organised in Cameroon with all having diverse interests. These interests are personal, social, political or scientific. This study gives us a general view concerning elections, political parties, political life of Cameroon, strategies of electioneering and objectives of political parties during each type of election. This study is going to enable us have a general view of the political life of Cameroon and will give us ideas concerning elections in Cameroon. In addition, it going to inspire us as political activists and could work as a wind vain or cardinal point for our orientation in politics. It is basically important because with observation or findings, they will help as a guide to the future.

This study carries general and society interest. Concerning these interests, this study work will be important, for it's going to help people know vividly that, political parties or leaders are not coming for the electorate interest but for the interest of the political party in general and the politician in particular. Even though, this is an occasion for the electorate to impose their views and their needs to the politicians, most often than not after elections, the politicians often will forget of the electorate or even abandon them looking for issues that will maintain them in power as revealed by Mr. Ade Joseph Awah⁷⁵ a very committed member of the SDF and personal aid of Chairman Ni John Fru Ndi. The government especially the ruling party can benefit from this work in knowing that, even though they were victorious and are in power, there are some electorate who voted for the opposition. In spite of their ambitions, they have to take into consideration the views and interests of the minority. This is because the opposition who failed in elections, though in the minority, they have interests which have to be looked into whether they belong to the ruling party or not.

⁷⁵ Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF militant from 1990-date, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

Scientifically, a subject as this is an innovation in historical research. Since the return of multipartism in Cameroon in the 1990s, there has been a number of research work written concerning political parties, political leaders, return to multipartism, election problems, elections organs and the role of the authorities in elections, crises after elections but none of these works have been done squarely concerning political parties' strategies for parliamentary and presidential elections within this time which is the interest of this work. This work is important because any research concerning elections in Cameroon can have some basic information concerning elections.

12- Problems Encountered

The major problems we faced during this study and construction was the paucity of documents concerning election strategies even in the archives of political parties. The sensitivity of our topic influenced the decision by some informants to deliver the information sought. It was also difficult to have access to the archives of some political parties, administration and ELECAM because the context under which the study was carried out was not in our favour due to the activities of MRC after the 2018 elections. In fact, it required patience to meet some of the informants and even when it was possible, we suffered immensely in trying to introduce political parties' strategies which some of the informants were not willing to release the internal views of the party, probing let alone trying to manage to redirect them to specific issues. This made our indepth interviews to be sometimes very long. Again, some of the informants we identified, either proved too busy or unwilling to answer some questions coupled with the bad roads to travel into the hinterlands.

The fact that most of them gave appointments and never respected the time, contributed in retarding the progress of our study on the field. This made our research somewhat cumbersome. The fact that our study subject area covered the major political parties which are found in the national territory was quite expensive interms of movement and logistics. Some of us not having a perfect understanding of the French language as compared to the English language was a bit of hindrance in working with some of the informants. Finally, terrorism in the Northern part of Cameroon and the impact of the Anglophone crises made it difficult to access some of the areas and some of the informants found in very risky zones. In spite of these problems, we

employed tact and patience to sort out required documents and got the most essential ones. Though some informants proved busy and unable to conform to some of the questions in our questionnaire, our mastery of the English language and a good understanding of French gave us a wider access to our key informants. The assistance accorded us in terms of orientation and documentation by the various political actors greatly assisted us in the realisation of this project.

13- Organisation of the Work

This work is organised in six chapters, each of the chapters organised in three parts and each of part organised into A, B, C with each of them subdivided into 1, 2, 3.

Chapter one presents the return of multipartism in Cameroon and the presentation of major political parties since 1990. It examines the main factors that influenced the emergence of multiparty politics in Cameroon. An attempt has also been made to present the major political parties in Cameroon since 1990 and social situation during the inception of multipartism in Cameroon.

Chapter two handles the strategies developed by political parties before elections. These strategies are developed for the the parliamentary, presidential and senatorial elections from 1990 to 2013. It analyses how the various political parties prepared themselves for the various competitive elections. The discussion and appreciation of electoral law by the political parties is one of the main idea developed.

Chapter three presents the electioneering strategies of political parties for the presidential election. It handles the presidential electioneering of 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011. It compares the strategies developed by the ruling party with the other political parties. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to analyse how the strategies put in place by the ruling party explains it continuous victories since the presidential election of 1992 to 2011. It also brings out the common strategies of all the political parties and the specificity position of each of them.

Chapter four presents electioneering strategies of political parties for parliamentary election starting from 1992 to 2013. In this chapter, we develop the national strategies adopted by political parties for the local election and appreciate local candidates' strategies of each party. The chapter

proceeds to bring out the reason which justifies the necessity of local strategies and how they influence the issue of elections.

Chapter five delves into the attitudes and reactions of political parties from voting to declaration of definitive results. At times the attitudes always result in either peace or violence depending if the political party is the winner or the loser of the said elections. It tells us why the political parties always adopt the position of claiming victory prior to the declaration of results by the competent elections institutions. This chapter equally evaluates the different petitions submitted by the various political parties after the proclamation of definitive results.

Chapter six entitled the appreciation of different strategies and their impact on political parties and political life of Cameroon is concentrated on the positive and negative points of political parties strategies. It equally evaluate the weaknesses of the opposition political parties during the process of election. It also shows how electioneering is one of the main causes of division in political parties. This chapter focuses on the imperativeness of any political party to develop a permenent ideology like in great democracy. Its closes by the proposition of the theory of vote lobbying, recommendations to enforce the democratic systems in Cameroon and conclusion for further research areas such as Municipal and Regional elections.

CHAPTER I:

THE RETURN OF MULTI PARTY POLITICS IN CAMEROON AND EMERGENCE OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES SINCE 1990

Introduction

In this first chapter, we are presenting the main factors that influenced the rebirth of multipartism in Cameroon at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. Our analysis will be based on the intervention of some external influences and great figures. We are also focusing our analyses on the social context in Cameroon during that historical period. The chapter ends by presenting the major political parties in Cameroon since 1990s.

I - The Context of the Rebirth of Multipartism In Cameroon

Before and immediately after independence, Cameroon was a country characterised by multipartism. In 1966, the then Head of State Amadou Ahidjo imposed a one-party system thereby ending the existence of multipartism in Cameroon. This one-party system existed till 1990 when international and national factors obliged the new president, Paul Biya to decide in support of multipartism. This was due to the pressure of some great figures like Barrister Yondo Black, Ni John Fru Ndi and His Eminence Christian Cardinal Tumi who were the actors for the revolution to get back multipartism reinstituted in Cameroon. The return of multiparty politics in Cameroon in 1990s was spearheaded by a number of major actors. They played a very vital role to see that pluralism was re-introduced in Cameroon after 1966 that saw the disolution of all existing political parties to form the Cameroon National Union¹. There were both external and national factors which influenced the return of multipartism in Cameroon. This situation was facilitated by a number of great figures of civil societies, political and religious leaders. Some members of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), the ruling party, were against the return of multipartism, even though a few others were for pluralism. There were citizens who needed a change and some others who wanted to maintain the statusquo. Those who were against multipartism led by the government officers such as Ministers, Governors, Top Military officers,

¹ V. J. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-Present..., p. 246.

Senior Divisional officers, General Manager of State-ownedCooperation among other party members organised a series of matches in all major cities to say "No to multiparty politics". They said Cameroon was not ready for multipartism². In fact, because of national and external pressures, the president was obliged to tell his militants to be ready for competition for most of the Western powers and international organisations linked their financial aid to the respect of Human Rights and the institution of some level of democracy. This gave room for the creation of so many political parties following the liberty law of 19thDecember 1990 officially giving room for people to form political parties. Cameroon left from one political party to 209 political parties by the end of 2007³.

International Pressure

The restoration of multipartism in Cameroon in the 1990s was greatly influenced by some international factors which helped directly or indirectly to promote multipartism. The international communities started recommending democracy and the respect for human rights for all in developing countries. For instance, the International Financial Bretton Woods institutions, America, France, Germany, Canada, Britain and Japan all pressured the Cameroon government to see that some acceptable level of democracy was maintained. The conditions of their loans and assistance to African States were on the basis of democratisation and respect for fundamental human rights as these conditions and others were to follow the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)⁴. Principally, we are going to see the impact or the contributions that were brought from the end of the cold war to encourage the development and implantation of multipartism in Cameroon⁵. So too, we shall highlight the role played by the Eastern wing and the fall of Soviet Union in the promotion of maultipartism in Cameroon. The speech of President Mitterrand at la Baule on 20th June 1990 made strong recommendations to African Heads of Statesto implement democracy in their various countries.

² V.J. Ngoh, *Biya and the* ..., p. 434.

³S. Tata-Ngenge, *Citizenship for Cameroon* ..., pp. 39-48.

⁴ C.F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., pp. 183-184.

⁵V.J Ngoh, "Democracy and democratization in Sub-Sahara Africa: The case study of Cameroon 1960-2000", *epasa Moto*, Volume I, No.5, September 2001. p. 8.

The Collapse of East-Wast Tension (Cold War)

From 1945 the international scene was animated by severe tentions between the East led Russia and the West led by USA. The end of the cold war liberated the super powers; this was a confrontation between communism and capitalism, between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the Eastern Europe and Western Europe; and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire.⁶ This led to the condemnation of dictators and the undemocratic systems of government. The cold war ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of the Berlin wall had a number of consequences on the world stage as the rilvary nature of communism came to an end with the rise of capitalism. This led to the fall of popular democracies in most of socialist countries to the rise of liberal democracy all over the world. Many other world countries started embracing the vision of capitalism which had a number of advantages as compared to communism. The liberal democracy now became the world model and most of the countries started copying. This was spearheaded by the western world and later came into the African continent and Cameroon in particular. Therefore, profiting from the situation in the Western World, many Cameroonians, politicians and members of civil society, started advocating for change⁷. At the end of the year 1989, they bagan to ask from the Paul Biya's regime to put an end to the one-party system.

Like in other African countries, the intellectuals or politicians who knew the benefits of democracy organised themselves to force Paul Biyas' regime to embrace pluralism⁸. Their revandication was inspired by the other movements in Africa and Eastern Europe which were motivated by the callapse of Soviet Union after the break down of the Berlin Wall. According to this reality, we see that, the end of the Cold War gave the liberty to populations to revandicate their rights and liberty. It was possible, to ask Human Rights or other types of liberty without being considered as a supporter of communism or capitalism. Cameroonians, who are very introduced in the world, were among the first African citizensthat chose to go on the streets to request for their political rights. The end of cold world opened the doors for the reclamation of pluralism in Cameroon because of the influence of the Eastern wing due to the collapse of communism.

⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷ V.J. Ngoh, "Biya and the transition to democracy" in J. Mukum Mbaku and J. Teikougang, *the leadership challenge in Africa Cameroon under Paul Biya*, Africa World Press, inc, pp. 429-430.

⁸Hamadjoda Ibraham, 71 years old, former regional president of ANDP, Far North Region, Maroua, 18th December 2018.

The Eastern Wind or the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the wind of change blowing from Eastern Europe across Africa initiated a new order that encouraged political liberation in Cameroon. In fact, the fall of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of Communism by some states such as Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Burgaria affected Africa in general and Cameroon in particular⁹. The Eastern wind was a moment for change mostly in the Western world. It later on extended to the developing countries whereby the western powers imposed on the collaborators in the developing countries to implement democracy¹⁰. Cameroon was not an exception as this helped indirectly in the restoration of political pluralism in Cameroon from the 1990s. It is true, it was not fully the type of democracy requested by these western powers but it really influenced the growth of democracy and the restoration of multipartism in Cameroon in the early years starting from 1990¹¹.

In reality, the "Eastern wind" is used because of the movement of democratisation which took place in Eastern Europe. With these events, many dictorial governments collapsed in South America and in Central Europe. The people of these countries encouraged Africans to benefit from the context and the large movement of change to ask for change in their respective countries. It should be noted that, at the end of the year 1980, many African governments/leaders/people who inherited their position from independence. A lot more were those who either came to power through coup d'etat. There were no presidents elected democratically all over the African continent. This is why, the Eastern wind which started in Europe influenced part of Asia and South America, was an opportunity for the Africans in general and Cameroonians in particular to take their destiny into their hands.

The importance of democracy was stressed by some of the developed countries. Some of the developed countries even imposed on some of the developing countries, that should they not institute democracy in their respective countries, they were not going to have any aid for developmental projects as the two worked together. This was an international approach that greatly influenced the return of multiparty politics in Cameroon in the early 1990s¹².

⁹ C.F. Nchia, *Party politics in ...*, p. 187.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 432.

¹¹ Ibid,, pp. 183-184.

¹²The farmous speech of Francois Metterrand at the Franco-African submit in 1990 at la Baule was very clear on the need for the various African countries to adopt democratic institutions in their various countries. This was collaborated

Arguably, because most western powers were no longer in good terms with the developing countries leadership, mostly due to the inability to exploit their natural resources, these western leaders played a fast role to see that, such African leaders are thrown out of power using protests and the influence of democracy. This could be seen in Cape Vert in February of 1990, Gabon in April of 1990, Zaire in 1990, Congo Brazzaville in 1991 and Cameroon in 1990¹³. This most directly helped in promoting the return of multipartism in Cameroon. During this period, the French president who was leader ofd former French colonial administration of Cameroon cannot be neglected.

La Baule's Speech and Influence of other Western Nations

Up to 1990, after thirty years of independence, France still had a major influence on African countries in general and the Francophone states in particular. This is why; at the Franco-Africa submit on the 20th of June 1990¹⁴, the then French President Francois Mitterrand in addressing the African heads of states sent a very sound message in reference to the implantation of democracy to their various countries. The French President expressed the interest to see trust and confidence established between the leaders and its people and between one state and the others. He referred that France had at some time Nazism, Fascism, Francoism and Salzarism which means he was ready to assist the Africans to find solutions to their internal problems. He made it clear that democracy was a universal principle which could not forget the differences in structures, in civilisation, in tradition and in customs. So, it's impossible to propose a ready-made system. Therefore, it is not for France to dictate some constitutional laws that were to be would be imposed on the people who have their own consciousness with their own History who must know how to lead towards the universal principle which is democracy.

The president said in reference to liberty, it was not only the state to provide but the citizens' needed to be consulted. He proceeded to say it is not only the public powers that should act; it is also non-governmental agencies that often know the situation on the ground best and can better propose solutions. France did not want to intervene in the internal affairs of African countries. The president proposed to these heads of states a ready plan being representative system,

by other western powers like the United State of America, Britain, Germany etc as a means for the African countries to continue receiving financial assistance for them, they need to institute some level of democracy or multipartism in their respective countries else no aids will be given them.

¹³ V. J. Ngoh, *Democracy and Democratisation* ..., p. 16.

¹⁴Franco-Africa submit of 20th of June 1990 at La Baule.

free elections, multiparty politics, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, rejection of censorship as he said this was the direction, we must all go to get to a state of equality.

Indeed, the President indicated that the flow of capital from poor South towards the rich North was bigger than the flow of capital that went from the rich North to the poor South, to which he said there was something wrong. This was made in the light that the different Heads of States had different means of getting to democracy which he noted the only way was the plan he presented. The French President during the France-African submit reiterated, France was going to link loans and aids to the African countries ready for political reforms which he emphasised that the democratisation process was a prerequisite to gain France's friendship and assistance¹⁵.

In reference to Cameroon, this particular speech at Le Baule influenced the Cameroon government and the civil society to request for the return of multipartism in Cameroon¹⁶. Indeed, this speech created of awareness on the importance of multipartism as the civil society pressurised the Cameroon government for multipartism knowing that, the colonial power was in support of democracy. Some other Western powers like the United States of America (USA), Britain, Germany and a number of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Commonwealth equally advocated that their financial assistance had to be based on the respect of democracy and human rights¹⁷. Therefore, of the number of public matches in most of the major cities by the leaders and sympathisers of the ruling party, saying no to multipartism or that Cameroon was not yet ready; the importance of pluralism still arose. These external factors pressurised President Paul Biya in a CPDM extraordinary party congress held in June 1990 to open up for political parties even against the wishes of his party officials as he told them to be ready for competition.

The international context therefore, had a great influence on political decision on President Paul Biya to re-instate political pluralism. But its very important to note that, although the international context was important, the national engagement of the population, the sacrifices of a number of many political leaders and the pressure of the newly born civil society of Cameroon, was one of the major factors that pushed the Yaounde regime to decide in accepting the idea of multipartism.

¹⁵ C.F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., pp. 284-285.

¹⁶Nji Godfred, 58 yaers old, member of ONELL, Ngaoundéré 16 november 2018

¹⁷ V.J. Ngoh, *Democracy and Democratisation...*, p. 14.

B-Internal Context

In the 1990s many Cameroonians were dissatisfied with the way State activities were being handled. They thought that, the state activities were handled only to the advantage of a few Cameroonians based on tribalism, bribery and corruption wherein meritocracy virtually had no place in Cameroon¹⁸. These generally led to the misuse of public funds or tax payer's money. Development in Cameroon had almost come to a standstill with very low rates of employment. A number of citizens ranging from the civil society leaders, the political and religious leaders as well as a large part of the general population lacked confidence in the government and openly demanded for multiparty as a means to remedy the difficult political, economic and social situation prevailing in Cameroon in general the rural areas in particular¹⁹. This section is focused on the influence of civil society and the political activist during the movement of the request for the return to multipartism in Cameroon. The role of the population at the national and international level is also appreciated in this analysis.

The Influence of the Civil Society

The civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) played a critical role in encouraging and promoting the very indispensable democratic institutions. They monitored the government on issues of human rights and gross injustices; they saw into it the issue of good governance and also the utilization of tax payers' money was more accountable²⁰. Prior to the period of 1990, there was a system of bad governance in Cameroon which was accountable neither to the state nor to its citizens. Those who were in power had been there for so long, that they considered their positions as their personal property where they were answerable only to the one who appointed them to such positions. As such, these individuals were there only for their personal interests and those of their families and some close ones or for he who appointed them and not for the interest of the entire nation. This made it difficult for the rest of the citizens to enjoy the natural resources of Cameroon which were now enjoyed only by a few selected individuals.

The civil society assisted to educate not only the citizens but also reminded the government of their rights, responsibilities, their pulse and entitlements through the support of fiscal

¹⁸V. J. Ngoh, *Cameroon 1884-present* ..., pp. 338-339.

¹⁹ Abbo Ulsmanu, 71 years old, Vice Secretary General of NUDP in Adamawa, Ngaoundere 18th December 2018.

²⁰Citizens' manual for participatory governance, produced by centre for human rights and peace advocacy, Ghana Street Nkwen, Bamenda, p. 47.

transparency in revenue. They had as duty to monitor and report the conduct of the entire society on all facets of life especially, the activities and results of the electoral process despite the fact that, they established close ties with other institutions. Great personalities, groups and the state in divessed aspects of religious, culture and economy must retain their independence and must not seek political powers. They should influence public debates and freedom of expression in the country²¹.

These Western powers had in most cases to use indirect means to push for democracy through the country's civil society leaders who pushed up their governments or pressurized the power to open up for democracy. These civil society leaders were given financial and technical assistance to push their individual governments to accept democratic changes which was very successful. Cameroon was not an exception as it benefited from this support and the civil society leaders made the ordinary Cameroonians to know of the importance of democracy and join the civil society leaders to request in the implementation of democratic spirit in our society. At this time, only a few numbers of people were engaged in the civil society, reasons being that, during the one-party system it was not authorised to have independent movements.²²

The pressure from other internationally recognized groups such as branches of Amnesty International²³, African Watch and pro-democracy associations drew the attention of foreign governments to the unpleasant situations in the affected countries. Finally, the absence of free and honest political debates coupled with the fact that most African presidents took measures to become life presidents regardless of the wishes of the populace aggravated the situation²⁴. There was absence of genuine competitive presidential elections in most African countries after the 1960s as most holders of presidential offices were appointed by military or party officials or others went to power because they were backed by the only existing political party²⁵.

The part played by Africans, especially the role of Cameroonians who lived abroad, popularly known as the 'diasporas' most especially cannot be compromised due to their petitioning

²³ This organization was created in 1961 in London, to fight for freedom, liberty and good governance in the World. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, it extended its activities to the African continent.

²⁴V. J. Ngoh, *Democracy and Democratisation*..., p. 13.
 ²⁵Ibid., p. 13.

 ²¹Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the movement "Right for All", Douala, 6 febuary 2019.
 ²²Abbo Ulsmanu, 71 years old, Vice General Secretary of NUDP in Adamawa, Ngaoundere 18th December 2018.

and manifestations through little groups and unions protesting against the dictatorial regimes. The heads of the Muslim communities equally were dissatisfied with the way the government was managing the activities of the nation only for the interest of a few individuals. In addition, power had recently changed from their hands and during the attempted coup d'état of 1984 a lot of theirs were killed. This angered made them to join the others in the request for multipartism which could be a solution to their problems in Cameroon. Also, the church played a key role in humanitarian works. For instance, the churches struggled for the restoration of human rights and equality amongst men. It is therefore through the medium of church doctrines, preaching and education that inspired and emancipated fellow Christians and citizens of different societies and nations in general on the need for development in the live of mankind in all ramifications.

In 1966 multipartism was rescinded with an official return to one-party system in Cameroon but in the 90s, the civil society greatly influenced the return to multipartism²⁶. The Cameroon National Union (CNU) was transformed in 1985 to the Cameroon People Democratic Movement (CPDM) in Bamenda which still existed as a one-party. It should be understood, the hidden agenda behind the change of name was to give the newly installed president Paul Biya the absolute control over the party and the country, contrary to what was agreed when he was handed power. It was to remain that the outgoing president, his Excellency Ahamadou Ahidjo was going to remain the head of the party while the newly installed was to be the Head of State which did not last for long as changes were made:

The CPDM represents President Paul Biya's desire to create his party in his image following the identification of the CNUwith the former regime of Ahmadou Ahidjo. It is representative of the New Deal era that became the symbol of Biya's rule. The party attempts to distinguish itself from the past through its new emblem made of a flame protected by two black hands on a blue field encircled by the initials of the party. Its motto is Unity-Progress-Democracy. The party strives in its objectives to mobilize the population of the country in or to

- Consolidate national unity, integration and independence;
- Promote a democratic system of government as well as rapid economic growth; and
- Contribute to the civic political education of nationals and promote their economic and social interest.

However, the CPDM is equally characterized by striking resemblance to the CNU party. Like the CNU, the CPDM has annex organization like the youth and wonen's wings. Its structures are a carbon copy of the past from the lowest organ (the cell) to its highest organ (the national congress). Like the CNU, the CPDM is highly elitist²⁷.

²⁶F. I.W. Nkwain, *Cameroon: National Unity and Peace*, Maryland Printers, Bamenda, 2008, p. 41.

²⁷ J. M. D. Delancy and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 88.

The government was criticized from all the frontline churches in Cameroon which justified that a need for change was absolutely necessary. A number of human rights organisations based in Cameroon who were equally upset with the manner in which state activities were carried out and the inhuman treatment that was given to its citizens joined a number of none governmental organisations to request for change in the way the government was managing state affairs. By this, they were requesting for multipartism as a solution to the Cameroon problem. These amongst other issues were handled wrongly, because these NGOs, felt that if there was multipartism, there would be equitable distribution of the country's natural resources for the betterment of the entire country. There would be checks and balances as compared to the situation in 1990s wherein some few individuals thought Cameroon was their private property and managed very poorly. This explains why, when there was the window opportunity to request for change from the one-party system to multipartism, almost everybody joined in requesting for multipartism as a solution in Cameroon as accessed by one of Cameroon's seasoned politicians²⁸. The role played by the civil society was not isolated; the political activists joined their voices and their engagement to that of the civil society to put enough pressure on president Biya's regime to accept multipartism. Among the pressure group, we have political activists.

2) The Political Activists

The deplorable political, economic and social situation in Cameroon for the past decades was a call for concern. Cameroonian political activists who joined their voices to those of the politicians to ask for immediate change as according to Mudoh Walters. He worked in close collaboration with Albert Woman Mukong²⁹. Its moment came in the 1990s when these political activists could air and make their opinions without much censorship by the corrupt regime in power, they joined the other sectors to criticise the ills of the government³⁰. They requested for multipartism as the only solution to the Cameroonian problems as this could lead to the change of the corrupt and incompetent leaders that had been in power for decades without much positive results. Cameroon from independence till 1990s has been governed by almost the same people. By this, there had been little or no opportunity for younger politicians to come up within the one-party

²⁸ Tikum Richard Anyang, 56 year, SDF and later NUDP Executive, Yaounde, 20th May 2020.

²⁹ Mudoh Walters, 54 years, Human Right Activist and later on a politician of various political parties, Douala, 20th December 2019.

³⁰Kamdem Léon, 58 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Ngaoundéré 18th November 2018

system³¹. Therefore, when the opportunity came in the 90s to fight for multipartism most of these young aspiring politicians came up strongly advocating for the restoration of multipartism in Cameroon.

There were equally a set of politicians who were thrown out or defeated from the lone political party which was equally the governing party. They saw the 1990s as an opportunity to express their political opinion in Cameroon as reflected by Atekwana Joseph who decided in joining the SDF³². These groups of politicians equally supported the return of multipartism. They knew with the eventual introduction of multipartism, they could create their own political parties and become political actors in Cameroon as could be seen with the situation of Ni John Fru Ndi who was defeated in Mezam for parliamentary seat by Achidi Achu in 1988. He moved on to the opposition in addition to the Anglophone problem and later founded of the Social Democratic Front on the 26th of May 1990 even without government approval³³. Therefore, the year 1990 or the opportunity to request for multipartism was the right moment for these groups of politicians to express their various views point out of the CPDM single party. This should be noted, all the people considered as politicians were those who wanted to creat their own political parties. But after, the 26th May 1990, we are going to see the rise of a number of politicians at the national and regional levels. In the Far North of Cameroon for example, we have some regional great figures of the opposition who animated the movement of pluralism in the region³⁴.

The period of 1990s had witnessed a drastic reduction in civil servant salaries which brought a lot of hardship to Cameroonians. This pushed a number of Cameroonians to disapprove of whatever thing the government was doing. The politicians took this opportunity to advocate for mullipartism which could bring change for the betterment of the entire country. The request by IMF for the Cameroon government to privatise and the closure of some of the parastal companies led to unemployment and created much hardship on the citizens. This is one of the reasons why when the moment came in 1990 to request for pluralism as a mean to bring sanity to Cameroon, most of the citizens bought the ideas of the politicians as the economic hardship was really unbearable.

³¹Tikum Richard Anyang, 56 year, SDF and later NUDP Executive, Yaounde, 20th May 2020.

³²Atekwana Joseph, 67 year, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

³³SDF, *The struggle for democracy*, p. 13-16.

³⁴ Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, leader of MDR in Mayo Danai, Datcheka, 15th August 2019.

The change from one party system to multipartism had a number of advantages as these political activists were advocating and preaching for change and this got a number of Cameroonians on board requesting for the restoration of multipartism. As this was the only means to bring change in the political class of Cameroon that had remained the same since independence. It now needed change in order to take the development of the country forward from its stagnancy.

3) The General Population

The population in general lacked basic necessities such potable water, roads, good health care services and there was high rate of unemployment. This made a majority of Cameroonians dissatisfied with the way the government was managing the affairs of the country³⁵. The increasing rate of corruption put the general population in doubt on how state affairs were managed. We realised repeated circumstances of segregation, tribalism, corruption which brought hardship to a majority of Cameroonians. The 90s came with opportunities for the general population to show their dissatisfaction with the manner in which the state activities were managed to the advantage of only a few Cameroonians while leaving the majority in suffering and abject poverty³⁶.

Two main groups of people who advocated for change during the 1990s can identified. Firstly, we had the general population and the university students. It should be understood that in the year 1990, there was only one state University in Cameroon being the University of Yaoundé hosting students from all over the national territory with grievances that needed redress. So, when the wind of change was blowing, they joined to advocate for change and knowing this could easily be gotten if there is multipartism, they joined the other sectors to request for multipartism in Cameroon³⁷. The second vital group was those of "souveteurs" or "buyam sellam"; considering the very high level of unemployment, those who could not find government jobs joined other businesses that provided food on the tables. This group explained there were sufferings because of the weaknesses of a few individuals because since Cameroon had enough natural resources which if well managed, there would be enough for the entire population and for the future generations. This prompted this group of people who were in the majority in the 1990s to solicit for the return of multipartism as it would bring the system of meritocracy, good governance and equal opportunity for all with a drastic drop of unemployment. These groups really made their grievances

³⁵ Moustapha Abdoulaye, 66 years old, Djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

³⁶H. Touo, *Multiparty Politics and* ..., p. 18.

³⁷V.J. Ngoh, Biya and the ..., p. 437-438.

known by joining in public manifestations against the government and led the government into retaliating, leading to a number of human lives lost³⁸.

As a contrary approach, to fight the government, the population declared civil disobedience in the forms of ghost towns, non payment of taxes, non respect of government institutions and gave both the government and the civilians more hardship. The issue of huge national and foreign debts coupled with unemployment and the inability of the government to provide basic needs contributed to the population's request for a change in the statusquo or the way in which the country was managed³⁹. These pushed many Cameroonians to advocate for the national and international community to support multipartism to be reinstituted in Cameroon. This was the only means to advocate for a sound political, economic and social situation in Cameron and which could be accountable like other countries where there is democracy and accountability⁴⁰.

Further, note should be taken that, the end of the 1980s was a very critical period in Cameroon because of the decrease in export earnings, in the words of President Paul Biya. All our export commodities fell at the same time. The government portrayed the cause of the crisis as largely external: the falling value of exports and especially the precipitated decline of the price of petroleum on the world market. That is to say some of the grievances of the Cameroonians already started in the 1980s because of the drop in export commodities. This led to Cameroon government's reduction of its budget of 1987 to 1988 by 18%. The government took steps to force the retirement of many civil servants, curtailed electricity, telephone and housing facilities granted to top civil servants, sold many administrative vehicles, and privatized unproductive parastatals enterprises and the closure of certain costly economic missions in various Cameroonian Embassies abroad⁴¹. There was unemployment, rampant corruption, collapse of banks and capital flight became recurrent and a cause of discontent among the citizens. Another prominent issue was the Anglophone marginalisation wherein some prominent members of the government such as Emah Basile considered the Anglophones as enemics in the house as some of the Anglophones were even

³⁸ Chemboa Andre Leopold, 79 years, Financial Secretary of SDF for Western Region, Bafoussam on 11th March 2019.

³⁹ S.C. Abega, Le retour de la societe civile en Afrique, Presse de L'UCAC, 2007, p. 59.

⁴⁰⁴⁰ Moustapha Abdoulaye, 66 years old, djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

⁴¹M.D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., pp. 14-142.

called "*Biafrans*" (Nigerians)⁴² which infuriated a number of Anglophones who strongly criticised the government and absolutely stood for multipartism as a solution to their problem.

The invasion of the student quarters from 2nd April to 6th May 1991 by the military wherein hundreds of them were arrested, property looted, and the rape of students made the student community to be dissatisfied with the way the crisis was being handled⁴³. These students stormed the various Embassies in Yaoundé to report the inhuman abuses of the government and thereby attracting the attention of the international media⁴⁴. These foreign governments started asking Cameroon government to respect basic human rights which was an indirect means of supporting the return of multipartism in Cameroon⁴⁵. We should acknowledge the fact that, the World Cup Football Match hosted in Italy gave Cameroon's indomitable lions team unexpected success which distracted the attention of Cameroonians to football successes as opposed to political activities which were previously dominating Cameroonians.They had to change to concentrate on the victories of the Indomitable Lions during the World Cup in Italy. However, this was only short-lived as immediately after the tournament the ghost town activities were intensified⁴⁶. All this situation, motivated the members of the civil society, the political activists and a large part of the population to decide to manifest on the streets and, to look for solution to their civil rights and the general situation of the Cameroon.

Some Great Figures of Multipartism Revendication in Cameroon

The History of restoration of multipartism in Cameroon was marked by activities of some great figures. Some of them were the politicians like Fru Ndi, Adamu Ndam Njoya and Bouba Bello who engaged to challenge President Paul Biya's regime. They were influence by different ideologies but had the same objective. Other important personnalities identified in the civil society were very implicated in the fight for pluralism so that, human rights and liberties should be respected in the country. Concerning the government members and members of the ruling party, there were divided into two groups, the first being against the restoration of multipartism and the

⁴² V.J. Ngoh, *Democracy and Democratisation* ..., p. 22.

⁴³ V. J. Ngoh, *Biya and the* ..., pp. 437-438.

⁴⁴ V.J. Ngoh, *Democracy and Democratisation*..., p. 25.

⁴⁵Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, leader of MDR in Mayo Danai, Datcheka, 15th August 2019.

⁴⁶ When the players returned after the unexpected victory of 1990 World Cup in Italy, the celebration was short live for the politicians and the youths were back on the streets asking for political reforms as the only means to better their situation economically and politically.

second group who stood for multipartism which was the new organisation of the political life of the country.

The Political Great Figures

There were a number of influential political activists and politicians who spearheaded the revolution from the 1990s with serious political impact and consequences. This shall be discussed in details in the ensuing paragraphs.

a. Barrister Yondo Black

Barrister Yondo Black Mandengue and precisely nine others in their quest for pluralism and the fight for multipartism on 19th February 1990 got his office raided by the Cameroon National Intelligence Service but found nothing incriminating.⁴⁷ He proceeded in taking the investigation team to his residence ⁴⁸ where he handed the draft documents for National Coordination for Multipartism that highlighted their support for pluralism. They did not officially request for the creation of multipartism but went on criticising the one-party system and the Biya regime. This was a means by which the government in power used in pursuing him and his followers.

The arrest of Yondo Black and imprisonment for six months created a lot of public awareness as he was a former President of Bar Association. During his trial in Yaoundé there were a host of diplomats present, and about 200 defending lawyers led by Batronia Ben Muna who was a catalyst for democratic process and multipartism in Cameroon⁴⁹. The arrest was discussed widely over Radio France International (EFI), The British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) and Voice of America (VOA). The pressure was too high on the government to release Yondo Black and he gained his freedom on 13th March 1990. The government issued a statement to say they were not arrested for trying to form a political party but that, they were arrested for holding clandestine meetings, fabricating distributing tracts hostile to the regime, and insulting the head of State as well as inciting revolt.

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
⁴⁷ C. F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., p.164.

⁴⁸Ibid., *p. 180*.

⁴⁹ J. V. Ngoh, Biya and the ..., p. 433.

His arrest created some impact on the political life of Cameroonians as an extraordinary assembly of the Bar Association was held in which the President Ben Muna condemned the absence of the rule of law in Cameroon and gave his support to Barrister Yondo Black and the six others and called for their immediate release to join their voices to other national and international human rights organisations. This arrest was at the climax of the request for multipartism as it gave the opportunity for the founding of the Social Democratic Front as the government said they were not arrested because, they tried to form a political party⁵⁰. This created awareness on the importance of pluralism and gave right to the request for the legalisation of the SDF and many other parties that followed. He is the first advocate of multipartism in Cameroon and even tried to work with other actors and activists like Albert Mukong and other Cameroonians out of Cameroon⁵¹.

Picture N° 1: Barrister Yondo Black one of the first leaders to fight for multipartism



Source: Cameroon Tribune, n° 2684, 25th April 1991

⁵⁰H. Touo, Multiparty Politics and ..., p. 18-19.

⁵¹ E. V. Njoh, The Social Democratic ..., p. 26.

The return of multipartism in Cameroon after a one-party rule of over twenty-four years in the 1990s was a well calculated move by a number of renowned political figures such as Ni John Fru Ndi. He was born on 7th July 1941, a book seller and founder of Social Democratic Front on the 26th of May 1990. Amongst other essentially politicians of the Anglophone extraction, he was very dissatisfied with the manner in which Anglophones were treated in Cameroon. They had been planning to create a political party and the 90s came as the time for these politicians to express and expose this opinion⁵². After the presentation of Yondo Black asking the democraty in Cameroon, let us now talk about the man consider as the leader of opposition in the country since 1990.

b. Ni John Fru Ndi

Ni John Fru Ndi is the main opposition figure in Cameroon from 1990 to 2013 and the founder of the SDF. He was born on 7th July 1941 at Baba II village, Santa Sub Division, and attended school at the Baforchu Basel Mission and the Santa Native Authority School. In 1960 he began his secondary school in Nigeria at the Lagos City College as he later got a scholarship from Accra contractors to study piloting at the Zaria Flying School in 1966 due to his efficient services⁵³.

He ran the Ebibi Bookshop Centre and headed a football club. He ran for parliamentary position in 1988 on the CPDM list and failed. He led the founding and the launching of the SDF in Bamenda on the 26th May 1990. He was elected SDF National Chairman at the first Ordinary National Convention held in Bamenda in 1992. In the Presidential election of 1992, he was the main challenger of Paul Biya in which the official results declared Paul Biya the winner while Fru Ndi made all attempts nationally and internationally to get the results annulled to no avail. He was placed under house arrest in late 1992 and later released on the 20th January 1993 as he proceeded with some of the elections and boycotted others till date. Functioning as the main opposition party without joining the ruling party, he remains a very charismatic politician of Anglophone origin.


He is considered the achitect of the reintroduction of multipartism in Cameroon as he was the one who spearheaded the rebirth of multipartism with the creation of the SDF⁵⁴. This is the main opposition party created under tensed conditions leading to the death of six persons in Bamenda. These six deaths created a lot of awareness within the national and international


⁵²SDF, The struggle for ..., p. 3-12.

⁵³M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of ...*, pp. 184-185.

⁵⁴ SDF @ 25, the struggle for ..., pp. 10-11.

communities. The motto of his party "power to the people" is a strong rallying force behind his successes. The picture below shows Ni John Fru Ndi, leader of the SDF and main opposition in Cameroon.





Source: Collection from SDF Secretariat in Bamenda on 11th January 2018.

Though Ni John Fru Ndi is considered a prominent leader of the opposition and the architect of the return to multiparty politics in Cameroon, some of those who worked rigorously for multipartism to be reintroduced in Cameroon were people like Jean Jacques Ekindi, referred to in political circles as "Hunter of the Lion".

Jean Jacques Ekindi

Jean Jacques Ekindi born in January 1945 popularly known as (chasseur du lion) was a big wig of the CPDM party who openly requested for multipartism and later even resigned from the CPDM. This created a awareness and others rallied others in joining the fight for the return of multipartism in Cameroon. He founded the party Mouvement Progressiste (MP) and has been its National President since it was founded on the 23rd August 1991. He participated in the opposition rally organised Douala by the National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Association (NCOPA) in Douala from 23rd to 24th September 1991 which ended with his arrest, though it was

for less than a day as foreign embassies fought for his release⁵⁵. He was a vivid critic of Paul Biya and stood for a Unitary State as it will be less expensive to run as compared to a Federation proposed by other political actors in 1992.

In 2003, he was the Chairman of Front Alternative Forces, an opposition coalition. Because of his frequent criticism of the government, he was locked up for a number of issues again on 17th August 2004. He did propose that, there should have been only three political parties in Cameroon, that is the ruling party and two other opposition parties. He criticised the existence of so many political parties which he thought were put in place by the government to weaken the opposition parties. The MP of Jean started some sort of alliance system which he started with the SDF to support his candidature which ended as the later decided to stand for elections in Wouri⁵⁶. He later formed an alliance with Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) to support his candidature without them participating in Wouri. We therefore conclude by saying Jean-Jacques Ekindi with the picture is below, is a very prominent politician in the history of the return of multipartism in Cameroon.

Picture N° 3: Jean Jacques Ekindi, the hunter of the Lion. One of the radical politicians



Source : Emmanuel Batamag, Cameroun : Jean-Jacques Ekindi tourne le dos à son parti, https://www.afrik.com/cameroun-jean-jacques-ekindi-tourne-le-dos-a-son-parti, consulted the 17th November 2019.

⁵⁵ Wikipedia, "the free encyclopedia, As an opposition leader in the early 1990s". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Jacques_Ekindi. Consulted 20th November 2017 at 6:00 pm. ⁵⁶Ibid.,

Another significant political personality in Cameroon who contributed gretrly to the return of multiparty politics in Cameroon was Issa Tchiroma Bakary, leader of the Cameroon National Salvation Front (FSNC).

Issa Tchiroma Bakary

Issa Tchiroma Bakary was born on 10th September 1949 in Garoua. An engineer from France, he was employed at the Cameroon railway during the Ahidjo regime. During the coup attempt of 6th April 1984 wherein the Northerners were prime suspects, though he claimed he was not involved, he was arrested in Douala on 16th April 1984 and taken to Yaoundé. He served some prison term in Kondengui where he was incarceratedand taken to Yoko where served a six years prison term during which he profited in learning English and was released in 1990. He joined the UNDP an opposition party as its Secretary General during the parliamentary election of 1992; he was elected into Parliament for Benoue Constituency. After the contested presidential elections of 1992 and the forming of a new government he was appointed Minister of Transport on 27th of November 1992 against the wish of his UNDP party⁵⁷. In July 1994 Tchiroma and Mostapha were maintained in the named government which earned them, their dismissal from the UNDP. They made all efforts to fight against but in January1995 the Central Committee of the UNDP finally dismissed them from the party. They decided to form their own party called National Alliance for Democracy and Progress at the same time fighting the leadership of Bello Bouba Maigari in the UNDP⁵⁸.

Issa Tchiroma in 2002 during the congress of UNDP once joined the party, he and other prominent Northerners decided to come together in 2002 and signed a memo decrying the marginalisation of the Northerners to whom they wanted the state to pay more attention⁵⁹. During the October Presidential election of 2004, he was part of the opposition coalition supporting a

⁵⁷ Wikipedia, "National Assembly (Cameroon)". Found:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Cameroon), consulted 9th June 2021.

⁵⁸Hamadou Mohamed, 57 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19 november 2019

⁵⁹ Tchiroma was Secretary-General of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP), an opposition party, in the early 1990s. In the March 1992 parliamentary election, he was elected to the National Assembly as a UNDP candidate in the Bénoué constituency of North Province. Later in the year, after Biya controversially won the October 1992 parliamentary election, Tchiroma was appointed to the government as Minister of Transport by Biya on 27 November 1992, along with another UNDP leader, Hamadou Moustapha. He and Moustapha accepted their appointments without the approval of UNDP President Maigari Bello Bouba; the appointments were viewed by some as a way of dividing and weakening the opposition by coopting certain opposition figures.

unique opposition candidate to fight Paul Biya in which he supported the election of Adamu Ndam Njoya for the opposition. This was rejected by Ni John Fru Ndi and he equally criticised him for not really being a democrat and for refusing the results of the majority.

Issa Tchiroma again left the UNDP to form his own party, National Salvation Front (FNSC) in January of 2007 with the objective of contributing to the advert of a free society and promoting democratisation process in Cameroon⁶⁰. This was to give, himself the independence to talk and negotiate on an equal bench with the other political parties since he took the decision to accept a ministerial position without the approval of his party⁶¹. In a Press Conference on 20th February 2008, he supported the amendment of the Constitution in which the limit for presidential mandate was taken off. It was a surprised move for he and his party to take such a decision which he argued will guarantee stability and development. Again, in the midst of national and foreign media critising Paul Biya of his much wealth and corruption he said in an interview published by Cameroon Tribune on 29th June 2009, Biya was fighting to eradicate corruption as the international media wanted to destabilize the country. All this puts his objectivity into doubt as he was now progovernment and not opposition⁶².

On the 30th June 2009, he was appointed Minister of Communication, a position he used on 17th of August 2009 in closing Sky One Radio which he said was not law abiding and once they start respecting the law, it will be reopened. He openly supported the Head of State during the very expensive vacation in France in September of 2009. He said like any other worker, the President has the right to his vacation. He was very controversial on a number of issues like the death of Bibi Ngota who was beaten to death in April 2010 in Kondengui prison. Tchiroma said he died of HIV/AIDS which had wickened his immune system in spite all efforts made by prison doctors to save his life⁶³. He was ready to tell all sorts of lies in order to protect the interest of the government. Today, this former opposition of the president Paul Biya is one of his principal defenders at the national an international level. The role of another figure of return of multipartism as Adamou Ndam Njoya can not be neglect.

⁶⁰ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, "Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_for_the_National_Salvation_of_Cameroon. Consulted 20th June 2020 at 8:30 pm.
⁶¹ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, "Issa Tchiroma". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Issa_Tchiroma. Consulted on 18th November 2019, consulted 20th November 2019.

⁶²Mahamet Ali, 56 yaers old, MDR member Mokolo, Maroua 20th November 2019

⁶³ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, "Issa Tchiroma". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Issa_Tchiroma, consulted on 18th November 2019. Consulted 20th November 2019.

Adamou Ndam Njoya

Adamou Ndam Njoya born 8th May of 1942 is Cameroonian politician, holder of Ph. D in International law and Political Science from the University of France. "He was Minister of National Education from 1977-1980, Minister Delegate at the Presidency for General Inspection of State and Administrative Reforms, a relatively powerless post compared to Education which was very influential⁶⁴.

He founded Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) in 1991, through which he advocated for decentralisation and the rights of minority. He was instrumental at easing the tensed socio-political and economic situation in Cameroon in the early 1990s as he led the delegation of the opposition parties to the Tripartite Conference. In 1992, he contested for the Presidential elections and was not successful. He was Mayor of Foumban from 1996-1997, Parliamentarian between 1997 and 2007 and has run unsuccessfully for the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon in 1992, 2004 and 2011⁶⁵. He was the chosen candidate for the opposition parties to fight Paul Biya in 2004 presidential election but Fru Ndi rejected his candidature and decided to quit the coalition and stood alone which did not make the coalition successful, Fru Ndi refused to respect the results of the strategy communitee and the panel which the leaders of the CNRR had put in place. The result placed Ndam Njoya ahead of Fru Ndi which the later found hard to swallow⁶⁶. He can be remembered as one of the prominent politicians who criticized the removal of the limit of two terms of the President saying the two terms of five years are enough while advocating for a two round of election and decentralisation.

⁶⁴M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 273.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 174-175.

⁶⁶J.V. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-Present (2018) ..., p.348.

Picture N° 4: Adamou Ndam Njoya, the intellectual of multipartism dispute

Source: Wekipedia libre, "Adamou Ndam Njoya". Found: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adamou_Ndam_Njoya consulted 30th November 2017.

He remained a real opposition leader from 1990 to 2013 without joining the government. Remarkable after two terms as a Parliamentarian he decided not to run again but remained an active politician and has always remained steadfast with the main opposition parties as they agreed to boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections and 2007 which he implemented and never joined the ruling government. In November 1991 he led the delegation of opposition parties to the Tripartite Conference. Let us now talk about the former prime minister of Paul Biya who is Bello Bouba.

Bello Bouba Maigari

Bouba Bello Maigari born in 1947, a former Prime Minister in exile on 25th May, 1990, announced the formation of a new party, the National Union for Democracy and Progress in Cameroon, from Paris. The party was effectively created in Douala on February 9, 1991. He returned to Cameroon on 17th August 1991 to continue his active life in politics. He served in both the Ahidjo and Biya's government in very strategic position⁶⁷. He was among a number of Northern Cameroonian politicians who fled after the abortive 1984 coup d'état. He was dissatisfied

⁶⁷M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., pp. 170-171.

the manner in which they were ousted from power with the emergence of the new administration. They waited for an opportuned moment to criticise the government and the moment came in the 1990s where they had the opportunity to return home and form political parties and to be once more active in the political life of their country. (See the following picture).



Picture N° 5: Bouba Bello Maigari the former Prime Minister of Cameroon 1982-1983

Source: Author collection from NUDP office in Yaounde on 12th September 2019

Bouba Bello Maigari handled a number of Ministerial positions before the return of multipartism in 1990 in Cameroon. He served as Secretary General in the Ministry of Armed Forces 1972-1975; Deputy Secretary General at the Presidency on June 30th 1975 and the Minister of State for the Economy and Plan in 1982. When Ahidjo resigned in November 1982, he was named Prime Minister from 6th November 1982 to 22nd August 1983 under President Paul Biya. The President halted the legal proceedings against Bouba Bello which pushed him to flee to Nigeria into exile⁶⁸.

He was an opposition politician in the 90s as he announced the formation of a new political party from Paris; UNDP on 25th May 1990 while the party was legalised in Cameroon as UNDP in March 1991. He became the President of UNDP during the Garoua Congress 4-5 of January

⁶⁸Moustapha abdoulaye, 66 years old, djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

1992 thereby ousting the party's ponjeer leader Samuel Eboua⁶⁹ and elected into the National Assembly in March 1992. Bouba Bello participated in the Parliamentary election of May 1997 in which his party performed very poorly but boycotted the Presidential elections of October 1997. At the end he joined the government of December 1997 as Minister of State for Industrial and Commercial Development till 2004. He suffered defeat in the 2002 Parliamentary elections wherein the UNDP got only one seat as some attributed the poor performance to the Bouba Bello's cooperation with the CPDM government but he still decided to support Paul Biya in the October 2004 election saying UNDP was supporting Biya for the sake of continued peace and economic growth. In 2009 he defended his party participation in the government saying it gave him the opportunity to directly work for the benefit of the country as compared to when he just merely criticizing from outside⁷⁰. He was later appointed Minister of Post and Telecommunications from 2004 to 2009. He did not stand as a Presidential Candidate for October Presidential election gaining him much favour with the ruling party and was moved from Minister of State for transport from 2009 to 2011 where he was appointed Minister of State for Tourism and Leisure in December 2011. He is a controversial figure in Cameroon politics for he worked in a number of Ministerial positions in both the government of Ahamadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya⁷¹. He was very active during the period of multipartism first as an opposition leader and later joined the ruling party which means, he was no longer an opposition leader but a supporter of the Biya regime⁷².

Maurice Kamto

Maurice Kamto on the picture below a Cameroonian politician was a member of the international law commission of the United Nations from 1999-2016.⁷³

⁶⁹ C. F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., p. 24.

⁷⁰Mohamadou, 65 years old, CPDM communication member, Garoua-Boulai 20 december 2019

⁷¹M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., pp. 170-171.

⁷²M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 66.

⁷³ "Message spécial du Président Maurice KAMTO aux Forces de Défense et de Sécurité à l'occasion de la fête nationale du 20 mai 2021". Found: https://www.mrcparty.org/. Consulted 20th June 2021 at 5:15 am.

<image>

Picture N° 6: Maurice Kamto the spokes person of the coalition of opposition in 1992

Source: Actualite Afrique, L'opposition camerounaise appelle à des manifestations, https://www.dw.com/fr/lopposition-camerounaise-appelle, consulted on 30th March 2020.

He and Professor Peter Ntamark were the leading individual agents for the negotiation of the return of Bakassi a disputed territory between Cameroon and Nigeria. His decisive contribution enabled him to be appointed as Minister-Delegate to the Ministry of Justice in 2004. However, he subsequently resigned from the government in November 2011. He proceeded in forming a new political party called Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC) which participated in the 2013 Parliamentary elections and obtained one seat. He is a crowd pulling politician. This explains how within the first year of the creation of his party he was able to secure a seat in the National Assembly.

The MRC, headed by Professor Maurice Kamto, came into existence during the 2013 Parliamentary elections which he suprisingly won a seat after just one year of existence and participated at the presidential elections of 2018. During the first year of the political life of the party, MRC won a legislative seat during its first participation in Parliamentary election in Cameroon.

The other politicians

Francoise Foning (1949-23rd January 2015) was a fervent supporter of the CPDM ruling party. She started life as a business lady at the early age of 12 years, later she ventured into

restaurant and Tourism businesses. Madame Foning was a Mayor, a Parliamenterian, leader of *l'association mondiale des femmes d'affaires*, president of the CPDM women's wing in 1992, head of the African network, founding president of Cameroon businesswomen and of the World Female Company Managers. She was so influential that a street in Douala VI was named in her memory. She received distinctions or awards from the King of Bamun as Nijh and from the government as Grand Officer of National Order of Merit. She was named African Manager of the year in 2004. Indeed, she was such a leading personality both in the domain of business and politics, she was a very remarkable individual both at the national and international levels. We can not study the history of Cameroon without mentioning her name for she did help in influencing a number of female politicicians in Cameroon politics⁷⁴.



Picture Nº 7: Francoise Foning as a businesswoman, leader and politician

Source: Collected from CPDM Head office in Yaounde on 13th September 2019

Active members of civil society

We equally have a group of civil society leaders who were upset with the way, state machinery was working⁷⁵ and needed an opportunity to voice their opinions such as, Cardinal Tumi and some members of government who were not given lucrative positions and those who were thrown out of government. They started criticising the government and needed an opportunity to do so which was the returned to multipartism in 1990. These politicians, members of the civil

⁷⁴ Necrologie, Françoise FONING, "Un modèle de militantisme". Found:

http://www.rdpcpdm.cm/2015/03/francoise-foning-un-modele-de-militantisme/. Consulted 24th May 2020.

⁷⁵ C. F. Nchia, *Party politics in ...*, p. 177.

society and dissatisfied members of the government helped in one way or the other to advance the return of multipartism in Cameroon in the 1990s either directly or indirectly.

Cardinal Christian Tumi

Cardinal Tumi whose picture is under, born on 15 October 1930 in Kikaikelaki a small village in the Nso of the North West Region of Cameroon. Trained as a Teacher studied in Nigeria, France and Switzerland where he graduated with a Ph.D in Theology. He returned to Cameroon and was named Rector of the Seminary in Bambui. He was elected first Bishop of the Diocese of Yagoua and later made Archbishop. In 1985 he was elected president of the National Episcopal Conference of Cameroon a post he held until 1991. Though a religion personality icon, he played a vital role shaping the political life of Cameroon since 1990to 2013⁷⁶. He was a vivid critic of the ruling government where he regularly called for the respect of human rights the need for free and fare elections in Cameroon to gurantee peace, stability and economic development.

Picture N° 8: Cardinal Tumi an outspoken religious figure in Cameroon politics



Source: Félix Mbetbo, 7 choses mystérieuses que vous ignorez sur Christain Tumi https://www.google.com/search,Cardinal Tumi, consulted 20th May2020

The journalist Pius Njawe

Pius Njawe, born on 4th March 1957 in Babouantou in Haut-Nkam Diviison of the West Region of Cameroon was an adamant critic of President Paul Biya who was imprisoned more than a hundred times in his journalistic career. He published and open letter to President Paul Biya in 1990 which ended with his arrest. He was one of the first leader of the civil society asking for freedom and the respect of humman rigth. (See picture No: 09)

Picture N° 9:Pius Njawe a very outspoken civil society figure in Cameroon politics



Source: Christopher Ambe Shu, "Cameroon's Ace Journalist, Pius Njawe, Dies in Road Accident in USA", https://recorderline.blogspot.com/2010/07/cameroons-ace-journalist-piusnjawe.html, consulted 14th July 2019.

In 1998 he published an article in which he said Paul Biya was suffering from heart attack which earned him another prison sentence but because of pressure for humanitarian organisations he was realeased after spending about a year in prison. He received a number of international awards for his exemplary practice of journalism and the defense of press freedom like 1991 CPJ International Press Freedom Award and 1993 golden Pen Freedom Award from World Association of Newspapers⁷⁷'. He was a very critical journalist by such doing opened the eyes of may Cameroonians of the wrong doings of the government thereby calling for change.

Albert Womah Mukong

Albert Mukong Woman was a strong human right activist, an advocate for the return to Federalism or the independence of Southern Cameroons wherein he was a strong adviser of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC)⁷⁸. He spent most of his adult life in jail; he started within the reign of Ahmado Ahihjo. Mukong was an indomitable crusader for freedom and liberty. He was detained and imprisoned a number of times by the Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya's governments because of his request for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. He wrote his famous book "Prisoner without a crime" among a number of publications. He has actively participated in political life of Cameroon besides being a human rights fighter. He was the most conspicuous Anglophone political prisoner, as secretary general of One Kamerun he created some alliances with Ernest Quandie, Bishop Ndongmo whom they together suffered torture in the hands of Ahidjo and he continued with the Biya regime. He absolutely advocated for the Anglophone course as he said, 90% of the administrators in Anglophone Cameroon are Francophones, no Anglophone has ever held any strategic Ministry such as Armed Forces, Foreign Affairs, Territorial Administration, National Education and Finance ... justifying the fact, Anglophones are now second-class citizens⁷⁹. Arrested and released on several occasions, he came up with the idea of founding a political party which he needed some Francophone's to join him in the struggle⁸⁰. He advocated for the return to two state Federation such that the Anglophones and the Francophones to be managed as two different entities as there were before unification and only to have a central administration that manages the both states. He made a number of contacts in which he was advised to meet Barrister Yondo Black with whom he travelled from Bamenda to Douala and accompanied by Anicet Feko. Albert Mukong Woman is the personality on this picture.

⁷⁸M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of ..., p.* 255.

⁷⁷Njawé's career as a stubborn critic of the government coincided with the unfolding of Mr. Biya's increasingly repressive rule. He was arrested about 126 times and jailed at least 3 times; in 1998 he was sentenced to two years in prison for reporting that Mr. Biya had had heart trouble, though he was released before serving the full sentence. He wrote about his time in jail in "Bloc-notes d'un Bagnard" ("Convict's Notebooks"), published in 1998.

⁷⁹Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the movement "Right for All", Douala, 6 febuary 2019 80



Picture N° 10: Albert Womah Mukong a very influential civil society activist in 1990

Source: Global Freedom of Expression, Mukong v. Cameroon, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/mukong-v-cameroon/, consulted 17th November 2019.

Upon their discussion Yondo Black told them he was in the process of founding a political party in which he thinks they should join their efforts to form one. Note should be taken that Anicet Feko was sceptical about the revelation of Yondo Black for if it were true that they were in the process of founding a political party, Prof Tekam would have informed them and not referring them to meet him for such a project as he was residing out of Cameroon in Paris. Some days after, the group was arrested and when Albert Mukong was informed to escape, he rejected⁸¹. He being a prominent Anglophone activist created both national and international pressure on the government for his release. He was later on transferred from BMM Douala to Kondenge Yaoundé Maximum prison where he and others were judged and freed except for Yondo Black and Anicet Ekane who were given six-month imprisonment. As a matter of fact, his jail helped in creating the need for multipartism in Cameroon thereby exposing the political, economic and social ills of the

⁸¹ Mukong rejection to escape after Yondo and others were arrested as he was communicated to escate for fear the regime will come for him, which was a very courageous step for he was ready for imprisonment as a means to bring democracy to his country, inspite he knows the regime in power is an autocratic one.

ruling party. He died a very strong human rights activist, leader of the SCNC, strong advocate for the return of two states Federation or the Independence of Southern Cameroons⁸².

The Government

The two main figures in early 1990, President Paul Biya and Prime Minister Sadou Hayatou had for find out compromising means to appeace the politicians and the civil society leaders who need a change in Cameroon. The masses and the political activists called for multipartism in Cameroon as they were very upset with the manner in which the entire country was managed. The government had no other objection as it initiated, passed and promulgated laws liberalising the Cameroon political landscape. Amongst the laws were law No.90/055 and law No.90/053 both of December 1990. The first was regulating the organisation of meetings, demonstrations in public places. Organisers of meeting was needed an authorisation from the District Officer of their areas at least three days before the event, so as to make sure that the government is informed and to be in control of any activity that is organised by the opposition⁸³. The second law provided for the formation of political parties as article 14 calls for the provision of funds for the political parties that contest for elections while section 9 disqualifies any political parties popped up as mushrooms as by April 1991 there were already 68 legalised political parties in Cameroon⁸⁴.

- Gregory Owona

Gregoire Owona born 1950 has served in many positions in Cameroon at higher level. He started as an Assistance Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPDM in 1992. Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Relations with the National Assembly from 1997-2011 and proceeded to be Minister of Labour and Social Security, a position he held from December of 2011. He comes from the Centre Region and has been an ardent supporter of the CPDM and was elected as a Councillor in Douala 1987, Member of Parliament from Littoral from 1988-1992. He was the Vice President for National Commission of Fundamental Human Rights in the 1990s. He has in all his positions supported the CPDM and President Paul Biya whole heartedly.

⁸² M. D. Delancey and al, Historical Dictionary of ..., p. 255.

⁸³ The liberty Law 90/53 of 19th December 1990.

⁸⁴J. V. Ngoh, Biya and the Transition to democracy, pp. 435-439.

Picture N° 11: Gregoire Owona, one of the great oppositions to multipartism

Source: Wekipedia, "Grégoire Owona". Found: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gr%C3%A9goire_Owona. Consulted 1st Febuary 2019

Joseph Charles Ndumba

Joseph Charles Ndumba born on 2ndFebruary 1936 was first appointed Minister of Information and Culture in 1974. He served as Secretary General of CPDM from 1992-2007⁸⁵. He was a very loyal member of the party to his boss. He had difficulties with his Assistant Secretary General Gregoire Owana and the President decided to side with the Assistant with whom Charles Ndumbar had not been on talking terms for years. Poor health made it difficult for Charles Ndumbar to manage the activities of the party and the President replaced him with Rene Sadi on the 4th of April 2007 while appointed him as a Roving Ambassador at the Presidency. He was one of the supporters of President Paul Biya who was totally against multipartism.

Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni

Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni born in 1945 was a very prominent and controversial politician who served the government from 1990-2001 at the moment of political upheavals in

⁸⁵ Emmanuel Batamag, "Qui était Joseph Charles Doumba?". Found:

https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=-+Joseph+Charles+Ndumba. Consulted 21th July 2019.

Cameroon. He supported the government in such a manner that he could even tell lies without reason. He served in a number of Ministerial positions such as Ministory of Culture in 1990, and as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from 1997-2001. He further served as Minister of Information until he was appointed Minister of Communication and Government Spokesman, a position in which he made a number of controversial statements like "A good player cannot lack a team"⁸⁶. He was also Board Chair of the University of Douala 2005-2008. He frequently appeared on the Cameroon Radio Television Corporation defending the interest of the government against the opposition especially the SDF.

He is notably known for a number of controversial expressions such as "zero mort"⁸⁷ during the student riot of 1991 which led to death of a number of students but he came out to say there was none dead. When Ni John Fru Ndi was put under house arrest in the midst of violence and state of emergency in the North West Region initiated by him. This was taking into consideration that the SDF claimed to have won the Presidential elections of October 1992 which the Supreme Court declared Paul Biya the winner⁸⁸. Kontchou said if Fru Ndi is freed he will be a public danger for the entire Cameroon⁸⁹. His fervent support for the government and the Master Paul Biya made him a very controversial politician considering he joined government at the time of multipartism and making a number of allegations or statements very difficult to say considering the political situation, as he could see red and say it's white. For a personality of his status, it needed courage to make such statements, this was an evidence to justify to Cameroonian politicians to say the government in power was not serious and honest to its citizens.

-Achidi Achu

Achidi Achuwas born 5 November 1934 in Bamenda. He grew up in Santa, served as Minister of Justice from 1972-1977, as Prime Minister from 9 March 1992-1996, and elected into Senate of Cameroon in 2013⁹⁰. During the 1992 Presidential elections, he appeared on the CRTV addressed Cameroonians in French and accused the SDF of having diabolic plan to prosecute and

⁸⁶Declarations of Augustine Konctchou in support of the government

⁸⁷Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20th November 2019.

⁸⁸ Arret de cour supreme No.1/PE/92-93 du 23 octobre 1992 portant proclamation des resultants le l'election presidentielle du 11 octobre 1992.

⁸⁹ Wikipedia, "Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustin_Kontchou_Kouomegni. Consulted on 18th November 2019.

⁹⁰M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 18.

execute the leading figures of the State, government, and military if they won the elections. He urged the people to reject the opposition in order to avert potential violence and instability in Cameroon. In 2003, he was appointed Chairman of Board of Directors of the National Investment Corporation (SNI). This man on the picture is a very charismatic politician with his famous statement in politics, "You scratch my back, I scratch your back"⁹¹.



Picture Nº 12: Achidi Achu Simon first Anglophone Prime Minister of Cameroon

Source: Wikipedia, Simon Achidi Achu,

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Achidi_Achu, consulted 25th July 2019.

He has handled a number of positions with the party as Central Committee Member, Head of the discipline commission of CPDM during the campaign of 2007 parliamentary and municipal elections and President of the campaigns support and follow up committee in the North West Province. In 2009 he was one of the three members of the CPDM North West Section's council of the wise which was intented to formulate strategy and tactics to enable CPDM attain dominance in the North West Province. In the Senate he was elected Vice-President of the Senate on 12th June 2013. Some opposition political parties, politicians and the civil society pressured the government for a sovereign National Conference in order to solve the political problem of Cameroon through the use of civil disobedience, and ghost towns but the President was absolutely against stating it

⁹¹ Speech of the former prime minister during an interview on the national television CRTV.

was "sans objet"⁹². He was such an influential politician of the Anglophone origin who introduced of the concept of politics being a "Njangi" through this he won a lot of militancy for the CPDM. He was a peace broker and moderated in his own way the Anglophone problem which influenced the political activities of Cameroon during the era of multipartism.

Hamidou Marafa Yaya

He was born around 1952, an adent supporter of the CPDM regime and a very close collaborator of President Paul Biya coming from the Northern part of Cameroon⁹³. He studied Petrolium at the University of Kanzas in the United States of America. He returned to Cameroon and managed SNI from 1981-1990. He served as the Minister of Territorial Administration a position in which he was chanced in proposing a good number of influencial Governors, Senior Divisional Officer and Sub Divisional Officiers all over the national territory. He played alot of political malpractises as regarding the frauding of election as these officials were directly under his control. Same as all the elections were managed by the Ministry of Territorial Administration till the creation of ELCAM in 2004⁹⁴.

He later moved as Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon which was one of the influencial positions where he started developing the interest of presidential candidate. A number of sources including the American Ambassador to Cameroon among others said, was the reason behind his arrest and imprisonment. In prison he wrote a total of seven letters to express his innoncence⁹⁵, his participation in seeing that, the CPDM candidate was victorious especially for the 1992 Presidential elections which he said the candidate of the SDF Ni John Fru Ndi won and the election was rigged for President Paul Biya as he wrote in one of his letter from prison, "He used to doctor election results in favour of the same regime that has now jailed him" as reported by Ni John Fru Ndi in an interview granted to the Guardian Post Newspaper⁹⁶. Some of the letters were asking for pardon from the head of State which felt on deaf ears as he still remains in prison. His important role was putting in place administrators who were going to make

https://www.journalducameroun.com/7eme-lettre-marafa-hamidou-yaya-de-la-prison-sadresse-aux-camerounais/.

⁹² J. V. Ngoh, *Biya and the ..., p.* 205.

⁹³El Hadj Oumarou Hadji, 68 yaers old, CPDM deputy member of parliement, Maroua 22 november 2018.
⁹⁴Habiba Nsangou, 52 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Maroua 21 november 2018

⁹⁵Marafa Hamidou Yaya, "7eme letter; Marafa Hamidou Yaya, de la prison, s'adresse aux camerounais". Found:

Consulted 20th November 2018.

⁹⁶ Nuggets of Hope, A collection of Press Statements, speeches and interview of the SDF National Chairman, p. 86.

sure; the CPDM is successfull in all the elections the Ministry of Territorial election was organising which were to the total satisfaction of his boss. Some of the politicians and critics read his letters with a lot of mix feelings as to why he is only admitting CPDM fraud only when his was sentenced to imprisonment. He was such an influential politician in that, he was responsible oversaw all the manipulations to see that President Paul Biya remains in power irrespective of the circumstances.

II- The Major Political Parties in Cameroon since 1990

Following the law No.90/056 of December 1990, legalising the formation of political parties, within the space of one year, there were already 68 political parties legalised and by the end of 2013, there were 208 political parties legalised in Cameroon. Some of these political parties were only representing family heads and have never participated in any of the elections ranging from council, parliamentary or presidential elections. We have therefore come up with eight political parties which we shall be considering as major political parties in Cameroon for our study period.

A-The Ruling Party

The ruling party the CPDM, was a continuation of the CNU. They have been using all the means at the state disposal to make sure they are successful in all the elections that they have participated in from the rebirth of multipartism to 2013. To get this done they made sure the party was implanted all over the national territory.

1) Change from CNU to CPDM

The CPDM that was created in Bamenda in 1985 was a continuation of the CNU which was created 1st September 1966 with the headquarters in Yaoundé.The hidden agenda of changing from CNU to CPDM was to give the current president, the leadership of the country and the political party to make sure he is really in total control of Cameroon⁹⁷. It should be understood, that when President Ahmadou Ahidjo handed over power to Paul Biya, the leadership of the party was still with him and President Paul Biya was not very comfortable⁹⁸. Therefore, the assumption that, since independence, there is only one party governing in Cameroon is not wrong. A few years

⁹⁷ M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., pp. 29-30.

⁹⁸El Hadj Oumarou Hadji, 68 yaers old, CPDM deputy member of parliement, Maroua 22nd November 2018.

after independence, in 1966 all the parties were surrendered into one being CNU⁹⁹ and in 1985 there was a change of name to CPDM which has been in power from 1985 till date.

The organisation and objectives of the CPDM were gcared meant to be successful in all the elections at all the levels¹⁰⁰. The CPDM is structured as follows: the cell, the branch, the subsection, the section and the party is represented at all the administrative units of the administration.

On March 29 1990 for more than a week, there was a nationwide manifestation by the members of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement in favour of President Paul Biya and against any multipartism. The militants of the CPDM sang patriotic songs supporting their party chairman to justify the fact that, they were not ready for multipartism and with placards carrying the following messages; "No to precipitated multipartism, Down with detractors of the New Deal, No to anarchy, Away with detractors and away with divisive tendencies, we support Paul Biya Fon of Fons, we say no to multipartism" These manifestations were headed by big barons of the party such as the Governors, Ministers, and Directors of State Corporations who were profiting from the system and needed no change. The manifestations which were in most of the urban cities of Cameroon started from the Douala¹⁰¹.

Though the President saw how he had a national support from his party not to accept multipartism, intense pressure both from the international and national actors pushed the President during a CPDM extra ordinary Congress of the CPDM on 28th June 1990, to hold his party to prepare for "eventual competition" In this respect, a series of measures led to the Law of 90/056 of December 19, 1990 relating to the formation of political parties without any restrictions.Hence, the pressure the government was getting both from the internal and external partners to see that democracy is instituted in Cameroon yielded fruits¹⁰². However, this law states that no party shall be authorised if it's undermines the territorial integrity national unity, the Republican character of the state, National sovereignty and national integration, in particular through any type of discrimination¹⁰³.

⁹⁹ J. V. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-Present (2018) ..., p. 250.

¹⁰⁰Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua 20th November 2018.
¹⁰¹H. Touo, Multiparty Politics and ..., pp. 19-20.
¹⁰² Law 90/53 of 19th December 1990.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 21.

2. Organisation of the party

CPDM was the principal political party in Cameroon. Its presence all over the country they had CPDM militant. They have well and performant organization and its objectives are defined on its status.

Concerning the organization of the party, we have officials at the base level and at the national level. The basic structure of the Party is the Cell. A set of Cells forms a Basic Committee. A set of Base Committees form a Sub-Section. A set of Sub-Sections forms a Section. The Section is headed by an elected Bureau.

Concerning the governing bodies of the Party, we have three main instances:

-The Congress

1. The Congress defines the political, economic, social and cultural orientation as well as the general framework of the Party's action.

2. It is held every five years. However, if necessary, this period can be shortened or extended by the Political Bureau.

It may be convened for an extraordinary session under the conditions set out in Article
 of these Statutes

-The Central Committee

-The Political Bureau

3. The Objective of the Party

Concerning the objectives of the party, the article 2^{104} of the status states:

The Cameroonian People's Democratic Rally Party aims to bring together and mobilize the populations of Cameroon in order to:

- the consolidation of national unity, integration and independence;
- promotion of a democratic political system;
- Cameroon's economic development;
- the safeguard of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and in the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, in particular equality of all before the law;

¹⁰⁴ CPDM status, article 2.

• contribution to their civic and political education and to the promotion of their economic and social interests;

• the safeguard and promotion of Cameroonian cultural values, in particular bilingualism;

• the development of political orientations and an action program aimed at the search for the well-being of all through work in order, peace and democracy;

• research and consolidation of African Unity.

• the contribution to the development and modernization of Africa in the current context of globalization;

• contributing to the establishment of a new, more balanced and just world order;

• promoting the protection of nature and sustainable development;

• strengthening of sub-regional and regional integration.

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• the development of political orientations and an action program aimed at the search for the well-being of all through work in order, peace and democracy;

• research and consolidation of African Unity.

• the contribution to the development and modernization of Africa in the current context of globalization;

• contributing to the establishment of a new, more balanced and just world order;

• promoting the protection of nature and sustainable development;

• strengthening of sub-regional and regional integration¹⁰⁵.

B- Opposition Parties

In order to know or classify which of the opposition parties is a major political party, we have decided to take a number of criteria into consideration, such as making sure, a party is represented in parliament or has at least 5% during presidential elections to be considered as a major opposition party. It's important to evaluate how many times the party has participated in elections in Cameroon at various levels like council, parliamentary or presidential elections. When we evaluate from the number of elections the party has participated in, we shall proceed to see if the party has won in any of the elections and the number of seats. Finally, we shall evaluate the participation of the party at Presidential elections. Our interest will be to see what the percentage is scored during the said election as we consider any percentage below 5% as eliminatory¹⁰⁶.

1) The Mechanism of Selection of Parliamentary and Presidential Candidates

The type of personality chairing the party is equally some indices to evaluate the viability of the party. We have noticed that most of the vibrant opposition parties in Cameroon have as leaders' former members of government, and political figures such Bouba Bello Maigari¹⁰⁷ the former Minister during the Ahamadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya regime who created political parties to express their dissatisfaction with the manner the state affairs are being managed. Similarly other leaders like Adamu Ndam Njoya, Federick Kodock, Hogbe Nlend, Issa Chiroma Bakari¹⁰⁸. The exception is Edith Kah Walla who is an intellectual and members of the civil society decamped from SDF to form her own party. Marice Kamto has since been in government as the exceptions who had to quit the parties because of disagreements. According to the above criteria, the major political parties are; SDF, UNDP, UPC, CDU, MDR, MLLC, MP, MRC of Maurice Kamto who have participated and won at least a seat during the Parliamentary elections or have scored above 5% at Presidential elections in Cameroon from the rebirth of multipartism in the 1990s to 2013¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁵ Status of CPDM

¹⁰⁶ M. D. Delancey and al, Historical Dictionary of ..., pp. 149-152.

¹⁰⁷ Portraying owners of political parties, who have been former members of government¹⁰⁸Hamadou Mohamed, 57 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19 november 2019

¹⁰⁹ H. Touo, *Multiparty politics and ..., p. 14.*

2) The Major Political Parties

The various major political parties, the date of creation, town of creation, head quarters, presentation of the main leader of the party, the zone of influence, differentsessions of elections that they participated in at for parliamentary and presidential levels.

	POLITICAL PARTIES									
CPDM		SDF	UPC	NUDP	CDU	MDR	MP	MRC		
Date of Creation	March 1985	May 1990	1991	Febuary 1991	March 1991	1991	August 1991	August 2012		
Town of Creation	Bamenda	Bamenda	Douala	Douala	Yaounde	Yaounde	Douala	Yaoundé		
Head Quarters	Yaounde	Bamenda	Yaounde	Yaounde	Yaoundé	Yaounde	Douala	Yaoundé		
Various Leaders	Paul Biya	John Fru Ndi	Agustin Kodock	Bello Bouba Maigari	Adamou Ndam Njoya	Dakolé Daïssala	Jean Jacques Ekindi	Maurice Kamto		
Area of Influence	National Territory	70% of the National Territory	Bassa area	FarNorth, North and Adamaou a Regions	Noum Division	Far North Region	Wouri division	60% National territory		
Legislativ es elections	1992,199 7, 2002,200 7, 2013	1997, 2002, 2007, 2013	1992 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013	1992 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013	1997. 2002, 2007, 2013	1992 1997 2002 2007 2013	1992 2007 2013	2013		
Presidenti al elections	1992,199 7, 2004, 2011	1992, 2004, 2011	1992, 1997, 2004,	1992, 2004, 2011	1992, 2004, 2011	1992, 2004, 2011	1992 2004	/		

Table N° 1: Parties considered as major political parties in Cameroon

Source: Author's Collection and Compilation from election results

The Social Democratic Front (SDF)

This political party is the main challengefor the ruling party since the return of multipartism. It was launched in Bamenda on the 26th of May 1990 before the law authorising the liberalisation of pluralism signed on the 19th December 1990¹¹⁰. The party was forcefully launched before signing of multipartism law which saw the death of six young Cameroonian by the military forces¹¹¹. The head quarter of the SDF at creation was Bamenda, the regional capital of the North

¹¹⁰The Law No: 090/056 of 19, 1990 which authorized the formation of political parties in Cameroon promulgated by the Head of State, His Excellency President Paul Biya.

¹¹¹SDF, The struggle for democracy and good governance, p. 16.

West of Cameroon which was subsequently transferred to Yaoundé. The founding of the SDF by the founding fathers was aimed at protecting the interest of the Anglophones whom they considered marginalise. This explains why they resorted in the creation of a political party for the interest of the minority. As the party was legalised, with the admission of militants from diverse background all over the national territory, the SDF changed her initial agenda at creation which was the maginalisation of the Anglophes to the problem of the entire country. Remarkably it saw the influential contributions of the Bamilekes both in their numbers and financial support for the growth of the party. This resulted to the conclusion in which the SDF proposed a federal system of government in which they hope it was to be decided by the people. In which there is absolute separation of power between the legislative, judiciary and the executive proposed in a constitution for Cameroon should they succeed in taking over power in Cameroon¹¹². This is the system of draft Federation constitution of the SDF, the structure of the SDF party being, the Convention, The NEC, National Executive, Divisional Executive, District Executive, The Ward which is well structured in seven regions of the country¹¹³.

The SDF remained within our entire period of study as a committed opposition party by not joining the government of the CPDM inspite the proposal from the ruling government to give some Ministerial positions. The efforts made by the CPDM to get them integrated into the government have been abortive. However, the ruling party has used a number of strategies to weaken the party but the party has remained resolute to its course and is the major opposition party in Cameroon. They have fought in parliament to come out with an independent electoral code which has not been successful, nevertheless they have been able to bring some remarkable changes in election organisation in Cameroon as submitted by honourable Mbah Ndam¹¹⁴. This is changing from the MINATD to NEO ¹¹⁵ and to ELECAM. The SDF has fought to bring some sort of semi accountability within the government like in the case of Mouchopou Siedou where he fraudulently presented bills and was paid close to two millards francs cfa for public contracts and exaggerated others. On the 7th of September 1999 he was investigated by the judicial police on those accounts

¹¹² SDF, proposed constitution for Cameroon for a new dispensation, Bamenda, 16th December 1994.

¹¹³The Social Democratic Front (S.D.F), Democracy Justice and Development proposed Constitution for Cameroon, Bamenda, December 16, 1994 signed by Ni John Fru Nidi, National Chairman of SDF.

¹¹⁴ Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, Cameroon and SEMAC Parliamenterian, Yaounde, 23rd July 2019.

 $^{^{115}}$ LOI N° 2000/016 DU 19 DECEMBRE 2000 PORTANT CREATION D'UN OBSERVATOIRE NATIONAL DES ELECTIONS

of fraud. When he was found guilty and sentence to twenty years of imprisonment in November of 2003. The credit of this imprisonment is given to the SDF members of parliament¹¹⁶.

The SDF boycotted the 1992 Parliamentary elections requesting for a good electoral system in Cameroon but participated in the Presidential election in the same year with the same electoral laws. The SDF is believed to be victorious in the election as presented by SDF and the election observing body, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) revealed in a working session with Christopher Fomunyoh¹¹⁷. The SDF boycotted one Parliamentary and Presidential elections requesting for acceptable electoral conditions in order to guarantee free and fair elections in Cameroon. The Chairman of the party is Ni John Fru Ndi from inception of SDF till our upper limit of studies, this has equally raised a lot of criticism within the national territory as other political actors and members of the SDF have been advocating, the chairman needs to step down and give the opportunity to other members of SDF to manage the party activities. Manu have argured the party is not a personal property of the National chairman of the SDF Ni Joh Fru Ndi which equally ture for some SDF members of parliament who are not willing to hand over power to the younger politicians¹¹⁸.

SDF is implanted in almost the entire nation with great influence in the North West Region, a large part of Western Region, Littoral and South West Regions. Concerning the Western Region, its influence was extended to the Bamilike areas except of Bamoun Kingdom which is principally for CDU as it dominance has been recorded since the return of multipartism¹¹⁹. In the Littoral Region, the parties greatly implanted in Wouri and Mungo Divisions¹²⁰. In the South West, the party was implanted in Lebiallem, Meme, Kumba, Fako Divisions where the party's presence is really felt.

The SDF party's presence is significantly seen in the Centre Region as they have won some councils and parliamentary seats which were seized by the ruling party as presented by Honorable

¹¹⁶ Mounchipou Seidou, "Ex-ministre camerounais des Postes et Télécoms, est décédé 2 ans à peine après sa sortie de prison". Found: https://www.investiraucameroun.com/gestion-publique/1901-7061-mounchipou-seidou-ex-ministre-camerounais-des-postes-et-telecoms-est-decede-2-ans-a-peine-apres-sa-sortie-de-prison. Consulted 10th June 2021.

¹¹⁷Christopher Fomuyoh, 63 years, Regional Director for National Democratic Institute for Africa, Bamenda, 18th October 2019

¹¹⁸Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 63 years, chief of secretariat SDF head office in Bamenda, Bamenda, 1st December 2020.

¹¹⁹ Chemboa Andre Leopold, 79 years, Financial Secretary of SDF for Western Region, Bafoussam on 11th Marchv2019.

¹²⁰ Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

Mbah Ndam in a working session, where the party had to go for litigation but finally lost the case to the CPDM party. It has influenced in the North, Far North, Adamawa, East and South Regions. This party has participated in the afore-mentioned parliamentary and presidential elections

The National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP)

The NUDP is one of the major political parties in Cameroon created in February 1991. The main ideology was democracy, capitalism and anti communism, the leader was Samuel Eboua and during the party's first congress from 4-5 January 1992 in Garoua, Bouba Bello Maigari was elected as the President of NUDP¹²¹. Nchia affirm that:

Bello Bouba Maigari replaced the pioneer president of the party Samuel Eboua-victim of a conspiracy in the Garoua Congress masterminded by a group of Northerners. Endong confirms that massive defection started in the (NUDP) as key players of the party left to join Movement for Democracy and Progress (MDP) formed by Samuel Eboua after the Garoua Congress in January 1992. Before Hamadou Mustapha and Issa Tchiroma Bakary could be excluded from the party, they had joined the ruling CPDM coalition government- Presidential majority¹²².

This pushed Samuel Eboua to quit the party forming Movement for Democracy and Progress (MDP) which did not have much success. The majority of its supporters and militants are from the North of Cameroon. Many of its militants and Cameroonian politicians considered the NUDP to be representing the legacy of former President of Cameroon Ahamadou Ahidjo who ruled from 1960 to1982 when he handed power to President Paul Biya. It was established as an opposition party and won the largest number of opposition parliamentary seats during the March 1, 1992 Parliamentary election where it won a total of 68 parliamentary seats out of a total number of 180 as this was the peak period of the party in Cameroon's History.

It should be noted that; initially the NUDP had agreed with other opposition parties not to participate in the 1992 Parliamentary elections but at the last moment decided to take part in the elections. It became the second most represented party in Parliament with 68 seats and during the Presidential election of 1992, Bouba Bello was the third receiving 19.2% of the national vote count as per the official report of the results from the Cameroon government¹²³. The party started as an opposition party in the 1990s, after the Parliamentary elections of 1992 some of its members were integrated into the government like Issa Tchiroma¹²⁴. This was subsequently followed by the

¹²¹Bello Jonas, 60 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2018.

¹²² C. F. Nchia, "Party politics in ...", p. 24.

¹²³M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., pp. 270-271.

¹²⁴ People Pill, Issa Tchiroma Cameroonian Politician, https://peoplepill.com/people/issa-tchiroma, consulted 18th August 2019.

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President who accepted a Ministerial appointment and has taken the party to be pro CPDM or government. This is one of the reasons advanced by its critics for the drastic drop of the party's structure.

Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC)

The UPC party was created on the 10th April 1948 in Bassa in Douala has always been a controversial movement as considered by the government and the French colonial administration terrorist party or organisation¹²⁵. The patriotic founders of the party or those who supported the ideology of the party like Ruben Um Nyobe, Charles Assale and Felix Moumie were for total and immediate independence of Cameroon had to escapedout of Cameroon for their safety although, most of them were killed within and out of Cameroon.

The UPC party re-surfaced in 1991 with the return of multipartism in Cameroon. The party held a number of congresses in 1991, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004 and 2007. They have participated in a number of parliamentary elections where few of them had been elected. The party came second during the 1997 presidential election represented by Henri Hogbe Nlend who came second after President Paul Biya as the main opposition parties boycotted the elections. There have been a lot of internal struggles for power within the UPCits split into three factions as we have UPC of Nde Ntumaza which was pro SDF, UPC and Augustin Federic Kodock which was pro CPDM same as UPC Hogbe Nlend equally pro CPDM. The party had members in parliament, participated in Presidential elections, and got its militants appointed to Ministerial positions as we saw the last appearance in 2007.

Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU)

The CDU party was founded on 26th April 1991 by Adamou Ndam Njoya a former Minister of Education under President Ahmadou Ahidjo. The party remained completely as an opposition party without joining the governemt. It did not join the government as other parties like NUDP, UPC, MDR changed from pro-opposition to pro government. The party boycotted the March 1992 Parliamentary elections, October 1997 Presidential while during the October 11th 2004,

¹²⁵Oumarou, 65 years old, CPDM member, Figuil 26th November 2018.

Presidential election the CDU candidate Adamou Ndam Njoya represented the coalition of opposition political parties but John Fru Ndi objected since he was not the one selected¹²⁶.

The CDU party concentrated its influence in the Noun Division where it had been winning almost all the council and parliamentary seats. During the parliamentary election of 2007 the CDU formed an Alliance with Progressive Movement (MP) of Jean-Jacque Ekindi agreeing not to run candidates in the Wouri Centre constituency where the MP was competing. This gave the opportunity for the MP party to be victorious. During the proceeding elections wherein, there was no Alliance and the MP lost the parliamentary seat. The founder of the party Adamou Ndam Njoya considered elective positions to be his family property as submitted by¹²⁷ a strong supporter of the CDU who says most of the elective positions be it mayor or parliamentary candidates are in one way or the other related to the founder in blood relation especially in Noun Division¹²⁸. The party successfully participated and won seats for the parliament and participated in the presidential election which has earned the party recognition as one of the major political parties in Cameroon.

Movement for the Defence of the Republic (MDR)

The MDR party was created by Dakole Daissala. It is mostly based in the Far North Region. The party participated in the multiparty parliamentary election of 1st March 1992 in which it won six parliamentary seats. The CPDM went into an alliance with the MDR in 1992 after the Parliamentary election in order to obtain a parliamentary majority¹²⁹. This alliance led to the appointment of its leader as Minister of State for Post and Telecommunications from 1992-1997, with three other Ministerial position to MDR as compensation¹³⁰. Its President held the position of deputy President at the National Assembly from 1997-2002. He was appointed Minister of Transport from 2004-2007 and finally appointed a Senator in 2013.

The MDR party supported the 2008 constitutional revision of removing the presidential two-term limit thereby permitting Paul Biya to run for another mandate in 2011 and the party president equally supported a two round of election with compulsory voting. In the parliamentary

¹²⁶Atanga Godwin, 55 years old, cadre à cellule de communication du MDR, Tabati, 19th May 2018.

¹²⁷ Bello Hamed, 60 years, member of CDU, Tibati, 20th December 2019

¹²⁸ CDU supporter saying almost all elective positions are link to the founder, this equally seen when the founder of the party died in 2020, the position of the chairman of the party was not given to the Vice chairman who was the next in command but it was given to the wife of late Adamou Ndam Njoya. This got the vice chairman frustrated and resigned from the CDU party.

¹²⁹Gansop Emile, 56 years old, militant du MDR, Garoua-Boulai 22 december 2019

¹³⁰ M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 254.

election of 1997, the party got only one seat and finally did not make any seat during the 2002 elections while during the 2013 parliamentary elections, the party won again one seat¹³¹. The MDR which is mostly represented in the Far North has participated and won parliamentary seats in 1992, 1997 and 2013 which made to be considered as a major political party in Cameroon.

Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC)

The MRC was founded in August 2012 by Professor Maurice Kamto. It contested and won a seat in the 2013 parliamentary election. In fact, it is very remarkable that within the period of one year of its creation, the party was able to obtain a parliamentary seat which showed the initial popularity. This is because, there are a number of political parties that exist for years and have not been able to win a parliamentary seat as compared to the MRC that participated for the first time and got a parliamentary seat as analysed by one of Cameroon's scholar¹³². The President of MRC was a member of the international Commission of the United Nations from 1999-2016. Maurice Kamto and Peter Ntamark were pivotal members in the commission for the resolution of the Bakassi issue infavour of Cameroon. This helped in the appointment of Maurice Kamto as Minister Delegate to the Ministry of Justice in 2004 but he resigned from the government in November 2011.

Progressive Movement (MP)

The MP party was founded on 23 August 1991 by Jean Jacques Ekindi. The party presented its leader for the 1992 presidential election, during a campaign at the Cameroon Radio Television part of his campaign message was refused to be aired on 2nd October saying it was insultive and defamatory to the President. Though it was later aired on 7th October as the decision was reviewed by the National Communication Board (NCB). This gave the impression that, the party created some impact in Cameroon's political life. Its leader assumed the name of Lion Hunter "Chasseur du lion¹³³" for his fierce opposition to Paul Biya who named himself l'homme lion during the 1992 presidential elections. He advocated for a unitary state as he submitted that it was less expensive as opposed to Federation presented by other politicians as a means to remedy the political situation

¹³¹Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, MDR leader in Mayo Danai, Datcheka, 15th August 2019.

¹³²Peterkins Manyong, 61 years, Publisher of independent observer, Bamenda, 4th May 2020.

¹³³ Eco Matin, "Jean Jaques Ekindi: le chasseur de lion revient dans la tanière". Found: https://ecomatin.net/jean-jaques-ekindi-le-chasseur-de-lion-revient-dans-la-taniere/. Consulted 15th Setember 2019.

in Cameroon. In subsequent campaigns over the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), Jean Jacques Ekindi's party campaigns were refused broadcast saying he was not respecting the laws. On the 11th October presidential election at the last moment on the 10th October he withdrew from the elections declaring in favour of Ni John Fru Ndi the candidate of SDF.

The MP party Chairman openly said some of the parties created were for personal interest and done by government agents to weaken the opposition parties in Cameroon. He even advocated that to him, there was no need for so many political parties as he would have loved to have only three parties; one in the government and the other two being opposition parties.

On the 22nd July 2007, its leader was elected into parliament from the Wouri Centre Constituency in the Littoral Province. At this time, the party had established an alliance with CDU, wherein the party was not going to present a candidate in Wouri because the SDF had decided to present a candidate for the Wouri constituency ignoring their previous arrangement. The party leader participated in political consultations with the Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni regarding the appointment of the members of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM). When the president finally appointed CPDM leading members into ELECAM on 30th December 2008, Ekindi was very upset saying proposals made during the consultation were not taken into consideration by the president. He expected members of ELECAM to be neutral and independent individuals as oppose the appointments of CPDM big-wigs into ELECAM¹³⁴.

Political Parties	CPDM	SDF	NUDP	UPC	CDU	MDR	MLJC	MP	MRC
Participation in		4	4		4	2	2	3	1
Presidential									
election									
Seats in 1992	88	Absent	68	18	Absent	6	Absent	Absent	Absent
Seats in 1997	116	43	13	1	5	1	1	0	Absent
Seats in 2002	149	22	1	3	5	0	0	0	Absent
Seats in 2007	153	16	6	0	4	0	0	1	Absent
Seats in 2013	148	18	5	3	4	1	Absent	0	1

Table N° 2: Statistics of parliamentary seats for the major political parties from the rebirth of multipartism to 2013

Source: Author compilation from election results.

¹³⁴Appointment of members of elecam who are big wing of cpdm at ELECAM and constitutional council.

3) Presidential Majorities and other smaller Political Parties

As advanced by Jacques Jean Ekindi the creation of many political parties in Cameroon was meant for personal interests for it was not meant to fight the government in power¹³⁵. We started seeing that instead of politicians fighting for the interests of the parties, they were fighting for their personal interests. A number of vibrant political parties decided to campaign for the candidate of the CPDM party President Paul Biya like NUDP of Bouba Bello Margari, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, Hogbe Nlend faction of UPC and a group of G20 parties who are always there to support the candidature of CPDM presidential candidate.

The G20 are group of Cameroon opposition parties who have regrouped themselves to support the candidature of Paul Biya for Presidential election. One of the candidates for the presidential elections of 2011 Jean De Dieu Momo who is now a very strong supporter of Paul Biya candidacy, saying it will help to maintain Cameroon in peace and stability, considering it the best decision he has ever taken in his life. In fact, some of these smaller parties are not really known till when the presidential elections are coming up as we see them offering their support to the CPDM candidate Paul Biya for reelection.

The Relationship Between Political Parties

There has been no stable relationship between political parties in Cameroon be it between the ruling party or between the opposition parties. At one moment you see the parties working together and during another election you see the parties working apart. In the early 1990s, saw the main opposition almost working together but because of greed there could not come out with a unique opposition candidate for the presidential elections. The ruling party on its part collaborated with a party or its member by giving them appointment but once the alliance or collaboration is no longer productive for the ruling party, the candidate is thrown out of the government.

1) Relationship between opposition parties and the ruling party

There is a very radical relationship between the opposition and the ruling party. There has been no cordial relationship between the main opposition parties and the ruling party. The ruling party has been making all efforts to weaken the opposition party by integrating some of its

¹³⁵Mahamet Ali, 56 yaers old, MDR member Mokolo, Maroua 20th November 2019.

members into government without the approval of the party. This was seen in 1992 appointment of Issa Tchiroma Bakary and Monchoupou Seidou without the approval of NUDP hierarchy¹³⁶. Also, the integration of Federick Augustine Kodock and Hogbe Nleng from the UPC divided the party into factions. The government tried in the SDF but was not very successful because of the vigilant nature of the party but during internal difficulties of the party such as the convention organised by the first Vice President in Yaoundé, the government took the opportunity to further

organised by the first Vice President in Yaoundé, the government took the opportunity to further divide the party into factions¹³⁷.For instance in the conflict between the former Secretary General Tazoacha Asongangi of SDF and his party, the government did not act as an honest broker.

During the first multiparty Parliamentary election of 1992, the major opposition parties had agreed, they were not going to participate in the election if there was no independent electoral code. This was to make sure the elections were going to be free and fair. At the last minute the NUDP one of the main opposition parties, decided to take part in the elections. Unfortunately, the CPDM was not able to get a majority in Parliament. The MDR apparently received encouragement from the CPDM as it formed a coalition with government in 1992. In return, the MDR was given four cabinet positions which now gave the ruling party a comfortable majority¹³⁸.

2) Relationship between opposition parties

The relationship among the opposition parties has been a very stormy one because of greed. This started during the first parliamentary multiparty elections, in which the main opposition parties decided not to participate but at the end NUDP participated for her personal interests and this weakened the strength of the opposition party. Bouba Belo Maigari double-crossed Samuel Eboua by accepting that his party is going to participate in the election after collecting bribe and the five hundred million frs cfa promised any party that was willing to participate in the election by the government¹³⁹. There was a cordial relationship between the SDF and CDU who stood firm

¹³⁶The nomination of Issa Tchiroma without the party approval in the governeùent of Yang Philemon was the beginning of internal fighting with the NUDP party for the party did not give the clearance for them to joint the government. It was judged by the party; this was done for the interest of the individuals and not that of the party. ¹³⁷Hamadou Mohamed, 57 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2019.

¹³⁸M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 254.

¹³⁹SDF, The struggle for ..., pp. 80-82.

in their decision to boycott the parliamentary election of 1992, the presidential election of 1997 which was a sign of solidarity¹⁴⁰.

The SDF and its new allies of twenty parties called Alliance for the Reconstruction of Cameroon through a Sovereign National Conference (ARC-SCN) decided to boycott legislative elections until electoral laws were revised to apply in a multi-party democratic setting and an independent electoral national electoral commission created that would organise the whole process starting with registration of voters and the voting proper, right up to the proclamation of results¹⁴¹.

The SDF and the MP collaborated in the 1997 parliamentary election in which the SDF did not present candidate in Wouri which facilitated the MP to win a parliamentary seat in Wouri Central. Once the SDF decided to present a candidate during the 2002 election, the alliance changed hand from SDF-MP to MP-CDU, this shows some sort of collaboration between opposition parties as it gave positive results. The fact is that, once MP was not collaborating with any of the parties, she was not victorious in an election, though their collaboration was not formal¹⁴².

It is equally remarkable that during the Tripartite Conference of October 1991, the opposition stood as one as they had formed the Coalition of Opposition Parties (COP) which made them stronger as they were talking as a team. At the end of the Tripartite Conference 13th November 1991 the declaration was signed only by 40 out of the participating 47 parties. Since the Samuel Tchwenko adviser of the SDF most popular and organised party refused signing, the government took advantage not to implement the tripartite declarations¹⁴³. As the opposition was no longer working as a team, and weakened in the relative calm that had returned, the government took the opportunity to call for early parliamentary elections in March 1992.

In the presidential election of 2004, some main opposition parties decided to come out with a unique candidate for the opposition parties to fight against the CPDM candidate Paul Biya Here Adamou Ndam Njoya of CDU was elected by the Coalition for National Reconcillation and Reconstruction (CNRR) with 15 parties behind the candidacy of Ndam Njoya¹⁴⁴. The Chairman of the SDF who wanted to be the opposition unique candidate objected the choice and decided to

¹⁴⁰Strong collaboration between CDU and SDF and boycotting the same elections as seen in their both boycott of the 1992 parliamentary election, the absention from the presidential election of 1997 as there were both requesting for better conditions to make sure there is free and fair election.

¹⁴¹SDF, the struggle for democray, p. 81.

¹⁴² Ade Joseph Awah, 59 years, SDF militant and close aid to Ni John Fru Ndi, Bamenda, 13th March 2019.

¹⁴³J.V. Ngoh, Biya and the ..., p. 440.

¹⁴⁴M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of ..., p.* 150.

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stand alone and this weakened the force of the opposition thereby leading to Biya again winning in the 2004 presidential elections¹⁴⁵. Though all the opposition parties did not succeed in getting a unique candidate we consider this step as already a good beginning in trying to bring a united force to fight President Paul Biya.

3) The relationship between civil society and the political parties

The political and economic atmosphere in Cameroon was so tense from all the sectors of life as Cameroonians needed change. The civil society leaders starting from lawyers as we could site the situation of Yondo Black who amongst nine others were picked-up for trying to form a political party in 1990, leaders of "Bayam Sellam" and taxi unions, Teachers' union leaders, the Church with prominent leader like Cardinal Tumi, openly advocated for change of power in Cameroon. The civil society joined the opposition in promoting ghost town, non respect of the government institutions as a means to push the government to accept change which led to the law of 5 December 1990 legalising the formation of political parties in Cameroon.

The civil society's main objective was to see that, the dictatorial regime in Yaoundé accepts multi-partism in Cameroon. The civil society had seen from the results of Franco-Afrique meeting, wherein the master (France) had told its students (French African Head of States) to institute some acceptable level of democracy¹⁴⁶ and the civil society used it as a means to push the government for multi-partism. The aggressive nature of the government in using force and the military against the population further increased the civil society's hatred for the government.

The house arrest of Ni John Fru Ndi 1n 1992 after the proclamation of presidential elections results coupled with the state of emergency declared in the North West Region was a serious cause of disgruntleness from the civil society against the state. It further created a tense relationship between the citizens and the government¹⁴⁷.

III- The social situation in Cameroon during the restoration of multi-partism

¹⁴⁵Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20th November 2019.

¹⁴⁶ French President asking African presidents to institute some minimal level of democracy as a pre condition to get some financial aid. This was clearly helighted during the President speech at the Franco-Africa Submit at La Baule. ¹⁴⁷ Egoh Aziz, Civil society and politics in Africa, the case of Cameroon, pp. 9-12.

The internal pressure as the pressure from political and external factor like France government influence the putting in place of new rule to see that some level of democracy are instituted in Cameroon.

The elaboration and promulgation of the law

The internal and external pressure on President Paul Biya in the 90s was getting too high that he had no other option than to abide by the demands of the civil society and the political activists to accept multi-partism by signing the pluralism Law on 5th December 1990¹⁴⁸ even against the support of his CPDM.

Campaigns for Multipartism

The pressure from political activists in 1990 for the liberalisation of multi-partism was so timely, that all the sectors of the economy wanted democracy and the introduction of multipartism in Cameroon. We got people from almost all the sectors who were not happy with the way the state was managing activities in Cameroon from the civil society, religious leaders, politicians and a majority of the population as this was evidence of the turnout at rallies organised by the politicians¹⁴⁹. We had former and current members of the CPDM who really wanted change. In reference to the failed attempted take-over of 1984, most of the Northerns who were in government of Ahamadou Ahidjo such as Issa Tchiroma Bakary, Diakole Diassala, Samuel Eboua etc were picked up and jaile. Bouba Belo Maigari was forced to escape out of Cameroon for they were assumed to be enemies of the state. When the time came in 1990 that amnesty was granted to political exiles and the possibility of creating new political parties, these groups of politicians who had been living in the cold or suffering in jails had the opportunity to express their political aspirations.

The civil society and the students of the University of Yaoundé I which was the lone University in Cameroon were not happy with their situation. They campaigned too for change of government and the absolute need of new reforms at the University. The student leaders

¹⁴⁸Law 90/53 of 19th December 1990.

¹⁴⁹ The call for demonstration from politicians especially in urban cities likes in Bamenda, Douala and Yaounde, where we saw a very heavry turnout of the population to listen on what the politicians are saying was evidence Cameroonians are not really happy the way the country is managed. In such rallies we see people of all sectors of life, even including students as we have to note, the level of unemployment was equally very high which is one of the grievances of the population.

(parliament) called for total a strike in which the lecturers later joined with strikers carrying the message "Biya must go"¹⁵⁰. Ironically, the President visited the economic capital of Douala mocking the students and the opposition saying "*me voice donc a Douala*" Here I am in Douala¹⁵¹. The government reacted by bringing the military in the student residential areas from April-May of 1991¹⁵². The students were beaten, raped, property was looted, consequently, diplomatic institutions and the international community called on the Cameroon government to respect of human rights.

The souveteurs or call them *Buyam sellams* joined the train in supporting the demand for multipartism. It should be noted that, most of these small business men and women were educated people who had completed school and could not find an office job. They made the civil disobedience very successful as they refused to pay taxes and as such making it very difficult for the government to attain its outlined objectives as presented by Tazoh Daniel¹⁵³.

The initiative of the intellectuals by publicly criticising the wrongs of the government on the new papers or over the radio and television gave the opportunity for many Cameroonians to know of the ills of the government. There was a radio program on Sunday morning called "Cameroon calling" which gave the possibility to most of the civil society and intellectuals to express their dissatisfaction with the government.

The church officials precisely the Episcopal council headed at that time by eminent Cardinal Tumi called on the government to respect human rights and open up for pluralism as the only solution to the Cameroonian problem. Though he was a church official and not a politician, he thought the only way of resolving the Cameroonian problem was through a political means in which he joined his voice to call for political reforms¹⁵⁴.

Campaigns Against Multipartism

There were some Cameroonians especially the few members of the CPDM who were profiting from the dictatorial and unaccountable system in Yaoundé. They were against the

¹⁵⁰ There were rallies organized by the students in which there had placards on which it was written, we need reforms in the University. Some politicians entered the rallies which was taking place both at the university campus and on the street of the urban cities with placards written "Biya Must Go ...

¹⁵¹J.V. Ngoh, *Biya and the* ..., p. 438.

¹⁵²J.V. Ngoh, *Democracy and Democratisation*..., p. 26.

¹⁵³ Tazoh Daniel. 58 years, Taxation worker in Bamenda. Bamenda, 26th September 2019.

¹⁵⁴ Cardinal Tumi calling for political reforms in 1990s

lies in the major citie

restoration of multipartism. The big barons of the ruling party organised rallies in the major cities of Cameroon starting from Douala saying "No to multiparism, away with detractors of the new deal, no to precipitated plularism, no to anarchy, no to external interference ctc"¹⁵⁵. Precisely, rallies were headed by the Governors, Ministers, Directors of State Corporations, Military Officials, Senior Divisional Officers, Sub Divisional Officers and top sympathisers of the ruling party who were campaigning against multiparism and wanted Biya to remain in power as they were profiting from the regime in power and wanted no change¹⁵⁶. The letter of motion of support written to the President, Messages on, Cameroon Tribune saying it was dangerous to go for multipartism at that early time so we should wait...

Some CPDM radical like the Wouri Section President Jean-Jaques Ekindi called for the institution of political liberalism. John Ngu Foncha, the first National Vice Chairman of the Party and Grand Chancellor resigned his position from the party in 1990 complaining of the repressive policy of the party and because he was treated as a nuisance by the national president of the party Paul Biya¹⁵⁷.

The law of Liberty and Freedom Published in 1990

The Foumane Akame Commission's proposals were subsequently approved and adopted by the National Assembly. These were a number of laws promulgated amongst which were the Law No. 90/055 regulating meetings, demonstrations which had to be organised or held in public places wherein the organisers of such eventswere require to apply for an authorisation. The Law No. 90/056 provides for the formation of political parties while article 14 calls for the provision of funds for political parties that contest elections¹⁵⁸.

Violence and repression

The period of 1990-1992 was a tense period in the History of the reintroduction of multipartism in Cameroon. The political activists, civil society and the general population needed immediate change even at the risks of their lives. We saw how the general population was taking instructions from the opposition parties instead of the government by respecting ghost town called

¹⁵⁶J.V. Ngoh, *Biya and the* ..., p.434.

¹⁵⁵H. Touo, *Multiparty politics and* ..., pp. 19-20.

¹⁵⁷J.V. Ngoh, Biya and the ..., p. 436.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 436-437.

by the opposition and the civil society leaders. The government put in place all the strategies to stop the population from advancing in their abjective even through the use of the police, gendermes and the military. This was done through diplomacy or using the forces of peace and order which at times led to property destruction and death of innocent civilians killed by the military. One of the political analysts affirms that:

As the growing tension persisted in the North West Urban towns, the government responded with the reinforcement of more troops comprising gendarmes, policemen and soldiers to various towns. The intensification of the deployment of more troops to Bamenda was as a result of the civil disobedience proclaimed by the SDF party which was soon taken over by NCCOPA in May 1991. The forces of law and order used clubs, teargas, grenades, life bullets and water cannons to crack down and disperse demonstrators¹⁵⁹.

1) The organisation of marches and repression

The CPDM political activist marches started when news went to the big-wigs of the Cameroon People Democratic Movement that Ni John Fru Ndi allias Ebibi a book seller and some prominent Cameroonians in Bamenda had filed documents for the creation of a new political party. This act threatens the lives and positions of the barons of the CPDM, the big-wigs like Fon Angwafor III, JB Ndeh, Elvis Ngole Ngole, and Abety Peter staged a demonstration in the region with placards written: "No to precipitated democracy without peace, no to adventurers etc"¹⁶⁰. These demonstrations which were taking place in Bamenda and many of the cities were peaceful and accepted by the forces of law and order for it was against multi-partism and supporting Paul Biya¹⁶¹.

We remarkably recall the 5th July 1991 march to the then Governor Ebong Ngolle of the North West Province to hand a memorandum calling for a Sovereign National Conference by the opposition parties. The governor left his office and intercepted those marching at the Veterinary Junction where the Memorandum was read and handed to him by SDF Provincial Coordinator Mr. Mfonyam¹⁶². The population including people of all sectors of life needed to reach the final destination which was the governor's office but the coordinator was not ready to lead. This saw the exceptional leadership of Andrew Akonteh who led the crowd to upstation. On their way, they had confrontationsat finance junction with the forces of law and order but the team managed to the Governor's office without the coordinator. For this reason, he lost his position to Mr. Andrew

¹⁵⁹C. F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., p. 252.

¹⁶⁰Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20 november 2019

¹⁶¹SDF, the struggle for ..., pp. 29-30.

¹⁶²Ibid., pp. 32-34.

Akonteh. This was the first victory of the mass population for the request of democracy in Cameroon¹⁶³.

It should be recalled that on the 26th May 1990, there was a big march in Bamenda for the launching of the SDF which brought a lot of repression from the government leading to six deaths. The Chairman further proceeded to Bafoussam where he was shot on the leg but he continued resiliently to march on amidst the spray of tear gas all in an effort to get multi-partism re-instituted back in Cameroon¹⁶⁴.

The SDF coordinated Divisional leaders for the North West Region to take a trip to Yaoundé to personally meet Paul Biya and clearly present the Cameroonian situation to him for it was thought his people were not telling him the right situation on the ground. Buses left Bamenda at 4 a.m while collecting other activists on the way. At Bandjoum the National Chairman took the lead of another group and took the Bafang trajectory to gather other forces in Douala before heading for Yaoundé. His group was stopped at Boum Nyobel while the Bamenda group was stopped at the esplanade at Tonga in the presence of Chief of Army staff General Semengue in a Helicopter where he stepped down listened to the chanting militants, shookhands andtook pictures and promised the population he was taking their grievances directly to the President in Etoudi, that the people need a Sovereign National Conference¹⁶⁵. This led to the peaceful return of activists to Bafoussam and Bamenda. The Bamenda team arrived by 7pm where there was total confusion with the spray of tear gas and burning tons of papers to prevent the police from pursuing them into the quarters while talking of "ghost town"¹⁶⁶. The period of 90s was when rallies were organised and marches took place without an authorisation for the purpose of democracy in Cameroon¹⁶⁷.

Diakole Diassala was arrested after the failed coup attempt, imprisoned for seven years without any charge and was released in 1991. He participated in an unauthorised manifestation on the 13 January 2001 in Yaoundé; the manifestation was disrupted by the forces of law and order while Diakole and some members of the party were detained for about five hours¹⁶⁸..

¹⁶³ Ibid, pp. 33-34.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁶⁶Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20 november 2019

¹⁶⁷ Sama Isaac Nde, Retired SDF Divisional executive for Nkambe and Wum, 67 years, 30th September 2019.

¹⁶⁸Wikipedia, "Dakolé Daïssala". Found: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dakol%C3%A9_Da%C3%AFssala. Consulted on 28th November 2019 at 4:30pm.

2) The declaration of national ghost town

The opposition parties needed a means to make the government feel their impact or to push the government to accept pluralism or their requests for National Conference or for an independent electoral code. They instituted the issue of civil disobedience and the call for ghost towns which brought a lot of difficulties on the government in terms of collecting revenues. This was a strategy used by opposition political parties and the civil society in which the government suffered tremendously as citizens were no longer paying taxes nor respecting the orders of the government. Remarkably was the call of the main opposition party for citizens not to consume French produced goods in addition to the call for ghost towns¹⁶⁹.

The elements of ghost town were: No payment of taxes, refusal to go to work, refusal to obey the orders of councillors and parliamentarians and any other person who was elected during the one-party system. This was launched by the National Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties (NCCOP) with the avowed aim of compelling government to call for Sovereign National Conference and to put up guidelines for future elections in Cameroon.Unfortunately the government refused and banned the group while the army was called up to restore order¹⁷⁰.

3) Arrests, Intimidation and Transfers

The government using the police, gendarmes and forces of law and order at its disposal intimidated political activists, civil society members who were against the government or CPDM were arrested by the forces. We got the following frontline leaders, civil servants; political activist, lawyers and ordinary citizens were arrested and taken to police, gendarmerie and prison.

Barrister Yondo Black was arrested and taken to Brigade Mobile Mixte (BMM)¹⁷¹ in Douala wherein within ten days other nine members were arrested for being part of the group that drafted the documents in the process of forming a political party being; Julienne Badje arrested on 17 February 1990 in Douala, Djon Djon in Eseka, 19 February Yondo Black and Anicet Ekani, Henriette Ekwe, Regina Manga, Kwa Moutome, Rudolphe Bwanga and Hamani Gabriel, Vincent

¹⁷⁰M. D. Delancey and al, Historical Dictionary of ..., p. 192.

¹⁶⁹ SDF call for Cameroonians not to consume French goods as a means to show their disapproval of the French to the regime in power. As a matter of fact, this at the end worked negatively for the SDF opposition party as this let to the French government losing interest in the SDF to be a viable partner.

¹⁷¹Dibussi Tande, "Memory Lane (19 February 1990): The Yondo Black Affair Revisited" Culled from *Reform and Repression in Cameroon: A Chronicle of the Smoldering Years (1990-1992), Found:*

https://www.dibussi.com/2010/02/the-yondo-black-affair.html. Consulted on 17th November 2019 at 2pm.

Feko arrested on 21st February in Douala while Albert Mukong was arrested in Bamenda on 26th February and transferred to Douala¹⁷². Those who were arrested because they found themselves at Yondo Black during the raid were later on released while the ten others were transferred to Kondengui Maximum Security Prison in Yaoundé. There were three main groups headed by Jean Michel Tekam's for Front Democratic Camerounais, Social Democratic Front represented by Albert Mukong and Vincent Feko.

Ni John Fru Ndi was thus placed under house arrest, with a heavry contingence of gendarme officers, recently recruited, surrounding his Ntarinkon compound. Takembeng women decided to kee vigil in turns at the compound of the one they referred to their saviour, their son and their President elect¹⁷³.

He was placed under house arrest in late 1992 and later released on the 20th of January 1993 a means to stop him proceeding with his request of victory for the Presidential election of 1992 which he claimed victory. Jean Jacques Ekindi participated in opposition rally organized in Douala by the National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Association (NCOPA) in Douala on 23-24 which ended with his arrest, though it was less than a day as foreign consults fought for his release¹⁷⁴.

The reaction of the international community

International communities also influence the putting in place of the democraty in Cameroon. The most important actor in this case xas the former colonial master France. We can not neglect the influence of other foreing country and the United Nation Organizationn.

1) The French

The French government at the Franco African summits at La Baule France in June 1990 and at Chaillot, France in November 1991 insisted their financial aids and other international donors shall be baseon good governance, transparency and accountability¹⁷⁵. This somehow assisted in advancing democracy in Cameroon but was only verbal statements for there was no real democracy introduced as existed in France but financial aids were still given to Cameroon¹⁷⁶. This at one moment puts us in doubt to say are these colonial masters really sincere of their objective to really get democracy introduced in Cameroon and their colonies in general especially the French?

¹⁷²Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the Movement "Right for All", Douala, 6 febuary 2019 ¹⁷³SDF @ 25, The struggle for ..., p. 90.

¹⁷⁴ Wikipedia, "Jean Jacque Ekindi". Found : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Jacques_Ekindi. Accessed 28th November 2018, at 5:30 pm.

¹⁷⁵J. V. Ngoh, *Biya and Transition* ..., p. 432.

¹⁷⁶Gakam Aloys, 45 years old, member of CPDM, Garoua 23 november 2018

2) The United Nations and International Organisation

The international monetary fund, The United State of America, The Common Worth of Nations, The Amnesty international,

The International Monetary Fund in trying to redress Cameroon declining economic situation met with stiff resistance. The Cameroon government was not really willing to open up especially with the National Hydrocarbon Corporation wherein the accounts were only known by its Director General and the President of the Republic¹⁷⁷. It's worth taking note, it was only in 1997 the account of National Hydrocarbon Corporation (NHC) was integrated into the state budget but it's not still clear to what extent. The IMF between 1998 -1995 four stands by agreements entered to with Cameroon collapsed¹⁷⁸. The fact is that in spite of the fact, no immediate change was recorded; these international bodies did not have or put a means to force the dictator to implement democracy in Cameroon. These international bodies were more active or result oriented than the colonial masters by asking the liberation of arrested persons and andmore democracy.

3) The Position of Organistion of African Unity (OAU)

The Organisation of African Unity founded in 1963 has as its aims and objectives to safeguard the interests and independence of all African States, encourage the continent's development and settle disputes amongst member states with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. The OAU from Independence has been the main political organisation in Africa but has not got the political power as compared to the African Unity (AU). That is to say the OAU was just a silent observer as it could not enforce any of its decisions for, they lacked a standby military to enforce their decisions¹⁷⁹.

Note should be taken that almost all the African countries were almost at the same level where Africa was governed by dictators who did not really want to quit from power. The citizens needed change but those who were in power did not really like democracy as it was going to remove them from power should genuine and democratic elections be organised. They wanted to continue with a one-party system or a democracy of their own choice. As a result, the citizens had to use violence as a means to express their absolute desire for change. Thus, they requested for

¹⁷⁷Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua 20th November 2018.

¹⁷⁸Idem

¹⁷⁹Bello Jonas, 60 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré, 19th November 2018.

better human rights, accountability and democracy which created a lot of tension almost all over Africa as was seen in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Cameroon¹⁸⁰.

There are a number of factors which influenced the restoration of multipartism in Cameroon championed by certain great figures. The restoration of multipartism in Cameroon was equally influenced by some external factors such as the end of the cold war which signifies the end of communism to the adoption of capitalism as its major principle to be democracy. The effect of the Eastern wing was not only felt in the West but gradually was extended to developing countries. The French President in his address at the Franco-African summit in La Baule where he clearly indicated to the African leaders that they were obliged to introduce some sort of democracy in order to benefit any financial assistance from France. The social situation in Cameroon during the restoration of multi partism was that which the government had no other option than to legalise multipartism with law of No: 90/056 of December 1990. The population wanted change on the way the country was managed from the political, economic and social aspects. The government arrested and intimidation politicians, civil society and population to calm down the uprising. The international communities supported the Cameroon civil society and the politicians for the return to multipartism. There are a number of national factors which equally influenced the restoration of pluralism in Cameroon starting from the influence of the civil society such as the church leaders, the student communities. This gave room for political activists, civil societies and the general population who joined their voices as seen in the civil disobedience to advocate for the return to multipartism in Cameroon.

Conclusion

The chapter aimed at presenting the main factors that influenced the rebirth of multipartism in Cameroon at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. Our analysis was based on the intervention of some external influences and great figures. We also focused our analyses on the social context in Cameroon during that historical period. The chapter ends by presenting the major political parties in Cameroon since 1990s.

¹⁸⁰Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati, 20th November 2019.

CHAPTER II:

STRATEGIES DEVELOPED BY POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE ELECTIONS

Introduction

Chapter two handles the strategies developed by political parties before elections. These strategies are developed for the the parliamentary, presidential and senatorial elections from 1990 to 2013. It analyses how the various political parties prepared themselves for the various competitive elections. The discussion and appreciation of electoral law by the political parties is one of the main idea developed. This vividly explains why this chapter concentrates on the views, attitudes and various positions of the different actors implicated in the elections on the electoral law. The analysis and views of the ruling party are not very objective. Considering the observations and conclusions of the opposition parties in reference to the relationship between political parties and the organs responsible for elections organisation, it is always a point of contention. This chapter is principally based on the strategies of political parties at the eve of elections.

I - The Question of Electoral Law

The strength of any election is seen in the electoral law put in place acceptable by all the parties. The electoral law has always been a point of contention in Cameroon since the return of multipartism in the 1990s in Cameroon. The electoral law of 1992 states for the presidential and parliamentary elections¹⁸¹. The opposition parties have always criticised the weaknesses of the electoral code and requested for an independent electoral commission as a solution to the political difficulties in Cameroon. On the other side the government or the ruling party is satisfied with the electoral law put in place. The renaissance of multipartism came along with varied strategies to enhance victory in various elections at the polls. The CPDM was inherited from the one-party system which has not been used to competition. In a similar way, the newly created parties devised strong strategies to outmatch their rivals in competitive election. The prominent speech of His Excellency President Paul Biya after the, CPDM big-wigs were making public demonstration in the major cities of Cameroon saying "No to suicidal multipartism¹⁸².

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¹⁸¹ The Cameroon elections where managed by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization which the main opposition parties have been criticizing, it will not be proper for the Cameroonian Ministry of Territorial Administration and decentralization to organize election as they will not be free and fair.

¹⁸² H. Touo, *Multiparty politics and* ..., pp. 19-20.

In the midst of all these in a CPDM congress held on 28th and 29th June 1990 the President took the dramatic move in his policy speech at the Congress by announcing to its anxious militants "preparez-vous pour une eventuelle concurrence"¹⁸³ There was internal and external pressure for the President to open up for some level of democracy in order to get financial support from the Western world. The militants are encouraged to get themselves registered on the electoral lists while members of the party are requested to donate or support the party financially to enable her carry out a successful campaign. In fact, when the elections periods are getting closer the various political parties start in advance preparing their choice of candidates whose selection is sometimes done through the investiture committee or through the organization of primaries. In some cases, some of the Presidential candidates are considered as the natural candidates¹⁸⁴. As soon as the candidates are known, the various political parties prepare a variety of political party strategies before the announcement of election date.

A) The Strategy or Attitude of the Ruling Party

Since 1990, with the return of multipartism, the CPDM has no problem with the various organs responsible for the organization of election starting from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD) for the Parliamentary and Presidential elections of 1992 and 1997 elections. The ruling party has total confidence in the elections organising organs and the civil administrators in charge of the organs handling elections as they consider as bad faith for the opposition parties to criticize every situation presented by the government¹⁸⁵. It is due to pressure from the SDF, other main opposition parties and the international community that the Cameroon government instead of creating an independent electoral commission decided to create the National Election Observatory (NEO) in 2000. This was still under MINATD¹⁸⁶. The CPDM found a great improvement in the organization of elections. The subsequent creation of Elections Cameroon. This is reflected in created by Law No: 2006/011 of December 2006,¹⁸⁷ as highlighted by the manual for participatory governance¹⁸⁸. This part is going to explain and analyse

¹⁸⁶ E. V. Njoh, The Social Democratic ..., p. 62.

¹⁸³ C. F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., p. 172.

¹⁸⁴ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic Front (SDF) in multiparty in* Cameroon 1990-2010, p. 73.

¹⁸⁵Awa Fokum Augustine, year, governor of West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

¹⁸⁷ The creation of ELECAM with law No: 2006/011 of 29thDecember 2006.

¹⁸⁸Citizens' Manual for participatory governance produced by the Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy, p.9.

the reasons for the strong confidence of the CPDM in the organs organizing elections. Conversely, the opposition thinks the organs responsible for the organization are a complete scam. As such, there is a perpetual tense admosphere between the government and the opposition. They proceed to explain the ruling party's appreciation of the criticism of the opposition in reference to the electoral law.

1) Strong Confidence in Election Organizing Organs

The first question is why the strong confidence by the ruling party in the elections organizing organs; while using organs like the MINATD, ONEL or ELECAM, the CPDM officials have always indicated that through these elections organizing bodies, free and fair elections are guaranteed. The fact is that, these election organising organs are initiated and put in place by the ruling party, consequently, such bodies worked in favour of the government. Opposition parties vehemently argued that, these election organizing organs are indirectly working for the interest of the CPDM as pointed out by the SDF electorial district official for Bali¹⁸⁹. Note should be taken that the ever first multiparty elections, were organized by the government who is at the same time the ruling party. This means you cannot set the rules and turn around criticizing the electoral laws. The laws of the election organizing organs are initiated by the ruling party which means they cannot introduce laws which are against the interest of the government. They have to do everything to make sure their various interests are protected.

It is noticed with President Paul Biya of the CPDM is at the same time the Head of State and is the one appointing all the members of the elections organising body. He appointed the Minister of MINATD¹⁹⁰. The head of NEO who is still controlled by MINATD and the head of ELECAM whom some of its members have to resign from the CPDM Central Committee to take up positions in ELECAM because the two positions are not longer compatible. Therefore, if members of these elections organizing body are former members of the CPDM, there will be working for the interest of the CPDM and not that of the entire nation to conduct free and fair elections in Cameroon¹⁹¹. Historical facts show that, since the return of multipartism, the CPDM has won in all the elections organized by the various elections organizing organs. Hence it is worth evaluating whether they have the best political party strategies or it is the law that is on their side.

¹⁸⁹Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, leader of MDR in Mayo Danay, Datcheka, 15th August 2019

¹⁹⁰Habiba Nsangou, 52 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Maroua 21 november 2018

¹⁹¹Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights (CJDHR) December 2011 Volume 5, Number 2, pp. 13-14.

2) The role of the civil servants and administrators

The civil servants, the administrators and the ruling party claim they are neutral once it comes to the issue of elections. They purport they are working for the smooth running and organization of elections without taking sides. The government officials and the civil servants appointed to manage elections claim or talk of their neutrality in the organization of elections as stipulated in their letter of appointment¹⁹².

It should be noted that, when elections such as the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1992 were managed by civil servants. During the parliamentary election of 1992 which was organized by the MINATD, the CPDM had the worst results as they needed to negotiate with other parties before having a majority in parliament, reason being that, the ruling party under estimated the strength of the opposition¹⁹³. The CPDM had to negotiate with MDR in order to have a comfortable majority in parliament wherein the MDR was given four Ministerial positions but during the Parliamentary elections of 1997 the CPDM had the needed majority to form a government so did not enter into any coalition with any other political parties¹⁹⁴. It was equally noticed during the Presidential elections of October 1992, with reference to published results from the MINATD, there was no great difference between the Percentages scored by the SDF and the CPDM. Though, the results were published several days later created suspicions fraud had taken place on the results¹⁹⁵. This is to say the opposition party got their best results when elections were organized by MINATD. After these initial elections organized by MINATD, in the subsequent elections, the CPDM has been winning absolutely with absolute majority. This is testified by one of the top Minister of the ruling CPDM in one of his outings during which he said at St-Television on the program "Emission entertain" in May of 2019 and with "la reine at Canal 2" in 2017, that when elections were still organized by MINATD, the opposition almost won the elections. This is a justification that the rigging machineries of the CPDM were not yet really put in place as it happened with election results within the preceding years.

¹⁹² Buyong Godlove Fru, 39 years, ELECAM staff in Bamenda, Bamenda, 18th March 2019.

¹⁹³https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Cameroonian_parliamentary_election ¹⁹⁴ M. D. Delancey, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 254.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 10.

3) The bad faith of the opposition party to criticise every situation

It is important to examine why the opposition parties in Cameroon have always been on the criticising side without necessarily taking any responsibility for both their failure and appreciating any good step taken by the government or the ruling party. The fact was that, in all the elections which the CPDM have been victorious, the opposition have never accepted their defeat but we get them claiming, the CPDM won because of fraud as indicated by the mayor of Babessi¹⁹⁶. It has been noticed even if ameliorations are made on the electoral law, the opposition parties are always not satisfied with what the government presents. The major opposition parties already have it at the back of their minds, that the government or the ruling party was making every effort to rig elections. This was why since the ruling party won in almost all the elections, the opposition parties concluded its because of rigging and not by merit. To the opposition, from the registration, campaign, voting and declaration of the results the ruling party is making all efforts at cheating.

The fact that, the CPDM is the ruling party, they have their representative all over the national territory whereas the other political parties have their representatives in only few parts of the nation. The CPDM was the successor of the CNU and, however, equally characterized by striking resemblances to the CNU party. In fact, like the CNU, the CPDM has annex organizations like the youth and women's wing. Its structures are like of the pasts from the lower organ the cell to its highest organ which is the National Congress.Like the CNU, the CPDM is highly elitist making the presence of the CPDM to be felt all over the national territory¹⁹⁷. Some of the opposition parties only have their representation at the level of a single division like the CDU that its influence is only felt in the Noun and while some small mushroom parties are known only in their village or only at the level of the family¹⁹⁸. So, the presence of the CPDM with representatives all over the entire nation makes it possible for those representatives to see that the interest of the party is respected by making sure the party wins in their area of representation as a means to justify to the hierarchy of the party that, they are working well. The attitude of the ruling party as concerns the electoral law makes one say the CPDM officials are very self-centered. They are always fighting to win all the seats as if it's no longer a competitive election. This is seen in situations

¹⁹⁷ M. D. Delancey, Historical Dictionary of ..., p. 88.

¹⁹⁶ Metoh Mbah Joachim, 58 years, CPDM Mayor for Babessi, Bamenda, 20th April 2020.

¹⁹⁸Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 63 years, Head of SDF Secretariat in Bamenda, 1st December 2020.

where there are a host of other political parties but you still see the Supreme Court reading results with CDPM having above 90%¹⁹⁹.

The fact is that most of the opposition parties have not been able to totally convince the electorate to reject the electoral law or to accept their political agenda. This is one of the reasons why they remain on the criticizing side for almost all election results declared by the appropriate authority. The ruling party has the financial means and can easily corrupt or convince the electorate that the electoral laws at the current stage have no difficulties and are perfect to guarantee free and fair elections in Cameroon²⁰⁰. Since the electoral law is not very straight, and with the financial means at the disposal of the CPDM, this pushes some of the electorate just to accept the law for the purpose of peace or that they have been corrupted to accept the wrong facts knowingly²⁰¹.

It can be concluded that since the return of multipartism in 1990s, the ruling party has always had confidence in the laws and the organs organizing elections since they are the ones having the majority and the ones appointing those managing these election organs. They do have the conviction that all elections have been organized at the right time under the best possible conditions. While the major opposition parties were criticising the laws, they were still voted by the members of parliament. They were still criticising and telling their electorate the electoral laws favored only the ruling party. So, while the CPDM party was very confident that the electoral laws are good and that the elections organising organs are good to guarantee free and fair elections, the major opposition party have the view that the electoral laws and the elections organising organs cannot organise free and fair elections for there were only protecting the interest of he who appointed them to such offices.

B) The Strategy of Opposition Parties

The opposition parties have been criticising the electoral law from the introduction of multipartism in 1990, They argue that it cannot guarantee free and fair elections both for the Parliamentary and Presidential elections. In fact, the opposition parties have always been suspicious of the ruling party in working with the election bodies: MINAT, NEO and ELECAM which will only make sure they are victorious as this is the reason why the opposition parties have

¹⁹⁹Nji Godfred, 58 yaers old, member of ONELL, Ngaoundéré 16th November 2018

²⁰⁰Mudoh Walters, 54 years, Human Right Activist and Politician, Douala, 20th December 2019.

²⁰¹Bello Jonas, 60 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19 november 2018

been regularly calling for an independent electoral commission which will guarantee free and fair elections accepted by all parties and the international community.

1) The dissatisfaction with electoral law

With reference to the electoral law, the opposition parties do not have the same point of view like the ruling party²⁰². As indicated previously, while the CPDM is confident with the electoral law and the organising organs like MINATD, NEO and ELECAM, the major opposition parties were disatisfied with the electoral law and elections managing organs saying there are a number of loopholes which would have been managed differently if there existed an independent electoral commission²⁰³. They argue that the electoral law put in place since the return of multipartism cannot guarantee free and fare elections in Cameroon for they considered the elections managing organs to be part of the ruling party; MINATD was managed by appointed officials of the government, NEO is under MINATD and most of those managing elections organising bodies were former members of the CPDM to which some of them who resigned from previously held government positions while others resigned from the Central Committee of the CPDM in order to pick up positions in ELECAM²⁰⁴. This was almost enough evidence, the neutrality of elections organising body will not be guaranteed in such officials expected to organise free and fair elections in Cameroon. In this section, we are going to explain and analyze the disatisfaction of the opposition parties concerning the electoral laws. We shall explain reasons for the suspicions of the complicity between the ruling party and the different elections organs and reasons why the opposition parties absolutely solicit the change of the electoral law in order to satisfy all the participants²⁰⁵.

The major opposition parties and their dissatisfaction with electoral laws have some basis if critically examined as the following reasons can better substantiate the fact: - Once we look at the return of multipartism up to 2013, all electoral laws have been proposed by the ruling party without any consultation with the opposition parties because of their numerical majority. It is clear that those proposed laws could never have been against the ruling party instead all of the proposed

²⁰²Nji Godfred, 58 yaers old, member of ONELL, Ngaoundéré, 16th November 2018.

²⁰³ Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, Legal adviser of SDF, in Yaoundé, on 23rd July 2019, Yaounde.

²⁰⁴ Cameroon Journal on ..., p. 13.

²⁰⁵Souleymane Hamidou, 63 yaers old, ADD member, Tibati 17th May 2018.

laws were aimed to protect the interest of the ruling party at the detriment of the major opposition parties who wanted free and fair elections or democracy in Cameroon.

The opposition parties had put it clearly to say most of the articles of the electoral laws were not democratic and do not promote the idea of free and democratic elections. This therefore confirms the fact that enacted laws were aimed at satisfying the interest of the ruling party as they were not willing to be defeated in any free and transparent elections be it Parliamentary, Presidential elections or Municipal.

The opposition parties have vividly explained in the electoral law that, the ruling CPDM party is a candidate in the election, the referee of the elections and at the same time the one declaring the election results. This made it difficult for them to have the neutral position which was expected of the electoral law or the organs responsible for the organization of elections or declaration of results. This explains why since the return of multipartism in 1990, all the elections organised by MINATD, NEO or ELECAM ended up with the final results being contested by the major political parties²⁰⁶. That the ruling party has cheated in the election results sometimes brought about rioting and destruction of public property²⁰⁷.

In the same way a number of international organisations such as National Democratic Institute (NDI) says though there were mal practices of the elections which she recorded results of the Cameroon Presidential elections of October 1992. This was coroborated by the Union for Change saying the results collected on the field and from authentic reports from Divisional Counting Commissions (DCC) portray Fru Ndi as the winner with 38.67% and Paul Biya with 36.86% a very small margin over the incumbent. This ended with Fru Ndi being put under house arrest and destruction of property of CPDM officials in the North West such as those belonging to Prime Minister Achidi Achu, Fon Angwafor, Hon Peter Fomum, Mr George Ndikum, Albert Ngafor, Regina Mundi, Yunga Teghen, Adu Ncho with Tita Fomukong leader of Cameroon National Party (CNP) roasted to death. This brought about a period of violence and insecurity²⁰⁸.

It should be noted, that the government did not take into consideration the views or opinions of the opposition parties for either criticising or accepting the electoral law or those organs responsible for elections. The troublesome opposition leader will even be locked up as a means to

²⁰⁶ Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 62 years, SDF Executive Secretary, Bamenda, 1st December 2020.

²⁰⁷Kamdem Léon, 58 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

²⁰⁸ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic* ..., pp. 83-84.

silence their idea and bring peace and stability in the country. This sort of intimidation to avoid any rioting or public gathering to criticise whatever step the government took in order to bring peace and stability in the country is one of the measures applied by the government to solve the agitation from the opposition parties asking for better reforms.

2) The suspicion of complicity between the CPDM and election organs

Members of the election organising bogies were appointed by the President of the Republic who at the same time was a candidate for the election. Therefore, since the officers of the elections organising bodies were appointed by the presidential, such a person could not work against the interest of the person who appointed him or her and that made it difficult to be neutral in the execution of their duties²⁰⁹. When one takes a critical look at the hierarchy of the elections organising organs starting from 1990 to 2013, It was true that most of the top-ranking officers are former bigwigs of the CPDM party who can only be there to protect the interest of the party and not that of the general public. Though, once such members are appointed, they claim to be neutral but soon after their appointment, most of them start giving motions of support to the Head of State. It means there are still indirectly members of the ruling party as its seen in some of the motions thanking the head of state for appointing them to such prestigious positions. At the end, these officers will do all in their best to support the ruling party in order to anticipate or confirmation an appointment to other posts of responsibility. These are enough reasons for the major opposition parties to be suspicious of such officers of the elections organising. They cannot guarantee any free and fair elections since they needed to have their interest protected by making sure CPDM candidates are victorious as reported by one of ELECAM officials in Bamenda²¹⁰.

It is obvious that the major opposition party were suspicious of the civil servants. These civil servants are expected to be neutral but some openly supported the ruling party. Some of these civil servants even forced their junior workers to vote for the CPDM party by giving instructions to junior workers to make sure they get their names registered on the register list and subsequently vote for the CPDM candidate. In 2013, the Senior Divisional officials instructed civil servants to get them registered on the electoral lists and get ready to vote. Similary, we had a number of military men who voted for the ruling party at quartier General in Yaounde and brought proof they

 ²⁰⁹ Chenboa Andre Leopold, 79 years, Financial Secretary of SDF for West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.
 ²¹⁰Tamfu marguerrite, 39 years, ELECAM official in Bamenda, 8th March 2019.

had voted for the ruling party as reported by one retired military official²¹¹. Some of these civil servants are even found on the field telling their junior workers and village communities to support the candidature of the ruling party which was illegal but you still see them doing so as a means to maintain them in power or to fight for appointment opportunities without any objection from the government as its to her own advantage.

It has been realised that even in the CPDM, the laws favoured them but they did not even respect the said law, for some of its members acted contrary to the same law they have initiated and voted for as the guidelines for any election. Also, we have noticed and it has been brought to our knowledge that members of the election organising body and the administration on the field have never gone against the interest of the ruling party who is directly or indirectly their bus on the field. We got the SDO and Governors moving with its etat major to see that their planned election is managed as the government in power intended²¹². On election days, people were not expected to move from one administrative unit to the other but these top administrative officials were the one giving "laisser passer" to most of the supporters of the CPDM who moved freely from one town to another²¹³ as one of the top civil administrators told me during a working session. It confessed that the government machinery was very difficult to understand.

Members of the election organising body ought to be working for the unity and acceptance of their rules for free and fair election which the opposition have been criticising. This has not been the case as some of the influential leaders of the election organising organs were working for the interest of the political party that appointed them. This was enough reason why the opposition parties were suspicious of the elections organising organs having some direct or indirect support for the ruling party which merits some level of suspiciou from the opposition parties. As a matter of fact, being suspicious was not evident; the opposition cannot sue such an official for fraud for his or her point is based on suspicion without proof of fraud. The opposition parties usually put up

²¹¹Tiku Mathias, 50 years, retired Gendarme, Douala, 21st December 2019.

²¹² The government officials such as the Governors, Senior Divisional officer and election officiers are given the lasser passer to move on election day, under the canopy of controlling elections on the field, the same previllages are not given to the members of the opposition parties, which means the ruling party is favored as compared to the opposition parties who do not have the previlage to move in cars on election days except for limited top ranking officials of the party.

²¹³ One of the Governors who have work in the North West Region and the Western Region of Cameroon, says the Governors are arm of the government and are there to execute the instructions of the government. So it's not normal for the government to organize an election and do not succeed, else such a Governor does not need to maintain his position or thinking of an appointment or is ready to quite power.

a number of complaints against election officials but have ended up without any concrete decision as reported by Chimasa Lawrence a prominent politician of the SDF party²¹⁴

3) The request for the change of the electoral law in Cameroon

Since the return of political pluralism in Cameroon in the 1990s, the major opposition parties have been requesting for an independent electoral commission as the only means to guarantee free and fair elections in Cameroon. These parties especially the SDF and UDC have boycotted some elections like the 1992 Parliamentary election as a means to call on the government to institute conditions that favourfree and fair elections in Cameroon. Some of them also boycotted the Presidential elections of 1997 claimed the electoral laws favour only the ruling party. Concerning electoral code, the chapter IV talking about electoral disputes says that: '' only constitutional council is autorised to proclain the result''²¹⁵. Even the different political partis have the definitive result, they cannot say whether they won or lost the elections.

The major opposition parties requested the government to create an independent electoral commission which shall be made up of neutral personalities taken from all walks of life in order to be sure of free and fair elections in Cameroon. In this regard, the government has been moving from one election organizing body to another. It introduced NEO I and NEO II still under MINATD and later brought ELECAM which could only organise, supervise and conduct election but could not declare results. These were the reasons why the opposition parties have been lobbying for an independent electoral commission which to them was the only means to solve the Cameroon electoral problem²¹⁶. In fact, according to Cameroon Journal;

Most countries in Sub-Sahara Africa in the wake of political pluralism and reawakening attempted to put independent electoral bodies in the state to oversee the management and organization of elections since the 1990s. For instance, in Ghana there was the Electoral Commission (EC), The Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) and the Electoral Commission of Ivory Coast²¹⁷.

In such an independent electoral code, the rules of all the actors were clearly spelled out wherein there shall be no one as candidate and referee of the elections as it has been handled in Cameroon. Such an independent electoral commission had the mandate to manage the registration of voters, control the voting, the counting of votes and the declaration of results as opposed to the 1992,

²¹⁴Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 63 years, Administrative Secretary at SDF head office, Bamenda, 1st December 2020. ²¹⁵Electoral code of the Republic of Cameroon chapter IV, p. 32.

²¹⁶Awa Fokum Augustine, governor of West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

²¹⁷ Ibid

1997, 2002, in which the elections were organised by the MINATD but the results were declared by the Supreme Court. This situation continued in 2018 presidential elections where results were declared by the Constitutional Council though they did not organise the election. Having the role to declare the results which could not be objected as they were the highest authority in reference to elections litigations angered the opposition.

According to the above explanations the electoral law in Cameroon is not really in favor of democracy as it found in the Western World where elections are organised and the results declare by the organisers of the elections. This is contrary to the Cameroonian situation wherein the elections are organised for the interest of the ruling party. The ruling party is therefore, making all efforts to remain in power by using either illegal or illegal means. We can therefore conclude after evaluating that the idea of the major opposition parties is not different from those of the civil society who are equally advocating for democratic change in ther country.

C) Political parties and civil society's view of election organising bodies

The major political parties in Cameroon have always criticised the leadership of the elections managing body starting from MINATD, NEO I, NEO II and ELECAM to be former members of the CPDM who could not guarantee a free and fair election²¹⁸. This explains why they have stood for an independent electoral commission made up of neutral members for elections organization. They have repeatedly made strong requests for the government to have separation of powers for the three arms of government which were the executive, legislative and judiciary to make sure each of them was independent²¹⁹. This was because the opposition parties and civil society leaders expected that during elections, the administrators had to be an independent and neutral observer with no intervention in elections for they were considered supporters of the ruling party.

²¹⁸ When elections were organized by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and decentralization, the Minister is appointed by the head of State, when there was the introduction of ONEL and ELECAM, the head of these election organizing institutions are appointed by the head of state, which the opposition parties have always be advocating, the you not be a player and refree as the CPDM is the one appointing official and equally participating in election, which can not really guarantee neutrality.

²¹⁹Awa Fokum Augustine, year, governor of West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

1) The request for neutral members for election organizations

The ruling CPDM party alone was not credible for Cameroonians to rely on them to organize elections and come out with credible results accepted by opposition parties and the civil society²²⁰. In such a situation there was not going to have the heavy contesting of election results by the losing side or the opposition parties. As a matter of fact, the objective was to have the head of this election organising body who was neither working for the CPDM or for any of the major opposition parties²²¹. Note should be taken that once the parties accepted the neutrality of the election organizer the electorate was going to validate the outcome of the results consequently there would be peace and tranquility before during and after the polls²²².

Once an analysis of the leaders of the elections organising body, starting from the MINATD headed by the Minister who was appointed by the head of state who is a member of the CPDM party with interests in the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Consequently, he will be working not for the interest of the general public but for the interest of the person who appointed him to such a position. As a result, therefore, free and fair elections could not be guaranteed. The leadership of NEO and ELECAM who were all appointed by the Head of State and were loyalists of the CPDM.

The rebirth of multipartism got all the active members of the society to be interested in politics and to make their points of view on how they wanted the democratic institutions to be managed in Cameroon. The civil society which was principally made up of professional associations, women groups, human rights organizations, student groups, trade unions, the media and members of the Bar association all collectively participated to see the return of multipartism through advocacy, and civil organisations for peace and reconciliation. They help to provide a natural frame work for negotiations between conflicting parties in the country. These were very influential groups of people who made very significant contributions to see how democratic institutions could be introduced and managed in Cameroon for the betterment of the society²²³. Since 1992 the point of view of the civil society has almost been the same with that of the major opposition parties calling for an independent electoral commission. They wished the handling the elections in Cameroon was handed over to an independent electoral commission which could

²²⁰ Mudoh Walters, 54 years, Human Rights Activist and Politician, 20th December 2019.

²²¹Awa Fokum Augustine, year, governor of West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

²²²Soulé Hamad, 56 years old, CPDM member, Meingaga, 28th December 2019.

²²³ C. F. Chia, Party politics in ..., p. 177.

guarantee free and fair elections. It is however true that the political parties and civil society leaders realized that the electoral code in Cameroon is not perfect to respect rule of democracy, the rights of the citizens and their votes. They would like to see that future elections in Cameroon are organised by an independent electoral commission in order to guarantee free and fair elections²²⁴.

Election Organ	Year	Leadership	Linked to the
			CPDM
Ministry of Territorial	1992	Marafa Hamidou	A member of the
Administration and		Yaya	CPDM Central
Decentralisation			Committee
L'Observatoire	LOI N° 2000/016 of		
National des	19 décembre 2000		
Elections (ONEL)	Jun 21, 2002		
ELECAM	Law N° 2006/011 of	Fokam Samuel Azu'u	Former baron of CPDM
Elections Cameroon	29 December 2006		

Table Nº 3: Showing leaders of elections organs and their affiliation to the ruling party

Source: Authors compillation from various Presidential appointments

2) The request for the separation of powers between the legislative and executive

Before the return of political pluralism in Cameroon and even after two decades there was no real separation of powers in Cameroon between the legislative, the Judicary and the executive. The legislative power was there to execute all that was instructed by the chief executive who was the President of the Republic. Indeed, since the return of multiparty politics in 1992 the National Assembly has never accepted any private member bills in the Parliament from any of the opposition parties. All the bills presented by the opposition parties have been rejected since the ruling party had a crushing majority in Parliament.²²⁵. Even in situations where the ruling party did not have a majority in the initial Parliamentary election of 1992, the ruling party negotiated an alliance with MDR to have a majority by offering its leadership four Ministerial positions. This gave the ruling party the possibility to see through any bill in Parliament, therefore all bills presented by the National Assembly.

²²⁴ Timamue Martina P. Lenkong, 46 years, 1st Deputy Mayor of CPDM in Babessi after resigning from SDF, Bafoussam, 11 March 2019'

²²⁵Honorable Mbah-Ndam Joseph, 64, SDF Parliamentarian, Yaoundé, 23rd July 2019.

It was the wish of the opposition to see that there was absolute separation of powers between the legislative, judicary and the executive. Their idea was that power should be given to the legislative arm and to make it absolutely independent from the executive power. Should this be done, it would be able to enact laws that would promote democracy, free and fair elections to the satisfaction of the opposition, civil society and the general population. This would make all the state departments accountable for their activities as opposed to the current situation wherein almost all powers are concentrated in the hands of the executive.

3) The request for the neutality of the administrators

The opposition parties and the civil society see the administration and the administrators working rather for the ruling party, and not, neutral in the execution of their duties. Therefore, no independence was seen in the manner in which they ran their departmental activities either as individuals or as administrators. In almost all their interventions, there are pro governments, especially once it involved the issue of elections²²⁶. The administration and administrators were supposed to be independent collaborating with the opposition parties as they did with the ruling party. This was the contrary for the opposition parties were relegated to the background. The opposition political parties were at times oppressed and intimidated by these administrators in order to support government's envisaged line of action²²⁷.

The neutrality of the administrators as in issues related to elections was very doubtful. This explains why once you are a candidate or partisan; you could not be a good referee. Same as in the position of the administration and the administrators who would want to see into it that, they protected the interests of the one who appointed them; it's the head of the ruling party and at the same time the President of the Republic of Cameroon²²⁸.

The civil society rapidly joined their opinion to that of the opposition parties requesting the separation of powers between the Legislative, Judiciary and the Executive powers. It was the wish of the civil society to see that the administrators were independent and neutral in election business. That was to say, during elections the executives and administrators had to be absolutely neutral to guarantee free and fair elections in Cameroon. The civil society and NGOs played a capital role in encouraging and promoting democratic institutions. The NGOs stood as watchdogs especially for

²²⁶One of the Governor, the name was kept anonymous.

²²⁷El Hadj Oumarou Hadji, 68 yaers old, CPDM deputy member of parliement, Maroua 22nd November 2018.

²²⁸ Awa Fokum Augustine, Governor of Western Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

the government and the elections organising bodies to ensure that democracy and human rights are respected. They monitored the government on issues of human rights and gross injustices, the issue of good governance, utilization of tax payers' money for the government to be more accountable²²⁹. The fact is that the electoral law was the main question of debate before any elections especially at the level of the opposition parties trying to portray the irregularities of the law while the government or the ruling party is on the other side convincing them that the electoral law was good and very suitable for our situation or context²³⁰.

The main concern of major opposition parties was on coming out with an acceptable electoral system that will guarantee free and fair elections and acceptable by all the participating political parties. The opposition parties knew, the electoral law was not really in their favor. This explains why they would do extra work to convince the population of the absolute need to change those in power in order to bring new laws which will promote democracy, free and fair elections in Cameroon. While the opposition parties were doing everything possible at their level to see that acceptable democratic electoral laws were put in place, the ruling party was very confident with electoral laws and the election organizing organ which to them, what the opposition parties needed was to comply with and abide by the laid down laws for Parliamentary and Presidential elections being our area of interest.

The opposition political parties and civil society submitted that the electoral laws were in favor of the ruling party²³¹. The opposition parties say the ruling party was not respecting the laws which even made to favor them in all aspects as they still working in complicity with the administrators and the elections organising organs to see that the interest of the ruling party protected even before election²³². This explains why the major opposition political parties to work hard before elections to put up very solid political strategies to combat the ruling party for them to think of winning an election either the Parliamentary or Presidential. They needed to work in advance to see that, the guarantee that the government accepted the putting in place of good electoral laws, the provision of neutral officials to manage electoral process and finally to see that there the separation of powers from the administrators and those managing elections in order to guarantee a free and fair election.

²²⁹ Citizen Manual for ..., p. 47.

²³⁰Hamadou Mohamed, 57 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2019.

²³¹Adoum Gassaba, 59 yaers old, member of ADD, Maroua 19th November 2018.

²³²Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF member for 1990 till date, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

II- Mobilisation of Militancy

The existence or success of any political party was based on the mobilisation of militancy. According ot researcher, there can exist a political party and its organs but if there is no militancy, the political party is really considered as not existing or considered as a mushroom²³³, not influential political party or mushroom party to say. This is because in an election all the political parties count on their militants to vote for them or their ideology. At the same time, these militants would be the ones campaigning for their close ones to vote for the ideology of the party thereby gaining more sympathizers for the party in an election. In this case the militancy was a key strategy of a political party in the winning or losing of an election for in the normal ethics it the voters who decide who the winner or loser besides the strategy of rigging, cheating and corruption. This section focuses on the mobilisation of militancy as a main strategy of a political party in preparing for an election. It potrays how rallies were organised to explain the standpoint of a political party in a particular election, their reasons for participating or not participating in an election. How the SDF made trips all over the national territory in 1992 to explain why there were not going to participate in the March Parliamentary elections as the rules were not straight. Same as in the same year how the very SDF and other parties decided to go in for the October Presidential election in spite of the fact, the electoral laws were not modified nor the independent electoral commission created by the government. It should be understood that once the opposition political parties accept to participate in an election, they followed the footsteps of the ruling party to request for citizens at voting age to get themselves registered on the electoral list and ask their militants to contribute in the raising of funds for the electoral campaigns through the sales of membership cards, giving of gifts or subventions by influential party members and even through the sales of party gadgets. In fact, the organization of effective rallies where the party had a influence, calling for massive registration of all those of the voting age to effectively get themselves registered on the electoral list and the raising of funds for the realization of party's projects before an election were very powerful strategies for the mobilisation of militancy before an election.

²³³ This is the view of the researcher after taking into consideration how the various political parties have been evolving in Cameroon. Taking into consideration what is done in the mushroom parties and the major political parties in Cameroon.

A) The Organisation of Rallies

It was through the organization of party rallies that the general public, party sympathizers and sympathizers are informed of the party manifesto in details²³⁴. Through the organization of rallies the militants of the party and the general public were informed on the current stance of the party concerning current issues involving the nation. Through these rallies more awareness is created that the party's ideology was sold to the general public with the unique objective of gaining more new sympathizers for the party and renew the confidence of the party to the members. Through the organization of rallies, the parties had as well some proxies with the militants and the hierarchy of the party. During rallies the management of the party had the possibility to share ideas and information before, during and after the rallies in order to prepare better for future rallies. The ruling CPDM had a number of advantages over the opposition parties for they have the financial means and representatives all over the national territory as opposed to the opposition that lacks the means²³⁵. As a consequence, the society or the populations were going to embrace the information that had reached them

1) The ease or advantages of the ruling party

The ruling party was implanted all over the national territory. It should be noted that the CPDM inherited its membership from the CNU. By implication the CPDM was the national party and its membership was implanted all over the national territory²³⁶. This made it possible for the ruling party to pass its message across to its militants and would be militants were doted all over the national territory. The government used the administration and the state radio to communicate their message which was easy to disseminate all over the national territory for they had the monopoly over the state infrastructure which were always at the service of the CPDM during party mobilization.

The CPDM was financially stable. This gave them more ease to organize rallies as compared to the opposition parties who have limited financial capability. The sources of funding for CPDM were many and at times the state since they were in power used state resources for their

²³⁴Mohamadou, 65 years old, CPDM communication member, Garoua-Boulai, 20th December 2019.

²³⁵ Basic texts of Cameroopn People's Democratic Movement, Edition 2012, p. 35

²³⁶ M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of ..., p.* 88.

party activities like the CPDM congress halls, cars and the facilities to have authorizations for rallies which were not the case with the opposition parties.

The ruling party had at its disposal the services of the Ministers, Governors, SDO, DO who are indirectly members of the CPDM²³⁷. They made all efforts to see that they give their maximum support to the ruling party within their area of command. These were privilages that the opposition parties did not have and if the administrator was seen trying to facilitate the activities of the opposition party, the said administrator risk being replaced as it was considered as siding with the opposition party. Those exceptional administrators who were seen assisting the opposition parties in most cases were transferred to other areas which were less interesting or even removed from their current positions and called to other duties as a means to tell the administrator, "If you support the opposition there is a consequence"²³⁸.

Indeed, the CPDM bigwigs even considered the state buildings like congress halls as belonging to the CPDM in spite of the fact that, such buildings were constructed using tax payer's money. That is to say, if there was going to be a CPDM rally automatically, the members of CPDM considered that the congress hall were at her disposal for party activities, even if there was an application from the opposition parties. There was a situation where in the SDF and the CPDM both requested to use the municipal field for party activities. The field was automatically given to the ruling party. This state property to them was considered as belonging to the ruling party in which the opposition party could not have access to such facility. It is noted even on the congress halls at all regional head quarters, its written on it CPDM congress hall, same as these halls are managed by the Section Presidents of the CPDM where the halls are found. This is equally not correct for the said halls were constructed by funds contributed by all Cameroonians and not only members of CPDM as submitted by an SDF dissatisfied member²³⁹.

2) Difficulties faced by opposition parties in elections

The opposition parties were expected to get approvals from the SDO and DO before the organisation of a rally within their areas of jurisdiction. Sometimes when these opposition parties submitted requests for an authorisation to organise a rally, it was rejected with a weak reason why the opposition cannot hold a rally on that particular day and place for security reasons. It was not

²³⁷Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20th November 2019.

²³⁸Mahamet Ali, 56 yaers old, MDR member Mokolo, Maroua 20th November 2019.

²³⁹Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF member for 1990 till date, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

acceptable for any political gathering for security reasons²⁴⁰. This was a drawback and weakness for the advancement of the opposition party in the development and implantation of the party in the said region.

The opposition parties also had limited financial resources to expand their activities all over the national territory. This explains why the opposition parties have not been able to campaign all over the national territory. Opposition parties have not been able to see themselves represented all over the national territory as the CPDM was doing for both Parliamentary and Presidential competitions. Most of the opposition parties were concentrated in particular cities like; the NUDP mostly represented in the Northern Regions, the MP in Littoral and CDU in the Noun and the UPC in the Bassa region. Because of financial difficulties some major political parties decided to concentrate their presence only within their area of influence²⁴¹.

A comparative analysis between the influential members of the opposition to the CPDM, the ruling party will justify that the opposition parties do not have big business magnets who invested money in them. On the contray, businessmen like Fotso Victor, Joseph Kadji Defosso, Onubenu, Aladji Baba Danpullo of Tea Estate who were business magnates invested a lot of money in the CPDM as a means to protect the interest of their businesses. In most cases this money was reduced in one way or the other from their tax declarations as most of them declared less taxes as compared to their actual turn over.

The particular situation of Baba Danpullo of Ndawara in the North West Region who pays minimal taxes. It was even alleged that once a tax controller visits the Tea Estate and does not do exactly what he had instructed, the tax controller was going to be transferred as a punitive measure for the owner of these businesses have very strong connection or relation with those in administration as submitted by a tax collector at the Regional Delegation of Taxes in Bamenda and corroborated by some business tycoons in the Region²⁴². The opposition lacks such business magnates for if they are discovered, the government is going to do everything to attribute them heavy taxes and stop awarding these businessmen contracts²⁴³. This was to make sure contractors were not going to have enough resources to support the opposition parties. This is a strategy mostly implemented by the ruling party to discourage businessmen from supporting the opposition parties

²⁴⁰Souleymane Hamidou, 63 yaers old, ADD member, Tibati, 17th May 2018.

²⁴¹Peterkins Manyong, 61 years, Publisher of Independent Observer, Bamenda, 4th May 2020.

²⁴²Tazoh Daniel, 60 years, retired Tax Collector, Bamenda, 20th October 2019.

²⁴³Mohamadou, 65 years old, CPDM communication member, Garoua-Boulai 20 december 2019

as it was the situation with late James Mbanga of the SDF^{244} . In this situation if there were still some businessmen who wanted to support the opposition parties, it was done at times in a discrete manner without portraying their identities in order to avoid punishment from the government.

There equally existed cultural blockages in certain strong-holds of the party both in the opposition and on the ruling parties. The Eastern Region is the strong-hold of the CPDM in Cameroon. In this light at times, the indigenes never allow the opposition parties to hold rallies in their areas for they considered the area as belonging to the CPDM. This was seen in the early 1990s in the North West Region which was the strong-hold of the SDF, so inhabitant of North West who was not in support of the SDF was considered as an enemy in the house²⁴⁵. By implication only dieheart supporters could still stand for the ideology of the party especially in the North West Region which led to the destruction of property and lives as indicated by Christopher Fung:

The opposition led by SDF had commenced on a very high note of civil disobedienceviolence in the North West burning of tyres in the streets, on roads, setting ablaze houses of members and supporters of the ruling CPDM party. Among those CPDM militants and supporters included Simon Achidi Achu's house was burnt with his old mother nearly a victim, Fon Agwafor III's house set ablaze, John Niba Ngu, Hon. Peter Fomun, Hon. Ihims Jacob, Hon. Francis Nkwain, Hon Atia Daniel, Hon. Akenji Simon, Mrs. Regina Mundi, Joseph Ado Ncho (proprietor of Hotel Resort 84), and the roasting alive of the CNP chairman El-Hadji Tita Fomukong²⁴⁶.

This is to say, in as much as the opposition parties had a number of disadvantages, they used the issue of civil disobedience, destruction of property and lives which was a power strategy applied by the opposition. This intimidated those who supported the CPDM but irrespective of this, there were a number of instances wherein the ruling CPDM had a number of advantages over the opposition parties for the same elections either parliamentary or presidential.

3) Consequences on the Society

The general population in most of the cases only had information concerning the CPDM since they had a monopoly over the Media and their presence almost all over the nation. Hence, a strategy to favor the ruling party as the population was mostly informed on ruling party's activities or programs since they monopolised the state media, the CRTV as presented by Julius Ngoh;

²⁴⁴ Agwo Patrick Tekum, 55years, President of Guzang village meeting of late James Mbanga, Yaounde, 20th June 2019.

²⁴⁵ Sama Isaac Nde, 67 years, Retired SDF Divisional executive in Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 30th September 2019.

²⁴⁶C. F. Nchia, Party Politics in ..., p. 235.

The government owned radio and television, The Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), became so notorious for broadcasting only what the government wanted that Christian Cardina Tumi, later in 1990, told CRTV journalists that they had lost all credibility and were nothing more than "Your Master's Voice" (Ngniman and Ngono, June 14, 1990). The social malaise was aggravated by an increasing population and a high literacy rate which meant that more Cameroonians were able to differentiate between empty political rhetoric and existing reality²⁴⁷.

The fact, is that the election calendar in Cameroon is not made known far in advance and is decided upon only by the chairman who doubles as the President of the Republic of Cameroon. This made it difficult for the opposition to plan and strategize for the next elections. It should be understood that, there is no fixrd electoral calendar in Cameroon but only to wait on the President to announce when elections are to be organized as outlined by a close aide to Ni John Fru Ndi of the main opposition party²⁴⁸. Even though there were tentative periods on when elections were to be held but the President needed to sign a decree in this light where he could decide to send the date ahead or bring it earlier as it was done for the Presidential elections of 11 October 1992 where the SDF and the other opposition parties were caught unprepared because the Presidential election billed for November 1993 was brought back toOctober 1992 a year earlier than was expected. This caused the opposition parties to call for the postponement as they lacked the financial means to immediately go for campaigns but this was ignored by the government²⁴⁹. This was a powerful strategy by the ruling party to take its competitors unawares because the ruling party had the administrative instruments in her hands to decide when elections were going to take place without any consultations.

The population was presented as an oppressed group; therefore, it was a strategy that was only advantageous to the ruling party. The ruling party had the possibility to disseminate any information they intended to send to the public provided it was to their advantage because it had the necessary means and possibilities to carry out any political activities without any financial stress. They had the financial means as to even use state funds and property for the interest of the CPDM party, so since they control the CRTV which was the national medium of communication in Cameroon, they decide what information has to be disseminated over the Television and radio at what position²⁵⁰.

²⁴⁷ J. V. Ngoh, *Biya and the ...*, p. 430.

²⁴⁸Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF militant, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

²⁴⁹ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic* ..., p. 72.

²⁵⁰Hamadou Mohamed, 57 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2019.

In view of the above explanation, the population had no confidence in the administrator just like the opposition parties did not trust the administrators because any request from the opposition for an authorization for a rally aimed at mobilising its militants was hardly granted by the administrator. This was a strategy for the ruling party to block the opposition from mobilizing their militants. It is worth mentioning that, in the few rallies permitted by the administrators for the opposition parties, the opposition made all efforts to use such rallies for maximum publicity as a strategy to renew confidence in their militants and would be supporters of the party²⁵¹.

The organisation of rallies was one of the major strategies of political parties to manifest their political projects before elections. Therefore, the validation or refusal to authorize political parties rallies has a vital role to play negatively or positively in the elections for during rallies, the party sold its political agenda to their militants and the general public. The SDF reported a number of times where they had been refused authorisation to organise a rally by the Divisional or Sub Division Officials²⁵².

Picture Nº13: CPDM rally image CPDM Secretary Campaign rally in Bamenda accompanied by Prime Minister



Source: Author collection from a prominent CPDM supporter in Bamenda

Once the CPDM were organizing a rally, the made sure a number of government officials accompanied their leaders to give the rally the influence it deserved. Once the Prime Minister was in North West Region he was accompanied by all the other Ministers from the Region.

²⁵¹Bello Jonas, 60 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2018.

²⁵²Jonas Mbah Acha, 62 years, Former shadow Minister of SDF, Yaounde, 17th January 2018.

Picture Nº14: rally image SDF presidential candidate for 1992 presidential election campaign



Source: Author collection from SDF secretariat in Bamenda

Picture Nº15: CDU Presidential candidate attending to journalist after a campaign rally



Source: Author collection from CDU supporter in Foumban

At the of rallies, the political parties had the possibility to evaluate their strengths in one way or the other to know if they were going to win or lose at the elections. This depended on the number of persons attending the rally for this was one of the means to evaluate the popularity of a political party in a particular constituency. Those who were coming to the rally were mostly those who would be on the field voting and campaigning with their close ones to vote for the ideology or projects of the party in the upcoming election. Therefore, the organization of rallies was a powerful strategy for political parties before elections.

At the rallies the parties had the opportunity to call on their militants and would be militants to get registered on the electoral lists. The issue was that militants who supported the party's ideology but were not registered on the electoral lists could not be of any help to the party as they would not vote for the party during elections. Therefore, it was at rallies that, these types of militants could be reminded to register and if this was done, once the election time came, they would have the possibility to make a change by voting for the party and even telling their close ones to vote for the ideology of a particular party. On the basis of this, rallies were good platforms for the political parties to lobby for voters before elections.

B) The call for electoral registration

The call for electoral registrations was a strong factor for the mobilisation of the electorate for upcoming elections. There was always a lot of controversy within the political parties when there was the call for elections. The opposition in most cases criticised the government for one reason or the other either to accept to participate or not in the election. In as much as the opposition parties were contemplating on participating in the electoral lists. It should be understood that both the ruling party and the opposition knowing the importance of registration of militants on the electoral law used all sorts of strategies to get their militants registered on the electoral lists in view of upcoming elections.

1) The reason for the option of registration

The search for electorate was the main reason why political parties organize rallies. They got their members registered on the electoral lists to make sure they were going to vote for them when the moment comes. The ruling party had been very successful in campaigning for their sympathizers to get registered on the electoral lists on time or before election announcement to be prepared in advance for the elections. Same as it uses even government official like H.E Atangi Nji who served as Minister of Special Duties at the Presidency in 2007 went campaigning for massive registration in preparation of up coming elections²⁵³.

In this light while some of the oppositions were still thinking and by the time the decision was taken for them to participate in the elections, the electoral list was already closed or they were not going to have enough time to get their electorate register. It became a negative strategy for the opposition while a positive one for the ruling party²⁵⁴.

The fact, that the opposition parties took a decision late for their participation in an election which would have taken as the elections were announced had negative consequences on the opposition candidates as opposed to the candidate of the ruling party who started preparing immediately the elections were announced by the Head of State. This was a positive strategy for the ruling party, considering that once enough time was taken for preparation, it was easier to get expected results as compared to the opposition who were always in a rush because they always took the decision to participate in an election at the last moment which was not really helping them as submitted by ruling party expert²⁵⁵. It was the wish of any political party to have committed militants registered on the electoral list. Some parties even took the responsibility to sponsor the registration of the serious militants on the electoral list knowing that, in the nearest future, these electorate were going to vote for them or their political party depending on the type of election.

It was equally in this registration process that political parties saw viable actors who were engaged and could campaign for the party in the field making sure that during the upcoming elections these newly registered electorate should vote for their party. The popularity of the party depended on the number of effectively registered electorates. This indicated that all the parties struggled to have the maximum number of their militants and would-be militants registered on the electoral lists as a major strategy for upcoming elections.

As a good political party strategy to show that they were present on the field, the party had to ensure that their members were registered on the electoral lists and be present on the field during political campaigns. The truth was that once an electorate was registered, he or she was committed to the ideology of the party. Such a militant became the ambassador of the party and campaigned

²⁵³Kamdem Léon, 58 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Ngaoundéré 18th November 2018.

²⁵⁴Atanga Godwin, 55 years old, cadre à cellule de communication du MDR, Tabati, 19th May 2018.

²⁵⁵ Mbaku Jerry, 64 years, Retired Senior Politician and civil servant from Batibo for the CPDM party, Yaoundé, 12th September 2019.

to his or her close ones to get them registered on the electoral lists and to vote for the party of interest when election period came²⁵⁶.

In fact, it was the duty of the citizen to get himself or herself registered on the electoral list and participate in electing those governing them. It was a civil responsibility to participate in elections even if you were not a politician. Similarly, the responsibility of the political parties is to encourage the citizens to get themselves registered on the electoral list even if they were not militants of their party. The hidden fact was that at the time of registering the electorate could not be convinced with the ideology of the party. But once it was election time, such an electorate could change his or her mind to support a particular party. Since the candidate was registered on the electoral list, the said candidate can vote for the party but if he is not registered on the electoral list even if he or she changes the mind, there will be no possibility to vote during the election period.

2) Similar strategies put in place by the opposition and ruling parties

These parties in most cases took the strategy of door-to-door campaign to educate the militants and would-be militants of their political agenda concerning upcoming elections in order to win their confidence. This strategy was that once a politician talked to the voter on-one-to one basis, it was sure they could have clarifications to make sure the electors vote for their party²⁵⁷. The parties in the process of getting direct contact with the electorate, visit to different meeting groups to explain to them their political agenda and why they deemed it better for the electorates to vote for their party. Visiting of meeting groups was sometimes accompanied by drinks and support for some ongoing meeting projects. At these meeting the political ideology²⁵⁸. In cases where they succeeded to convinced them to listen to their purpose of visiting the meeting. It was already an initial victory for in subsequent meetings, the said electorate can cross carpets.

The parties used fliers regularly to portray their party and candidates before elections. We see the exhibition of signboards at the entrance of villages or city area with written propaganda such as "A vote for change", "A vote for development in the municipality" A vote for accountability". All these placards were a means to create more visibility and awareness of the

²⁵⁶Cletus Anye Matoyah, 56 years, an adent supporter of the CPDM party, Bamenda, 2nd May 2020.

²⁵⁷Habiba Nsangou, 52 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Maroua, 21st November 2018.

²⁵⁸Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua, 20th November 2018.

party. Through the placement of signboards, some of the electorates were attracted to the party such a strategy used by all political parties before elections as has recorded tremendous results for the party before elections. Moreover, as much as most of the political parties were governed by a group of certain individuals for decades his own party is governed as a family property which is suppose to be a national issue²⁵⁹.

The rebirth of political pluralism in Cameroon came with the liberalization of the communication as seen the opening of many private radio and television stations such as the Afrique Media, Canal 2 and Abakwa FM in Bamenda. These media houses gave the opposition parties opportunities to present their political agenda to the public on what they were willing and going to do if the electorate gave them their confidence during the upcoming elections. The radio and television programs put in place by the major political parties over the state media, the CRTV and other private Media created a lot of awareness of the political party's activities and manifesto²⁶⁰.

At the rebirth of multipartism, most of the opposition political parties used the telephone to make most of their internal communications which was very accurate and discrete for the information was shared only to those that mattered at the level of the party²⁶¹. The opposition parties as well as ruling party used communiqués to send their messages to the other parts of the electorate or the constituency. When the party has information that will be disseminate to the entire public and militants, communiqués were dispatched to party organs and the said communiqués were placed in public spaces for the consumption of party members and the general public while copies were kept at the branch level of the party for archives. After the year 2000, the social media was well developed in Cameroon, giving the opportunity for parties and sympathizers to share information before elections over the internet, email and WhatsApp. This was an effective and fast means of disseminating party information and of course which is very productive at the level of the party and considered by many of the leaders as a very efficient strategy for information dissemination at very low costs²⁶².

²⁵⁹Elvis Teke, "CDU: Cyrille Sam Mbaka Resigns". Found: https://www.crtv.cm/2020/09/cdu-cyrille-sam-mbaka-resigns/. Consulted 10th June 2021.

²⁶⁰Haminatou Hadja, 56 yaers old, member of ADD, Maroua, 21st November 2018.

²⁶¹ Werewum Maurice, 56 year, SDF Districk Chairman for Batibo, Bamenda, 26th October 2019.

²⁶²Honorable Mba-Ndam Joseph, 64, SDF Parliamentarian, Yaoundé, 23th July 2019.

A good number of the major political parties, adopted the policy of reorganizing their party leadership especially at the grassroot level. Most of the parties in an effort to bring in new vibrant faces into the party decided to reorganize the basic organs for the CPDM by organizing elections at the root level either because of the vacancy of such a position or their need to bring change at such a level while at the central level new members intergrate into the Central Committee through appointment. At time party even decides to create new constituencies as we saw Mezam divided into several sections, Widikum created as a new constituency etc as a means to see the party inplanted in the area in preparation of future elections to get more support of the party²⁶³. Similar efforts are seen in SDF reorganizing some of the Districts through organization of elections for such position supervised by the party hierarchy making sure some of the previewed parliamentary candidates are integrated into position of leadership into the party and to kickoff some of the leaders who are no longer popular in the party as a means to give a new leadership into the party²⁶⁴. While some of the party like the UNDP endorsed in appointing new members from areas that were not represented into the central command of the party especially from regions that had not got any parliamentary representation like the North West Region²⁶⁵. The conception of reorganization of leadership of the various parties brought in new ideas and new leadership into the various parties that we reorganized. This went a long way to make much more popularity for the parties reorganized which equally brought in positive results especially at the parliamentary elections. As a fact, the multiplyier effects was seen in subsequent presidential election mostly seen at the level of the CPDM

3) The specific strategies of the CPDM party in elections

The ruling party used all the other strategies applied by the major opposition parties in order to lobby for electorates before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in Cameroon. Since the ruling party was more viable financially, they employed other additional strategies in order to get the support of voters before elections some of them were conventional and others unconventional means of getting the support of the electorates when elections are announced.

²⁶³ Enwei Francis...

²⁶⁴ Joseph Awah...

²⁶⁵ Mudoh Walters...

Since the CPDM party was the government in power, they used the state radio and television to sell their agenda to the entire country whenever necessary. The time the ruling party occupid over the national radio and television was not limited as opposed to that of the opposition parties. This gave CPDM the opportunity of selling their political ideology with more details. This of course was a very important strategy for the national radio and television was the official channel of communication of the government. Once the ruling party was on radio or television, the majority of the population listened which easily passed their message accros to the majority of Cameroonians. The fact was that, activities carried out by the CPDM in reference to campaign was considered as state activities and broad cast over radio and television which was an advantage out of reach of the opposition parties²⁶⁶.

Financial resources played a very important role in an election as it was seen with the ease the CPDM was managing it activities because of her financial strength. They decided to transport and feed the electorate for registration as a means of encouragement. The fact is that most of the registration's centers were found in the city areas and ones in a while they visited villages to get the electorate registered. The point was that those who were far from such centers might not see the reason of spending money to get themselves registered on the registration list. Since the CPDM knew the importance of getting the electorate registered on the electoral list, a number of tycoons in the CPDM most of the times decided to sponsor the transportation and feeding of the electorate for registration on the electoral lists²⁶⁷. Some of the big magnates even carried the of ELECAM and registration kits to where the scanty populations were found to make sure the majority of the electorate are registered on the electoral list. Owing to this strategy, once the electorate was registered on the electoral list, it was clear except otherwise when the elections were announced these new voters were probably going to vote for the party that enabled them to register on the electoral list. So was considered a very vital strategy before elections which could only easily be handled by the government as some of the opposition even considered the election organizing body as part of the CPDM²⁶⁸.

²⁶⁶Peterkins Manyong, 61 years, Publisher of Independent Observer, Bamenda, 4th May 20020.

²⁶⁷Notuto Godfred Awah, 58 years, Retired Regional Delegate for MINADERA, Bamenda, 25th October 2019.

²⁶⁸ Revelation made by an official of the main opposition party who considers this strategy of the CPDM bigwing as fraud while CPDM barons consider it as a means to get the electorates register on the electoral list for the preparation of upcoming elections.

As we earlier indicated, some of the CPDM used illegal means in preparing for elections. These barons had the financial viability and they engaged in sponsorship of transportation, feeding and giving of allowances to voters to be transported from the big cities for registration in their areas of origin especially for the Parliamentary elections as this concerned the particular interest of the envisaged Parliamentarians. Similarly, some of the elites do same for the Presidential election as proof for the party's leadership to know there was general support for the Head of State in constituency. They used this to be maintained in power, lobby for appointments or developmental projects. The former prime Minister, His Excellency Achidi Achu used to transport students and people of Santa origin from Yaoundé to be registered and to vote in Santa in spite of the fact they are residing in Yaoundé. This strategy in most cases had seen a majority of voters transported from Yaoundé to be registered and vote in Santa. When elections were announced and organized, this group of electorate was going to vote for the party that enabled their registration. This was a vital strategy for the ruling party since they had the financial viability. However, some of the electorate with consciences finally decided to vote for the party of their choice but as of late, the CPDM barons requested to see proof that these sponsored electorate come out of the voting and present the opposition ballot papers to proof they had voted for the CPDM²⁶⁹. This extra precaution was implemented to combat those who were sponsored and once on the field they instead vote for the opposition as the opposition parties considered this an illegal strategy for its not done in an official manner.

The opposition parties usually claimed that the ruling party even registered and transported military persons to vote for the ruling party out of their station. On the voting day, these military persons will be dressed like civilians and since their names were on the electoral lists as it was registered earlier or just integrated on the electoral list, they are going to eventually be expected to vote for the CPDM which is the party in power and the party sponsoring them to those areas. Once these military vote for the ruling party especially for the Presidential election, the military were given outstation allowances and transported to their various camps or assigned station²⁷⁰. Indeed, even though being an illegal strategy, it went a long way to increase the number of electorate for the ruling party during elections. We therefore, conclude that, since the CPDM is the party in

²⁶⁹Honourable Abi Francis, 48 years, CPDM Parliamenterian from Momo East, Yaounde, 16th August 2019.

²⁷⁰ This was revealed to us by a retired military person, who explained how they were transported out of their station to go vote for the CPDM during Presidential election of 2004 and 2011. This was handled as a mission in which they were given two days out station allowances. They were dressed as civilian on the voting day and transported back to their centers or camps after voting.

power with so many advantages as to use the government machinery for personal gains, they applied any means possible to be victorious in an election be it legal or illegal.

C) Raising of Funds

In view of the participation of a political party in elections, there were expected to raise funds for their expenditures. These funds are to be used in all the stages of elections, so they occupied a central position and played a very vital role in the success of the political party. This explains why before elections, the various political parties put all their efforts together in order to raise substantial amount for their political activities. The most popular means political party used for raising funds was through the sale and registration of yearly membership cards²⁷¹. Secondly, through gifts from influential supporters of the party, some gave anonymously depending on the level of their activity with the state. At times these funds were raised through subvention in some of the party activities, situation where some members volunteer to sponsor some parts or an entire project of the party as their own contribution to see the advancement of the party and its objectives. Finally, some funds were raised through the sale of party gadgets to members and would-be party members. It was this financial resource that will permit the political parties to put in place all the other strategies. This goes a long way to say that without money, it was difficult for a political party to progress or advance in her field activities.

1- Membership

The membership in a Cameroonian political party is open to all Cameroonians irrespective of race, colour, ethnic group, religion, sex, social or economic and religious status. However, a member must not be below the age of 18 years, and should not have been a member of another political party. The person had to accept the aims and objectives, principles, fundamental values, policies and programs of the party which are the general condition of the membership of a Cameroonian party with the justification of payment of membership card²⁷². As a matter of fact, all the political parties in Cameroon claim a majority of their funds come from membership registration. This was an official means for the party in raising funds noting that in reality the most important legal and open source of raising funds for the party.

²⁷¹ Taga Naussie Ceraphine, 48 years, Financial Secretary of the CPDM in Bafoussam and committed member of the CPDM for the past 20 years, 11th March 2019.

²⁷²Edum Njoh, *The Social Democratic* ..., pp. 48-49.



Picture N° 16: Some examples of party membership cards from CPDM

Source: Collected from a CPDM member during an informant investigation

ENRO NTAL DRARN RATE FRONT MAN RECY. JUNTICE - DEVELOPMENT Sancou MEMBERSHIP CARD CARTE DE MEMBRE A1 D+Bonco Barrow Electoral district : --Circonscription électoral Division : Départeme Province : 1990 Date of membership : _ Date d'adhésion au part RONT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIOUT XXATE . R NIKE - DEVELOPPEMENT Treasurer National chairman Member Tresorier Membre Président national · 150 F

Picture N° 17: Some examples of party membership cards from SDF.

Source: Collected from an SDF member during an informant interview on 11th March 2019

There existed three types of members who funded the party as follows: membership registration to the party. This was the only means to say you are a member of a particular party by openly registering oneself in the said political party. Secondly, through membership donation which was a means to make oneself famous or known at the level of the party by donating substantial amounts of money or materials for the realization of party activities like one James Mbanga gave a piece of land for the construction of SDF secretariat in Olézoa – Yaoundé and three million francs for the advancement of SDF activities. He was involved in transporting the documents meant for the launching of SDF which were hidden in a fridge mixed with other food stuffs and were almost caught by the Gendarmes at control check point in Bafoussam²⁷³.Some members offered their buildings to be used for free for a number of years for the party hierarchy especially by the supporters of the opposition parties for the realization of some major activities like the registration of the party for major elections especially for the payment of cautions²⁷⁴. These types of loans were known only by the big wigs of the party and payment was made once there was some availability of cash in the party treasury or refunded by the individuals from whom the

²⁷³ SDF @ 25, the struggle for ..., pp. 14-15.

²⁷⁴Habiba Nsangou, 52 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Maroua 21st November 2018.

money was borrowed and used on their behalf, the general objective was to satisfy the interest of the party or portray good image of the party during the registration for an election at the end a party could not get its candidates register for an election, the failure was that of the party and not the individual reasons while the party ensures that its envisaged candidates are duely registered.

One of the questions needed to ask ourselves is why were militants giving money to the party in the form of a gift, donation or loans for the realization of party activities. Objectively, there were party members who are happy with the ideology of the party. For example, the SDF came in 1990s plans for with a federal system of government in Cameroon. At that time, there were a number of Cameroonians who bought the idea and decided to give their financial support to push the party to success and the betterment of the country in future. On the other hand, we had some individuals who gave financial assistance to the party. In anticipation of political positions in the party once the party got to power. The businessmen who gave their money to the party are expecting in the nearest future to get some contracts from the party as soon as they were victorious at the upcoming elections or even to give them or their close ones appointments as a means of compensation for the financial support they had given to the party. The objective here was that political parties in most cases had become businesses which many of the well-to-do financially used their financial means as a strategy to make themselves known at the level of the party²⁷⁵.

2) Gifts and other subventions

In most cases, these types of supporters make sure what ever contributions they gave to the party, it was made discretely without the public attention or media attention. These sorts of contributions were handed directly to the top leadership of the party who sometimes shared the information only at the top level of the party for accountability²⁷⁶. There were other donors who gave as a means to lobby for party support once they gained power. It's realized in Cameroon most of the big contracts were awarded because of human connection. It should be noted, once the party came to power, those businessmen who supported the party financially were expected to be awarded juicy contracts so that, they could recover the money invested or contributed in the party at the preparatory or before the organization of the elections to assist the party in implantation on

²⁷⁵Hamadou Mohamed, 57 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2019.
²⁷⁶Haminatou Hadja, 56 yaers old, member of ADD, Maroua, 21st November 2018.

the field as this was seen both within the opposition and ruling parties as a means to guarantee their respective support for the party in future as presented by a quiet observer²⁷⁷.

We even got some influential individuals calling on their friends and family members to come and support the party financially. Such strategies had given very positive results as those friends and family members coming to support the party knew that, indirectly they were supporting the person who invited them though at the end all support was going for the realization of the activities of the party on the field for campaigns in view of the upcoming elections.

3) Sale of Party Gadgets

The sales of party gadgets were considered by members as a means of raising funds for the party but the funds coming through this means were limited because some of these gadgets were even offered to members and would-be members for free. This did not give money to the party but promoted the activities of the party to an extent. It has been observed that some of the political parties are not the ones doing the production of party gadgets. It may be left in the hands of some party members to produce their party gadgets. That the gadgets were produced by the party or by individuals at the end it gave some financial contribution to the party and create awareness of the party through party T-shirts, caps and mufflers on the field as they came as a means of publicity and raising of funds for the party²⁷⁸.

The raising of funds greatly contributed to the mobilization of militancy and to know which of the members were engaged in party activities on the field. This also helped the party officials to know which of the party strategies had to be put in place depending on the availability of at the level of the party. Campaigning on the field worked efficiently depending on the financial viability of the party else the campaign activities were limited only to certain areas. Therefore, the raising of funds for the party was an important strategy of the party in the realization of its projects before elections²⁷⁹.

The mobilisation of militancy was a very determinant factor for all political parties in preparing for an upcoming election to make sure the party was going to be victorious. A good or

²⁷⁷Djokombe Emmanuel, 47, journaliste at le messager in 1995, Yaoundé, 21st January 2019.

²⁷⁸ The production of party gadgets was left both at the hands of the individual candidates and at the charge of the party. The participation of the individuals mostly for parliamentary election while for the party charge once it concerns the presidential election.

²⁷⁹Moustapha abdoulaye, 66 years old, djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

poorly conceived political party strategy for the mobilization of militancy could give hope or discourage a party in upcoming elections. It was therefore clear that a political party could not be put in place before an imminent election that excluded the mobilization of militancy²⁸⁰.

The issue of mobilisation of militancy was important at three different levels: we shall therefore start at the level of organization of the team for campaigns. The campaign teams had to plan and mobilize in advance to ensure all the members where available work was announced by the hierarchy of the party. Secondly, the funds had to be mobilized in advance in order to successfully manage the campaigns and finally at the level of the party, the members of the party had to make sure the voters or the members of the party and other sympathizers of the party are there and available to vote for the party once the elections are announced. We can conclude after the mobilisation of militancy and funds, that the choice of the candidate has a main influence on the issue of elections in Cameroon.

III- The choice of the candidate

Different political parties had different criteria for the selection of their candidates for the parliamentary and presidential elections. Most of the political parties took into consideration the specificities of the election and the conditions prevailing when the elections were announced. In fact, the type of election determines the method put in place for the selection of the candidate. Generally, since the return of political pluralism in 1992, for all the political parties of either the opposition parties or the ruling party, there were three major methods of choosing a candidate for an election in Cameroon by a majority of political parties²⁸¹. Firstly, most of the major political parties used the investiture committees which were generally made up of very senior devoted members of the party or those who knew and fought to keep the ideology of the party alive. Secondly, some parties the organised primaries within the party to select the candidates for Parliamentary or Presidential elections. Finally, the consideration of the principle of natural candidacy in which case it focused mostly on the presidential election. Hence, it was always the founder of the party who was always chosen as the natural candidate. In the ruling party, the CPDM there was Paul Biya, while in SDF is Ni John Fru Ndi and the CDU was always Adamou Ndam Njoya. For our entire study period, the presidential candidates for their various parties²⁸². Though

²⁸⁰Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20th November 2019.

²⁸¹Souleymane Ali, 69 yaers old, member of ADD, Garoua-Boulai 19th December 2019.

²⁸²Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati, 20th November 2019.

we have a few cases in some constituencies where the parliamentary position been monopolized by certain individuals who have been running and winning for decades as if they are the most reliable individual to contest for such a position in the area.

A) The Investiture Committee

The major political parties have a set of roles which are the criteria for the selection of their candidates or candidate for elections by hierarchy of the party. At times, based on what the individual had been doing for the party in seeing that the party was successful. Finally, the impact such a candidate will be for the party and its consequences were some of the aspects the hierarchy of the various parties into consideration for the selection of the would-be Parliamentary or Presidential candidates.

1) Criteria for selection of candidates

The first thing that mattered in the criteria for the selection of candidates for an election was the type of election either for parliamentary or presidential elections. Secondly, the area where the election took place was equally primordial for when it was the strong hold of the party, considerations were different. For instance, if the SDF had to choose a candidate for an election in Bamenda which was its strong hold and choosing a candidate for SDF in the Ebolowa which was the strong hold of the CPDM, different considerations were taken for the interest of the candidate and the party.

A number of parties took into consideration, the opponent candidate for the selection of the competing candidate, that is to say a powerful and popular candidate needs a stronger candidate to compete with. In the situation wherein the opponent has a prominent candidate and some personality that is appreciated by population like the Former Prime Minister Achidi Achu, who says in politics:

Scratch my back, I scratch your back". What did Achidi Achu mean by "politics na njangi"? In a context where Cameroonians are compelled to perceive and relate to politics as a game of infinite attempts to balance between competing and conflicting regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious interests (Nyamnjoh 1999), selecting and relating to intimate others involves juggling and joggling myriad competing and conflicting claims and counterclaims of belonging. It is in this regard that "politics na njangi" means different things at different levels. At one level, Achidi Achu was using it to invite Anglophone Cameroonians to appreciate and reward the fact that one of their own – "a son of the soil" of the Anglophone community that comprises two of Cameroon's ten Regions – had been appointed and entrusted by the President of the Republic, in a highly competitive context, to the most prestigious office - that of the Prime Minister of the Republic. It was an invitation for them

to understand that the President had honoured the Anglophone community and Regions by playing or "hipping" njangi for them, and the ball was now in their court for them to reciprocate²⁸³.

In situation wherein there was a prominent candidate on the opposite side, the competing party had to equally choose a very strong candidate to compete with the opponent's experience else there was going to be little competition during the election proper. A number of parties wanted to select candidates that were committed to the ideology of the party, and a candidate that can easily follow the instructions of the hierarchy of the party. In such a situation the party could easily guide and orientate the candidate on how to manage the affairs of the party to the satisfaction of the members of the party and hierarchy.

At times it was important to see that the selected candidates had the support of the influential ethnic or religious groups in the area. Preferably if the candidate was from the area to make sure the influential groups were in support of the selected candidates was an advantage for the candidate and the party. Once the selected candidates had strong attachment to the influential group, it was already a good strategy for the party. We realized that in Yaoundé II during the parliamentary elections, the candidate was chosen from the Bamilikes origin which was a major group that made up a majority of the electorate. For instance, in areas populated by Bamilikes such as Mokoko, Madagassaka and Cite Vert all who were of the Bamilike origin. Therefore, a candidate who was not from the Bamiliki origin may not archive the desired results for the party is such areas. The election of Madam Foning in Douala V was because most of the electorate were from the Western Region. Joshua Osih could not win in Kumba and decided to relocate to Douala where he was able to secure a winning because of the combination of Anglophones and Bamilikis in the constituency who voted for him instead of the ruling party. In fact, it had been proven in Cameroon politics that the only ethnic group that stood for election out of their regions of origin and succeeded in most cosmopolitan centres were either from the Western Region or the Anglophone regions²⁸⁴. This was a vital reason the investiture committee took into consideration cultural and regional back ground of candidates to compete in an election.

We have equally seen for the past elections in Mayo Danay particularly in Yagoua which was mostly a Christian inhabited area that it was difficult for a Muslim to stand an election there and defeat a Christian because a majority of the electorate were Christians so the investiture

²⁸³ Francis B. Nyamnjoh "Politics of Back-Scratching in Cameroon and Beyond," in: Petr Drulák and Šárka Moravcová, (eds), 2013, Non-Western Reflection on Politics, pp. 5-6.

²⁸⁴Abega Jean Claude, 52 years, Journalist with Vission 4, 22nd June 2019.

committee for the interest of the party were supposed to invest a candidate that was from the Christian faith to be sure of victory in Yagoua especially for parliamentary elections. The same scenario was equally seen in Maroua town where a majority of the electorate was Muslims. The investiture committee was better place to take the decision for the selection of candidates else a wrong candidate could be selected which could result could a sanction vote from the electorate²⁸⁵.

In some of the areas, the electorate agreed on a rotation basis as it could be seen in the Tubah/Bafut constituency wherein the parliamentary seat was rotating between Bafut and Tubah²⁸⁶. This was to make sure that both areas were represented and in such a situation the investiture committee played an important role making sure the will of the electorate was respected though it was not written and signed anywhere by both parties and communities but the politicians on the ground accepted to such an agreement.

Finally, there was the equilibrium of the population either basing on gender to make sure both the male and female sexes were represented in the selection of the candidates especially at the parliamentary election. The electoral code made it mandatory for a female to be represented on the parliamentary lists else the list was rejected for gender inequality. There was another criterion that was taken into consideration while choosing candidates for elections. All the above explanations are strategies political parties took into consideration in the selection of party's candidates because it contributed to the advancement of the party especially those having infighting. If the gender or religious or ethnic considerations were not taken into consideration in the process of selecting a parliamentary candidate, it could lead to a sanction vote for the party.

2) The personality of the candidate and party contribution

The candidate's personality and charismatic manner was equally a vital strategy in the selection of a candidate for an election. Once you look at the physical appearance of certain candidates, the electorates tend to confirmed them for political position. The manner in which they presented their political ideology made some of the electorate to directly confirmed their candidature as opposed to some of the candidates who were well educated, but lack a personality and charisma to convince the electorate which was already a neglective point for the candidate and the party.

 ²⁸⁵El Hadj Oumarou Hadji, 68 yaers old, CPDM deputy member of parliement, Maroua 22nd November 2018.
 ²⁸⁶ Nyanjoh Sunday Mulunh, 64 years, retired Sub Divisional Delegate for Tubah, Bamenda, 13th September 2019.

The financial viability of the candidate was an important consideration in the selection of a candidate either for the parliamentary or presidential elections. There were a number of circumstances where the candidate for election was expected to make a number of expenditures without planning in advance for the interest of the party and his personal interest. Once there were two equal candidates for an election and one had financial potentials while the other candidate does not have financial means, the candidate with financial potential was going to be selected. Obviously, the electorate and the party preferred a candidate who made cash available for the party when need be and not a financially broke candidate. For he can handle administrative and logistic expenditures of the party which could not be managed by a poor or financially weak candidate.

The popularity of the candidate at his base was equally a very good strategy. There were candidates who had been supporting developmental projects in their constituencies before elections. Selecting such candidates for upcoming election was better than choosing a candidate who was little known within his area of jurisdiction. The selection of a popular candidate was good for the candidate and for the party as the electorate assumed that such a developer, if given an elective position, would engage in implementing other developmental projects in the constituency as compared to a new candidate who was not well-known in the area of development²⁸⁷.

The availability of the candidate was an added advantage for the selection of a candidate based on the individual availability and previous personal contribution for the development of his or her constituency showed that it was a potential candidate. We have realized over the years there were people who come up for elective position only when elections were closer else, they remained in urban cities and electorate only saw them when elections were announced. Such candidates who were not always around their constituencies were going to perform negatively if selected for election whereas a popular candidate would contribute positively to his or her selection in an election. The availability of the candidate was beneficial to him and the parties for the electors were used to the way such a personality handles issues for he or she had been interacting with the electorate which was an added advantage.

New candidates were sometimes difficult to be selected for an election as compared to a militant who had been militating in the party for a number of years. Such a militant had a good mastery of the party's ideology and hierarchy. He or she could easily fight to gain the support of

²⁸⁷ Honourable Abi Enwi Francais, 48 years, CPDM Parliamenterian from Momo East, Yaounde, 16th August 2019.

the other party members for her candidature in an election as compared to a new militant who wanted to take an elective position. The explanation was that, in some parties the militants agreed on a number of individuals who would take positions of responsibility such as who is going to run as mayor, member of parliamentarian or President. In such a situation new militant in the party did not have an opportunity to be selected as a candidate for upcoming elections except they were opportunists.

At the end, a candidate was much more appreciated by the immediate voters who decided for whom they are going to give their votes. The above are just guidelines which at times were strategies to most of the major political parties in selecting their candidates during elections. We have to equally accept that some of the candidates were not based on the above explanations but on family relationship as was seen in parliamentary competitions in CDU and in some of the parties that the family members had decided to consider the party as family business. This was seen in CDU from the returned of multipartism that any person who had stood and taken a position in the party be it Mayorship, Parliamentary seat or Presidential candidate was related to the founder of the party Adamou Ndam Njoya especially in the Noun which justified the fact, family ties were an important critera for the selection of candidate amongst others as confirmed by top ranking member of the CDU²⁸⁸.

3- Impact of Candidate Selection and Consequences

The choice of the investiture committee had both negative and positive aspects of the candidate they presented on behalf of the party. One of the negative aspects is that it can divide the militants of the party, that is to say those who were expecting to be invested by the party while at the end others are instead invested. This may create a division within the party. Some will accuse the investiture committee of favoritism as this can lead to the rejection of the party by some of the electorate. A clear situation was in the parliamentary of elections of 2013 in Nkam Division wherein the wife of Minister former Piere Mokoko Mbonjo was selected for parliamentary and council elections and this created difficulties within the CPDM party in this constituency. The population was angry with the choice of the candidate and decided to vote for the opposition party. Therefore, for the first time in 2013 the CPDM lost the election to the opposition party for making a wrong choice of the candidate. This resulted to a sanction vote for the CPDM that had always

²⁸⁸Cyrille Sam Mbaka, CDU Vice President, Douala, 22nd December 2019.

won in the Nkam Division but the opposition won as a result of the wrong candidate presented for the election²⁸⁹.

Internal fighting because of the choice of the candidate could weaken the campaign strategies as some of the members not invested by the investiture committee could refuse joining the campaign team as their names are not found on the list²⁹⁰.

In as much as there were negative aspects of the investiture committee, there were a number of positive aspects if the right candidate was presented. In situations where the right candidate was chosen and supported by a majority of the militants, there was going to be unity in the party. As such, the campaign was going to move on smoothly for the interest of the party and the candidate. At this time, a positive strategy for the investiture committee for they would succeed in keeping the party in unity before election instead of getting the militants divided over who is going to represent the party in an upcoming election. We had realized that a majority of political parties opt for the investiture strategy to be sure of victory in upcoming elections by making the choice of the right candidate. At times the candidate of the investiture committee was the origin of many of the difficulties within the party. This was the reason why during particular elections or in some particular cases in spite of the advantages of the investiture strategy, the party still decided to call for primaries in order to choose a candidate.

B- Selection through the organisation of primaries

There were two main reasons that encouraged political parties to go through primaries for the selection of their candidates for elections. Firstly, when the opponent was stronger or wellimplanted, it was advisable for the party to go in for the primaries in order to come out with a stronger competitor within the party to compete with the other candidate. This enabled the various candidates to make a competitive campaign within the party and get the best candidate for the upcoming elections and presented officially to members of the party. Secondly, political parties went for primaries as a strategy to mobilise the electorate for the upcoming elections. This was

²⁸⁹Tamstsua Sidollin, 39 years, CPDM Sub Section President of Bafoussam 1, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

²⁹⁰ I remember when I was not invested for the council list elections in Batibo in 2013, when my name was integrated into the campaign list for Batibo Sub Division, I told the organizers to give me financial means for me to join the campaign team which was not given and I refused going for the campaigns. The reason was simple. If I go for the campaign trip then I am going for the interest of those selected on the council list and the party wherein my own interest was not protected. For going on a campaign trip in one's area of origin there was absolutely going to be some expenditure especially on drinks and transportation which one cannot present for the party for refund, so it needs to be taking care of by one of the party hierarchy or competing candidates.

aimed at developing the interest of the electorate in an upcoming election and to remind the militants of the battle ahead of the party. In fact, the selection of a candidate for an upcoming election through primaries had far reaching consequences on the party.

1) Selection, endorsement and presentation of candidates

The selection and the endorsement of a candidate were aimed at getting the best candidate for an election. This was a pre-campaign strategy intended to tell the electorate to be prepared to accompany the candidate towards elections. It was some kind of renewal to the electorate and the candidate, for they would have to familiarised themselves with preparation for the day of elections²⁹¹.

The organization of primaries was another means to make the electorate acquainted with their candidate and his / her ideology. Once the electorate and the candidates met personally during the primaries, it gave the opportunity for the electorate to exchange views with the candidate on diverse issues and concert on how to agree on their divergence. This enabled the electorate to know the candidate's program before the election proper. Therefore, in such a situation, the candidate and electorate had an insight into the various road maps of the candidates and to show what the candidate was going to do differently from the other politicians. Knowing this vividly was through primaries for the candidate would present some sort of campaigns to sell his or her ideas to party officials, militants and even outsiders to make sure his candidacy was the best choice²⁹². In conclusion, primaries were very good strategies of selling the ideology of the party to members and would-be members before the election proper.

It should be understood that during such primaries, the electorate started developing more interest in the candidate as it was considered the people's candidate for an election given that the candidate was chosen during primaries as oppose to the situation where the candidate was invested by the investiture committee²⁹³. During primaries the candidate's popularity was reinforced for they started already some of campaign even though it was only done at the level of the party. Such a strategy greatly increased the popularity of the candidate for the primaries of the major parties like the SDF while that of the CPDM was always very tense. Winners of the primaries especially

²⁹¹Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua 20th November 2018.

²⁹²Abbo Ulsmanu, 71 years, NUDP Vice Secretary General, Ngoundere, 18th December 2018.

²⁹³Adoum Gassaba, 59 yaers old, member of ADD, Maroua 19th November 2018.

in the strong hold of the party is already considered as a parliamentarian especially for parliamentary elections.

Over the years, the primaries were a strategy mostly used by the opposition political parties with the objective that their candidate would be made known to the general public. On the contrary, most of the candidates of the ruling party were always well-known individuals with political track records within the constituency. At times, the candidate was an old civil servant who had been supporting the party with some developmental projects within the community. As such, the electorate already knews him or her as compared to the opposition who wanted their candidate to be known and will prefer the strategy of selecting the candidate through the primaries. However, at times, the ruling party goes for primaries once they realize that on the opposite camp, there is a very strong candidate.

2) Electioneering by various candidates at party level

Once elections were announced, at the level of all the major parties, militants lobbied to be candidates representing their various parties for the upcoming elections. This struggle was done at the level of the different parties and at times, the pressure was very tense. The candidate was settled on, calm be returned at the party level. This internal struggle to campaign to be selected as a party candidate did not involve the government administrators. The internal affair of the party and mostly involved those who lobbied for elective positions either parliamentary or presidential candidate first at the level of the party which at times was very tense and competitive²⁹⁴.

A glaring could be seen in situation within the SDF and the CPDM struggle among candidates for the parliamentary election of 2013 in the Batibo constituency. The leading party in Batibo was the SDF where the current Member of Parliament Hon Mbah Ndam Joseph had been a parliamentarian for the SDF since the elections of 2007 where he was invested by the investiture committee. In 2013 there were other potential candidates who wanted to contest for the position but in the campaign language of Honorable Mbah Ndam Joseph, he said it was his last mandate to make sure his retirement benefit was guaranteed. This was to give him enough time to train his successor. After many campaigns, those who were lobbying to be parliamentary candidates gave up their intentions, as the hierarchy of the party still wanted Honorable Mbah Ndam. At the end of the mandate, he never gave the position to another aspirant for he was still currently the

²⁹⁴Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, leader of MDR in Mayo Danai, Datcheka, 15th August 2019.

parliamentarian for the Batibo constituency in spite he announcement to give the possibility for other aspirants for the parliamentary position²⁹⁵.

When we look at the situation of CDPM, Fon Teche had regularly been holding the position of the Sub Section President of the CPDM for Batibo and parliamentary candidate commutatively for the past years. Once in power, this elite wanted to occupy all the positions because of the advantages attached to them and any member of the party who wanted to take over from them became a problem²⁹⁶. There was the power struggle between the Fon of Guzang, Fon Ngwan Mbayemsig and the Fon Teche over who was going to be the parliamentary candidate. This led to some internal squables within the CPDM as some initial accord which were tacitly agreed upon were not respected consequently, the Fon of Guzang temporarily left the party²⁹⁷. The occurrences of this situation in a number of political parties were very common and went a long way to separate party militants and friendship within the party because of the strategy of lobbying to be the party candidate for an election. The fact was that, once a militant had been chosen as the party candidate for an election especially in areas where it was strong hold of the party, like in Batibo, the said candidate was sure to be a parliamentarian once the elections were organized.

The fact was that, once there was serious electioneering within the party and a candidate were finally arrived at, the electorate knew that the candidate representing the party was chosen by them, based on their conviction and not even that of the candidate. Such a candidate was always supported by the masses and party members as opposed to the candidate invested by the investiture committee because of his / his ethnic affiliation or his money. This gave credibility to the candidate in election because the party's candidate was chosen by the voters and not by the party. With this strategy, the militants would willingly and strongly invest their time and resources to see that their chosen candidate succeed in the election.

In conclusion, once the electorate contributes in designating the candidate to represent them in an election, the electorate were more committed to ensure that the candidate succeeded. It was in this light that it can be concluded that the primaries were a motivation to call the electorate vote. This was because there would be the presence of some of the electorate who for the first time when the elections are finally organise. The electorate that experience voting in the primaries for the

²⁹⁶ Fomum Victorine, 46 years, former aspirant for CPDM Parliamentary candidate, 20th January 2020, Yaounde.

²⁹⁵ Werewum Maurice, 56 years, SDF Districk Chairman for Batibo, Bamenda, 26th October 2019.

²⁹⁷ HRH Ngwan Mbayamssig III, 58 years, Fon of Guzang, aspirant for Parliamentary candidate for CPDM in 2013, Yaounde, 20th January 2020.

selection of their party candidates which was a very positive strategy at the level of the party for it started initiating the individual into future elections. The fact is that, once a new voter participates at electing a candidate during the primaries such a new voter will make sure he or she participates in the elections once there are announced.

3) Consequences of such selection of candidates

Like any method or strategy used by political parties for the selection of candidates for an election, there existed negative and positive impact before the election. Once the strategy was having negative impact, it was not good for the party. If the impact has positive results, its good for the advancement of the candidate and the party²⁹⁸.

The party may waste some resources in fighting for same candidates within the party. Unfortunately, such money used for the internal campaign in the party ought to be used in fighting the real opponent when the elections proper was announced. It was thus necessary to put all the labour and finances to fight the opponent and not wasting labour and finances within the party. In such a situation, if the candidate has invested too much at this pre-campaign, he will be exhausted and weakened to continue with the real campaign of winning the adversary. Hence the adverse party who never went for primaries gets more strength.

The refusal of those who lose in the primaries to contribute financially or materially for upcoming elections or to participate in the campaign because of their failure to win during the primaries was a big loss to the party. This explained why some parties would prefer to go in for the investiture committee as opposed to the primaries. Primaries were usually strenuous, expensive and creted enemity and division within the party.

In spite of the fact that we had some negative impact of the primaries, there exist a number of positive aspects because of the strategy of organization of primaries within the party for the selection of the candidates. The chosen candidates were made well known to the electorate. This was going to guarantee some level of success in upcoming elections. The fact, that a candidate was selected by the voters and not by the party will make most of the militants more committed in

²⁹⁸Atagana Joseph, 65 years, Former opposition member now back to CPDM, Bamenda, 31st January 2020.

upcoming elections. Thus, this will push them to invest both morally and financial support to see that their chosen candidate succeeds²⁹⁹.

In the process of internal campaigns for the primaries, some new militants were integrated in a party because of the process of choosing a candidate for upcoming elections. As a result of the democratic process, some militants decamped. During the selection of candidates through the primaries, candidates come up with their agendas and projects that they were going to realize if elected into office. In the course of presenting solutions to some of the difficulties in the localities, some of the onlookers can develop sympathy for the party. As said, a positive point of organization of primaries as it recruits new militants for the party. Once the electorate is happy with the candidate that the majority of the voters have chosen, they are equally poised to support the party financially and joined the campaign team on the field in order to get more militants for the party. They made sure that the envisaged projects of their chosen candidate were realised if elected to office.

As a finale, the selection of candidates by investiture was well developed and appreciated by a number of political parties. The used of primaries for the selection of candidates was a strategy which was properly developed in a number of political parties and had greatly contributed to the advancement of the party ideology through the emergence of a credible candidate for upcoming elections³⁰⁰. We had equally realized that many political parties in Cameroon because of egoism and the influence of the founders of the party remained in command for a very long time. They had established the rule of the natural candidate as it was practised practiced by all the major political parties in Cameroon especially for the presidential election.

C- The question of natural candidate for presidential elections

The natural candidate was mostly the candidate chosen many years before the election as the supporters of the party already know naturally that, such a person was going to be the presidential candidate of the party. In most cases, such a candidate was a person who could not be challenged inside the party for a number of reasons. For instance, the candidature of Paul Biya in the CPDM, John Fru Ni in the SDF, and Adamu Ndam Njoya in the CDU had always been natural candidates. Such natural candidates were always the founders of the party³⁰¹. We have seen, that

²⁹⁹Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua 20 november 2018.

³⁰⁰Haminatou Hadja, 56 yaers old, member of ADD, Maroua, 21st November 2018.

³⁰¹ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic* ..., p. 73.

such a candidate held the touch light of the ideology of the party and the militants and the candidate himself or herself were ready to spend for the party.

1) The status of the party

A number of political parties already determined who was a candidate for which election without necessarily organizing primaries or going through an investiture process, especially for the presidential elections. This is somehow a good strategy, for the hierarchy of the party do not want to bring division into the party in the process of organizing a primary or using the investiture approach to select a candidate for the presidential candidate.

The selection of the candidate especially for the presidential election was done on the eve of the election and a number of political parties do not want to weaken the strength of the party by going for primaries or through investiture committees but they preferred to get a natural candidate for the party. The natural process of getting a natural candidate helps to put the party members as one without any division or expenditures in trying to come out with a natural candidate for the party in the upcoming election.

2) The challenges of the founder of the party

In Cameroon all the founders or initiators of political party had the ambitions to be a presidential candidate. This was seen in all organized presidential elections in Cameroon from 1992 to 2013. The founders of the party had made all efforts to be the presidential candidates of the party. At times, the charisma of the founder of the party made the candidate a natural candidate for the presidential election. In a situation where the founder of the party was not a natural candidate, for an upcoming election, the reason was that, the founder was dead as analyzed by a seasoned politician from the CPDM³⁰².

At the level of the parties no militant was willing to go against the intention of the founder of the party; else, such a militant daring to challenge the founder would be considered as an enemy in the house. As such, the party hierarchy will sort all means to expel such a militant from the party either directly or indirectly. At the level of the CPDM, we saw personalities like Titus Edzoa who announced his candidature for the Presidential election of 1997, was accused of embezzlement and sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment for trying to challenge President Paul Biya. He only

³⁰² Jerry Mbaku, 64 years, Retired civil servant and politician, Yaoundé, 12th of September 2019.

succeeded to come out after spending seventeen years following President Paul Biya's clemency of 25th February 2014 on the eve of the celebration of the reunification in Buea³⁰³. Marafa Hamidou Yaya was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment on September 2012. He was charged for intellectual dishonesty and corruption but the reason was his ambition for the Presidential election as he declared in a working session with the American Ambassador that the Anticorruption created was just aimed to punish political opponents of the Head of State³⁰⁴. We had similar situations in the main opposition party where all those who tried to challenge Ni John Fru Ndi for Presidential candidate had been throwned out of the party with the dreaded article 8.2. We can point the case of Bartonie Ben Muna who stood to compete with the National chairman as a Presidential candidate during the SDF convention. Professor Clement Ngwasirri questioned the power of the national chairman and was sacked under article 8.2. The learned professor of law believed that the party was caged with dictatorship that spurs conflict of authority and personality following the misused of the dreaded article 8.2 of the SDF against him. In addition, the fact that only the chairman controls the party's funds and NEC refused to have the party's accounts audited since the creation of the party pushed some prominent members of the party to quit such as Late Albert Woman Mukong, Vincent Fako, Professor Carlson Anyangwe, Dr. Gemuh Akuchu and Nfor Ngala Nfor who left because of mismanagement³⁰⁵. These wer instances to show that if any militant steps on the toes of the natural candidate, he or she was thrown out of the party.

The aspect of natural candidate was considered a good strategy because; the natural candidate was always the founder who was equally the most popular militant of the party. They all took the mission of the part as their only job and had sacrificed all their lives for the interest of the party³⁰⁶. Some politicians even made the allegations that without these individuals at the helm of their respective parties, the parties will crumble and some even said the various parties were equal to them.

The founder of the party had been seen leading in all major elections in Cameroon as could be seen with Belo Bouba Maigari heading the parliamentary list for his party in the Nord, Marice

³⁰³Wekipedia, "Titus Edzoa". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titus_Edzoa, consulted 22nd of January 2020 at 6:30 am.

³⁰⁴Wikipedia, "Marafa Hamidou Yaya". Found: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marafa_Hamidou_Yaya. Consulted on 22nd January 2020 at 7:20 am.

³⁰⁵ C. F. Nchia, Party Politics in ..., pp. 218-219.

³⁰⁶Wikipedia, "Titus Edzoa". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titus_Edzoa. Consulted on 22nd of January 2020 at 6:30 am.

Camto head of his parliamentary list in Nfondi during the 2013 elections, Ni John Fru Ndi head of the Senatorial list of 2013 for the North West Region and Jean Jacque Ekindi as head of the list for MPs in Douala. It was a good strategy to get the founder of the party as a natural candidate for an election or to head an election for he or she was the most popular candidate of the party and known by the population and the electorate.

3) The question of financial means or capability to sponsor

The financial aspect was a very vital element taken in the selection of a candidate for presidential or parliamentary election as finances was very important for an election. If the candidate chosen for an election was financially viable this would have little dispute at the level of the party in accepting the candidate as finances was very important for the success of the party. It was needed from the selection of candidates, for campaigns strategies and for logistics reasons. There was the absolute need to choose a strategic candidate who had financial viability. This was going to eases activities in the realization of some minor projects. A viable candidate would make available finances without stressing the party during campaigns.

It had been realised that once a candidate is financially viable, the electorate and the population had some extra confidence in the candidate with the conception that such a candidate was not into politics to exploit but he or she is in the election to construct as he already had the financial potentials. Meanwhile, if the candidate was not financially viable, some electorate or members of the party may think that such a candidate was coming to enrich him or herself from the party's finances. We saw the victory of Donald Trump in the United States of America Presidential elections that he was not very popular but since he was very rich, the Americans voted for him based on the manner in which he carried out his presidential campaigns and the support of his finances. In Cameroon, we have the influential position of Busheme Syvester the proprietor of Conglecam who was the head of CPDM list in the Western Region for the Senatorial election for 2013 and 2018, the parliamentary election of 2007/2013 and the head of the CPDM list in the Kung-Khi Division was the PDG of Express Union and the Vice chancellor of the University of Dschang Albert Konche and Veronique Fotso. These were individuals who had come into politics not with the objective of making money but with the intention of contributing to the development of the country and the party for they already had financial stability. Therefore, a financially stable candidate was a strategy which was very convincing for the general electorate. Had the conviction

that such a very rich candidate was not at the party or for the election as a means to get him or herself enriched. Usually, other electorate assumed that if the candidate was poor such a candidate would first try to use all means to enrich himself or herself before trying to realize the objectives of the party.

There are many strategies that were developed by political parties before elections all with the objective of winning. The question and the discussion on the issue of the law has been of primordial concern to all major parties in Cameroonian. The mobilization of militancy within the party and fighting to get new members for the party before elections and the choosing of the right candidate for an election were cardinal to the success or failure of a party. In all the methods of selecting candidates for elections in Cameroon, the most developed approach of selection of candidates for an election was through investiture committee. In conclusion, various political parties have developed a number of strategies before elections were announced in order to win the support of the electorate. In preparation for elections, especially the major political parties had made all efforts to see that the electoral law was friendly as we saw the elections organising body changed from MINATD, to NEO and to ELECAM. On the contrary, we saw the ruling party claiming that the electoral law is free and fair. Once the party accepted to participate in an election all efforts were made to mobilize their militants to get themselves registered on the electoral list. This was done through the organization of rallies to present the party's projects and to raise funds for the party campaign projects. Big supporters of the party were expected to donate generously for the party to succeed. A number of parties started preparing right in advance for the election by making sure that the right candidates were selected for the various elections. This selection of candidates was either done through the investiture committee or through the organization of primaries or based on the principle of natural candidates who in most cases were the founders of the party.

Conclusion

The Chapter handled the strategies developed by political parties before elections. These strategies were developed for the the parliamentary, presidential and senatorial elections from 1990 to 2013. It analysed how the various political parties prepared themselves for the various competitive elections. The discussion and appreciation of electoral law by the political parties was also one of the main ideas developed.

CHAPTER III:

ELECTIONEERING STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Introduction

This chapter focuses on electioneering strategies of political parties during the presidential elections in Cameroon since 1992. It opens by appreciating the different strategies adopted by the CPDM which was the ruling and always winning party in the various presidential elections. After, it analyzes the strategies of all the opposition political parties which engage in presidential competition with the CPDM. The chapter ends by doing a comparative study of strategies put in place by all the political parties which attempted the presidential election in Cameroon from 1992 to 2011.

I - Presidential elections strategies of CPDM from 1992 to 2011

In Cameroon since the return of multipartism, we have two types of national elections which are the parliamentary and presidential elections. Concerning the second election, many political parties put their candidates in competition for the Presidency. To achieve this ambition, they put in place many strategies to convince the population to vote for their candidate. During this period all the political parties did their best to show that, the candidate designated by their party was the best choice to govern the country. This was why all the political parties of the ruling and the opposition amps as well as the major or mushroom parties who put in place some strategies adapted to the circumstances and their financial means. Sometimes, these parties had similar strategies but generally, the different parties developed their strategies which were particularly to challenge their opponents. As from 1992 to 2011, it can be observed a number of different strategies developed by political parties during presidential election. The aims of all the various strategies were to encourage members of the party and the population in general to choose the leader presented to them.

The CPDM adopted various strategies for Presidential elections in Cameroon from the reintroduction of multipartisms in 1990s up to 2013. The CPDM came out with various strategies

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and slogans for different Presidential elections in Cameroon¹. Her Presidential candidate participated in a maximum of two campaigns initiated to convince the electorate. The ruling party technically initiated some of the strategies which were aimed at destabilising the opposition parties from gaining support on the field either directly or indirectly. These strategies employed by the ruling party on the field in order to win the support of the Cameroonian electorate were usually successful because thery were the party in power and could manipulate the law to their advantage.

Electioneering strategies put in place by the CPDM depended on the stakes on the ground and the competitiveness of the election year as was the case in the presidential elections of 1992 which were highly competitive with all the major political parties participating. In the 1997 Presidential election, the party adopted a policy which was not very aggressive because the major political parties such as the SDF, NUDP, CDU were not participating. By this, the ruling party managed to get some less influential parties to legitimise her Presidential elections. The 2004 Presidential election campaign saw the ruling party employing another intense political campaign strategy with the return of major political parties in the race. Its objective is to make sure the opposition parties did not succeed in presenting a strong unique candidate. This is to continuously divide them and weaken the campaign of the opposition on the field to the advantage of the CPDM. Finally, the CPDM adopted a different strategy for the 2011 Presidential election with the introduction of ELECAM to manage elections but without the power of proclaiming results such powers are left in the hands of the Supreme Court sitting in the place of the Constitutional Council.

The strategy of getting ELECAM in place presented to the Cameroonian electorate and the international community, that the Presidential elections were going to be free and faire but since the ruling party still appointed its officials, it could be observed that the activities of the organ was far from being objective.

Presidential Elections of 1992

The 11 October 1992 witnessed the first multiparty presidential elections organised in Cameroon since independence². There was the effective participation of presidential candidate Paul Biya on the field as he was seen campaigning amongst the other sympathisers of the CPDM. The CPDM employed all means at her disposal adopting either legal or illegal strategies to portray

¹ Jerry Mbaku, 64 years, CPDM elite and member of campaign team from momo, Yaounde, 12th September 2019.

² M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of ..., p.* 149.

its candidate as the ideal person to continue leading the nation while destabilising the opposition parties especially the SDF that was gaining more support on the field. The then Gilbert Andre Tsoungui, Minister of Territorial Administration and Augustin Kontchou Koumegne, Minister of Communication and spokesman of the Government, monopolised the airwaves of the lone Cameroon Radio and Television Corperation to preach hate, warning Cameroonians against "going for an angel they did not know", referring their immediate opponent Ni John Fru Ndi who was the Union for Change Candidate who held rallies with a very heavy turnout that made the CPDM afraid³.

1) The projects and slogan adopted by CPDM

The ruling party at the level of the Central Committee developed the slogan Lion Man "L'homme lion" ⁴ for their Presidential candidate for the October 1992 election. The CPDM considered its candidate Paul Biya as "The Lion Man" or call it 'l'homme lion'. Reason was that the lion is considered king of the forest and the leader of the CPDM was considered the lion of the competing candidates. This was a means to give superiority to the CPDM presidential candidate over the opposition candidates in the field. It should be understood that during this period, the Cameroonian indomitable lions were equally very successful during their participation in the World Cup organised in Italy 1990. The strategists of the CPDM, taking advantage of the national team, to name their presidential candidate l'homme lion for the presidential election of 1992. The top officials of the government, including Ministers, General Managers of State Corporations, members of the Central Committee and officials of the CPDM, were dispatched to their various constituencies to campaign for candidate Paul Biya for the 11 October 1992 polls. This was the first ever competitive campaign wherein the CPDM was going to pit other political parties. The CPDM had to send these officials in their areas of command to campaign for the incumbent who could not be made available at all campaign rallies. Therefore, these state and party officials carried the message of the Head of State who was the presidential candidate of the CPDM to the electorates using all the state means at their disposal.

³ SDF @ 25, The struggle for ..., p. 86.

⁴ The slogan of l'homme lion as adapted by the burea of the CPDM as their campaign strategic instructment for the presidential election. This slogan and message were going to be adopted all over the national territory as one of the campaign strategies of the ruling party.

2) The effective campaigns on the field by CPDM

The presidential candidate of the CPDM for the presidential elections had to join the state and party officials campaigning for him once in a while and once such an occasion came up it becomes a state visit. The Head of State and presidential candidate of the CPDM once on the field for campaign, it was considered a state activity wherein all state protocol was put in place. There was total state security prior to the envisaged campaign, during the campaign and after to make sure the security of the Head of State was guaranteed. The state officials were mobilised to join the Head of State whereever the rally was organised days ahead of the rally to assure effective preparation and arrangements on the ground. The participation of the Head of State in a rally was not only left to the elite of the area but handled as a national issue wherein policy speeches were made with very significant promises. Unfortunately, the execution was a serious bond of challenge as most political analysts have said, the president was very good at making promises but realisation is a very big challenge as we shall see in our subsequently pages⁵.

The presidential elections had only one constituency; therefore, all members of the party were expected to put all their efforts together to make sure their aspirant or nominee was given all the attention he needed to succeed in the elections. He was accompanied in the realisation of this project by top officials of the party who were expected to give a significant amount of financial support for the execution of field campaigns which was a crucial part of the elections⁶.

The effective participation of the presidential candidate of the CPDM at campaigns was managed as a state activity for all the logistic arrangements and financial expenditure were covered by the state directly. This was opposed to the opposition presidential campaigns which were handled by the party from logistic to financial engagement, to make sure it was proper organisation.

⁵ Sama Isaac Nde, 67 years, Retired Divisional Executive in Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 30th September 2019.

⁶ Honourable Abi Francis, 48 years, CPDM member of parliament from Momo East, Yaounde, 16th August 2019.



Picture N° 12: President Paul on field Campaign for Presidential Elections of 1992

Source: Author collection from CPDM secretariat in Bafoussam

The organisation of the CPDM was made in such a manner that the campaign was felt all over the national territory, starting from the lowest to the highest organ of the party to see that the mobilisation was effectively done. The mobilisation was done at the level of the party and subsequently lobbying for new supporters for their candidate from the Cameroonian population at large⁷.

3) The Mechanisms used by the CPDM to Destabilise the Opposition Parties

The ruling CPDM had been in power for so long that, it eventually controled Economic, Political and Social aspects of the nation which permitted it to execute any action in order to destabilise the opposition, making sure, that the ruling party's presidential candidate was victorious. The 1992 presidential election was the first competitive elections participated by all major political parties. Strategically, the Presidential election was supposed to be organised in November of 1993 going by the Cameroon electoral projections but since it was the President who decided when an election held in Cameroon, the President decided to bring the election much

⁷Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua, 20th November 2018.

earlier to October 1992 which is an advantage to the ruling party as they had the financial means for campaigns. On the other hand, was a surprise to the opposition parties who were not yet prepared and lacked the finances. So, all attempts by the opposition to get the presidential election postponed was ignored by the government⁸. Thus, they were obliged to participate else the CPDM would still go ahead with the elections with the participating opposition parties even if they were not major political parties.

The ruling party had the monopoly over the CRTV which was the lone means of communication in Cameroon. They used it in presenting their case through at the same time making all efforts to discredit the opposition parties especially Ni John Fru Ndi whose supporters were multiplying in the field. As a matter of fact, if the ruling party could not succeed openly to destabilise the opposition parties as a means to weaken them, they tried even through corrupt means to buy some of the opposition members or to create or initiate an internal fighting within the party as a means to weaken the effectiveness of the party on the field

There were situations wherein the SDF rallies were denied authorisation by the powers that be which hindered them from the organisation of their rallies. In view of the plurality law of December 1990, the organisation of a political rally or any public gathering needed the authorisation of a Senior Divisional Officer upon submission of an application declaring the purpose of the event, when, where and at what time the activity is taking place. Once the SDF rally coincided with an attempted rally of the CPDM, the opposition rally was not going to be authorised. As a consequence, this was going to frustrate the entire activity and organisation put in place by the party. The SDF had long previewed a campaign rally for the Far North of Cameroon, but the President Paul Biya decided to carry out a rally in Maroua in the Far North for her presidential campaigns which was to be attended by president Paul Biya the incumbent this led to the suspension of the SDF rally to give way for the ruling party candidates' rally. This was a disadvantage for the opposition party which had not been given equal opportunity for the political campaign. Since the administration was directly and indirectly supporting CPDM candidate, it was made possible to see that the envisaged rally of the SDF was not authorised once the administrators realised, they could be a conflict of interest or that the interest of the CPDM candidate was

⁸ Edum Vitalis Njoh, The Social Democratic Front (SDF) in multy-party politics in Cameroon 1990-2010, A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of a post graduate Teaching Diploma (DIPES II) in History, Higher Teacher Training College. Bambili-Bamenda, June 2014, p.72.

threatened. The administration was there to satisfy the interest of the ruling party irrespective of the consequences provided the ruling party was satisfied at the end.

The government decides to transfer some strong leaders of the SDF who are working in government services out of their stronghold as a means to weaken and destabilise the opposition party. The situation of Teno Lawrence a teacher and SDF District Chairman in Batibo transferred from Batibo to Iyumujok. This was a means to destabilise the opposition strong hold in Batibo. Such transfer is based on the recommendations of the CPDM hierarchy on the field who reported to the hierarchy of the CPDM in Yaoundé of the disturbance they were getting on the field from such opposition leaders. The barons of the CPDM had to see the necessary connections that, the individuals who were civil servants and challenging the smooth running of the party activities such the case of Teno Laurence has to be transferred out of the party area under his command. Since those in management were top barons of the CPDM, they could even see that, the recalcitrant individuals were transferred even within the school year as a means to destabilise the political party for which he or she belonged⁹. This yielded tremendous results for the CPDM party in a number of constituencies in Cameroon where opposition parties were vibrant because of some individual civil servants. As these individuals were transferred out of their areas of interest to rural areas the opposition party's strength in the area became weakened and overused.

The government as a strategy to weaken the opposition political parties, decided not to settle the bills of opposition contractors. A clear case was the situation of late James Mbanga whose contract for the realisation of some structures for the Dschang University was blocked and work had to stop and other pending contracts were not paid making it difficult for them to support the party of their choice. The ideal was that since, the government controled eventually everything in Cameroon, the government identified contractors who were strong supporters of the opposition parties and made sure their bills were not paid with the only explanation being that there was no liquidity in the coffers of the state. The misfortune was that once a contractor's bill was not settled after the completion of work, it tended to accumulate interest on the loan taken to execute the project. At last, even when the bill was paid after a very long time, the contractor ended up paying a big part of the money as interest thereby doing the job at a deficit. Such punishment was because he or she was supporting the opposition against the government. Some of the contractors were able

⁹ Jerry Mbaku, 64 years, CPDM elite from Batibo, Yaounde, 12th September 2019.

to endure while others ran out of contract business or decided to go back to the ruling party¹⁰. The government of Cameroon indirectly frustrated a number of contractors who were booming in business such as Nangah Company limited to go-out of business because of their support for the opposition parties instead of supporting the ruling party.

It was even, that most of the opposition businessmen were given very heavy taxes as a means to discourage them from supporting the opposition parties. Nevertheless, the strong ones still decided to support the opposition since they believed they were standing for a just course while the week and undecided businessmen returned to the CPDM as a means of protecting their businesses. Some of the business establishments which could not bear the heavy taxes over the years were forced to renounce the opposition parties in order to sustain their businesses and families¹¹. The government machinery in developing countries was very dangerous because it can frustrate a business. This explains why some business magnates such as Fotso Victor, Kadji and Aladji Baba Dnapullo remained fervent supporters of the government in power. They do so inorder to protect their businesses.

The government decided to base its system of appointment to duty post only for those workers that were loyal to the ruling party. Those who openly supported the opposition after the 1990s were not able to be appointed to higher grades or positions. In fact, the government even adopted the policy of appointing junior workers to position of responsibility win total disrespect of meritocracy but because they were supporting the ruling party. A number of teachers were appointed as principals or even out of their Ministry of origin just as a means to compensate them for supporting the CDPM while keeping the most experienced teachers as a means of punishing them for supporting the opposition parties. In some cases junior workers were appointed to positions of responsibility just because of their connection to the CPDM. This strategy of appointing workers to post of responsibility as a means of compensation for supporting the CPDM candidate has resulted in increased support for the CDPM party. In so doing they render the opposition party weaker and weaker over the years. This, as a matter of fact, was going to weaken the government institutions that had seen less competent workers appointed to positions of responsibility because they were supporters of the CDPM and not based on meritocracy.

 ¹⁰ Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF member at the creation of multiparty in 1990 till date, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.
 ¹¹ Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

In the quest of extra favour from the governing party, because of the rational behaviours of human being, many of those politicians who needed extra help from the government were forced to joined and support the CPDM. The ruling party could easily employ and gave advantages to its supporters both for civil servants and contractors. Many of those who needed assistance from the system in power were easily converted to the CPDM party not because they were convinced of the party's ideology but because, they needed favour from the ruling party. Therefore, the CPDM used this means as a good strategy to get more supporters for the party by telling them to support the candidature of the CPDM who was going to earn them promotion and a good number of facilities from the government. This was a powerful tool used by CPDM that had been in power for decades to destabilise the opposition parties in Cameroon.

The Cameroon government puts at the disposal of participating political parties some funds to enable them carry out their campaigns before elections and gave the last quarter if the opposition parties scored a minimum of 5% of the national votes cast for the Presidential elections. Technically, since the CPDM was also the government these funds were not given to the opposition parties on time with the objective to hinder them from progressing with their campaigns. The SDF was always criticising the government for making this money available late or after the campaigns as a means to frustrate the opposition parties in their plan for serious campaign trips in advance¹². The ruling party had a number of strategies at her disposal to destabilise the opposition and those supporting the opposition parties or candidates in Cameroon. Apart from these extra advantages of the CPDM, they still had a number of strategies which the party put at its disposal to convince the electorates for the various presidential elections, these gave them very positive results as opposed some major opposition parties which were not well-organised.

B) The Strategies put in place by the CPDM for 1997 Presidential Elections

The campaigns for the 12 October 1997 electionwas relatively calm as compared to the campaigns 1992 Presidential election. These campaigns of 1997 were not tense, reasons because the main opposition parties like the SDF, NUDP, and UDC boycotted the campaigns. These major political parties decided not to participate at the presidential elections of 1997 because they were requesting for free and fair electoral laws¹³. The government did not succumb to the demands of

 ¹²Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 63 years, Administrative Secretary at SDF head office, Bamenda, 1st December 2020.
 ¹³ Idem

the main opposition parties who insisted on an independent electoral commission else they were not participating in the elections. The ruling party lobbied and got some minor parties to participate in the elections. To the ruling party, once there were more than two political parties participating in an election, there was indication that a number of political parties participated in the elections. The ruling party put all its human machinery in the field for national campaigns in the whole territory to cajoire Cameroonian electorate to vote massively for the CPDM Presidential candidate, Paul Biya.

1) The Projects and Slogan Adopted by CPDM

The CPDM had much more organised campaigns that were carried out all over the entire national territory. The natural Presidential candidate Paul Biya was named the "The Best Choice", the slogan of best choice with the image of the president was placed at the entrance of the major cities of Cameroon and in public areas to create more awareness about the CPDM candidate. The appellation the "Best choice" meant that in the common sense of the expression, amongst the competing candidates, President Paul Biya is the best candidate for the Presidential office. When, the campaign message was decided upon by the Central Committee of the CPDM in Yaoundé, placards and, T-shirts are made and distributed all over the national territory to party officials. In most cases, the barons of the party did extra printing in their respective areas of origin for free distribution to support the presidential campaigns

2) How CPDM Campaigns of 1997 were Organised

The campaign message was decided and agreed upon at the Central Committee of the CPDM in Yaoundé. The leadership of the party was charged with the responsibility to disseminate the message in their respective constituencies through the organisation of rallies at the Provincial, Divisional, Sub Divisional and at the District levels to make sure the members and would-be members of the party were informed of the strategy the party was taking. This had the objective to make the candidate of the CPDM victorious in the election. There was a specialised communication department which handled any media communication over the CRTV which was the lone means of communication at the time.

The magnates of the CPDM working out of their constituencies of origin had to take a mandatory mission to their towns or city of origin to campaign for their Presidential candidate and

to make them available for campaigns in other areas if need be and to work as a team to convince more electorate for their candidate. In most cases, these barons of the CPDM party are to ensure that banners of their Presidential candidate are placed at very strategic positions of the town. At their city or town of origin, these tycoons of the CPDM had to make sure they visited meeting groups with gifts to present their case and lobbied for the people to vote for their Presidential candidate. During such visits the hierarchy of the party moved along with gifts, T-shirts and party gagets for distribution to members and would be members of the party as a means of motivation to their electorate.

3) The Specificity of the Campaigns of the Presidential Elections of 1997

The boycott of the major political parties like the SDF, UNDP and CDU were because they requested for an Independent Electoral Commission which the government refused. Nevertheless, 15 candidates participated though with a very low turnout¹⁴. This meant the campaigns were just some sort of formality for the incumbent was automatically going to win with a wide margin since the main opposition political parties were not going to participate. The candidate of the CPDM, Paul Biya, had to compete with the following low profile presidential candidates like Henri Hobge Nleng of the UPC, Samuel Eboua of the MDR, Albert Dzongang of PPD, Joachim Tabi Owono of Action for Meritocracy and Equal Opportunities, Antoine N'Demannu of Rally of People without Borders and Gustave Essaka of Cameroon Integral Democracy¹⁵. A critical look at the profile of the various Presidential candidates shows that Paul Biya was going to be competing with candidates who were not really known in Cameroonian politics. These candidates were just to accompany the incumbent to his victory for the Presidential elections. The absence of the major political parties in this Presidential elections meant the CPDM was going to win the Presidential election with ease while the little known political parties that were participating were going to validate the victory of the CPDM with their participation as the CPDM said their candidate won in a competitive election for legalised political parties participated in the election.

¹⁴ Edum Vitalis Njoh, *The Social Democratic ..., p.* 91.

¹⁵ Wikipedia, "1997 Cameroonian presidential election". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Cameroonian_presidential_election. Consulted on 9th December 2019 at 10 :30 am.

C) The disputed elections of 2004 and 2011 with the return of major political parties

The specificity of the 2004 presidentials was the return of the major opposition parties into the elections. The major opposition parties accepted and participated in the elections of 2004 though the independent electoral code which they had requested was never granted. The issue here was that there was no provision of an independent electoral code but rather the government introduced some semi-organ for the management of elections in Cameroon. Some major opposition parties came up with Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya as their coalition candidate¹⁶. All the major opposition parties did not come to validate the unique candidate as the main opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi because of egoism left the group. He was frustrated that he was not chosen to be the opposition candidate for the Presidential election to fight incumbent Paul Biya. The NEO came and revised the electoral list in Cameroon deleted some double registration of the electorate, and between 4800 and 5000 voters were wiped out from the registration list of the electorate. These were symptoms of good fate. The opposition further criticised government for not making available the campaigns funds as stipulated by the law early enough for the opposition parties to use for their campaign's activities. The NEO had to ensure that the government did its own part of the procedures to see that elections are organised in a free and transparent manner¹⁷. Due to the weaknesses of NEO on the 19th December 2006, there was the creation of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM)¹⁸ which was in charge of organisation and supervision of elections in Cameroon. ELECAM introduced the biometric registration, and electoral cards, and the creation of many registration centers closer to the electorate so as to encourage them register on the electoral lists without any difficulties. All these innovations suggest to the opposition parties and the Cameroonian electorate that the 2011 Presidential elections could be organized under free and fair conditions. The elections laws prior to this the election of 2011 were better as opposed to the previous Presidential elections of 1992 and 2004. Since the ruling party or the government vehemently refused an independent electoral commission which would had been responsible for

¹⁶C. F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., p. 205.

¹⁷"Cameroon: The October 2004 presidential elections, including the process, the monitoring efforts, the election results, the reaction of government organizations and opposition parties, as well as the treatment of opposition party members by government authorities (2004 - May 2005)". Found: https://www.refworld.org/docid/42df60c7d.html. Consulted 27th Décembre 2019 at 2 :30 am.

¹⁸ Loi No :2006/011 portant creation, organization et fonctionnement d'elections Cameroun (ELECAM) du 19 decembre 2006.

the organisation, supervision and declaration of results; such cosmetic proposals were geared to bring the opposition parties to participate and legitimise the victory of the government.

1) The strategies adopted in 2004 with the return of the major opposition parties

With reference to the presidential campaign of 2004, it was highly competitive as the major political parties decided to compete for the presidential office. The presidential candidate of the CPDM did not initially participate in the campaigns but at the last minute his presence was felt on the field. The presidential candidate, Paul Biya, said the other presidential candidates were inexperienced by saying he was the only candidate who could prevent anarchy in Cameroon. The president in his policy speech advocated and promised free mosquitonets for pregnant mothers. There was a lot of sketicism over the pledges because of the failure of so many promises made by Paul Biya during previous elections of 1992 and 1997 presidential campaigns. The presidential candidate of the SDF, Adamu Ndam Njoya of the CDU, Garga Haman Adji of the ADD with a host of other participating candidates little known in the political circle in Cameroonian.

The CPDM knew that the issue of the independent electoral commision was off the table. It equally realised that the main opposition parties unable to come out with a unique candidate to figh it candidate Paul Biya. It should be understood, that the strategists of the CPDM know that, once the opposition parties wer not been able to put up a unique candidate, the work of the CPDM candidate to be re-elected is guaranteed. The CPDM campaign teams were dispatched to the various regions as usual. The campaign teams requested the CPDM tycoons to make special contributions of funds to be used for Presidential election of the party. Any big-wig members working with the government were supposed to make money available for the party for this crucial project and then find how to justify at your departmental level. If you are a businessman, you were expected to support with cash and bring the rest subsequently to the election team or commision members of your region. They launched the campaigns to raise money for the Presidential elections is done in Yaounde and other subsequent launchings were done at the Regional head quarters headed by the Regional campaign teams made up of officials of the government. For example, the South West Campaign team was headed by then Prime Minister and head of government Ephraim Inoni who was the son of the soil. The top government officials and top business magnates within

the Regions were expected to make substential contributions to enable a successful campaign in their areas of command.

2) The strategies adopted during the presidential elections of 2011 with the creation of ELECAM

Due to the national and international pressure, the ruling party accepted to create ELECAM to manage elections in Cameroon. Prior to the establishment of ELECAM, elections were organised, managed and supervised by the MINATD and NEO created in 2000. Therefore, the establishment of ELECAM was a significant step in the democratisation process in Cameroon¹⁹. Though ELECAM still had some major difficulties like the multiple ballot papers which were cumbersome to manage, transportation of election materials could not be handled by ELECAM. It was advocated for the major opposition parties and the international community as it was a constitutional issue. The law establishing ELECAM proved that it was an independent body with managerial autonomy, in reference to the law, ELECAM's duty was to organise, manage and supervise elections and referendums. Therefore, was vested with the requisite powers to perform its duties, its functions through the Electoral Board and the General Directorate²⁰. Contrary to expectations, the ruling party proceeded to appoint members of ELECAM who were loyal to the government. Some seasoned politicians like Jean Jacque Ekindi even submitted the leaders of ELECAM were made up of former members of the CPDM. Therefore, they were in such a position to protect the interest of the person who appointed them and not to serve the Cameroonian public to ensure free and fair elections.

¹⁹ Pascal Nzeucheu, politics in the Bamileke region of Cameroon, 1946-2013: Dynamics and implications, Ph.D thesis, University of Bamenda, April 2018, p. 239.

²⁰ Report of the Common Wealth Expert on the Cameroon Presidential election of 9 October 2011, pp. 7-13.

Image Nº1: Publicity adverts of the CPDM



Sources: Collection from CPDM Secretariat in Bafoussam

3) The Attitude of the CPDM during the two Elections with the idea of Unique Opposition Candidate

The ruling CPDM developed a strategy to say that, their presidential candidate was the people's choice. This idea was to wipe out the issue of a unique candidate for the opposition if they finally come out to any such conclusion. Using the iconography approaches, the images of Paul Biya were placed at the entrances of the major cities of the Republic of Cameroon as a campaign strategy.

II – The Presidential Elections 1992-2011 and Opposition Strategies

The SDF had developed strategies and pressured both the national and international bodies to unseat President Paul Biya, the candidate, of the CPDM from 1992 to 2011 without success. The SDF had in all instances made sure that their Presidential candidate, Fru Ndi, should be the opposition unique candidate or they stood alone claiming they had the majority of supporters on the ground and that they were the major opposition party.

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A- The Strategies Developed by the SDF Party.

The SDF from 1992 to 2013 had been the main challenger of the CPDM. The SDF developed strategies which put them second in terms of national representation in Cameroon. The SDF party was ranked second after the CPDM regarding official figures from the Cameroon government. During the Presidential elections of 1992, SDF was almost represented in 80% of the country²¹. The SDF was well structured into seven organs to manage the affairs of the party. There was SDF Wards headed by a Ward Execative, Electoral Districts headed by Electoral District Committee, Divisional Cordinating Committee headed by a Divisional Coordinators, Provincial Executive Committee headed by a Provincial Chairpersons. The National Executive Committee headed over by the National Chairman, the National Advisory Council convened and presided over by the National Chairman and the National Convention meeting held during years of elections to designate the Presidential candidate. The later was the highest organ of the party. It had the power to decide on the nation-wide policies, programmes and amendments of the constitution of the party as also elected and revoked the National Officers of the party amongst others. This convention was also disseminating information of the party to its members and supporters²².

The visit of its National Chairman accompanied by his entourage for the introduction and implantation of SDF did go a long way to create more awareness of the SDF and its manifestation of Federal System to be decided by the Cameroonian electorate. It had been the strategy of the SDF to see Cameroon governed as a Federal State which was to be decided by Cameroonians. The SDF did everything to outline the ills of the government in proposing how they were going to govern Cameroon if they won the Presidential Elections. They clearly outlined in the book, Social Democratic Front (SDF) Democracy Justice Development in a proposed constitution of Cameroon for a new dispensation²³. These stratified organs starting from the lower to the upper organ of the party came up and disseminated various strategies for their campaigns. This caught the attention of many Cameroonian electorate who needed change and a way forward for Cameroon to emerge from the deplorable economic and political difficulties.

²¹ Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF member at the creation of multiparty in 1990 till date, 14th March 2019, Bamenda.

²² E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic* ..., p. 45-48.

²³Social Democratic Front (SDF) ..., pp. 1-9.

1) The SDF in the 1992 Presidential Election

The SDF fought hard to expose the ills of the ruling CPDM and promised Cameroonians they were able and going to bring the needed change if they were elected into office. Cameroonians who were hungry for change saw in the campaigns of the SDF and their slogan "Power to the people and equal opportunities" to be very appealing and decided to give their support to the SDF openly, especially at the presidential election of 1992 which they stood for the following:

The SDF party in her platform promised to form a transitional government. It pointed out that, to change from a state with a one-party system to a democratic multiparty state it was incumbent to form a transitional government that would unite all the forces. Such government would be enlarging in order to enable the creation of new structures that will be acceptable to the majority of Cameroonians. The party also promised to dissolve the existing National Assembly because it does not represent the legitimate aspirations of Cameroonians. The SDF in like manner promised to summon a National Conference composed of all political parties, Human Rights Organisations, Professional Institutions, Religious Institutions, Traditional and Cultural Institutions, Syndicates and persons of the civil society. The party argued that it was the only legitimate forum in which new Institutions which could satisfy the socio-political aspiration of Cameroonians could be established. Finally, the party promised to a democratic multipary state in March 1992, which was not the case in the present dispensation. The existing constitution was designed for a one-party state and so, could not satisfy the aspirations of multi-partism and freedom of expression. She argued that a new constitution would lay the foundation for real democracy with the separation of power²⁴.

This was a very convincing message which made the Cameroonian electorate think, this was the right moment for change in Cameroon as it saw many Cameroonians' comings out to listen speeches in the SDF at rallies which were organised by its National Chairman and Presidential Candidate Ni John Fru Ndi in most of the cities in Cameroon.

The SDF embarked on a campaign strategy that effectively started from the grass roots. The hierarchy of the SDF and its presidential candidate, Ni John Fru Ndi, made sure they personally met the electorate to present their political agenda for Cameroon. We scarely saw the appearance of the CPDM Presidential candidate on the field as opposed to the Presidential candidate of the SDF who made himself available almost all over the national territory before the Presidential elections of 1992. Being personally on the field for campaign was an added advantage for the SDF candidate as compared to the CPDM candidate who for majority of the campaigns was represented by other party members

²⁴ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic ..., pp.* 76-77.



Picture N° 13: SDF Campaign Slogan for 1992 presidential election

Source: Author snapped image during field trip from an SDF militant in Yaounde

The SDF succeeded in convincing its militants to sponsor the campaign trips of the SDF delegations on the field. Militants and would-be militants of the SDF made individual and group contributions to receive the SDF delegation on the field or to get the message of the Chairman, the Presidential Candidate of the SDF. The tradition in Cameroon was that, during the one-party system, the party or the government directly or indirectly made funds available for the running of the party. The big officials of the party had to make sure there were funds for logistics, transportation and entertainment for party rallies or activities. With the coming of SDF and during her Presidential campaigns of 1992, the members of the party had to make personal contributions to see that the visit of its Presidential candidate and team was successful one. During the campaign visit of the National Chairman of the SDF, in some areas like in Douala, Bafoussam, the Northern

Provinces and South West Province, the SDF team would usually back home with some cash, gifts and food items handed to the Presidential campaign team²⁵.

The SDF succeeded in convincing some of the opposition parties to support the candidature of Ni John Fru Ndi as the Union for change candidate for change. The major opposition parties could not agree to come up with a strong and unique candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya as an individual. The candidates decided to present themselves for the Presidential election of 1992 as presented by the Alliance for the Reconstruction of Cameroon through the Sovereign National Conference (ARC-SNC).

This was alliance of opposition parties that hope to change the socio-political-economic situation in Cameroon through the convening of a Sovereign National Conference as a first step toward solving the country's political-economic crisis. The ARC-SNC included a group of a dozen opposition parties, otherwise known as the hard-core opposition parties, with the Social Democratic Front (SDF) as the head. They constituted themselves into the Union for Change Group, which envisaged change through a three-point agenda: the resignation of the Paul Biya government, the formation of the transitional government that will convene a Sovereign National Conference, and the establishment of genuinely democratic institutions. John Fru Ndi was elected chairman of the ARC-SNC. Other prominent opposition politicians in the alliance included Maigari Boubo Bello of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP) and Adamu Ndam Njoya of the Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU)

In anticipation of the October 1992 presidential elections, the alliance chose Fru Ndi as the opposition single candidate. This did not help the alliance because various political parties in the alliance presented their own candidates. Consequently, the alliance's attempt to present a single presidential candidate failed²⁶.

The failure to get the major political parties come out with a unique candidate to face the incumbent Paul Biya did not stop the main opposition party in Cameroon, the SDF from continuously striving to come out with other strategies to seeing into it that the party is successful in the Presidential elections of 1992.

2) The SDF Strategies in the 2004 Presidential Election

The SDF was absent during the presidential campaigns and elections of 1997 because they requested for independent electoral commission to make sure the elections were free and fair. This condition was not fulfilled in 2004 but the SDF still decided to go in for the Presidential competition in 2004. It was hopeful that the major opposition parties were going to present a unique candidate as a means to oust Paul Biya from office. The leader of UDC took an initiative to meet Ni John Fru Ndi at his Ntarinkon Residence, conscious of the fact that, no opposition party

²⁵ Mbah Fleix, 60 years, SDF volunteer driver, Bamenda, 30th November 2019.

²⁶ M. D. Delancey al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 34.

could single handedly win the CPDM. These two leaders and political parties decided to extend their hand of fellowship to other politicians who were equally thinking of having a unique candidate to fight against Paul Biya. They first contacted the Alliance for Patriotic Forces (APF) composed of Victorine Hameni Bieleu, Barrister Yondo Black, and Anicet Ekafor to negotiate to see how the opposition could come together to present a unique candidate for the 11th October 2004 Presidential election.

Dakole Daisala and others including George Nyamnbi, Sindjoun Polam and Henri Hogbe Nlend joined the rangs for this purpose. Later on, the Ndi-Njoya clan moved to the Grand North where the first adherents were Issa Tchiroma and Sanda Oumarou for the idea of platform to negotiate the presentation of a single candidate at the presidential elections²⁷. This group came out with fifteen points for the candidate to be chosen as the presidential candidate. They emphasised on the level of education and Bilingualism. The SDF team interpreted it as a means to eliminate the candidate of the SDF and pointed out that it was against the constitution of the Republic of Cameroon which stated clearly that, the President of the Republic should know to read and write one of the official languages of Cameroon. The other main opposition parties decided to give their support to Admou Ndam Njoya of CDU to be its presidential candidate for the 2004 election²⁸. This angered Ni John Fru Ndi who hurriedly convoked a convention of the SDF which invested him as the Presidential candidate. Therefore, the SDF moved out of the coalition and stood with the support of some other opposition parties.

²⁷ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic ...*, pp. 92-93.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 93.




Image Nº2: Poster adverts of theSDF during the 2004 presidential elections


Source: Author image snaped during field visit at SDF secretariat in Bamenda on 11th January 2018

The National Chairman of the SDF during the nationwide campaigns, promised to give priority to good governance, fight against corruption, fight against poverty, appropriate education, affordable and efficient health care, construction of the nation, transparent economic management, development of new infrastructure and a more friendly and reciprocal international relations. As a matter of fact, the Chairman promised to put in place an army well-trained with disciplined soldiers who have to fight the war against corruption to make sure all Cameroonians benefited from the country²⁹. He concluded with the slogan; he is the candidate of hope for Cameroon³⁰. He concluded with the slogan that was "He is the candidate of hope for Cameroon

²⁹ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic* ..., pp. 93-94.

³⁰ SDF achives, brochure titled, "2004 Presidential Election" in which it outlined some of the electorial promises of the SDF should its candidate be elected during the 2004 presidential election.

3) The Last Attempt of SDF Chairman in the Presidentials of 2011



Picture N° 14: SDF Candidate Campaign Ballot of 2011 Presidential Elections

Source: Author collection from SDF Secretariat in Bamenda

The presidential elections of 2011 were the last participation of SDF party with natural candidate before 2013. It was one of the controversial mandates given to the chairman of the SDF for presidential elections in Cameroon.

B- The Strategies of the CDU, NUDP and UPC

The CDU, NUDP and UPC were among the political parties that participated in a number of Presidential elections in Cameroon between 1992 and 2011. They either stood as independent candidates, in an alliance with another party or supporting the candidate of the ruling CPDM candidate Paul Biya. The NUPD and UPC parties for instance supported the CPDM while the CDU remained an opposition candidate and had even boycotted the 1997 Presidential elections. Some of these parties acted making sure the interest of the party was taken into consideration while the others acted only once their personal interest was taken into consideration by the ruling party.

1) The electoral strategies of NUDP from 1992 to 2011

The NUDP from its inception was a viabrant opposition party in Cameroon with the objective of bringing sustable change in Cameroon. At the 1992 Presidential elections it campaigned strongly against the ruling CPDM. It carried out an offensive campaign against the ruling party and at the 1997 Presidential elections, the party boycotted with the other major political parties on grounds, that they wanted an Independent Electoral Commission which would guarantee free and fair elections in Cameroon³¹.

2) The activities of CDU in presidential elections from 1992 to 2011

The candidate for the CDU party, its founder Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya had been consistent from the return of multipartism politics in Cameroon to 2013. In those elections in which the CDU party participated, they have presented their natural candidate as Presidential candidate. In the presidential election of 1992, the party once again invested Ndam Njoya as the presidential candidate while at the 1997 presidential election, the party boycotted the elections on grounds that the electoral laws were not good and favouring only the ruling CPDM. The ruling party did not abide by the recommendations or demands of the major opposition parties amongst which the CDU is one. At the Presidential elections of 2004, the CDU candidate was supported by the Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CNRR) brought together 15 other parties behind Adamou Ndam Njoya who voted him as the unique opposition candidate in an attempt to oust Paul Biya from power³².

As some of the non-ARC-CNS parties continued the search for a single candidate and during the 9th 10th and 11th September 1992 meeting, the conditions to be fulfilled by the candidate required him to have a respectable national and international reputation, be bilingual, incorruptible, morally upright, experienced and courageous. After several candidates had withdrawn, Ndam Njoya of the CDU and Garga Haman Adji of the Conservative Republican Party (CRP) squared off and Ndam Njoya polled 9 votes while Garga had one vote with one abstention. This group of parties which styled itself the Patriotic Opposition Party (POP) declared Ndam Njoya Presidential candidate. Meanwhile, Fru Ndi, Eboua, Jean Jacques Ekindi, and Bello Bouba just to name these

³¹Hamadou Mohamed, 57 years, NUDP member in Ngaoundere, Ngoundere, 17th November 2018.

³² M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 150.

had earlier filed in their candidatures for the Presidential elections. Ndam Njoya had spent all his time as a single candidate for the opposition³³.

The main opposition party leader Ni John Fru Ndi rejected the voting of Admou Ndam Njoya as the opposition candidate for the Coalition for CNRR³⁴. Fru Ndi decided to run alone which greatly weakened the strength of the opposition parties in the elections as the ruling party proved stronger and capable during the campaign while the opposition strength was divided and weakened. In the presidential elections of 2011, the CDU invested Admou Ndam Njoya this time around as a candidate of his CDU party. The opposition strategies were weaken as compared to the incumbent who was well prepared had required finances to succeed in the elections. The possibilities of CDU succeeding, in the Presidential elections were very slim considering the fact that the influence of the CDU was not really felt at the national territory but mostly within Noum. Thi e it difficult for the party to succeed in national competitions such as Presidential elections. The other parties were no longer campaigning for a coalition candidate for the opposition as was the case in 2004. The candidate of CDU was now campaigning as an individual candidate for its s mad party which gave little chances for the candidate to be successful at Presidential competition of 2011.

3) The UPC election strategies between 1992 and 2011

The UPC party was split into two factions in 1991 with the moderate faction led by Augustine Federick Kodock while the radical faction was led by Ndeh Ntumasak. The split was because Augustine Federick Kodock did not want to stand for the presidential candidate for the 1992 elections just like Ntumuzah was against the participation of the party in the parliamentary election of that year. The UPC participated in a single presidential election in 1997 with Henri Hogbe Nlend standing as their presidential candidate. The UPC could not participate in the 1992 presidential election because of some elementary conditions which its candidate could note fulfil as most of its influential members were living in exile. Its candidate was eliminated at the presidential of 1992.

³³³³ E. V. Njoh, *The Social Democratic ..., p.* 79.

³⁴ Wikipedia, "Cameroon Democratic Union". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon_Democratic_Union. Consulted on 19th November 2019 at 8: pm.

The party presented Henri Hogbe Nlend for the 12 October 1997³⁵ presidential elections in which he came out second receiving 2.9% and was appointed Minister of Scientific and Technical Research. Augustine Federick Kodock had wished to participate in the 2011 presidential election but his candidature was rejected. He was no longer holding a ministerial position. He gave his votes to the candidate of CDU rather to the other faction of the UPC. Though, UPC was an opposition party, it got split into factions starting from the birth of multipartism in 1991. The faction of Augustine Kudock who in 1992 was anti-government became pro-government. Similarly, Henri Hogbe Nlend who even stood against the incumbent in 1997 presidential election also later became pro-government.

C - The strategies developed by other political parties

During the various elections, any political parties developped strategies to win an election. The small political parties tried to organize themselves financially same as they are counting on the support of the government.

1) The MDR and MP Election Strategies

There were a number of political parties who had parliamentary seats but were not able to successfully present a presidential candidate during elections. These included parties like Movement for the Defence of the Republic (MDR) led by Dakole Diassala who during the presidential elections of 1997, supported the candidature of Samuel Eboua of the MDP. In the presidential elections of 2004, he changes his position and supports the candidature of Paul Biya of the CPDM which earns him a Ministerial position as Minister of Transport.

In 2008 Daissala supports the constitutional revision that removes the presidential two term limit, thereby permitting Paul Biya to run for another term in 2011 presidential elections, It should be noted that he favours other constitutional changes for the creation of a two-round voting with a compulsory voting³⁶. Another party on this category was the MP of Jean-Jacques Ekindi who participated in the presidential elections of 1992 knowing he was not going to win as he was not known in the entire country. The MP party announced its participation at the presidential election

³⁵ Henri Hogbe Nlend was seen as one of the most influential candidates at the 1997 Presidential elections for reasons that all the major opposition parties boycotted the elections under the pretext the electoral laws were not competitive. As a result, after his participation at the Presidential election he was rewarded with a Ministerial position.

³⁶Wikipedia, "Dakolé Daïssala". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dakol%C3%A9_Da%C3%AFssala. Consulted 9th December 2019 at 4 :30 pm.

of 2004 but on the eve of the election, it withdrew its candidature in favour of the SDF Candidate. But the name was not removed from the list of those participating candidates as it was a strategy of the ruling party to weaken the opposition party candidate by still keeping the names of candidate who withdrew on the list to confuse the the electorate for worked for its own advantage.

2) The strategies of other opposition parties

Cameroon has a total of 328 registered political parties as portrayed in one of the out of the boss of MINATD. Among this total political parties been able to locate eight political parties which were considered major political parties for having won at least a seat during the parliamentary election or having won at least a 5% of votes in one of the presidential elections. The are above two hundred parties which are not really known for there have neither won a seat during the parliamentary elections nor scored above 4% in any of the presidential elections as reported by the MINATD and the Supreme Court sitting in as the Constitutional Council. Some of these parties were only known at the level of their families wherein you can hear of only husband, wife and children³⁷. Some oral sources even say some of the parties were teleguided parties formed by the government agents. Equally have some twenty parties which called themselves presidential majority as they did not present candidates for themselves during presidential elections but were there to support the candidature of Paul Biya of the CPDM during presidential competitions.

Similarly, Garga Haman Adji of the ADD had been consistently participating in presidential elections in Cameroon from 1992 to 2011. It is important to note that, he was not an ally of the ruling party and always stood for his party even though not scoring any significant results³⁸.

There was also the personality of Edith Kah Walla a stunch member of the SDF till 2010 when she starts nursing hopes to challenge the SDF National Chairman for a primary in view of the 2011 presidential elections which is objected and she has to quit the party. In fact, in 2010 as the SDF party is planning to present Ni John Fru Ndi for the third time as the candidate for the upcoming presidential election of 2011, Kah Walla is completely against and is ready to challenge

³⁷ The consideration, Cameroon have above three hundred registered political parties with a population of below twenty-five million, justified the fact, some of the members of political parties only ended at the family level as submitted by some members of the major political parties.

³⁸ Wikipedia, "Garga Haman Adj". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garga_Haman_Adji, consulted on 20 December 2019 at 10: am.

the National Chairman at the primary to select a presidential candidate which the hierarchy of the party object and she decides to resign from the party and joined the Cameroon People Party (CPP). Her party never scored above five percent for the presidential election nor had it got a parliamentarian to be considered as a major political party but it stood consistently on the opposition bench. She participates in the presidential election of 2011 scoring below 5% and securing the sixth position out of twenty-three political parties³⁹. She stood for a united Cameroon and against the separation of Cameroon. Edith Kah Walla was a renowned politician and business person who suffered a number of attacks, arrests and house arrest from the government for being vocal. She stood for social justice, equality and participated in a number of manifestations within the SDF and her CPP party to see that justice and democracy were practiced in Cameroon. Its worth noting that she remained a fervert opposition leader from the time she joins politics to the creation of her CPP.

3) The Pro CPDM Parties

There were some opposition parties or part of its leadership that had divided opinions in view of the Presidential elections in Cameroon. From 1992 after we get members of NUDP such as Issa Backary and Monchupou who decide to accept ministerial positions give their support to the candidate of the CPDM. The faction of the UPC led by Augustine Federick Kodock refused presenting a candidature for the 1992 Presidential elections by giving its support to incumbent Paul Piya. In the 2004 because of the division in UPC, the various factions divided their support while in the 2011 presidential elections a prominent faction of the UPC supported the CPDM which becomes pro-government in order to earn ministerial position. At one moment a very prominent opposition party NUDP chairman Bouba Bello Maigari supported the candidature of CPDM Paul Biya during 9th October 2011 presidential elections⁴⁰.

³⁹ It's worth mentioning that she boycottes the presidential election of 2018 and the parliamentary election of 2020 calling for the reform of electoral institutions as she constantly criticises the elections organising body ELECAM as a branch of the CPDM.

⁴⁰ Cameroon receives over 600,000 tourists in 2011, http://news.cameroon-today.com/tag/bello-bouba-maigari/ consulted on 9th December 2019.

III - Comparative study of strategies of political parties for presidential elections

The strategies of political parties during an election were developed to convince electorate and population to vote generally and specifically for the candidate of their party. In the case of Cameroon, it should be noted that, parties conceived its strategies, had observed that, at times they have common strategies which an obligation during an election, in this case can take the example of the organization of rallies.

A- Common strategies employed by the ruling party and the opposition parties.

There existed a number of campaign strategies employed by both the ruling party and the opposition to rally support during Presidential elections in Cameroon. The entire forces of the party rallied its support for the candidate chosen for the Presidential elections⁴¹. Since the Presidential candidate could not make himself or herself available all over the national territory, powers are delegated to some of the various party officials to represent or campaign in their constituencies on behalf of the Presidential candidate of his or her party. This strategy was implemented by both the ruling party and the opposition parties during Presidential elections. Found in most cases that the Presidential candidate is always the founder of the party as seen with Paul Biya for the CPDM, Ni John Fru Ndi for the SDF, and Adamu Ndam Njoya for CDU, the various leaderships of the UPC and the other parties presenting themselves as the Presidential candidates. The strategy of presenting the founder of the party as the party's Presidential candidate was a practice common in all the political parties during the 1992 Presidential election. To an extent this move was understandable for the founder of the party was the most popular and known member and it was normal for the party to invest in the Presidential race. The party invest a candidate who was very popular and versed with the ethics of the party. Therefore, such a strategy was good for he could easily attract members and new members to vote for the party. For founders could not easily go against the laid down objectives of the party.

1) The organisation of rallies and the use of mass media

The organisation of rallies to present the party 'Presidential candidate and its envisaged projects for the electorate was a tradition of the various political parties in Cameroon. A number of parties decided in most cases to launch the campaigns where they had popular support. This is seen with

⁴¹ Hon Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 year, Cameroon and SEMAC Parliamenterian, Yaounde, 23rd July 2019.

the SDF, which launches its Presidential campaigns in Douala in September 1992 and it is a crowd pulling event under the banner of the Union for Change that group some political parties. He then moved to Bafoussam where Ni John Fru Ndi presents himself as the "man for change". In attendance during the rally is Dr. Victorien Hameni Bieleu of UFDC, Jean Michel Tekam and the representative of the elite of the "West for change". Maurice Kamto who challenges the ills of Biya regime and presents Fru Ndi as the candidate for "Union for change". It is a crowd pulling event. The campaigns of the "Union for change" candidate as he proceeds in the North West, South West, Littoral, Grand North was accompanied by Garga Haman Adji and Sanda Oumarou, the former ministers of Public Service and Administrative Reforms, and that of Post and Telecommunications respectively. During Fru Ndi's campaigns in the Grand North he promises the provision of pipe-borne water and tarred roads to the population of Kaele, Pitoa and Mora if they gave him their votes⁴². Other parties organise their initial rallies where there were a majority of the electorate. Most of the parties launched their campaigns in the Northern part of Cameroon. The Northern Regions had the majority of the voters which was a very vital point in winning or losing in an election. They also ended the campaign where its closer to where the Presidential candidate was going to cast his own vote for the Presidential elections.

The CPDM launches with the campaign message of "vote the advancement of democracy" which is started by the party. It campaigns under the banner of Presidential majority which are grouped some political parties. The CDU campaign under the platform of POP⁴³. The table below classifies the various major political parties from 1992 to 2011 for presidential candidates, launching of presidential rallies and closing of the rallies.

⁴² E. V. Njoh, The Social Democratic ..., pp. 75-76.

	POLITICALS PARTIES					
Years	CPDM	SDF	NUDP	CDU	UPC	PM
	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential
	Candidate	Candidate	Candidate	Candidate	Candidate	Candidate city
	City of	City of	City of	City of Launching	City of	of Launching
	Launching	Launching	Launching		Launching	_
1992	Paul Biya	Ni John Fru Ndi	Bello Bouba	Adamou Ndam Njoya		Jean Jacques
			Maigari			Ekindi
1997	Paul Biya	-	-	-	Henri Hogbe	
					Nlend	
2004	Paul Biya	Ni John Fru Ndi		Adamou Ndam Njoya		
2011	Paul Biya	Ni John Fru Ndi		Adamou Ndam Njoya		Jean Jacques
	-					Ekindi

 Table Nº4: Major political parties from 1992-2011 at presidential elections

Source: Author's construction with information gathered from publications of past presidential elections and statistics.

This table indicate that the founders of the parties considered as the major parties the front runners for the presidential competition of their parties. These included Paul Biya for the CPDM, Ni John Fru Ndi for SDF, Admauo Ndam Njoya for the CDU and Henri Hogbe Nlend of UPC.

2) The use of gadgets and food distribution to the electorate and would be-electorate.

The parties that participated or campaigned for Presidential elections used almost similar means to create awareness for their presidential candidates. Both the ruling party and a number of oppositions parties came up with a number of gadgets with the image of their presidential candidate. Significantly, have seen T-shirts of the CPDM printed with the following information *"The Best Choice", Meilleure Choix, The Force of Experience.* Equally get such information written on banners at the entrance of all the major cities of the country with particular slogans for each of the campaigns as in the CPDM presidential elections of 11 October 1992 is Lion Man *"l'homme lion"* which meant the strongest animal in the forest; likening candidate Paul Biya to the strongest candidate amongst other presidential candidates with the reintroduction of multiparty in Cameroon. In 2004 it is free mosquitoes' nets for pregnant mothers but there is significant criticism over the pledges made in previous elections. In 2011 there is the slogan the people's choice *"Le choix du people "*⁴⁴ seen on almost all the big billboards in Yaoundé and Douala with an elegant picture of their candidate dressed in a black suit. Prior to this there is the national call

⁴⁴ This was seen on very large posters on all the entrances of the cities in Cameroon and at most of the public strategic places for fast visibility by the population for the interest of the ruling party. The fact, is that even after the election some of the posters are still found at the entrance of the town and in a number of public areas.

of the members of the CPDM for Paul Biya to stand for the Presidential election. "*Cameroon of great ambitions*" and realisation "*Le Cameroun des grandes ambitions et grandes realisations*" which he announces the construction of barrages Lom Pangar, Memvele, Second Bridge over the Wouri in Douala and Kribi Seaport.

There was the massive production of CPDM uniforms and distributed for all the administrative organs for the subsequent distribution to CPDM militants and would-be militants. The source of finance for the purchase of the CPDM party outfit, shall discussed in the subsequent chapters. The CPDM party cups and umbrellas were distributed by party officials to members of the party and general public as a means of lobbying voters for Paul Biya, its presidential candidate with his image on these gadgets. The tycoons of the CPDM were expected to purchase these gadgets in large quantities for distribution to its militants as their own contribution for the campaign of their presidential candidate⁴⁵. Though, there were a few militants who purchased these gadgets for their personal use on individual basis, a number of party members transformed the CPDM uniform for their family members.

Today, it was a tradition in Cameroon that prior to ordering campaigns, the officials of the party bought food and basic elementary goods such as salt, rice, oil and maggi in large quantities to offer to the electorate. This was done at the beginning like in the 1990s mostly in the rural areas but gradually extended to the urban areas. Prior to the presentation of the candidate or the message there was a lot of feasting drinking, eating and distribution of money to the voters. This practice was done by almost all the major political parties and became a successful strategy in convincing the electorate, potential voters, would be electorate. It true, the food is eaten openly but the distribution of envelopes containing money was done in a discrete manner by the officials of the party under the direct supervision of the tycoons of the party from the major cities that have come to the rally to support their party candidate.

A prominent parliamentarian of Momo East in the North West Region when asked if this is not a means of corruption, he clearly said, "No" making more clarifications to say, a politician has to use all the means at his or her disposal to win the electorate's support even through the use of appointment of elite to prestigious positions, lobbying for developmental projects, gadgets, food

⁴⁵ Mokum Mirabel, 50 years, CPDM councilor for Yaounde V, Yaounde, 20th June 2019.

and even money provided it convinces the electorate to accept voting for his candidate or party when the moment came.

A number of politicians used football competitions in their areas of command to bring the youths together. They organised football matches for both boys and girls with some reasonable financial means to encourage the electorate to participate. Such trophies are always titled "Minister's cup", "Honourable's cup", "Unity cup"⁴⁶. In most cases it was done indirectly either during the presentation of the trophy or at the Galla night ending the tournament or even within the initial matches, the politicians along found a means to present or integrate his political message. This proven positive over the years as pressure activities like football, a number of politicians have been able to pass through their messages. Honorable Mbah Ndam Joseph's trophy was able to bring youths of the entire Batibo Sub Division who equally voted for him when elections were organised almost through out his [political career.

The opposition parties were not an exception in the purchase and distribution of party gadgets. At the level of the opposition like the SDF, most of the gadgets were sold and the profit re-injected into the party for other party financial needs. The SDF did not have the financial viability of the CPDM to buy these gadgets in large quantities for distribution to party members and "would-be" member as it done by the CPDM, mostly using taxpayer's money. Banners of the opposition parties could be seen mostly in their strong-holds and a few of them in the economic and political capitals since of were an expensive venture. At times big posters of Ni John Fru Ndi with him dressed in North West Traditional regalia and with the message "Power to the people and equal opportunities" could just like SDF t-shirts are sold by the various wards or individual's and designated by of the party.

The CDU party's influence was mostly felt in the Noun Division for the 1992 presidential election with T-shirts, posters and bannners while for the 2004 presidential campaigns, there is the presence of the images of Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya almost all over the nnation as he is the presidential candidate for the coalition of opposition parties for the reconstruction of Cameroon⁴⁷. The other political parties which voted for him as the opposition candidate had to campaign for him within their areas of influence⁴⁸.

⁴⁶Jato Richard, 50 years, Journalist at radio Hotcoco, Bamenda, 3rd May 2020.

⁴⁷ C. F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., p. 205.

⁴⁸ E. V. Njoh, the Social Democratic ..., p. 79.

The NUDP concentrates its efforts in the Northern part of Cameroon where it had influence especially for the 1992 presidential campaigns where they use some posters and t-shirts in accordance with their financial means. The subsequent years saw the party gradually dropping as members of the electorate considered the NUDP as an agent of the CPDM⁴⁹. Meanwhile the UPC candidates for the various presidential campaigns especially in 1997 mostly in Bassa zone where banners were found with a few of them in Yaoundé and Douala because of their limited financial means.

3) The use of non-conventional methods to destabilise the opponent

The ruling CPDM candidate Paul Biya was commulatively a candidate for the presidential elections, and the person deciding when the election had to take place as stipulated in chapter V, section 86 sub 1 stating: "Electors shall be convened by decree of the President of the Republic"⁵⁰. He equally decided the date of the election's management body. MINATD, NEO, ELECAM the Supreme Court or and the Constitutional Council. President Paul Biya appoints those to head any of these structures⁵¹, so as to say, he who appointed you, you work for his interest for if you were not working for his total satisfaction, you could be kicked off. This was one of the vital points the opposition parties had been advocating for it to change. There could be a free and fair elections in Cameroon once all the officers were appointed by Paul Biya. In fact, technically, the President only appointed persons, who were loyal to him to head these institutions. Of course, this was to say, the ruling party already had an edge over the opposition.

In some situations, heavy bills and taxes were given to businessmen supporting the opposition party. There are a number of recurrent cases in the Social Democratic Front supporters who get their taxes increased just like their bills for work executed for the government. For example, businessmen closer to the opposition especially the SDF suffered this fate⁵². Since, the ruling party employed and deployed workers of its choice, identified opposition party supporters are transferred from their strong-holds mostly from the urban center's to the interior of the country. This is a strategy applied by the ruling party to punish the supporters or discourage them from

⁴⁹ Bello Hamed, 60 years, Member of UDC, Tibati, 20th Noveember 2019.

⁵⁰ Electoral code of the Republic of Cameroon, p. 24.

⁵¹ Emmanuel, "President Paul Biya appoints new members of Elections Cameroon". Found: http://news.cameroon-today.com/president-biya-appoints-new-members-of-elections-cameroon/7070/. Consulted on 21st July 2020.

⁵² Agwo Patrick, 55 years, GUDA President Yaounde and close ally to late Mbanga, Yaounde, 5th Febraury 2020.

giving assistance or support the opposition party as testified by the SDF administrative secretary in Bamenda⁵³.

B- Peculiarities of each of political party

The particular advantage of the ruling party was that, it made the laws and have them executed in its favour. The CPDM was a state party wherein all the state officers were expected to be members. This explains why the party was found at all levels of the country from the District, Sub-Divisional, Divisional, Regional to the National level. It made the presence of the ruling party felt all over the national territory. The state used state facilities at its disposal for party activities such as vehicles for movement and congress halls for conferences. These were advantages which could only be enjoyed by the ruling party which had this means at her disposal as opposed to the opposition which had to apply for authorisation to even use an open field.

1) The CPDM party and its presence all over the national territory

As a matter of fact, government officials from lower to the higher administrative command were considered supporters of the ruling party and this made their presence to be felt all over the country. The official transfer of CNU properties and members to the CPDM made it normal for the party to get itself implanted all over the national territory⁵⁴. Therefore, if a government official was found in an administrative position and was not supporting the interest of the CPDM, such an administrator was likely to be transferred to another locality or even dropped from his or her function. Advantages could only be enjoyed by the ruling party. It should be noted that even during CPDM campaigns, the members of the security forces including the police, gendarmes and even army were deployed in their numbers for security reasons which was an advantage enjoyed only by the CPDM for the opposition parties could not have the command over the forces of law and order.

When the ruling party earmarked a campaign in a municipality, all the elite of such a constituency were expected to return home for such a campaign to be organised. Note should be taken that some of these officials who returned to their villages or areas of origin for campaign

⁵³ Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 63 years, SDF administrative secretary for Bamenda head office, Bamenda, 1st December 2020.

⁵⁴CPDM Basic text ..., p.13.

travelled in government service cars and at times on government mission resulting in the waste of State resources.

2) Failures / Challenges of the Ruling Party

The fact, that the CPDM had been in power since 1985 and beyond gave more points for the opposition parties to be able to criticise its weaknesses. The major opposition parties had been able, with facts to analyse the weaknesses of the ruling party from the political, economic and social aspects. These weaknesses played negatively on the strength of the CPDM during the council, parliamentary, senatorial and presidential elections. These negative aspects could only give rise or advantage to the opposition parties which would eventually gain more supporters during an envisaged election.

In the political domain, the fact that President Paul Biya had been in power for over three decades makes it normal for the opposition parties and Cameroonians to request for his replacement as a means to accelerate development. The presence of the same persons in government or getting a particular person at the head of the nation without any possibility of real change or development contributed enormously to the call of the Paul Biya's government to exit the political scene in Cameroon⁵⁵.

In the economic domain, there has been economic stagnation in Cameroon since the 1980s resulting from the fall in the prices of cash crops, like coffee, cocoa and cotton in the world market⁵⁶. This led to a number of international organisations like the World Bank and foreign partners investing in Cameroon, to give strong and difficult conditions for Cameroon to adjust before further investment. This led to a drastic drop in the regular level of employment and has made life difficult for ordinary Cameroonians.

The social amenities provided for Cameroonians like scholarships for the university studies are suspended in the early 90s giving room for the beneficiary students and their respective families to criticize the government. The allowances given to top government officials like free basic amenities were suspended within and without the countries in consolates and diplomatic services

⁵⁵Jato Richard, 50 years, Journalist at Radio Hotcoco, Bamenda, 3rd May 2020.

⁵⁶M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 141.

as recommended by the World Bank and other donors before the attribution of loans to Cameroon with the frame work of the structural adjustment programs.

3) The negligible parties without any initial strategy

There are over 300 legalised political parties in Cameroon⁵⁷. Some of these parties were just made up of their immediate family members. Others were just satellite political parties without any political agenda. They played the role of distrupting any political arrangement initiated by the opposition parties or to report to the structure that registered them whatever activity was going on within the opposition parties they were informed⁵⁸. This explains why is it that out of a total of 328 political parties, they were few of them considered relevant in politics. Some of the non relevant parties never went anywhere for campaigns and never won either a Senate parliamentary seat or even had ever scored of above 5% during a presidential election. This is to say; such political parties were not out for the interest of the country but for their personal interest and as such were considered as irrelevant parties without any agenda or strategy for change.

C - Critical appraisal of political parties' strategies

Each of the major political parties had its own electioneering strategies and specificity which worked either to its own advantage or to its disadvantage. There were a number of political parties such as CPDM and SDF with a clear political agenda or projects for the entire nation. Some of the major political parties remained typically, tribal parties. A case in point was the NUDP as a Northern party with most of its supporters coming from the Northern part of the country⁵⁹. The CFU was considered a Bamoun party as most of its victories came from the Noun Division where she it controlled both the council and parliamentary seats there since the return of multipartism to 2013⁶⁰. Though the SDF was considered an Anglophone-Bamilike party, it rapidly gained national representation over the years. The CPDM was a transformation of CNUwhich represents the entire nation and its people⁶¹. The omnipotence and omnipresence of the ruling party all over the national territory and was managed directly by the state to the advantage of its party first, before the entire

⁵⁷Simon Tata Ngenge, 63 years, Senior Lecturer University of Bamenda, Bambili, 23rd June 2018.

⁵⁸Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

⁵⁹ NUPD having most of its members from the northern part of Cameroon who are even consider by some politicians to be those supporting the former regime of Admadou Ahidjo, since he originated from the North. So, most of the electors from the North decided to support the NUDP as the leadership was one of them.

⁶⁰ Pascal Nzeucheu, politics in the ..., pp. 253-255.

⁶¹ CPM Basic text ..., p.13.

nation. We shall proceed to see the strong political parties' strategies in terms of their project's presentation and campaigns. The campaign weaknesses of the various political parties and while the ruling party was omnipresent in the entire nation as we evaluate their influence during political campaigns or electioneering for presidential election in Cameroon where they were found in all parts of the country.

1) The strong points of the political parties

The major political parties as seen during electioneering in Cameroon could equally be classified depending on their outlined projects. The political agenda of the CPDM was the one that was executed at the national level or the entire country. The policy speech of the national president of the CPDM in addition to their manifesto was the guideline for the management of the CPDM campaign and the governance of Cameroon before and after the re-introduction of multipartism. According to Paul Biya as a mission statement in the Cumunal Liberalism

Taking into account the human and material potential of our country, I can affirm that a great destiny awaits Cameroon. However, its absolutely necessary that each Cameroonian citizen be aware of the fact that realisation of this dream still encounters a major obstacle, namely the fragile and delicate task of nation building due to persisting ethnic, religious and linguistic particularisms. It is necessary to inculcate into all Cameroonians a sense of their own existential solidarity which is the basis for the deployment of those essential forces needed to increase the speed of the country's progress. Therefore, I considered national integration which is the ultimate step towards national unity, to be the cardinal, historic task of the highest priority which I have to carry out with all Cameroonian people.

The task is all more necessary and essential as it requires the support of all our compatriots, irrespective of their political, religious, language and cultural background⁶²

Such statements and affirmations by the current head of state were a very promising and went a long way to convince the voters to vote for his party especially during presidential elections. The worry is, whether such affirmations or statements are going to be put into reality or action we allow History to judge for us. It can be realised that most of the political parties propagandas were never put into practice the objectives was to convince the electorate in order to win their votes.

The Central Committee of the CPDM prepared the strategies or campaign based on the party agenda and the declarations made by the National President in view of upcoming elections. The CPDM was one of the parties that was well organised as far as their campaigns were concerned. They CPDM outlined certain number of guiding principles for economic actions such as:

⁶² Paul Biya, Communal Liberalism ..., p. 42.

- Democratic planning
- Infrastructure development / Infrastructural development
- Assistance to small and medidum sized undertakings and the development of heavy industry
- Mastery of science and technology
- Greater efficiency of our services
- Creation of decent jobs
- National economic independence⁶³

In the political domain, the CPDM made sure that, the influential members of the society was members of its Central Committee. This was ensuring that the envisaged decisions were taken and executed together. Since campaigns needed financial stability, the party made sure that the members on board had some financial stability or financial means made available to the candidate for campaigns. This was to say money must be made available to the candidate even if it was coming from state coffers so that, their candidate was succeessful.

Indeed, during the presidential election of 1992, the CPDM uses the slogan L'homme lion" During the 1997 there is the slogan of "The Best Choice" during the 2004 we get the slogan "the people choice" and during the 2011 presidential elections we get the slogan" Le Cameroon des grand ambitions" The CPDM always had very captivating slogans for its presidential elections as opposed to those of the other opposition parties. In this study, the SDF stood as the opposition party from the beginning of our study to the end of the study in 2013.

The SDF in its manifestos clearly advocated for a federal system of government to be decided by the citizens. The style and system of Federation is going to be decided by Cameroonians. The party had not been able to conclude on this issue between 1990 and 2013. They call the country as the Federal Republic of Cameroon right from the preamble⁶⁴. In spite all attempts made by the ruling party to get a coalition government. The SDF remained adamant, saying they want to take over the government and implement their own agenda. The steadfastness of the SDF as an opposition party has worked both negatively and positively as a campaign strategy for the party. The SDF remained on the particular slogan "power to the people and equal opportunities" while advocating for Federalism in Cameroon as this gained a lot of support for their presidential candidate. Since the creation of SDF and the participation of the party at

⁶³ Paul Biya, *Communal Liberalism...*, pp. 71-87.

⁶⁴Social Democratic Front ..., p. 1.

presidential elections, the chairman had always been the joker for SDF presidential election. However, this came with some challenges and successes.

With reference to SDF campaigns, beginning from 1992, Cameroonians from almost all the sectors need change. The presidential candidate for the SDF, Ni John Fru Ndi is such a charismatic speaker who caught the attention of most Cameroonian electorate to vote massively for the opposition, though the opposition is not unable to present a single candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya who won the election. At the 2007 presidential elections the SDF does not participate amongst other political parties saying the rule of the game are not good and advocates for an independent electoral code which the government objects. At the 2004 presidential election, the major opposition parties decided to come out with a unique candidate but since it was not the candidate of the SDF who was chosen, the SDF decided to run for the election on its own platform. It made the campaign of the ruling party much easier while the 2011 presidential elections but the popularity of the SDF had dropped as opposed to the earlier elections. The choice of the presidential candidate for the SDF was always Ni John Fru Ndi and this has to a certain extent played negatively on the SDF. Those who wanted change of candidate and found it difficult moved to other parties⁶⁵.

2) The bad aspects of the political party

The various political parties had their weaknesses in the approaches adopted for political campaigns or electioneering towards presidential election. This in one way or the other angered the party members or the electors as will be discussed below;

At the level of the top-knotch members of the CPDM, some who want change as to the candidate for presidential election which did not work were unhappy going for electioneering on behalf of the CPDM during the 1992 campaigns. They were obliged in one way or the other to go on the campaign trip so as to maintain their position or to lobby for a higher position after the elections. This explained the fact, politics is voluntary but in Cameroon, even if you have the expertise in some managerial positions, these positions were going to be given to the less qualified candidates since they supported the president in winning elections. As the former Prime Minister

⁶⁵Timamue Martina Lukong, 46 years, 1st Deputy Mayor of Babessi, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

of Cameroon, honourable Achidi Achu said "You scratch ma back I scatch your own"⁶⁶ meaning if he is assisted in his political ambitions, he was going support the individual or clan to succeed whereever there was the means.

At the electioneering of 1997 presidential elections, the main competing opposition candidates were absent. Therefore, it was just a formality to legalise the position of President Paul Biya for there was no real competition as most of the parties that participate have very little significance⁶⁷. At the 2004 presidential electioneering within the CPDM, there is the open chanllenge of the candidacy of Paul Biya by internal members who needed change and thought it was time for him to quit power. This led to the imprisonment of some major politicians like Titus Edzoa who personally wants to challenge the candidancy of Paul Biya and that ends him in prison for close to twenty years. This instituted fear in other Cameroonians not to attempt to criticize the position of Paul Biya till again Marafa Admidou Yaya who equally expressed the same hope for the 2011 Presidential elections and was pickup and jailed under fictitious charges of embezzlement and put prison. He seized the opportunity to tell the Ambassador the anti corruption, *Epervier* was aimed to punish political competitors of Paul Biya and not to fight corruption⁶⁸

It can therefore be concluded that, the major difficulty within the CPDM is that of trying to see how to replace the candidature of Paul Biya during presidential elections which has met absolute resistance⁶⁹.

There is equally, the aspect of tribalism within the ranks of the CPDM wherein power was concentrated in the centre region. It was a source of discontent within the party even during elections. There was even the open expression of some senior elite from the Central Region who even said "An Anglophone cannot be a president of Cameroon"⁷⁰. French Cameroonians were of

⁶⁶Francis B. Nyamnjoh, Politics of Black-scratching ..., pp. 4-6.

⁶⁷ Tikum Richard Anyang, 56 years, Former meber of SDF and later NUDP Executive, Yaounde, 20th May 2020.

⁶⁸ This view had been vividly expressed through various interviews he granted from prisons to national and international media, his letters written to the Cameroonian public to speak the truth of certain activities in Cameroon during his reign as Minister of Territory Administration among which he reveals Ni John Fru Ndi was the rightful winner of the 1992 Presidential elections.

⁶⁹ There was even an allegation, that a group of some Cameroonian elite led by people of the centre region held a meeting out of Cameroon trying to meditate on how to replace Paul Biya. When the secret meeting was uncovered, almost all who were involved are currently serving various imprisonment terms under charges of corruption with some of their property seized. Some fabulous sums of money paid by CPDM big wigs such as Marafa Hamidou Yaya, Jean Marie Atangana, Zacchaeus Forjindam, Chief Ephraim Inoni, Yvesbara, Urbain Olanguena Awono, Aboubakary Siddiki, Polycarpe Abah Abah, Iya Mohammed, Yves Michel Fotso but are suffering in prison for political reasons and not really for the crimes they were charged with as opined by opinion leaders.

⁷⁰ Those from Centre Region who think an Anglophone can not be president of Cameroon as corroborated by other members of the CPDM who in order areas like Et Hadji Oumarou Hadji who think Anglophone as minority is not

the majority and those who were of this opinion angered the Anglophone communities who equally thought an Anglophone should be given a chance⁷¹. That has not happened from independence till the upper limit of our study being 2013.

The SDF, from its creation in 1990 to 2013 has seen the founder of the party, Ni John Fru Ndi, representing the party as presidential candidate for all the elections it's participated in. In 1992 presidential elections at least a majority supported his candidature for the position. The fact, that Ni John Fru Ndi was not willing to cede power to any other politician could be considered as egoism. The fact that the opposition got divided in 2004 makes their campaign strategies weak to the advantage of the CPDM⁷². Though the inner cycle of the SDF, strongly argued egoism by saying the other opposition parties do not have a national representation as Ndam Njoya who was chosen was known only in the Noun while Ni John Fru Ndi was known all over the national territory and made the people's tour with specific political projects

At the internal level of the SDF, some of the elite candidates who thought Ni John Fru Ndi is no longer capable of handling the office of the President, decided cotest for selection as the the presidential candidate for the SDF party at the level of the primaries. This create difficulties within the party because such members are considered by other members of the SDF as sellouts. We can recall the case of Ben Muna who stands against Fru Ndi and at the end the famous "article 8.2" was applied to throw him out of the party⁷³. As a matter of fact, some of such influential members decide to quit the party by founding their own political party as Ben Muna did with the founding of Alliance of Progress Forces (APF)⁷⁴.

In the 2011 presidential elections the chairman of the party still contended to be the SDF presidential candidate. This angers a number of influential members of the party who decided to moved either back to the CPDM, to other political parties and some founded their own political parties like Edith Kawale for these members are not seeing any hope in SDF as everything is

suppose to take the position of head of state but can always take a vice position. This he made his position clear during our working session in Maroua.

⁷¹ Mudoh Walters, 54 years, Human Right Activist and Politician, Douala, 20th December 2019. ⁷²Ibid.

⁷³ Cameroon Journal, "I will be a fool to go back to the SDF – Bernard Muna". Found: https://www.camerounweb.com/CameroonHomePage/NewsArchive/I-will-be-a-fool-to-go-back-to-the-SDF-Bernard-Muna-329011. Accessed on 20th August 2020.

⁷⁴ Nformi Sonde Kinsai, "APF Is 5th Political Force In Cameroon – Ben Muna". Found:

https://cameroonpostline.com/apf-is-5th-political-force-in-cameroon-ben-muna. Consulted 28th July 2020.

Whenever you do something, there are always who come out saying if it were me, I would have done this; if it were me, I would have done that. The point is that it was Asonganyi and nobody else-Secondly, I announced that I would no longer run for a post in the National Executive Committee at the convention that was supposed to hold shortly after that. It was not defiance against anybody. It was a firm decision to tell some truths about my feelings at that time. As Secretary General, I had been suppressing my feelings for too long. Much was going wrong in the party. It was necessary to do it the way I did to draw attention to the problems. You see, there are other militants who later wrote an internal memorandum to the Advisory Council of the Party drawing their attention to some of the problems I raised. But the NEC has been pursing those who signed the memorandum, dissolving their structures giving them 8.2. Since I know the party very well. I know it would not matter if I aired my feelings within the party or outside the party. It is difficult for those who do not know the SDF to understand the level of intolerance within the leadership of the party⁷⁵.

There has been divided opinions within the leadership of the party and as such, made it very difficult for the party to function smoothly during presidential campaigns. It means those members who were not willing to collaborate will leave or go on for a very poor presidential campaign giving an advantage to the ruling party as seen in 2004 and 2011 presidential campaigns where the party's hierarchy had a divided opinion especially as to who was going to be the presidential candidate.

The other issue was since its president considers himself more qualified as opposed to the other candidates, though he did not really have the national territory representation, he wanted by all means to be the presidential candidate. This was seen in 1992 wherein he was not chosen as the presidential candidate and, he decided to run as an independent candidate. During the 2004 presidential election he even lobbies with some of the major political parties like NUDP to make sure he was the chosen candidate with their hidden agenda that, the Presidency of the Republic could not be given to an Anglophone.

3) The presence of the CPDM all over the national territory

The head of the CPDM was equally the head of the executive, head of the legislative and head of the judiciary in Cameroon. If one needed appointment, development or appreciation directly or indirectly, the only means is through the CPDM boss. By implication all local administrators were supporters of the CPDM, else, you will be thrown out of office and its the only means to progress in your political and professional career. The party is present all over the

⁷⁵ Tazoacha Asonganyi, Cameroon: Difficult choices in a failed democracy. Published in United State of America, 2015, p. 331.

national territory and better organised from the cell, sub section, section, region and national level and considered by others as national party. As a matter of fact, either willingly or unwillingly either as a business man, professional or politician who needed to progress are expected to join the CPDM ranks else government could use any other dubious means to throw your out of activity.

A professional who was not singing songs of praises to the hierarchy of the CPDM, you either remain at the same position or will never be appointed to a higher position same a politician, you just need to accept all that has been presented by the ruling party else if you start criticising the government, you will be considered as an opposition and the hierarchy of the party considers you as an enemy in the house. Indeed, with these attachments to progress the CPDM makes it clear that the Cameroonian population is obliged to be members of the CPDM willingly or unwillingly. All developments either from national funds or from loans from international donors like the African Development Banks, International Monetary Fund or from any of the Allies of the country like France, America and Germany etc are always linked to the CPDM. This makes the party omnipresent and known by all Cameroonians as a viable party as they take credit equally for activities they have not executed. Therefore, if you need progress, one is expected to join the ruling party as considered by other politicians as the natural party and it has the financial means and is found all over the national territory as submitted by a former member of the party who left the party for SDF and finally return to the party because of its economic advantages which are not found in the opposition party⁷⁶.

At the end of the analyses, its possible to affirm with conviction that, pre-electioneering strategies for presidential election was particular because the candidate had explained their project all over the country. This was why, when the political parties engaged it selves in presidential competition, it has to be able to present a general project in which all the Cameroonians have to discover some thing interesting for their family, village and the entire nation. During the four presidential from 1992 to 2011, the ruling party CPDM had adopted various strategies to be the party which will convince a large part of the population. These strategies were to fight against the numerous opposition parties which were not well organized as opposed to the CPDM. Beside the CPDM opposition political parties, have developed good strategies but do not have the financial means to put them in place. It should be noted that, the opposition political parties do not adopt the same

⁷⁶ Atagana Joseph Atanga, 65 years, former pay master for Bui and ex-executive of the SDF, Bamenda, 31st January 2020.

strategies. Any opposition political parties at its head office put in place various strategies which they think, they can win the CPDM without the help of the other opposition parties. Never the less, we observed that, these parties have at times common strategies imposed by the type of election and the political rule of an election. But in many cases, the different political parties will adopt different strategies because they are looking for an original element to convince the electorate to be accepted by the population.

Conclusion

This segment of our work presented the electioneering strategies of political parties for the presidential election. It examined the presidential electioneering of 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011. It also compared the strategies developed by the ruling party with the other political parties. One of the main objectives of this chapter was to analyse how the strategies put in place by the ruling party explains it continuous victories since the presidential election of 1992 to 2011. It also highlighted the common strategies of all the political parties and the specificity position of each of them. All the various political parties knew that, the type of strategies put in place can determine who was going to win or lost an election. It also determined the choice of the electorate and the point of view of political analyses. During the presidential election, the strategies adopted in general, for the parliamentary election, strategies were more regional than national like will be presented in our next chapter.

CHAPTER IV: ELECTION STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1992-2013

Introduction

This chapter describes and analyses the national strategies developed or adopted for the parliamentary election since 1992-2013. It focuses on the local strategies for parliamentary election while insisting on the candidate's strategies and will end by studying, evaluating the first Senatorial elections which were organised in Cameroon for the first time in 2013. However, it should be understood at the national level that, there are some orientations given for all the candidates to follow for the smooth running of the party.

I – The national strategies adopted by political parties

The parliamentary elections are governed by Cameroon constitution as to the qualification of the candidate, term of office, polling, nomination of candidates, electoral disputes and proclamation of results in reference of the electoral law of 1992 and the revised electoral law of April 2012 voted and promulgated into law by the National Assembly and the President of the Republic¹. The parliamentary election is a local election and has its own specificities. It concerns particular local areas and regarding particular individuals who are lobbying to be elected as opposed to the presidential elections involves the whole country with a single candidate for each party. The particular candidate for the parliamentary elections is campaigning for themselves and have to invest money, time and personal resources to make sure they are successful. The various political parties develop a contextual strategy of campaign. These different strategies developed depend on the level of education of the population. The developed strategies have to be made sure; the electorate understand clearly what the politicians are presenting as developmental projects for their constitueny. The importance of the election equally depends on who are the various candidates competing for and the various parties. There are a number of parties who have their strong hold areas. In such a situation like in the North West which is a strong hold of the SDF, any of the candidates who is invested on behalf of the party is going to win without much stress. The East Region is the strong hold of the CPDM. Candidates who are invested there for the CPDM are sure of winning without much effort. We are therefore submitting that, if a less popular party

¹ Electoral code of the Republic of Cameroon, adopted at its plenary sitting held on Friday 13th April 2012, the National Assembly, Yaoundé, pp. 35-39.

comes to compete in such an area, irrespective of the influence of the candidate such as UPC or CDU irrespective of the candidate's strength, they are not going to win because such a territory already knows its natural winner except the use of absolute fraud. But before the specific strategies are developed, the small areas or constituency identifies what is best for them to guarantee success.

The strategies developed at the national level for parliamentary elections depend on the political party and its representation in the national territory. The ruling party is the principal political party that has a clear representation or organisation of the local elections during the electioneering period all over the national territory. some opposition parties also try to put in place a national orientation to contest and campaign during parliamentary elections. This part of our study will carry out national strategies of the CPDM, the main opposition party being the SDF and we shall examine the strategies developed by the other political parties. These can be considered as minor political parties that have succeeded in having some members of parliament since the return of multi party elections in 1992.

A) The national strategies of the CPDM

The national strategies of the CPDM are developed in Yaoundé by the Central Committee of the party. They come out with the guidelines on how the campaigns are going to be managed globally for the parliamentary election². The party's strategy is mainly using the presidential image and position to convince the electorate to vote for the candidate of the CPDM when the election moment comes. The members of government or top-ranking officials of the CPDM see that these strategies are implemented by descending on the field personally to campaign for the designated candidates of the CPDM to run for the parliamentary election. Same as some of the CPDM officials issue National identity cards to potential members for future votes for the party.

1) The role of the CPDM central committee, congress and the political burea

The Central Committee is the principal organ for decision taking for the CPDM. As stated in the CPDM basic texts, the ruling bodies of the party is the Congress, the Central Committee and the Political Burea³. Particularly, the Central Committee is made up of representative from the entire nation representing the party. The leadership of the party is represented at the Central

² Honourable Abi Francis, 48 years, CPDM member of parliament for Momo East, Yaounde, 16th August 2019.

³ CPDM basic texts ..., p. 23.

Committee from the lower level of the party to the top management of the party. They come together to define the campaign strategies of the party once there is the announcement of an election, be it presidential or parliamentary election. At the Central Committee of the CPDM, the organ decides which of the strategies is going to be used for the selection of candidates for the running of parliamentary election which shall be implemented on the field which will be through appointment or through the organisation of primaries on the field. In most cases, the decision of the CPDM Central Committee is not challenged on the field by CPDM members for it can lead to party sanctions of those who want to disobey the hierarchy of the party as reported by Honourable Enwi Francis a member of parliament of the CPDM from Momo East Constituency⁴. The Central Committee of the CPDM is a very important organ of the party for it is made up of the most important members of the party chaired by the National Chairman Paul Biya. It should be understood that to be a member of the Central Committee of the CPDM is always a competitive and a lobbying exercise at the level of the party. They are these members who decide or execute the decisions of the Central Committee within their constituencies and as such report to the hierarchy of the party.

2) The use the president's effigy for campaigns in parliamentary elections

At the level of CPDM, irrespective of an election be it a national election or local election, the images of the head of state, Paul Biya are used to boast the image of the competing candidate of the CPDM. It should be noted that the images of the president are used because of his popularity within the party. He is the most popular personality within the party as his name is linked to appointment and development. Since at times the local candidate for the parliamentary elections might not be known within his or her constituency, the images of the head of state will be used to boast the image of the competing candidate. At this stage, the electorate is convinced that voting for the local candidate is equally voting for the CPDM party who is represented by the head of state. We do think, the electorate was misled with the image of the compute only intention is to push the electorate to vote for the candidate of the CPDM which to an extent can be considered as an illegal strategy for the electorate has been in one way or the other manipulated as submitted by Piaplie Rodrique⁵.

⁴ Honourable Abi Enwi Francis, 48 years, CPDM member of Parliament from Momo East, Hotel des dputes Yaounde, 16th August 2019.

⁵ Piaplié Rodrigue, 35 years, Ph. D students, University of Yaoundé 1, Yaoundé, 28th November 2019.

The use of the presidential image has equally proven as a unifying factor within the party. Its reason first is that at the level of the party, a vote and support for the national president is a vote for him to succeed in his ambitious to bring the party as one and also their members. Historically, within the CPDM party, the use of the images of the head of state is known as respect of the party as his image symbolises the party for, he is well known by almost all the electorates and highly respected within the party. It should be known that the regular winning of the CPDM during the previous elections which they have always had a majority be it presidential or parliamentary election is an advantage for the CPDM. Therefore, all aspiring candidate say, the CPDM is a party of victory because of their previous results. This is an advantage for the parliamentary candidate of the party as he or she is using the national flame for his personal and local advantage considered as a very positive strategy for the ruling party.

3) The deployment of government officials to the field for campaigns

The ruling party on regular bases deployed government officials as heads of campaign missions for both presidential and parliamentary elections⁶. We see them appointing some of the state officials as heads of campaign teams. It is an absolute advantage for the local parliamentary candidate. Such state officials move in a big delegation and equally with financial viability to support the party's candidate. This economic advantage becomes an encouragement for the local candidate who now stands as if it's a national election and no longer as a local parliamentary election. The issue here is that, the Minister is equally on the field campaigning for his or her real appointment. When the CPDM candidates win, it implies the Minister is equally doing a good job within his or her constituency. But if the CPDM candidate loses, he or she is likely going to be thrown out during the presidential nomination for the party is not doing well in his own constituency. The CPDM candidate on the field works with the party head of mission as a team work to see that both of them succeed, in order to get the trust of the head of State for eventual appointments be it in government or in parliament.

The indirect advantage of sending government officials to support a CPDM parliamentary candidate is that such a candidate is going to use government logistics for his campaigns which are not available for the opposition candidate. The government's logistics will range with ease; they will have conference halls for campaigns, football fields, ground stands for their campaigns

⁶ Jonas Mbah Acha, 62 years, Former shadow minister of SDF, Yaounde, 17th January 2019.

and government cars for the transportation of their electorate which is an absolute strategy that can only be benefited by the members of the CPDM since they are the ones in power and in control of such logistics and equipment, once a state official like the head of government Achidi Achu is in Widikum campaigning for the CPDM parliamentary candidate, it gives more credibility to the candidate and respect both from the electorate and the party. In terms of development such a candidate can easily lobby for developmental projects as he or she is already working with the powers that be which is not always easy to penetrate. The aim of the national strategies developed be it by the CPDM or the opposition political parties they have their specific strategies which they do hope to achieve known by the hierarchy of the party and by the competing parliamentary candidates.

B-The national strategies of the main opposition parties

Since the return of multipartism, we can consider particularly only four political parties as main opposition parties between 1992 and 2013. These opposition political parties considered as main opposition parties have their own particular national strategies during local elections in Cameroon. The Social Democratic Front is considered as the most organised opposition political party both nationally and locally for our entire study period as portrayed by Zambo Belinga for having dominant supporters in the North West, South West and Western Region from a global perspective⁷. We consider the National Union for Democracy and Progress as the second most organised opposition party whose influence is mostly felt in the first ever parliamentary elections organised in 1992. We therefore consider the CDU and UPC to be the next set of political parties to be considered as major opposition parties in Cameroon for our study period.

1) At the level of SDF the only party trying to challenge CPDM almost everywhere in the country

The national strategies of the SDF are decided by the National Executive Committee (NEC). They give orientation for the campaign strategies of the SDF in both presidential and parliamentary elections. It's the NEC that gives the criteria for the selection of parliamentary candidates which normally takes place before an election be it parliamentary or presidential election. NEC committee decides if the parliamentary candidates will be appointed or a primary is going to be organised for the selection of those to stand on behalf of the SDF for parliamentary

⁷J. M. Zambo Belinga, ''Les elections au ...'', pp. 466-467.

elections. Once the candidate has been chosen, such a candidate is supported financially and materially with some party gasgets to see that the selected or appointed candidate has support in his or her field campaign. We see in a number of parliamentary elections where the National Chairman of the SDF is on the field campaigning for the SDF candidates as is seen in 1997 which recorded the highest number of parliamentarians for SDF in our study period. In 2002 we still see the vibrant participation of Ni Fru Ndi to support SDF parliamentary candidates within the North West, Western Region, Littoral, Central Region and the Northern Regions to ensure that SDF havs more wins at the parliamentary elections.

The organisation of elections always comes with internal difficulties within the party wherein SDF is not an exception. Therefore, the party creates a national commission in charge or resolving election difficulties, regional teams are a set up to manage the various elections at the regional level. This is to make sure the elections are managed smoothly within the region to see that in such an election party unity is maintained while discouraging indiscipline and separation.

2) The Parliamentary Strategies of UNDP

The NUDP made the provision of gasget to its parliamentary candidates all over the nation for campaigns especially in 1992 wherein the government makes available a reasonable amount of money for its campaigns⁸. The government makes all efforts to see that the UNDP participate in the 1992 elections in order to give credibility to the elections. The party at the last moment acceptes and is given a reasonable amount for parliamentary elections as the other main opposition political parties abstain from the elections saying they need an independent electoral commission to organise the elections in order to ensure transparency. The party uses the investiture to select its parliamentary aspirants and offer them T-shirts and some cash to handle the campaigns. The national chairman and his team influence some parliamentary candidates and, there is a presidential campaign team who in some areas to support the interest of a parliamentary candidate depending on the influence of the candidate or upon the interest the national executive of the NUDP is putting in such an area. In some occasions the national chairman, Bouba Bello Maigari is on the field in the North of Cameroon to support parliamentary aspirants. This support is more visible again from 1997 with the NUDP government. This gives them more financial viability as

⁸ NUDP received 500 million for parliamentary campaigns of 1992, this was one of the major reasons while the NUDP decided in going in for parliamentary elections in 1992 inspite all of the major opposition parties had earlier decided to boycott the elections while asking for free and fair electoral conditions in Cameroon.

she even does the parliamentary registration for some of the candidates as we see the registration of councillors and parliamentary candidate for Momo under the leadership of Mudoh Walters Ngoh⁹.

As chairman, Bouba Bello Maigari joins the government. This gives them the possibilities to support parliamentary candidates financially since he is already controlling a budget within the government. Most of its support is seen in the northern part of Cameroon and most of the major cities in Cameroon where the influence of NUDP is, indeed with the financial facilities it is easy to facilitate the campaign of some of the parliamentary aspirants who record some successes. Even with the financial support, are unable to record the successes it had in 1992 where the other main opposition parties were not participating. After 1997, many of the Cameroonian electorate started considering the NUDP as a pro government. It has only one parliamentary candidate in 2007 which brings down the fame of the NUDP till the upper limit of our study period. The party is representing only a small part of the North and nothing felt in the North West and South West of Cameroon.

3) The Strategies of CDU and UPC Considered only as Tribal Parties

These two parties have concentrated their strategies only in their areas of origin and not in the entire national territory. This explains why out of the major cities they are not known in the field. The parties to intervene only where they are already known traditionally or having some great influence on the field. When we talk of the CDU, most of her activities are concentrated in the Noun Division and in towns where the Bamum communities are located like Quosi Sub Division. This explains why they do not present parliamentary candidates for the entire nation but only for a few towns where they hope the party is known and that the parties hope of making a victory. Indeed, statistics have shown that for our entire study period, the CDU has won seats only in the Noun Division which explains why her parliamentary strategies have always been concentrated in the Noun¹⁰.

In reference to the UPC party which is one of the oldest existing parties in Cameroon, we have seen its activities concentrated in the Bassa area particularly in the Senegal Marritine and the

⁹ Mudoh Walters Ngoh, NUDP Chairman for Momo, Douala, 20th December 2019.

¹⁰P. Nzeucheu, *Politics in the ...*, pp. 255-256.

Nyong et Kelle Division. These were the traditional strongholds of the party as they presented candidates and won parliamentary seats in spite of the fact that, the party has been standing in factions with some of the leadership being pro-ruling party while some others pro-opposition has put the party hierarchy divided on the view on how elections are to be carried out. Consequently, the party in a divided position¹¹.

The CDU and UPC concentrate their strategies for parliamentary elections where they have some field influence. The parliamentary candidates have always had some financial support from the party to carry their field campaigns. Remarkably within the UPC, especially during the years wherein they have Ministerial positions be it during the period of Federic Koduck or Hogbe Henri, they support their parliamentary candidates with financial and logistic materials to see that the party win seats during the parliamentary elections. Winning of parliamentary seats is a means for the party to have an influence to be maintained in government. This is because, once the ruling party realises that, a party does not have a significant influence on the field or that the ruling party is not getting any support from such a party no Ministerial position is attributed to such a party. This is seen with the UPC when they lost their parliamentary seats. In reference to the CDU, though they have not entered into government for our entire period of study, they control a number of councils and parliamentary seats which have given them financial strength to support its parliamentary campaigns on the field especially in the Noun Divisional where they have been dominating for the parliamentary seats. It's the Division of origin of its founder Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya who has personally put his resources and those of the party to see their parliamentary candidates succeed in both council and parliamentary seats¹².

In conclusion, we can, therefore, say the various parties have their distinct strategies at the national level which is their means of making the party ideologies known by the electorate. In fact, both parties are use the national media being the Cameroon radio and television, the various news papers to lobby the electorate for the party once the moment comes. It should be noted that during the official campaign period, both the radio and television allocate time for all the major participating parties to make their campaigns over these two Media. Since these Media do not allocate enough time for these parties to send across their messages to the electorate, they resort to contracting with other prominent media to send across their campaigns or messages to the

¹¹Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20th November 2019.

¹²Idem

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electorate. This is either paid for by the party or the candidates standing for the parliamentary elections. These campaigns have recorded a lot of positive results for various parties and individuals standing for parliamentary seats for it has enable these parties and individuals to give clarifications on a number of doubts in the minds of the electorate¹³. We shall proceed to other smaller political parties which equally have representation at the National Assembly since 1992 and which equally have their own strategies in lobbying to win seats as will be our next concern.

C- The strategies developed by the other political parties for parliamentary elections

In this part, we are going treat the issue of alliances of some political parties in order to gain victory at the parliamentary elections. We shall look into the ethnic and tribal views as handled by some of the smaller parties. In this case, we are going to examine how the MP of Jean Ekindi, MDR of Dakole Daisalla and CRM of Professor Maurice Kamto have put in all the efforts and campaign strategies during their parliamentary elections.

1) The MDR and the conquest of the far North Region

This is one small party that is represented in the National Assembly. It focuses its energy in the Far North Region as the leader of the party, comes from the said Region. This brings the influence of his familiarity with the electorate as a political advantage¹⁴. Most of its candidates are from the Kedis zone, which is non muslem religion, unlike Mayo Danai and Mayo Sanegal which are mostly of the Christian fate who tend support their fellow Christians as submitted by Darkimba Wayang, one of the residents during an interview we conducted¹⁵. At times we see that, the party members are mostly tribal members as the head of the party is a Topoli. For this reason, most of the electorate there tend to support the party because of ethnic lineage, since the creation of the party, he has only won a seat in there, hence, it is a reason for us to conclude that his party is concentrated there because of tribal affiliation.

¹³Habiba Nsangou, 52 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Maroua 21st November 2018.

¹⁴ MDR focusing its support for the Far North, this because the founder of the party is an elite of the Far North which is easier for him to easily get a number of supporters of his ideology and to be members of his party. This explains why the only parliamentary seats of the party came from the Far North.

¹⁵Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, Leader of MDR in Mayo Danai, Datcheka, 15th August 2019.

2) The MP and the strategies of alliances

This is a small political party located in the Littoral Region whose candidate is only in the Wouri where the leader of the MP originated. The influence of the party is only in the constituency of the founder, Jean Jacque Ekindi. He has participated in a number of elections and failed in the Wouri. Due to his failures, they seek an alliance with the CDU even though it is not done formally as submitted by a CDU member based in Douala¹⁶. In the parliamentary election of 1992, the founder tries the parliamentary seat in Wouri and is not successful. In 2007 the founder goes into an alliance with CDU and is elected Member of Parliament for Wouri. In 2011 during the presidential elections, CDU turns to MP founder requesting he gives him the support for presidential election but the leader of MP decides to run for himself for the presidential elections. This annoyes the founder of CDU who breaks out their deal when the leader of MP goes alone for the parliamentary election of 2011 he fails as as usual. He not been successful in 1992, 1997 and 2002 parliamentary elections. Indeed, this is evidence that even though the leader of MP a Wouri based politician is not capable of winning alone and absolutely needs the support of another party to realise the victory. This proves that the strategy of alliance is fruitfull on on the field.

3) The MRC Strategies and its Initial Success in 2013

This is one of the emerging parties created in 2012 by former member of government Professor Maurice Kamto who has previously served in Biya's government in the position of a Minister and decided to voluntarily resign from the government to the astonishment of many Cameroonians. The fact is that, he says he needs change and decides to move against the short comings of the Biya regime which he says he is capable of correcting and giving a bright future to Cameroonians through the CRM if he is voted in to power. The parliamentary candidates use the international reputation and charisma of its founder to give a push to the parliamentary candidates of his party members. It should be noted, that its national president or founder uses his intellectual integrity to support his ideology and the parliamentary candidates of the party. He is personally present on the field to support the parliamentary candidate of his party.

There are a number of issues such as, the founder of CRM resigning from Paul Biya's government is a positive campaign speech for the parliamentary members of CRM wherein the population will be convinced, that this is the party that will bring change since during her first

¹⁶Cyrille Sam Mbaka, 58 years, CDU Vice President, Douala, 22nd December 2019.

participation in the parliamentary elections she gets a seat which is a reason to exploit which of the strategies are put in place to realise this tremendous success. Some tendencies or opinion link the success of his party to the fact that he was once a leading lawyer in the Bakassi peninsula which he fought and won for Cameroon for in reference to the ICI ruling in 2002 where Nigeria formerly handed the disputed Bakasshi Pensula over to Cameroon¹⁷. This makes a number of Cameroonian electors to support his party for the first parliamentary elections he participates in. It is very successful with the support of some of the electorate knowing that voting for the CRM candidate, is equally voting for Prof Maurice Kamto who is very famous and has a track record of successes that gave a lot of credibility to the party.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the various political parties be it the ruling party, the major opposition political parties or minor political parties, have developed their various strategies at the national level for parliamentary elections to enable their party ideology known to the electorate. The particularity of each party strategy at the national level is depends on the objective of the party putting in place its financial possibilities and the influence which the party intends to have on the field. All these are aimed at getting a victory for the party. It should be known that at the national level almost all the various major political parties are using the same medium at the national level which is mostly the CRTV that covers the national territory to cross the campaign messages of the parties and its programs.

The Cameroon People's Democratic Movement recognizes the role and importance of the media information, and coomunication technologies in this light, it must intensify relations with social communication outlets at all levels, in order to regularly ensure that the population is properly informed on its actions, promote its growth and influence and win the opinion battle.¹⁸

However, the strategies put forward by the various major political parties at the local level have some similarities while some parties equally develop different strategies as they are looking forward to the competing candidates and or to the philosophy of the party. Irrespective of the strategy adopted, consideration mostly depends on the type of the electorate to be convinced for a particular election as literate electorate are approached differently from uneducated voters for both of them view elections differently. It is left at the level of party and candidate to manage the situation to see that the party and the individuals are successful in the upcoming elections.

¹⁷ International Court of Justice, https://mauricekamto.org/icj/. Consulted 15th March 2020

Wikipedia,"2008Zimbabweangeneralelection".Found:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Zimbabwean_general_election.Accessed on 18th May 2018.1818 CPDM basic texts ..., p. 189.

II- The candidates' local strategies for parliamentary elections

The parliamentary election is not only organised at the national level as validated by the party hierarchy but also by the most important organisations at the local and regional levels where the candidates are really involved as this really concerns them for the parliamentary elections. This is because at times, the strategies adopted do not mostly depend on the party but on the candidate who absolutely wants to be elected. This explains why most of the major political parties, be it the ruling party or the opposition major political parties give opportunities to their militants and the competing candidates to develop a strategy which can help them to win in the upcoming elections because the final objective of the party and the candidate is winning. At times these strategies are put in place together with the hierarchy of the party while in other instances, the candidate and the local commission of the party have to improvise in order to move ahead of their rivals. In this part of our work, we shall first of all justify the necessity for putting in place local strategies which are very important for the winning or losing an election. A critical analysis of the local strategies of candidates of some major opposition parties' will be compared with those of the ruling party that has been in power for so long.

Jutification for Local Strategies

It has to be taken into considerations that all the elections are never the same for each election has its own particularities. In reference to the parliamentary elections, it's an election within a determinate area concerning a certain group of people or concerning people of the same ethnic group who reason in a like manner and have to be treated technically. For the parliamentary elections, the electorate in different areas have different difficulties which have to be addressed by the candidate differently making sure the electorate is pleased with the approaches which they "would-be" parliamentarian is going to address their difficulties.

1) The particularity of the election

The parliamentary election is an election which is within a specific area. It's not a national election. Therefore, it's an election which is taking place within a well-defined constituency¹⁹. The electorate is known by the candidates wherein their problems or needs are known. There specific strategies have to be developed to address the needs of the population by the candidate under the

¹⁹Kamdem Léon, 58 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Ngaoundéré 18th November 2018.

umbrella of a particular party. In as much as the candidate and the electorate know themselves very well, the voting centres are equally known and based on the tendencies on the field, the candidate, and the electorate can already start predicting who could be victorious in such an election. Its, the election is taking place within a particular constituency and the fact that both the electorate and the candidates know one another, they can evaluate the potential of the various candidates based on their past history. In this regard, the strategies have to be practical and realistic for the party that intends to win the confidence of the electorate²⁰. This explains why the local strategies for major political parties have to be oriented differently and handled differently within the various local areas as the electorate want immediate solutions to their problems.

2) The election concerning sons and daughters of the same area

The parliamentary election is a competition between candidates who are well known which means it does not involve strangers, so candidates cannot easily tell lies. Parliamentary elections is involving people of the same communities who are somehow even related as cousins, sisters, brothers and parents wherein the various candidates have to develope strategies which are very convincing for each of the candidates to win the support of the electorate. The various candidates are supposed to talk directly how to resolve the problems of the people leaving in that community which is well known and can be appreciated by the electorate and the general public who are patiently waiting to see that he brings a better approach to their difficulties. The candidates are supposed to handle the difficulties from a holistic approach to develop local strategies which will not necessarily hit or destroy the opponent since the various competing candidates are coming from the same constituency. They are considered as one family who are bount to remain together even after the election which means the various candidates have to treat each other as brothers and sisters.

3) The voluntary effort to bring specific solutions to particular problems

We have realised over the years that the problems or needs of the community are always different. Some of the communities have water but lack electricity as others will have electricity and lack water²¹. Also some of the constituencies might need roads, schools, administrative structures etc which makes us conclude that the needs of the various communities are always

²⁰El Hadj Oumarou Hadji, 68 yaers old, CPDM deputy member of parliement, Maroua 22nd November 2018.

²¹Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the movement "Right For All", Douala, 6th Febuary 2019.

different depending on the area. This means the various candidates have to develop particular strategies depending on the area to bring attempted solutions to the peoples, difficulties after evaluating the activities on the ground. The various candidates have to make a field diagnosis before advocating for attempted solutions to the difficulties of the people. The politicians do not need to propose solutions to the problems. That does not exist like promising the electorate to construct bridges where there are no rivers. Candidates have to critically evaluate what the electorate need and make sure the proposed solutions are adopted to the needs of the people at the right time and place²².

To easily handle the difficulties of the communities, the politicians or the competing candidates are expected to leave with the population. Being close to the population or the community gives the candidate the possibility to win the confidence of the electorate who are the major players in this election business. Therefore, the various candidates from major political parties have to develop their local strategies which are different from the national and regional strategies developed by the party in order to be successful in an election.

The financial capability of the candidates is a viable instrument for the success of a parliamentary election. Prior to election campaigns, the various candidates campaigning should have practically developed some projects and get them realised which can be presented as a realisation to the electorate during campaigns²³. Therefore, those candidates who do not have financial stress can get such projects executed and present them during his or her campaigns to show that he or she is a developer. Candidates who do not have strong financial means can not engage in such expenditures. It is a weakness for such a candidate. This brings us to the submission of the theory... saying politic is a business with identified buyers who are the candidates and the sellers who are the electorate it, means politics is a very organised form of business with all its partners known for the business to be initiated.

Indeed, many reasons justify why candidates or political parties develop strategies differently in function of their area or in function of the needs of the electorate. At times, some of the local strategies could be identical but it depends on the approach and the magnitude with which the candidate handles the strategy to sure the interest of the party and the candidate is protected for victory to be guaranteed.

²²Gakam Aloys, 45 years old, member of CPDM, Garoua 23rd November 2018.

²³Moustapha abdoulaye, 66 years old, djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

B- Some Opposition Political Parties' Local Strategies

The opposition political parties do not have the same financial support and the same important logistics as the ruling party. The financing of the opposition comesfrom contributions of the members²⁴ of the party while the financing of the CPDM is comes indirectly from the donations of its members who are from the government like Ahmadou Danpollo with his income from Tea Estate, Paul Fokam Kammogne, Smuel Foyou from Beer, Nana Sylvester, Seafood Joseph Kadji Defosso, Mohamadou Bayeri Fadi and Fotso Victor. They are given special treatment such as having their tax bills reduced and estimated or presented by the politicians on how much they are willing to pay as taxes²⁵. In reference to the contributions of top government officers, they will then know how to justify once ever there is control. At times, some of them will collect money and at the end, the said projects will not be executed, and their justification will be that, the money was used for political purposes. Concerning this, I informed by one at the top management of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

It should be noted that some of the politicians do their best to see into it that the election moves up slowly and steadily. Some of these opposition parties develop a system of alliances to make sure they are able to win in some elections as we can see the alleged intervention of the CPDM in the SDF during the senatorial election of 2013^{26} where the SDF won the Senatorial election in the Adamawa without having even a council as the CPDM list was rejected and the NUDP who even had 45% of the councillors can not win the Senatorial election and in the Western region where the CDPM asked their councillors to vote for the SDF list saying they were more representative as compared to the CDU who was mostly made up of the Bamauns²⁷.All the same,asking about the Senatorial elections in the North to Minister Gregory Owona he says, there is no special arrangement made with the SDF as they asked their electorate to use their consciences in choosing for a better list. Indeed, even the explanations given by a CPDM official who

²⁴ Sources of financial contribution of the opposition party is mostly through the contributions coming from the members of the party, some members because of special arrangements with the chairman of the party can give special donations or loans on no interest for the realization of some party activities. Though most of these contributors are a expecting some favour from the party, once it eventually rises to power.

²⁵Contrally to the opposition parties, the ruling party gets its funding from those in top positions, business tycoons who in return will have the support of the government in the management of their respective activities.

²⁶ P. Nzeucheu, *Politics in the* ..., pp. 255-256.

²⁷ CPDM asked the councilors to vote for SDF during 2013 Senatorial election as was instructed by the hierarchy of the party. This even created some stress within the CPDM supporters as the Mayor Fotso Victor was already telling some of the councilors to vote for CDU for the Senatorial election which was only changed at the last moment inorder to to follow the CPDM party line.

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collaborated with the Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph saying there is no alliance with the CPDM. From our internal findings, we realised that there is some sort of collaboration between the SDF and CDPM which might not be formerly endorsed. The second case is the support of MP's, how the CDU called its members to vote for MPs during the legislative election of 2007 that permitted Jean Jacque Ekindi to win a seat in the Wouri²⁸. Therefore, the beginning of the principle of alliances is a successful strategy especially during the parliamentary elections.

1) Strategies developed in cosmopolitan towns

In cosmopolitan towns, there are so many ethnic groups and associations which are well organised in the holding of their meetings to see how their social life can be better organised. A member used these organised groups for the dissemination of their political agenda. Many of the major political parties visit the very well-structured groups is to sell the political agenda of their party and lobby them to vote for their party once elections are announced. We can see this in the visit of the SDF in Yaoundé visiting the Guzang Development meeting in Yaoundé to lobby for support for theSDF parliamentary candidate in Polytechnic Yaoundé as reported by the president of the Guzang Development Association, Agwo Patrick during our working session in Yaoundé²⁹. With the advent of the cheap importation of motor bikes from China, a number of politicians from some of the major political parties negotiate with the Association of bike riders or and a number of bike riders who group themselves together dressed in sponsoring party uniforms moving round the city with tracks and placards of the party distributing to potential voters³⁰.

This is always a successful means of advertising, taking into consideration that the general public will be seeing them and be moved with their ambiance. This could interest some of the public voters who may decide to move towards them for inquiry about the party involvement and some finally end up joining the party³¹. Therefore, the use of the services of bike riders as a strategy to see that the party information or projects are well exposed is a very good strategy for its makes the plan of action of the party known all over the national territory and obviously convinces some of the electorate to decamp and joint the opposition party. The anticipated result of the party as it

²⁸ MP alliance with CDU

²⁹ Agwo Patrick Tikum, 55 years, President GUDA Yaoundé, 5th February 2020.

³⁰Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua 20th November 2018.

³¹Mahamet Ali, 56 yaers old, MDR member Mokolo, Maroua 20th November 2019.

has to be understood, during such activities a number of party officials joined the bike riders for any clarification on party objectives or projects.



Picture N°20: SDF and bike riders'during the rally

Source: Collected from an SDF militant in Bafoussam

It is very recurrent seeing a number of political parties making placards and images of their party pasted around the cities to project what the party candidates can achieve in the event that the party candidate is elected. This is done by a number of major political parties who have the financial means. The parliamentary elections concern individual candidates who are the final beneficiaries. They print their images with their brief plans of action, past at Carrefours and public gathering areas to attract the attention of the public reader. This has recorded a lot of successes within the past years³².

We have witnessed a number of small meeting groupings with politicians in quarters to explain their party activities to penitential voters. Almost all the parties are fond of organising such small groups to explain the party's envisaged projects. The effectiveness of these small quarter meetings is that, the politicians and the electorate have the direct connection. Once they agree on some principles, the candidateis now assured that the electorate will vote for the party once elections come up. This method is better thanthe politician is talking to a large public. In this case,

³²There have always been a number of banners from almost all the political parties participating for an election either at the entrance of the town, the cities areas or even only in their quarters. The used of images have created significant impact on the candidate and the activities to be carried out. These images create a lot of visibility for the party and the candidate especially for the parliamentary elections.

it is easy for the politician to have a one-on-one discussion with the electorate. So, these quarter meetings organised by politicians are very effective because of the personal contact with the electorate. The aspiring candidates or their direct representatives may negotiate their conditions for voting a candidate and verbal accords are made.

We have another group of organised village meetings where the candidates or their representatives visit these village meetings after prior arrangements with some of the officials of the meeting who are already in support of the party ideology. They give the party members some official time during their meeting deliberations to present whatever the politicians have come to present. During such occasions, the politicians will present their programs appealing to the members who can make it to get themselves registered on the electoral list in their villages. The politicians promising to take care of their logistics to the village as a number of CPDM elites in Santa have been doing with their citizens in cosmopolitan towns of Yaoundé and Douala. This is reported by an SDF militant on how students based in Yaoundé were sponsored to go and vote for CPDM in Santa during the 2002 parliamentary elections³³. The SDF politicians have equally been sponsoring their supporters to move from big cities to their respective villages for registration and voting. This is a regular business for most of the major parties in Cameroon trying to sponsor some of its supporters to move from cosmopolitan areas and get them registered in the village in order to support them and convince their village brothers and sisters to vote for them. This has been a success for a number of years but in the three last elections we got a number of candidates who were sponsored to their villages but during the election moment, they voted the party with the best ideology. Once a number of political parties realised such irregularities, they equally put a number of strategies in place to combat such behaviours by asking visiting voters whom they are sponsoring to come out of the ballot box with the voting card of the opponent to show proof that they have not voted for the opponent. This strategy solved some of the doubts but some visiting voters still decided to put an empty envelope so that, they could come and pretend they have voted for the party in order to take their compensation for voting for the intended party as promised. The fact, here is that, the politicians have to be conscious, vigilant and keep on developing strategies to combat such difficult electorate.

Finally, a number of major political parties in Cameroon print T-shirts of their parties and distribute to 'would be' electorate as gifts with their party messages written on them. This is a

³³Adeh Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF militant, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

means to create an awareness of the party activities in the area. Those who were not aware of the party's activities can ask questions and be clarified by party officers or those who have been briefed on the party activities. We have the second group of politicians who sell their T-shirts to party members and would be members as a means to pass their electoral message to the electorate. The issue here is that while the CPDM candidates are mostly distributing their T-shirts to their militants as they have the financial potentials³⁴ the SDF is negotiating and selling theirs for they do not really have the means to print and distribute to the population as the CPDM party does. At times, the ruling party does the distribution from Ministerial structures and then the party organs. Through such distributions, some of the electorate will decide to vote for the party, from whom they have received free t-shirt. As such, they are not voting for what they believe in but for the free t-shirts they have received. Therefore, the distribution of t-shirts becomes a good strategy since in some areas its winning new electorate for the party. This goes a long way to illustrate the Public Choice Theory³⁵.

2) Strategies adopted in rural areas and villages

In most of the rural areas and villages, there was a door-to-door campaign by many of the political parties be it the ruling party or the major opposition party. The fact here is that in the rural areas and villages almost everybody knows one another, so the politicians or their agents can visit people without prior notification and start presenting their reasons of being there and why they think they are the best candidate for the upcoming parliamentary elections. We have learnt of some politicians who start visiting their villages on regular bases once elections are coming up. Also, we learnt of how some of the elite politicians will even take a two-week holiday in their villages of origin to start socialising with the electorate, visiting 'crydies' with drinks and to technically start presenting their political agenda and the projects they intend to develop in the village within the nearest future, for instance, the case of honourable Mbah Ndam as reported by a researcher. This strategy of door-to-door visits by politicians to brief them on his or her political agenda have proven very positive as its used by almost all the political parties and have recorded tremendous results because the electorate is convinced of a party's ideology, and the party getting victory at the end. Since, the village is a much smaller area, once a few persons especially those leading the village buy the politician's idea, they are going to proceed in convincing the rest of the villagers

³⁴ Mokum Mirabel, 50 years, CPDM Councillor, Yaounde, 20th June 2019.

³⁵ T. Goldon, J. Buchanan "La theorie de choix publique"

to vote for a particular party depending on his or her projects and what the village is going to gain if such a person is voted into parliament.

The politicians have micro grants to handle some development aspects within their constituencies but most of the parliamentarians use these micro project funds for their personal gains especially when elections are coming up. The incumbent and the aspiring politicians buy food stuffs like rice, animals, drinks and many other consumable items and share to the villagers at the coming of parliamentary elections. We see some of the incumbent politicians using part of their micro grants to buy zinc for primary and secondary schools that need rehabilitation, and the construction of bridges where need be in order to encourage the electorate to vote for their party³⁶.

This strategy has been working well for some of the parties or aspiring members of parliament who have the financial stability. This strategy is almost used by the both parties be it the ruling party and the opposition political parties. It is because the parliamentary election concerns the individual candidate and means that those who are lobbying to be voted into parliament spend even out of their personal pocket to make sure their candidature is successful because the immediate beneficiary of the parliamentary election is the candidate first and the party second³⁷. This explains why they have to do everything to win the election by showing to the electorate that he or she is a generous candidate and if voted in parliament, he is going to lobby for more developmental projects from the government. This is always the language of the CPDM parliamentarians while the opposition says they will be more accountable to see that micro grant money is used judiciously for the development of the village if he or she is given the chance. This is a view submitted by a renowned political scientist Mbaku Jery³⁸.

Finally, the incumbent politician and aspirant for the post returns to his residence in the village or in his family compound, while there, the politician will make sure there is enough food and drinks for the villagers and other elite living not far from his or her residence. They both share a drink and or meal. At this time, his or her compound is currently receiving guests on monthly bases till the results of such parliamentary elections are released.

³⁶Darkimba Wayang, 67 years, leader of MDR in Mayo Danai, Datcheka, 15th August 2019.

³⁷Adoum Gassaba, 59 yaers old, member of ADD, Maroua 19th November 2018.

³⁸Mbaku Jery, 64 years, CPDM member of campaign team from Momo, Yaounde, 12th September 2019.

3) The alliance strategies among the opposition parties

There existed different levels of alliances among the opposition parties during the period of multipartism in Cameroon. Some of the alliances are formal while others are informal arrangements among the leaders of the parties or by some decision makers of the party. Significantly, such a successful alliance could be highlighted, like in the situation of MP party of Jean Jacque Ekindi and CDU party of Adamu Ndam Njoya during the parliamentary elections of 2007. It should be understood, that the MP has been contesting for a parliamentary seat in Wouri without success till in 2007 when the leadership of the CDU asked its militants in Wouri to vote for MP party since there were not participating for the parliamentary election in Wouri. Indeed, with this alliance between the MP party and the CDU party the leader of MP party Jean Jacque Ekindi was able to win a parliamentary seat in the Wouri. This is testified by an influential member of the CDU in Wouri during our working session on the relationship between the two parties³⁹.

Generally, this situation has existed in Cameroon during the period of multipartism. For instance, if an opposition party is not participating in a constituency but has some few militants in the area the leadership of the party calls its militants on the voting day to cast their votes for the opposition party participating there as their wish is to get the incumbent party out of power. This sort of solidarity has existed between a numbers of opposition parties who judged themselves that should they present a candidate for such an election, they may not be successful based on their popularity. This is also when they even lack financial means to make a trial. So, these opposition party. To some extent, this has given very positive results which gives room for future formal alliances.

At times, there may not exist any formal or informal arrangements but we have some individuals who are so influential that, they can convince members of the other parties participating or not in an election to vote for his candidature. A valid submission is the fact which such a candidate tells the electorate. The parliamentary election regards the individual and what the person can bring as change in the development of his or her constituency. He uses this in convincing the electorate to vote for him during the parliamentary election. He persuades them that, he is the better candidate to bring development as compared to the other weak candidates who are just there because the party has invested them and they do not have any developmental plan

³⁹ Acknowlegment of a member of CDU party in Wouri for their alliance with MP.

for the community. So, based on the charisma of some politicians, they can lobby and be voted into parliament based on his or her envisaged projects intended to be accomplished in the constituency if voted into the parliament. Such arrangements have worked and the individuals is voted into parliament. At times, you even see the potential candidate decamping either from the opposition to the ruling party or from the ruling party to the opposition in future election as seen in the SDF wherein an existing SDF mayor decamped and joined the ruling party after his mandate and was given again the position of mayor as it was seen in Tubah⁴⁰.

The conclusion is that, at local elections there exists some solidarity with the opposition for their aim is to see that the incumbent be defeated at the polls. The strategy changes in function of the town and areas for the opposition parties while for the ruling party their strategies on the field are mostly directed from the head office as they call it "party discipline".

C-The CPDM candidate strategies on the field

We have realised that during the creation of the CPDM and the return of multipartism, the CPDM party has always been considered as the state party. Indeed, from the returned of multipartism in 1992-2013, the CPDM candidates on the field have been using some sort of illegal campaign strategies to convince its electorate amongst other strategies which are acceptable by other political parties. Some of these illegal strategies usually employed by the CPDM are always to intimidate of electorate. As a matter of fact, the CPDM is the party in power and so they decide who is appointed where and when, so the candidates of the CPDM on the field can conveniently tell the electorate that if they do not vote for the ruling party, they risk not having any developmental projects such as electricity, water and roads which will be taken mostly to those areas that have voted for the candidates on the field especially those in government, will tell the electorate, that if the candidate for the CPDM is not voted, they equally risk being thrown out of government. Therefore, its of absolute importance to see that the candidate of the CPDM be voted into power to make sure they can maintain their position in power or lose it. For instance, Minister Moussa Tchouta of planning and Territorial Development from Bamilike Region lost his position

⁴⁰ SDF decamping to the ruling party and wining election because of dispute within the hirachy of the party. The SDF mayor was in serious dispute with the hirachy of the party. The investiture committee did not support him for the mayor position but because of his popularity, he won the support of the councilors and was elected mayor. At the end of his mandate, he decamp to the CPDM and still won the mayor position.

for failing to convince his people to vote for the CPDM during the legislative election of 1992 and in the 1992 nomination he lost his post of Minister⁴¹.

Voting for CPDM could equally be a means for promotion even to higher position and for the electorate to continue profiting from the many advantages which are linked to supporting the ruling party. ⁴²To get this succeess, the candidate(s) of the CPDM have the financial and political backing of their message, for while on the field the candidates of the CPDM makes available a lot of food and drinks which the opposition cannot easily make available as they do not have the financial facility like members of the ruling party. Since the members of the CPDM plan such an election in advance, some of the elite already fight to see that some sons and daughters from the soil are appointed to some government positions which the politicians of the CPDM will use in telling the population that more appointments are on the way if the electorate supports the candidature of the CPDM⁴³. Some who have been appointed will be on the field campaigning for the candidates of the CPDM for his or her position equally depends on the success of the CPDM party within his constituency. Indeed, such facilities can only be enjoyed by supporters of the party in power as members of the opposition have to handle their campaign on the field differently because, they do not have the financial facilities of the ruling party or the administration directly or indirectly on their side.

1) The Manipulation and Intimidation of the Electorate

The use of manipulation and intimidation of the CPDM candidates to the electorate is a very vital instrument applicable by the CPDM candidates on the field⁴⁴. We are going to sub divide this intimidation into three sub groups first, we are going to look at manipulation from the level where the CPDM candidates are using the name and images of the head of state for their local elections. It should be acknowledged for our entire study period that Cameroon has only one president. All that he has achieved during his time in power is considered as the success of the party forgetting to understand, that as president, he is supposed to ensure equitable development of the nation. Therefore, for the local candidates considering the development carried out within the constituency by the head of state and using the images of the head of state to his or her own

⁴¹ Pascal Nzeucheu, Politics in the ..., p. 215.

⁴²Alioum Moussa, 65 years old, second deputy mayor of CPDM, Maroua 20th November 2018.

⁴³ Honourable Abi Francis Enwe, 48 years, CPDM member of parliament for Momo East, Yaounde, 16th August 2019.

⁴⁴ Chembo Andre Leopold, 79 years, SDF financial Secretary for West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

advantage was manipulation and misleading which can be considered as an illegal strategy that cannot be employed by the opposition parties⁴⁵.

We have seen openly members of the CPDM claiming that realisation of some basic projects like water and electricity done in the community is the work of the CPDM. Therefore, if the electorate want more, they have to keep on voting for the CPDM and its ideologies. We have equally seen a number of projects which have been realised by a number of international organisations like the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), donor countries who have made a number of developmental projects within the constituency which are presented as realisation carried out by the CPDM. This is misleading just because most of the electorate for the local election are not literate. So, they will accept the submission of the CPDM candidates without any objection till the issue is brought up but it will be too late for he or she has gotten the elective mandate from the population⁴⁶. A vivid example is the Bamenda-Manfe road which the CPDM candidates along the stretch of road were misleading the electorate that is the development of the CPDM party. It is absolutely wrong as clarified by SDF Member of Parliament, honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph in an interview we had in Yaoundé⁴⁷.

We have the second stage of intimidation by the candidates of the CPDM on the field which is pressure on the electorate. It's known that all the major appointments are done from the CPDM or the government in power from the executive, judiciary and legislative arms. This gives the CPDM candidates room to pressurise the electorate that should they not vote for the ruling party candidate, appointments that were given to their sons and daughters will be wiped out, the fear of losing a lucrative job by one of theirs will push some of the electorate to vote for the CPDM candidates not because of his or her political ideologies but because of intimidation.

Finally, Cameroonians know of the influence those in power have. The electorate voted because of some of their electorale promises, we have seen in most cases wherein the CPDM candidates are promising the electorate should they or their candidates be voted for, they are going to see that the sons and daughters of the soil are integrated in a number of professional schools. This in most cases works as it seen from 2000 that many of the Manyu students enrolled in the Higher Teacher's Training Colleges because the then Minister of higher education was Abgor Tabi

⁴⁵Idem

⁴⁶ Mudoh Walters, 54 years, Politician and Human Right Activist, Douala, 20th December 2019.

⁴⁷ Honorable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, Cameroon and SEMAC Parliamenterian, Yaounde, 23rd July 2019.

originating from Manyu as reported an elite from Manyu Division Madam Alatafor⁴⁸. Some of the promises materialised and the students were integrated into professional schools but a number of other CPDM candidates gave out such empty promises to the electorate but knowing that, it can not be done just because they want to get their candidate voted when elections come up. The fact is that, the candidates of the CPDM can apply any sort of manipulation and intimidation to see that its candidate is successful during the election even by telling blatant lies as we have received in a number of electoral promises made by the CPDM which have never been kept. Such promises are both made at the local and the national level as at times, we even get the national president of the CPDM saying "I will personally supervise the ring road" but at times nothing is done⁴⁹.

We have seen situations in which the members of the CPDM are discrediting the candidates of the opposition parties who have no history of political experience. In such a situation member of the CPDM will completely disqualify the opposition candidate while saying the candidate of the CPDM is well known, for most of them are former members of government like Honourable Achidi Achu, Bell Luc Rene or renowned businessmen like Fotso Victor. So, the CPDM present such renowned individuals that give them the opportunity to lead. They will be there to see that a number of projects are realised for the betterment of the community as compared to the opposition new comers who will be coming to power to make some money and a name for themselves. In this situation, the members of the CPDM think that, the well known and experienced politician is better for the management of the country as opposed to a politician who is not well known. In conclusion, those of the ruling party are saying, it's better to be with the known devil than with the undelivered angel who is the opposition with no track records, of his or her activities.

2) The use of government facilities by pro-government candidates

Over the years, the candidates from the ruling party, the case of the CPDM in Cameroon, always link themselves with the ownership of the state property. Once they have the possibility to use a state car, most of the candidates from the ruling party consider the cars as party cars and think it but normal for the cars to be at their disposal for party activities. We had the incumbent parliamentarian from Ndop who happens to have had a post at the national assembly with a service

⁴⁸ Margaret Anyinke Alatafor, 62 years, Retired elite from Manyu, Buea, 10th April 2019.

⁴⁹ Politicians make promises on their visit to the people be it on private or public visit, the case in hand was went President Paul Biya visited the North West Region of Bamenda and in his speech, he said he was personally going to see that the ring road was tard for a number of promises had been made an nothing was really done.

car. During his total campaign trip and even during his private trips uses the car as he was seen visiting Honourable Enwei Francis during his father's crydie in Widikum⁵⁰. This is vividly an advantage not enjoyed by the other politicians or candidates of the opposition party. This can be considered as a service advantage for the CPDM candidate but it is an illegal strategy.

The opposition parties argue that, once the candidates of the CPDM are going on the field for campaigns, they move around with their entourage and use the state cars the elite of each constituency are expected to return home in order to vote for the party or to make sure the party is successful in an ongoing election. The fact, that the elite from the area are expected to be home to vote for the ruling party as an obligation can be consider as an illegal strategy for the person or persons are not voting for the ruling party voluntarily but because they are obliged to. This point is submitted by some electorate from Nkambe during our interview said. They are obliged to travel to Nkambe to campaign for the party during the parliamentary election in spite of the high insecurity that was in the Division. They had to do everything to protect their position and to make hierarchy understand, they are supporting the party⁵¹,

The facility with which the candidates of the ruling party obtain public facilities like the stadia, public places like the commercial avenues and the attribution of the forces of law and order to render peace are issues before the opposition obtains, they need to write a number of applications to get them approved before they can ever be permitted to use such venues. The issue is that, it's in the interest of the ruling party to see that the opposition parties fail in all their envisaged projects in the organisation and holding of rallies. Once a candidate of the ruling party is organising a rally, all the government arms are at his or her disposal to see the smooth running of the activities as we even see state officials like the DO and SDO in attendance especially when the candidate has external elite or government officials in attendance. This can be considered as an illegal strategy for the other members of the major opposition parties are not having such an advantage as reported by Chimasa, member of SDF party during our working session in Bamenda⁵².

⁵⁰ Researcher eye witness during trip to Widikum, where the Member of Parliament was visiting with a state car as if he was for a state visit but contrary, he was attending the crydie of his friend who is a member of parliament. We do think such private visit should not be done using state properties.

⁵¹ Pa Nchanli. P. 68 years, Retired Civil Servant from Nkambe, Bamenda, 17th Febraury 2019.

⁵²Lawrence Walters Chimasa, 63 years, SDF Excative Secretary, Bamenda, 11th January 2018.

3) The Investment of Financial Resources by the CPDM Candidate

Money can only be spent by he or she who has the money and knows why the expenditure undertaken. This is especially seen in parliamentary elections in CPDM during the period of multipartism. The CPDM Central Committee disburses financial support, requests the various committees to raise additional financial support to add to what the competing individuals have put in place to guarantee their success in parliamentary elections. Within the hierarchy of the CPDM, its not an individual who manages campaign funds but a committee of devoted members of the party whose main objective is to see that their candidate is victorious in an upcoming parliamentary election. The finances raised are spent manner; a number especially in producing the images of the head of state, umbrellas, T-shirts and party uniforms which are distributed to party members and supporters as a means of making the electorate feel the strength and presence of the party.

The second stage on how the raised funds are used is the direct purchase of consumable items by the leadership of the party and distribution to members and electorate and would-be electorate in particular areas led most often by the parliamentary candidate or any top-ranking officer who is accompanying the parliamentary aspirant on the field. The distribution of this food stuff is mostly done through the chiefs, quarter headers, village meetings depending on which means evaluated by the team on the field to be most effective. The idea of this food distribution is to make the common electorate feel the presence of the CPDM candidate on the field and as matter of fact, during the sharing members of the CPDM campaign teams are given the opportunity to make some presentations of official speeches which enabled the party to indirectly present their parliamentary candidate and some of the projects earmarked for the constituency within the coming years.

The distribution of food stuff and wine have proven to be very effective in the Garoua as it had become a tradition for the electorate to expect food stuff and wine from those who are competing. Some of the electorate even considered such provision of food stuff and drinks as their own direct advantage or benefit from the election as reported by a seasoned politician of the Garoua⁵³.

The issue of money is always handled as top secret wherein some influential members of the party. In the community that are identified and shared some financial packages to move in the

⁵³ Gakam Aloys, 45 years, Member of CPDM, Garoua, 23rd November 2018.

field and personally campaign for the candidate of the CPDM. Such individuals whose money is given on the field decide if to give cash to other electorates to buy them over, make provision of drinks within the communities to talk of the CPDM upcoming elections and candidates. Such people whose money is given are always opinion leaders in the community and very charismatic individuals who are going to apply all the means at their disposal to see that the image of the party is sold correctly to the electorate. The attribution of money for campaigns within the CPDM on the field as a party does not have written records as this is decided by a very close cycle of the party within the organizing committee for parliamentary election. In as much as some of the cash is shared by the internal members of the parliamentary committee members, the campaigning candidates for parliamentary elections makes available their special envelopes for field activities to tackle some specific group of the electorate. In fact, parliamentary competing candidates equally have at their disposal the right-hand men whom they make available at their disposal some financial means to manage the campaign strategies on the field making sure the campaign is successful. The control on how such money is used on the field is based on mutual confidence whose main objective is to see that once elections are organized the candidate of the CPDM should win. The party makes available campaign funds for parliamentary campaigns and the individual competing for parliamentary elections equally and personally makes available a good financial package for campaign activities directly or indirectly. A CPDM parliamentary candidate says, he spent a total of thirty million francs cfa in the CPDM parliamentary competition of 2002 in Buea⁵⁴.

On the field, the ruling party uses a number of strategies for their parliamentary campaigns. A number of these strategies are criticized by the major opposition parties and the civil society as being illegal⁵⁵. When we make a comparative evaluation of the various strategies put in place by the opposition parties and the CPDM from 1992 to 2013, we can conclude that, the CPDM party is well organized in the presentation of their parliamentary strategies as opposed to the opposition parties whose strategies are mostly based on the initiative of the competing individuals on the field.

This is based on the fact, that from 1992 parliamentary elections the CPDM negotiated a power sharing with MDR and UPC. The fact that CPDM has been winning continuously in all the parliamentary elections makes us think, they have better strategies as compared to the other major opposition parties be it legal or illegal strategies. In 2013, the opposition political parties and the

 ⁵⁴ CPDM candidate who spent a substantial amount of money before winning the parliamentary election of 2002
 ⁵⁵Soulé Hamad, 56 years old, CPDM member, Meingaga 28th December 2019.

CPDM experienced a new type of electioneering strategies. We shall be taking of the Senatorial elections which is not really part of our main study but will throw lighter on election strategies in Cameroon from a holistic point of view.

II1- The particular case of the first indirect elections: strategies for senatorial elections of 2013

When we make a few statistics in terms of years, we realised that from 1990-2012 is a long period of twenty-three years of multipartism in Cameroon and a period of seventeen years after the creation of the house of Senate in the constitutional modification of 1996 which saw the first indirect election that took place in 2013. The Cameroon constitution gives room for one hundred Senators amongst which thirty are appointed by the head of State⁵⁶. The election of Senators is going to be on a list system with ten constituencies as stipulated by the Cameroon constitution with a number of major political parties put in a number of strategies to see that their political party is successful during this election, Senators have to win as a team to make a victory⁵⁷.

We got a number of political parties that participated in the first Senatorial election in Cameroon even some were just participating knowing they could not be successful taking into consideration, those who are to participate in the Senatorial election were only councillors and regional councillors and the situation of Cameroon shows that, since the regional councillors are not yet put in place, those to elect the Senators were only going to be done by the municipal councillors. Somehow based on the municipal councillor's representation, the results of the Senatorial election are already known but this was not the situation after the publication of the results of Senatorial elections by the constitutional council. The ruling party have a majority of the municipal councillors but the other major parties still went for the elections knowing with their very good strategies, they can still convince the councillors of the CPDM or the other parties to vote for their list being one of the reasons as submitted by a strong member of the opposition who went for the Senatorial election knowing that, the CPDM has a majority of the municipal councillors⁵⁸. Indeed, during the Senatorial election of 2013, we had a lot of surprises which is one of the reasons we think, the political parties have enough reasons to challenge the results of the first ever senatorial elections organised in Cameroon. All the same, this part of our study is

⁵⁶ Electoral code of the Republic of Cameroon, p. 47.

⁵⁷Bello Jonas, 60 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré 19th November 2018.

⁵⁸ Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

concentrated on the analysis of the choices of the candidates, the candidates' profile and the campaign strategies of all the parties engaged in the election and the question of the relationship between the SDF / CPDM during this particular election where some won without even having a councillor as submitted by Piapelie.

A- The choice of the candidates and their profile

Never in the political history of Cameroon, was the choice of the candidates for an election so controversial like what took place during the senatorial election of 2013 that was very tense and competitive. Some schools of thought think that, the senatorial election of 2013 came as a surprise to the politicians and political parties even the SDF for they had waited for long and were not sure again when such an election will be organise in Cameroon. We are going to evaluate the various choices of candidates presented by the main contesting parties of senatorial election being the CPDM and the SDF whom in terms of the representation of councillors could manage some victory, for the senatorial election in Cameroon everything being equal as said by economists.

1) The CPDM and the choice of the former civil servants' chiefs and politicians

We seen that most of the candidates chosen by the CPDM were former civil servants such as Peter Mafany Musonge, Niat Marcel Njifenji, Simon Achidi Achu etc were candidates and or appointed as members of the first Cameroon house of senate. ⁵⁹Many of these former high ranking civil servants as compensation for their loyalty to the CPDM and its leadership and secondly to see that, their experience in public management can be put in place for the successful management of this initial house of senate making sure the interest of the CPDM is protected. As a matter of fact, prior to the conception of the house of senate, the Head of State and its team had already earmarked how they wanted it to be run and needed to put in place only those who will see their objectives realised as initiated without any objection.

We equally saw a number of chiefs, traditional rulers, lamidos because the senate is first and foremost a representative of the various regions. This explains why there were many chiefs and lamidoes in the senate for first, there are the representatives and leaders of the people on the field such as Fon Teche who at the time was the President of the North West Fon's Union (NOWEFU), Ibrahim Adamou Ndam Njoya the sultan of Bamoun, the Lamido of Ngoundere etc

⁵⁹Oumarou, 65 years old, CPDM member, Figuil, 26th November 2018.

who were either elected or appointed by the head of state into the initial house of senate of 2013. Also, in terms of appointment, it was representative, having three per region appointed and seven elected making a total of one hundred Senator justifying the representativeness of the Cameroon initial house of senators. In fact, getting the people representatives as senators was a well thoughtful decision of the head of state for these already traditional rulers who have been governing its citizens for decades have already have a sound experience in management which was an added advantage for them to be part of this very important house. Its said wisdom comes with age and experience, so we realised, most of those who were candidates or appointed to be initial senators in Cameroon were already people of ripe ages and with a host of experience. This explains why a good number of them died within the initial five years of service as explained by a Bamenda based politician of the SDF, Mr Sama Isaac evaluating the composition of the Cameroon first house of senators⁶⁰ as others still managed to share their experiences with other senators.



Picture N⁰ 21: Cameroon senate of 2013 during a session

Source: Author collection

⁶⁰ Sama Isaac Nde, 65 years, Retired SDF Divisional Executive in Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 30th September 2019.

2) The SDF candidates and their backgrounds

The leadership of SDF decided in investing very top officials of the party for Senatorial election, especially those individuals who were not occupying any official position in the government were invested for the senatorial election of 2013. We saw the national chairman of the SDF Ni John Fru Ndi invested head of the senatorial list for the North West Region with prominent members of the party and same as a means of compensation for their contribution to the growth of the paarty⁶¹. Same as in other areas in the country we saw renowned personalities like Tchouchad in the west region... indeed, some of these individuals have invested a lot of financial and intellectual contribution to the growth of the party which makes it but normal for them to be chosen as "would be" senators for the first senatorial elections in Cameroon.

It should be noted that those members of the party who were chosen initially as Senators or to compete for the senatorial election were the strategic members of SDF in terms of decision making. The party was investing them because of their experience and as a means to compensate for their fidelity towards the ideology of the party as indicated by one of the inner cycle members of the party Honourable Mbah Ndam⁶². This was for those areas where the SDF had some councillors and were hoping to get a victory likewise in other areas where the SDF had no councillors and decided to put up a list, the candidates were just handpicked depending on their availability from the members of the party as was the case in Adamawa wherein a driver was even invested as a "would be" senator as submitted by Mr Ade Joseph⁶³. So, once we see the choice of the senatorial candidates for some of SDF party who were really of a low profile makes us to think, maybe the party was just making a trial and error but the surprising issue is that, it was instead some of the weaker and low-profile candidates who won the senatorial election in Adamawa and the Western regions.

This brings us to some conclusion to say, there could be a special arrangement made directly or indirectly within the CPDM and SDF for in the regions where the SDF won the CPDM list was rejected likewise in the North West Region where the SDF had the majority of councillors and headed by the National chairman Ni John Fru Ndi, they even loss the election to the CPDM team which tells us the CPDM has better strategies be it legitimate or illegitimate.

⁶¹Hinorable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, Cameroon and SEMAC Parliamenterian, Yaounde, 23rd July 2019.

⁶² Idems

⁶³ Adel Joseph Awah, SDF militant and close aid to Ni John Fru Ndi, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

3) The Candidates of the other Political Parties like UNDP, CDU, and MDR

Cameroon have so many registered political parties, so much that till now their presence is not felt in any of the constituencies but we get them participating in almost all elections be it council, parliamentary, senatorial and presidential elections. We shall therefore treat the situation of some of the identified political parties whose presence was felt on the field by Cameroonians during the senatorial election. We realised most of these parties choose their senatorial candidates from their executive members for those regions that presented senatorial candidates⁶⁴. As a matter of fact, these parties invested candidates who are not known at the national level and as a consequence, such candidates cannot successfully carry out their campaign to guarantee victory which explains. We had the following candidates from;

NUDP

The NUDP had a few doted councillors in the Northern Region but did not have a majority of the councillors which could enable them win the senatorial election. Though they did not have a majority of councillors on the field they still decided to participated for the Senatorial election of 2013 in which there were not successful⁶⁵.

CDU

The situation of CDU for the Senatorial election of 2013 was almost similar to NUPD for they had a few coucillors in the Western Region where they went in for the Senatorial election. As opposed to the CDPM as analysed by Pascal Nzeucheu;

Three political parties presented their candidacies for the senatorial elections namely SDF, CPDM and CDU. The CPDM and MDR lists were rejected because of irregularities recorded in their files. On the CPDM list, Bernadette Akwalefor Djeud's non convection certificate did not meet official requirements because it was signed by the police instead of the court. As regards the MDR list Fotsin Gansu submitted 3 uncentified documents in his file, which was not in conformity with article 164 of the penal code.

It was the geopolitical referential which determined the disqualification of the CPDM list in spite of the disappointment amongst the party's Bamilike political elite. However, this rejection could be analysed from two perspectives: political and strategic. Politically, it may result from the CPDM's scheme to avoid a monopoly in the senate. In the gerrymander approach, the West Region was a bastion of the CPDM with the Noun dominated by the CDU, and in the Adamaoua Region the CPDM and the NUDP led a duopoly of the political scene. Thus, the CPDM did not worry about a possible overthrow coming from the opposition parites in case of their victory⁶⁶.

⁶⁴Bello Hamed, 60 years, member of UDC, Tibati, 20th November 2019.

⁶⁵ Hamadou Mohamed, 57 years, Member of NUDP Ngaoundere, Ngoundere, 19th November 2019.

⁶⁶ Pascal Nzeucheu, Politics in the ..., p. 253.

Since the CPDM decided to asked the councillors to vote for the list of the SDF, the CDU ended up loosing the election in spite the fact the CPDM list was rejected. Since the party concentration was only in the West Region, so they participated and came out without any representation.

MDR

The MDR participated as well without any success for the Senatorial election. Even in the West Region where she wanted to put up a list it was rejected for the present of uncertified documents in the file of Fotsin Gansu⁶⁷. Thanks for the presidential appointment of the 30% of Senators wherein the President appointed one of its members as was the case of the NUPD to the Senate. That is to say, though non of them official won for the Senate seat, at least some of them became Senators throught Presidential appointment.

All of them failed during the senatorial election of 2013 but could only benefit on the appointment of the head of state amongst the 30% to be appointed with three coming from each of the regions. As we had the following personalities appointed as senators from the opposition party as a means to justify that, the senate is not only made up of two parties but a number of parties to show how Cameroon democracy is advancing as submitted by one of Cameroon politicians based in Yaoundé⁶⁸. In conclusion, we realised that the various political parties that participated in the 2013 senatorial elections have different criteria in the selection of their candidates best known and decided by the leadership of the party. It's based on the profile of candidates presented that we can evaluate the success of the campaign.

B- Campaign strategies during the senatorial

The electorates of senatorial election are only the councillors as of 2013 because the regional house is not yet put in place. So, all the participating parties decided to get direct contact with the councillors in order to present their vision for Cameroon while pleading for their support by voting for its candidates during the senatorial elections.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 253.

⁶⁸ Tikum Richard Anyang, 56 years, SDF and later NUDP Executive, Yaounde, 20th May 2020.

1) The meeting and direct contacts with the councillors by all the political parties

The fact, is that the aspirants for senatorial position talk very little to members of the public, for it was only as a means for them to see that, some influential members of the public could add their voices in convincing the councillors to vote for the candidates they are supporting since the general public is not participating in the voting⁶⁹. As a matter of fact, those who were really aspiring for senatorial elections took direct contact with the councillors in order to convince them of their nice programs should he or she be elected as senator. We got candidates who had to organise some sort of conference and get the councillors of his constituency to be guest of honour in order to really explain to their understanding the various envisaged programs while hoping for their endorsement.

The point is that, the aspirant for the senatorial position knows equally that the electorates so depending on the interaction between the candidate and the electorate, a candidate can already start evaluating their chance of winning or losing the election even though is only the ballot box that decides who is the winner and loser for it has happened in a number of situation where the electors promised candidates of their vote but after the elections they realised they have voted for the opposite camp⁷⁰. A clear example was when the SDF Senators of the North West Region promised their support for the team headed by Ni John Fru Ndi but at the end some voted for the CPDM which explains while the SDF lost at the senatorial election of 2013⁷¹.

2) The presentation of the programs to the councillors and the general public

The various candidates for senatorial election are expected and presented their programs and envisaged projects to the individual councillors of their respective constituencies. Same as in their various constituencies made their projects public. This is to make the general public to be aware of what they have as a package for the community. In such light, they will be witnesses to the promises of the politicians and based on individual judgement, they can put pressure on the councillors to vote for the candidates of their choice⁷². It should be noted, the councillors at times

 ⁶⁹Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the movement "Right for All", Douala, 6th Febuary 2019.
 ⁷⁰Moustapha abdoulaye, 66 years old, djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

⁷¹ This explains why in spite the fact, the SDF was having a majority of councilors in the North West Region who were the only electors legible for the election of Senators in 2013 but at the end the SDF list was not victorious in spite the numerous advantages. Therefore, even if the party calls on the electorate from the party to vote base on party lines at times, once their interest is not respected, we see them voting on the opposite camp as was realized during the Senatoral elections of 2013 in the North West Region wherein the SDF lost to CPDM.

⁷²Souleymane Ali, 69 yaers old, member of ADD, Garoua-Boulai, 19th December 2019.

listen to the call of the general public for the same councillors will need the vote of the public, members of the party, should it happen that the selection of the councillors is through primaries. The idea here is that, once a candidate for the senatorial election has a very good and well-defined project for the community, it became a very good strategy for the councillors and the general public to say they have a candidate who wants to see that their interest is equally protected by bringing developmental issues and not to be working only for their personal interest. This is because, during campaigns especially for the parliamentary elections, in a number of villages we see politicians coming home and once they are voted into office you will only see them home when the next parliamentary election is approaching⁷³.

3) The promotion of their candidates to the councillors

It's both for the interest of the party and the candidate to justify to the councillors what their candidate is capable of doing if given the chance to be a senator, to get this done, it will depend on the past performances of the candidate within the constituency. To be an elected official, the candidate should be able to present some of his or her track records in personal participation in village or community development like grading of roads, provision of basic facilities to the community which makes it easier for the public to be able to decide the choice for candidate to the electorate. Indeed, prior to participating in an election, it's a very positive strategy for the candidate to show some of her track records in supporting developmental projects in his or her community.

It is incumbent on the party to see that, the Division is generally represented by making sure all the elected positions are not given to one and the same village or tribe. We have seen situations wherein there have been sanction votes not because the candidate is not capable but because the elected positions have always been given to a particular tribe and once the opposing party brings a candidate from a neutral tribe, we see the electors voting just to see that power should be shared within the entire division and not concentrating on the same tribe or village. Same is seen in the issue of gender as it is becoming very important in Cameroon history. The issue is that once the gender aspect is not respected, the state disqualifies the list and since the female is always majority of the electorates, once the ladies decide to give a sanction vote the party is going to suffer. This is to tell us, that a party which is organised and wants to win should be able to see

⁷³Mohamadou, 65 years old, CPDM communication member, Garoua-Boulai, 20th December 2019.

that, there is equitable representation of the constituency and gender base oriented so that both men and women are elected in the party when ever deemed necessary⁷⁴.

The campaign strategies of the different political parties during the senatorial election of 2013 were very original and depended on the list presented by the various parties and the vision of the political party. The different strategies of the different political parties were marked by the many suspicions between the ruling party and the SDF as we shall present in our subsequent paragraphs.

C- Suspicions during the senatorial election of 2013

The senatorial election of 2013 was really suspicious especially between the CPDM and the SDF for some of them won where they did not even have a councillor and others losing where they had councillors being the situation of SDF in Adamawa and North West respectively⁷⁵. That is to say the SDF won the senatorial seats in Adamawa without having a single seat and losing in the North West Region where the SDF had a majority of councillors. It's on this clear evidence of collaboration that a number of observers had to conclude that, there should be some sort of collaboration between the ruling party and the main opposition party regarding the senatorial election. As a matter of fact, in this work, we are going to question the aim of all political parties strategies and their grievances, to obtain this objective we are going to analyse the different suspicious of collaboration between the SDF and the CPDM, the suspicions of corruption in this election and at the end the reaction of all the major political parties in competition for the 2013 senatorial election whose results were very controversial as indicated by a political analyst at Radio Hotcoco during our working session in Bamenda⁷⁶.

1) Suspicions of the relationship between CPDM and SDF

The fact is that the two areas being West Region and Adamawa where the SDF won for senatorial election are the same areas that the list of the CPDM was cancelled by the constitutional council. Since the CPDM controls all the power as in previous election when there is an error on the list, the constitutional council will still give the party the right to do the rectification but this time around the constitutional council did not give the CPDM the chance to rectify their list as it

⁷⁴Bello Jonas, 60 yaers old, member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré, 19th November 2018.

⁷⁵Moustapha abdoulaye, 66 years old, djaoro and member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré, 18th November 2018.

⁷⁶ Jato Richard, 50 years, Journalist at Radio Hotcoco, Bamenda, 3rd May 2020.

was just thrown out which makes us to suspect they could be some special arrangement between the SDF and the CPDM. In fact, the first aspect of suspicions is that, reasons why the CPDM list was rejected was because one of the non-conviction certificates of its aspirant Bernadette Akwalefo Djeudo did not meet the official requirements because it was signed by a commissioner of police instead of it being established at the court of First Instance⁷⁷. The police commissioner who signed the certificate of non-conviction was not punished for he knows it was not within his area of competency. Another party of low profile MDR whose list was rejected because one of its aspirants Fotsin Gonsu submitted three uncertified documents in his file which was not in conformity with articles 164 of the penal code was as well rejected, though, they did not have the potential of winning for they did not have the necessary councillors⁷⁸. It is an indication something really went wrong. Secondly, how did they file past through the central committee of the party without it being notice? The file even passes through the ELECAM office without the officials realising that one of the non-conviction certificates was signed by a commissioner instead of a judge, which makes a number of political analysts to think it was just a deliberate act on the part of the government to see that at the end, the SDF will win in some of the regions not to lose in the first ever house of senators to be a one-party senate should, the CPDM win all the seventy seats. Maybe it is why the CPDM ceded some of the regions to SDF technically.

Indeed, the fact of SDF putting a list in Adamawa without a single candidate to us could be some sort of collaboration between the SDF and CPDM which can be considered as some sort of illegal strategy but it worked for the winning of the SDF and giving more credibility for the CDPM that, the first initial senatorial election was not a monologue representation. So, if confirmed there was collaboration within the ruling party and the main opposition party, then it was a win win.

Now, another incident of suspicions of the SDF in the West Region is the fact, that the SDF had councillors only in Bafoussam and knowing the councillors are the only the electoratewhereas the CPDM and the CDU have councillors comparatively more than the SDF was an aspect of clear suspicion. Something was going on between the ruling party and the main opposition party as re-iterrated by a renowned Bafoussan based politician⁷⁹. To us we think this politician is right for if it's going by the number of councillors the competing parties in Western Region, the SDF was not

⁷⁷ P. Nzeucheu, *Politics in the ...*, p. 254.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 254.

⁷⁹ Chenboa Andre Leopold, 79 years, SDF Financial Secretary for West Region, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

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going to have any chance of wining. The point is that SDF had a total of 106 councillors while CDU had 222 councillors in the West Region which would have put the later advantageous but at the end SDF won the senatorial seats for the Western Region which is some proof to say at least there is some understanding between the SDF and the CPDM.

To convince the CPDM councillors to vote for the SDF⁸⁰, CPDM leaders offered them a cooktail and transported them to the polling stations. This was the case in the Nde Division with Niat Njifenji, in the Bamboutos with Victor Fotso, Consequently, the results of the 14th April 2013 elections saw the victory of the SDF in the West Region. Nevertheless, the voting instructions ordered by the Central Committee of the CPDM were not respected by all the councillors. Some decided to express their liberal conception of democracy by voting for the party of their choice. Some voted for the CDU, others opted for a blank vote whereas the last category did not vote. As a matter of fact, partisan fiefs were reinforced particulary for the CDU, the dominant party in the Noun Division where it obtained a high number of the votes cast that is 224 votes out of 235⁸¹.

When CPDM official was asked why such a radical decision of asking her councillors to vot for the SDF, the response was that, the CDU list of the candidates was not representative as it was made up of only Bamoun which to the CPDM was tribalistic as compared to the SDF list which was more representative of the entire western region. He concluded by saying the issue of supporting the list of the SDF was a resolution of the central committee⁸². This is true evidence to show that, there was a memorandum of understanding between the CPDM and the SDF parties which have not been made public. Some of the the senior politicians of the CPDM said favouring of the SDF in the region was a means to contain the spread of the CDU to the entire Region as it was only prominent in Noun Division⁸³.

When we make a comparative level of municipal councillor's representation in the Adamawa, we have the following representation in terms of councillors; the CPDM had a 55% representation while the NUDP has a 45% representation of the councillors. Since the CPDM list was rejected, the CPDM ask their councillors based on their conscience as was submitted by CPDM official who were refusing there was no collaboration between the two parties for if the party succeeded in winning the senatorial election of 2013, it was because the SDF had a better team and could convince the councillors to buy its ideal as compared to the NUDP who had the councillors but might have a weaker party strategy to convince the electorates which explains why the SDF won as submitted by a senior leadership of the CPDM Minister Gregory Owona⁸⁴.

⁸⁰ P. Nzeucheu, *Politics in the ...*, pp. 255-256.

⁸¹Ibid

⁸² Gregory Owona on the outing of West region senatorial election wherein the CPDM supported the SDF list

⁸³ Pascal Nzeucheu, Politics in the ..., p. 55.

⁸⁴ Ibid

We therefore conclude, the wining of the SDF for the Adamawa and the West region is very suspicious and this is why we think vividly that, there is some complexity between the ruling party and the SDF. We therefore conclude for the first time in the history of Cameroon, wherein the SDF have vehemently refused to collaboration or sharing of government with the CPDM, we have seen at least for once that, there is collaboration between the SDF the main opposition party in Cameroon with the CPDM ruling party which should have been organised only at the top level of the party as analysed by a political expert⁸⁵.

2) The Suspicion of Corruption

The suspicion of corruption seems vivid in the situation; there are only two parties that have councillors in the North West Region being the SDF having a majority and the CPDM with the minority in the following proportion. The fact, is that if there is the following of party discipline, the SDF is supposed to have won the senatorial election of 2013 but after the closure of polls and counting, the CPDM won the senatorial election in the North West Region to the greatest surprise of the leadership of the SDF which brings us to the idea of suspicions of corruption by the wining party as it has a minority of councillors who were the only electorate for senatorial elections. In as much as we are thinking, the CPDM with their financial might must have bought over some of the councillors of the SDF to vote for the CPDM as presented by the district chairman of Batibo Mr. Werewum Maurice⁸⁶ who said he was waiting for victory but was surprised to see that the CPDM was victorious which means some of the SDF councillors voted for the CPDM which is difficult to identify as the senatorial election is through secret ballot⁸⁷.

We equally clearly see the suspicions of corruption in the Adamawa with the winning of the SDF senatorial list. The fact is that SDF won in the West Region, for officially, the CPDM asked their councillors to vote for the SDF. This there was party discipline, the councillors were automatically going to vote for the SDF list but in Adamawa senatorial election, the CPDM did not give any instruction for its councillors to vote for the SDF. We are therefore concluding that, the members of the SDF senatorial list and probably the SDF party gave some financial compensation the CPDM councillors to vote for the SDF list. This is because, there is no explanation as to explain while the CPDM councillors who were not obliged to vote for the SDF

⁸⁵ Ngam Confidence, 48 years, Associate Professor of History, Bamenda University, 12th January 2018.

⁸⁶ Werewum Maurice, 56 years, SDF Districk Chairman for Batito, Bamenda, 26th Octorber 2019.

⁸⁷Kamdem Léon, 58 yaers old, member of ELECAM, Ngaoundéré 18th November 2018.

since their list was disqualified and all of them voted unanimously without any financial consideration would be very doubtful. It's from a number of opinions from political analysts, that we are able to conclude, that it was not for nothing that, the CPDM councillors voted unanimously for the SDF list who had not even a councillor as compared to NUDP who had 45% of the councillors but were not victorious in the 2013 senatorial election whose results were very controversial in the North West Region, Western Region and the Adamawa Region.

3) The Reaction of the CPDM / SDF and the Other Parties.

The various major political parties reacted differently to the public demand and assumption; there exists a very close relationship between the ruling party and the SDF concerning the senatorial election. At the level of the leadership of the CDPM, Gregory Owona had this to say, "that view the two list in the West Region between the CDU and the SDF, the latter is more representative of the whole region as compared to the CDU list which is made up of the Bamoums" therefore, after an evaluation at the level of the party, since their list was disqualified, the party therefore concluded that for the interest of the Republic, her councillors should vote for the SDF list which was more representative of the entire region. He proceeded in affirming that no special arrangement was made with the SDF but an independent position to protect the republican interest which explains why they decided to support the list of the SDF as reported by CPDM official in Bafoussam⁸⁸. He still had this to say for the senatorial elections of the Adamawa; that the councillors of the CPDM were asked to vote following their consciences which the SDF carried out their campaigns effectively and their list was elected by the CPDM councillors.

The leadership of the SDF based on a working session Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph who is one of the frontline leaders of the SDF since the SDF started participating in parliamentary election in 1992, said the victory of the SDF in Adamawa was based on the effective campaign carried out in the Adamawa and the profile of the various individuals they had put on the list SDF candidates put on the list for the senatorial electionswas very much appreciated by the other councillors and the plan of action presented by the senatorial aspirants. He further clarified, that since the CPDM councillors have been working with NUDP councillors, they were not happy the way the councillors of the NUDP were managing the activities of the councils especially when there had to share the council together. So when the opportunity came for the councillors to choose

⁸⁸ Taga Naussie Ceraphine, 48 years, Financial Secretary of CPDM Section Bafoussam, Bafoussam, 11th March 2019.

between the SDF and the NUPD, since the CPDM's list was rejected, the entire councillors' team of the CPDM decided to vote for the SDF list based on their past grievances with the NUDP. The anticipated program presented by the SDF member list and their choice of candidate for which the population was appreciative was submitted by Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph⁸⁹. When, the question was put on what happened that in the North West where the SDF had a majority and the list headed by the national chairman of the party, the CPDM was instead victorious with a minority of councillors. He said, the CPDM used their financial might to corrupt some weaker and hungry councillors to vote for the CPDM list which was really illegal according to honourable Mbah Ndam⁹⁰. In fact, since I was not very satisfied with the assessment of honourable, I decided to ask the same question to some inner cycle of the party, who told me, they think there was a special arrangement between the SDF and the CPDM especially regarding the senatorial election for the Adamawa and the West region as advanced by Joseph⁹¹ of the SDF and Honourable Enwi Francis⁹², CPDM parliamentarian for Momo East.He confirmed with certitude, that there was an agreement between the SDF and the CPDM for the senatorial election even if it was not written but only agreed upon by some top leadership of the both parties.

The other participating political parties that did not succeed in any of their lists for the senatorial election had this to say especially by the leadership of the party. They collectively say the senatorial election of 2013 was a special arrangement between the SDF and the CPDM as was echoed by the leadership of NUDP who was very dissatisfied with the outcome of the results especially in the Adamawa where she had 45% of the councillors. Taking into consideration that the CPDM list was disqualified by the constitutional council, the NUDM were very sure, their list was going to be successful since the SDF had no councillor in the area. They did not make much effort to see that some of the CDPM councillors vote for their list. This was a weak strategy for there is no assumption in politics. For politics is a gain of interests for probably as the SDF presented the councillors of the CPDM, they decided to vote for the SDF as against the NUDP who were already assured of victory and did not have any reason to lobby with the CPDM

 ⁸⁹ Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, Cameroon and SEMAC Parliamenterian, Yaounde, 23rd July 2019.
 ⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF militant and close aid to Ni John Fru Ndi, Bamenda, 14th March 2019.

⁹² Honourable Abi Enwe Francis, CPDM member of Parliament from Momo East, Parliamentary Hotel Yaounde, 16th August 2019.

councillors which was not a good strategy of assuming whereas the interest of the electorates are not protected.

The leadership of the CDU, who found themselves in almost the same situation like NUDP in the Adamawa, where the CPDM list was rejected in the West region, the CDU was the second after CPDM in having more councillors, so they thought, they were automatically going to be the winner in the Western Region. In addition to their assumption, the Mayor of Badjoun, a very influential member of the CDPM was already negotiating and informing his councillors to vote for the CDU when the time comes but his intention was shattered when a more top ranking official came and said, the CPDM councillors should vote for the SDF list which was a testimony to justify that the senatorial election was really an arrangement between the CPDM and the SDF as this idea was collaborated by members and leadership of the MDR party. This view is held and is the general public opinion in Cameroon.

It has been realised that in Cameroon, the parliamentary election is the only election that considers mostly the individual candidates. Therefore, the individuals have to make extra effort to see that they are successful in the election. The parliamentary election has less importance at the national level or at the regional level for its impact is mostly felt at the local level which is the constituency and remains most challenging for the competing candidates. Most strategies are developed at the national level by all the participating major political parties since 1992 but there are equally local strategies which are developed by the candidates to make sure their campaign is successful. These strategies are vigorously implemented on the field because that brings out more concrete solutions to the problems of the population and the electorate. It's very clear that, the opposition parties do not have the same strategies for the parliamentary elections but it should be noted, that any political party develops its strategies during the parliamentary election in function of its financial means, and proper consideration for the type of electorates and the type of candidate presented by the party and the opponent. Nevertheless, during the senatorial election of 2013, all the political parties adopted a new form of campaigning because of the type of election which means; either a party wins all the seats or loses. That is to say, as of the Cameroon constitution the senatorial election is a collective project since winning is based on list system. The senatorial election of 2013 has proven that the opposition parties in Cameroon are not really rival as it's supposed to be the case for there was some sort of collaboration between the ruling party and the main opposition party in Cameroon. The parliamentary and presidential campaigns are the most contested elections in Cameroon within which many strategies are developed from the beginning of the campaigns up to the day of voting.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine electioneering strategies of political parties for parliamentary election starting from 1992 to 2013 in Cameroon. In this chapter, we developed the national strategies adopted by political parties for the local election and appreciate local candidates' strategies of each party. The chapter proceeded to bring out the reason which justified the necessity of local strategies and how they influence the issue of elections. After these stages, the various political parties, be it the opposition or the ruling party, will adopt new altitudes or develop new reactions from the voting to the declaration of definitive results which is the aim of our next chapter.

CHAPTER V:

ATTITUDE AND REACTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES FROM VOTING TO DECLARATION OF DEFINITIVE RESULTS

Introduction

This fifth chapter has the aim of analysing the attitude or the position of the political parties from the voting to the declaration of results. It is focused on the pressure from political parties as a strategy to influence the organs or the body organising the elections and the other political parties in the competition. The chapter will also do an evaluation of the various petitions from political parties and individuals who were not satisfied with the conduct of the elections to the proclamation of definitive results. We shall analyse the reactions of the major political parties and contesting individuals after the declaration of the winner or winners by the mandated authority invested with the powers to declare election results.

I- The pressure from political parties

A number of major political parties developed strategies before and during campaigns to make sure their party was successful in the election. They proceeded to develop other strategies, some spontaneously during and after the elections, depending on each party's objectives and public speculations of the outcome of the results. These strategies had different objectives from the voting to the declaration of final results. It was noticed that political parties be it the ruling party or the major opposition parties put in a number of strategies in place to control or to influence election results in their favour. The attitude and the reactions of the various political parties depended on the speculations and the final definitive results declared or published by the elections organising body, be it MINATD, Supreme Court, NEO, ELECAM or the Constitutional Council¹. The reality on the field was that, for the past decades in Cameroon, once the ruling party scores victory at any of the elections, the opposition comes out with the flaws of the elections. They after argue that, the ruling party won through corruption. If it was the opposition that was victorious, you either see the opposition parties submitting with conclusions, that it was the ruling party that decided to give the

¹ Tim Frankline Diom, 36 years, ELECAM staff Bamenda, Bamenda, 9th August 2019.

small victory to the opposition just as a means to blindfold the international community and the general public as a pretext that the elections were democratically organised².

If there is anything that political parties know how to do best directly after the vote, it was to be identified as the main contestant of election results especially once the results are not in their favour. This was especially for the presidential elections which have been won by a single individual Paul Biya of the CPDM from the returned of multipartism till the upper limit of our study³. These political parties put pressure as was always expressed by declaring their candidate victorious before the declaration of the results as was seen with Ni John Fru Ndi in on October 20th 1992 when he declared himself president elect at his Ntarinkon residence for the first multiparty presidential election organised in Cameroon⁴. At times the pressure of the main opposition parties was manifested through the organisation of rallies to denounce the fraud of the ruling party. They went further to call for public manifestation to express their dissatisfaction with the declared results. At times mobs and some militants, generally of the opposition parties, destroyed property of the supporters of the CPDM and top government officials as was seen in the North West, South West and Western Regions after the presidential election of 992 where both property and human lives were lost. This issue was submitted by Christopher Fung Nchia⁵.

A- The declaration of victory by parties

We have noticed that in a number of African countries, it was very recurrent that immediately after voting, the opposition candidate for the presidency declaring himself winner as it was seen in Kenya where the main opposition declared himself the winner in a press conference attended by the national and international media⁶. The same situation happened in Zimbabwe where the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai Richard declared himself winner of the first round of election in 2008 but declined to participate in the second round for fear his supporters' risk being kill by the regime of Mugabe⁷. Similarly, a similar situation in Nigeria Presidential elections of 2019 where Atiku Abubakar rejected the victory of Mohammadu Buhari saying there

² Sama Isaac Nde, Retired SDF Divisional Execative for Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 30th September 2019.

³ M. D. Delancey and al, *Historical Dictionary of* ..., p. 10.

⁴ SDF @ 25, The struggle for..., p. 89.

⁵ C.F. Nchia, Party politics in ..., pp. 273-280.

⁶Wikipedia, "1992 Kenyan general election". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Kenyan_general_election. Accessed 20th March 2020.

⁷ Wikipedia, "2008 Zimbabwean general election". Found:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Zimbabwean_general_election. Accessed on 18th May 2018.

was massive fraud⁸. declared himself the winner of the presidential elections before the official declaration of the results and in Cameroon which is our case study, the situation was the same in 1992, when Cameroon's main opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi⁹ declared himself winner on 20th October 1992 before the official results which were read for over eight hours the next day 21st October 1992 which declared Paul Biya winner and finally he was confirmed in the Supreme court as winner by Dipanda Mouele in spite of the remarks he made of lots of irregularities registered but that his hands were tied¹⁰. We have, therefore, realised that the attitude of the opposition parties pushes the ruling party to plan in advance on how to manage the situation. Some time, pressure from the opposition parties influences the manner in which the election results were compiled.

The first strategy of the opposition after voting

The first strategy of the main opposition party was that, the competing candidate declares himself winner of the election. This was based on the collection of the party's representatives on the field. The SDF candidate during the presidential election of 1992 declared himself the winner in Bamenda¹¹. The objective of this earlier declaration was first to demoralise the other competing candidates and to fight any anticipated fraud by the ruling party to charge results. We realised that because of the earlier declaration of the SDF candidate as winner, the level of fraud was minimised as during the final declaration of the results for 1992 presidential elections, the gap between President Paul Biya and the John Fru Ndi was less than 3%. Within the subsequent presidential elections where there was no declaration of victory by any opposition party, there was over vehelming victory for the ruling party where she got above 80% in all the presidential elections, the candidates of the opposition parties, based on the results collected from the field, start declaring themselves victorious in their various constituencies while asking their supporters to remain on the spot till the final results are declared, for instance, the situation of 1997 legislative election in Santa, Batibo and Douala where the early declarations pushed the government in accepting and

⁸Ruth Maclean and Eromo Egbejule, "Muhammadu Buhari wins Nigerian election with 56% of the vote". Found: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/muhammadu-buhari-to-claim-victory-in-nigerias-presidentialelection. Accessed on 6 June 2021.

⁹ SDF @ 25, The struggle for..., p. 89.

¹⁰ Ibis, p. 89.

¹¹ J. V. Ngoh, History of Cameroon since ..., p. 353.

¹² Sama Isaac Nde, 65 years, retired SDF Divisional Executive in Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 30th Setember 2019.

declaring the rightful results. As such, declaring the candidates of the opposition parties' winners. The strategy of earlier declaration by the candidates for parliamentary election is a positive strategy for it has proven to be effective during the elections of 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013 in some of the constituencies all over Cameroon where the forces of the masses have pushed the election organs to declare the opposition winners or cancel of the election.

The second objective of the early declaration of victory by the opposition party is to prepare the minds of its militants and supporters that they should be ready to fight and protect their votes so that victory is given to the right person. Once such declarations are made, even though its illegal, the supporters of the party start justifying their victory to other members of the electorate which is equally a means of demoralising the supporters of the ruling party. Based on the declaration, we start entertaining very interesting and crucial debates between the members or supporters of the ruling party and the opposition supporters till the declaration of the final results by the rightful authority especially for the presidential elections. As regards the parliamentary elections, the competing candidates make sure they get their supporters to gather at the various counting spots to make sure the results are made public and moved to the final area where the results are to be declared to ensure that the actual results are declared by the powers that be. In most instances, once the opposition makes declarations for parliamentary elections, the declarations are always founded and can easily be verified as the area of the constituency is not large as compared to the presidential elections whose constituency is the national territory and not easy to verify within a very short period of time.

As a matter of fact, once such early declarations are made like it was in 1992, it calls the attention of the general public to start evaluating what really happened and what will happen if really the opposition becomes victorious in the election. The local and international media start brocasting such declaration while trying to confirm the information by contacting some of the actors on the field like international election observers, journalists on the field and even other participating candidates. This strategy already boasts the moral of the main opposition party pending the final declaration of the results. In reference to the legislative elections when early declarations are made, as from the elections of 2002 with the introduction of many private radios, we start having discussion over the media on who is the winner. They proceed to verify if the declarations of the opposition parliamentarians are correct based on the actual members of voters. Generally, for early declarations, be it for presidential or parliamentary elections from 2007 with

the event of the social media like WhatApp, Facebook or in short, the rapid advancement of the internet, any declaration made in public and shared over the internet for the general public consumption as a fact, gives some pressure to the government and the election bodies in the publication of the final results.

Finally, this earlier declaration by the main opposition leader is to give the candidate the importance and power to act on behalf of the electorate for the presidential elections while the objective of the declaring candidate is to tell the electorate that, he is going to defend their votes from the beginning to the end making sure their victory is given to them by the powers that be. Indeed, from the declaration, the leader is now called "President Elect or President". During the entire process and even after the election results be it that he is finally the winner or loser, the supporters of the party will continue calling him President. In reference for the legislative elections, the objective is that, the competitive candidate has to make sure his or her interest is protected for if the party is wins, the immediate beneficiary is the candidate who has to make sure he or she is really the winner. Room should not be given to the ruling party to change the results in its favour. We therefore conclude that be it for the presidential or parliamentary elections, there are always the opposition parties making early declarations of victory while the ruling party is always waiting on the elections declaring authority by saying the opposition have to respect the state institutions and not taking the laws into their hands.

2) The reaction of the ruling party

The ruling party and the government spokesperson start by evoking the law saying what the opposition parties and competing individuals are doing by declaring themselves victorious is absolutely against the Cameroonian law and is punishable¹³. They call the general population to remain calm and wait for the publication of results by MINAT as of the elections of 1992-2002 for parliamentary elections and Supreme Court for the presidential elections. As from the presidential elections of 2004, there were some changes in election procedures. With the introduction of National Elections Observatory, ELECAM and the Constitutional Council, elections were managed differently be it presidential or parliamentary elections. The ruling party has ever stood for the respect of the law, no declarations of elections, and speculations by whoever

¹³ The government spokeperson always request the population to be calm while waiting on the mandated body to give the vicdict of the elections as stipulated by the constitution of Cameroon and not to listen to distractors or listen to those who want to bring violence in the country.

before the final declaration of results. This is made public over the national media. The stand point of the government gives some assurance and calm in the country while the electorate and the general public keep on waiting for when the government will make the election results available. It has no specific date but depends on the discretion of the government.

The idea of the government is that, there are institutions put in place for the management of elections. The public can only hear from them. They say the institutions are organized, transparent and will publish election results once they are done with their compilation. So, they request on the public to reject any claims made by the opposition parties or their candidates declaring themselves as victorious for presidential or parliamentary elections. The language or stand point of the ruling party has always been the same from the return of multipartism to the upper limit of our study. Respect of the rules governing elections, get results only from those organs mandated to publish results.

The fact is that, the officials of the CPDM join the voices of the government to say, it's very unfair for the opposition to declared themselves winners before the declaration of results be it presidential or parliamentary elections. Note should be taken here that, the officials or the CPDM members talking are equally the same persons who are members of the government so, they cannot contradict themselves. The final objective is to support the stand point of the government, it is an indirect way of protecting their party and themselves¹⁴.

3) The influence on election organs both from the opposition and the ruling party

We are going to appreciate the influence on the election organs from dual perspectives, one from the view point of the opposition parties and the ruling party. At the level of the opposition parties, the declaration of victory was to put pressure on the election organs to declare nothing but the actual results. This was a meant to call the attention of the election organs be it MINAT, ONEL, ELECAM, SURPREME COURT or Constitutional council to take their responsibility in the declaration of results both for parliamentary and presidential elections without taking sides.

It is always the wish of the major opposition parties to see that, elections are free and fair. To get this done, they strived to see that the election organising body is independent and impartial in the execution of their duty. So, the opposition parties in making earlier declarations is a means

¹⁴ Werewum Maurice, 56 years, SDF Districk Chairman for Batibo, Bamenda, 26th November 2019.

to push the election organs to know, that they are aware of the actual results. Therefore, the election organs should not try any error in modifying the election results in favouring the government. We have previously indicated that most of the members of the election organising organs are appointed by the government and as a consequence, most of them make all efforts to see that the interest of the government is protected in order to maintain their positions or get better ones as compensations for supporting the government¹⁵.

Based on previous elections and the behaviour of leaders of the election organs, a number of irregularities have been recorded. This explains why there have been change of the election organising body from MINAT to NEO and the changed from NEO to ELECAM. All these as presented by the Minister of Territorial Administration are a means to bring perfection in the democratic processes of Cameroon¹⁶. These changes in the names of the election organising organs by the government show that, they do accept that there are some flaws in the election organising organs. The main opposition leader of the SDF have fought all his political life to get an independent electoral system in Cameroon but have not yet succeeded. We hope for better years ahead as presented by Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph by saying they have not been able to bring an independent electoral commission but some significant progress has been made from 1992-2013¹⁷. He proceeded in saying that, SDF has made progress in criticising the wrongs of some of the elections organising organs and requesting for the replacement of those who are not efficient in the execution of their duties. The issue of elections organising organs is a pertinent issue for the main opposition parties, especially, as the SDF and CDU boycotted the parliamentary elections of 1992 demanding for good electoral reforms. These two main opposition parties equally boycotted the presidential elections of 1997 still requesting for the introduction of good electoral reforms. They argue that those who are in charge of election organisation are partial in supporting the ruling party. Hence, they are not capable of organising a credible election free of fraud and favouritism¹⁸.

In conclusion, the declaration of victory is always coming from the opposition parties be it for the parliamentary or presidential elections. These declarations always made by the main opposition parties have some impact on the government and the elections organising organs. It's the only voice or strategy used by the main opposition parties directly after elections to make their

¹⁵ Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2011, p. 13.

¹⁶ Declaration of the Minister of territorial administration

¹⁷ Honourable Mbah Ndam, 64 years, Cameroon and SEMAC Parliamentarian, Yaoundé, 23rd July 2019.

¹⁸ Werewum Maurice, 56 years, SDF Districk Chairman for Batibo, Bamenda, 26th October 2019.

stand and voices heard by the electors, media and the international community. We can therefore, conclude that in most of the African countries be it for parliamentary elections or especially for the presidential elections, the competing candidates do not think they can be losers during an election. This explains why after every presidential election, once the opposition loses, they claim there was fraud or the election rules were in favour of the government. We can equally observe in Cameroon that, before the results and after the publication of results, the SDF start crying for impartiality in the elections and open fraud carried out by the CPDM. This is contract to the western world like in the USA, where the loser will give a call to his or her presidential opponent to say congratulations. For instance, Senator Machain congratulating President elect Obama and Hilary Cliton congratulating President elect Trump¹⁹. The issue in the western world is that both the loser and winners organise press conferences after the elections to appreciate their electorates and to start planning for the next elections. It is a culture which is worth emulating. But in Africa, after or even before the declaration of results, the competing candidates are already working as enemies.

B- Claims of Fraud

We have therefore concluded that after analysing the various elections in Cameroon, since the return of multipartism in 1992, there is always a suspicion of fraud by the different participating political parties in the elections²⁰. In Cameroon many types of fraud are developed both by the ruling party and the opposition parties having specific objective of winning²¹. This is appreciated differently by the various political parties and different reactions concerning the type of fraud and the level of fraud. At times, the opposition parties express their absolute disappointment because they think the ruling party is committing fraud by working in complicity with the Cameroon election organising organs starting from MINAT, the Supreme Court, ELECAM and the Constitutional Council who are the various organs responsible for the organisation and declaration of results in Cameroon. Their members are appointed by the head of state. This is equally

¹⁹ We heard Mchain calling President elect Obama to congratulate him after he realized after the entering of electoral results, there were all evidence, he is going to be the winner in 2008, same we saw Hilary Cliton called President elect Donarld Trump in 2016, once she realized the results received shown he is going to be the winner. The fact is that, in the America society for a number of decades, the losser makes a speech to encourage his or her supporters while the winner equally makes victory speech. The conclusion is that, the competing candidates are not consider as enemies but work in senegy for the advancement of the State.

²⁰ Archives of supreme court of Cameroon, 1997-1998 election presidentielle, contenteux electorale, minutes presidentielle

²¹ Pascal Nzeucheu, Politics in the ..., pp. 284-285.

suspicious to the main opposition parties that, these appointees cannot be neutral as submitted by Jean Jacque Ekindi²².

1) The different types of fraud presented by the parties

The various participating political parties in Cameroon have used different fraudulent means to make sure their party is victorious in elections. The main opposition parties have always accused the ruling party of double registration of the electorate from 1992-2007. The elections were handled by the Ministry Territorial Administration. So the government could always manage the electoral list the way it wanted to suit her objectives. In fact, for elections as from 2004 to the end of our study, the electoral list was now biometric which means, the electoral list could not be manipulated with be it by the ruling party or influential elite of the governing party. This in a type of way greatly reduced the level of corruption or manipulation of the electoral registration.

At the beginning of multipartism, since the election was managed by the government in power, it was realised on the field that on the voting day some of the ballot boxes are already filled with votes even before the Election Day see the situation of Balikuba of October 9th 2011²³. Where the following irrigularities were recorded as presented in the petition;

- 1. That children bellow voting age were seen stuffing ballot boxes at G.S Gahyit 'A' 'B' 'C'and 'D'polling station
- 2. That the purported ELECAM representative at the polling station was Mr. Nwanyuk Lamgmi who is a personal body guard to the Fon of Balikumbat who is a celebrated militant of the CPDM party.
- 3. That my personal representative was helpless and when he called on ELECAM officials to intervene nothing was done²⁴

There is also discrimination on voters' registration and delay of results publication as presented among some of the election irregularities by Zambo Belinga²⁵. Since, the election boxes are kept by the administration and as the administration is working indirectly for the success of the ruling party, they are the ones, through some agents of the CPDM, doing such filling of ballot

²⁴ Ibis.; p. 1.

²² At the moment the president Paul Biya was against the issue of independent electoral commission for Cameroon and number of consultations where made with some political actors and civil society leaders which end up with the recommendation, neutral persons, elderly statesmen, renounced religious leaders and representatives of major political parties should make up the new electoral structure in Cameroon but unfortunately, when the president announced, the members of ELECAM, there were all former members of the CPDM which is a fact, they cannot be neutral and have to work to see that, the interest of their boss and the CPDM are protected first.

²³ SDF petition to the President of Constitution Council against the presidential election of 9th October 2011 in Balikubaat, dated 11/10/2011 collected from Barrister Mbah Ndam Boniface in Yaounde.

²⁵J. M. Zambo Belinga, ''Les elections au ...'', p. 230.

boxes to tell the government that they are working well for the success of the party in his or her constituency. This was seen and absolutely criticised by the opposition parties with a case study in the Bamileke area;

Electoral malpractics in the Bamileke region were also characterised by the stuffing of ballot boxes during the voting process by the President of the polling station, traditional rulers and candidates themselves. Since 1990, the emergence of opposition political parties in this region paved the way for 'democrats of circumstance' who took any opportunity to cheat like was the case in Bamaha (Bazou) polling station in 1996. Here, Dominique Djousi, SDF candidate for the constituency, revealed that the President of the polling station, Jules Mbiami himself, filled some envelopes with CPDM ballot papers and publicly slotted them into the ballot boz: conversely, he hid the UFDC ballot papers claiming that the UFDC representatives were not present at the polling station. The stuffing of ballot boxes was also accompanied by the participation of underaged voters (below 20). The result was that the number of votes cast surpassed the number of voters enrolled at the same polling station. Twelve polling stations in the West RProvince experienced this issue during the 2002 legislative and Municipa elections.²⁶

This explains why for the subsequent elections starting from 2011, there was the introduction of the transparent boxes which end the history of stocking ballot boxes before presenting for voting that was always a disadvantage to the opposition parties.

The buying of electorate's consciences by dubious politicians whose practice has been seen is used by both the ruling party and the opposition parties. A number of electorate have been caught even on Camera exchanging the oppenet's ballot card for the sum of ten thousand francs to really prove they have voted for the ruling party. Politicians in Santa of the North West Region and in Mezam were asked to bring the SDF ballot cards after voting in 1997 parliamentary and 2004 presidential elections to show as proof they have not voted for the SDF the main opposition party. This is fraud for its not allowed by the law for candidates to come out of the voting room with ballot papers but this was done by some electorate who really needed to prove that they had voted for the party that negotiated in advance and to make compensation for the vote. Such electorate are not voting for the candidate of their choice but their consciences have been bought with money²⁷.

Some of the other parties electoral representatives are at times corrupted by the ruling party members to either come late or threaten to be absent especially in areas where the CPDM really wants to win or in the strong hold of the CPDM. An election official of the SDF in Ebolowa told us he was not able to make it during election of 2004 because of threats of life should he be seen

²⁶P. Nzeucheu, *Politics in the ...*, pp. 285-286.

²⁷Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the movement "Right for All", Douala, 6th Febuary 2019.

on the field on the Election Day²⁸. In the same manner, a control team of the SDF on the field could not see their representative who was appointed and accepted to work as SDF pulling official. He was corrupted not to be present. As such, letting the other pulling officials to fill the boxes with the cards of the CPDM. Since the ruling party has the financial means, it's easier for them to corrupt some of the opposition pulling agents who in most of the cases have not been given allowance on the election day as compared to pulling agents of the CPDM who are on mission on the election day with a number of financial advantages to make sure the CPDM is victorious²⁹.

The opposition parties give only a representative to a polling station. The election organising agents are equally indirectly working for the CPDM. During the election process, some of the pulling agents always go on break while others eat on the spot. One of the pulling agents in Douala told us that when the pulling agents of the opposition were invited to join the ruling party for the pulling officials launch, upon their return from launch, the ballot box was already filled with voting cards of the CPDM as was done for most of the elections from 1997. This strategy is fraudulent but has been very successful for the ruling party even though done technically without necessarily getting the consent of the opposition party representative³⁰.

It's not an obligation to have each of the participating parties give a representative during an election for in some of the areas, the parties do not even have members willing to openly represent the party. At times, it is equally because of intimidation or fear of the after results. At times, opposing in the fiert of the party is look upon as enmity³¹. Since the opposition parties do not really have the financial means and the physical representation on the field, at all the polling station, we sometimes see the numbers of voters more than the number of registered voters on the list. In situations where members of the opposition parties were not able to send representatives, at the end of the voting, the ruling party just decides to fill the election sheets with an imaginary figure of their choice. At times we see the figure more than the registered numbers. In some polling stations who do not have the opposition representative. Therefore, all the registered voters have voted for the CPDM. This is a fraudulence strategy succeeding only because members of the elections organising committee are working in close collaboration with the ruling party such fraud

²⁸Soulé Hamad, 56 years old, CPDM member, Meingaga 28th December 2019.

²⁹Mohamadou, 65 years old, CPDM communication member, Garoua-Boulai 20th December 2019.

³⁰Gansop Emile, 56 years old, militant du MDR, Garoua-Boulai 22nd December 2019.

³¹ The leaders of the ruling party and some of the supports' properties in a number of towns in the North West Province were destroyed. This was a means of the SDF supporters to show their anger for what is going on especially after the declaration of results.

could not take place if the elections organising agents were neutral in the execution of their duty, they will not allow such fraud to take place³².

The major opposition parties have been regularly complaining that the final process verbal submitted to the Supreme Court or the constitutional council is not the one they signed during the counting of votes. It should be noted that, after the counting of votes election sheets are signed by all the officials' present being representatives of the DO, ELECAM / MINAT, members of represented political parties present and copies handed to each of the representatives³³. The law says it is only the result slip from the election organising agent that is valid being from MINAT and ELECAM. In a number of complaints from the opposition parties, the figures coming from the election declaring authorities is different from the one signed by all the parties on the election day. Therefore, at times the CPDM technically changes the figure on the election sheet which is a strategy that can only be used by the ruling party that has given them a lot of advantages over the opposition who will start trying to defend their point but the ruling party has always refused the allegations made by the opposition parties.

2) The reaction of some of the parties concerning the fraud

Generally, the major opposition parties have been criticising the CPDM for master minding fraud for all the elections organised since the return of multipartism. There was none of the elections that the opposition parties have acknowledged that CPDM won legally whether for the presidential election of 1990, or the parliamentary of 1997. The main opposition parties boycotted the presidential election of 1997. When we look as from 2002 elections to the upper limit of our study, the opposition have always been criticising the ruling party for not making the rules of the games equal for all participating candidates or parties. We have seen situations wherein, the ruling CPDM have accepted the rerun of parliamentary elections in the following constituencies in the West Regions 2002 Bayagam and Bandjoun and 2007 and in 2002 Adamawa that is particularly in Ngoundere and Tibati because of fraud³⁴. This is to justify, that fraud is a very strong strategy in the losing or winning of an election in Cameroon³⁵ but we have seen in many instances that once the CPDM is accused, they always ask the opposition parties to bring evidence. It has always

³² Complixity between the CPDM and the election managing body in toping up votes or double counting

³³Ngamgoum Ferdinand, 63 years old, general secretary of the movement "Right for All", Douala, 6th February 2019.

 ³⁴ The repeat or rerun of parliamentary elections in some constituencies in the West Region and Ngoundere
 ³⁵ Archives of the supreme court, contentieux legislative 2002 centrale, process-verbal de proclamation des

resultats de l'election partielle de deputes a l'assemble nationale du 15 septembre 2002.

been a bone of contention especially for the presidential election for no part of it has ever been cancelled as compared to the parliamentary election which has had a rerun.

The ruling party have not equally been silent on the issue of election fraud. They have criticized the SDF of fraud during the parliamentary election in Noun in 2002 which led to the cancellation of parliamentary elections and a rerun of the election³⁶. We have seen the CPDM accusing the SDF of corruption and fraud in the North West Region wherein, SDF have used even intimidation to ask the electorate not to vote for the CPDM else their family and property will be destroyed. This has always been an illegal strategy used by the SDF to intimidate the supporters of the CPDM in the SDF strong hold. This is equally considered an illegal strategy employed by the main opposition party in Cameroon. It is not acceptable by other political parties and the civil society leadership.

The other party which has been criticising the ruling party is the CDU. They have been criticising the CPDM for fraud in the Noun for both the parliamentary and presidential elections, we also have similar situations of the NUDP criticising the ruling party of fraud in the Far North Regions. The SDF joined their voices to criticise the CPDM for corrupting its councillors in the North West region to vote for the CPDM by offering them financial compensation as they succeeded in getting a break through during the senatorial election of 2013 in which the SDF had the majority of the electorate but lost the elections to the CPDM. That means some money must have changed hands as submitted by one of the top officials of the party in the North West Region³⁷. We therefore come to the conclusion that, both the ruling party to a lesser extent and the opposition parties to a greater extent are criticising each other for frauding before and during elections in Cameroon.

3) The complexity of fraud between the ruling party and election organising organs

The return of multipartism brought an era of election competition in Cameroon. Prior to pluralism, there was one party and election were just within the CNU party wherein for the presidential election, it was only one candidate being Ahamadou Ahidjo from independence to 1982 and only Paul Biya from 1982 to 1990 when multipartism was introduced³⁸. In reference to

³⁶ Supreme court of Cameroon, minutes-judgements, contentieux electoral annee 2013, 151-328.

³⁷ Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

³⁸ Basic texts of ..., p. 13.

the parliamentary elections, the parliamentary candidates were chosen from the same party being the khaki and the Green as opposed to today's primaries within the SDF or the CPDM parties. With the return of multipartism, fraud was recorded at the level of registration. We equally see situation where other political parties are against the elections organising body for working in favour of the ruling party³⁹. A number of politicians say, priority of registration of electorate was given to pro supporters of the CPDM who were registered within their indicated area of voting. If the electorate was thought to be of the opposition parties, especially of the SDF, the candidate was registered but the name sent under another voting centre⁴⁰. In this light, the said candidate on the voting day will go to his or her chosen centre of voting but the name will not be found on the voting list, in this wise, such an electorate cannot vote since travelling on election day by vehicle is only allowed for elections officials or the need to obtain an access card signed by the Sub Divisional officer and Divisional official for the sub division and division respectively while for the Regions and the other officials are signed by the governors and the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon as the access card is called "Laisser Passer"

Picture N⁰ 22: Picture of a *laisser passer* or an access card on Election Day

³⁹ Aret No:96/CE du 17 juille 2002, PDS, UFDC, SDF, UNDP c/ Etat du Cameroon (MINAT)

⁴⁰ Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF adent member, Bamenda 14th March 2019.



Source: Collected from ELECAM office in Bamenda

The next step is the distribution of voters' card which is one of the strategies applied by the CPDM at the beginning of multipartism to knock out the supporters of pro-opposition parties. Once the distribution process is going on, the distributors are going to make sure those of the members of the opposition cards are sorted and kept aside. Once the electorates are not able to retrieve their cards even if they are registered, they will not be given the chance to vote. In this respect, the ruling party has technically knocked out the voters of the opposition party. This is a strategy of victory applied by the ruling party which is illegal but considered as a positive strategy used by the ruling party to its advantage as submitted by a top opposition leader in Bamenda⁴¹. We can only be grateful with the coming of NEO where the registration and distribution of cards was made easy and considering that, the list of voters were published in advance and cards





⁴¹ Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

distributed in advance to avoid confusion and fraud both by the ruling party and the opposition parties.

A good number of the opposition parties have indicated that during and when elections were managed by MINAT from 1992 to 2002, the ballot boxes were not transparent some of the election agents used to fill the ballot boxes with election votes of the CPDM party with the complicity of members of the CPDM election committee. This is to make sure, that the ruling party is victorious at the ongoing election but after biometric registration of voters, the ruling party made all arrangement to see that those who are supporting the CPDM were accepted to vote a number of times. They are given the chance to voter for the electorate who were not present on the field to make sure the CPDM party's victorious, as submitted by one of the election organisers in Bamenda.

Some members of the election commission have testified to us that once the opposition representatives are not represented in the commission, the CPDM representatives dictate the number of votes to be written down for the election commission. In some strongholds of the ruling party, the opposition representative is absent. In this case, the CPDM representatives will decide the figures to be written. In situations where the opposition representatives are present and the ruling party still intends to change the results, the voting statistics are imposed on the commission to suit the objective of the ruling party or when the election statistics are to be forwarded, the figures are modified or new electoral lists are signed and forwarded as we were briefed on some fraudulent practices carried out by the ruling party after elections in Cameroon. Finally, once the elections organising organs see such changing of results in the presence of their representatives be it from MINAT, NEO, ELECAM, Supreme court or the Constitutional Council they endorse them, these elections organs are working in complicity with the ruling party to execute such a vivid fraud. At the end, this gives them unmerited victory because of their strategy of fraud.

In conclusion, during elections in Cameroon as from 1992, there is a lot of fraud recorded and presented both by the opposition and the ruling party. The opposition is the first to condemn the ruling party of fraud while the ruling party equally openly accuses the opposition parties of fraud since they know normally that competing with them, the opposition cannot record success both in terms of strategies and numbers. All these attitudes of criticising each other is to put pressure on both sides to know that they are the one responsible for election fraud and also on the elections organising organs to work with transparency. The other forms of pressure which have recorded a lot of success is the call for manifestation by the opposition parties in order to destabilise the ruling party's economy as reported by a member of the opposition party in Douala⁴².

C- The call for manifestations

The call for manifestation is a strategy used mostly by the opposition parties to protest against the declared results which are in favoured of the ruling party. We got the call for manifestation by a joint communiqué signed by a number of opposition parties after the 1992 Presidential declarations which the incumbent Paul Biya was declared winner. The SDF called for the non-consumption of French produced goods, no payment of taxes, electricity and water bills. The objective was to weaken and frustrate the economy of the ruling party. The strategy to call for manifestation by the major opposition parties was a very efficient strategy which crumbled the economy of Cameroon in the early years of multipartism in the 90s. Once, the opposition called for manifestation especially during the first years of multipartism, the outcome of the support of the general population on the street was very great and impacted the economy greatly⁴³.

We see the opposition manifesting in 1992 in objection of the results declared by the Supreme Court in favour of the CPDM for they proclaimed the CPDM the winner of the 1992 presidential election. This particular manifestation really shows that, the opposition members' working together was a very positive strategy to fight the government or to pressure on the government to reconsider their decision. This was really a very good strategy. Finally, the declaration of manifestation is a strategy by the opposition parties to prepare the minds of the general population and its supporters, that there is going to be serious rejection of the pronounced victory of the ruling party. This we saw with the declaration for manifestation of 1992 by a group of some major parties headed by SDF, we saw the rejection of the presidential election of 2004 and a series of communiqués made by a number of major political parties after the presidential election of 2011 denouncing elections condition while requesting an independent electoral commission to guarantee a free a fair election in Cameroon.

As regards the call for manifestation for parliamentary election starting from 1992 to 2013, it has always been handled at the level of the party and spearheaded by the contesting candidates. During the parliamentary election of 1992, little or no call for manifestation was recognised for

 ⁴² Cyrille Sam Mbaka, CDU Vice President, Douala, 22nd December 2019.
 ⁴³ E. V. Njoh, The Social Democratic ..., pp. 53-54.

the following reasons; most of the major political parties such as the SDF and CDU boycotted the election as it was agreed by a number of main opposition leaders to pressure the government for good electoral laws before the organisation of parliamentary elections. In fact, while the main opposition parties knew they were not going to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections, at the last minute the NUDP decided to participate in the parliamentary election after he was given a very big financial package. As a result, the NUDP got 68 seats after the declaration of results which was the highest result it has ever recorded in the history of parliamentary elections in Cameroon. At this stage she had nothing to manifest against as she was satisfied with the results obtained. During these first parliamentary elections, the CPDM rigging machinery was not yet well organised and little did the CPDM think the opposition party could score such a victory to push them to go for extra negotiation before having a majority in parliament. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, a number of opposition parties called for manifestation in their various constituencies against fraud openly carried out by the candidates of the ruling party in collaboration with the election organising body who was MINAT but this manifestation was short lived as the government made declarations of the final results and used the military to bring peace and order in the various areas where there was agitation by unsatisfied groups of politicians.

Conclusively, during the parliamentary elections of 2002, 2007 and 2013, a number of political parties manifested before and after the declaration of results. This pressurised the government to declare the opposition candidate victorious for the parliamentary elections as was seen in Nkambe where all efforts to change the results failed because of the heavy presence of the population, at the Senior Divisional Office as reported by an eye witness. There are other areas of partial cancellation of parliamentary elections and rerun in the Western region, Far North Region and the North West region in some of the constituencies which resulted to victory for the ruling party and some of the opposition parties. The strategy of "call of public manifestation" by the opposition parties at times yields very positive results. The government can only react based on pressure from its citizens as reported by an Anglophone activist and politician Mudoh Walters⁴⁴.

1) The non-recognition of the results by the opposition

In Cameroon, starting from the declaration of parliamentary and presidential results, the opposition has never recognised the results declared by the election organising body to be correct

⁴⁴ Mudoh Walters, 61 years, NUDP Chairman for Momo, Douala, 20th December 2019.

or to consider themselves as the losers. They point to irregularities by the ruling CPDM party either at the level of bad electoral law, during the voting or at the level of declaration of results. The CPDM comes out with different figures not those that we recorded on the Election Day. We therefore conclude, that this is a always a strategy used by the opposition to put a lot of pressure on the government to see that there should be no falsification of election results else they are not going to accept the outcome of the manipulated results which in most cases end up in court as it has been a regular strategy put in place by the opposition, we saw with the first multiparty presidential elections wherein the first president of the supreme court Depanda Mouele acknowledges a number of irregularities for the presidential elections of 1992 but says his hands are tied⁴⁵ and still declared the candidate of the CPDM, Paul Biya the winner. It was highly contested. Claims of the opposition candidate of the SDF Ni John Fru Ndi was rejected and thrown out of court⁴⁶. The call by the main opposition leaders for the rejection of results was aimed at forcing the government to organise a rerun of the election with better election rules which would be void of corruption. They hope was for them to be victorious in event of rerun with better conditions is done either in the parliamentary or presidential elections.

The main opposition parties explained to their party members and the general public the stages in which the CPDM is involved in fraud which is the reason why main opposition leaders are rejecting the results declared by the elections organising body. This body always worked in complicity with the ruling party that have appointed them to such positions. The opposition exposes the flaws of the election organising body. The various stages in the organisation of the election starting from registration of voters, counting of the results which is not always transparent, the counting of the results and recording which has no control mechanism and to the declaration of results by the Supreme Court or the constitutional council which cannot be appealed are flawed. The main opposition parties considered it as a weakness which is the reason the leaders have been calling for the introduction of an independent electoral commission which is going to be neutral and impartial in the execution of their duties. The current situation wherein the appointment of the election body is done by the president of the Republic who is a participant to the election is inadmissible. This is not correct for one cannot be a party and judge at the same. It is very difficult to be neutral in such a situation.

⁴⁵ SDF @ 25, *the struggle for ...*, p. 89.
⁴⁶Supreme court ruling of the 1992 presidential election

2) The preparation of the population to protest after the results

As a tradition in Cameroon, after the declaration of results by the power that be, the major political parties who are contesting the election results start immediately preparing the minds of the population, not to accept the results or to be governed by those who do not really have their mandate. The politicians telling their voters, that those who have been elected were done so illegally. As a consequence, militants of the party are told to stand for their rights and should not accept any power usupper to govern over them. The electorate have to defend their vote till the end. The college of opposition parties especially the SDF calling on the population to resist the government as was the case with the presidential election of 1992⁴⁷. The population supported the call of the politicians for manifestation which gave a lot of economic and political stress to the government of Cameroon victory was declared for the ruling CPDM candidate Paul Biya instead of Ni John Fru Ndi⁴⁸.

Politicians explained to the electorate that the only solution is to throw out the illegal government through manifestation. This will directly or indirectly bring the attention of the international community to notice that problem. The major political parties call for a unity in the protest for their victory. In such a situation, they signed joint communiqués as was in 1992 and in 2004 considering the presidential elections. At this moment, it's worth acknowledging that, most of the major opposition parties in Cameroon are united in their manifestation once it comes to the issue of presidential elections protest. Likewise, once it's the issue of the parliamentary elections from 1992-2013, the political parties have managed it at the level of the individual parties spearheaded by the contesting candidates to make sure their victory is not stolen. In some areas, the opposition manifestation has recorded successes while in other areas they have met very serious resistance from the ruling party.

3) The meeting or conference of opposition leaders to launch public manifestations

The irony here is that prior to the organisation of elections, the major opposition parties have made a number of efforts to work together especially for the presidential elections of 1992 and 2002. These two presidential elections have seen some collective unity between members of the opposition parties but could not get the total unity of the opposition leaders together because

 $^{^{47}}$ E. V. Njoh, The Social Democratic \ldots , p. 54. 48 SDF @ 25, *The struggle for* \ldots , p. 89.

of the principle of greed. Each member of the leading opposition party has always been fighting to be the leader once the groups come together as we see leaders of the following parties fighting to lead the group when they were together. Ni John Fru Ndi for the SDF saying he is the most popular opposition party leader in Cameroon with a clear political agenda and will work for a transitional period if given the chance. We have the CDU leadership of Adamu Ndam Njoya who says, he is the most qualified and bilingual candidate to run Cameroon at the current stage and Bouba Bello Maigari of the NUDP who wanted to lead the group because of his political experience in the previous government of Cameroon and his representation of a larger part of the electorate who are found in the three Northern regions. The various reasons submitted by the different parties, made it difficult for the parties to really come together in order to present a unique candidate to challenge incumbent Paul Biya. This has been the major difficulty of major opposition political parties as submitted by a Yaoundé based political analyst⁴⁹. Even, though these parties have not been able to come out unanimously as one, we have seen the manifestation against fraud of the CPDM during presidential elections in 1992 and 2004 respectively when a few of them were able to put up a unifying candidate but were still defeated by the regime in power, either legally or illegally.

In conclusion, the various main opposition parties apply a number of strategies to pressure the government directly or indirectly after voting and the declaration of results, be it parliamentary or presidential elections in Cameroon. The call for manifestations by political parties has been the frequent strategy applied by the opposition parties in Cameroon since the return of pluralism till the upper limit of our study. Through these manifestations the opposition political parties equally submit their complaints to the organ responsible for the organisation of elections and those responsible for the declaration of results. This does not give immediate results but has some influence on subsequent election declarations. As a matter of fact, manifestations and litigations are tabled at the various courts responsible for the electoral litigations managed at the administrative courts located at all the regional headquarters. At the Supreme Court and the constitutional council but their decisions are final and cannot be appealed elsewhere as stipulated by the Cameroon electoral code⁻

II- Evaluation of the various petitions to the proclamation of definitive results

⁴⁹ Abega Jean Claude, 52 years, Journalist with vision 4, Yaounde, 22nd June 2019.

At the end of the process of voting, political parties or the candidates for the various elections who are not happy with the outcome of the elections will introduce litigations to reject the process or contest the results. At times, some of the parties or candidates will completely request for the total annulation of the entire process and call for fresh elections to be organised. This is because they think the elections were characterised by a lot of irregularities⁵⁰. Therefore, the results do not represent the will and aspirations of the electorate. From time immemorial in Cameroon, it's been noticed that such litigations or complaints mostly come from the opposition parties though in some few cases or areas, we see the ruling party submitting applications for the cancellation of some partial results especially for the parliamentary elections. Indeed, the reactions of the ruling party and the opposition parties after the proclamation of definitive results regarding petitions are not always the same. We even see the civil society leaders requesting for some result cancellations once the judge acknowledges that there was some significant level of election irregularities. In spite of the various petitions, it does not hinder the proclamation and publication of election results in Cameroon.

A- Petition Management

Irrespective of whether it's the opposition or the ruling party, the application for the cancellation of election results or the re-run of the election is a reality and very recurrent both at the level of the party and the state institutions. The petition management at times is handled by the party while at other moments it's the ambition of the candidates fighting to bring democracy and justice within the party to defend his or her rights if he feels cheated at the elections. This petition management is handled at three stages; firstly, the petition management is handled at the level of the party to be ascertained of the facts before action takes place. Secondly, petitions are managed at the various courts with the final vicdict coming from the Surpreme court seating for the Constitutional Council for both Parliamentary and Presidential disputes.

1) At individual and party levels

At the individual level, we have a number of people who are not satisfied with the entire election process or the perception of the members of his party or how the election process is being

⁵⁰ Opposition call for rerun of elections in most cases where there are situation of irregularities as was seen in the presidential elections of 192. Same in most cases, once the opposition parties forsee they are not going to be victorious or seeing some irregularities, the are fast in calling for a rerun of the election to be sure the election is free and fair.

handled. At this stage the individual petitions at the level of the party to express his or her dissatisfaction with the outcome of the results. This happens mostly during the parliamentary elections as we see in repeated cases with individuals submitting petitions for election irregularities in his or her constituency. We have experienced where the candidate is willing to submit a petition but the party is against such an application in line with the issue of party discipline as the party will oblige the candidate to abandon the petition. Once the party endorses the petition of the candidate, the cases will be discussed within the party, evaluated on how the situation could be best handled at the level of the party before the case will be taken to the supreme court seating in the place of the constitutional council.

2) Parliamentary disputes or litigations

These petitions range from petitioning the election organising bodies for rejecting some party list⁵¹. Petitions with parties and petitions against the State of Cameroon for favouring one of the political parties as the case of Moussi Simpice candidat de la liste de SDF et Balick Awa Fedelis and etat du Cameoun (ELECAM) which was delibrated by the Supreme Court of Cameroon⁵². As a matter of fact, there were petitions tender before, during and after the programation of results⁵³. The objective of the petition is for the cancellation of the election and to conduct fresh elections. The most important reason for this application for the annulation of the results is because of fraudulent aspects that were realised within the election such as changing of the process verbal by some election officials, excluding some electorate from not voting if they are identified to be supporters of the opposition, and excluding some members of the electoral commission which may give the ruling party or the dominant political party absolute possibility to fraud. Corruption of some of the commission officials is done by the purchase of votes, illegal filing of ballot boxes before the start of the election process, rigging of elections, and intentional wrong counting of votes which is intended to support one party or the other. This is mostly in favour of the ruling party and against the opposition parties since 1992 in Cameroon. Both the ruling party and some of the major political parties have submitted petitions and recorded some

⁵¹ Archives of the supreme court of Cameroon, dossier No:152/CE/96-97 of 25th May 1997

⁵² Archives of the supreme court of Cameroon, contentieux pre-electoral 2013, recours No:s 96 et 203/2013CE du Aout 2013

⁵³ Archives of the supreme court of Cameroon, Requete No:61/CE/01-02 du 17 juillet 2002, affaire: Union Nationale pour Democratie et la progress (NUDP)

positive and negative results from the following major political parties, the CPDM, SDF, UNDP and UPC.

3) At the presidential elections

Since the presidential election of 1992 to 2011, we are talking of four presidential elections that were all contested by the opposition parties for fraud and irregularities. Some of the parties will be contesting the elections both on the streets and in courts⁵⁴. A typical example is the SDF who contested the proclaimed victory of the CDPM both on the street and in court. The officials and members of the SDF called for street rioting as the government was not willing to compromise. The impact of the protests was felt both at the national and international level.

In reference to the 1997 presidential election, it was not complicated as compared to the 1992 presidential elections which were very competitive. This particular election of 1997 was more highly contested in court than on the streets reason being that the political parties which participated in the 1997 elections were not really popular. Taking into consideration that the rules were not straight, they still decided to participate in the election⁵⁵. The main opposition parties such as the SDF, CDU and UNDP boycotted the elections so the competition was not really there and that explains why Paul Biya of the CPDM scored above 98% in 1997 presidential election⁵⁶.

The 2004 and 2011 presidential elections were equally contested at the level of the court by the major opposition parties that contested for the presidential seat. At the declaration of the results of the presidential elections of 2004 and 2011 the participating parties and candidates except of the ruling party were not happy with the results and called on their supporters for street demonstrations, ghost towns declarations as a means to destabilise the government. Unfortunately, the government gave a deaf ear to their call and no favourable answer was given to their petition. The incumbent was declared winner and remains the president of Cameroon irrespective of the opposition's call for civil disobedience.

Since 1992 to 2011, it was the Supreme Court that was plays the role of the constitutional council for the declaration and proclamation of presidential election results. The inscription in the

⁵⁴ 1997-1998 presidentielle election, contentieux electorale, minutes presidentielle

⁵⁵Bello Hamed, 60 years old, member of UDC, Tibati 20th November 2019.

⁵⁶ Presidential results of 1997

constitution for the creation of the constitutional council was not yet put in place⁵⁷. All the judgements of the Supreme Court seating for the constitutional council are in favour of the CPDM candidate Paul Biya who has been always declared winner even if the judge acknowledges there are some evidences of irregularities. This was made openly by the Supreme Court judge during the proclamation of the 1992 presidential election where Depandal Moule⁵⁸ says, there were irregularities but his hands were tied and still declared Paul Biya the winner of the elections. Another courageous supreme court judge Ambraham Tchuente who signed a supreme court report saying the elections were characterised by fraud making remarks such as "J'apportes des reselves" this is to show that even though a majority of the judges endorsed Biya as winner some courageous judges were still there to declare the high level of corruption in Cameroon as to what concerns elections. The conclusion is that both the judiciary and the executive bench are not independent. As a matter of fact, all the petitions put forward for the presidential elections were abortive for all the opposition parties who were the only parties that tendered complains as the ruling party was very statisfied with the results of the Supreme Court seating for the Constitutional Council.

B- Reaction and appreciation by the various political parties

The reactions of the political class concerning the petition or the contestation of elections are appreciated differently if reaction depends on the position of the political party and the charismatic nature of the leader and the civil society. In this case, we have two types of reactions; the group in control thinks the one in the minority is exaggerating facts by saying there exists wide spread fraud for they think genuinely that the ruling party is winning, and it's left to be investigated to see if really they are saying it consciously, or the objective is because they are protecting their political and economic interests, We shall evaluate this depending on the appreciation of the CPDM, the appreciation of the political parties and the civil society's reaction.

1) The CPDM Appreciation

They are fast in saying the petitions of the opposition parties are not founded or having no facts and should be thrown into the dust bin for a loser must always complain. We got prominent politicians like Dr Abety of Tubah special constituency, Professor Elvis Ngole Ngole, Prof

⁵⁷ Law N° 96 /06 of 18th January 1996 on constitutional revision of 2nd June 1972 (modified by the Law No.2008/001 of April 14, 2008)

⁵⁸ SDF @ 25, the struggle for ..., p. 89.

Konchou Komengni and a number of government officials criticising the opposition petitions even before the court stake their decision. This means they think there are no facts in the petitions of the opposition. It's highly considered by the ruling party, that the litigations of the opposition are just propaganda and aimed to destabilise the government and should never be taken into consideration.

Generally, some of the high-ranking members of the CPDM say the litigations of the opposition parties are a means to express their weakness. We hear in other cases, the opposition candidates or the party was not prepared for the elections and just came at the last moment to compete with the CPDM candidate who has been preparing for the elections for years and it is obvious for their candidate to win and for the opposition candidates to fail. To some members of the CPDM argue that elections are not planed and on the Election Day as most of the opposition leaders are does as explained by Joseph Owona⁵⁹. It needs to be prepared from the registration of voters, bringing development projects to the people and convincing the electors to vote for your candidate based on previous results and not just to decide over night to stand for presidential elections. So, once they are defeated by CPDM candidate who has been with the electorate for years and regularly on the field to compete with someone who is new on the field, it's obvious for opposition candidates to be losers. This explains why at the end when the court's final verdict takes the position of the CPDM party, officials of some members of the opposition parties say, there is no difference between members of the Supreme Court and CPDM who are there to defend the interest of their masters. This explains why the opposition petitions are not really taken into consideration even if they are founded.

Though, in a few cases when it is realised that there were some irregularities in the elections in some areas, the CPDM does not have a problem in going back for the re-run of the elections. A number of opposition politicians have said with certitude that, once the CPDM decides to go for re-run for an election in some areas, it just a means of the ruling party to show to the national and international community that there is democracy in Cameroon for in most cases the re-run of those elections are won by mostly the candidates of the CPDM.

⁵⁹ We have witnessed a number of CPDM top government officials like Joseph Owana publicly saying, the opposition candidates are not capable of winning an election because while the CPDM is planning in advance for the election, the opposition parties are coming only at the last moment to participate in an election. That explains while the opposition parties instead of building strategies which can enable them win or come for a unique candidate, they go them as independent candidates which is absolutely very difficult to win the incumbent.

In conclusion, the members of the CPDM and the command of the party think that all the litigations submitted by the opposition parties against the candidate of the CPDM or against the party are only a manifestation of the frustration of the opposition parties who are not capable of standing and winning election against the giant CPDM which is very experienced and equipped as concerns elections in Cameroon.

2) The Opposition Political Parties' Reaction

The number of litigations since 1992 for all the elections organised in Cameroon show that elections organised in Cameroon from the inception of multipartism are characterised by fraud and irregularities. The conclusion could be drawn that there exist no free and fair election in Cameroon be it for the parliamentary or presidential. The CPDM has always been leading whenever the results are declared. When we evaluate from the initial multiparty elections of 1992 up to the senatorial elections of 2013, at the end of the declaration of results, the courts are flooded with various petitions from the opposition parties as a means to express their disapproval of the results both to the national and international community. This makes us to conclude Cameroon still falls below the standards of a democratic country as concluded by one of the seasoned journalists during informant consultations⁶⁰.

In fact, for the opposition political parties, their litigations both for the parliamentary and presidential election starting from 1992 to 2013 is a means to express their dissatisfaction with the final results. This is one of the only means at their disposal to express themselves and to bring out the weaknesses of the Cameroon electoral code and the weaknesses of the various organs responsible for the organisation of elections starting with MINATD, NEO and ELECAM wherein the major opposition political parties have been judged not to be competent for elections management in Cameroon for none of them is an independent organisation to organise an election for reasons being that they organised and supervised elections but have not got the mandate to declare the results as heighted by one of ELECAM official⁶¹.

Another strong point of the litigations submitted by the opposition is that, it's a strategy through which the opposition are using petition to bring the government to the negotiating table. This is in order to come out with a common consensus on a way forward to fix the electoral laws

 ⁶⁰ Abega Jean Claude, 52 years, Journalist with Vission 4, Yaoundé, 22nd June 2019.
 ⁶¹ Bayong Godlove Fru, 39 years, ELECAM staff in Bamenda, 8th March 2019.

in the absence of these laws free and fair elections cannot be organised in Cameroon. Though, the opposition witnesses the submission of some of the few litigations coming from the ruling party, to most of the major opposition parties, this is almost a drama for the government to justify to the national and international communities that there is real competitive democracy in Cameroon.

3) The civil society's point of view

The appreciation of the civil society can be handled from a dual perspective; the majority of the civil society thinks it's normal for the submission of litigation after the declaration of results for a majority of them believe that most of the elections if not all are characterised by fraud and a number of irregularities which always lead to unrest in the country. Congratulatory messages from the losers and celebrations as its seen in other democracies like in the western world are largely absent.

Indeed, the civil society thinks, the presentation of litigations by the opposition parties is one of the most significant means to put pressure on the Cameroon government to find a lasting solution to the deplorable election difficulties in Cameroon. It's one of the clear means to fight for conducive conditions for the organisation of the next elections in Cameroon in order to avoid the usual litigations disapproving the results proclaimed by the Supreme Court seating for the constitutional council.

The second view point of some of the civil societies especially those in the minority think, that if the opposition parties accept to go for the elections with the current code, they should equally be ready to accept the results declared by the organs responsible for election declaration, if the opposition political parties think the rules are not good or think the ruling party is going to manipulate the elections, they would not have participated in the elections in the first place so if they have participated in the elections, they should be ready to accept the results and stop bringing up unnecessary litigations which have given no good results to the opposition.

The general remarks of the civil society are that in the issue of the opposition submitting litigations is not bad but there is need for the opposition parties to study the methodologies on how to effectively present their petitions to follow the standards required by the state for most of the petitions or litigations are rejected for not following the norms outlined by the institutions in charge to make sure the litigations are presented accordingly and on time. The civil society in general equally, thinks, the litigation is important for the survival of democracy in Cameroon.

In conclusion, all the political parties be it the ruling party or the opposition parties have submitted petitions in Cameroon after the proclamation of election results from the beginning of our study to the upper limit of our study. Most of the election litigations are submitted by the opposition candidates and political parties for they are generally not satisfied with results and do think the most appropriate means to express their dissatisfaction is through the submission of litigation.

C-Declaration of Results

Be it the presidential or parliamentary elections in Cameroon, they are declared or proclaimed by the various organs responsible for the declaration of election results. This first multiparty election held on 11 October 1992 was won by the incumbent Paul Biya with a 39.98% of the vote with a turnout of 71.9% as reported by a government source.⁶² This was a crucial moment in Cameroon post-independence elections in which the main opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi in spite of all the efforts was not able to unseat the incumbent Paul Biya mainly because the main opposition parties were not able to come together and present a unique candidate to fight the incumbent.

The enthusiasm to get a change in government was high and a cross section of the Cameroonian population needed change. Therefore, many went to the polls hoping to have some positive change. It should be understood, that the outcome of the 1992 parliamentary elections which some two major opposition parties being the SDF and CDU did not participate caused the not put in a rigging machinery. However, for the ruling party to form a government, they needed a coalition which was some evidence that, there is competitiveness. The fact is that, the ruling party did not have the absolute majority. So, coming to the presidential elections of 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011 the reaction of the political parties especially the main opposition parties was seen differently, as at times we see the street violence and court litigations and at other moments even with the call for street demonstrations, the population reacted adamantly while at other elections were just heard of litigations which did not really have any impact on the election as will be analysed below.

⁶² Wikipedia, "2013 Cameroonian parliamentary election", Found: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Cameroonian_parliamentary_election. Consulted on 20th March 2020 at 2 :30 pm.

1) Presidential Election Results of 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011

The following parties participated and ended up with the following results in terms of numbers voted for each party and percentages:

Scoring	Presidential	Party	Party	Number	Percentage
order	Candidate	•	Initial	of votes	C
1	Paul Biya	Cameroon People's	CPDM	1,185,466	40%
		Democratic			
		Movement			
2	John Fru	Social Democratic	SDF	1,066,602	36%
	Ndi	Front			
3	Bello Bouba	National Union for	NUDP	569,887	19.2%
	Maigari	Democracy and			
		Progress			
4	Adamou	Cameroon	CDU	107,411	3.6%
	Ndam Njoya	Democratic Union			
5	Jean-Jacques	Progressive	PM	23,525	0.4%
	Ekindi	Movement			

Table Nº 5: Official Results for Presidential Elections of 11 October 1992

Source: Authors collection and compilation from election results

The general call for public manifestation by the opposition parties got tremendous success as there public disorder in major cities like Bamenda with the declaration of curfew by the government for a period of three months⁶³. The house arrest of its national president Ni John Fru Ndi⁶⁴, violence and the refusal of the citizens to respect public institutions in Douala and Yaoundé paralysed the economic sector. In an effort for the government to resolve the crises following on the cry of the political class, the civil society and the international communities, the government called for the Tripartite conference in Yaoundé⁶⁵ in which some temporary solutions were given to calm down the tension of the opposition political parties. After the victory of the CPDM was concretised, its candidate gradually began consolidating itself to power as the opposition moved from strength to a weaker position. The ruling party won over some of the leading opposition

⁶³ SDF @ 25 1990-2015, The struggle for..., pp. 89-90.

⁶⁴ The Associate Press, "Police in Cameroon Disperse Supporters of a Leading Foe". Found: <u>https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/29/world/police-in-cameroon-disperse-supporters-of-a-leading-foe.html</u>.

figures, brought some sort of disorder within the major political parties and finally made the unity which was built among the various opposition political parties to be weakened and destabilised⁶⁶.

Official Results for Presidential Elections of 12 October 1997

The presidential election of 12 October 1997 was generally boycotted by the major political parties requesting for fair electoral reforms. These major political parties include the Social Democratic Front, the National Union for Democracy and Progress, the Cameroon Democratic Union who boycotted and this gave the incumbent a victory of 92.57%⁶⁷. The victory of the incumbent was guaranteed even before the elections for most of the participating parties were unknown except of the UPC which was already with divided leadership. We shall only treat the statistics of parties that scored above 1% of the total participating voters;

Scoring	Presidential	Party	Party	Number	Percentage
order	Candidate		Initial	of votes	
1	Paul Biya	Cameroon People's	CPDM	3,167,820	92.5%
		Democratic			
		Movement			
2	Henri Hogbe	Union of the People	UPC	85,693	2.5%
	Nlend	of Cameroon			
3	Samuel	Movement for the	MDR	83,506	2.44%
	Eboua	Defence of the			
		Republic			
4	Albert	Popular Party for	PPD	40,814	1.19%
	Dzongang	Development			

Table N⁰6: Official Results for Presidential Elections of 12 October 1997

Source: Author compilation from election results

In view of the above presidential results of 1997, the incumbent candidate Paul Biya won with an absolute majority. The opposition political parties that participated had very little influence on the general population as the major political parties were absent. Therefore, very little litigation or reaction was witnessed from the opposition parties that participated at the 1997 presidential election. Some of the leaders of the main opposition parties said those parties that took place in the 1997 presidential election were agents of the ruling party and were just there to validate the

⁶⁶ Division within the various opposition parties after the tripathie conference

⁶⁷ Wikipedia, "1997 Cameroonian presidential election". Found: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Cameroonian_presidential_election. Consulted on 30th April 2020 at 2 :20 pm.

victory of the CPDM candidate who already won even before the proclamation of the results⁶⁸. The main opposition parties being the SDF, CDU and NUDP who did not take part at the election all rejected the results and some calling it a MASCALAT. They all argued against the legitimacy of the mandate given to Paul Biya saying, they were not going to consider him as the president of Cameroon. This point to the facts that though the CPDM puts the score of incumbents above 98%, these were fraudulent statistics fabricated and presented by the agents of the CPDM in the name of those organising elections at MINAT who at the same time are members of the ruling party. In fact, the major opposition parties completely rejected the 1997 presidential elections in terms of the numbers of those who participated as they concluded; the election was just a means to validate the presidency of Paul Biya and to compensate those who participated with Ministerial positions such as Hobge B⁶⁹.

The 25th October 2004 presidential election was one of the elections wherein the major opposition parties tried in coming out with a unique candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya. The opposition managed to team up with ten political parties to present Adamou Ndam Njoya as the unique candidate⁷⁰. This was objected by the main opposition candidate John Fru Ndi who decided to present his candidature on grounds that he was the most popular party and having a majority of parliamentarians which he thinks, he should be the unique opposition presidential candidate.

The SDF candidate presented a strategy of restoration of the previous salary level for Cameroonians, reduction of corruption which was becoming alarming eliminating of fees at the universities the removal taxes from small businesses. The incumbent Paul Biya described his opponents as inexperienced saying he was the only candidate who could prevent anarchy in Cameroon. He pleaded to improve on education, health, women's rights, decentralisation, and development of the tourism industry and the provision of free mosquitos' nets to pregnant women. But there was a lot of scepticism over the pledges as he has not fulfilled the previous pledges made in previous elections. In spite of all efforts made by some ten opposition parties to come out with

⁶⁹ Ministerial government of 1997 where presidential candidates were appointed as ministers

⁶⁸ Main opposition view of 1997 parties that participated at the presidential election


⁷⁰Wikipedia,"2004Cameroonianpresidentialelection".Found:https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Cameroonian_presidential_election.Consulted on 10th March 2020 at3:30 pm.

a unique candidate and the SDF presenting its candidate, the candidate of the ruling party was still victorious scoring 70.9%. The details of the scores of each party are presented below.

Scoring	Presidential	Party	Party	Number	Percentage
order	Candidate		Initial	of votes	
1	Paul Biya	Cameroon People's	CPDM	2,665,359	70.92%
		Democratic Movement			
2	John Fru	Social Democratic Front	SDF	645,066	17,40%
	Ndi				
3	Adamou	Cameroon Democratic	CDU	168,318	4.48%
	Ndam Njoya	Union			
5	Garga	Alliance for Democracy	ADD	140,372	3.74%
	Haman Adji	and Development			

Table Nº 7: Official Results for Presidential Elections of 11 October 2004

Source: Authors compilation from elections results.



Map N° 2: Political map of Cameroon after 2004 presidential election

Source: Herman Touo, Multiparty politics and democratic construction in Cameroon.

This map shows the competitiveness of both the opposition parties and the ruling party for the presidential seat in 2004. The opposition parties described the elections as being rigged and appealed to the Supreme Court to annul the results but this did not happen. Same as in the international Federation of Human rights League dissented and said that the elections had seen many irregularities but a group of other international observers said despite some shortcomings the election was largely satisfactory. A group of the former United Sates Congressmen qualified the election as "Fair and Transparent" This goes a long way to give the incumbent more credibility

for his 2004 victory⁷¹. Conclusively, the main opposition parties, called on the general population to come out in their numbers to revolt against the government for fraud in 2004 election but since the opposition could not come out as one to fight the incumbent, this call for revolt and ghost towns was a failure as compared to the situation of 1992 wherein the opposition parties almost paralysed the economy with ghost towns, no payment of taxes and non-respect of government institutions.

Official Results for Presidential Election of 9 October 2011

The 9 October 2011 presidential elections went on with mixed reactions from the international community. To start with, the incumbent was able to stand for the elections after the successful constitutional amendment passed in 2008 eliminating the limit to presidential term else, he would not have been able to stand for re-election. In fact, many observers view the opposition as anaemic and expected Paul Biya to be re-elected with ease which he did with a 77.99% while the other parties have the following scores⁷²: The presidential election of 2011remarkably has the highest number of presidential candidates in the history of Cameroon making a total of 23 candidates contesting for the presidential seat⁷³.

Scoring	Presidential	Party	Party	Number of	Percentage
order	Candidate		Initial	votes	
1	Paul Biya	Cameroon People's	CPDM	3,772,527	77.99%
		Democratic			
		Movement			
2	John Fru Ndi	Social Democratic	SDF	518,175	10.71%
		Front			
3	Garga Haman	Alliance for	ADD	155,348	3.21%
	Adji	Democracy and			
		Development			
4	Adamou Ndam	Cameroon Democratic	CDU	83,860	1.73%
	Njoya	Union			
6	Paul Abine	People's Action Party	PPA	61,158	1.26%
	Ayah	- •			

Table Nº8: Official Results for Presidential Elections of 9 October 2011

Source: Authors compilation from election results

⁷¹Number of candidates for the presidential election

 ⁷² Wikipedia,
 "2011
 Cameroonian
 presidential
 election".
 Found:

 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Cameroonian_presidential_election, consulted
 13th
 March 2020.pm.
 Found:

In reference to the results of 2011 presidential elections, a group of influential opposition parties came together called the G7 made up of Ni John Fru Ndi, Jean Momo Dedieu ... said, they were going to mount heavy protest on the street against the victory of the incumbent. The incumbent Paul Biya destroyed the plans by forming a new government and taking some of this out spoken politicians into government such as Jean Momo who turned from the opposition to a supporter of the ruling government. This did kill the team spirit of trying to unseat Paul Biya from power. As usual, a number of opposition parties planned to challenge the results of the 2011 presidential elections.

We have important personalities like the United States Ambassador to Cameroon, Robert P. Jackson and former colonial power France criticised the election citing a number of irregularities who sees the election as the oppositions in Cameroon. On the other side we got a number of important organisations and individuals who endorsed the results of the 2011 presidential election in Cameroon such as, the mission chief of the African Union's Observer Mission in Cameroon, the former Prime Minister of Mali Ibrahim Boubacar Keita stated in his report that the African Union judges found the vote to be "free, transparent and credible" La Francophonie and the Commonwealth also praised the election. Fred Mitchell, former Foreign Minister of The Bahamas, led the Commonwealth Mission to Cameroon; he said that there were no signs that people were coerced to vote and election was conducted peacefully⁷⁴.

It can therefore be concluded that because of the divided opinion of the opposition parties or their in-ability to come out with a unique candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya has given the incumbent continuous victories in spite of some minor election irregularities. This has seen a significant drop of the strength of the opposition parties where we see the opposition main party at 36% as compared to the ruling party scoring 40% during the 1992 presidential elections to the same opposition party scoring a 10.71% while the CPDM candidate is at 77.99% in 2011. Therefore, in as much as the opposition parties are dropping drastically according to government statistics, the CPDM ruling party is continuously consolidating itself in power with a rapid rise in percentage score during the presidential election from 1992 till 2011 which is the period of our logical frame work. The question of the CPDM continuous victories is an issue to be analysed to see if it's based on them having the best strategies or it's based on corruption, needs to be evaluated. The civil society and the international community do equally have a mixed reaction as to the outcome of the continuous victory of the ruling party and the drastic weakness of the opposition parties in Cameroon for all the presidential elections from the reintroduction of multipartism to 2013, the upper limit of our study period.

⁷⁴Wikipedia,"2011Cameroonianpresidentialelection".https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Cameroonian_presidential_election.Consulted on 11th March 2020 at 4:30pm.

2) Parliamentary Elections Results of 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013

Parliamentary elections are organised for a total of 180 seats to be competed for by willing registered political parties in Cameroon. Eligible candidates and conditions are specified in the Cameroon electoral code. Parliamentary elections in Cameroon were due to hold in April 1993 but precipitated and brought forward to early 1992 as a strategy by the ruling CPDM to take the newly created opposition parties unawares. As the main opposition parties were advocating for an independent electoral commission for the smooth organisation of legislative elections, the government called for elections on the 1st of March 1992. Unfortunately, or fortunately, the NUDP decided at the last minutes to participate in the parliamentary election against the agreement of the major political parties to boycott the legislative elections. The elections were organised in peace with the following parties winning the following seats⁷⁵;

Parties arranged in ascending order	Parties	Number of seats won	Number of seats cancelled or reorganised
1	CPDM	88	
2	NUDP	68	
3	UPC	18	
4	MDR	6	

Table Nº9: Results of 1 March 1992 Parliamentary Election

Source: Author compilation from election results

In the parliamentary election of 1992, the opposition parties put together had a majority of the seats. They had a total of 92 seats while the CPDM had 68 seats⁷⁶. Unfortunately, the opposition parties were not able to come together as one or to work as a coalition with their majority seats in parliament. The ruling party took the advantage to negotiate with the MDR in order to have a majority in parliament for which they were successful in getting the support of the MDR⁷⁷ and subsequently had some collaboration with the UPC wherein they were offered some ministerial positions thereby completely weakening the force of the opposition's parties in this initial multiparty parliamentary election.

⁷⁵http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2053_92.htm, consulted on 5th March 2020 at 2:30 pm.

⁷⁶ Parliamentary results of 1992

⁷⁷ CPDM and MDR collaboration of 1992 after parliamentary election, the went into alliance in order for the government to have the needed majority in Parliament.

The parliamentary elections of 17th May 1997 were participated by all registered political parties in Cameroon, though there was no independent electoral code as previously requested by the main opposition parties, as a pre-condition for the to participate in the elections, they still decided to take part in it. The CPDM got a big victory with 116 seats while the NUDP dropped drastically giving a rise to the SDF as would be seen in the following results in spite the fact, that the Supreme Court cancelled results in seven constituencies⁷⁸.


Parties arranged in ascending order	Political Parties	Abbreviation	Number of seats won	Number of seats cancelled or reorganised
1	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement	CPDM	116	7
2	Social Democratic Front	SDF	43	
3	National Union for Democracy and Progress	NUDP	13	
4	Cameroon Democratic Union	CDU	5	
5	Cameroon People's Union	UPC	1	
6	Democratic Movement for the Defence of the Republic	MDR	1	
7	Liberty Movement of Cameroon Youth		1	

Table Nº10: Results of 17 May 1997 Parliamentary Election

Source: Author compilation from election results

The parliamentary election of 1997 marked the beginning of the fall of a number of political parties which participated the initial election of 1992 such as NUDP, UPC, MDR with the exception of the ruling CPDM who got a comfortable majority in parliament. We got the coming of SDF and CDU. Seven constituencies were re-run in which the CPDM got six seats.

⁷⁸Wikipedia,"1997Cameroonianparliamentaryelection".Found:https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Cameroonian_parliamentary_election.Consulted 4th March 2020 at 2pm.



Map N°1: Political Map of Cameroon after 1997 legislative elections

Source: Herman Touo, Multiparty politics and democratic construction in Cameroon for parliamentary representation of 1997.

The above map explains, the various parties that gained at least a parliamentary seat during the parliamentary elections of 1997 which was participated by a cross session of the political parties in Cameroon which we considered as the major political parties in Cameroon.

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Parliamentary Election of 30th June 2002,

The election was previewed for the 23rd June 2002 but because of a number of irregularities the elections were pushed to the 30th June 2002 as election materials were not yet distributed to all the electoral zones. The elections saw a ground breaking win for the CPDM with 149 seats while the SDF saw a ground losing drop to 22 seats as portrayed on the following results table amongst other political parties¹

Parties arranged in ascending order	Political Parties	Abbreviation	Number of seats won	Number of seats cancelled or reorganised on the 15 th September 2002
1	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement	CPDM	149	17
2	Social Democratic Front	SDF	22	
3	Cameroon Democratic Union	CDU	5	
4	Cameroon People's Union	UPC	3	
5	National Union for Democracy and Progress	NUDP	1	

Table Nº11: Results of 30th June 2002 Parliamentary Election

Source: Author compilation from election results

We noticed the overwhelming victory of the CPDM, the beginning of the drop of the main opposition party the SDF, the drastic drop of NUDP to a single seat and the complete absence in parliament of some of the political parties present at the previous elections such as the MDR and the MP⁷⁹.

Parliamentary Elections of 22nd July 2007

The parliamentary election was held on 22nd July 2007 with a re-run of some cancelled constituencies on the 30th September 2007. We saw an overwhelming victory of the CPDM with 153 seats but the main opposition party drops to 16 seats she just managed to form a parliamentary group. Same as we saw the resurface of Jean-Jacques Ekindi of MP. The re-run of cancelled elections was on 15th October 2007.

⁷⁹ Archives of supreme court, process-verbal de proclamation des resultats de l'election partielle des deputes a l'Assemblee Nationale du 15 septembre 2002.

Parties arranged in ascending order	Political Parties	Abbreviati on	Number of seats won	Number of seats cancelled or reorganised on the 15 th October 2007
1	Cameroon People's	CPDM	153	17
	Democratic Movement			
2	Social Democratic Front	SDF	16	
5	National Union for	NUDP	6	
	Democracy and Progress			
3	Cameroon Democratic Union	CDU	4	
4	Progressive Movement	MP	1	

Table Nº 12: Results of 22 July 2007 Parliamentary Election

Source: Authors compilation from election results

The parliamentary elections of 2007 saw the fall of the main opposition party, the SDF, a small rise at the level of NUDP with the appearance of MP after its Alliance with UDC on the 18th July where both of them formalised an agreement not to stand election in the same constituency⁸⁰. The election marked a lot of petitions from a number of opposition parties with NUDP spearheading the list. The SDF even projected, that the CPDM wanted a 2/3 of the members of the national Assembly in order to have the possibility to modify the constitution to permit President Paul Biya to run for the 2011 upcoming presidential elections.

Parliamentary Election of 30th September 2013

The parliamentary election was initially scheduled for July 2012, and shifted next to February 2013 and further to July of 2013 but was finally held on the 30th September 2013. This election again still witnessed overwhelming majority for the CPDM as portrayed in the following results⁸¹;

⁸⁰Wikipedia,"2007Cameroonianparliamentaryelection".Found:https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Cameroonian_parliamentary_election.Consulted on 4th April 2020 at 1pm.⁸¹Wikipedia,"2013Cameroonianparliamentaryelection".Found:https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Cameroonian_parliamentary_election.Consulted on 4th April 2020 at 2pm.

Parties arranged in ascending order	Political Parties	Abbreviation	Number of seats won
1	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement	CPDM	148
2	Social Democratic Front	SDF	18
3	National Union for Democracy and Progress	NUDP	5
4	Cameroon Democratic Union	CDU	4
5	Union of the People of Cameroon	UPC	3
6	Movement for the Defence of the Republic	MDR	1
7	Cameroon Renaissance Movement	CRM	1

Table Nº13: Results of 30th September 2013 Parliamentary Election

Source: Author compilation from election results

At the parliamentary election of 2013, it saw the reappearance of the UPC and the emergence of the MRC that was newly registered and was able to win a parliamentary seat headed by Professor Maurice Kamto⁸². The 2013 parliamentary election marked the continuous drop of the SDF and the inability to bring to Cameroonians the promised constitutional change as they have not been able to get the majority of seats in parliament to enable them do so. To this end, we see the CPDM party on the continuous rise with a number of parliamentary seats while the opposition parties are always at the decline as they keep on attributing this to the very bad electoral code which is mostly favouring the ruling party, and very bad organisation put in place by the various organs responsible for the organisation of election such as MINAT, ONEL and ELECAM. This is not fair for starting from the registration of voters, the voting process to the declaration of results is not managed in an independent manner to give equal opportunities to all the participating political parties. This makes wonder whether the continuous success of the ruling party and the continuous fall of the opposition parties is that the CPDM has the best strategies or it's based on some illegal or legal strategies which are responsible for the victories or failures respectively.

3) The Senatorial Election Results of 2013

⁸²This election saw the emergence of the MRC political party, remarkably their winning of a parliamentary seat gave a lot of recognition to the party and its leadership headed by Professor Maurice Kamto a former Minister in the administration of the CPDM before founding his own political party.

The Senatorial election were instituted in Cameroon after the revision of the 1996 Constitution but the power to call for senatorial elections was in the hands of the president of the Republic who was to decree for senatorial election and date which was done by decree No; 2013/056 on 27 February 2013, with 14 April set as the election date. The election of the senators is an indirect vote in which, a total of 10,636 councilors from 360 councils are going to elect seventy senators based on a list system while thirty senators are to be appointed by the head of state with three appointed from each of the ten regions in Cameroon respectively. The president of the house of the Senate is the constitutional successor of the president of the republic of Cameroon in case of any vacancy.

In the Senatorial election of 2013, the CPDM got 56 elected seats and the SDF 14 seats while the rest of the Senators were appointed as portrayed below:

Region	Elected Senators	Appointed member of Senate
<u>Adamawa</u>	Aboubakar Siroma	Baba Hamadou
	Maikano Abdoulahi	Moussa Sabo
	Haman Paul	Mohaman Gabdo
	Maande Paul	
	Nguiebe Joël	
	Haoua Madeleine	
	Ahmadou Tidjiani	
Centre	Naah Ondoa Sylvestre	Nkodo Laurent
	Mama Jean Marie	Ondoua Pius
	Anong Adibimé Pascal	Pongmoni Jean Marie
	Bell Luc René	
	Nicole Okala	
	Essomba Tsoungui Elie	
	Nnemdé Emmanuel	
East	Salé Charles	Matta Joseph Roland
	Tokpanou Isabelle	Zé Nguelé René
	Ouli Ndongo Monique	Aboui Marlyse
	Ndanga Ndinga Badel	
	Amama Amama Benjamin	
	Moampea Marie Calire	
	Mboundjo Jean	
Far North	Abba Boukar	Mahamat Bahar Marouf
	Alioum Alhadji Hamadou	Baskouda Jean Baptiste
	Julienne Djakaou	Dakolé Daïssala
	Mahamat Abdoulkarim	
	Mme Zakiatou	
	Abdoulaye Wouyack Marava	
	Amrakaye Martin	
Littoral	<u>Geneviève Tjoues</u>	Madiba Songue
	Tobbo Eyoum Thomas	Etame Massoma Siegfried
	Din Bell Armande	Ngayap Pierre Flambeau
	Mbassa Ndine Roger Victor	
	Kingué Simon	

Table Nº14: Elected and appointed Senators in 2013

	Ebongue Jean Jules	
	Kemayou Claude [d]	
North	Youssoufa Daoua	Aboubakary Abdoulaye
<u>rtorun</u>	Namio Pierre	Hayatou Aicha Pierrette
	Mme Asta Yvonne	Hamadou Abbo
	Ahmadou Alim	Hamadou Abbo
	Amidou Maurice	
	Mme Adamou	
	Bebnone Payounni	
Marth Wast	Achidi Achu Simon	Ear Dah Cananaa III
North West		Fon Doh Gayonga III Nkwain Francis
	Wallang David Akwo	
	Dinga Ignatius	Fon Teiche Nje II
	Mme Enoh Lafon	
	Wanlo John	
	Awanga Zacharie	
	Jikong Stephen Yerima	
<u>South</u>	Medjo Delphine	Ngalli Ngoa Pierre Henri
	Zang Oyono	Menye Ondo François Xavier
	Obam Assam	Bisseck Paulette
	Mba Mba Grégoire	
	Eloumba Medjo Thérèse	
	Nnanga Ndoume	
	Mbita Mvaebeme Raymond	
Southwest	Tabe Tando Ndiep Nso	Mafany Musonge Peter
	Ankie Affiong Rebecca Amah	Fun Mukete Essimi Ngo Victor
	Njifua Lucas Fontem	Chief Anja Simon Onjwo
	Matute Daniel	
	Mme Ntube Agnès Ndode	
	Otte Andrew Moffa	
	Mbella Moki Charles	
West	Tsomelou Jean	Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya
	Tantse Tagne Bernard	Honoré Djomo Kamga
	Tatchouang Paul	Marcel Niat Njifenji
	Metiedje Nguifo Tchetagne Delphine	
	Sonkin Etienne	
	Tchomnou Raoul	
	M. Nono	

Source: Wikipedia, "Senate (Cameroon)". Found:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_(Cameroon), consulted on 5th April 2020 at 4pm.

It's remarkable, that there were some ambiguities in reference to the senatorial results of 2013 which makes us to think otherwise, the SDF lost elections in the North West Region wherein they have the highest number of councilors. This is to say, if the electorate were going to follow party discipline, the SDF list would have been the victory list in the North West but instead i twas the CPDM⁸³. Secondly, the SDF won the Senatorial list in Adamawa wherein they had no Councilor as compared to the UNDP who had 40% of the councilors⁸⁴. It would have been the

 ⁸³ "Republic of Cameroon Election for Sénat (Cameroonian Senate)". Found: https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1052/. Consulted on 30th July 2019.
 ⁸⁴ Ibid

NUDP wining the Senatorial list in Adamawa taking into consideration that the CPDM list was disqualified but the SDF list was victorious⁸⁵. We equally have the situation in the Western Region, wherein the CDU has more councilors than the SDF but the list of the SDF was victorious, this could be understood, for the CPDM officially asked its councilors to vote for the SDF saying the CDU list was representing only the Bamoun and not the national territory as submitted by Minister Gregory Owona⁸⁶. Historians have been thinking there was some sort of agreement between the SDF and the CDPDM during the Senatorial elections of 2013 as endorsed by Honorable Abi Francis of the CPDM during our working session in Yaoundé⁸⁷. We had accusations coming from the CDU⁸⁸, NUDP⁸⁹ and even from SDF officials saying the CPDM bribed the SDF councilors of the North West Region to vote for the CPDM. We shall subsequently examine whether those parties that were victorious at the Senatorial election applied legal or illegal strategies in their various campaigns in order to archive the various victories.

III- Reaction of political parties after the declaration of definitive results

We noticed before the proclamation of definitive results, that the political parties already introduced petitions on some of their grievances, concerning the results. It seems most of them already anticipated fraud or already thought or knew they were going to be the losers, so they started looking for a defensive means in the presence of their supporters as reported by a prominent politician of the CPDM party in Douala⁹⁰. The issue is that, once the supreme court standing for the constitutional council finally proclaims the results as was on... in 2013, the only weapon at the hands of the opposition parties is to now formerly submit their litigations accusing the CPDM of fraud. Indeed, after the proclamation of results, the major opposition parties were characterised by deception and very unsatisfied with the manipulation of the ruling party to have an absolute

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Gregory Owona a baron of the CPDM instructed the CPDM councilors of the Western Region to vote for the list of the SDF as a means to support the large picture. That the members of the SDF party were not only coming from one tribune as was the situation of CDU proposed Senators all coming from Bamoun, he said based on this fact, the councilors of the CPDM are going to throw their support or to vote in favour of the SDF which was very annoying to the CDU and to some of the big barons of the CPDM like Fonso Victor who had started telling some of the councils to vote for CDU once elections come up till the last moment when Minister Gregory came with this information which had mixed feeling but because of party discipline the CPDM councilors were oblige to vote for the SDF list.

⁸⁷ Honorable Abi Francis, 48 years, CPDM Parliamentarian from Momo East, Yaoundé, 16th August 2019.

⁸⁸ CDU accusation of special coalition between the SDF and the CPDM, they think the Senatorial elections of 2013 was not really a competitive election but a sort of arrangement put in place by the ruling party to share the Senatorial seats within itself and her friends.

⁸⁹ NUDP appreciation of the 2013 Senatorial election

⁹⁰ CPDM prominent politician in Douala

majority in the house of Senate⁹¹. They present to their electorates the issue of the electoral law which mostly favours the ruling party, so the politicians or the political leadership call on their supporters to move to the streets as a means to contest the swimming victory of the ruling party.

To the ruling party, both at the level of the party and the various elected candidates, they manifest their satisfaction after the proclamation of senatorial elections of 2013. The militants of the ruling party express total satisfaction in the organisation and proclamation of the results by the constitutional council, we can conveniently conclude that during the 2013 senatorial election in Cameroon, both the civil society and a number of NGOs think the elections were organised in a successful manner.

A- The deception of opposition political parties

In reference to all the elections organised in Cameroon since 1990, the opposition political parties and leadership are characterised by deception at the end of the electoral process. We often see them against the electoral law wherein they say the electoral law is mostly in favour of the CPDM. To this effect they call on their supporters to express their dissatisfaction by moving on the streets, rioting, and carrying out violent destruction to show to the national and international community, that they are not satisfied with the election results or are cheated as usual in favour of the CPDM.

1) The contestation of the electoral law

Indeed, after any election in Cameroon, the law is the major instrument of contest or argument because there is no guarantee in the Cameroonian law as appreciated by most of the major opposition parties and its leadership to really come out with credible results of an election in Cameroon without the putting in place of an independent electoral code as submitted by SDF Regional Coordinator for the North West Region. The electoral law of Cameroon has been revised five times since the introduction of multipartism in 1992. This is based on the pressure given by the major political parties after the proclamation of results as they are not always happy and requesting for change or amendments on the electoral laws of Cameroon have witnessed a lot of criticism from 1992 to 2013 which is the upper limit of our study. This explains why the

⁹¹ Reference of Senatorial election of 2013

opposition parties are always fast in attacking the bad electoral laws for their failures as they conclude as usual in most cases. They say the law is in favour of the CPDM party as it is made mostly by the majority of the ruling party who do everything and see into it that the interest of the ruling party is protected and not the interest of the opposition parties or the general public as presented by a prominent member of the CDU party in Bamoun[.]

2) The suspicions of preferential treatment towards the ruling party

The opposition politicians have always put forward the argument that members of the elections organising body are in one way or the other linked to the ruling party starting from the registration, team of voters, election organs and the team declaring elections. This was highlighted by a political analyse who says, firstly, the Ministry of Territorial Administration as of the 1992 election to 2004 was solely organised by Territorial Administration whose members are appointed by the government and who pay their allegiance to the person who appointed them to such position who is the boss of the CPDM putting them in a position of indifference than to support he who appointed them as submitted by an anonymous MINAT official in Yaoundé⁹². Secondly, members of the administration such as the Divisional Officers, Senior Divisional Officers and Governors who coordinate the elections organising team are appointed by the president from whom if you need promotion one has to ensure that the CPDM wins in his or her area of command. On election day, the access to movement is managed by these officials within their area of command, so most of those giving the possibilities to move around are those supporting the strategy put in place by the ruling party to make them systematic winners of all organised elections in Cameroon, as submitted by one of the top-ranking government officials during our working session. Thirdly, we see the influence of the army and the police who are there to protect the respect of law and order but in a number of elections organised in Cameroon from inception of multipartism in Cameroon, we have seen that a number of members of the armed forces, police, gendarmes and army are active politicians campaigning and voting for CPDM.A military officer explains how they were deployed to go and vote like civilants in opposition strong hold in Santa and Mezam in order to support the CPDM. That is to say, the members of the armed forces who would have been neutral

⁹² Anonymous MINAT official in Yaoundé, who submitted for confidentiality he would not want his identity to be made known, he said once he was appointed at MINAT and during the elections of 1997 and 2004, he was given the mandate to make sure, the ruling party was success at any elections under his area of command. Those who did not follow the instruction were gradually drop from their administrative position while those of them who follow the instructions were promoted.

on the field are instead active supporters of the CPDM indirectly which is evidence that we cannot expect to have a genuine and credible election under such conditions.

Finally, we see members of the elite community who are either top civil servants or top business magnets have to suspend their activities during the election period, move on the field to campaign for the ruling party with financial support depending on his financial viability while for the economic operators, they are expected to give substantial amounts like Fotso Victor, Danpoulo to support the CPDM for the organisation of any election in Cameroon. They are expected to support at the national level of the party and at the department or regional level to make sure the economic interest is protected. This is same with those in government positions who are expected to discretely make some financial assistance for the management of party activities during elections period. This conclusion is that, once these top elite and influential elites put their resources to see the ruling party or its candidate in an election, they are going to do everything to make sure the party is successful for they even have as a duty to travel to their respective areas calling on their local populations to vote for the CPDM as a means to bring about development and since the local population has a lot of influence on the population, there are pushed to voting to the ruling party even if it's out of their wish but that final result is to see that the candidate or party they are supporting is successful at the end of elections. That tells us even that there are individual business magnets and senior elite who are making all sorts of corrupt practice and gymnastics to make sure the CPDM party is successful at any cost.

The state cars have been prohibited used during an election period but starting from 1992 to up to 2013, we have seen top civil servants using state cars for their campaign trips. These state cars and logistics like CPDM conference centers which are constructed with tax payers' money are always put at the level of the ruling party without any objection. Since, the roads to the hinterland are not always very good, those state officials who move to their various areas of origin to campaign. Once their cars cannot support the bad roads, they move to other government structures or parastatal and beg or request for the service responsible to provide him a car and driver for such a very important trip to campaign for the party.

The mass media such as the CRTV both radio and television, in spite the fact that the time allocated per party is always very limited we see the CRTV on a number of occasions doing the propaganda of the CPDM and running programs which are promoting the interest of the ruling party. The party even moves further to negotiate with the private media organs to see how they can promote the image of the ruling party by given them some financial assistance. Indeed, all these are some realities found on the field which are aimed at supporting the ruling party to victory of which the opposition parties do not have such advantages.

3) General contestation of results

When the elections have to be organised it is decided only by one person be it the parliamentary or presidential elections in Cameroon. Since the resurface of multipartism in Cameroon in 1990 to the upper limit of our studies, the almighty President Paul Biya decides when elections have to be organised and the number of seats to be attributed to each constituency. He creates special constituencies once he thinks the interest of the ruling party is protected to make sure the CPDM's interest is guaranteed in the particular area. This is to say all the special constituencies created for parliamentary seats are won by CPDM such as Momo East constituency⁹³. In the Dja-and Lobo where the population is about 130,000 people with five parliamentary seats as compared to Mezam with a population of above 400,000 people with two parliamentary seats. The economic capital of Cameroon with more than three million inhabitants had seven seats as it was considered dominated by opposition supporters. The above explanation and the distribution of parliamentary seats shows that, where the interest of the ruling party was protected more seats were attributed while an area considered opposition dominated, fewer seats were attributed.

As a matter of fact, the distribution of parliamentary seats is supposed to be the based on the population of the area but which has not been followed by the powers that be, making it normal for members of the opposition parties, the civil society and the international communities to have the possibility to contest results after publication in addition, some other election irregularities. We regularly see militants and political parties who are not happy with the election results moving on the streets protesting and contesting the results which at times end up in violence. A case in place is the presidential election of 1992 where there was general political imbroglio in Cameroon as

⁹³ It should be understood Momo East has been part of Batibo constituency for decades and under the parliamentary control of the SDF since the reintroduction of multipartism in the 1990s but since the head of state needed to have the CPDM participate in the decision making of the area, he decided and created the Momo East constituency wherein Honourable Abi Enwei Francais was elected poignant parliamentarian.

⁹⁴ Notuto Godfrey Awah, former regional delegate for MINADER and silence CPDM elite of Santa, 65 years, Bamenda, 10th October 2019.

both the politicians and non-politicians needed change and thought the election results declared were in favour of the CPDM candidate⁹⁵.

The social media played an important part in the contestation of election results. This was felt from 2007 wherein before the official organ responsible for the publication of results, the social media must have done a recollection of results statistics and start making public of the party and candidates that have won in major city areas or in a number of areas. This was a very big blow to the government for once the final results are to be declared both results are not going to be the same as most of the areas that were declared in favour of the opposition parties will be officially declared in favour of the CPDM party and their candidates victorious. Since, the social Medias are not responsible for the declaration of election results in Cameroon and it is the official results to be declared by the Supreme Court, that will triumph and bring tense arguments and contestation of the results based on the information gathered by the media in reference to what is published or declared as official results.

We therefore conclude, that in spite of the election contestation, since the ruling party is in command of the legislative, judiciary and executive powers, in spite of the contestation, be it from the opposition political parties or from the opposition politicians, the final results declared by the election organising organ have always prevailed irrespective of the level of contestation especially for the presidential elections for in a few cases the contestation for parliamentary elections have yielded some fruits but in terms of the general complains, the election results are decided by the agent of the CPDM responsible for election declarations making sure his or her master's interest is fully protected as submitted by a political analyst in Yaoundé⁹⁶.

B - The CPDM reaction after definitive results proclamation

Indeed, the ruling party and its militants after the declaration of definitive results, manifest happiness and the spirit of celebration of the awaited victory declaration. We get the big barons of the party spending lavishly to celebrate the party victory at the elections be it parliamentary or presidential. We see those explaining reasons for their huge victory to be the result of a weak opposition party who is too weak to fight the mighty CPDM or its very experienced candidate Paul Biya at any presidential competition in Cameroon from 1992 to 2011 being our space of studies.

⁹⁵ Ade Joseph Awah, 56 years, SDF militant in Bamenda, Bamenda. 14th March 2019.

⁹⁶ Abega Jean Claude, 52 years, Journalist with Vision 4, Yaoundé, 22nd June 2019.

A number of them even submit in public discussions that in as much as the opposition is not capable of presenting a unique candidate to fight the incumbent, its impossible for them to unseat the National chairman of the CPDM who is very strong and has the best strategies to move

1) The manifestation of their happiness

The ruling party from the introduction of multipartism has been progressively winning in all the elections be it parliamentary or presidential elections in Cameroon. Just as we see the CPDM very organised in their campaigns they are equally very organised in their manner of celebration which is done lavishly after the declaration of results be it for parliamentary or for presidential elections. A series of traditional dances are organised and taken to the residence of the elected member of parliament while for the presidential elections, merry making and feasting is organised at the residence of top party officials like the Ministers, members of central committee to thank the electorate for the confidence renewed unto the CPDM party and its leadership which usually ends up with a motion of support to the head of state.

Cameroon into emergence as presented over a CRTV interview with Minister Gregory Owona⁹⁷.

2) The Celebration Democracy

To the members of the ruling party, after successful competitive elections, be it for the parliamentary or presidential elections, it's normal for the party members to celebrate victory and the growth of democracy. To see many parties competing in elections, which is democratically organised and the leaders chosen without much blood is a significant advancement in terms of democracy as compared to other Africa countries which end up in civil wars like in Cote devoir, Central Africa Republic, Rwanda and Kenya which usually end up in to serious ethnic tribal wars. Indeed, from the beginning of multipartism to the end of 2013, we have not seen real bloodshed in Cameroon because of democracy, therefore there is the need to celebrate the advancement of democracy in Cameroon as there has existed and continue to exist peace during and after the

⁹⁷ In the evaluation of 2011 presidential election of 2011, Minister Gregory Owona was asked the question; the CPDM has been victorious in all organized elections in Cameroon since the reintroduction of multipartism to know the strategy of the ruling party? He stated categorically, the CPDM is the most experienced political party in Cameroon, represented all over the national territory, with its head a chairman who has a total mastery of the people and the entire country has made the electorates gain the confident of the CPDM over the years. He concluded, by saying the opposition political parties are not organize, are not even capable of working as a team even to present a unique candidate to fight the incumbent which makes him think the opposition parties in Cameroon are very weak and cannot unseat the president as they cannot even organize or unanimously agreed within themselves so how can we even think of them managing a country wherein they cannot manage at a party level.

declaration of definitive results be it for parliamentary or presidential elections in Cameroon as compared to other African countries.

3) The judgement of weakness of the opposition

The ruling party officials generally think, the opposition parties are too weak to confront the mighty ruling party which is represented all over the national territory as compared to some opposition parties who are only represented within their families, Division or only part of the country. The CPDM leadership says victory of the party is because the opposition parties have not been able to convince the electorate to vote for them because the Cameroonian electorate has confidence in the ruling party and their agenda to take Cameroon to emergence come 2035. There exists no unity between the opposition parties; there is a lot of self-centeredness within the major opposition political parties starting from 1990 to 2013. The opposition political parties have not been able to put forward a unique candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya which is a big weakness for the entire opposition political parties. The fact is that each of the leaders of the main opposition political parties such as Ni John Fru Ndi of the SDF, Adamou Ndam Njoya of the CDU and Bouba Bello Maigairi of NUDP have always been fighting with various arguments⁹⁸ to see that, their party leader is chosen as the unique candidate to fight against the ruling party which has not worked for close to three decades. This is absolutely one of the major weaknesses of the opposition parties for not being able to oust the incumbent Paul Biya.

The ruling party thinks the opposition parties are not winning because they have the wrong strategies but for the parliamentary and presidential elections what is their major reason for the election failures. In fighting of opposition parties at the level of their party and within the various opposition political parties makes it impossible for them to record victory and this explains why at the beginning there were some electorate who were supporting the opposition political parties but as the years went by, these electorate who moved to the opposition camps decided to return to

⁹⁸ The SDF party puts forward the argument, its party is the most represented party in terms of population and the only party having a fixed agenda for Cameroon which is the reason the leadership of the party thinks they should be the party to present a unique candidate to fight Paul Biya or the stand alone or with a coalition of few parties supporting her party's candidature as was seen in 1992 and 2004 presidential election. The CDU thinks its candidate is very educated and bilingual and since Cameroon is a bilingual country, there is need to have a very educated and bilingual candidate for the presidency of Cameroon and the members of the NUDP thinks its candidate is very experience to manage the activity of the nation which have kept the opposition parties at the same position to the advantage of the ruling cpdm since there have not been able to present a unique candidate for all the opposition parties to fight president Paul Biya.

the CPDM. As a matter of fact, the ruling party is working on the weaknesses of the opposition political parties to her own advantage and this is their own judgement as to why the ruling party has been progressively winning at both parliamentary and presidential elections while the opposition political parties have been moving from strength to weakness as we have seen in all the opposition parties. They have drastically dropped at the level of parliamentary representation and the percentage score for presidential elections from 1990-2013.

C- The reaction of the different militancy

In many cases the reaction of militants after the proclamation of definitive results depends on the issues leading to the particular election and at times it depended on the reaction of the competing candidate be it for parliamentary or for presidential elections. There existed a clear difference in the way the militants of the ruling party and the opposition parties reacted after the declaration of election results, just as with members of the civil society who reacted differently after the proclamation of election results. The fact is generally, that the ruling party militants are joyful and appreciative of how the elections were organised while the militants of the opposition parties are rejecting the results as they are the losers and members of the civil society at times have mixed feelings on the conduct of the elections.

1) The Attitude of CPDM Militants

To the members of the CPDM party, an election is the demonstration of force, this is the only means to show the strength of their party in front of the other week opposition parties. When they are declared winners, they claim and assume to be very strong political party as compared to the other political parties who were declared as losers. In fact, according to the CPDM militants, they believe to have the best political strategies, best candidates for any election be it parliamentary, senatorial or presidential elections and the best means and possibilities to convince the electorate who have always been voting massively for the ruling party from the reintroduction of multipartism in 90s to 2013 the upper limit of our study. The ruling party considers an election as a battle won, which explains why after the declaration of definitive results, the CPDM militants always call for total celebrations. In fact, the attitude of the CPDM members is that of total satisfaction for they think the success of the party is because of their individual engagements to make sure the party is successful on the field be it for parliamentary or presidential elections. Finally, the militants of the ruling party think their challengers of the opposition parties do not

have their capacity and cannot measure with them in terms of election mobilisation, campaigns and strategies which have the best all-round approach in election strategies as compared to the weak opposition parties⁹⁹.

2) The Opposition Militants

The attitude of the opposition militants depend on the results of the elections, in a situation where there are winners in some areas during the parliamentary election. They say and think, the victory is because they have the support of the population or call it the electorate. Same with the opposition, after the declaration of their victory, they think and say it's because they invested the best candidates for the particular parliamentary election in which the party has put in place the best political strategies that have taken the party to victory. On the other hand, when the opposition are not declared winners, they result to manifestations of their non-satisfaction of the declaration of results and the entire election process by calling on their supporters to move to the streets to manifest their absolute unhappy of the election results while calling for elections rerun or cancellation. The main opposition parties once not satisfied, generally submit, to the members of the ruling party or directly to their opponent do not want the success of the country for they know once they fraud the main opposition parties are going to react by calling street protests. As a concluding point, the opposition submits to the media and litigations as the major reason of their defeat due to many irregularities of the electoral process which are always in favour of the CPDM party but concluding by saying the quest for victory and change is considered as a war in which they are still in the race and the battle continuous till there is victory and a drastic change in the process for the organisation and declaration of results be it parliamentary or presidential elections which will be accepted by all the partners involved in the elections 100 .

3) The Civil Society

The civil society including the NDI, Transparency International, African Union and USA among others is a very important group in any system of democracy, there are both international and national NGOs working in this light. Indeed, after the declaration of results, we see the civil society

⁹⁹ Alioum Moussa, Second deputy Mayor of CPDM, Maroua, 20th November 2018.

¹⁰⁰ These are the sorts of declarations coming out from some of those who have remained in the opposition parties from the reintroduction of multipartism in the early 1990s till 2013. Principally, we have the inner members of the SDF and CDU who have totally refused joining the government and keep on fighting for the change to bring genuine democracy in Cameroon through elections and not base on cheating and favoritism.

taking position after election results to ascertain there was transparency in the process of elections to the declaration of results. This is to evaluate and take a position on how the elections were conducted, to see if Cameroon is really following democratic norms and finally to see if Cameroon is taking into consideration the international engagements, she has committed herself to. There is a variety of civil society organisations involved and always committed on the conduct of elections organisation in Cameroon such as The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)¹⁰¹, a United State of America based organisation reputable for the monitoring of elections was present in Cameroon during the presidential election of 1992. In her report of the 1992 presidential elections in Cameroon which were organised by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, they say, the government made all the efforts to see that, they were going to be victorious as the already started by refusing Yondo Black and Albert Mukong from forming a political party. This led to NDI's conclusion, that the election was flawed to the point where its legitimacy and validity are called to question. A number of other civil society organisations such as African Union, The United State of America, the European Union etc while as regards the national civil societies we can talk of the Episcopal National conference who trained and sent election monitors on the field. In most cases we see them against the conduct and elections process. We can equally talk of Niveau droit de l'home, national press such as messagers of Pius Njawe, Herald, Chronicle and a host of other private media organs.

We can conclude that a majority of the civil society organs has been constantly against the Cameroon government in reference to elections organisation to the proclamation of results saying the system puts in place have always been against the opposition parties and favouring the ruling party. An evaluation of the four presidential elections and five parliamentary elections organised in Cameroon from the reintroduction of multipartism in 1990, the civil society has always been having the same recommendation where they are not satisfied with the process of election and recommending for continuous improvement on the process as most of them have been calling for an independent electoral commission. The conclusion is that, the civil society and the international communities have mix reactions in reference to the political maturity of Cameroon from the organisation of elections to the declaration of results in Cameroon within the period of 1990-2013.

¹⁰¹ SDF @ 25, the struggle for ..., pp. 87-88.

There are some who think the conduct of the elections is not acceptable while others think, the results of the election are somehow acceptable.

Conclusion

In conclusion of this chapter, the first part shows the attitude and reactions of the political parties from voting to the declaration of definitive results. These results depend on four aspects, the size of the political party if it's represented within the national territory or only within a small constituency. This determines its public influence whether it's the opposition or the ruling party. Each attitude is appreciated differently. Secondly, the winners and the losers of the election; if they are declared the winners or the losers, they react differently as the winner is satisfied and celebrates while the loser is disgruntled and call on its supporters for manifestations. Thirdly, the charismatic nature of the leadership of the party and the point of view of its militants on how they appreciate the results plays an important role in their attitude to the elections and finally depending on the opinion of the civil society from both the national and international communities. In viewing the second part of this segment, we can identify three types of attitudes, firstly from the administrative complaints and petitions which in most of the cases are handled in favour of the ruling party. Secondly, violence on the streets called by the major opposition political parties as the only means to manifest their dissatisfaction. A critical look at the different attitudes of political parties and their leadership easily takes us to appreciate the various strategies of political parties and the impact on the political life of Cameroon.

CHAPTER VI:

APPRECIATION OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL LIFE OF CAMEROON

Introduction

This part of the work analysis the appreciation of different strategies and their impact on political parties and political life of Cameroon which is concentrated on the positive and negative points of political parties strategies. It equally evaluate the weaknesses of the opposition political parties during the process of election. It also shows how electioneering is one of the main causes of division in political parties. This chapter focuses on the imperativeness of any political party to develop a permenent ideology like in great democracy. Its closes by the proposition of the theory of vote lobbying, recommendations to enforce the democratic systems in Cameroon and conclusion for further research areas such as Municipal and Regional elections.

I- Appreciation of different strategies and their impact on the political parties and political life of Cameroon

The different political parties have put forth a number of strategies both for parliamentary and presidential elections which have made them to modernise their strategies and pushed each of the major political party to have a political ideology. Secondly, to work for the interest of the entire nation instead of working only for its small constituency which have in one way or the other impacted the political life of Cameroonians. Same the various political parties have seen a remarkable change from the original concept of the parties' strategies. This there are mutual respect for various political party's campaigns all over the national territory, and a number of recommendations on elections procedures acceptable by the various election partners. Indeed, because of the various strategies put in place in order to win the various parliamentary and presidential elections from 1992 to 2013, its conclusion is that most of the major political parties have proposed changes both to the government and the hierarchy of their party with the aim of improving the electoral system in Cameroon.

From the year 1990 to 2013 many elections have been organised in Cameroon for the parliamentary and presidential positions. The different elections permit us to study the strategies

developed by each political party to win an election, be it legislative, presidential or municipal elections. In this thesis we are going to focus our analysis on the parliamentary and presidential elections from 1992-2013. Our analyses are based on strategies developed before, during and after the elections. The aim of this study is to see how the opposition political parties and the ruling party conceive, implement and defend their political parties' strategies on the field to win the different elections they participated. This analysis shows that, since the era of multipartism in 1990, the different political parties have developed many types of strategies in function of the type of election, the situation of the country and culminating in results that separate victors and losers. These strategies do not give the same results which are why this chapter will focus on the appreciation of the different strategies and their impact on the political parties and political life of Cameroon. This last chapter of this thesis is opened by appreciation of the different strategies of the different political parties developed during the presidential elections from 1992-2011. It's continues with the analyses of parliamentary strategies and the impact on the political party and closes by presenting the challenges and perspectives of political parties' strategies in elections in Cameroon in the present day.

A) The positive points of political parties' strategies

A critical analysis is of the so many strategies developed by political parties during the different presidential elections in Cameroon puts us at the position to conclude that all the political parties in Cameroon which have engaged in presidential elections since 1992 have some common positive points. These political parties equally have some specific good points according to the situation in the country as appreciated by political experts in reference to the political activities of any of the political parties.

1) Common positive aspects of some political party strategies

It has been realised, in the strategies advocated by all the political parties, be it for the presidential or parliamentary elections in Cameroon that none of the political parties is advocating for street violence as a strategy. The various parties are not parties of radical violence. However, during the presidential election of 1992, there was a call for violence by most of the SDF supporters. The leadership of the party was against the situation similarly in 2018, the supporters of the MRC party wanted street violence but the command of the party stood strongly against. It's true, the general objective of any political party is fighting to win in any of the elections, but the

general respect within the various parties and respect of each of the parties with dignity of its party is a recommendable fact as the various political parties are not treating each other as enemies.

Generally, the various political parties have a common approach in trying to fight in convincing the undecided voters to support their party, be it for the opposition or the ruling party. They fought to convince the undecided voters within the respect of the law. These campaigns to get the neutral votes have so far been going on in Cameroon in a peaceful manner as those to decide the future of the party are the voters. Therefore, in the campaign for voters, the various political parties are putting the interest of the nation first. The leadership of the parties put the interest of the nation as their main motivation.

The various candidates presented for the different presidential elections in Cameroon from 1992-2011 have not had a problem of nationality. All candidates who have participated for the presidential election defended the fact they are Cameroonians considering that Cameroon does not accept dual nationality. We have seen in a number of African countries like Ivory Coast and Mali where the issue of nationality has been a very highly debated issue during their presidential elections. This has never been the case in Cameroon. The various candidates, who have even presented their candidatures for the high office of Cameroon, be it whether they are residing in Cameroon or just coming from out of Cameroon, has never had a fight on the issue of nationality or to refuse such a candidate on grounds of nationality.

It's the wish of the various political parties to get their party supporters as many as possible to give them votes once elections come up. In this light, we see all the political parties campaigning wherever possible for this would be electorate for the party to get them registered on the electoral list. These various political parties campaign for the electorate to get themselves registered preferably at their towns of origin as a way to influence their loved ones to equally come out and vote for the party. It is a common strategy employed by all the political parties be it the opposition parties or the ruling party in Cameroon. This strategy has been going on since the reintroduction of multiparty from 1992 to 2013. We have seen the same situation with various political parties in Cameroon that have always adopted the policy of organising rallies in big cities to educate the electorate and would-be electorate on their various political programmes¹. The distribution of some party gadgets as a means to convince some supporters for the party during the upcoming elections

¹ Honorable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, SDF member of parliament, Yaounde, 23rd July 2019.

is a common strategy employed by all the participating political parties. The is the concept of reorganisation of the party which is done in most of the influential parties such as the CPDM and the SDF, once the party hierarchy realises some of the party officials are no longer popular, we see the party calling for fresh election at the party base in order to create more confident to the electorate and conveys new officials of the party which has always been a positive point be it for the rulling party or the opposition party.

2) The good aspects of the strategies of the ruling party

The ruling party has unique appreciative strategies which are present all over the national territory. The CPDM party is well organised from the District level, sub Divisional level, Divisional level, Regional level and to the National level which makes the dissemination of information and the respect of party discipline to be a very good strategy for their many victories. As a matter of fact, their rallies have been successfully organised simultaneously all over the nation taking into consideration that once the central committee takes a decision it's easy to communicate to the descending organs without any major difficulties.

The CPDM has a good strategy of representation at all elections offices. This is the only party that is represented at all the election offices all over the national territory. We have seen during elections in Cameroon that many of the opposition political parties have not been able to get the party represented at the various elections offices either because they lack members or the means to compensate the party's representative at the election office but we see a systematic presence and representation of the ruling party all over the national territory. Indeed, once a party has a representation in an election office, the interest of the party is protected within the commission as compared to the situation where the party is not represented and will only be depending on the result sheets signed the elections organising body. If there are some irregularities, such a party does not have any evidence but at the level of the ruling party, such irregularities cannot occur as the ruling party is represented all over the national territory and in all election offices.

The CPDM party is well organised financially and administratively. The collection of funds for the party is well organised in such a manner that no individual can collect funds meant for the election and use for private or any other purpose². Also, in the light of the administration, all

² Mbaku Jery, 64 years, CPDM elite from Batibo, Yaounde, 12th September 2019.

decisions come from the central committee or from the central level of the party and transmitted to the other organs of the party for execution. This is a very good strategy for the smooth running of the party. We have seen that; the ruling party is always present and active on the field even before the announcement of an election. The CPDM is always prepared and present on the field for any announced election as compared to some of the opposition parties who are only seen on the field when elections are announced.

Finally, the charismatic nature of the head of state has attributed positively to that of the party; this is why at all campaigns the CPDM party uses the images of the head of state to the advantage of the contesting CPDM candidate. Be it parliamentary elections, the CPDM uses the images of the head of state Paul Biya to portray the stability of the party. The party hierarchy uses the images of the national chairman as campaign instruments and such images are put at the entrances to all main cities in Cameroon at the same time supervised by the elite members of the party. It is not common within many of the opposition parties who concentrate on their various parliamentary and presidential candidates with very little success story to talk about as compared.

3) The Opposition Parties Positive Strategies

It should be understood that the deplorable political and economic situation in Cameroon is as a result of the various bad CPDM candidates and their selfish intentions of working only for themselves and not for the entire nation. It's the opposition party that gives to the population the hope of change as we see some transform the abbreviation of SDF meaning Social Democratic Front into "suffer don finish". The population was optimistic of the victory of the SDF as this was corroborated by a very strong supporter of the president Yaya Marafa who wrote from prison saying the SDF candidate for the 1992 presidential election was really the winner but in 1992, he said the incumbent Paul Biya was the winner. This was corroborated by the American Ambassador who endorsed that Ni John Fru Ndi was really the winner of the 1992 initial presidential election. This was equally acknowledged by the NDI who said after the collection of the field results, the SDF candidate was the winner of the 1992 presidential election.

The opposition parties have always presented the weaknesses of the electoral code and pressurising for an independence electoral commission in the entire country. Those of the government bench and CPDM do not see anything wrong with the electoral code or the need for an independent electoral code. Some of the main opposition parties have been participating in presidential elections knowing they are not going to win. But it's one of the strategies to expose the weakness of the ruling party and the electoral law. This has always led to improvement of the

the weakness of the ruling party and the electoral law. This has always led to improvement of the electoral law and election management as the government moved from elections being organised by MINAT to ONEL and ELECAM. This improvement was because of the opposition participation at various election and its criticism and recommendation for future election. Although they were not victorious, this pushes the government to improve on the electoral law and election management.

B- The negative aspects of all the political parties' strategies during the presidential elections

In any strategy developed by any opposition party or the ruling party, there exists some weaknesses. The conclusion is the fact that any group or political parties have some common failures on their strategies. There are some particular weaknesses which are attributed to the opposition political parties and some short comings of the ruling party. At the end, some serious and permanent improvement is required on the both sides.

1) The weaknesses of the opposition political parties

Since the reintroduction of multipartism in 1990 and the organisation of the various presidential elections in 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011 in Cameroon the main opposition parties have not been able to put up a unique candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya. This is one of the major weaknesses of the opposition parties which has absolutely accounted for their defeat at the various presidential elections. The incumbent has been in power for so many years with his roots all over the national territory. In this wise, the opposition needs concentrated efforts and forsightness to unseat the president who has at his disposal the financial strength, the support of the administration and the support of the election organising bodies. There is the absolute need for the opposition parties to come together, present a unique candidate for the presidential elections and have the general population on their side to be able to unseat the incumbent. This has not worked as of moment because most of the opposition parties have always been fighting and standing individually as presidential candidates. This makes them weaker as whereas if they had presented

a unique candidate, maybe it could have been a solution to unseat the incumbent as submitted by a of Cameroon season politician³.

The opposition political parties even participating at elections do not have a unique strategy in protecting their votes during and after voting. This is why the ruling CPDM can put in place strategies of rigging and succeed with very little stress starting from 1992 to 2011. We have seen that one of the major weaknesses of the opposition parties is that, they are unable to organise campaigns all over the national territory as the CPDM party is does and during the election day, the opposition parties are not duly represented all over the national territory. Therefore, they are obliged to accept the results given by those who were present at the polls as they were not able to present representatives as outlined by the law. These representatives would have been there to protect the interest of the various opposition parties.

The opposition parties having been preaching for change but since the reintroduction of multipartism in Cameroon, we have seen the opposition parties following exactly the same approach of the ruling party. The incumbent Paul has been the presidential candidate of the ruling party for our entire study period. Same the leaders or the founders of all the major opposition parties have been presidential candidates for their parties; Ni John Fru Ndi for the SDF, Adamu Ndam Njoya for the CDU and Bouba Bello Maigari for NUDP. Therefore, any of the party members who tries to criticise the candidature of the founder was considered as an enemy of the party and is thrown out of the party as this has brought a lot of division within the party. This selfcentredness of the main opposition parties has made them weaker both at the party level and generally at the level of the opposition parties' development in Cameroon. Note should be taken that while the opposition parties are weak the ruling party is gaining more strength. Therefore, the strategy of presenting the same persons as presidential candidates is a weak strategy for its not helping in advancing democracy in Cameroon. The natural candidate is not helping in advancing democracy any more for in as much as the ruling party is talking of incumbent Paul Biya as their natural candidate for presidential elections, the opposition are equally keeping their party initiator or founder as the natural candidate for the presidential election. This is as if the party has become a private property or belongs to an individual both for the ruling party and the opposition parties.

³ Mudoh Walters, 54 years, Human Right Activist and Politician, Douala, 20th December 2019.

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Generally, the opposition parties have a weakness in that, they do not plan in advance for the presidential elections. Most of them just come on board on the eve of the election presenting their candidature for the presidential election. When the election time is so close, they are going to be new to the electorate. It means that not enough campaign has been done on the field as compared to the ruling party that has been constantly on the field and planning for the election. This is a positive strategy as compared to the opposition parties who are coming at the eve of the election with very little preparations done on the field. This is a contributory factor to the opposition failure at the various presidential elections in Cameroon.

2) The shortcomings of the ruling party

The ruling party has always been developing a number of strategies to make sure the opposition parties are not united. The more the opposition parties are divided, the better for the ruling party whose objective is to continue keeping the opposition parties in a divided and weak position. We see the ruling party developing the idea of tribalism within the political parties and the politicians we get concept like Anglo-Bami during the presidential election of 1992. They painted the SDF to be representing only the interest of the Anglophones and Bamilikes whereas Cameroon belongs to the all-ethnic groups. They tried to explain, that the Bamilikes already have economic power and are domineering. If given again the political powers, then one ethnic group is going to have both the political and economic power which is not absolutely good for the advancement of Cameroon. The ruling party even submitted that should power be given to the Anglophones; they will be working only for the interest of the Anglophones and not for the national territory. In fact, the idea of the ruling party in trying to bring ethnic differences in Cameroon is a negative point and a negative strategy for the ruling party.

3) The common negative attitudes of both the ruling party and the opposition parties

The ruling party and the opposition parties have some common negative attributes in the presidential strategies. We have seen the main opposition leader in Cameroon not concentrating in presenting its programs and projects on how they can bring change but concentrating their efforts

on their presidential candidate saying Ni John Fru Ndi is a man of change and saying Paul Biya must go. The ruling party says Fru Ndi is "a book seller" and cannot govern Cameroon.

The fact is that instead of bringing the facts on the table, their presentations are not substantiated with reasonable facts. We see both the ruling party and the opposition parties on the field sharing foodstuff and drinks to the various electorates as a means to convince them to vote for their party in the upcoming elections. This is a weakness on the various sides for instead of presenting substantial arguments based on facts to convince the electorate, food and drinks are offered to the electorate. Unfortunately, this is just a momentary enticement that cannot really help the electorate is a weakness on both the opposition parties and the ruling party for trying to entice the electorate with food and drinks which is not what the population needs for the advancement of their community. They should rather bring solid plans of electrification, tarring of roads and of industrialisation to help improve the standard of living of its citizens.

The fact of presenting one and the same candidate for the presidential election is a weakness for such individuals cannot say they are the only capable candidates to lead the party⁴. As a matter of fact, those trying to compete with the natural candidates at the level of the ruling party find themselves in prison such as Titus Edzoi the former secretary General at the presidency, Marafa Amadou Yaya while at the opposition parties like in SDF where Ben Muna was thrown out of the party for trying to compete with the presidential candidate, Fru Nidi and Samuel Eboi and Bouba Bello Maigari also felt out. These are serious weaknesses both for the ruling party and opposition parties for always presenting the same candidate at the presidential elections. This is not helping in advancing democratic process in Cameroon. There are major weaknesses for both the ruling party and the opposition parties in Cameroon.

It was realized, that both the opposition and ruling parties presidential candidates are not personally seen campaigning all over the national territory or in the major cities as a means of getting closer to the electorate. Starting with the ruling party, we see the appearance of its presidential candidate only in about two campaigns while at the level of the main opposition parties because of time constraints and financial difficulties, we see them campaigning only in a few cities.

⁴ There have been politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition parties who have critized the point only particular individuals have been presenting themselves for the presidential candidate. Most of those who have the courage of trying to present themselves for candidates in the ruling party end up in jail like Titu Edzoi, Marafa Yaya under charges of corruption while on the opposition side, they are thrown out of the party like in the SDF wusing Article 8.2

In fact, we see other officials of the parties campaigning for them especially for the ruling party who is hardly seen on the field campaigning while the SDF presidential candidate is trying to do the maximum he can for the campaigns. The other opposition parties end their campaigns only within certain regions or where they are really known. Indeed, the presidential election is a national election and has only one constituency which by implication, means that the presidential candidates are to move all over the national territory presenting their programs and campaign activities. This has not always been the case. Most of the presidential candidates are hardly seen on the field for campaigns especially in the hinterlands, be it for the opposition parties or the ruling parties. It has been reported on several instances where electors are caught voting in multiply centres be it for the ruling party or for the SDF. It was a weakness on both parties⁵.

C- The critical analysis of the strategies developed during the presidential elections by all the parties

We are going to globally look at the various strategies adopted by the political parties before the elections, during the operation of votes and after the proclamation of results of presidential elections. These have a serious impact on the political life of the party and on the results.

1) Appreciation of the strategies developed by the parties before elections

A number of political parties engage in serious field work by making the electorate and "would be electorate" know of the advantages of voting for their party and what the population can achieve by voting for their party long in advance before the announcement of presidential elections. As a a matter of fact, this particular strategy is mostly taken seriously by the ruling party in preparing its electorate far before the announcement of presidential election. The ruling party makes sure those who are of voting age have their names registered on the electoral register. It is obvious that if a candidate is not registered on the electoral register such a person will not have the possibility to express his or her civic responsibility of deciding who controls the nation by voting. We even see the ruling party negotiating with ELECAM to take the election kits to their constituencies of interest for the registration of voters knowing fully well that when elections will

⁵ J.M B. Zambo, les election au Cameroun ... p. 214.

be announced, those electors are surely going to vote for the ruling party. That enables them to register and vote which is a very excellent strategy for the ruling party.

Members of the ruling party who are in government or during business with the government move regularly to their villages where they are considered as senior elite. At times they move from door to door or visit social groups "Njangi" where they are given the opportunity to explain to the population to get themselves registered on the electoral list both by those who might have changed their area of residence and to those who might not have had their names registered on the electoral list and to those who have turned of age to be registered on the electoral list. This is a strategy developed and endorsed at the central committee of the CPDM and ask of its party leaders to see its implementation. It becomes a national strategy for the ruling party and explains the reasons by explaining its victory at various presidential elections. The party starts planning in advance but this is not really taken serious by most of the opposition parties.

It is noticed for the past presidential elections, that most of the opposition parties are not yet decided if they are going to take part in the presidential elections or they are going to boycott like what happened in 1997 with the boycott of the presidential election by all the major political parties while the ruling party was seriously preparing on the field for the elections. The main opposition parties concentrated most of their efforts on trying to criticise the electoral law and the election organising organ, and once they finally accepted to take part in the election, there was no sufficient time to get their electorate convinced of their projects for they joined the election campaign team late. Even at times the opposition parties accept to participate in the presidential elections late like it happened in 1992. They needed authorisation for the holding of their rallies which at times is very challenging. The state officials sometimes refuse to give the authorisation on the dates chosen for rallies, and the venue intended. Authorisations which need further push to be granted with adjustments making the opposition to waste valuable time whereas the ruling party's authorisations are endorsed with relative ease.

The fact that the opposition parties are sometimes not decided if they would participate in a presidential election or not is already a very big hindrance to them. The issue is that, even a year before a presidential election most of the opposition parties are not year decided if they would participate at the elections or not. The election calendar year is known in Cameroon but the particular month is not known until the decree of the head of state. We can therefore conclude that most of the opposition parties are not decided early enough about their participation in such elections and as such are not able to see that their electorate are duly registered on the electoral list. It is a serious handicap and a major weakness that accounts for their failure during a number of presidential elections.

2) The conduct of the strategies and the impact on the results

The opposition political parties seem to have political party strategies which are not very successful. Reasons being that from the reintroduction of multipartism from 1990, for all the presidential elections organised in Cameroon in 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011, the opposition parties have been dropping drastically in percentages scored. Though there is the argument that the ruling party is using some illegal strategies to win the various elections. We cannot object but we can equally conclude that the popularity of most of the opposition parties have drastically fallen as the years go by. We have even seen some parties like the SDF which was considered national party in the early 1990s known to be having supporters all over the national territory, to a party considered in 2011 as representing only the interests of the Anglophones and a few Bamilikes. It has reduced to a regional party. As for the other main opposition parties like the CDU, its concentration base is found in the Noun while the NUDP influence is felt mostly in the Northern part of Cameroon.

A lot of divisions within the opposition parties and such divisions within and among the parties do not give them the spirit to work as a team and this is negative for the opposition parties. When there is division, there is no confidence within the opposition parties. That makes the opposition parties have no confidence among themselves, each of the opposition parties is fighting to out-smart the other political party to its own advantage. This led to alliances among the opposition parties against the others as was seen in 1992 and 2004 presidential elections. Some of the opposition parties wanted Ni John Fru Ndi to be the unique candidate for the presidential election while others supported Adamou Ndam Njoya. This has permanently made it impossible for the opposition to present a unique candidate to fight the incumbent Paul Biya in presidential elections. We can therefore state that, some of the strategies put in place by the opposition parties have a serious impact on the results they obtain at the end. We think the success of the ruling party is the result of putting of both legal and illegal strategies. Some of the opposition parties have a good percentage at the presidential elections.

We have seen that, the strategies of the CPDM whether official unofficial, or be it that the strategies are conventional or non-conventional, there are well applied and well organised all over the national territory. It is an absolute advantage for the CPDM as compared to the opposition political parties which lack a central command. The ruling party has a grip on its militants or on the party hierarchy which explains why the ruling party has been winning in all organised presidential elections in Cameroon from 1992-2011.

The analysis of the different political parties' strategies during the various presidential elections shows that, the use of conventional strategies alone cannot enable the winning of presidential elections. This explains why the ruling party has been using both the conventional and non-conventional strategies for their regular winning of elections as submitted by a renowned political analyst⁶. Since the opposition parties cannot easily employ the use of unconventional strategies to their own advantage as the ruling party does, they will constantly lose in all presidential elections organised in Cameroon. Even if the opposition parties are interested in using the illegal strategies to their own advantage, they lack the financial means to corrupt the officials as the ruling party does. They also lack the support of the election organising organs such as MINAT, ONEL, ELECAM and the administration who are appointed by the ruling party and are always there to support them. Therefore, we can conclude that as the ruling party is in charge of all the appointments, in control of the forces of law and order, and the appointments of the election organising organs, they have all the means at their disposal to use both the conventional and unconventional strategies to favour their presidential candidate, making sure he wins. By contrast the opposition parties can only concentrate on the legal strategies which cannot enable them to win the presidential elections that have only a single constituency.

3) Critical appreciations of the strategies adopted by the political parties after the proclamation of definitive results

Once there is the declaration of definitive results for presidential elections in Cameroon by the Supreme Court standing for the constitutional council, we see the real bad fate of the ruling party barons who are the first to go over the air confirming the declarations of the organs responsible for the declaration of results. We see them praising the election organs for having done a great job. They say the elections were well organized, free and transparent with no irregularities.

⁶ Jato Richard, 50 years, Radio Hotcoco Journalist, Bamenda, 3rd May 2020.

Even as some members of the Supreme Court confirmed that there were some irregularities or as submitted by the first president of the Supreme Court who in declaring the results of 1992, said "my hands were tight". This is proof of some election irregularities yet, we hear strong supporters of the CPDM saying as indicated above, the elections were transparent, free, well organised. As such they say democracy is gaining grounds in Cameroon. This is why we think the central committee members of the CPDM are not always objective once it concerns protecting the interests of their party. Even at the presentation of facts by the opposition to justify there was fraud, the members of the CPDM are not willing and will not accept there was fraud for the CPDM to win.

On the other hand, we see the reaction of the main opposition parties which is that of dissatisfaction in reference to the proclamation of definitive results. We see the opposition parties asking for its supporters and militants to move for street demonstrations as was seen in most major cities in 1992 where there was some unionism at the level of other opposition parties calling for street demonstration, non-respect of the state institutions, and no payment of taxes. The government started looking on possible solution to bring peace or calm the opposition party. This led to the calling of the tripartite conference. In fact, this is the only medium the main opposition parties have at their disposal to express their dissatisfaction after the proclamation of the presidential election or the manner leading to the organisation and declarations of the presidential results. They have always resulted to the opposition criticising and saying the election has been characterised by fraud and favouritism to the ruling party.

Based on the pressure from the opposition parties, we have realised that the government has been making a number of efforts to ameliorate the electoral code at the level of parliament to give room for free and fair elections. The management of elections from the hands of MINAT to NEO, from NEO to ELECAM for the organisation of presidential elections and improve on the organ responsible for the declaration of results from the supreme court to the constitutional council for the declaration of results. We have seen a number of improvements of elections management have had from manual registration of voters to semi biometric registration all aim at reducing fraud. We have seen how the voting procedures have changed to transparent boxes as compared to what took place during the presidential elections of 1992 and 1997 where voting was taking place in wooden boxes so much that, ballot papers could be filled half into the boxes before they are brought into the election room without any person noticing as the ruling party was employing such strategies but with the modification of the ballot boxes transparent, this sort of mal practice cannot repeat itself.

In conclusion, the political parties' strategies during the various presidential elections are at times the same while at some other elections, there are some changes in the strategies but it should be noted, that the CPDMuses both legal and illegal strategies for their continuous winning of the various presidential elections in Cameroon since the reintroduction of multipartism. The attitude of the opposition parties after the proclamation of the election results has contributed in ameliorateing the electoral law in particular and the electoral system in general, though it is not totally satisfactory to the opposition parties but some acceptable improvements have been made on the electoral system in Cameroon as corroborated by Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph⁷. We shall therefore concentrate on the various parliamentary strategies employed by the various political parties during parliamentary elections in Cameroon.

II- Parliamentary strategies and their impact on the political parties

The parliamentary elections in Cameroon have its own particularities. It is because of these particularities that the strategies change from one constituency to another and from one political party to another and finally from one candidate to another. This is why the opposition political parties' strategies during the parliamentary elections are radically different from the strategies put in place during the various presidential elections. As concerns the ruling party, the particularity is that they use almost the same strategies for the parliamentary elections. As for presidential elections there are difference in that the parliamentary constituencies are many compared to the presidential elections which have only one constituency. All the strategies endorsed by the political life in Cameroon during elections have an impact on the social and political parties in Cameroon.

A- General view and criticism of opposition parties' strategies during the parliamentary elections

At the parliamentary elections, opposition political parties developed plural types of strategies on the field, and each political party of the opposition has its own strategies in function of their means and the area of competition where they develop specific and particular strategies to suit their objectives.

⁷ Honourable Mbah Ndam Joseph, 64 years, SDF Member of Parliament, Yaoundé, 23rd July 2019.

1) Strategies as the main causes of division within the parties

The strategies adopted by the main opposition parties during the parliamentary are concentrated where they have a lot of influence on the electorate or where the opposition thinks if they present a parliamentary candidate, they will have a high propensity to win a seat. The opposition parties concentrate their efforts or campaigns in same areas with very strong strategies. Remarkably, the concentration of CDU strategies in the Noun for the parliamentary elections has been seen throughout our study period. They have perpetually won all the parliamentary seats for the CDU in the entire Division of the Noun⁸. NUDP concentrates its parliamentary strategies in the Adamawa, the UPC concentrates all its parliamentary strategies in Bassa where they have previously been winning some parliamentary seats for the past years and the main opposition party the SDF intensify their parliamentary strategies during the 1997 parliamentary election in the North West Region, Western Region, South West Region, Littoral Region, part of Central Region and part of the Northern Region where they were able to win some parliamentary seats. In the subsequent parliamentary elections, the SDF had to concentrate its parliamentary strategies only to the Anglophone regions and part of the West. That means that the power influence exhibited by the SDF was almost taking the party to a national level but is reduced now as the SDF can only campaign or concentrate its parliamentary campaigns in just about three regions as compared to the representation the SDF had during her first participation at parliamentary elections. In as much as these political parties decide to narrow their participation during the parliamentary elections to particular areas, there are a number of party members who are not pleased as the party is reducing its influence only to certain areas. They intend to see their opposition parties represented all over the national territory. Some of the members are for the expansion of the party while others want the party to be concentrated only where they already have an influence.

2) Division among the opposition parties

The fight by the various opposition parties to gain seats through parliamentary elections has always been a cause of fighting among the various political parties in Cameroon. In most of the constituencies, the four main political parties that contested for parliamentary seats included; the CPDM, SDF, NUDP and the CDU. This puts all of them competing on who puts the best strategies to win the confidence of the electorate for parliamentary elections. When the opposition

⁸ Pascal Nzeucheu, Politics in the ..., pp. 253-256.

political parties are fighting within the same area for parliamentary seats, they forget the main opponent who is the ruling party⁹.

The opposition parties are not working as a team to fight their natural rival who is the ruling party. At times, we still see the opposition political parties fighting among themselves even when they know that they are not going to be successful in getting the parliamentary seat. They still go as individual parties thereby giving more advantage to their opponent to win such a seat. If the opposition parties could have joined their efforts together to present a candidate for all the opposition parties, they could have been victorious but when they go as individual parties, they give more opportunities to the CPDM to win. Such a situation is seen in Douala where there was collaboration between the SDF and MP, Jean Jaque Ekindi won the parliamentary seat, when the SDF decided to present its parliamentary candidate in Douala V. Both of them lost the parliamentary seat. It's the same situation wherein the CDU dropped her participation and asked its followers to vote for an MP which enabled Jean Jaque Ekindi to return to parliament for the growth of the opposition parties. Since, the opposition parties are always fighting for selfish motives, there are a number of times where such fights have ended up profiting the ruling party because the opposition parties are divided and do not want to work as a team.

The issue is that if the opposition is working as a team especially for parliamentary elections, where they know individually, they cannot win, they should join together and support the candidate of the opposition party. This is going to increase the chances of the opposition political parties in parliament and this will enable the opposition parties to be able to pass their bills, if they do have a majority in parliament. If they work as individual parties more opportunities are given to the ruling party that easily sweeps the majority of the parliamentary seats in their interest. Should the opposition political parties have the type of collaboration which works within churches, such as when a Christian of the main stream church goes to a new town and does not find the Presbyterian Church, such a Christian will go to worship at the Catholic Church or the Baptist church. Same as for the full gospel Christian who will advise the Christian to worship in any Pentecostal church or any born again church that is available in the locality. We think that if such collaboration can work among the various oppositions' political parties, this is going to give them more strength and victory in future parliamentary elections.

⁹ Atekwana Joseph, 67 years, SDF National Treasurer, Bamenda, 5th May 2020.

3) Criticism of the ruling party strategies during the various parliamentary elections

It is recurrent to see the various main opposition political parties accusing the ruling party of cheating and corruption during the various parliamentary elections. It could be considered as the true and also a means to defend themselves for their defeat during the last parliamentary elections. The main opposition parties accused the ruling party of using the state property to her own advantage during parliamentary campaigns such as state cars (CA) for their field campaigns and party or congress halls for CPDM activities. But those congress halls are constructed by money from all of the tax payers of the region yet, the ruling party used these premises for its own advantages as if such facilities were constructed by the ruling party. We even had situations wherein projects that are realised with funds from the national budget are presented by the CPDM candidates during their campaigns as if it was the CPDM party that realised the project. This was untrue and misleading to the electorate¹⁰. This is a tricky strategy for the ruling party for they are impersonate for jobs or projects realised with state funds. The Bamenda – Manfe road, the construction of schools allocated in state budgets are all presented by the CPDM politicians as realisations members of the ruling party which is misleading and not correct.

The opposition political parties are not focused on the populations' interests but deploy all their efforts in criticising the failures of the ruling party and the opposing parliamentary candidates. The opposition political parties spent precious time in accusing the president of the republic who is not even a candidate at the parliamentary election. Instead of confronting the parliamentary candidate to fight against President Paul Biya who is not even a parliamentary candidate for his party. Finally, the main opposition parties do not put in place their intellectual and economic means to win the real opponent who is the candidate for the parliamentary election. They are instead fighting the general CPDM party or criticising what the leader of the party is doing.

B- An appreciation of the ruling party strategies during the various parliamentary elections.

The CPDM party during the various parliamentary elections be it the legislative or senatorial elections puts in place the various organisations or arrangements to make sure they win all the seats in the areas where they have presented candidates. It should be understood that; the

¹⁰ Sama Isaac Nde, 67 years, Retired SDF Divisional Executive for Nkambe and Wum, Bamenda, 30th Setember 2019.

ruling party treats all the elections as very important and wants to win all the available seats if possible. To them, they think they do not have any reason for losing an election. This is why at the regional level or national level, the CPDM looks for all means possible to win elections as if those they are competing with are not capable of winning a seat except, they decide to give some of the few seats to the opposition parties just to indicate that there was some competition.

1) The implantation of a machine to win

In fact, during the parliamentary election, whether through direct or indirect voting, the organisation of the ruling party candidates to win is very important. The ruling party conceives any election like a war they have to win and do not have to give any chance to the opposition parties even if it's a party of government alliance. This explains why the ruling party puts in place a strong committee to manage the campaigns and control the votes. They sent special envoys from the Central Committee to help parliamentary candidates. These are either a member of government, a delegation from the central committee or even top civil servants to support the parliamentary candidates on the field. At times the delegation is made up of several personalities as the Prime Minister (Philimon Yang), Minister of Arts and Culture (Ama Tutu Muna), Secretary of state (Yonga Tingen) and members of the CPDM in Momo, East, Honourable Enwi Francis at the parliamentary elections of 2002 and 2007. This gave him victory over the SDF candidate. So, as the delegation leaves Momo, they move to other Divisions of the North West Region for the same mission to make sure they give the party support to their various candidates in the region both financially and morally.

The ruling party from the level of the central committee makes available party gadgets and financial support to their parliamentary candidates on the field. This is a preparatory means to enable their parliamentary candidates create more awareness of their presence on the field to to electorate and would-be electorate so that once the election is announced they are going to vote for the CPDM candidates. In fact, the ruling party makes all efforts to see that their candidate wins in any of the organised legislative elections, with support coming from the party, top civil servants and top business magnets. An example is the senatorial election of 2013 in which envelopes were distributed to councillors and chiefs to make sure the CPDM list in the North West headed by former Prime Minister Achidi Achu was successful. In spite of the fact that the SDF has more of

the councillors, the CPDM was victorious as the party hierarchy had put all the mechanisms to make sure their list is victorious whether using legal or illegal means. In another situation, we saw the support of the state behind the candidature of Madam Francois Founny where the Secretary General of the CPDM accompanied by about ten ministers were in Douala 5 to support her for parliamentary elections she ended up winning. The support of Hourable Abunow in Manyu Division who was the vice president of the National Assembly to make sure he is maintained as a parliamentarian. The conclusion is that whenever it's necessary, the leadership of the ruling party sends any important personality of the state or of the party to support their parliamentary candidate on the field to ensure victory. This is hardly done at the level of the other opposition parties. Itis evident that the CPDM puts all mechanisms in play to make sure their parliamentary candidates are victorious either using conventional or unconventional strategies, what they need is victory.

2) The voluntary techniques of fraud during elections

The ruling party in most cases uses all means at her disposal to ensure victory. During the early years of multipartism, the registration of the electorate was manual. This means that names could be added without any possibility of control. The ballot boxes were wooden and not transparent. Most of the opposition parties claim that members of the election organising committee used to fill the boxes with ballot papers of their interest before bringing them to the election site, since the boxes are not transparent¹¹. There was no way to control and it only serves as an advantage to the ruling party especially when elections were controlled by MINATD. There were recurrent reports by the main opposition parties that the ruling party always changed the result statistics to favour their parliamentary candidates¹². This was done at the time of counting or at the time of transmitting the results sheets to hierarchy. If the opposition parties try to present a result sheet that was signed by all the parties during the initial counting, the supreme court has the argument that the result sheets which are valid are those coming from the election organising body We question if the result sheet given to the opposition political parties are not to be considered in cases of litigations what is the need of giving the opposition parties copies of the election results? Therefore, one can say, the supreme court is there to legitimise fraud and not justice.

¹¹ Zambo Belinga, Les elections au ..., pp. 274-278.

¹² Minutes-judgement contentieux electoral annee 2013, 1-150

Since the ruling party decides whatever thing that happens during elections, they equally decide who the members of the election commission are. The ruling party is the one to appoint such members, some of them are appointed with a mission to make sure the CPDM party is victorious. Therefore, members of the electoral committee are often corrupted to make sure the results are in favour of the CPDM. We have been told of repeated instances where members of the ruling party especially in their areas of command such as in Ebolowa and Mvomeka have intimidated members of the opposition from participating in the electoral supervision. This is to permit them give whatever statistics they like for the results. Even in some places in the North West like in Bali Kubat where John Kohtem the districk chairman of the SDF was murder by Fon Doh Gah Gwanyin II¹³, we have seen elections contestants or supervising agents of the SDF are killed. This means the CPDM is ready to employ any strategy possible be it conventional or unconventional to see its party wins an election.

Since the ruling party has the financial capabilities, they have used these means in a number of instances as a new strategy starting from 2002, where they asked the electorate to come out of the ballot box with proves they have voted for CPDM by presenting the ballot paper of the opposition party as evidence¹⁴. Once the opposition ballot paper is presented, each voter receives the sum of ten thousand frances cfa. In fact, this is a means of corruption initiated by the hierarchy of the party.

It has been reported in Bamenda that during the counting of ballot papers at the close of voting. SONEL agents expressly take off electricity as a means to confuse those counting the ballot papers. At this stage, a plan to fill some of the ballot boxes is carried out. The increase of the number of ballot papers counted is implemented. This is possible because as the members of the opposition parties fought and used torches or put-on generators, the CPDMofficials are busy doing their frauds and at times, when the act has been committed lights come almost at the time of finalising. It is a calculated means of fraud by the ruling party in making all efforts to see that their parliamentary candidate is declared victorious.

The Cameroon law states voting ends at 6pm but we see situations wherein the ruling party has delayed the counting to late into the night like in Kumbo and Nkambe. The election counting

¹³ Christopher Fung Nchia, Party politics in ..., p. 195.

¹⁴ This we are chance to see thanks to the social media as some of the journalist using discret camaras have been able to picture in most cases the ruling party given ten thousand notes to voters for coming out of the voting box with the opposition ballot to justify they have voted for the ruling party.

committee expressdelayed the counting to enable some of the population that tried to return home before the end of the counting. Note should be taken that most of the fraud takes place in the night and late in the process of counting, so in the absence of the general population or only in the presence of fewer supporters of the opposition parties, the CPDM can easily handle their strategy of fraud and declare their parliamentary candidate winner. This has worked in a number of constituencies in Cameroon and the declarations done by the CRTV who are supposed to be neutral but, in most cases, they are working for the ruling party.

Finally, the intervention of the administration at the level of the SDO, DO, Governor and the election organising officials in situations where there are difficulties created by the ruling party to bring confusion. We see the intervention of these officials simultaneously in support of the ruling party in situations where the population is not willing to accept. They call in the forces of law and order who come to the scene in most cases to pick up the members of the opposition parties and to be released only after the proclamation of the results. This is done as a strategy to intimidate the others who could be thinking of criticising the expressed fraud going on and because of the fear of the unknown, the remaining opposition partys'officials will either be silent or can only speak after the act has been committed.

In conclusion, all these strategies are what we consider illegal strategies employed by the ruling party. The main reasons are permitting the CPDM to be victorious in most of the parliamentary elections in Cameroon. These are considered unconventional strategies as they are working only for the interest of the ruling party and can only be applied by the CPDM. This cannot be exploited by the opposition parties even if they are interested. This brings us to the conclusion, that the continuous victories of the ruling party in all the parliamentary elections from 1997-2013 is not only based on legal strategies but mostly on illegal strategies in order to make sure the CPDM has an absolute majority in parliament.

3) The super natural organisation

The ruling party in all their campaigns even for parliamentary elections uses President's image, meanwhile it is not a presidential election. Since the president has been in power for so long, and has handled a number of few positive projects, the CPDM parliamentary candidates turn to attribute these projects to their president and themselves. This sometimes confuses some of the electorate to believe them in their narratives but is not correct and needs to be rectified. Taking

into consideration the charismatic nature of the president, we see the CPDM candidates making a lot of their references to the success story of the president whereas the members of the opposition parties do not have such an opportunity. This is a point to criticise as all the candidates do not have the same advantages. The candidates of the ruling party and their supporters on their campaign trips used state cars registered "CA" for the benefit of the CPDM party¹⁵. Due to heavy criticism the government restricted from the use of state-owned cars for campaigns. This is still defied by government officials like the PM, Ministers and Official CPDM delegation on a campaign trip all used government cars and are even accompanied by the forces of law and order. The campaign team of the ruling party received very big sums for their campaign trips coming from the central committee of the party and party officials who are in government. Same came from business magnets who are obliged to support the campaigns of the ruling party directly or indirectly as a means of protecting the prosperity of their business. This is not the same case with members of the opposition parties. We do consider this as an advantage for the ruling party as it does not make the election competitive because one of the parties is already favoured even before elections begin.

C- The impact of electioneering strategies on political party life in Cameroon

The strategies developed by political parties during the electioneering process have a serious impact on the political parties and mainly on the relationship within the parties. The different strategies developed are at the origin or the cause of the division within a party and the main cause of multiplication of political parties in Cameroon. This is the reason why there are more than three hundred political parties in Cameroon with a population of about twenty-five million. Therefore, some of the parties are only known at the level of their families, and others at the community level while some at the Divisional level and others known only at the level of the Region. This means very few political parties are known at the national level in Cameroon. Once some members of the party are not happy with the electioneering strategy of the party, by the next election, such members have either left the party or formed their own political party even if it has no ideology to protect.

1) Electioneering strategies as the main causes of division within political parties

¹⁵ Abbo Ulsmanu, 71 years, NUDP Vice Secretary General, Ngoundere, 18th December 2018.

At the end of the process of electioneering, some of the candidates are frustrated once their lists are rejected at the level of the political party for what is known as selection during the primaries as it done mostly with the SDF and the CPDM. This brings a lot of division within the party. As a result, most of the candidates whose list is not retained at times threaten to quit the party especially at the level of the opposition parties. It should be noted, that once a prominent politician quits the party because of certain misunderstanding, such a prominent politician is not leaving alone but leaves with his or her close ones. This is destabilising in some of the parties and serves as a good example. Ben Muna left the SDF, the quitting of Samuel Ebua from the NUDP and what is important is that, these personalities have left for the creation of their own political parties, though they have not recorded much success in their political lives after quitting the party but have brought division within the party because of electioneering strategies of the party¹⁶.

In some other parties, most of the members who are seen following the party guidelines during the process of electioneering for the party members are making all efforts to see that their candidatures are retained at the level of the party. Once some of the party members disrespect the rules or if the strength of the founder is threatened by some of the party members who come with new ideas, the party hierarchy kooks for articles of the party's constitution to justify that they are violating the party status. For instance, the SDF, article 8.2 automatically dismisses such a member from the party after an emergency, NEC meeting or during the next NEC meeting It is not an emergency. In the CPDM, once a party member is against the party norms, it considered that such a militant is not following party discipline. In most cases a false accusation could be labelled on such a militant in same way. Finally, such a militant will only find himself under police custody and later saving a number of years for fraud as it's the case with most of the political prisoners such as Titus Edzoa in Cameroon¹⁷.

There are also cases of in-fighting within a number of political parties especially after the declaration of results. Those parties which have not succeeded in winning start criticising the other top party officials for having brought in very bad or unsuccessful electioneering strategies which

¹⁶ The strategy of trying to challenge the founder of the party especially with the opposition parties have gone a long way to weakened the party. The fact, is that most of the unsatisfied members of the party end up living the party for the creation of their own parties while some decide to joined back the CPDM. The ironing is that, most of those who have left the opposition parties for the creation of their own parties have not made political progress.

¹⁷ Wikipedia, "Titus Edzoa". Found: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titus_Edzoa. Consulted on 22nd of January 2020 at 6:30 am.

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have landed the party into failure. The fact is that prior to elections, a number of top party officials present electioneering strategies which could lead to the party's success but if these electioneering strategies are not successful, there are going to be accusations and counter accusations within the party. Members blame one another for the electioneering strategy that has failed the aspirations of the party.

2) Electioneering as a dividing factor within a party

There existed different types of groups within a party which are conservatives, moderates and radicals in most cases. The traditional ask or want the statuquo to remain in place or to be the guiding principles of the party while the progressive wants change of the election candidates to people with newer ideas and even the possibility of the change party ideology to suit the exigence of the current demand of the society rather than basing the parties strategies on what was decided by even people who are not still living and developed such strategies at the time we never thought of the current development or advancement of the political life in Cameroon.

We have heard at times within the party that camps are formed based on gender equality and we see some of the party officials who want equal representation between men and women as advocated by the United Nations Organisation for Women, calling for equal representation between men and women. It should be understood that Cameroon opted for a 30% women representation which is not always follow strictly and goes a long way to explain the reason of some divisions within the party during electioneering strategies between the men and women's representation. We have therefore got party lists both from the ruling party and some of the major opposition parties rejected in Cameroon for having not respected the quoted for women representation within their party.

There is another crucial factor of division within most of the parties which is the issue of the young and the older generation. In most of the political parties we see a division caused between the young and the old. The older generation is always asking the younger generation to wait for the right moment to take the party command. Even the creation of the youth wing has not solved this problem of division within the party between the youths and the older generation. In most cases, the older generation is not willing to hand over power to the youths especially within the ruling party for we see the same faces in politics. This is a source of division within the party. Though, there is no much difference between the ruling party and the major opposition parties like in SDF, NUDP and CDU, there are a number of particular individuals who have been in parliament since the reintroduction of multipartism or since they were elected party representatives. They have permanently remained in command from the level of the youths who militate in the party and have grown up to be adults but they are still considered as youths while power still remains in the hands of the older generation of the party.

This is causing some of the youths who want power and could not be given the position of power decide in quitting the party and forming their own political party such as Ben Musa, Kah Walla Cala who are gradually gaining some popularity even out of their areas of influence. The fact is that, many of the youths have waited and once the moment comes for the elder politicians to hand over the baton to the younger politicians, they start creating division between them and the younger politicians or still asking them to wait for the right moment to come as submitted by a young vibrant politician from Batibo, Maitre Mbah Eric who thought he was going to take over the parliamentary baton from Honourable Mbah Joseph as he indicated but when the moment came, he was not yet ready to surrender the parliamentary seat of Batibo which created a lot of tension between the various individuals and the party and party hierarchy for there are some of the top party members who equally think it's time to give the youths a chance while others think the youth should wait for their moment to come. This shows that, electioneering is a real cause of division within the party either because some are progressive while other radical; some in support of the women representation and others are in support of the youths while others want the older generation to remain in power.

3) Electioneering as the cause of multiplication of parties in Cameroon

It has been noticed that after every election in Cameroon, the member of parties increases. After the first multiparty elections of 1992 in Cameroon, there was an increase in the number of parties created. In fact, those members of the party who were not happy with the electioneering strategies put in place by the party for the previous elections decided in founding their own political parties with new electioneering strategies targeting new elections with completely a new ideology. The continuous increase in the number of legalised political parties in Cameroon results from discontent in the electioneering out-comes.

The outsiders and members of the civil society equally evaluate the weaknesses of the various political parties with the intention of forming their own political parties with the aim of

improving on the current situation which they are not very comfortable and hope to create their own political party. In other situations, the ruling party will favour the division for the creation of other new parties as a means of destabilising the strong opposition parties as was seen the situation of the NUDP where Smauel Eboi left and created MDP. The situation of SDF where Ben Muna left and created Alliance of Progressive Forces (APF) Kawalla left the SDF and joined Cameroon People's Party (CPP). Electioneering is one of the major factors that brings division within the party for once the opposition parties are weak the better the situation for the ruling party.

III- The challenges and perspectives of political party strategies in elections in Cameroon

The question of elections in Cameroon is a reality which brings out many lessons to be learned. After studying the different electioneering strategies from the reintroduction of multipartism in since 1990 to 2013, a number of challenges have been revealed which the government has to overcome in other to be considered as a democratic country. Some of these challenges concern the political parties and others concern the electoral system.

A- The reorganisation of political parties strategies during parliamentary and presidential elections

The main challenge of the political parties be it the opposition or the ruling party is first of all to have modern organisation and fundamental ideology of the party. This will help as a guideline for the electorate. For instance, we have in the United States of America two lines of thought to guide the electorate, one can support the democrats or the republican's ideology but the current situation in Cameroon wherein there are about three hundred political parties without any clear ideology is confusing. We might say the CPDM is standing for a centralized and indivisible Cameroon, while there is SDF standing for a federal system of government. The population to decide which type of government they want between the ideology of the CPDM and that of the SDF while the ideology of other political parties can only be imagined from the party's name. So there is the absolute need for the various political parties to come out clearly with a political agenda and ideology which can be understood by its members and electorate within a very short period of time.

1) The necessity to adopt modern strategies by the political parties

There is the absolute need to abandon the current strategies of offering food and drinks to the electorate as a means to lobbying for votes once elections are organised as they are very bad strategies. Offering food and drinks to the electorate is just a momentary advantage for after eating the food and taking the drinks nothing will be left behind for the electorate to say the sold or offered their vote for. We therefore recommend that, henceforth, campaigns should be based on ideas that can bring specific changes and transformation of the community, and programs should be presented which can systematically change the society within a given period of time which will finally end up ameliorating the conditions of life of the electorate.

The current campaigns strategies need some modifications to suit the current aspirations of the population and the electorate considering that most of the areas for campaigns are not really accessible especially during the raining seasons. Those involved in political campaigns should start looking on intensifying their campaigns based on the use of the various social Medias like facebook, whatapps, messages, chats groups to meet various communities and present their vision to the communities, if they are voted into power. The politicians have to start and strongly use the private and government radio television for direct face to face debates with their opponents to present their various projects and how the communities for parliamentary elections and the country for the presidential election are going to be managed with each of the candidate having the same time allocation not the current situation where the ruling party is given all the media attention while the opposition parties have very little time or even nothing. If this is done, there is going to be equitable time distribution and fair play to put a stage for real competitive elections as it happens in the western world such as in France and the United States of America.

There existed a number of modern methods which could be employed by viable political parties as propaganda for their political strategies. Besides only putting on party uniform, using party gadgets, moving from house to house to convince electorate to vote for their candidates, the political parties can introduce caravan, bus declaration with party logo, images of their past activities for more field visibility with loud speakers presenting the party activities, projects and ideology to the general population using loud speakers as a means to talk to the mixed electorate, young electorate, and undecided electorate. These can in one way or the other influence the electorate in making a decision based on political party's presentations and perspective for change.

2) The imperative for all political parties to develop a permanent political ideology

There is the absolute need for each and every political party to have a fixed political agenda and directive for its electorate and would be electorate as to what the party ideology stands for. For instance, the SDF stood for Federation but it should be able to say, they are standing for two states or four state federation and not remaining undecided with the pretext that it's the population to decide on the type of federation. Same as the ruling party who are advocating for a unity and decentralised system of government but they have been talking of decentralisation for the past two decades but much is not done to see this dream come true as most of the country's decisions come from one person and from Yaoundé. This means power is still concentrated in Yaoundé and in the hands of a few individuals in spite the fact that the government is advocating for the transfer of power to the councils. This is still on papers and not a reality as the reality on the field.

There is the need for the various political parties in Cameroon to regroup themselves into the following ideologies as an example. They are for socialism, they are for democratic ideology, and they are for republicanism. This is to avoid the situation wherein most of the political parties are just created without any clear indication of their political line of action. If this could be done, the existence of about three hundred political parties in Cameroon can be reduced to about five with specific objectives as to what the politician wants to offer to the electorate and remain accountable for their engagement to the electorate. As such, this is both for the ruling party and the various opposition parties to come out with their clear agenda and vision for the population or to members of his or her community.

3) The obligation of political parties to get out of the tribes

The various political parties have to start reasoning out of the small tribes to start thinking at the national level. Most of the parties concentrate their activities only specific areas like the UPC that concentrated their activities only in the Basa area where they can only succeed in a few seats for the parliamentary elections while the fight for the presidential seat is already a lost battle since their current influence is only at the level of tribe. We see the situation of the CDU party. Its influence is mostly found in the Noun Division where the party has been continuously winning for parliamentary election but at the national level for presidential elections, the influence of the party is not well felt¹⁸. That is why the party has been having very little scores at the presidential elections for there are not well-known.

We see the NUDP concentrating her activities in the Adamawa region. Most of the supporters of the NUDP are former supporters President Amadou Ahidjo. Most of the supporters of NUDP are mostly Muslims and think that through NUDP, they are going to return to power. This explains why most of the Muslims support the NUDP since the head is a founder knowing he is going to be there for the protection their interest. We therefore, recommend for the NUDP to move out of their comfort zone. They have to be looking nationally and should have representatives in all Divisions and Regions of the country in order to have a national representation.

The various political parties should start looking beyond the area of the founder of the party as the influence of the party as seen with the SDF in North West founded by Ni John Fru Ndi, the situation of CDU in Noun headed by its founder Adamou Ndam Njoya, the Basa zones for the Kudock / Urbenlen of the UPC concentration and many other smaller opposition parties that are only known within their tribes of origin. Therefore, for the political parties to think of national intervention or impact, the various political parties should be thinking national and not only concentrating their activities within the strong hold of the party's founder. This reduced the strength of the party to a small area rather than taking the party to the national level. This brings us to the conclusion that since the rebirth of multipartism in Cameroon, there are only three political parties which have moved out of their tribes to the national level being the CPDM for all the various elections from 1992-2013, the SDF from 1992-1997 and the MRC as from 2013 who have been making tremendous efforts to take their party's image from the tribes to the national level else small political parties are only known within their tribes.

B- The reorganisation of the electoral system in Cameroon

Taking into consideration what has been going on in Cameroon since the return of multipartism, it's urgent to reorganise the electoral system of the country. It will necessitate the passing through the adaption and respect of campaigns criteria by the party and the elaboration of new laws. These laws and criteria are going to give more time to the political parties to carry out their campaigns in a more organised manner. In this light, all the actors of elections like the civil society, political parties and the government have to sit and prepare a consensus electoral code.

1) The adoption and respect of general criteria of campaigns in Cameroon

There is need for the Cameroon government or the law makers to review the criteria for fund raising for political parties before and during an election period. The government is against the support of foreign support for political campaigns even if its coming from Cameroonians residing abroad but the same constitution accepts Cameroonians who are residing abroad to participate in the election. The fact is that even within the country, the business magnets cannot openly support the political campaigns of the opposition parties as they do for the ruling party. We frequently see business magnets such as Fotso Victor and Danpoulo opening giving support of a hundred of millions for CPDM fund raising in 2011 presidential election. In return, some of these business magnets get tax breaks but for the business magnets that support the opposition parties openly, most of them risk having their government bills not settled and the cancellation of some contracts. A case in hand is late James Mbanga in the early 1990s for supporting the SDF was punished indirectly by not honouring his bills submitted to the state for payment and the cancellation of his ongoing contracts at the university of Dschang. Therefore, for business persons supporting the ruling party is an honour but for them supporting the opposition party is indirectly treated as a crime and needs some sort of punishment. The ruling party or government refuses the settlement of their bills, cancels some of their contracts and indirectly increases their taxes without any justification for supporting the opposition's party. This is not fair and needs re-adjustments for all the parties to be at the same level ground for the competition.

There is need for the government to formerly give access for the Cameroonians overseas who are willing to vote to be able to equally support the political parties of their choice. Financially for it shall be a means for Cameroonians abroad to be able to contribute to the growth of democracy back home both morally and financially. We think the government should be clear on the amount of money to be spent for campaigns. Is there need to put a limit on the amount a political party or an individual can spend for campaign.

The Cameroon constitution previews some financial support for political parties participating in elections before election depending on their previous scores and after the elections depending on the party's output at the elections. The campaign subventions which are supposed to be given to the opposition parties before the elections is hardly given for fear that such amounts will be used in fighting the ruling party. Therefore, such amounts were given to the opposition parties only after the election. This is not proper for money which would have been used for campaigns is given to the parties' months after the declaration of results which means the money is now used for other purposes instead of the campaign previewed. Other opposition parties justify by saying they borrowed money for campaigns and so the government needs to pay it back. We can therefore conclude that, the only time such money was given to political parties in advance was for the initial multiparty parliamentary elections of 1992 where the NUDP received their subvention earlier for the government was fighting for credibility with the participation of some political parties to justify to the international community and national media that the parliamentary elections were participated in by some major political parties and not only the ruling party as some of the parties like the SDF and CDU decided to boycott asking for better election conditions.

Once elections are going on, we see the ruling party occupying very large public space with their posters at the entrance in most of the towns and on public notice spaces. We even see situations where the opposition posters are removed and replaced with those of the CPDM. We therefore think, the government needs to regularise the management of public space for posters by all the participating political parties for any of the elections be it parliamentary or presidential. We have equally noticed the domineering position of the ruling party on the state media for their campaigns both on the CRTV television and radio whereas the opposition political parties are given only restricted space over the national CRTV television and radio. It is not acceptable for all the parties need votes and should be given equal opportunities. Finally, we think the political parties should be given the right to publish the results collected from the field as a matter of information to their supporters while waiting for the final publication which should be coming from those organising elections and not that elections are organised by ELECAM but the results are published by the supreme court or the constitutional council for presidential elections which is not fair for we think he who is organising elections should be given the possibility to declare elections.

2) The need for sufficient time for political parties for their campaigns

It is important for the government to attribute one month for campaigns taking into consideration the various means of transportation which are not very accessible. In fact, the government previews two weeks for election campaigns in Cameroon which we think is not enough for any political party to make a round trip for political campaigns even if the political party is concentrating only at the Divisional and Regional headquarters. The fact is road transportation in Cameroon is not quite accessible especially in the rainy season. The air transport is not very accessible for flights are only available to Yaoundé, Douala, Ngoundere and Maroua which means out of the ten regions in Cameroon only four are accessible by fight and equally very expensive. This makes it impossible for the political parties to afford making inclusive for the ruling party. We are therefore saying that two weeks previewed by the law is not enough time to visit the ten regional headquarters and forty-eight Divisional headquarters for their political campaigns. We think should the government increase the campaign period from two weeks to one month, at least this is going to enable the willing and capable political parties and politicians to easily and calmly move around Cameroon presenting their activities and projects to the voters. They need to explain why their party and their candidate is the best to manage the activities of the state.

3) The Adoption of a Consensus Electoral Code

To get an election that is acceptable by all the partners, there is the absolute need to get an electoral code which is accepted by all the actors of geo-politics in Cameroon. This is because since the reintroduction of multipartism, the major opposition parties have been regularly criticising the electoral code and requesting the need for an independent electoral commission as has been the cry of the SDF and CDU that have boycotted similar elections, requesting for electoral reforms. It is important to adopt that the organ organising election from the registration of voters to counting of votes should be the same organ declaring or proclaiming the results of elections be it for presidential or legislative elections in Cameroon. Finally, all efforts should be made to see that the various actors involved in an election play the part for which they are meant such as the administration and the forces of law and order are supposed to be neutral but in most cases as reported by the opposition parties, the elections organising bodies, the administration and the forces of law and order are seen playing but the role of supporters of the ruling party instead of that of a neutral player for all the political parties. We think a consensus code should be established making each of the actors or partners of the elections to play nothing but the rule for which he or she is supposed to play in order to guarantee free and fair elections in Cameroon be it for legislative or presidential elections.

It should be noted that the population to decide who represents them be it for legislative or presidential elections. We think Cameroon does not have the maturity to go in for indirect voting taking into consideration the corrupt nature of the country. Looking at the senatorial election of 2013 in which the SDF has a majority of the electorate and still loses elections in the North West Region. The NUDP had 40% of the councilors and lost to the SDF who had no councilors and the similar situation occurred in the Western Region where the CDU had more councilors than the SDF and lost the elections to the SDF. This is to say, the indirect elections are not really based on party lines but on some other instructions or through the use of corrupt strategist which is while we are thinking Cameroon is not yet ready for an indirect system of election as we are proposing a scenario where the population is voting for all elective positions with the principle of one person one vote. We therefore conclude by saying that the system of wining through a simple majority means some of the elected officials does not have the majority support of the electorate. Therefore, we are submitting there should be two rounds of elections, so that the winner of an election should have above 50% of the electorate in support of the party or the candidate.

C- The perspectives

At the end of this historical study concerning elections strategies in Cameroon, it's necessary to give some perspectives concerning the future of elections in Cameroon. These projections concerning the biometric system, the voting age and the call for two rounds for parliamentary and presidential elections could help in advancing the young democracy of Cameroon. This is to make sure any elected official of Cameroon should be sure he or she is representing at least above the view of 50% of the electorate either through an alliance or a two round of elections and not just allowing elected officials to be winning just by simple majority. Same in view of the various theories we have taken into consideration for this study, we a delighted to propose the theory of vote lobbying for the Cameroon context as explain below;

The theory of vote lobbying

This theory is initiated and developed by Sama David Ngoh, those to be elected and those aspiring to be elected start involving themselves in the development of their community, this is a means to make the community understand if he or she is given power, many more developmental projects can be lobby and brought to the community. The start by lobbying and bringing water, electricity, hospital and schools especially to his or her areas of origin from the government or other donnors. A host of many CPDM elite are very convensant with this concept. If they are already members of government, they will make all their efforts legally or illegally to see that a number of sons and daughters of the soil are apported to government positions. The followers and supporters of those appointed are going to vote for them whenever they are participating in an election, Achidi Achu says "You stratch my back I stratch your own" a means to have the support of the electorate once its election time. So, he and many others made sure a number of elite from his area of influence are appointed to government positions of responsibilities. Who later become their campaign agents during period of elections. In preparation to participate in an election, the various individuals if not already members of a political party, they start by involving themselves into a political party of their choice or start by criticising the leadership or the opponent political party or by making statements in support of the activities of the ruling party. "Zero mort" during the student revolt as submitted by Koncho Kommengne, A number of government official telling open lies even if they know what they are saying is complete lies but the objective is to support the leader of the CPDM and the CPDM party. The theory of vote lobbying is that, to be elected or to participate in politics is not done overnigh. A number of arrangements are made before the election its self be it within the opposition or the ruling party.

1) The putting in place of a biometric and electronic electoral system in Cameroon

Since the reintroduction of multipartism in Cameroon, after the declaration of each of the results be it for the legislative or presidential elections, the loser in most cases is the opposition parties for all the four organised presidential elections and for the six legislative elections. The main opposition parties have been crying fraud and attributing it mostly to the bad electoral system. We are therefore proposing a solution with some of the following means like putting in place a biometric and electronic electoral system as an objective of protecting the vote of the population. The results are counted and declared as such to avoid any argument after the declaration of the results by the election organising organ. This means of biometric system and electoral electronic system is going to automatically fight against any system of minor fraud like double registration, counting mistakes and to ensure a system of transparency for the voters and the various political parties. Such a system is going to permit Cameroonians to participate in voting from any part of the country for the presidential elections without stress as opposed to the current situation wherein the electorate is obliged to be physically present where they were registered in order to have the possibility to vote. We therefore, think that, with the putting in place of a biometric and electronic voting system, this is going to facilitate the issue of single ballot which will be profitable even to the state in terms of financial expenses for election organisation plus the confidence of the

electorate and political parties will have upon the declaration of results. This is going to solve the various difficulties and post violence which always occurred in Cameroon after the declaration of results be it legislative or presidential elections in some parts of the country especially at the head quarters of the opposition political parties which have always been attributing their losing of an election to fraud and not believing the ruling party might be having the best political party strategies.

2) The reduction of the voting age from 20 to 18 years

The masses and active population in Cameroon is between the ages of 18 to 22 years, therefore there is the need for the voting age to be reduced from 20 years to 18 years as a means to increase the voting population of Cameroon. The fact is that, it's not normal for an estimated population of Cameroon of twenty-five million inhabitants to have only six million voters. The irony is that at the age of eighteen years in Cameroon, he or she has the right to join and militante, in a professional school but is not given the basic rights to vote. This is not normal and needs the law makers to address such an issue which will inturn increase the voting population of Cameroon as submitted by the main opposition political parties over the years. We do think, accepting the youths to start voting at eighteen years is giving them a sense of responsibility in deciding who is managing the affairs of the state rather than discouraging them in the political life of the nation by refusing them the right to vote and once the year goes by some of them will loose interest in even participating in voting. We therefore think, the government is keeping the voting age at twenty years to have those voting to be reasonable in the light of the old politicians who have been in power for decades. The youths are more radical and need change while the older voters are more conservative.

3) Encouraging direct voting and election with two rounds

In conclusion, it should be the population to decide who represents them be it for legislative or presidential elections. We think Cameroon does not have the maturity to go in for indirect voting taking into consideration the corrupt nature of the country. Looking at the senatorial election of 2013 in which the SDF has a majority of the electorate and still loses elections in the North West Region. The NUDP had 40% of the councilors and lost to the SDF who had no councilors and the similar situation occurred in the Western Region where the CDU had more councilors than the

SDF and lost the elections to the SDF. This is to say, the indirect elections are not really based on party lines but on some other instructions or through the use of corrupt strategist which is while we are thinking Cameroon is not yet ready for an indirect system of election as we are proposing a scenario where the population is voting for all elective positions with the principle of one person one vote. We therefore conclude by saying that the system of wining through a simple majority means some of the elected officials does not have the majority support of the electorate. Therefore, we are submitting there should be two rounds of elections, so that the winner of an election should have abover 50% of the electorate in support of the party or the candidate.

Conclusion

The chpater analysed the appreciation of different strategies and their impact on political parties and political life of Cameroon which is concentrated on the positive and negative points of political parties strategies. It equally evaluated the weaknesses of the opposition political parties during the process of election. It also showed how electioneering is one of the main causes of division in political parties. This chapter equally focused on the imperativeness of any political party to develop a permenent ideology like in great democracy. Its closes by the proposition of the theory of vote lobbying, recommendations to enforce the democratic systems in Cameroon and conclusion for further research areas such as Municipal and Regional elections.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The study began with a general introduction which highlighted key elements that provided an indepth understanding of the subject matter. The general introduction provided an orientation of the interest of the study and previewed a framework of the central argument. The general introduction traced the background of political evolution in Cameroon, followed by an explanation of key reasons for choice of the topic and highlighting the relevance of the study. It also provided a definition of key concepts which further substantiated the study. It provided a delimitation of the study by setting the geographical, thematic and diachronic scope. It further elucidated some theories which better explained the study in theoretical context. It situated the key objectives of the study which remained a major guide for the study. An extensive literature review of previous works was explored in order to provide a base for the present study. The substantial literature review did not only provoke the present study but certified its scientific originality by exposing the research problem. The general introduction stated a research question after a lucid exploration of the problem statement. It scrutinised the significance of the study and how it is of relevance to policy making and future research endeavours. It prescribed the methodology and sources consulted in the process of realizing the study taking into consideration the ethics of research. Basically, the study was divided into six main chapters. Each chapter began with an introduction and end with a brief conclusion that aimed at maintaining the internal logic between the chapters.

Chapter one presented the return of multipartism in Cameroon and the presentation of major political parties since 1990. It examined the main factors that influenced the emergence of multiparty politics in Cameroon. An attempt was also been made to present the major political parties in Cameroon since 1990 and social situation during the inception of multipartism in Cameroon.

Chapter two handled the strategies developed by political parties before elections. These strategies were developed for the the parliamentary, presidential and senatorial elections from 1990 to 2013. It analysed how the various political parties prepared themselves for the various competitive elections. The discussion and appreciation of electoral law by the political parties was one of the main ideas developed.

Chapter three dwelled on the electioneering strategies of political parties for the presidential election. It handles the presidential electioneering of 1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011. It compared the strategies developed by the ruling party with the other political parties. One of the main objectives of this chapter was to analyse how the strategies put in place by the ruling party explains it continuous victories since the presidential election of 1992 to 2011. It also brought out the common strategies of all the political parties and the specificity position of each of them.

Chapter four explored electioneering strategies of political parties for parliamentary election starting from 1992 to 2013. In this chapter, we developed the national strategies adopted

by political parties for the local election and appreciate local candidates' strategies of each party. The chapter proceeded to bring out the reason which justifies the necessity of local strategies and how they influence the issue of elections.

Chapter five delved into the attitudes and reactions of political parties from voting to declaration of definitive results. At times the attitudes always resulted in either peace or violence depending if the political party is the winner or the loser of the said elections. It told us why the political parties always adopt the position of claiming victory prior to the declaration of results by the competent elections institutions. This chapter equally evaluated the different petitions submitted by the various political parties after the proclamation of definitive results.

Chapter six titled the appreciation of different strategies and their impact on political parties and political life of Cameroon concentrated on the positive and negative points of political parties strategies. It equally elucidated the weaknesses of the opposition political parties during the process of election. It also demonstrated how electioneering is one of the main causes of division in political parties. This segment also focused on the imperativeness of any political party to develop a permenent ideology like in great democracy.

The analysis of the problematic was based on four theories which are: The Theory of collective action, The Theory of Electoral Sociology, The Theory of public choice and the Theory of rational electors. These theories helped us to show and explain how the preparation of elections in Cameroon are done and, why there is significant differences between parliamentary and presidential competitions. Furthmore, the theories explained why the process of elections in Cameroon are different from the other African countries and it equally help us to understand that, what justifies the winning or losing of an election by political parties during the different elections in Cameroon since the return of multipartism. In addition, the application of theories in facts analysises shows that, all the elections competitions in Cameroon have its own specificity, like the slogans of various parties during election. Nevertheless, the theories have some weaknesses because there are not able to explain why the ambition of opposition political parties to fight against fraud after the election have not succeeded from 1992 to 2013. Although the opposition political parties are putting all their energies and developing new strategies, they have not succeeded in winning the majority in parliament or to challenge the CPDM candidate for

presidential elections. This brought us to the conclustion different electors, reacted differently in various areas for the same elections with the same strategies put in place, humanity will reason and react differently. The fact, is that what might make electors decide in giving their votes for a particular candidate in Bamenda is different from what the electors in Bafoussam or in another city will be expecting. Therefore, the various theories mentioned above have in one way or the other influenced the choice of the electors for both the parliamentary and presidential elections. We can as well conclude the proposed theory developed by the author "The theory of vote lobbying" works squarely in Cameroon elections context for both the parliamentary and presidential elections.

The question of election strategies and electioneering in Cameroon is old and problematic. There are unanswered questions and doubts in the minds of the electorate and the politicians. Since the colonial periods both in French and British Cameroon, political parties and candidates developed strategies to win an election. It should be noted, after the proclamation of the independences of the two Cameroons, being 1960 for Eastern Cameroun and 1961 for Western Cameroon. They have both continued to observe the development of election strategies of political parties up till 1966. This is when President Ahamadou Ahidjo decided to unified all the exiting political parties to form a unique party called Cameroon National Union and it became the single party for all Cameroonians. As a matter of fact, the political activities in Cameroon from 1966 when multipartism was stopped to 1990 where there was mounted pressure for multipartism, the political activities in Cameroon were dominated only by one party system. In such a situation it was the end of multipartism and election strategies during elections in Cameroon.

In favour of the rebirth of multipartism in Cameroon in the early 1990s, many issues changed concerning elections in Cameroon as there was the institution of competition in the minds of the electorate and those to be elected. The creation of many political parties as from the 1990 and the imposition of pluralism by the actors of the civil society and the politician brought a drastically change in the political life of Cameroon. This led to the development of new political parties' strategies by politicians. This pushed the opposition politicians to convince electors to vote for them or their party in any upcoming elections. The strategies adopted by all political parties in activities in Cameroon for the parliamentary and presidential elections, the putting in place, before, during and after an election as a means of convincing the electorate.

Generally, in presidential elections, some political parties adopt national strategies in their efforts to convince the electorate in order to be victorious in an election. As regards the parliamentary or legislative elections, their strategies depend on the type of candidate presented for the election and the area of the election. At times, there are common strategies for the presidential and legislative elections as well for some of the elections different strategies used.

After, the analysis of major strategies of political parties of Cameroon parliamentary and presidential elections, it brought out the results that:

The development and the multiplication of electioneering strategies by political parties in Cameroon from 1990-2013 is the consequences of the rebirth of multiparism in the country in the year 1990. In the same light, we can affirm that, in Cameroon since 1990, in all the parliamentary and presidential elections, all the political parties in competition used both conventional and unconventional strategies in an election where ever its possible. The ruling party CPDM employs most of the illegal strategies while the opposition political parties, do not have as much possibilities to apply the illegal strategies in winning an election.

Lastly, it's certain that one of the most important strategies used by political parties during the election processes is based on the management of the period between the proclamation of the results and after the elections declaration. The issue here is that, hardly do we find either the opposition or the ruling party going to campaign at the strong hold of its opponent. We can consider the South for the strong hold of the ruling party and Bamenda the seat of the SDF being the main opposition party in Cameroon. We have hardly seen the Presidential candidate of the ruling party coming for campaign. Same we see the SDF concentrating most of its rallies in its area of their strong supporters like in the North West, West and Littoral. On the other hand, the ruling party candidate especially for the presidential election is hardly seen on the field campaigning as some times, we see President Paul Biya campaigning in the Far North of Cameroon where he already had the support of most of the electorate. Instead of the ruling party candidate going to campaign in the North West or West which are the heart of the opposition parties, they concentrated campaigning in other regions for their interest is not based on field campaigns. But on strategies developed by the political party is something else. The ruling party is basing its final strategy on the help they are going to receive from those organising election who are equally appointed by the government to make sure the CPDM is voted into power or waiting on the declaration of the Supreme Court pronouncing CPDM to be winner irrespective of the results. This was evident when a Supreme Court judge declared Paul Biya winner of the 1992 presidential election with the remarks his hands were tied. In this case the judge was already instructed to make everything to see the CPDM candidate victorious. On the other hand, members of the opposition political parties have as a major strategy to call on its militant and supporters to move in their number on the street to agitate against the rigging of the CPDM, we can conclude that both the ruling party and the major opposition parties have an immediate strategy surrounding the results proclamation. In most times ended in street demonstration from the opposition. Opposition fans take to the streets as a means to portray their dissatisfaction with the conduct of the election to the declaration of definitive results. The ruling party makes all efforts to see that the declaration of CPDM as winner was maintained irrespective of the consequences as to whether they have enough votes or not to win an election.

Finally, we have found out that the election strategies developed by the various political parties in different parliamentary and presidential elections are very instrumental in distinguishing the vector from the vanquished. Besides, the division within political parties and the crossing of carpets also emanate from discontent of some party member following poor management of strategies of the party. Some disappointed party members proceed to the formation of their own parties. This explains the proliferation of political parties, especially after the declaration of definitive results. All in all, after the appreciation of all the strategies put in place by the different political parties, we concluded that, the various political parties used both conventional and unconventional strategies during elections.

The question of electioneering and elections in Cameroon is not only mostly discussed at parliamentary and presidential levels but also on the municipal and regional elections. As a matter of fact, the last two elections are not yet researched at the national level in general and concerning the strategies developed for these elections in particular. The historians should be interested in the question to understand why and how leaders are elected at the aforementioned levels and why people decide to vote for a candidate on the platform of a particular party. It's also important to study particular strategies of political parties, taking individually to understand the aims and the finality of their strategies. Its closed by the proposition of the theory of vote lobbying, recommendations to enforce the democratic systems in Cameroon and conclusion for further research areas such as Municipal and Regional elections.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Interview Guides

These questionnaires are established in the process for a Historical Research in History on the subject:

"Election strategies of major political parties for parliamentary and presidential competitions in Cameroon 1990-2013"

Name of student: David Ngoh Sama

NB: The information collected in the course of this interview or research work will only be used for this academic work.

Name of informant		age	•••
Status or function	place	date	

A. General questions for all the groups

- 1) What do you understand by the return of multipartism in Cameroon in the 90s?
- 2) What was the role of the civil society during this period of multipartism?
- 3) What is the role of political activist and the President of the Republic?
- 4) Can you appreciate the social situation of Cameroon during the restoration of multiparty?
- 5) According to you, what is an electoral code?
- 6) What can make a political party's strategy good or bad during an election?
- 7) Can you state some electoral strategies developed by some political parties that you know?
- 8) In your own view, how can you explain the omnipotence of CPDM and drop-down of opposition parties since the return of pluralism?
- 9) How can a campaign influence the choice of your vote and possibly the other electorates?
- 10) Can you appreciate the altitudes and reaction of political parties after the proclamation of the definitive results?
- 11) Which political party is well organized in Cameroon after CPDM?
- 12) Can we say that the different organs responsible for election organization since 1992 are free and independent or transparent?
- 13) What do you think the opposition parties in Cameroon can do in order to win an election?

14) How many times have you participated in an election and what has been influencing your vote?

B) Specific Questions for Administration

15) What is the role of administration and civil servants during an election?

16) Concerning the elections of 1991 and 1992, what was the role played by MINAT?

17) People and political parties of oppositions accusing MINAT and administrative authority for complexity with the ruling party, what can you say about this view from the opposition party?

18) Why does the ruling party have with ease and authorization for the organization of a rally? Likewiseit's very difficult for an opposition party to obtain an authorization for a rally?

19) Do you think the election game is free and equal for all the participating parties?

20) According to you, explains what is the leadership of CPDM and the role of opposition party in an election?

21) In your area, what is the main popular political party?

22) As an administrator, can you outline to us your major political party strategies?

23) In your area of command, which of the election is very competitive the parliamentary orpresidential elections? Why?

24) What is the relationship between administration and the organs of organizing elections?

25) Since the returned of multi-partism, do you think we can talk of opposition political party in Cameroon? If yes or no why?

26) According to your experience sincerely, is there sometimes intentional fraud taking place during elections in Cameroon?

If yes! Who are responsible for the fraud? That is from 1990-2013

B) Opposition parties

What is the origin and ideology of your party?

16) What is the role played by your party during the returned of multipartism?

17) What is the relationship between opposition party in Cameroon and your party with other opposition parties and which parties in particular?

18) How do you select your candidates for an election in your parties?

19) Who developed the campaign strategies in your party (is it done by the party or candidate)?

20) Can you state and explain the different strategies developed by your party during the various elections?

21) What are the party's mechanism to raise funds for an election?

22) Why do you change strategies from one election to another or are the strategies the same?

23) Do you really think the electoral law is equal for all political parties?

24) According to you, are organs of election organizations are independent of bias?

25) What do you think is the relationshipbetween CPDM, MINATD, ONEL and ELECAM. Approval or Disapproval of this work?

26) Your electioneering strategies, is it the same for national and local elections? I mean for Parliamentary and Presidential elections?

27) At the end of all elections, what is your opinion after the declaration of definitive results?

28) Can you appreciate the strategies of other political parties? Be it legal and illegal strategies?

29) What explain the regression of your party in all the organized elections from 1991 till 2018?

30) What are the impacts of election strategies of your political party and the political life of Cameroon?

31) What is the relationship between the opposition political party, MINAT, ONEL and ELECAM?

Follow up depending on the reaction of the informant

C) CPDM

What is the ideology of your party from creation to date?

16) What is the role of the administration in the organization of elections in the early 90s to 2018?

17) Can you give us the role played by your party during the reborn of multipartism in Cameroon?

18) What are the impacts of the return of multiparty in your party?

19) What can you say about the mechanism of selection of candidates in your party since 1991?

20) What are the relationship between your party and other political parties?

21) Other political parties claim that, the electoral law and organizing body of election are in favour of your party? What is your opinion about this claim?

22) The three organizing bodies since 1991 are directed by former members of CPDM. According to this image, do you think, they can be objectives or that they can organize any credible election?

23) Which are the various origin of the funds of your party?

24) How do you concise and apply your party strategies during national and local elections?

25) Before the proclamation of elections results, what is the attitude of your party?

26) After results, when other parties are accusing for fraud, what is your party's reaction?

27) How do you appreciate the opposition political strategies in Cameroon?

28) Do you think, the strategies developed by a party can influence election results? Why?

29) What are the impacts of political strategies on your party and on the political life in Cameroon in general?

30) What is the relationship between church and media in reference to politics in Cameroon?Follow up depending on the reaction of the informant

D) Civil society and political activist

Why did the civil society decided to be interested in political activities in Cameroon?

16) Please can you brief us on the role of civil society during the return of multiparty in Cameroon?

17) Who are the main figures / individuals fighting for the return of multiparty?

18) Can you site us the major political parties in Cameroon since 1990 till date?

19) How do you appreciate the mechanism used by political parties for the selection of their candidates since 1992?

20) What are the influence of the civil society on the political parties in Cameroon?

21) What was the role played by international communities during the reborn of multiparty?

22) According to you, is the Cameroonian electoral code clear and equal to all the parties?

28) What are your views of the different strategies developed by the different political parties in other to win elections?

29) Which of the political party strategies are well concise and applicable according to you?

30) Do you think successive organs of organizing elections are transparent?

31) What can you say of the relationship of CPDM and organs of election organizers?

32) Do you think, the opposition failure in all elections is because of the lack of good election strategies? Why?

33) How are these impacts of elections strategies impacted on political parties and political life in Cameroon?

34) What is the relationship between the civil society and the Catholic Church?

35) What is the influence of the social media in politics?

Follow up depending on the reaction of the informant

E) Question for Militancy.

- 1. Why do you choose to be a militant of your party?
- 2. How do you appreciate the mechanism of the choice of candidate of your party any of the elections?
- 3. When you are voting are you voting for the candidate or the political party?
- 4. Can you change your vote because of the attitude of the members of your party?
- 5. How do you contribute to the victory of your party during an election?
- 6. During campaign of your party do you think that candidate and political organs take into consideration the idea of militancy?
- 7. The strategies put in place after the choice of candidate do, they take into consideration the militancy point of view.
- 8. When there is an election, which attitude do you adopt with the other political parties and organs organizing elections?
- 9. In times of campaigns, if the strategies are against your interest, can you change the strategy because you are a candidate?
- 10. In the presidential and parliamentary elections, candidates do not have the same status, do you think the status does influence the party strategies
- 11. Since the return of multiparty in Cameroon, we have the same candidate in the same party for the presidential elections. How do you appreciate the situation?
- 12. According to your opinion, do you think the change of candidate can have an impact in the victory or losing an elections?

- 13. How does the media and Catholic Church influence politics in Cameroon?
- 14. Follow up depending on the reaction of the informant

F) Nonvoters / Absenteeism and those who refused voting if possible

- 1. What is motivating your position in an election?
- 2. In your situation, do you think, it has an impact on elections?
- 3. Are you register on electoral list and why?
- 4. If the political laws are modified are you ready to participate in an election?
- 5. Are you aware refusing to vote you are not contributing to choose those who will rule your society?
- 6. As an outside observer do you think that strategies developed by political parties influence the results of elections?
- 7. There are three organs that have been organizing elections in Cameroon for the past decades, in your opinion which of these organizing bodies is the best?
- 8. Do you think in the current situation in Cameroon an opposition party can win an election organize by ELECAM?
- 9. Do you know it's a civil obligation in Cameroon for a citizen to register and vote in an election?
- 10. When political parties are developing their strategies, do they ask the electorates to vote for one or the other candidate?
- 11. The elections mechanisms in Cameroon include the absenteeism and non-voters how do you personally appreciate the situation?
- 12. If you are chance to advise political parties in their elections strategies what will you say?
- 13. Follow up depending on the reaction of the informant.

Thaks for your contribution for the development of sciences and the archivement of this research

Appendix 2: Attestation of Research

FORMATION DOCTORALE EN SCIENCES HUMAINES ET SOCIALES ********** B.P. : 755/YAOUNDÉ Tél /Fax (237) 222 00 97 18



Ref N°. 7 8.0. 18.1./ Dept-Hist

ATTESTATION DE RECHERCHE

Je soussigné, **Professeur Philippe Blaise ESSOMBA**, Chef de Département d'Histoire à l'Université de Yaoundé I (FALSH), certifie que Monsieur SAMA David NGOH, matricule 95U226, est inscrit en cycle de DOCTORAT / Ph.D de l'année académique 2016/2017 et poursuit actuellement un travail de recherche sur le thème suivant: « *Les stratégies des majeurs partis politiques dans les élections parlementaires et présidentielles au Cameroun 1990-*2013.», sous la co-direction du Pr. KOUFAN MENKENE Jean (Maitre de Conférences) et du Dr. NGAM Confidence (Charge de Cours).

Nous le recommandons aux responsables des centres de documentation, archives et toutes institutions de recherches nationales ou internationales, en vue de lui faciliter la recherche.

En foi de quoi, la présente attestation lui est délivrée pour servir et valoir ce que de droit. /. **30 MAI 2017**.....

Fait à Yaounde, le contraction de la contraction



Appendix 3: Journalist view of thinking the presidential election of 2011 will be postpone

Source: Collected from the paper publisher in Bamenda

Thehome of Ship Captain, news of his death had spread in a dirty deal. He ages Essomba, in the like wild fire in harmattan. No the way he way

By New Valentine with field notes

esidential quarters near Unity

revolt against Biya if he declares Officer of the Presidential Guard

Commits Suicide

bathe would invite diplomatic sanctions on his limping economy depending on international communities for survival.





Appendix 4: Minister's sack and jail for fraud

Source: Authors collection

Appendix 5: SDF members decamp to CPDM and awarded financially



Source: Collection from news paper publisher

Appendix 6: Minister call for massive registration Advertori

Minister Calls for Massive Registration ahead of twin elections

<section-header><text><text><text><text> Atanga expressed hopes that the votes may rise to over twenty thousands given the

wenty thousands given the worth of the party epitomized by the Head of State's granting of the University, tarring of the Ring Road, appointment of Philemon Yang as PM and sons and Appointment of Philemon Yang as PM and sons and daughters to prestigious government offices amongst others sons and daughters of the region.

The Minister told the population that ever since the Head of State visited North West, much attention is being given to the Region, reasons why "we must continue to rebuild the confidence in the Head of State President Paul Biya. "He has given us quite enough and is incumbent us to continue to rally behind him and appreciate his love of the Region by voting massively for the CPDM in the upcoming election"

The Minister also made a retrospect of the 1990 92 politics. In those years it was a taboo wearing CPDM uniform as user was prone to attack by SDF togs.

It was not until 2007 when he Atanga made a triumphant entry into North West politics and demystified SDF myth by challenging Fru Ndi the political barbarism of the SDF at the time. The bold step he took weakened the

SDF and enshrines a new political culture in North West. SDF since then, ceased from being a near religion and people no longer dread the party and the national chair party and the national chair man John Fru Ndi now known within the press (John Ntarikon). Who was a near prophet in the early nineties'

Militants exhorted to be fishers of men and propagate the philosophy of the CPDM in order for people to understand the worth of belonging to the ruling party.

Minister Atanga said that SDF has nothing to offer to North West. On this premise he exhorted the population not to repeat the mistakes of the past that stagnated the development of the region for decades.

To support argument of belonging to the ruling and winning party to reap the harvest, Atanga attributed the choice of the North West for the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Armed Forces to the dramatic political twist of 2007 that ushered in nine CPDM Parliamentarians against eleven for SDF and 18 CPDM cound

change he went on are the creation of the State University and other giant development projects ceded to the Region by the Head of


Haven learned from past mistakes, Minister Atanga Nji enjoined all the and vote for the CPDM party and Paul Biya guarantor of the development of the North West and the entire Republic.

population that North West and Bamenda in particular is the birth place of the CPDM and is incumbent on North West to remain loyal to the State and thank Biya for holding the Region in very

Better ask yourself what you have done to the state, not what the state has done to

The atmosphere was further eleventh by the FCFA relinquish to militants to

Source: Author collection from news paper publisher



His Excellency Atanga Nji



Appendix 7: Reason why people want the president to quit

Source: Author collection from news paper publisher



Appendix 8: CPDM campaign images for Senetorial election

Source: Author collection from CPDM Secretariat in Bafoussam



Appendix 9: Two types of CPDM membership cards

Source: Archives of CPDM regional secretariat in Bafoussam

Appendix 10: SDF membership cards



HEMBO Gent THEFT ou OU2 1991 pert-comptable 1992 1993 1994 1995 PL 1994 HENRO SON TAL DRAFTS KATTS FRONT Name : DEMONRACY . JUNTLE . DOVELOUMENT BAtouza-Bangou Residence : _ Domicile MEMBERSHIP CARD este-Cor Profession : 12 CARTE DE MEMBRE Nº 66880 DISSO Ward : A Cellule Electoral district : --- Property Circonscription électorale Aon **Division** : Division : _ Département Province : _ TH 1994 Date of membership : _ Date d'adhésion au parti FRONT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIQUE 93 Date : ____ DEMOCRATIE - JUSTICE - DE VELOPPEMENT Treasurer Member National chairman IN BATHIN ; 1/00 Membre Trésorier Président national 150 F

Source: Collected from SDF militant Mr. Chembo Leorpond During an interview in Bafoussam

Appendix 11: Honourable Enwi Francis Abi of Momo East on Vanguard



Source: Collected from the archives of the Vangaurd in Bamenda during an informant with the publisher of Vangaurd

Appendix 12: loi n° 2000/016 du 19 decembre 2000 portant creation d'un observatoire national des elections

LOI N° 2000/016 DU 19 DECEMBRE 2000 PORTANT CREATION D'UN OBSERVATOIRE NATIONAL DES ELECTIONS

L'Assemblée Nationale a délibéré et adopté,

Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit :

ARTICLE 1er : Il est institué une structure indépendante chargée de la supervision et du contrôle des opérations électorales et référendaires, dénommée Observatoire National des Elections (ONEL).

ARTICLE 2 : La mission de l'ONEL est de contribuer à faire respecter la loi électorale de manière à assurer la régularité, l'impartialité, l'objectivité, la transparence et la sincérité des scrutins, en garantissant aux électeurs, ainsi qu'aux candidats en présence, le libre exercice de leurs droits.

ARTICLE 3 :

1) L'ONEL est mis en place en année électorale dès le début du processus électoral. Il comprend onze (11) membres nommés par décret du Président de la République.

2) Son mandat prend fin dès que le processus électoral est arrivé à son terme.

3) Les membres de l'ONEL sont choisis parmi les personnalités indépendantes de nationalité camerounaise, connues pour leur intégrité morale, leur honnêteté intellectuelle, leur neutralité et leur impartialité. Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ils ne doivent solliciter ni recevoir d'instructions ou d'ordre d'aucune autorité publique ou privée.

4) Les membres de l'ONEL prêtent serment devant l'Assemblée Plénière de la Cour Suprême avant leur entrée en fonction. 5) L'ONEL est dirigé par un Président assisté d'un Vice-Président nommé parmi ses membres, par décret du Président de la République.

ARTICLE 4 :

1) Il ne peut être mis fin, avant l'expiration de leur mandat, aux fonctions des membres de l'ONEL que pour incapacité physique après avis conforme de l'ONEL ou sur leur demande.

2) L'empêchement temporaire d'un membre est constaté par l'ONEL. Si cet empêchement se prolonge au-delà d'une durée de trente (30) jours, il est mis fin aux fonctions de l'intéressé dans les conditions prévues au premier alinéa.

3) Le membre nommé pour remplacer le membre de l'ONEL dont le poste est devenu vacant, achève le mandat de celui-ci.

ARTICLE 5 : Ne peuvent être nommés membres de l'ONEL :

- les Membres du Gouvernement et Assimilés ;

- les magistrats en activité ;

- les Secrétaires Généraux de Ministères et assimilés ;

- les Directeurs Généraux des établissements publics et des entreprises du secteur public et parapublic ;

- les Directeurs d'administration centrale et assimilés ;

- les personnes exerçant un mandat électif national, régional ou local ;

- les Gouverneurs, les préfets et leurs adjoints, les sous-préfets et leurs adjoints, les Chefs de district en activité ou à la retraite depuis moins de trois (3) ans ;

- les Chefs traditionnels ;

- les Responsables et personnels des forces de maintien de l'ordre en activité ;

- les personnes inéligibles ou frappées d'incapacités électorales ;

- les candidats aux élections contrôlées par l'ONEL ;

- les parents jusqu'au deuxième degré des candidats à la Présidence de la République ;

- les membres d'un groupe de soutien à un parti, à une liste de candidats ou à un candidat.

ARTICLE 6 : Les attributions de l'ONEL sont les suivantes :

1) Il supervise et contrôle la gestion du fichier électoral ;

2) Il supervise et contrôle le fonctionnement des commissions mixtes chargées de l'établissement et de la révision des listes électorales ;

3) Il supervise et contrôle les opérations d'établissement, de conservation et de révision des listes électorales ;

4) Il supervise et contrôle l'impression des documents électoraux ;

5) Il supervise et contrôle le fonctionnement des commissions mixtes chargées du contrôle de l'établissement et de la distribution des cartes électorales ;

6) Il supervise et contrôle les opérations de distribution des cartes électorales ;

7) Il connaît de toutes les réclamations ou contestations concernant les listes et les cartes électorales non réglées par les commissions de supervision compétentes ;

8) Il ordonne des rectifications rendues nécessaires à la suite de l'examen, par lui, des réclamations ou contestations dirigées contre les actes de l'autorité administrative ou des commissions mixtes électorales concernant les listes et les cartes électorales ; 9) Il connaît des contestations et des réclamations portant sur les candidatures et le comportement des candidats ou de leurs représentants en période électorale non réglées par les commissions de supervision compétentes ;

10) Il veille à ce que la publication de la liste des bureaux de vote soit faite à temps ainsi que sa notification aux candidats ou aux représentants de la liste des candidats selon le cas ;

11) Il vérifie la régularité de la composition des membres des bureaux de vote ;

12) Il veille à ce que la liste des membres des bureaux de vote soit publiée et notifiée à temps à tous ceux qui, selon la loi électorale, doivent la recevoir, notamment les représentants de listes de candidats ou les candidats ;

13) Il veille au bon déroulement de la campagne électorale afin d'assurer l'égalité entre les candidats ;

14) Il supervise et contrôle la mise en place du matériel électoral et des documents électoraux (impression et cheminement des bulletins de vote) ;

15) Il vérifie la régularité des opérations de vote, de dépouillement du scrutin, des décomptes des suffrages ;

16) Il veille à la bonne tenue des procès-verbaux des bureaux de vote ;

17) Il supervise et contrôle :

- le ramassage et l'acheminement des procès-verbaux vers les commissions de recensement de votes ;

- la centralisation des résultats au niveau des commissions compétentes ;

18) Dans chaque bureau de vote, une copie du procès-verbal est remise au délégué de l'ONEL. Celle-ci fait foi en cas de contestation à quelque stade que ce soit du processus de décompte des votes, sauf inscription en faux.

ARTICLE 7 : Des indemnités et frais de mission sont accordés aux membres de l'ONEL dans les conditions fixées par décret.

ARTICLE 8 : Sauf cas de flagrant délit, ou de violation des dispositions constitutionnelles et légales en vigueur, les membres de l'ONEL ne peuvent être poursuivis, recherchés, arrêtés, détenus ou jugés pour des opinions ou des actes commis dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions.

ARTICLE 9 : L'ONEL est doté d'un secrétariat permanent dirigé par un Secrétaire Général nommé par décret du Président de la République, sur proposition du Président de l'ONEL et chargé, sous l'autorité de celui-ci de :

- l'administration de l'ONEL, - l'établissement des procès-verbaux des réunions de l'ONEL,

- la réception, la gestion et la conservation de la documentation relative aux élections,

- l'information du public.

ARTICLE 10 : L'ONEL établit son règlement intérieur.

ARTICLE 11 : L'ONEL exerce ses fonctions soit de sa propre initiative, soit sur saisine par les partis politiques en compétition, les candidats ou les électeurs.

ARTICLE 12:

1) L'ONEL veille à ce que la loi électorale soit appliquée aussi bien par les autorités administratives que par les partis politiques, les candidats et les électeurs.

2) En cas de non respect des dispositions législatives et réglementaires relatives aux élections par une autorité administrative, l'ONEL l'invite à prendre les mesures de correction appropriées. Si l'autorité administrative ne s'exécute pas, l'ONEL propose, à l'autorité compétente, des sanctions administratives contre le fonctionnaire ou l'agent public responsable. Celle-ci statue sans délai. Le cas échéant, l'ONEL saisit les juridictions compétentes qui statuent elles aussi sans délai. La saisine est faite par tout moyen laissant trace écrite.

3) Les manquements commis par les partis politiques, les candidats ou les électeurs peuvent également être portés par l'ONEL devant les autorités judiciaires.

 Lorsqu'il s'agit d'infractions à la loi pénale relative aux élections, l'ONEL est habilité à saisir le Procureur de la République et à soutenir les poursuites.

ARTICLE 13 :

1) Dans le cadre de leurs missions, les membres de l'ONEL et de ses démembrements ont accès à toutes les sources d'information et aux médias publics.

2) Les Gouverneurs, les Préfets et leurs adjoints, les Sous-Préfets et leurs adjoints, les Chefs de district, les agents de l'administration territoriale, les présidents des conseils régionaux, les maires, les autorités traditionnelles ainsi que les présidents de bureaux de vote sont tenus de leur fournir tous les renseignements et de leur communiquer tous les documents dont ils peuvent avoir besoin dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions.

ARTICLE 14 :

1) L'ONEL peut s'adjoindre, le jour du scrutin, des délégués désignés par son Président qui leur délivre des ordres de mission garantissant les droits attachés à leur qualité et définissant les fonctions qui leur sont confiées.

2) Ces délégués procèdent à des contrôles inopinés, sur pièces et sur place. Un même délégué peut être habilité à exercer sa mission dans plusieurs bureaux de vote. ARTICLE 15 : L'ONEL met en place, dans les régions, les départements et les communes des structures correspondantes dont la composition et le fonctionnement sont déterminés par décret, sur proposition du Président de l'ONEL.

ARTICLE 16:

1) Les membres de l'ONEL et de ses démembrements ainsi que ses délégués ne peuvent être chargés d'une mission de supervision, de vérification ou de contrôle dans les bureaux de vote où ils sont inscrits.

2) Ils sont habilités à voter dans l'un des bureaux qu'ils contrôlent sur présentation de leur carte électorale.

ARTICLE17:

1) L'ONEL informe régulièrement l'opinion publique de ses activités et de ses décisions, par la presse ou par toute autre voie jugée opportune.

2) Des rencontres peuvent avoir lieu entre l'ONEL et les partis politiques qui présentent des candidats aux élections.

ARTICLE 18 : Dans la supervision et le contrôle des élections, l'ONEL peut collaborer avec les observateurs internationaux invités par le Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 19 : Après le scrutin, l'ONEL établit un rapport général sur le déroulement des opérations électorales et l'adresse au Président de la République qui le fait publier.

ARTICLE 20:

1) L'Etat met à la disposition de l'ONEL tous les moyens matériels et humains nécessaires à l'accomplissement de sa mission.

2) Les frais de fonctionnement de l'ONEL et de ses démembrements sont à la charge de l'Etat et font l'objet d'une inscription au Budget de celui-ci.

ARTICLE 21 : Un décret précise les modalités d'application de la présente loi.

ARTICLE 22 : La présente loi sera enregistrée, publiée suivant la procédure d'urgence, puis insérée au Journal Officiel en français et en anglais.

Yaoundé, le 19 décembre 2000

Le Président de la République (à) Paul BIYA

Source:

Appendix 13: loi n° 2006/011 du 29 décembre 2006 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de elections cameroon (ELECAM)

Loi n° 2006/011 du 29 décembre 2006 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de Elections Cameroon (ELECAM)

(version anglaise)

 Date Signature: Vendredi, 29. décembre 2006
 Law N° 2006/011 of 29 December 2006
 To set up and lay down the organisation and functioning of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM)

The National Assembly deliberated and adopted, The President of the Republic hereby enacts the law set out below:

PART I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1:

(1) This law sets up and organises an elections management organ hereinafter referred to as Elections Cameroon, abbreviated ELECAM.

(2) Elections Cameroon shall be an independent body responsible for the organisation, management and supervision of all election operations and referendums.

(3)Elections Cameroon shall perform its duties in keeping with the Constitution and rules and regulations in force.

(4) Elections Cameroon shall be a moral entity with managerial autonomy.

(5) The Head Office of Elections Cameroon shall be in Yaounde.

Section 2:

(1) Members of Elections Cameroon shall refrain from acts that may undermine the independence and dignity of their duties. They shall specifically, during their tenure, exercise their powers strictly for the purpose of their mandate.

(2) Members of Elections Cameroon shall, under no circumstances, seek or receive instructions or orders from a public or private authority during the performance of their duties.

Section 3:

(1) Members of Election Cameroon may not be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or tried for their views and actions in the performance of their duties.

(2) Save in cases of flagrante delicto or violation of the Constitution and law, members of Election Cameroon shall not be prosecuted during their tenure.

PART II DUTIES

Section 4:

(1) Elections Cameroon shall organise, manage and supervise elections and referendums.(2) In this respect, Elections Cameroon shall be vested with the requisite powers to perform its duties.

PART III ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONING

Section 5: Elections Cameroon shall perform its duties through the following organs:

- The Electoral Board (EB)

- The general directorate of elections (GDE)

CHAPTER I THE ELECTORAL BOARD I – DUTIES

Section 6:

(1) The Electoral Board shall ensure compliance with the electoral law of all stakeholders for the purpose of guaranteeing regular, impartial, free, fair, transparent and credible polls.

(2) In this respect, the Electoral Board shall:

- effect scrutinies and controls as may be appropriate during election and non-election years;

- scrutinise candidacies and publish the final list or lists of candidates contesting presidential, legislative, senatorial, regional and municipal elections;

- publish presidential, legislative and senatorial election trends;

- forward election reports to the Constitutional Council or bodies provided for by the law;

- ensure the timely publication and notification of the list of members of polling stations to the appropriate persons outlined in the electoral law, notably representatives of lists of candidates or candidates;

- control the preparation of election material and election documents within the deadlines fixed by law;

- examine claims and petitions regarding pre-election and election operations, subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council and appropriate courts or administrative services;

- order the correction of errors ascertained upon consideration of claims or petitions filed in respect of elections or referendums.

Section 7: Within the framework of its missions, the Electoral Board shall:

- adopt the by-laws of Elections Cameroon

- submit reports and/or proposals to the appropriate authorities on issues that fall within their competence;

- examine and approve draft budgets prepared by the director general;

- approve the action programme prepared by the director general;

- approve progress reports drawn up by the director general;

- make recommendations or suggestions on any draft bill relating to elections submitted to it;

- determine the organisation and functioning of branches;

- hold consultations with the administration, political parties and civil society for the purpose of managing the electoral process.

II - COMPOSITION AND TENURE

Section 8:

(1) The Electoral Board shall comprise twelve (12) members, including a chairperson and one (1) vice-chairperson.

(2) Members of the electoral board shall be designated from the midst of independent personalities of Cameroonian nationality, reputed for their stature, moral uprightness, intellectual honesty, patriotism, neutrality and impartiality.

(3) The chairperson, vice-chairperson and members of the electoral board shall be appointed by decree of the President of the Republic upon consultation with political parties represented in the National Assembly and civil society.

(4) The chairperson and vice-chairperson of Elections Cameroon shall be the chairperson and vice-chairperson of the electoral board.

(5) The mandate of members of the electoral board shall be four (4) years, renewable as appropriate.

(6) Before taking office, members of the electoral board shall take the following oath before the constitutional council: "I swear to fully and faithfully discharge my duties and to exercise my office without fear or favour in accordance with the Constitution and laws in force, to ensure the confidentiality of proceedings and votes, to abstain from taking public positions and to decline any consultation on matters falling under the purview of Elections Cameroon."

(7) They shall be bound to declare their property and assets.

Section 9:

(1) The mandate of a member of the electoral board shall expire in one of the following cases:

- non-renewal of the mandate;
- resignation;

- death.

(2) The resignation referred to in sub-section (1) above shall be duly established by Elections Cameroon. In this case, the member whose resignation has been established shall be replaced by decree of the President of the Republic, upon consultation with the chairperson of the electoral board. The member appointed shall serve the incumbent's remainder term. He shall take the oath as set out in section 8 (6) above.

Section 10:

(1) The temporary incapacitation of a member shall be established by Elections Cameroon. Where such incapacity exceeds six (6) months, the duties of such member shall be terminated by decree of the President of the Republic.

(2) The member appointed to replace the incapacitated member shall serve the incumbent's remainder term. He shall take the oath as set out in section 8 (6) above.

Section 11: The mandate of members of the electoral board may be terminated in the following cases:

- physical incapacity duly established by Elections Cameroon;

- serious misconduct, duly ascertained by Elections Cameroon, notably the breach of oath;

- penalty imposed for a felony (life or fixed-term imprisonment coupled with banishment and civic disqualification).

Section 12: A member whose mandate comes to an end, pursuant to the provisions of section 9, 10 and 11 above, shall not be candidate for any election organised by Elections Cameroon immediately following the end of such mandate.

III – CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

Section 13: The duties of chairperson, vice-chairperson and member of the electoral board shall be incompatible with those of:

- member of government and persons ranking as such;
- member of the constitutional council;
- active magistrate;
- secretary-general of a ministry and persons ranking as such;
- general manager of a public establishment, public and semi-public enterprise;
- director in the central administration and persons ranking as such;
- person with a running mandate in national, regional or local body;
- governor, senior divisional officer and assistant senior divisional officer, divisional officer and assistant divisional officer, head of district in office;
- traditional ruler;
- official and personnel of the forces of law and order in active service;
- person disqualified or ineligible for elections;
- candidates contesting elections supervised by Elections Cameroon;
- members of a political party or support group of a political party, list of candidates or candidate.

IV – FUNCTIONING

Section 14: The Electoral Board shall hold 4 (four) ordinary sessions each year when convened by its chairperson. However, when the need arises or at the request of 2/3 (two-thirds) of its members, the board shall meet in extraordinary session.

Section 15:

(1) During an election period, the electoral board shall meet as often as necessary.

(2) The electoral board shall meet at least every fortnight upon the convening of the electorate.

Section 16: Meetings of the electoral board shall be convened by the chairperson, and where the latter is unavailable, by the vice-chairperson.

Section 17:

(1) Decisions of the electoral board shall be taken by consensus. In the absence of such consensus, decisions shall be taken by a simple majority of members present. In the event of a tie, the chairperson shall have the casting vote.

(2) The quorum shall be formed by 2/3 (two-thirds) of members.

(3) Proceedings of the electoral board shall be recorded in a report signed by the chairperson and rapporteur.

(4) The secretarial services of meetings of the electoral board shall be provided by the general directorate of elections.

CHAPTER II THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF ELECTIONS

Section 18: The general directorate of elections shall be responsible for the organisation and management of the poll under the supervision of the electoral board.

Section 19: The general directorate of elections shall be placed under the authority of a director general, assisted by a deputy director general, as appropriate.

I – APPOINTMENT

Section 20:

(1) The director general and deputy director general shall be appointed by decree of the President of the Republic for a mandate of five (5) years, renewable as appropriate upon consultation with the electoral board.

(2) In the event of the vacancy of the office of director general or deputy director general, he/she shall be replaced in accordance with the provisions of section 20 (1) above, to serve for the remainder of the mandate.

Section 21:

(1) The duties of director general or deputy director general shall expire in the following cases:

- non-renewal of the mandate;

- resignation;

- death.

(2) The mandate of the director general or deputy director general may be terminated in the following cases:

physical incapacity duly established by the electoral board;

serious misconduct, duly established by the electoral board;

penalty imposed for a felony (life or fixed-term imprisonment coupled with banishment and civic disqualification).

II – DUTIES

Section 22:

(1) The director general shall be responsible for all election operations and referendums under the supervision and control of the electoral board, such as:

- drawing up, managing, updating and keeping the national voters' register as well as election documents and materials;

- procuring and distributing election materials and documents;
- drawing up and publishing voters' lists;
- issuing and distributing voter' cards
- organising and supervising the training of electoral personnel;
- preparing the annual draft budget of Elections Cameroon and draft elections budgets;
- implementing the budget of Elections Cameroon and elections budget;

- managing sundry resources and equipment put at his disposal;

- receiving and submitting to the electoral board candidacies for presidential, legislative, senatorial, regional and municipal elections;

- distributing, within the statutory time-limit, samples of ballot papers to candidates or political parties contesting the elections in view of campaigning;

- coordinating the work of observers accredited by the appropriate national authorities;

- organising polling stations and appointing officers to the said polling stations;

- reporting to the relevant authorities any threats to public order in the polling stations;

- coordinating all bodies responsible for election operations;

- transporting election reports and other documents from polling stations to the head office of Elections Cameroon;

- forwarding election reports to the electoral board for the publication of election trends.

(2) In this respect, the director general shall be vested with all powers necessary for the performance of his duties.

(3) he shall submit a progress report to the electoral board at least once every six months.

(4) After every election, the director general shall be responsible for centralising and keeping all election documents and materials. He shall draw up the final report on the conduct of the poll.

Section 23:

(1) The director general of elections shall be responsible for the administration of Elections Cameroon

(2) he shall attend electoral board meetings in an advisory capacity.

(3) The director general shall represent Elections Cameroon within the framework of his duties and may appear in judicial proceedings.

(4) The director general shall serve as secretary during electoral board meetings.

(5) The deputy director general shall perform such duties and carry out such missions as shall be entrusted to him by the director general within the framework of the administration of Elections Cameroon.

III – SUPPORT BODIES

Section 24:

(1) The general directorate of elections shall comprise support bodies.

(2) The organisation and functioning of support bodies referred to under section 24 (1) above shall be laid down by the electoral board.

(3) heads of support bodies shall be appointed by the director general of elections.

IV – STAFF

Section 25:

(1) The director general shall recruit staff on behalf of Elections Cameroon, in keeping with the laws and regulations in force.

(2) He may also request the secondment of civil servants or transfer of government contract workers and state employees.

(3) Staff of Elections Cameroon shall be bound by the in-house staff rules adopted by the electoral board in keeping with the laws and regulations in force.

(4) Throughout their employment, civil servants, contract workers or state employees on secondment or appointment, shall be bound by labour laws subject to the general rules and regulations of the Republic service in respect of retirement, increment and end of secondment.

(5) During the election period, the director general of elections may hire temporary staff to perform specific duties.

CHAPTER III BRANCHES

Section 26:

(1) Elections Cameroon shall have branches at provincial, divisional and council levels.

(2) The organisation and functioning of branches shall be laid down by the electoral board.

(3) Officers of the branches shall be appointed by the director general of elections upon the approval of the electoral board.

PART IV FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

Section 27: The resources of Elections Cameroon shall be public funds managed in compliance with public accounting rules.

Section 28: Elections Cameroon shall have an annual budget and an elections budget in an election year.

Section 29: The Director general shall be the authorising officer of the Elections Cameroon budget.

Section 30: The draft annual budget of Elections Cameroon as well as the draft elections budget shall be prepared by the director general of elections and approved by the electoral board. The chairperson of the electoral board shall submit the said draft budgets to government for consideration and tabling before parliament for adopting as part of the Finance law.

Section 31:

(1) Upon adoption of the state budget by parliament, the minister in charge of finance shall disburse funds to Elections Cameroon as priority state expenditure as set out in the appropriations of the Finance law.

(2) Where elections are held in a non-election year, the state shall take appropriate measures to allocate requisite resources to Elections Cameroon for the organisation of the elections.

Section 32: The minister in charge of finance shall appoint a treasury accounting officer to Elections Cameroon.

Section 33: An auditor shall be appointed to Elections Cameroon by the minister in charge of finance for a mandate of three (3) years, renewable once.

Section 34: The administrative accounts and management accounts of Elections Cameroon shall be submitted annually to the minister in charge of finance and to the audit bench of the Supreme court.

Section 35: The accounts of Elections Cameroon shall be audited annually by the relevant state services.

PART V MISCELLANEOUS, TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 36: A decree of the President of the Republic shall lay down the protocol ranks and privileges of the chairperson and vice-chairperson of the electoral board, members of the electoral board, as well as the director general and deputy director general of elections.

Section 37:

(1) The chairperson and vice-chairperson of the electoral board shall be entitled to monthly remuneration and benefits in kind.

(2) Members of the electoral board shall be entitled to session allowance during meetings of the electoral board and refunded all expenses incurred in respect of such meetings upon production of supporting documents.

(3) Allowances and mission allowances shall be granted to members of the electoral board.

(4) The monthly remuneration, session allowances, allowances and mission allowances referred to in sub sections 1, 2 and 3 above shall be determined by decree of the President of the Republic.

Section 38: The director general and deputy director general of elections shall each be entitled to monthly remuneration and statutory benefits whose nature and amount shall be determined by decree of the President of the Republic.

Section 39: The rules of procedure and modus operandi of Elections Cameroon shall be laid down by the by-laws.

Section 40:

(1) Elections Cameroon shall receive any collaboration and assistance requested from government services for the performance of its statutory duties.

(2) The minister in charge of territorial administration shall ensure permanent liaison between government and Elections Cameroon. In this respect, the latter shall submit copies of minutes and progress reports to him.

Section 41: Where Elections Cameroon is duly established as incompetent by the constitutional council, the President of the Republic shall, under Article 5 of the Constitution, take the requisite corrective measures.

Section 42:

(1) All previous provisions repugnant hereto are repealed and shall so remain.

(2) The electoral duties of relevant state bodies shall be transferred to Elections Cameroon, under the supervision of the President of the Republic.

(3) As and until Elections Cameroon is effectively put in place, over a period which should not exceed 18 (eighteen) months, the National Elections Observatory (NEO) and other relevant electoral state bodies shall continue to carry out their respective electoral duties.

(4) A decree of the President of the Republic shall duly ascertain that Elections Cameroon has been effectively put in place.

Section 43: Separate instruments by the President of the Republic shall lay down, as and when necessary, conditions for the implementation of this law.

Section 44 : This law shall be registered, published according to the procedure of urgency and inserted in the official gazette in English and French. Yaounde, 29 December 2006 (Sign) Paul Biya, President of the Republic

Source: Internet download

Appendix 14: The La Baule Speech (1990)

La Baule, June 20, 1990

• • •

In any case, we are ready to help you establish this movement, which I believe to beindispensible in order to obtain the political, geographic, and economic instruments that would permit us to continue battling the crisis. But I would like to say the following: just as there is a vicious cycle between debt and under-development, there is another vicious cycle between economic crisis and political crisis. One nourishes the other.

This is why we should examine how to proceed together so that, politically, a certain number of institutions and ways of acting allow trust to be restored, sometimes trust between a people and its leaders, most often between one state and other states, in any case the trust between Africa and the developed countries. I'd like to borrow His Majesty the King of Morocco's observation, both ironic and serious, as he described the way in which democracy was established in France. It was not without evil, or repeated accidents. Expanding my talk, I will borrow the words of one of the Heads of State here this evening: the Europe we come from, we French, had, at the same time, Nazism, fascism, Francoism, Salazarism, and Stalinism, no less...

Were these the models on which you have built your states, you who have taken, in the best case, just a quarter of a century?

It took us two centuries to try to create order, first in our thoughts and then in reality, with successive descents; and we are teaching you about it?

We have to talk about democracy. It's a universal principal which seemed so incontrovertible to the peoples of central Europe that in the space of a few weeks, the regimes considered the strongest were overthrown. The people were in the streets, in the squares, and the ancient power, sensing its fragility, gave up all resistance, as if it had already been void of substance for a long time and it knew it. And this revolution of the peoples, the most important one we have seen since the French Revolution of 1789, will continue.

I said recently about the Soviet Union that this revolution has come from there and it will return there. The one who governs there knows it well, he who is, with courage and intelligence, leading a reform that, already, is facing every kind of opposition, that which, attached to the former system, refuse the reform, and that which wants to go faster. So the story is still unfinished. It must be said that this wind will go around the world. We already know it well: one of the poles freezes or heats up and voilà: the entire globe feels the effects. This thought does not have to remain climate-related, it applies to the society of men!...

Finally, we can breathe, finally we have hope, because democracy is a universal principle. But we cannot forget the differences in structures, in civilizations, in traditions, in customs. It is impossible to propose a ready-made system. It is not for France to dictate some constitutional law that would then be de facto imposed on people who have their own consciousness and their own history and who must know how to lead towards the universal principle that is democracy. And there are not thirty six paths to democracy.

As Mr. President of Senegal reminded us, development is needed and freedoms must be learned...How can you engender democracy, a principal of national representation with the participation of numerous parties, organize the exchanging of views, the resources for the press, when two thirds of the population would be living in misery. I repeat, France does not intend to intervene in the interior affairs of friendly African nations. It has its say, it intends to pursue its work with aid, friendship, and solidarity. It does not intend to be questioned, it does not intend to abandon any African country.

This also about liberty: it is not only states that can provide it, it is citizens. Therefore, we must ask their opinion. And it is not only public powers that can act, it is also non-governmental agencies who often know the situation on the ground the best, who embrace the inherent difficulties, who know how to heal the wounds. We do not want to intervene in interior affairs. For us, this subtle form of colonialism, which consists of permanently teaching and giving advice to African states and those who lead them, is as perverse as all other forms of colonialism. To do this would be to believe that there are superior peoples, who hold the truth, and others, who would not be capable of it, but I know about the efforts of so many leaders who love their people and intend to serve them, even if not in the same way as on the banks of the Seine or the Thames. That is why we must begin a methodical study of everything to do with economic life. We must put customs arrangements in place that would prevent the tax evasion and other financial crimes that often justify the criticism we hear. Again, from this point of view, France, if you wish, is ready to offer aid in people and technology, to train officials, to be beside them. I have seen the birth of most of your states, I have known your battles to put an end to the colonial condition. These battles often pit you against France, and only the wisdom of French and African leaders, at the end of the day, prevented the tragedy of a colonial war in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was necessary to build a state, a sovereignty, with internationally-guaranteed borders, the ones that were drawn and regulated by colonial countries, in gilded lounges of western Chancelleries,

tearing apart ethnicities without understanding the nature of the terrain. And here we are: the new states have to manage the old contradictions inherited from history, they have to build a central administration, train and appoint civil servants, manage public finances, enter into the grand international circuit, often without having received the necessary training from the old colonial countries.

And we have to deal with these states, as we would with nations that have been organized for a thousand years, as is the case with France, Great Britain, Spain, or Portugal! Customs and traditions just as deserving of respect as yours, the history and nature of these peoples, their own culture, their own way of thinking, could all this be reduced to a solved equation in a northern capital?

Really, I appeal to your reason, and I think that we know each other well enough to know that nothing will happen between us without respect or disregarding the esteem in which we hold each other. It there is dissent in some particular country, well then the leaders of the country will discuss it with their citizens. When I say democracy, when I chart a course, when I say that this is the only way to get to a state of equality when the need for greater freedom is apparent, of course I have a plan ready: representative system, free elections, multiparty politics, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, rejection of censorship: here is the plan that we have. We have discussed this many times, and here, tonight, again in particular. I know how much some scrupulously defend their people and seek progress, including in their own institutions. Many of you said, "If you transpose the single party and arbitrarily decide on a multiparty system, some of our populations will refuse it, or else will immediately suffer from its deleterious effects."

Others said, "We have already done this and know about its disadvantages." But the disadvantages and still less important than the advantage of feeling that one is in a civically organized society.

Others said, "We have started, the system is not there yet, but we are going in this direction." I am listening to you. And, as I agreed more easily with those of you who defined a political system close to the one I am used to, I understood the reasons of those who believed that their country or their population was not ready. So who will decide? I believe that we could decide by saying that, in any case, this is the direction in which we all must go. Some have put on the seven league boots, either in civic peace or in disorder, but they have acted quickly.

Others are walking step by step. May I say that the most important thing is to go in the right

direction. I am speaking to you as one citizen of the world to other citizens of the world: it is the path of freedom that you are advancing on at the same time as you advance along the path of development. Moreover, the thought can be reversed: by taking the road towards development, you are committed on the road towards democracy.

To you free people, to you sovereign states that I respect: choose your path, determine the steps and the pace. France will continue to be your friend, and if you wish, your support, internationally as well as domestically. You bring a lot to the relationship. When I see, for example, that the flow of capital that goes from the poor South towards the rich North is bigger than the flow of capital that goes from the rich North to the poor South, I say that there is something wrong.

Colonialism is not dead. This is no longer the colonialism of states, it is the colonialism of business and of parallel channels. We are speaking as sovereign states, equal in status, even if not always in means. There are all kinds of conventions between us. There are military conventions. I repeat the principle of the French policy: every time a foreign menace appears, that could attack your independence, France will be by your side. We have already demonstrated this many times, and sometimes in very difficult circumstances.

But our own role, as a foreign country, even though we are friends, is not to intervene in domestic conflicts. In these cases, France, with the country's leaders, will ensure the protection of its citizens, its nationals, but does not intend to arbitrate conflicts. This is what I have been doing as part of my responsibilities for nine years. In the same way, I will always forbid a practice that sometimes existed in the past which consisted of France trying to organize domestic political changes by plot or conspiracy. You know well that, for the last nine years, this has not happened, and this will not happen in the future

Source: Online download

Appendix 15: SDF petition against Presidential eletions of 9th October 2011 in Balikumbat Sub Division

NI JOHN FRU NDI C/o National Secretariat Social Democratic Front P.O.Box 490 Bamenda Date: 11/10/2011 To The Honourable President of the Constitutional Council Yaoundé RE: PETITION AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 9TH OCTOBER 2011 IN BALIKUMBAT SUB DIVISION IN NGOKETUNJIA DIVISION OF THE NORTH WEST REGION PURSUANT TO S. 93(new) OF LAW N° 92 OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1992 TO LAY DOWN CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE VACANCY OF AND ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC, AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED BY LAW N° 97/20 OF 9/09/1997 AND BY LAW N° 2011/002 OF 6TH MAY 2011 I have the honour to put before you my petition against the October 9th 2011 presidential elections in Balikumbat Sub Division of the Ngoketunjia Division of the North West Region. I was a candidate at the above mentioned elections. I ran the elections as the candidate of the Social Democratic Front (S.D.F). The district chairman of the S.D.F in Balikumbat Sub Division wrote a complaint on the 9/10/2011 addressed to the chairman of the Divisional Supervisory Commission for the 2011 presidential election for Ngoketunjia and copied me. A copy of the said complaint is herein attached and marked exhibit 'A'. From exhibit 'A' I deduced that there were irregularities to wit: 1. That children below voting age were seen stuffing ballot boxes at G.S Gahyit 'A' 'B' 'C' & 'D' polling stations. 2. That the purported ELECAM representative at that polling station was Mr. Nwanyuk Lamgmi who is a personal body guard to the Fon of Balikumbat who is a celebrated militant of the C.P.D.M party. 3. That my personal representative was helpless and when he called on ELECAM officials to intervene nothing was done.

- 4. That my representative Mr. Lecigah Pius Tantch met the Fon of Balikumbat and his children some below 10years of age at the small market polling station stuffing ballot boxes with ballot papers of the C.P.D.M candidate. That the S.D.F representative there was tied and the ballot boxes were being stuffed.
- 5. That the Fon of Balikumbat sent threatening messages that all those who campaigned and voted for me and the opposition should be ready to move out of that village after the elections.

From the foregoing, my lords I am bound to conclude that the elections in Balikumbat Sub Division were not free and fair. It is evidently clear that there were ambulant voters who were equally under aged. It should be recalled that it was in this same constituency that my former representative in the person of John Kontem was murdered and the court after a trial convicted the murderers to fifteen years imprisonment. A vote count of the votes in Balikumbat Sub

Division brought out the following results:

16.000votes -CPDM (Biya Paul)

4000 votes -SDF (NI JOHN FRU NDI)

The-electoral-register of Balikumbat-had-18.000-registered voters. The result sheets equally produced the same 18.000 voters. How true this can be is to my mind an affront to common sense. What about those who died or those on transfer or sick in hospitals? I am therefore praying the constitutional council to do the following.

- 1) Cancel the elections in its entirety in Balikumbat Sub Division. Pursuant to S. 93 of the above cited law.
- 2) Declare that the elections in Balikumbat were marred with mal practices such as ambulant voting, under aged voting and rigging by stuffing of boxes with ballot papers of the C.P.D.M.
- 3) Order a re-run of the elections in Balikumbat Sub-Division.

This done my lords Justice shall have been seen to be done.

Further submissions and supporting documents and evidence shall be filed subsequently

NI JOHN-FRI

Yours Sincerely,

Source: Collected during a working session in Yaounde with Barrister Mbah Ndam Boniface

Appendix 16: SDF petition against ELECAM, Salli Filacia and CPDM

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	IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL OF CAMEROON
	HOLDEN AT YAOUNDE
	SUIT N ^o
	BETWEEN;
	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SDF)PETITIONER
	AND
	1. ELECTIONS CAMEROON (ELECAM)
	 SALLI FELICIA WEAH THE CAMEROON PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (CPDM)
	PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION AND CANCELLATION OF CPDM CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 30 TH SEPTEMBER 2013
	FOR MENCHUM NORTH CONSTITUENCY PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 165 AND 167 AS READ WITH SECTIONS 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, AND 131 OF LAW N ^O
	$2012/01$ OF 19^{TH} APRIL 2012 AS AMENDED.
	The Petitioner is a prominent political party in Cameroon and is massively participating in the forthcoming parliamentary elections of 30 th September 2013 all over the national
Real Products	territory with Menchum North constituency inclusive. The Perliamentary elections for
	disqualification of the CPDM Alternate Cantilate for the Furnamentation of the CPDM Substantive Menchum North Constituency and consequently cancellation of the CPDM Substantive Candidate on the following grounds:
	A NEW (NO RESPONDENT) whose names appear as
	- That SALLI FELICIA WEAH (2 RESPONDENT) whose number of the Alternate Candidate to Mr NJI FIDELIS MUH ZIAH for the CPDM for the
	Alternate Candidate to Mr NJI FIDELIS MUH ZIAH for the Cr DM for the upcoming parliamentary elections of September 30 th 2013 is a member of the Social Democratic Front (SDF).
	to the August for the Municipal
	 The said SALLI FELICIA WEAH compiled her documents to the internet of the internet of the elections of September 30th 2013 on the ticket of the SDF Council list for the FURU AWA Council in Menchum Division. See (attached) Annexes 'A' – 'A2'.
	council elections
	and won – reason why she compared
	Annexes 'A' - 'A2.
	 Annexes 'A' - 'A2'. Strangely enough ELECAM failed to reject her candidature in view of section 167 as read with sections 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, AND 131 of law N° 2012/09 as read with sections 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, AND 131 of law N° 2012/09 as read with sections 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, AND 131 of law N° 2012/09
	 Strangely enough ELECATI 26, 127, 128, 129, 130, AND 131 of law 12 based with sections 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, AND 131 of law 12 based in a section of 19th April 2012 of the Electoral Code as amended, and went ahead to publish of 19th April 2012 of the Electoral Code as amended, and went ahead to publish

Appendix 17: UNDP petition against the state of Cameroon

Contentieux Electoral (Législatives 2002) Requête nº61/CE/01-02 du 04 juillet 2002

ARRET Nº 84/CE/01-02 du 17 juillet 2002

AFFAIRE : Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (UNDP) Etat du Cameroun (MINAT)

RESULTAT

DECIDE : Article 1^{er}: Le recours de l'UNDP en annulation de l'élection législative du 30 juin 2002 dans la circonscription du Wouri-Est est reieté : Article 2 : Les dépens sont laissés à la charge du Trésor Public ; Article 3 : Le présent arrêt sera communiqué au Ministre de l'Administration ; PRESENTS MM. A. DIPANDA MOUELLE, Premier Président de la Cour Suprême, Président MM. B. ITOE MUTANGA, S. BISSOMBI, D. MINLO, G. GWANMESIA, C. ATANGANA, A. TCHUENTE, Mme F. ARREY MM. H. NGALAME KOME. T. FOUDA TSILLA. M.F. TCHEPTANG. F. MOCHE D. MOUYEME J. YOUMSI, D. BISSECK. M. EPULI ALOH, P TAKAM M. EBONGUE A, NOAH MENOUNGA. MMe S. MENGUE Conseiller à la Cour Suprême. M. M. RISSOUK à MOULONG Procureur Général N. MESSANGA ATANGANA, Greffier

REPUPLIQUE DU CAMEROUN AU NOM DU PEUPLE CAMEROUNAIS L'an deux mille deux et le dix sept juillet : La Cour Suprême, siégeant comme Conseil Constitutionnel au Palais de Justice à Yaoundé en la salle ordinaire des audiences de ladite Cour et composée de : M. Alexis DIPANDA MOUELLE, Président de la Cour Suprême, Président, MM. Benjamin ITOE MUTANGA, Salomon BISSOMBI, Daniel MINLO, George GWANMESIA, Clément ATANGANA, Abraham TCHUENTE, Mme Florence Rita ARREY, MM. Hans NGALAME KOME, Théodore FOUDA TSILLA, = gratis Moïse Flaubert TCHEPTANG, Frédéric MOCHE,

David MOUYEME,

Joseph YOUMSI,

Dagobert BISSECK,

Mathias EPULI ALOH,

Pius Andy TAKAM,

Moïse EBONGUE,

Aimé NOAH MENOUNGA,

Suzanne MENGUE,

Conseillers à la Cour \$ uprême ;

Source: Archive of the Supreme Court of Cameroon

Appendix 18: UNDP petition rejected in Lom et Djerem for the Legislative of 2002

MRABGA OMAQA REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN Contentieux Dector (Législatives 2002) AU NOM DU PEUPLE CAMEROUNAIS Recours nº 95/CE/01-02 ---- L'an deux mille deux et le dix-sept juillet La Cour Suprême, siégeant comme Conseil ARRET nº 81/CF Du 17 juillet 2002 Constitutionnel au Palais de justice à Yaounde en la AFFAIRE salle ordinaire des audiences de ladite Cour et ETAT DU CAMEROUN (MINAT) composée de M. Alexis DIPANDA MOUELLE, Président de la RESULTAT PRESIDENT DECIDE Article 1^{ee} : Le recours est recevable : Article 2 : Le Conseil Constitutionnel est Cour Suprême MM. Benjamin MUTANGA ITOE incompétent pour connaître du contentieux de l'établissement des listes électorales et de l'établissement ou de la distribution des cartes Salomon BISSOMB1 électorales ; Article 3 : Le recours de l'UNDP en annulation de l'élection législative du 30 juin 2002 dans la Daniel MINLO circonscription du LOM et DJEREM est rejeté George GWANMESIA Article 4 : Les dépens sont laissés à la charge du = gratis Trésor Public : Article 5 : Le présent arrêt sera communiqué au Clément ATANGANA Ministre de l'Administration Territoriale Abraham TCHUENTE PRESENTS RESENTS : A. Alexis DIPANDA MOUELLE, Président de la Cour Suprême PRESIDENT Mme Florence Rita ARREY MM. Hans NGALAME KOME MM. B. MUTANGA ITOE S. BISSOMBI Théodore FOUDA TSILLA D. MINLO G. GWANMESIA C. ATANGANA A. TCHUENTE Moïse Flaubert TCHEPTANG F. R. ARREY Mme H.NGALAME KOME MM. Frédéric MOCHE T. FOUDA TSILLA M.F. TCHEPTANG David MOUYEME F. MOCHE D. MOUYEME J. YOUMSI Joseph YOUMSI D. BISSECK M. EPULI ALOH P. ANDY TAKAM Dagobert BISSECK M. EBONGUE A. NOAH MENOUNGA Mme S. MENGUE Mathias EPULI ALOH Conseillers à la Cour Suprême M. M. RISSOUK à MOULONG, Pius Andy TAKAM Procureur Général Me. N. MESSANGA ATANGANA, Greffier ler rôle

Source: Archive of the Supreme Court of Cameroon

Appendix 19: SDF Petition accepted in NDE for Legislative elections 1997

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CONTENTIEUX ELECTORAL (Légielatives 1997)	AU NOM DU FRUFLE CAMEROUNAIS
REQUETE NO.	an mil neuf cent quatre vinst
REQUETE N° 596 du 15 Avril 1997 DE M. TOHOUMMA Dieudenné (SDF DU NDE) A R R E T N° 4/CE/96-97 du 30 Avril 1997 <u>A R R E S U L T A T</u> : La Ceur DECIDE : <u>ART. 1er. La requête est</u> recevable en la forme; <u>ART. 2</u> :Elle est fendée. Il est recevable en la forme; <u>ART. 2</u> :Elle est fendée. Il est sement de la liste du parti SDF de le Département du NDE, après rempl ment du candidat NOUMMA Isidere <u>ART. 3:</u> La présente décisien sere médiatement netifiée au Préset de	trente Avril ; La Geur Suprême, statuant cemme Geur Censtitu tiennelle, au Falais de Justice à Yacundé en la salle erdinaire des audiences de la Geur et cempe sée de : NMe Jean MOMO MPIDJOUE, Censeiller à la Geur Suprême, FRESIDENT S. BISSOMBI, Genseiller H. NGALAME, Genseiller H. NGALAME, Genseiller M.F. TCHEFTANG, Genseiller A. TCHUENTE, Genseiller L. GWANNESIA, Genseiller
médiatement netifiée au Préfet du <u>ART. 4:</u> Les dépens sent laissés à charge du Tréser Public	N118.
P.P.P.C.	Marie Géline EWANE, Greffier
PRESENTS:	rendu en audience Publique erdinaire, con-
MM. : J. MOMD MPIDJOUE, Conseiller	r à fermément à la lei l'arrêt dent la teneur suit,
la Cour Suprême,	sur requête de Monsieur TCHOUMBA Dieudenné man-
S. BISSOMEI, Censciller	
L. ASSIRA ENGCUTE, Conseiller	
H. NGALAME, Censeiller M.F. TCHEPTANG, Censeiller	Maître TSAPY Jeseph Laveisier, avecat a Darous
A. TCHUENTE, Conseiller L. GWANMESIA, Conseiller C. ATANGANAN. Conseiller	En présence de Mansieur Pierre Marie MVIENA,
F. MONEKOSSO KINGUE, Censeiller D. MOUYEME, Censeiller	Substitut Général près la Cour Suprême ;
P. TAKAM, Conseiller P.M. MVIENA, Substitut Général Marie Céline EWANE BIDJE, Gréffie	
	x y give a

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Vu le décret nº 97/060 du 02 avril 1997 portant convocation du corps électoral pour l'élection des Députés à l'Assemblée Nationale, modifié par celui

Vu le décret n° 97/062 du 02 avril 1997 portant découpage spécial de certaines circonscriptions électorales et répartition des sièges au sein desdites

Vu les arrêtés n° 0151/A/MINAT/DAP/SDE du 27 avril 1997 et suivants du Vice Premier Ministre chargé de l'Administration Territoriale publiant les candidatures dans les circonscriptions électorales à l'occasion des

Vu le procés-verbal de la commission nationale de rececnsement général des votes en date du Ter juin 1997 .

Tenant compte de ses décisions intervenues à l'audience des 03 et 04 juin 1997 tant sur l'exploitation du procès-verbal de la commission nationale de recensement général des votes que sur les recours introduits par les parties. décisions portant notamment


- 1°) Annulation du scrutin dans les circonscriptions ci-après
 - MAYO BANYO
 - MAYO REY
 - · NDE

2°) Rectification des résultats dans les circonscriptions suivantes

- · BOUMBA NGOKO pour le partage des deux sièges en compétition, soit 01 pour le RDPC et 01 pour L'UNDP ;
- LEBIALEM, pour rétrocession au SDF de l'unique siège en compétition initialement attribué au RDPC.

Après vérification de l'ensemble des opérations de décompte, a arrêté ainsi qu'il suit. les résultats des élections concernées, présentés par province :

Source: Archive of the Supreme Court of Cameroon



Appendix 20: The sharing of some parliamentary seats between the CPDM SDF and UNDP

							and a	-
A MA	Majorité Absolue Majorité Relative Est ainsi déclarée élue la liste UNDP composée de :	SIEGE =]	% par rapport au S.V.E.	SUFFRAGES	PARTIS	REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN PROVINCE : EXTREME NORD CIRCONSCRIPTION : DIAM Partis en competition : 07		
in the	a liste UNI		6,34 %	1 799	ANDP	MEROUN AE NORD DIAN		
M HAM	DP compos		3,55 %	1 008	MDR	IARE CEN		
Immo Immo	ée de :		0,44 %	127	OND	<u>BOUN</u> NORD DIAMARE CENTRE URBAIN		
M HAMADOU MALOUM		,	27,70 %	7 862	RDPC			
AMADOU MALOUM			2,95 %	837	SDF	- 22 - LECTEUI DURCEN ULLETIN UFFRAGI		
7	UNDP	-	58,38 %	16 569	UNDP	- 22 - ELECTEURS INSCRITS :44 261 ELECTEURS VOTANTS :29 159 POURCENTAGE DE PARTICIPATION :65,88 % BULLETINS NULS : 776 SUFFRAGES VALABLEMENT EXPRIMES : 28 383		
			0,64 %	181	UPR	IS :44 261 <u>TS</u> :29 159 <u>3ARTICIP</u> 76 LEMENT I		
M A						ATION :6		
<u>Suppléant</u> M AMADOU ADJ						5,88 % . <u></u>		
Ildv								
1						-		
1								
		-Hillers	-	and a second				

Source: Archive of the Supreme Court of Cameroon

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N°	Name and Surname	Age	Status	Place	Date
01	Ni John Fru Ndi	76	Chairman of the SDF	Bamenda	10/01/2018
02	Simon Tata Ngenge	63	Senior Lecturer University of	Bambili	10/01/2018
			Bamenda		
03	Lawrence Walters	62	Chief Secretary SDF head office	Bamenda	11/01/2018
	Chimasa				
04	Jonas Mbah Acha	62	Former shadow minister of SDF	Yaounde	17/01/2018
05	Souleymane Hamidou	63	ADD member	Tibati	17/05/2018
06	Atanga Godwin	55	Cadre à cellule de communication du	Tabati	19/05/2018
			MDR		
07	Nji Godfred	62	member of ONELL Ngaoundéré	Ngaoundéré	16/11/2018
08	Hamadou Mohamed	57	member of NUDP, Ngaoundéré	Ngaoundéré	17/11/2018
09	Bello Hamed	60	member of UDC, Tibati	Ngaoundéré	17/11/2018
10	Moustapha abdoulaye	66	djaoro and member of NUDP	Ngaoundéré	18/11/2018.
11	Kamdem Léon	58	member of ELECAM Ngaoundere	Ngaoundéré	18/11/2018
12	Kamdem Léon	58	member of ELECAM	Ngaoundéré	18/11/2018
13	Bello Jonas	60	member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré	Ngaoundéré	19/11/2018
14	Adoum Gassaba	59	member of ADD	Maroua	19/11/2018

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16	Mahamet Ali	56	MDR member Mokolo	Maroua	20/11/2018
17	Alioum Moussa	65	second deputy mayor of CPDM	Maroua	20/11/2018
18	El Hadj Oumarou Hadji.	68	CPDM deputy member of parliement	Maroua	21/11/2018
19	Haminatou Hadja,	56	member of ADD, Maroua	Maroua	21/11/2018
20	Habiba Nsangou	52	member of ELECAM, Maroua	Maroua	21/11/2018
21	Habiba Nsangou	52	member of ELECAM	Maroua	21/11/2018
22	Haminatou Hadja	56	member of ADD	Maroua	21/11/2018
23	Habiba Nsangou		member of ELECAM	Maroua	21/11/2018
24	El Hadj Oumarou Hadji	68	CPDM deputy member of parliement	Maroua	22/11/2018
25	Gakam Aloys	45	member of CPDM	Garoua	23/11/2018
26	Oumarou	65	CPDM member, Figuil	Figuil	23/11/ 2018
27	Souleymane Hamidou	63	ADD member Garoua	Garoua	23/11/2018
28	Abbo Ulsmanu	71	NUDP Vice Secretary General	Ngoundere	18/12/2018
29	Djokombe Emmanuel	47	journaliste at le messager in 1995	Yaoundé,	21/01/2019
30	Ngamgoum Ferdinand	63	General Secretary of the movement "Right For All",	Douala	06/02/2019
31	Buyong Godlove Fru	39	Elecam Staff Bamenda	Bamenda	08/03/2019
32	Tamfu Marguerrite	39	ELECAM official in Bamenda	Bamenda	08/03/2019
33	Taga Naussie Ceraphine	48	Financial Secretary of C P D M Section Baf	Bafoussam	11/03/2019
34	Tamtsua Sidollin	39	C P D M Sub Section President of FAMCEP Bafoussam 1 ^{er}	Bafoussam	11/03/2019
35	Awa Fonka Augustine		Governor of Western Region	Bafoussam	11/03/2019
36	Timamue Martina P. Lenkong	46	1st Deputy mayor of Babessi	Bafoussam	11/03/2019
38	Chenboa Andre Leopold	79	Financial Secretary for West Region	Bafoussam	11/03/2019
39	Karmi Jean Maire	59	None voter since 1992	Bafoussam	11/03/2019
40	Ade Joseph Awah	56	SDF Militants	Bamenda	14/03/2019
41	Agwo Patrick Tekum,	55	President of Guzang the village meeting of late James Mbanga	Yaoundé	20/06/2019
42	Mokum Mirabel	50	CPDM Councillor	Yaounde	20/06/2019
43	Abega Jean Claude	52	Journalist with Vission 4	Yaounde	22/06/2019
44	Honorable Mba-Ndam Joseph*	64	SDF Parliamentarian	Yaoundé	23/07/2019
45	Tim Frankline Diom	36	Elecam Staff Bamenda	Bamenda	09/08/2019
46	Darkimba Wayang	67	leader of MDR in Mayo Danai	Datcheka	15/08/2019
47	Hon. Abi Francais	48	CPDM Parliamenterian from Momo East	Yaoundés	16/08/2019
48	Mbaku Jerry	64	CPDM elite from Batibo	Yaoundé	12/09/2019
49	Sama Isaac Nde,	67	Retired SDF Divisional executive in Nkambe and Wum	Bamenda	30/09/2019
50	Christopher Fomunyoh	63	Regional Director for National Democratic Institute for Africa	Bamenda	18/10/2019
51	Pa Wabeng	67	SDF Ward Chairman	Bamenda	19/10/2019
52	Tazoh Daniel	60	Retired Tax collector	Bamenda	20/10/2019

53	Notuto Godfred Awah	58	Retired Regional Delegate for MINADERA	Bamenda	25/10/2019
54	Werewum Maurice	56	SDF Districk Chairman for Batibo	Bamenda	26/10/2019
55	Hamadou Mohamed	57	member of NDUP, Ngaoundéré	Ngaoundéré	19/11/2019
56	Mahamet Ali	56	MDR member Mokolo	Maroua	20/11/2019
57	Bello Hamed	60	member of UDC	Tibati	20/11/2019
58	Piaplié Rodrigue	35	Ph. D students, University of Yaoundé 1	Yaoundé	28/11/2019
59	Mbah Flix	60	SDF Volunteer Driver 1990-2000	Bamenda	30/11/2019
60	Souleymane Ali	69	member of ADD	Garoua- Boulai	19/12/ 2019
61	Mudoh Walters	54	Human Right Activist and Politician	Douala	20/12/2019
62	Mohamadou	65	CPDM communication member,	Garoua-	20/12/2019
			Garoua-Boulai	Boulai	
63	Tiku Mathias	50	Retired Gendarme	Douala	21/12/2019
64	Gansop Emile	56	militant of MDR, Garoua-Boulai	Garoua- Boulai	22/12/ 2019
65	Soulé Hamad	56	CPDM member, Meingaga	Meingaga	28/12/2019
66	Fon Ngwan Mbayamssig	58	HRH of Guzang and Aspirant for Parliamenterian	Yaounde	20/01/2020
67	Fomum Victorine	46	Aspirant for Parliamenterian	Yaounde	20/01/2020
68	Atanga Godwin	55	Communication MDR	Yaounde	22/01/2020
69	Atagana Joseph Atanga	65	Former payer master for Bui and ex executive of the SDF	Bamenda	31/01/2020
70	Agwo Patrick	55	President GUDA Yaoundé	Yaoundé	05/02/2020
71	Metoh Mbah Joachim	58	CPDM Mayor Babessi	Bamenda	20/04/2020
72	Cletus Anye Matoyah	56	CPDM Session President for Mezam	Bamenda	02/05/2020
73	Jato Richard	50	Radio Hotcoco Journalist	Bamenda	03/05/2020
74	Peterkins Manyong	61	Publisher of Independent Observer	Bamenda	04/05/2020
75	Atekwana Joseph	67	National Treasurer	Bamenda	05/05/2020
76	Tikum Richard Anyang	56	SDF and later NUDP Execative	Yaounde	20/05/2020
77	Nkembe Samuel	37	Greffier Principal (Supreme Court)	Yaounde	21/05/2020
78	Mbah Ndam Boniface	50	SDF Lawyer	Yaounde	22/05/2020

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