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CENTRE DE RECHERCHE ET DE  
FORMATION DOCTORALE EN  
« SCIENCES HUMAINES, SOCIALES ET  
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UNITE DE RECHERCHE ET DE  
FORMATION DOCTORALE SCIENCES  
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DEPARTEMENT PHILOSOPHIE

UNIVERSITY OF YAOUNDE I

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POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL FOR HUMAN,  
SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES

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DOCTORAL RESEARCH UNIT FOR  
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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

**THE IDEA OF PERPETUAL PEACE IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A Contextual Reading  
of Raymond Aron's *Peace and War*.**

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To my son

OSANGA Daniel ABEKUM

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## ABSTRACT

Are Raymond Aron's views on war and strategy still relevant to twenty-first-century scholars who try to think about war<sup>1</sup>? It is this question of Jean-Vincent Holeindre that motivated us to read *Peace and War* (1962) in view of contextualising it. In this book, Raymond Aron presents his theory of International Relations as the science of peace and war. Peace is considered in its relation to power and Aron thinks that only an International Legal System could lead to perpetual peace. A contextual reading of *Peace and War* enables us to perceive the need to reform the United Nations System and, in a special way, its Security Council. That is why a particular attention has been given to the necessity for Africa to be given an important place in the United Nations Security Council in order to talk about her own problems in her own way, with her own voice. Beyond Aron's legacy, alongside with the need to have an International enforced Law System, peace-building in the world must be grounded on education and humanism. That is why *Ubuntu* has been presented as an African approach to peace-building and conflicts resolution that could contribute in promoting social solidarity at national level, at regional level and at international level so as to foster a system of Global Solidarity.

**Key words:** Peace, War, Pacifism, Aron, United Nations, International Relations, Humanism, *Ubuntu*

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<sup>1</sup> Jean-Vincent Holeindre, "Raymond Aron on War and Strategy: A Framework For Conceptualizing International Relations Today" in Colen, J., Dutartre-Michaud E. (eds), *The Companion to Raymond Aron: Recovering Political Philosophy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52243-6-3>

## RÉSUMÉ

La théorie de Raymond Aron sur la guerre et la stratégie est-elle encore pertinente pour les chercheurs du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle qui tentent de penser la guerre ? C'est cette question de Jean-Vincent Holeindre qui nous a motivé à lire *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (1962) en vue d'en faire une contextualisation. Dans ce livre, Raymond Aron présente sa théorie des relations internationales comme la science de la paix et de la guerre. La paix est considérée dans sa relation avec le pouvoir et Aron pense que seul un système juridique international peut conduire à une paix perpétuelle. Une lecture contextuelle de *Paix et guerre entre les nations* nous permet de percevoir la nécessité de réformer le système des Nations unies et, en particulier, son Conseil de sécurité. C'est pourquoi une attention particulière a été accordée à la nécessité de donner à l'Afrique une place importante au sein du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies afin qu'elle puisse parler de ses propres problèmes à sa manière, avec sa propre voix. Au-delà de l'héritage d'Aron et de la nécessité de mettre sur pied un système de droit international plus contraignant, la construction de la paix dans le monde doit être fondée sur l'éducation et l'humanisme. C'est pourquoi la philosophie de l'*Ubuntu* a été présentée comme une approche africaine de la construction de la paix et de la résolution des conflits qui pourrait contribuer à promouvoir la solidarité sociale au niveau national, régional et international afin de parvenir à un système de solidarité globale.

**Mots clés** : Paix, Guerre, Pacifisme, Aron, Nations Unies, Relations internationales, Humanisme, *Ubuntu*



## **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

A reflection on peaceful international relations has historically not succeeded in avoiding the question of war or violence. Today, more than ever, thanks to the developments of nuclear research and the enhancement of war technologies alongside with the New Information and Communication Technologies, peace is always threatened at national and at international level. As a matter of facts, current political events show that the world is marked by permanent tensions. It is in fact the scene of multiple conflicts that sometimes lead to the collapse of the state, or even the weakening of its authority. Through the New Information and Communication Technologies, conflict is more perceptible at a global level in the global village as it affects all the regions of the world.

The globalisation of conflict is illustrated by the omnipresence of violence which compromises the living together of humanity and threatens the possibility of perpetual peace. Such violence, because of the terrors that accompany it, provides a breeding ground for what Thomas Hobbes squarely described as the state of nature or the natural condition of man characterized by a permanent condition of conflicts of interest the result of which is the state of war “and such a war, as is of every man, against every man”<sup>2</sup> which makes humanity endure the horrible consequences of violence. This makes human life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”<sup>3</sup>, with the freedom of a beast that leads to uncontrollable violence. In other words, the omnipresence of violence poses the problem of peace and the means to ensure its sustainability.

It is in view of preserving the sustainability of peace and security that the League of Nations was created, leading to the establishment of the United Nations. This seemed to be a decisive step in the search for world peace. Through the U.N, it was thought that humanity, through states, was on the way to preventing conflict and war through the principle of collective security. The principle of collective security advocated the pursuit of world peace through peaceful and legal alliances between states, where each state would commit itself to the others not to attack their sovereignty. These alliances, as Kant conceived them in the *Perpetual Peace Project*, should eventually encompass all the countries of the world, rendering useless the idea of defensive warfare implied by the international disorder that prevailed at the time when the promoters of collective security were still only a club of the minorities and the privileged, still reduced to the circle of the winners of the Second World

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<sup>2</sup>Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), in *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, ed. by Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, p.532.

<sup>3</sup>*Idem.*

War. The Cold War, as history shows, was a conflict based on the antagonism of values underpinned by the desire to achieve the greatest nuclear power, to which the United States and the Soviet Union had exclusive claims. It thus imposed on humanity a political order based on the principle of the risk of collective (global) death. To put it in another way, the horrors of nuclear weapons have rendered any large-scale war impossible unless the human race as a whole is prepared to commit suicide.

The situation has hardly improved since the end of the Cold War and the division of the world according to the East-West equilibrium of power, which was materialised by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although these two events heralded the advent of a world at last pacified according to the principle of collective security that the United Nations embodied and still embodies, the number of armed conflicts has not stopped evolving. More and more people and states are fighting each other. More and more large-scale conflicts are taking place in the world in the form of defensive or offensive wars and asymmetric wars (terrorism). These include conflicts resulting from the political gangsterism of states that unilaterally use hyper-zoological force on the pretext of putting the world in order according to their axiological preferences, whenever their vital interests are at stake. These are high-risk conflicts insofar as the logic of terror in which they take place spares no one. From this observation, we are obliged to try to understand what has not worked since the end of the Cold War. Why has peace not yet become an effective reality when it is universally desired? What else can explain the fact that conflict is a growing activity in the world today?

Based on the above questioning, we propose to reflect on the issue of world peace in the light of Raymond Aron's political thought. This is the reason why our work is entitled *"The Idea of Perpetual Peace in International Relations: A Contextual Reading of Raymond Aron's Peace and War"*. The choice of Raymond Aron is not made haphazardly. It is motivated by the fact that he attempts to understand if, through International Legislation, the world can reach a situation of Perpetual Peace. He noted: *"At least we should raise the question, at the end of this long inquiry, on what conditions international politics would cease being power politics; that is, developing within the shadow of war and what is the likelihood of these conditions being realized today and tomorrow."*<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (1966), with a new introduction by Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian C. Anderson, New York: Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 703-704.

Raymond Aron, (born March 14, 1905, in Paris, France—died Oct. 17, 1983, Paris), French sociologist, historian, and political commentator known for his scepticism of ideological orthodoxies. The son of a Jewish jurist, Aron obtained his doctorate in 1930 from the *École Normale Supérieure* with a thesis on the philosophy of history. He was a professor of social philosophy at the University of Toulouse when World War II broke out in 1939, upon which he joined the French air force. After the fall of France he joined the Free French forces of General Charles de Gaulle in London and edited their newspaper, *La France Libre* (“Free France”), from 1940 to 1944. On his return to France he became a professor at the *École Nationale d’Administration*, and from 1955 to 1968 he was professor of sociology at the Sorbonne. From 1970 he was professor at the *Collège de France*. Throughout his life Aron was active as a journalist, and in 1947 he became a highly influential columnist for *Le Figaro*, a position he held for 30 years. He left *Le Figaro* in 1977, and from then until his death he wrote a political column for the weekly magazine *L’Express*<sup>5</sup>.

Although the expression “Perpetual Peace” is indissociable with Kant’s Seventeenth Century Project<sup>6</sup>, the question of peace and security has been a preoccupation of political philosophers throughout the history of philosophy. Without pretending to recall the whole debate that surrounds that question of the conditions for peace in the State, we will just rapidly present some major trends from which our philosophical development and inquiry stems and flows with Raymond Aron as our guide.

In the Ancient Period, as if he was giving an answer to Heraclitus who considered war as the mother of all things, thus declaring that instability–perpetual change and perpetual conflict - is the law of being, Plato analysed stability in the state in terms of harmony in the soul. That is why he gives the Magistrate (guardian or soldier) the duty to maintain peace and security in the state through the implementation of archetypal values contemplated in the world of Forms. In order to achieve such a mission, Plato stated: “until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, [...] cities will have no rest from evils”<sup>7</sup>. Unfortunately, while waiting for the advent of philosopher-kings, Athenians had to witness and suffer the terrors of wars, which is a proof that politics is first

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<sup>5</sup><https://www.britannica.com/biography/Raymond-Claude-Ferdinand-Aron>, consulted on 8<sup>th</sup> June 2020.

<sup>6</sup>Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, Trans. by David L. Colclasure, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *The Republic (420BC)*, in *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, ed. by Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, Book V, p.110.

and foremost concrete and deals with concrete people who can decide to rule according to moral principles or not. The Middle Ages will see the subordination of state rule under Church rule. That is why Augustine would consider Church's rule as the rule of God on earth<sup>8</sup>.

During the Renaissance Period, it is with Machiavelli that the question of peace and security will really be given great attention and outmost reflection. Indeed, it is possible to relate the political instability in the world today to the logic of political predation that prevails in the Machiavellian universe and which subjects it to a process of permanent corruption or decomposition. For Machiavelli, corruption first affects the national political universe. It is perceived as a phenomenon of degradation of the whole social body and the rupture of what links men together in a state. This is why it is a breeding ground for instability and terror. On several occasions, Machiavelli insists on the unstable character of the national political universe, precisely in the *History of Florence*, where he establishes that all states are always in motion in their existence and are never stable. In his words, Machiavelli asserts that:

*[...] It MAY BE OBSERVED, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they are subject, pass from order into confusion, and afterward recur to a state of order again; for the nature of mundane affairs not allowing them to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same manner, having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost state of depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend; and thus from good they gradually decline to evil, and from evil again return to good. The reason is that valor produces peace; peace, repose; repose, disorder; disorder, ruin;<sup>9</sup> [...]*

The life of states, as Machiavelli represents it, is indeed unstable. It is subject to a process of variation that compromises political stability and the living together of individuals. At the national level, instability corresponds to the disorders that arise in the government of a state due to the occasions linked to phenomena such as famine, the discontent of the people, the dissatisfaction of the nobles, the plots of the ambitious, the corruption of the ministers, the revolt of the army or the weakness of the princes. The internal instability of the states is also linked to the fickle nature of the people who are subject to the power of the prince. Machiavelli insists on this undeniable fact when he states that the nature of peoples varies and

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<sup>8</sup> Augustine, *The City of God*, in *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, ed. by Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001.

<sup>9</sup>Niccolo Machiavelli, *History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy from the Earliest Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent, In Book Five; Chapter One* (with a new introduction by Hugo Albert Rennert, Ph.D); Pennsylvania State University: *Electronic Classics Series*, 2007.p.218.

it is easy to persuade them of one thing, but it is difficult to make them remain in this persuasion.

At the international level, the same instability prevails in inter-state relations. Indeed, Machiavelli's idea of the world is also that of an unstable environment, where each nation is a wolf to the others, an environment in which the logic of political predation makes its bed and conditions the relations between nations. In such a perspective, each nation is constantly in struggle with the others to take control of all or part of the world in order to make its political vision prevail and impose it on others, near or far. The Machiavellian representation of the world thus shows that it is the place where violence dominates and where the search for power is the ordinary approach of every nation. It is for this reason that Machiavelli insists on the fact that every nation in the world is driven by the natural desire to conquer territory and extend its dominion over the entire surface of the earth, thus constantly jeopardizing peace.

During the Modern Period, Social Contract theories will rise up in order to demonstrate that peace and security are only possible when man gets out of the state of nature, decides to live under the authority of the law in a civil state. It is in the figure of the Leviathan that Thomas Hobbes<sup>10</sup> will design the necessary authority (individual or assembly) that has the duty to impose the rule of law over the natural appetites of men.

It is from the social contract theories that Raymond Aron's conception of International relations arises. He considers that the Social Contract theory is limited as it does not take into account the relations that states are obliged to have with others and the power gap that exists among states. Aron thinks that "*If all states had the same regime at the present time, there would probably not be a threat of a major war between the principal actors of the international system*"<sup>11</sup>. Also, the Social Contract theory is not sufficient to put an end to conflicts between nations because the civil state has not succeeded in killing man's natural appetites which are often in contradiction with the law. Man is always ready to return to the same selfishness that led him to the unbearable state of nature by his desire to subdue others and this will to power accompanies strong states in their ambitions to establish their hegemony worldwide. He writes:

*[...] Either the state of nature between states involves by essence the greater or less frequency of war, in such a way that peace can only result from the substitution of the rule of law for the rule of force, or it*

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<sup>10</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, Part Four, p. 708.

*involves the substitution of the universal state for the multiplicity of sovereignties. States fight either for something [...] or else because of something or someone*<sup>12</sup>[...]

Hence, according to Aron, International System of Legislation is needed to guarantee peace and security at international level. This means that the idea of perpetual peace will remain utopian if an International System of Legislation does not create a forum for interpreting and applying laws which should be binding. It will contribute in reducing the absolute sovereignty of states and in putting an end to war. Aron warns that it is always possible to get back to the state of nature at any time if our civil societies do not have an international framework of law for settling conflicts among nations.

In this light, the absolute sovereignty of states is an impediment to the absolute and obligatory application of international laws to settle conflicts between states. According to Aron,

*[...] These conflicts will not necessarily provoke war, but if they are not to be settled by arms, we must imagine that a tribunal pronounces the law or that an arbitration is solicited by both sides, or finally that a superior will imposes a solution. The first two hypotheses refer us back to peace by law and the renunciation by states of their right to administer their own justice, the third to universal empire. [...] We reach a doctrine or peace by the submission of state sovereignties to law or to force. [...] If states retain the supreme right to render justice, they cannot live within a definitive peace, unless they have changed their very nature or unless the world itself has essentially changed*<sup>13</sup>.

Now, despite the settlement of the United Nations Organisation, conflicts are permanent worldwide and the predation logic is still very rampant. The creation of supranational institutions like the International Penal Court has not succeeded in securing peace in the world. New forms of wars have emerged after Aron's aspirations in favour of perpetual peace in the world: asymmetric wars and terrorism. This powerlessness of International System of Legislation leads us to reflect on the conditions for peace and security in International Relations. Can an International System of Legislation lead to perpetual peace in the face of asymmetric or irregular wars that do not engage states? Why is peace still jeopardized in the world despite the putting in place of an International Systems of Legislation? How relevant is Aron's theory for our contemporary world?

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<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 706.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 708.

In part one entitled **“Peace and International Relations in Aron’s Political Philosophy”**, we would like to bring out the specificity of Aron’s conception of peace and International Relations while at the same time giving an account of the context of emergence of his thought, notably the influences that are perceptible therein. This part is dedicated to a profound analysis of the conditions and problems that led Aron to lay a system of International Legislation to guarantee Perpetual Peace in International Relations.

Part two entitled **“Questioning Aron’s Pacifism Today”** is an attempt to make a critical evaluation of the contribution of Aron’s philosophy of peace in present day International Relations. In fact, we would like to confront Aron’s thought with new forms of wars and conflicts: asymmetric wars and terrorism.

Part three is entitled **“Securing Peace in the World Today Beyond Aron’s Legacy”**. Despite its weaknesses, Raymond Aron thinks that a Supranational Organisation such as the U.N. remains the only platform that can provide the needed International Legislation. He is aware of the fact that such an Organisation needs continuous reforms in order to face the ever-rising new challenges. In this part of our work, we intend to show the role of the law as a mechanism which makes the idea of perpetual peace possible in International Relations. This will enable us to bring out the relevance of Aron’s conception of the conditions for perpetual peace in International Relations, more than thirty years after Aron. In this ultimate part of our reflection, we shall consider, in a special way, the fate of small states in the International Relations dominated by the Western paradigm of democracy and culture.

It can already be remarked that in the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. As far as he is concerned, Raymond Aron belongs to the school of Realism. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists’ emphasis on power and self-interest is often their scepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states.



Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The distinction should be drawn between classical realism-represented by such twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau-and radical or extreme realism. While classical realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it is not the Machiavellian doctrine “that anything is justified by reason of state” (Bull 1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of war or conflict. The classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in international politics. Rather, they are critical of moralism-abstract moral discourse that does not take into account political realities. They assign supreme value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences.

Realism encompasses a variety of approaches and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned. Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced by neo-realism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the study of international relations. Both classical realism and neo-realism have been subjected to criticism from International Relations theorists representing liberal, critical, and post-modern perspectives. It is our ambition, through this research, to strive to understand Aron’s original standpoint as a Realist theorist in order to appreciate his contribution to the problem of peace maintenance in the world.

**PART ONE**

**PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN  
ARON'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

## PARTIAL INTRODUCTION

Raymond Aron is a French multi-dimensional thinker who experienced the two World Wars. As such, his thought could be a corner stone for a reflection on peace and security in International Relations. As Reed Davis puts it,

*Born in Paris on March 14, 1905, Aron was of that generation whose intellectuals were students in the days that followed the First World War and [who] wrote their first books in the years that preceded the Second. After 1945, they wondered how to avoid the third. The 1930s were particularly painful for Aron, propelling him towards what he described as an “active pessimism”, an outlook that marked him for the rest of his life<sup>14</sup>.*

This “active pessimism” will paradoxically inspire a political theory full of optimism. This first part of our work examines the main trends of Aron’s political theory, namely the idea of peace and that of International Relations. Before developing these major trends of Aronism, we think it necessary to bring out the background of his political philosophy in order to be able to show his originality from thinkers that have influenced his thought in one way or another. We do not pretend to be exhaustive, going back to the whole history of political philosophy. We will just consider some of the thinkers who might have opened the path to political realism and pacifism in the Ancient period (Aristotle); in the Renaissance (Machiavelli) and in modernity: Marx, as far as political realism is concerned and Kant, as far as pacifism is concerned. It will be observed that Aron’s political theory, though it is influenced by Realism in politics, does not make the apology of violence and war as it is the case with Machiavelli. That is why Kant’s *Perpetual Peace Project* will be given a prominent consideration in order to better understand Aron’s specificity as far as the search of perpetual peace is concerned.

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<sup>14</sup>Reed Davis, “Raymond Aron and the Politics of Understanding”, in *The Political Science Reviewer*, Vol. IV, n° 2, 2009, p. 188.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE BACKGROUND OF ARON'S POLITICAL THEORY

Following his biography, it appears that Raymond Aron upheld a rationalist humanism that was often contrasted with the Marxist existentialism of his great contemporary, Jean-Paul Sartre. Though his range was slightly narrower than Sartre's and his international renown less general, Aron enjoyed a position of intellectual authority among French moderates and conservatives that almost rivalled Sartre's on the left. Among Aron's most influential works were *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (1955), which criticized left-wing conformism and the totalitarian tendencies of Marxist regimes. Aron himself became a strong supporter of the Western alliance. In "The Algerian Tragedy" (1957) he voiced his support for Algerian independence, and in *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973*, (1973) he attacked the unthinking hostility aimed at the United States by French leftists. A continuing theme in his writings was the subject of violence and war, as evidenced in such works as *Peace and War* (1962) and his books on the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Aron also wrote an influential history of sociology entitled *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (1967). His memoirs were published in 1983<sup>15</sup>.

Through Raymond Aron's political thought, a critical history of political philosophy from its origins to the present day is apparent: Aristotle for Antiquity, Machiavelli for the Renaissance, Marx for Modernity and Tocqueville for Contemporary Times. As for the Middle Ages, dominated by theocentrism, it knew a much censured political philosophy, philosophy being entirely subjected to theology, and power being theocratically oriented. These four authors do not give to the term "politics" the same content. However, all of them are obsessed, with the exception of Machiavelli, by the question of the best regime.

#### I.1. Aristotle and the Idea of Political Sociology

Turning from the Ethics treatises to their sequel, *The Politics*, the reader is brought down to earth. "Man is by nature a political animal",<sup>16</sup> Aristotle observes; human beings are creatures of flesh and blood, rubbing shoulders with each other in cities and communities. Like his work in zoology, Aristotle's political studies combine observation and theory. He and his students documented the constitutions of 158 states—one of which, The Constitution of Athens, has survived on papyrus. The aim of the Politics, Aristotle says, is to investigate, on

<sup>15</sup><https://www.britannica.com/biography/Raymond-Claude-Ferdinand-Aron>, consulted on 8<sup>th</sup> June 2020.

<sup>16</sup>Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T.A. Sinclair, New York: Penguin Books, 1962. Book I, p.28.

the basis of the constitutions collected, what makes for good government and what makes for bad government and to identify the factors favourable or unfavourable to the preservation of a constitution.

Aristotle asserts that all communities aim at some good<sup>17</sup>. The state (polis), by which he means a city-state such as Athens, is the highest kind of community, aiming at the highest of goods. The most primitive communities are families of men and women, masters and slaves. Families combine to make a village, and several villages combine to make a state, which is the first self-sufficient community. The state is no less natural than the family; this is proved by the fact that human beings have the power of speech, the purpose of which is “to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust.” The foundation of the state was the greatest of benefactions, because only within a state can human beings fulfil their potential.

Government, Aristotle says, must be in the hands of one, of a few, or of the many; and governments may govern for the general good or for the good of the rulers. Government by a single person for the general good is called “monarchy”; for private benefit, “tyranny.” Government by a minority is “aristocracy” if it aims at the state’s best interest and “oligarchy” if it benefits only the ruling minority. Popular government in the common interest Aristotle calls “polity” or Constitutional Governments; he reserves the word “democracy” for anarchic mob rule. He recalls that human beings originally get together for the common interest and the common benefit<sup>18</sup>; it follows that:

*Those constitutions which aim at the common good are right, as being in accord with absolute justice. While those which aim only at the good of the rulers are wrong. They are all deviations from the right standard. They are like the rule of master over slave, where the master’s interest is paramount. But the state is an association of free men<sup>19</sup>.*

This is evidently a qualitative way of classifying the political regimes: how do rulers exercise their power? To this Aristotle adds a quantitative way: how many are those in power? For the term “constitution” (politeia) identifies the “concrete government” (politeuma); this is ‘supreme’ or ‘sovereign’ (kyrion) in any city and may be composed of one, few or many citizens. When the one, the few or the many rule with a view to the common good we have a

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<sup>17</sup>Aristotle, « *Politics* », in *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, ed. by Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, Book I, p.301, 1252a.

<sup>18</sup>Aristotle, *The Politics*, *op cit*, Book III, p.115.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

right constitution; when they rule for their personal interest, we have a perversion. The resulting classification is as follows:

<b>Right regimes</b>	<b>Perversions</b>
Monarchy (Kingship)	Tyranny
Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Polity (Politeia)	Democracy

If a community contains an individual or family of outstanding excellence, then, Aristotle says, monarchy is the best constitution. But such a case is very rare, and the risk of miscarriage is great, for monarchy corrupts into tyranny, which is the worst constitution of all. Aristocracy, in theory, is the next-best constitution after monarchy (because the ruling minority will be the best-qualified to rule), but in practice Aristotle preferred a kind of constitutional democracy, for what he called “polity” is a state in which rich and poor respect each other’s rights and the best-qualified citizens rule with the consent of all. Aristotle is aware that some people consider Sparta a mixed constitution and they extol its merits for this since they believe that the best regime should consist in a mixture of all constitutions – monarchy, oligarchy and democracy<sup>20</sup>.

Two elements of Aristotle’s teaching affected European political institutions for many centuries: his justification of slavery and his condemnation of usury. Some people, Aristotle says, think that the rule of master over slave is contrary to nature and therefore unjust. But they are quite wrong: a slave is someone who is by nature not his own property but someone else’s. Aristotle agrees, however, that in practice much slavery is unjust, and he speculates that, if non-living machines could be made to carry out menial tasks, there would be no need for slaves as living tools. Nevertheless, some people are so inferior and brutish that it is better for them to be controlled by a master than to be left to their own devices.

From Aristotle, Aron takes what he calls political sociology. It is a study based on observable social facts. This is what allowed Aristotle to establish a famous classification of the three fundamental regimes: the monarchic regime where the sovereign power belongs to one person, the oligarchic regime where the power is held by a minority of people at a time, the democratic regime where the sovereign power belongs to all citizens. To this

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<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p.71: In Sparta monarchy would be represented by the two kings; oligarchy by the Council of Elders and democracy by the Ephors, who are drawn from the rank of the people

classification, he added the antithesis of the healthy and corrupt forms, and finally he studied the mixed regimes<sup>21</sup>.

But this universal classification relying on the criterion of the number will be abandoned in the course of history.

## **I.2. Machiavelli and Political Realism**

Idealism in international relations, like realism, can lay claim to a long tradition. Unsatisfied with the world as they have found it, idealists have always tried to answer the question of “what ought to be” in politics. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there were some universal moral values on which political life could be based. Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic and international politics. His ideas concerning righteousness in war were carried further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the late fifteenth century, when Niccolò Machiavelli was born, the idea that politics, including the relations among states, should be virtuous, and that the methods of warfare should remain subordinated to ethical standards, still predominated in political literature<sup>22</sup>.

Machiavelli (1469–1527) challenged this well-established moral tradition, thus positioning himself as a political innovator. The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his separation of politics from ethics. He thereby lays the foundations for modern politics. In chapter XV of *The Prince*, Machiavelli announces that in departing from the teachings of earlier thinkers, he seeks “real life and not waste time with a discussion of an imaginary world”<sup>23</sup>. The “real life” is for him the only truth worth seeking. It represents the sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavelli replaces the ancient virtue (a moral quality of the individual, such as justice or self-restraint) with *virtù*, ability or vigour. As a prophet of *virtù*, he promises to lead both nations and individuals to earthly glory and power.

Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to both domestic and international affairs. It is a doctrine which denies the relevance of morality in politics, and

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<sup>21</sup>Aristotle, *The Politics*, *op cit*, Book III, p.325.

<sup>22</sup><https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/#MachCritMoraTrad>, consulted on 12<sup>th</sup> July 2020.

<sup>23</sup>Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, from “The portable Machiavelli”, in *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*, edited by Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett publishing company, 2001, p448.

claims that all means (moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political ends. Although Machiavelli never uses the phrase *ragione di stato* or its French equivalent, *raison d'état*, what ultimately counts for him is precisely that: whatever is good for the state, rather than ethical scruples or norms.

Machiavelli justified immoral actions in politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes, and to apply it to international relations. By asserting that the state has no higher duty than of maintaining itself, Hegel<sup>24</sup> gave an ethical sanction to the state's promotion of its own interest and advantage against other states. Thus, he overturned the traditional morality. The good of the state was perversely interpreted as the highest moral value, with the extension of national power regarded as a nation's right and duty. Referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state was power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers, and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power. He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar as it was expedient for the state. The idea of an autonomous ethics of state behaviour and the concept of *real politik* were thus introduced. Traditional ethics was denied and power politics was associated with a "higher" type of morality. These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with which German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified their policies of conquest and extermination.

Machiavelli is often praised for his prudential advice to leaders (which has caused him to be regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy) and for his defense of the republican form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such praise. Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for the demoralization of Europe. The argument of the Athenian envoys presented in Thucydides' "Melian Dialogue," that of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*, or that of *Carneades*, to whom Cicero refers—all of these challenge the ancient and Christian views of the unity of politics and ethics. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainstream of Western political thought. It was

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<sup>24</sup>Friedrich Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbert, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.



the force and timeliness of his justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political ends that persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him. The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other to the bitter end without regard for the rules of justice. The tension between expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a double ethics, private and public, that created a further damage to traditional, customary ethics was invented. The doctrine of *raison d'état* ultimately led to the politics of *Lebensraum*, two world wars, and the Holocaust.

Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is. Even if they do not explicitly raise ethical questions, in the works of Waltz and of many other of today's neo-realists, a double ethics is presupposed, and words such as *real politik* no longer have the negative connotations that they had for classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau.

It is especially to Machiavelli, says Aron, that one must attribute the dissolution of the traditional and classical political philosophy, even if the philosophies of history will also contribute to it. What we call today Machiavellian philosophy breaks with any moral conception of politics. In the philosophy of Machiavelli, there remain ideas and justifications, but they are in the service of the will to power. The merit of a political formula does not lie in its value or its truth, but in its effectiveness. Ideas are only weapons, means of combat employed by men, by definition engaged in battle; and in a battle, one can have no other end than to win.

But this cynical conception of politics, although objective, cannot be held to be valid, because it sees the essence of politics in the struggle for power alone. Certainly, there is a struggle for power, but it is not a fierce, increased struggle. And whoever does not see the "struggle for power" aspect is naive, and whoever sees nothing but this aspect is a false realist. What is to be sought is the legitimacy of the governing authority.

### **I.3. Montesquieu and the Question of Legality**

Montesquieu will introduce in *The Spirit of the Laws* a new variable. He retains Aristotle's idea that the nature of a regime depends on those who hold sovereign power. But in his classification of regimes into republic, monarchy and despotism, there is no difference

in the number of holders of sovereign power in the monarchical and despotic. The classical question was: who commands? With Montesquieu the question becomes: is sovereign power exercised in accordance with fixed laws or without rules and laws? The answer to this question calls for a new criterion: legality. Moreover, this answer indicates that each of these regimes characterizes a social and demographic type, as Rousseau also saw. Thus, the republic is really only possible in small cities, the monarchy is the characteristic regime of medium-sized states. With large states, despotism is inevitable. But this is not to say that mainland China is wrong to call itself a republic, or that the United States, which has fifty states and prides itself on being the showcase of democracy, is just an exception.

This observation shows us not only that there are other variables to be introduced into the classification of political regimes, but also that it is necessary to move away, in Aron's view, from the moral question of seeking the best regime.

#### **I.4. Marx and the Idea of Economic Infrastructure**

As far as the philosophies of history are concerned, of which Marx is the eminent representative, they subordinate the political problem to the economic-social problem. For Marx, the fundamental questions come down to these: what is the organization of production? What are the relations between classes? As for the political regime, the analysis of the social structure will explain it at once.

Marx looked to economic development, or 'productive forces', to use Marxist jargon, as the key to explaining transformations in social structure and political organisation. Aron's research, however, leads to a kind of primacy of politics over economics. According to Aron, this primacy of politics over economics is particularly evident in regimes that claim to be Marxist-Leninist, i.e. in regimes that profess the decisive role of "economic infrastructure". The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 was essentially a political phenomenon. The major characteristics of the Soviet economy derive, at least partly, from the party and its ideology. The Soviet economy is politicised, its structure and functioning are subordinated to political considerations: *"[...] the present leaders of the Soviet economy are less concerned with doctrine and more concerned with efficiency, and even today we can see some signs of this."*<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup>Raymond Aron, *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, Valence Ionescu, (Translator), Julian Pitt-Rivers & Ernest Gellner (ed), Great Britain: The Nature of Human Society Series, 1968, p.108.

Aron, for his part, was well aware of the significance of the ideological phenomenon. Among his later works, *Plaidoyer pour l'Europe décadente* (1977) bears striking witness to this. In the second chapter, entitled "Ideocracy or Marxism as a State Ideology", he subtly contrasts the views of the two great Russian dissidents, A. Solzhenitsyn and A. Sakharov: "How can we reconcile the ideology of the Soviet Union with the ideology of Russia? Sakharov: "How can faith and scepticism be reconciled? How does ideology manage to tyrannise minds that have stopped believing in it? The Soviet leaders are not unaware of the exact relationship between the standards of living in the East and the West, nor of the superior productivity of the Western economies, nor, of the advance of American science and technology in most fields. In this sense, they accept the secular reality of statistics. They did not, however, deny super-reality, the identification of the party with the proletariat, the necessity of public ownership of the instruments of production, in short the prophetism of Marx himself. Reality and super-reality coexist in people's minds. Capitalism remains cursed as such, whatever the experience of the so-called socialist regimes.

As he recounts at one point in his Memoirs, his conversion to sociology had begun with the study of Marxism. This was in the early 1930s. A few years later, one of his texts, published in 1937, is on "Politics and Economics in Marxist Doctrine". This study is more philosophical than sociological, but Aron will later take up the problem of the relationship between politics and economy in a more sociological way. It is worth mentioning in particular his lectures at the Sorbonne, given in 1957-1958 and published in 1965 by Gallimard under the title *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, in which Aron expresses his vision of the relationship between politics and economy through the idea of the "primacy of politics". In this concept of the primacy of politics, we can see on the one hand a continuity with classical philosophical thought. But, at the same time and above all, Aron discovers in favour of this primacy of politics many sociological reasons, drawn from the analysis of the industrial societies of his time, i.e. of the 20th century. Let us recall that his courses on industrial societies begin with an analysis of the economic features of industrial societies (courses of 1955-1956, published in 1962 by Gallimard under the title *Eighteen Lessons on Industrial Society*), and continue, in 1956-1957, with an analysis of the social structure of industrial societies (this second part of Aron's trilogy was published by Gallimard in 1964 under the title the *Class Struggle*), and

ended in 1957-1958 with the study of the political regimes of industrial societies analysed above<sup>26</sup>.

Aron opposes sociology, as conceived by its 19th century founders: In the history of ideas, sociology could almost be defined by the primacy of the concept of society over the concept of politics (or of the State). In spite of their differences, Auguste Comte and Karl Marx, through different paths, meet on this essential point.

This other conception affirms the primacy of the economy over politics. But, as we shall see later, it is rather the opposite. At least that is what Aron thinks. This idea comes from Tocqueville, who had followed the transformations of American society in the 19th century.

### **I.5. Tocqueville and the Democratic Ideal**

From Tocqueville, in fact, Aron takes his choice for democracy, the political regime that corresponds, according to him, best to the requirements of industrial society. Within such a regime, the class struggle has another connotation, nothing to do with Marx's "struggle to the death". However, Marx will stimulate Aron's economic thought.

We have tried to show that Raymond Aron reformulates the idea of the primacy of politics, characteristic of classical philosophy, in a new context: that of the sociological analysis of 20th century industrial civilisation. The problematic of the relationship between politics and economics, as well as the idea that it is economic development that serves as a point of departure, comes from the study of Marx. But in terms of the conclusions he reaches, Aron is much closer to Tocqueville, whom he considers one of the founders of sociology. The idea of the primacy of politics constitutes for Aron a sort of "bridge" between classical political philosophy and political sociology.

What is true is that Montesquieu and Tocqueville do not break with the tradition of classical philosophy, even if both emphasise the link between the social state and the political regime, and thus highlight the social conditions and consequences of the political regime. Unlike Comte and Durkheim, they do not postulate the supremacy of the social over the political, or even the insignificance of the political over the social. Tocqueville, because he was ultimately aiming at the political, still has something to tell us.

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<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

Aron clearly rejects the idea of the ‘convergence’ of the East and West, especially in his *Three Essays on the Industrial Age*. In his view, industrial civilisation has two variants: despotic and liberal. Socialism is not the historical successor of capitalism, as Marxists believe. Capitalism and socialism are contemporaries of each other; they are two alternatives, two different methods of solving similar problems.

The inspiration of Tocqueville is undeniable here and Aron claims to be inspired by him on numerous occasions. In his time, Aron shocked most of his contemporaries among the French intelligentsia who took for granted the "superiority of socialism over capitalism". Today, we tend to forget that for too long, the economy of Soviet-type regimes has been considered - wrongly - as a strong point (admiring in particular the rate of growth, the solution of the unemployment problem and the integral planning considered by many Western intellectuals as “rational”). Aron, on the other hand, knew the economy much better than most of the great French intellectuals and he never feared the economic superiority of the Soviet Union.

It can therefore be argued that Raymond Aron was less surprised by the fall of the Soviet empire than most of his colleagues. In *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, he writes: “In order that a revolution may take place in a regime of the monopolistic party, which is solidly entrenched as in the Soviet Union, a scission in the privileged minority must be made”.<sup>27</sup> This is what happened and Aron, a great admirer of Tocqueville, would not have been surprised if the Soviet bloc had collapsed at the same time as Gorbachev was trying to reform it. Recall the famous words of *The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution*:

*It is not always going from bad to worse that leads to revolution. What happens most often is that a people that put up with the most oppressive laws without complaint, as if they did not feel them, rejects those laws violently when the burden is alleviated. The regime that a revolution destroys is almost always better than the one that immediately preceded it, and experience teaches that the most dangerous time for a bad government is usually when it begins to reform”<sup>28</sup>.*

## **I.6. Kant and the Perpetual Peace Project**

The expression “Perpetual Peace” is usually associated to Immanuel Kant as he formulates the project in an essay that certainly contributed to the putting in place of a Supranational Organization in order to maintain peace in the world. In the Preface of this

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<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>28</sup>A. de Tocqueville, *The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution*, Book III, Chap. 4, p.157.

Philosophical Essay, Professor Latta affirms that Kant was not pessimistic enough to believe that perpetual peace is an unrealisable dream nor was he optimistic enough to visualize that it is an ideal that could be realised. According to Kant, Perpetual Peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative Utopian idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a moral principle which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised<sup>29</sup>.

In order to reach Perpetual Peace, Kant develops a set of conditions including a Cosmopolitan Right. According to him, perpetual peace is impossible between independent nations. This is because although independent nations can make treatises and alliances, these treatises and alliances are only binding as long as it is not in the interest of either party to denounce them and get rid of them. The only condition to prevent war among independent states is to put an end to independence. In the same manner in which peace between individuals can only be achieved and permanently secured by the institution of a republican government, so is peace achievable among nations only in a federation of free republican states.

The Kantian influence on Aron's philosophy of peace is visible in the role that a supranational organisation has to play in order to maintain peace in the world. According to Aron, only an International Law System can guarantee peace among nations. This International Law System is controlled by the supranational organisation.

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<sup>29</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (1795)*, trans. M. Campbell Smith, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1915. Preface, p. vi.

## CONCLUSION

At the end of this introductory chapter of our work, we reach the conclusion that if one had to divide the themes of Raymond Aron's political thought, one would attribute, by deliberate anachronism, the origin of the classification of political regimes to Aristotle, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, the philosophy of economy or correlatively the class struggle to the opposition between Marx and Tocqueville. As for international relations, which are inter-regime relations, he had them before his eyes and could, moreover, from there, complete his classification of regimes. Raymond Aron's sociology is a political sociology that opposes the founders of sociology who take for granted the primacy of the concept of society over the concept of politics. Against them, he does not break with the tradition of classical philosophy. This did not prevent the author of *Eighteen Lessons on Industrial Society* from approaching democracies and totalitarianisms in a 'Schumpeterian', and therefore non-classical, way. Towards the end of his life, Raymond Aron's work was finally recognized. His great intellectual and political lucidity was rightly praised. The publication, a few months before his death, of his *Memoirs* (1983), was a real triumph and the imposing work sold like a bestseller. However, let us beware of excessive optimism. Raymond Aron's ideas are not as widespread or as well-known as one might think. The author who pointed out that the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 was mainly a political phenomenon would probably say, if he were still alive, that the events of 1989 were also mainly political. It seems to me that, as in Aron's time, this approach is far from being unanimously accepted, both by social and political scientists and by the 'practitioners' of public life. The thesis of the primacy of the economy (especially in relation to politics) remains as common, if not dominant, today. Although Marxist-Leninist theorists have been more or less swept aside by history since 1989, they have been taken over in this respect by many of their former Western adversaries. The primacy of the economy can be either axiological or causal. For it should not be forgotten that economic development and political democracy are not simply two de facto processes whose interrelationships scholars can analyze.

## CHAPTER TWO

### PEACE IN RAYMOND ARON'S POLITICAL THEORY

This chapter aims at analysing Raymond Aron's conception of peace in his book *Peace and War*. From the outset, it must already be remarked that the French thinker, just like Aristotle considered that every society aims at achieving a common goal; he considers that every society's goal is to leave in harmony and maintain togetherness. For this to be achieved, it is important to guarantee peace: "because peace is rationally the goal to which societies tend"<sup>30</sup>. Peace is notoriously difficult to define, and this poses a special challenge for articulating any comprehensive philosophy of peace. Any discussion on what might constitute a comprehensive philosophy of peace invariably overlaps with wider questions of the meaning and purpose of human existence. The definitional problem is, paradoxically, a key to understanding what is involved in articulating a philosophy of peace. In general terms, one may differentiate negative peace, that is, the relative absence of violence and war, from positive peace, that is, the presence of justice and harmonious relations. One may also refer to integrative peace, which sees peace as encompassing both social and personal dimensions.

#### 2.1. Aron's Definition of Peace

Peace can only be well understood in relation to war. That is why Aron talks about the "dialectics of peace and war"<sup>31</sup> and the title of his book itself suggests this intimate relationship that exists between these two realities. According to Aron,

*Peace has hitherto appeared to be the more or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units. Peace is said to prevail when the relations between nations do not involve the military forms of struggle. But since these peaceful relations occur within the shadow of past battles and in the fear or the expectation of future ones, the principle of peace [...] is not different in nature from that of wars: peace is based on power, that is, on the relation between the capacities of acting upon each other possessed by the political units*<sup>32</sup>.

From this definition, we can derive two main characteristics of peace. First, peace appears, in its negative sense, as the absence of war. Such a negative definition of peace goes in line with Aron's political realism. He is not interested in telling us what peace must be; he

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<sup>30</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, Part One, p.150.

<sup>31</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p.151.



gives a historical account of peace in between “past battles” and “future ones”. Peace exists when there is no war, no military struggle among nations.

Secondly, in its positive sense, peace is a permanent conquest, a perpetual challenge as it is “based on power”, on the capacity of people and nations to respect one another, to refrain from violence and all kinds of conflicts. It could therefore be said that peace is the power of tolerance, the power of love, the power of respect, the power of self-mastery, in short, the power of non-violent and positive attitudes that has to encompass the power of intolerance, the power of hatred, the power of discrimination and all kind of abuses that lead to conflict among people and among nations.

In a nutshell, we can say that peace is more than the absence of war. It also means various ways of cooperation between states. Without it, there is no real peace; there is only a sort of truce. Also, there is difference between local, regional or world peace. If we speak about the world peace, in the strict sense, it is a stable state characterized by a complete absence of war and developed cooperation among states and other international subjects i.e. a reality in which the war has definitely become a historical category, an ugly part of the past. In other words, something that really does not exist for now, something that weighs and hopes. On the other hand, peace is also one of basic human rights.

## 2.2. The Typology of Peace

In order to distinguish the different types of peace, Aron uses the criterion of power. According to him, peace can be better understood in relation to force. As such, since the relations of power, in peace time, without being the exact reflections of the actual or potential relation of forces, are a more or less distorted expression of it, the various types of peace can be related to the types of relation of forces<sup>33</sup>. He writes:

*I distinguish three types of peace-equilibrium, hegemony, empire: in a given historical space, the forces of the political units are in balance, or else they are dominated by those of one among them, or else they are outclassed by those of one among them to the point where all the units, save one, lose their autonomy and tend to disappear as centers of political decisions. The imperial state, in the end, reserves to itself the monopoly of legitimate violence<sup>34</sup>.*

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<sup>33</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>34</sup>*Idem.*

**Peace by equilibrium** occurs when states experience a balance of power. Here there is reciprocal respect. It therefore follows that a balance of terror is the condition of a balance of power. For example, powerful states gathered in G7 or G20 experience mutual respect because there is a balance of power that maintains them in peace.

**Peace by empire** occurs when power is disproportionate between a state and another. At time an empire can dominate many political units by imposing them “peace”. Such peace is maintained as long as the hegemony of the empire upon the dominated states lasts. For example, colonised states, dominated by the colonising powers experienced peace by empire.

**Peace by hegemony** is sandwiched between *peace by equilibrium* and *peace by empire*. The absence of war does not result from the approximate equality of forces prevailing among political units and forbidding any one of them or any coalition to impose its will. It results, on the contrary, from the incontestable superiority of one of the units. This superiority is such that the unsatisfied states despair of modifying the status quo, and yet the hegemonic state does not try to absorb the units reduced to impotence. It does not abuse hegemony, it respects the external forms of state independence and it does not aspire to empire.<sup>35</sup>

When we observe the relations between African states and their former colonisers, we have the impression that these relations are conditioned by peace by hegemony. Some states are imposed an official language, an educational system, a currency and even sometimes, they are not free to choose their governments. Failing to rebel themselves, they are “independent” and dominated as well. This is what is called “neo-colonisation”, a new form of political, social and economic domination; colonisation from a far. Through neo-colonisation, the former colonial masters continue to influence life in Africa in one way or the other.

In order to give an illustration of the way nations have experienced peace throughout history, Raymond Aron gives an account of the Greco-Latin civilisation and the Asian civilisation. He writes:

*Neither the ancient world nor Asia nor modern Europe has known a lasting phase between equilibrium and empire. The Greco-Latin civilization of the Mediterranean, after long periods of disturbance, evolved toward imperial peace. In Asia the three great civilizations alternated between peace by equilibrium and imperial peace. In Japan, peace by equilibrium was retrospectively considered as a feudal dispersion of sovereignty because the Tokugawa imperial peace, thanks to the homogeneity of culture and institutions, turned into civil peace. The*

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<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, p.152.

*imperial unity achieved in China over two thousand years ago—as a result of the final victory of one state over its rival only succeeded through alternate phases of decomposition and restoration, of civil wars, and a peace that was both civil and imperial. In its foreign relations, the empire hesitated between the defensive, behind its great walls, and inclination toward impulses of expansion*<sup>36</sup>.

In our opinion, peace by equilibrium appears to be more secure than peace by empire or by hegemony. As a matter of facts, peace is always jeopardized wherever there is any kind of domination of some people by others. At the heart of Marx's dialectical materialism is the view that our ideas are shaped by our material conditions. In the opinion of Karl Marx, the “superstructure” (world of the mind) is determined by the ‘infrastructure’ (material world or conditions). This means that our thinking faculties are conditioned by the problems that we face in our lives. In the opening lines of the opening chapter of his *Communist Manifesto*, a book co-written with Friedrich Engels, Marx identified the engine of his dialectical materialism: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”<sup>37</sup>. Class struggle is thus the engine that moves Marx's dialectical materialism forward. The class struggle in our society is therefore between the land-owners and the labourers, the rich and the poor, the masters and the slaves, or in the words of Marx, the “bourgeoisie” (oppressors) and the “proletariat” (oppressed)<sup>38</sup>. A society of classes is based on the economic system called capitalism in which there is survival of the fittest so that while the rich get richer, the poor get poorer. Such a system sows the seeds for future class struggles. The stage is therefore set for Marx's dialectical materialism.

No human being likes to suffer without seeking redress. As such, the proletariat cannot suffer oppression without seeking to do something about it. Due to the deplorable nature of their material conditions, the members of the proletariat class develop revolutionary consciousness. This is because our material conditions shape our ideas. The thesis of Marx's dialectical materialism is frustration for the oppressed. The material conditions of the labourers push them to revolt against the land-owners; thus the antithesis to capitalism is a violent revolution which seeks to abolish the inequality. The aim of this dialectic process is to attain socialism, a classless society characterized by freedom and equal opportunities for all. Socialism or the classless society is a synthesis or reconciliation of capitalism and the conflict it creates. To Marx, Just like peace by empire or by hegemony, capitalism is a system whose

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<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p.153.

<sup>37</sup>Karl MARX & Friedrich ENGELS, *The Communist Manifesto* (1888), trans. Samuel Moore, with an introduction by A. J. P. Taylor, London: Penguin Books, 1967, p.79.

<sup>38</sup>*Idem.*

nature prepares for its downfall as a matter of logical necessity. This is because such a system is marked by inherent conflict or tension that destroys it. Like Aronian peace by equilibrium, Marx's dialectical materialism, therefore closes in on the ideal of socialism, the model of a human society in which everyone has equal access to the factors of production and in which everyone enjoys the fruits of his labour.

When peace is dictated by the law of the most powerful, the law of the strongest; such peace can easily turn out into violence and occasionally war. That is why Jean-Jacques Rousseau refutes the law of the strongest as he wonders:

*To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will; it is at best an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a moral duty? [...] For once might is made to be right, cause and effect are reversed, and every force which overcomes another force inherits the right which belonged to the vanquished. As soon as man can disobey with impunity, his disobedience becomes legitimate; and as the strongest is always right, the only problem is how that to become the strongest. But what can be the validity of a right which perishes with the force on which it rests?*<sup>39</sup>

In this vein we could also ask ourselves the following questions: "What kind of peace; is it that which is broken when power ceases? Is such a peace not only a maturation of war?"

### 2.3. Aron's Definition of War

Raymond Aron adopts Clausewitz's definition of war an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will<sup>40</sup> and considers it as his point of departure in his attempt to explain the phenomenon of war in relation to peace. For him, this definition is no less valid today than at the moment it was written. War, insofar as it is a social act, presupposes the conflicting wills of politically organized collectivities. Each seeks to prevail over the other. "Physical force . . . is therefore the *means*; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object."<sup>41</sup>

Further, Aron still adopts Clausewitz's famous formula according to which "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means"<sup>42</sup>. In his point of view, such a formula

<sup>39</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, (1762) trans. & ed. by Maurice Cranston, London: Penguin Books, 2004. Book I, Chapter III, pp.5-6.

<sup>40</sup>Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984: Book I, Chapter I. p.75.

<sup>41</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, Part One, p.21.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 23.

is not the expression of a bellicose philosophy, but a simple observation of fact: war is not an end in itself; military victory is not the goal in itself. Commerce between nations does not cease the day guns begin to speak; the belligerent phase takes its place in a continuity of relations always controlled by the collectivities' intentions toward each other<sup>43</sup>. Hence, war is a political phenomenon.

From this definition, Clausewitz deduces the tendency of war to escalate or even to become total. The basic reason for this is what Aron calls the *dialectics of the contest*. Finally Aron retains Clausewitz definition of war as "... an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme."<sup>44</sup> This means that war is a reciprocal conflicting situation opposing two opponents called belligerents.

#### 2.4. The Typology of Wars

From Clausewitz's formula, Aron distinguishes two types of wars: Absolute wars on the one hand and Real wars on the other. The subordination of war to politics as a means to an end, implicit in Clausewitz's formula, establishes and justifies the distinction of absolute war and real wars.

Absolute War is often confused with the very different concept of "ideal war" featured in the first chapter of *On War*. In that discussion, Clausewitz explained that ideal war is a philosophical abstraction-a "logical fantasy"-that is impossible in practice because it is not directed or constrained by political motives or concerns, nor limited by the practical constraints of time, space, and human nature. He called *real war* warfare constrained by these moderating real-world influences. Absolute War is also routinely confused with "*Total War*" a term that does not appear in Clausewitz's book *On War*.

Absolute war is characterized by very high levels of energy and professional competence, and it aims at the destruction of the opposing force and the attainment of a political decision by force of arms. It contrasts to a weaker, less competent-even pointless-form Clausewitz called "war of observation," based on the carefully circumscribed use of force in the century or so prior to the French Revolution. This two-ended framework appears to have been experimental. Clausewitz became quite critical of it by the middle of Book VIII - thereafter the term absolute war dropped out and the weak, befuddled nature of "war of observation" was transformed into a perfectly legitimate, respectable form called the "limited

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<sup>43</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 21.

aim." In Book I, drafted later, the term absolute war does not appear; for practical purposes, war in the real world is described using a spectrum bounded by the limited aim of wearing down the enemy's will to carry on the military struggle vice the most ambitious form available in reality, the aim of rendering one's opponent militarily helpless.

In its ideal form, war must be evaluated as 'pure concept,' meaning that war has timeless elements such as 'violence, political impact, and the vagaries of the play of human intelligence, will and emotions.' A state of absolute war would not consider the political and moral limits that hold significant in real, or total war. Ideal war can be seen to be an act of violence without compromise by mirror-image states pursuing objectives of the very highest importance, in which they fight to war's "logical" extremes; it is a war unaffected by political and moral considerations or moderation. In *On War*, Clausewitz explains what makes up this "ideal" war in a philosophical sense: "The three reciprocal actions", namely the utmost use of force, the disarmament of the enemy as the aim and an utmost exertion of powers.

Clausewitz states that "*...if one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand*<sup>45</sup>". Therefore, war in its most logical form would involve each state continually reciprocating each other's use of force (plus some) to maintain superiority, until both were using violence to its utmost extent. This is the **first reciprocal action**, and leads to the first extreme of war.

Clausewitz stated that the logical purpose of war is to make the opponent comply with one's will. However, an opponent will obviously not do that unless it becomes the least oppressive of its available options. Therefore, in order to make the enemy comply with one's will, a state must place its adversary in a position that is more oppressive to it than compliance. Furthermore, that position cannot be temporary, or appear to be temporary. This is because it will be more likely that an enemy will simply 'ride out the storm' in the prospect of being in a better position at a later stage. Any change in this position would be a change for the worse, and so in order to best achieve this position a state must disarm its enemy (forcing it into a position from which it cannot resist). As stated in his text: "his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance"<sup>46</sup>.

Furthermore, as war involves two (or more) hostile states, this principle applies to both, and so it becomes the **second reciprocal action**, whereby both try to impose such a

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<sup>45</sup> Clausewitz, *op. cit.* pp. 75-76.

<sup>46</sup> *Idem.*

position on the other. Here Clausewitz states that if a state wishes to defeat its enemies it must annihilate them. According to Clausewitz, the use of power involves two factors. The first is the *strength of available means*, which may be measured somewhat by numbers (although not entirely). The second factor is the *strength of the will* which cannot be specifically measured (only estimated) as it is intangible.

Once a state has learned the enemy's strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage. As the enemy will also be doing this, it too becomes reciprocal, the **third reciprocal action**, creating a third push towards an extreme.

There are two motives that lead men to war in the absolute and total sense, hostile feelings and hostile intentions. In terms of absolute war, Clausewitz discusses three characteristics that make it unique. First, the utmost use of force is necessary. Second, the aim is to disarm the enemy. Lastly, absolute war calls for the utmost exertion of powers. However, absolute war only exists in the abstract, and every requirement changes in shape when shifting to reality. For instance, while Clausewitz argues as to the impossibility of absolute war, he lists three requirements for it to occur in the real world. War would become a completely isolated act in no way motivated by the previous history of a state or politics, limited to a single solution (or to several concurrent solutions), and would contain within itself the perfect solution. The probabilities and chance that exist in reality prohibit an entirely absolute war from happening because the political will always enter the realm of war, even in its conclusion<sup>47</sup>.

At the conclusion of World War I, Clausewitz's theory of real war began to gain ground. Though often confused with absolute war, and even used interchangeably, real war is war as it exists in the real world. War, in its ideal form, cannot be waged in a limited way, though in reality a war without limits would be neither possible nor preferable. Though Clausewitz set out in search for the 'absolute,' and the 'regulative idea' of war in the international and national context, he concluded that war cannot be explained outside of the political context, and thus there never can be absolute war in reality.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>48</sup> Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 215.

As it appears in what can be considered as the philosophy of war of Clausewitz, the more violence escapes the control of the chief of state, the more escalation is to be feared and real wars risk coming closer to absolute war. Then, Politics seems to vanish when it takes the destruction of the enemy army as its single goal.

Yet, Aron himself presents another classification of wars. Following the “dialectics of peace and war”, the typology of peace enables Aron to determine the typology of wars<sup>49</sup>. He distinguishes **inter-state wars** which are perfect wars, **infra-state wars** and **super-state wars**: “*We shall call super-state or imperial the wars that have as their object, origin or consequence the elimination of certain belligerents and the formation of a unit on a higher level. We shall call infra-state or infra-imperial the wars that have as their stake the maintenance or the decomposition of a political unit, whether national or imperial*”<sup>50</sup>.

According to Aron, Inter-state wars become imperial when one of the actors in an international system, whether voluntarily or not, is led to establish his hegemony or empire over his rival, in case of victory. Inter-state wars tend to be amplified into hyperbolic wars when one of the actors ventures to acquire an overwhelming superiority of forces. As a matter of facts, he gives an account the Peloponnesian War and the First World War as hyperbolic wars. In such wars, the violence of the conflict can be imputed neither to the technique of combat nor to the passions of the belligerents, but to the geometry of the relation of forces. It is the magnitude of the stake-freedom of the Greek city-states or of the European states-that inflames military ardour<sup>51</sup>.

Indeed, great wars often mark the shift from one configuration to another, from one system to another, and this shift itself has many causes. Thus, it is impossible to give to a war a determined category or a fixed characteristic. Aron says:

*In a general way, we cannot attribute to wars of a determined category this or that concrete characteristic. Infra-state or infra-imperial wars such as the war of the Jews against Rome, of the Chouans against the French Revolution, wars of secession such as the war of Algerian liberation, which bring into conflict an organized power and those populations which refuse to obey it, are often among the most cruel; they are, in certain respects, civil wars, especially if the established power wins. Similarly,*

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<sup>49</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit*, Part One, pp.153-154: “The ternary classification of the forms of peace provides at the same time the most formal and the most general classification of wars: “perfect” wars, according to the political notion of war, are inter-state. They bring into conflict political units which recognize each other’s existence and legitimacy”.

<sup>50</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>51</sup>*Idem.*



*war becomes imperial when one of the belligerents brandishes a transnational principle, and the inter-state conflict is charged with partisan passions. The enemy is then simultaneously alien and adversary (or heretic or traitor). It would be just as dangerous to insist on these abstract notions*<sup>52</sup>.

From all the above, it follows that peace and war are two realities that entertain an intimate relationship. The ultimate goal of war is also peace. In fact, war is continuation of state policy by other means. War is violent means to establish peace. But it should not be first option to establish peace. That is why the saying goes “*sivispacem, para bellum*”, meaning that if you want peace, prepare for war.

## **2.5. Beyond Power Balance: The Principle of Legitimacy**

We have seen that peace and war are understood in relation to the principle of power. For peace to be effective, there needs to be a balance of power and when this balance of power is not effective, peace by hegemony and peace by empire can always give room to the escalation of violence and engender war. Aron therefore considers that the two formal typologies of peace and war require further analysis in order to give peace a stable foundation. In order to reach such a foundation, it is important to look for another principle except power. He wonders:

*If the three kinds of peace—peace by equilibrium, by hegemony, and by empire—have power as their principle the question will be asked: is there no other principle of peace except power? If wars are not concretely defined by their inter-, supra- and infra-state character, it will be asked: what other qualifications should be applied to them in order to define them?*<sup>53</sup>

By definition legitimacy is determined by whether the contractual relationship between the state and citizens is working effectively or not. Individual citizens or tribal members recognise political actors, institutions and relationships in return for services, which guarantee their individual and collective welfare. When such welfare is not forthcoming, legitimacy diminishes and rulers often find themselves forced to move from persuasive to coercive governance<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>53</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>54</sup> Kevin P. Clements, “Legitimacy And Peace Processes From Coercion To Consent”, in ACCORD, an international review of peace initiatives, issue n°25, London: Alexander Ramsbotham and Achim Wennmann (Ed), 2014, p. 14.

International policy has increasingly stressed the importance of legitimacy in relation to preventing or ending violent conflict. The World Bank's World Development Report 2011 declared as its "central message" that "strengthening legitimate institutions and governance ... is crucial to break cycles of violence". The 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States lists "legitimate politics" as the first of five Peace building and State building Goals. And the UN Development Programme's 2012 Governance for Peace report declares that the "social contract" between states and societies can help reduce armed violence when "popularly viewed as legitimate".

Legitimacy is generally understood as the popular acceptance of political authority. Kevin Clements defines legitimacy as the acceptance of unequal political relationships (stated or unstated), where some are given, assume, or inherit authority over others. Legitimacy is not universal, but is specific to particular contexts, constituencies and circumstances. It refers to the social and political contracts that manage formal and informal relationships between states and citizens, and between traditional or charismatic leaders and their constituencies and communities. Clements explains how legitimacy "matters for peace" as it is "critical to political order, stable peace and development [and] transforms coercive capacity and personal influence into durable political authority<sup>55</sup>".

By experience, it appears that Legitimacy lies at the heart of all political discourse and determines much political competition in both developed and less developed societies. When it comes to maintaining and safeguarding peace within nations and in international relations, Legitimacy appears as a fundamental principle of peace. In fact, Legitimacy is about social, economic and political rights, and it is what transforms coercive capacity and personal influence into durable political authority. It is the stated or unstated acceptance of unequal political relationships where some are given, assume, or inherit power over others. It is critical to political order, stable peace and development. Legitimacy enables rulers to govern with a minimal application of force and it entitles those who are ruled to expect that political power will be exercised to advance the common good, as opposed to narrow personal or partisan interests. It refers to the formal and informal social and political contracts that govern relationships between the state and citizens, and between traditional or charismatic leaders and their followers. It is also about the management and resolution of conflict within families, kin groups, communities and society.

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<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, p.7.

It must be remarked that, in situations of violent conflicts, Legitimacy is contested, however - especially when perceptions of the acceptability of political leadership or institutions are likely to be polarised. In civil war, for example, the legitimacy of the state is almost by definition fundamentally challenged by a significant proportion of its citizens. Non-state actors who use violence, such as armed groups, militias or gangs, are often seen as illegitimate (for example by certain states), but may have specific legitimacy within a given context: as champions of a popular cause; as providers of security and essential services to local communities; or as defenders of the interests and identity of their supporters. That is why Raymond Aron thinks that *“The principle of legitimacy is often at the origin of conflicts (which does not mean that it is their true cause).”*<sup>56</sup>

How might a focus on legitimacy help build peace in practice? One function of a peace process can be understood as providing a structure to accommodate diverse or competing sources of, or claimants to, legitimacy in conflict-affected states and societies, and to cultivate broad consent on a satisfactory way forward for peace<sup>57</sup>. A peace process can help to manage transition from coercive to consensual governance as a basis for advancing sustainable peace. The legitimacy of a peace process can be understood as the extent of popular support both for Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consent, the process itself – its specific initiatives and components – and for its outcomes, including a peace deal or political settlement.

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<sup>56</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, Part One, p.157.

<sup>57</sup><https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/> consulted on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2020.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter explored the dialectics between peace and war in Raymond Aron's master piece: *Peace and War*. Aron has two parallel chapters on maintaining peace in a world beyond power politics - entitled "peace by law" and "peace by empire" - that roughly correspond to the European and American views. And he criticizes both. The originality of his position is interesting for our debates today. His critique of international law is fairly conventional, but it is a convention that goes back to Hegel and many others, that international law is not really law, that there is no authority, no constraint - no "praetor," as he says. So Aron had a fairly simple notion that states are in a state of nature, not in a civil state. Consequently, international relations are defined by each state reserving the right to use force when negotiation fails. From our analysis, we can say that Aron's philosophy of peace is an introduction to his philosophy of International Relations. His conception of peace portrays his realistic conception of the relations between countries. Nevertheless, as we will see in the next chapter, Aron gives much place to diplomacy by insisting on the importance of morality in international relations. In this vein, Aron could be considered as a pacifist just like Immanuel Kant before him. As a matter of facts, while discussing the Cold War and the uses of nuclear weapons, Raymond Aron concludes that "peace by disarmament" is an "illusion"<sup>58</sup>. As we will see, Aron defends the idea of an International Law System as a solution to peace safeguarding in the world. Our next chapter will help us explore the nuts and bolts of Aron's philosophy of International Relations.

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<sup>58</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, Part Four, p. 643.

## CHAPTER THREE:

### ARON'S PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The subtitle of Aron's *Peace and War*: "A theory of International Relations" enables us to affirm that he devotes this book to the analysis and interpretation of International Relations. In this chapter, we would like to bring out, as clearly as possible, Aron's conception of International Relations so as to be able to better understand his political theory in general and his philosophy of peace in particular.

#### 3.1. The Meaning of International Relations

It is very difficult to define, once and for all, the concept of International Relations. In Aron's *Peace and War*, we find several aspects of International Relations which may help us in our endeavour to define and understand them. Hence, International Relations can be considered either as relations among nations or as a science of peace and war.

##### 3.1.1. International Relations as Inter-States Relations

As we read in the Preface, International Relations are, by definition, relations among nations:

*In the expression "International Relations," the nation equals any political collectivity that is territorially organized. Let us say, provisionally, that International Relations are Relations among political units, the latter concept covering the Greek city-states, and the Roman or Egyptian empires as well as the European monarchies, the bourgeois republics or the peoples democracies<sup>59</sup>.*

This definition involves a double difficulty. The first difficulty is related to the scope of political units. It is difficult to say whether relations among political units involve relations among individuals belonging to those units. This difficulty is related to the boundaries of political units. Where do political units, that is, territorially organized political collectivities, begin or end? For example, when young Africans want to spend their vacations beyond the borders of their respective countries, is this a phenomenon that should interest the specialist in International Relations? When a Young Cameroonian dies in the Saharan desert in his endeavour to cross the borders and go abroad for a better life, is such a phenomenon a preoccupation of International Relations?

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<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

The second difficulty is related to personal exchanges among individual persons from different nationalities within a political unit. Is such exchanges part of International Relations? When a Cameroonian buys French merchandise in a French store in Yaounde, does this economic exchange fall within the realm of International Relations? As we read in the introduction of *Peace and War*,

*It seems almost as difficult to answer affirmatively as negatively. Relations among states, i.e., strictly inter-state Relations, constitute International Relations par excellence: treaties are an indisputable example of such Relations. Let us suppose that the economic exchanges between one nation and another are entirely regulated by an agreement between the two states: in this hypothesis, such exchanges pertain without reservation to the study of International Relations<sup>60</sup>.*

Whatever the case, according to Aron, the focus of International Relations is on inter-state Relations, those which bring these entities to grips with one another. He writes:

*Inter-state Relations are expressed in and by specific actions, those of individuals whom I shall call symbolic, the **diplomat** and the **soldier**. Two men, and only two, no longer function as individual members but as **representatives** of the collectivities to which they belong: the **ambassador**, in the exercise of his duties, is the political unit in whose name he speaks; the **soldier** on the battlefield is the political unit in whose name he kills his opposite number<sup>61</sup>.*

It is therefore clear that International Relations call for actors who are either peace-builders or war actors. The actors of International Relations represent their political units in the dialectics of peace and war. That is why Aron goes further to define International Relations as the Science of Peace and War.

### 3.1.2. International Relations as the Science of Peace and War

As a science of peace and war, the science of International Relations can serve as a basis for the arts of diplomacy and strategy, the complementary and opposed methods by which dealings among states are conducted. It could be observed that nations are like living beings that can entertain either peaceful or conflictual relationships. As such, Karl Von Clausewitz considers that war belongs not to the province of Arts and Sciences, but to the province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any Art, to

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<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>61</sup> *Idem.*

liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities. He then compares war with politics: *“Politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale. Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops-where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.”*<sup>62</sup>

Thus we can readily understand why International Relations afford a focus of interest to a particular discipline and why it is difficult to give to their scope any precise delimitation. That is why historians have never isolated the account of events which touch on Relations among states. Such isolation would have been impossible in practice, so closely are the ups and downs of military campaigns and diplomatic combinations related to the vicissitudes of national destinies and to the rivalries of royal families or social classes. Like diplomatic history, the science of International Relations has to recognize the multiple links between events on the diplomatic and national scenes. Also, it has to deal with inter-individual Relations involving several political units. But so long as humanity has not achieved unification into a universal state, an *essential* difference will exist between internal politics and foreign politics. The former tends to reserve the monopoly on violence to those wielding legitimate authority, the latter accepts the plurality of centres of armed force. Politics, insofar as it concerns the internal organization of political units, has for its immanent goal the subordination of men to the rule of law. Politics, insofar as it concerns Relations among states, seems to signify-in both ideal and objective terms-simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states<sup>63</sup>.

### **3.2. The Idea of International System**

When states come together in order to engage in multifaceted exchanges, they are obliged, in one way or the other, to seek for an International system that will control and secure their Relations. That is why, above states, there is an International System which Aron defines as follows:

*I call an International system the ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular Relations with each other and that are all capable of being implicated in a generalized war. Units taken into account, in their calculation of forces, by those governing the principal states, are full-fledged members of an International system.*<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>Clausewitz, *op. cit.* Book II, Chap. 3, p. 149.

<sup>63</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.* Preface, p. 6.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, p.94.

Hence, Aron thinks that an International system is like a party system as it involves only a small number of actors. When the number of actors increases as it is the case with the United Nations where there are more than a hundred states, that of the chief actors does not increase proportionally, and sometimes does not increase at all<sup>65</sup>.

### 3.2.1. The Characteristics of an International System

The two characteristics of an International System are the configuration of the relation of forces on the one hand and homogeneity or heterogeneity.

#### 3.2.1.1. Configuration of the Relation of Forces

The first characteristic of an International system is the *configuration of the relation of forces*, a notion that itself involves several aspects which call for the following questions that we can ask ourselves with Raymond Aron<sup>66</sup>: what are the limits of the system? What is the distribution of forces among the various actors? How are the actors situated on the map? Before the present period, says Aron, -more precisely before 1945- no International System included the entire planet. Scarcely more than a century ago, the ambassador of Her Britannic Majesty had difficulty obtaining an audience from the Emperor of China, refused to submit to rites he regarded as humiliating, having to make a genuflection, and, to offers of commercial relationships, received this scornful response: What could his remote little country produce which the Middle Empire was not capable of producing as well or better? At the time, there were two reasons that combined to exclude China from the European system: *physical distance* prohibited China from taking military action in Europe, while limiting European military capacity in the Far East; *moral distance* between the cultures made dialogue difficult, reciprocal comprehension impossible<sup>67</sup>.

According to Aron, there are two criteria that appear in defining membership in a system: politico-military participation on the one hand and communication on the other. Hence, in the case of the exclusion of China from the European System, he thinks that it is politico-military participation that was used. He writes:

*Only the actors performing in the plays belong to a troupe. Performance, for the International troupe, is generalized war, potential or real: it matters little whether one of the actors speaks a somewhat different language. Certainly during the historical periods when a system has existed, in other*

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<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, p.95.

<sup>66</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>67</sup>*Idem.*



*words, when Relations have not been merely occasional and anarchic, the actors belong for the most part to the same zone of culture, worship the same gods, and respect the same prohibitions*<sup>68</sup>.

He then takes the example of the Greek city-states in their relation to *barbarian* states in order to illustrate this situation. The Greek city-states, according to him, like the European nations, were aware of both their fundamental kinship and the permanence of their rivalry. But the Persian Empire, which the Greeks considered as alien—barbarian—and the Turkish Empire, whose Islamic faith the Christian sovereigns could not ignore, were involved in the conflicts and the calculations of the Greek city-states or the European monarchies. They were an element in the relation of forces, although they were not an integral part of the transnational cultural ensemble<sup>69</sup>. Then the question remains: does geography have a role to play in the distribution of forces? According to Aron, the answer is yes.

Indeed, the geographical distribution of alliances exerts an influence on the course of diplomacy. According to the space they occupy, the political units have different resources, different objectives, and different dreams. Alliances have a relation to the respective positions of states—the most powerful ally is less alarming if it is remote. If it is not a “permanent ally,” a neighbouring state easily becomes an enemy. Nevertheless, the essential aspect of a system is the configuration of the relation of forces, space itself assuming a diplomatic significance only as a function of the localization of great and small powers, of stable and unstable states, of sensitive points (in military or political terms), and pacified zones<sup>70</sup>.

The distribution of forces in the diplomatic field is *one* of the causes that determine the grouping of states. In an extreme case, two states that have no real motive for dispute can become hostile to each other by a “fatality of position<sup>71</sup>.” This *fatality of position* occurs when the two powerful states are in permanent rival states. That is why Aron thinks that two dominant states are almost inevitably enemies, unless they are closely united, merely because an equilibrium exists only on condition that each of the two belongs to the opposite camp. When the rivalry itself creates the hostility, the mind or the passions subsequently find

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<sup>68</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>69</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

countless means of justifying it. In war, too, fury is sometimes the result of the conflict itself, not of the conflict's stake<sup>72</sup>.

However, such a situation is an extreme case because alliances are not the mechanical effect of the relation of forces. One might even say that some great powers are in conflict because of the divergence or contradiction of their interests or their claims. Other powers, great or small, join one side or the other, either out of interest because they hope to gain more from the victory of one camp than from that of the other, or out of emotional preference because the sympathies of the population incline to one side more than to the other, or out of a concern for the equilibrium of forces that may lead to peace by equilibrium.

### 3.2.1.2. Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in an International System

A part from the configuration of the relation of forces, there are many other factors that come into play in International Relations. Ideas and emotions, for instance, influence the decisions of the actors. As such, Aron thinks that a diplomatic circumstance is not completely understood so long as we limit ourselves to describing the geographical and military structures of the alliances and hostilities, to situating on the map the points of strength, the lasting or occasional coalitions and the neutral powers. It is also necessary to take hold of the determinants of the behaviour of the principal actors-in other words, the nature of the states and the objectives sought by those in power<sup>73</sup>.

Thus the distinction between *homogeneous systems* and *heterogeneous systems* is fundamental: *I call homogeneous systems those in which the states belong to the same type, obey the same conception of policy. I call heterogeneous, on the other hand, those systems in which the states are organized according to different principles and appeal to contradictory values*<sup>74</sup>. Between the end of the wars of religion and the French Revolution, the European system was both multipolar and homogeneous. The American-European system, since 1945, is both bipolar and heterogeneous.

Homogeneous systems afford, on first analysis, greater stability. Those in power are not unaware of the dynastic or ideological interests that unite them, despite the national interests that set them against each other. The recognition of homogeneity finds its extreme and formal expression in the formula of the Holy Alliance. Against the revolutionaries, the

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<sup>72</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.99-100.

rulers of the sovereign states promised each other mutual support. The Holy Alliance was denounced by liberals as a conspiracy of kings against peoples. It had no “national justification,” since the change of regime did not involve, in the last century, an overthrow of alliances: a victory of the revolution in Spain would perhaps have endangered the Bourbons, not France. At present, each of the two blocs tends to revive, for internal use, a Holy Alliance formula. Soviet intervention in Hungary was equivalent to proclaiming the right of Russian armies to intervene in every Eastern European nation to repress counterrevolution (as a matter of fact, any insurrection against the so-called socialist regime). In the West, too, the regimes are virtually allied against revolution. The Holy Alliance against counterrevolution or revolution is in the end necessary to the survival of each of the two blocs.

The homogeneity of the system favours the limitation of violence. So long as those in power, in the conflicting states, remain aware of their solidarity, they incline to compromise. The revolutionaries are regarded as common enemies of all rulers, and not as the allies of one of the states or alliances. If the revolutionaries were to win in one of the states, the regimes of the other states would also be shaken. The fear of revolution incites military leaders either to resign themselves to defeat or to limit their claims. A homogeneous system appears stable, too, because it is foreseeable. If all the states have analogous regimes, the latter must be traditional, inherited down through the years, not improvised. In such regimes, statesmen obey time-tested rules or customs: rivals or allies know on the whole what they can expect or fear.

Lastly, by definition, the states and those who speak in their name are led to distinguish between enemy state and political adversary. State hostility does not imply hatred; it does not exclude agreements and reconciliations after battle<sup>75</sup>.

On the contrary, Heterogeneity of the system produces the opposite of all that has been said about homogenous systems. When the enemy appears also as an adversary, in the sense this term assumes in internal conflicts, defeat affects the interests of the governing class and not only of the nation. Those in power fight for themselves and not only for the state. Far from kings or leaders of the republic being inclined to regard the rebels of the other camp as a threat to the common order of warring states, they consider it normal to provoke discord among the enemy. The adversaries of the faction in power become, whatever their stripe, the allies of the national enemy and consequently, in the eyes of some of their fellow citizens,

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<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, p.100.

traitors. The “Holy Alliance” situation encourages those in power to subordinate their conflicts in order to safeguard the common principle of legitimacy. In what we call the situation of ideological conflict, each camp appeals to an idea, and the two camps are divided, with a number of citizens on either side not desiring, or not desiring wholeheartedly, the victory of their own country, if it were to mean the defeat of the idea to which they adhere and which the enemy incarnates.

This crisscrossing of civil and inter-state conflicts aggravates the instability of the system. The commitment of states to one camp or the other is jeopardized as a result of internal rivalries: hence the chief states cannot ignore them. Party struggles *objectively* become episodes of conflict among states. When hostilities break out, a compromise peace is difficult, and the overthrow of the government or of the enemy regime almost inevitably becomes one of the goals of the war. The phases of major wars—wars of religion, wars of revolution and of empire, wars of the twentieth century—have coincided with the challenging of the principle of legitimacy and of the organization of states.

This coincidence is not accidental, but the causal relation can be, abstractly, conceived in two ways: the violence of war *creates* the heterogeneity of the system or else, on the other hand, this heterogeneity is, if not the cause, at least the historical context of great wars. Although we can never categorically retain one of the terms of the alternative and exclude the other, internal struggles and inter-state conflicts do not always combine in the same way. Heterogeneity is not only relative; it can also assume various forms. In many respects, homogeneity seemed to prevail in the European system in 1914. The states *recognized* each other<sup>76</sup>. After 1945 the diplomatic field expanded to the limits of the planet, and the diplomatic system, despite all internal heterogeneities, now tends to a juridical homogeneity, of which the United Nations is the expression<sup>77</sup>.

### 3.2.1.3. Transnationality in International Systems

International systems, as we have already said, are comprised of units that have regular diplomatic Relations with each other<sup>78</sup>. Now, such Relations are normally accompanied by Relations among individuals, who make up these various units. That is why Aron says that “*International systems are the inter-state aspect of the society to which the populations,*

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<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, p.101.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>78</sup>*Idem.*

*subject to distinct sovereignties, belong<sup>79</sup>*”. Hellenic or European society in the fifth century B.C. or in the twentieth century of our era are political realities that Aron considers as transnational, rather than inter or supranational.

A transnational society reveals itself by commercial exchange, migration of persons, common beliefs, organizations that cross frontiers and, lastly, ceremonies or competitions open to the members of all these units. A transnational society flourishes in proportion to the freedom of exchange, migration or communication, the strength of common beliefs, the number of non-national organizations, and the solemnity of collective ceremonies.<sup>80</sup> In every period, transnational society has been regulated by customs, conventions or a specific code. The Relations that the citizens of a nation at war were authorized to maintain with the citizens of the enemy state were controlled by custom rather than by law. Conventions among states specified the status of the citizens of each established on the territory of the other. Legislation made legal or illicit the creation of transnational movements or the participation in those professional or ideological organizations intended to be supranational<sup>81</sup>.

Transnational society by definition operates at least in part beyond the reach of the specific governments, businesses, and individual persons whom they most affect. Transnational relations are defined as contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments. In this light, Non-Governmental Organisations have a fundamental role to play in transnational relations. Actually, the distinction between an international and a transnational organisation is unclear.

### **3.3. The Idea of an International Legal System**

The International Legal System is the foundation for the conduct of International Relations. It is the system that normalizes state actions under international law<sup>82</sup>. A part from states, international legal personality is also possessed by international organisations and, in some circumstance, by human beings whose actions have impact on international relations. In addition, Non-Governmental Organisations are also considered as organisations possessing international legal personality.

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<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>82</sup>[www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org) consulted on July 20th 2020.

### 3.3.1. The Notion of International Law

Nations are governed by internal legislations expressed by their particular constitutions and applied in various institutions. In the same way, Relations among states are subjected to an International legislation. Aron defines International Legislation as follows:

*From a sociological viewpoint, I am inclined to call private International law the law that regulates this transnational society as we have just characterized it, that is, the imperfect society made up of individuals who belong to distinct political units and who are, as private persons, in reciprocal relation*<sup>83</sup>.

It is entirely to be expected that many jurists regard as municipal law all or part of such private International Law. Whether in familial or commercial relations, the norms applicable to foreigners or to relations among nationals and foreigners are an integral part of the system of norms of the state involved. Even if these norms result from an agreement with another state, an essential modification does not follow: agreements on double taxation, for instance, guarantee a kind of reciprocity of treatment, by each of the signatory nations, of the others citizens, at the same time that they protect the taxpayers of each state against a twofold imposition of taxes. The consequences of these inter-state conventions take place within the legal system of each particular state.

On the other hand, the propositions, prohibitions and obligations recorded in the treaties among states constitute elements of public International law. We have, in the two preceding sections, considered the *configuration of the relation of forces*, then the *homogeneity or heterogeneity of the systems*. The control of International Relations is located at the meeting point of the two previous studies. To what degree and in what sense are inter-state relations, in peace and in war, subject to law in the same way that individual Relations, in the family and in business, are today and in a sense always have been<sup>84</sup>?

Inter-state relations, like other social relations, have never been abandoned to the purely arbitrary. All so-called higher civilizations have distinguished between members of the tribe or the city, or the state and the foreigner, and between various kinds of foreigners. Treaties were known from earliest antiquity-by the Egyptian Empire as by the Hittites. Every civilization has had an unwritten code that dictated die manner of dealing with ambassadors,

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<sup>83</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p.106.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*, p.106.

prisoners, or even enemy warriors in combat. What new features does public International law provide?

The novelty in present day International Law is that States have concluded many agreements, conventions or treaties, some of which concern *transnational society*, while others concern both that and the *International system*. To the first category belong, for instance, conventions which are related to hygiene, to weights and measures; to the second belong questions of maritime law. In the collective interest of states and not of individuals alone, International conventions control the utilization of seas or rivers, the means of transportation and of communication.

The extension of International law expresses the broadening of the collective interests of transnational society or of the International system, the increasing need to submit to law the coexistence of human collectivities, politically organized on a territorial basis, on the same planet, upon the same seas and under the same sky. Yet, the question remains: does International law thereby modify the essence of inter-state relations?

According to Aron, controversies relating to International law ordinarily occur on an intermediary level between positive law on the one hand and ideologies or philosophies on the other, a theoretical level that might be called, to borrow the expression of F. Perroux, “implicitly normative<sup>85</sup>.” The obligations of International law are those which result from treaties signed by states or from custom. On the other hand, “the right of peoples to self-determination,” “the principle of nationalities,” “collective security” are vague formulas, ideologies that influence statesmen, eventually even the interpretation jurists make of positive law. It cannot be said that they serve as the basis of a system of norms, that they involve, for states, specific privileges or duties. Now the jurist who seeks to define the nature of International law attempts to put positive law in a conceptual form, to discover its specific meaning. But this interpretation is not included in positive law itself. The latter allows various interpretations. Juridical theory, even more than economic theory, conceals an element of doctrine. It brings to light the meaning of juridical reality, but this apparent discovery is also an interpretation, influenced by the theoreticians’ idea of what International law should be. In the unanimous opinion of jurists, an important, if not the principal, datum of International law is the treaty. Yet treaties have rarely been signed *freely* by *all* the high contracting parties.

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<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, p.107.

They express the relation of forces; they consecrate the victory of one and the defeat of the other<sup>86</sup>.

Now the principle of *pactasuntservanda*<sup>87</sup>, if it is not the originating norm or the moral basis of International law is nonetheless its condition of existence. But International law thereby tends to assume a conservative quality. It is the victor of the latest war who invokes the principle against the claims of the vanquished, the latter having meanwhile reconstituted his forces. In other words, the stabilization of a juridical order based on the reciprocal commitments of states would be satisfactory in one of the two following hypotheses: either if the states had concluded treaties that were considered equitable by all, or if there existed a claim acknowledged by all and capable of being satisfied by reference to indisputable criteria of justice.

The rules of “non-intervention” were elaborated and more or less applied during intermediate periods, when neither powers nor revolutionaries had partisans across the frontiers. If there exists neither a popular nor a royal *Internationale*, states abstain from siding with the sovereign or the rebels, because in fact the victory of the one or the other does not profoundly affect them. Juridical norms need to be interpreted. Their meaning is not always evident and their application to a specific case leads to controversy. Now International Law does not determine the organ that, in regard to interpretation, holds the supreme power. If states have not promised to submit their cases to the International Court of Justice, each signatory actually reserves the right of interpreting the treaties in its own way. As states have different juridical and political conceptions, the International law to which they subscribe will involve contradictory interpretations, will be split, in fact, into many orders, based on the same texts but leading to incompatible results. Moreover, states need only fail to “recognize” the same states or the same governments, to reveal the scope of these incompatible interpretations<sup>88</sup>.

### 3.3.2. The Question of War Legalization

We have already seen that International Relations could be defined, as the science of peace and war. This means that when one has to analyse and attempt to understand the nuts and bolts of International Relations, he will not avoid reflecting on the question of war

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<sup>86</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>87</sup> This Latin locution means that “agreements must be kept”. As such, states are obliged to respect the clauses of a contract and it implies that neglect of their respective obligations is a violation of the contract.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, p.109.



legalization. Grotius' book entitled *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, from the title suggest that it deals with the question of war legalization. According to Aron, this book does not treat the entire substance of International law, but certainly covers its principal objects. This title "*On the Law of Peace and War*" suffices to suggest the dilemma confronting jurists and philosophers: Must International law legalize war or, on the contrary, proscribe it? Must it anticipate or exclude the possibility of war? Must it limit or prohibit war?

Before the First World War, the answer given by history was unequivocal. European public International Law had never taken the outlawing of war as its object or principle. Quite the contrary, it provided the forms in which war must be declared, it forbade the use of certain means, it regulated the modes of armistice and the signing of peace, it imposed obligations upon the neutral powers with regard to the belligerents, upon the belligerents with regard to civilian populations, prisoners, etc. In short, it legalized and limited war, it did not make it a crime. War being legal, the belligerents could regard each other as enemies without hating or vituperating each other. States fought, not persons. No doubt a war's legality did not settle the moral question of discovering whether or not it was just. But the belligerent, even when responsible for an unjust war, still remained a legal enemy<sup>89</sup>.

Why did the classical jurists maintain *moral judgments* as to the respective conduct of states in conflict side by side with *juridical judgments* which legalized the conflicts for both sides? The reason was clearly indicated in the works of the seventeenth and above all the eighteenth century: granted that monarchs, if they are wise and virtuous, should not wage war for glory or amusement, covet lands or wealth that do not belong to them, yet how could sovereigns neglect the requirements of their security? If a prince accumulates so many forces that he will soon be in a position to crush his neighbours, will the latter passively suffer the destruction of an equilibrium that is the only guarantee of security in inter-state relations? The classical jurists were not only aware of the ambiguities we have analyzed above, the necessary distinction between initiating hostilities and aggression, between the responsibility for origins and the responsibility for the stakes; *they admitted the moral legitimacy of action dictated by the requirements of equilibrium, even if this action were aggressive.*<sup>90</sup>

Rousseau furnishes extreme expressions of the key ideas of this European law of nations. In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau writes:

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<sup>89</sup>*Ibid.*, p.111.

<sup>90</sup>*Idem.*

*War, then, is not a relation between men, but between states, in war individuals are enemies wholly by chance, not as men, not even as citizens, but only as soldiers; not as members of their country, but only as its defenders. In a word, a state can have as an enemy only another state, not men, because there can be no real relation between things possessing different intrinsic natures*<sup>91</sup>.

In a purely inter-state war, individuals have no motive for hating each other, and a victorious state must cease doing harm to the subjects of the enemy state, once the latter admits defeat. Violence is limited to the clash of armies. As it can be remarked, because of the plurality of sovereign states, the concrete obligations of International law cannot be enforced by sanctions: they remain prescriptive, like morality. The basis of International law as a universal law which must be valid in and for itself among states, insofar as it differs from the specific content of contracts, is that treaties must be respected: *Pactasuntservanda*.

Indeed, it is upon these treaties that the obligations of states in relation to each other rest. But since their relation has their sovereignty as its principle, they are, in relation to each other, in the state of nature and do not have their law in a universal will authoritatively established over and above them, but their reciprocal relation has its reality in a particular will.<sup>92</sup> International Law then consists of commitments made, implicitly or explicitly, by states to each other. Since states do not lose their sovereignty the day they, make these commitments, war remains possible either because the parties are not in agreement as to the interpretation of the treaties, or because one or the other desires to modify its terms.

On the other hand, even in war as a non-juridical situation of violence and contingency, there exists a connection in the fact that states recognize each other as such. In this connection they are valid for each other as existing in and for themselves. This means that war is the juridical state, foreseen in advance, that suspends most of the obligations that states contract towards one another in peacetime, but that do not thereby lose all legal character<sup>93</sup>. The belligerents do not employ any and all means, and when violence breaks out they do not forget the future restoration of their juridical relations.

In this light, Aron thinks that Juridical Formalism<sup>94</sup>, seeking to exclude war as a means of settling differences or modifying territorial status, has not been abandoned in the wake of failure, landmarked by the wars in Manchuria, Ethiopia, China, and finally the double,

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<sup>91</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *op. cit*, Book I, Chapter IV, p. 10.

<sup>92</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit*, p.112.

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, p.113.

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, p.114.

generalized war in Europe and the Far East. In 1945 an attempt was made to use the International law outlawing war to punish the Nazi leaders. During the Nuremberg trials “the conspiracy against peace” was only one of the indictments made against the leaders of the Third Reich, and war crimes do not concern us in the present context. Yet, the attempt to shift from aggression, an International crime, to the determination and punishment of the guilty illustrates an aspect of the problem that appears once International law tries to deduce all the consequences of “outlawing war.” Among the belligerents, one-state or bloc-is juridically criminal. What is the result of this “incrimination” of war that was once merely called unjust?

Optimistically, Aron invites the reader of *Peace and War* to suppose that the criminal state is defeated. How is it to be punished and where are the criminals? If the state itself is punished—in other words, if its territory is amputated and it is deprived of a share of its sovereignty. Now what matters most is that the clauses of the peace treaty prevent war’s return: is it wise that the desire for punishment, however legitimate, should influence the treatment of the enemy and the clauses of the peace treaty? And we are considering, let us recall, the optimistic hypothesis<sup>95</sup>.

### 3.4. The Policy of Equilibrium in International Relations

We have seen that peace by equilibrium could be achieved when there is a balance of forces between states. In the same light, Aron considers that foreign policy, in and of itself, is power politics. Therefore, the concept of equilibrium-balance applies to all International systems up to the Atomic age but perhaps not including it<sup>96</sup>. Aron distinguishes *forces*-the various means of pressure or constraint which states possess-and *power* -the capacity of states, each taken as a unit, to influence the others. Thus we deliberately use the expressions *power politics* and *balance of forces*. The first means that states recognize neither arbitrator nor tribunal nor laws superior to their will and, consequently, owe their existence and their security only to themselves or their allies. If I prefer “balance of forces” to “balance of power,” it is because forces are more measurable than power. But if forces are balanced, powers too are balanced, approximately. No state imposes its sovereign will on others unless it possesses resources so decisive that its rivals admit in advance the futility of resistance. As Rousseau writes, “To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will; it is at best an act of prudence.”<sup>97</sup> Hence, when a state recognises its weakness in front of a powerful state, it must

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<sup>95</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>96</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>97</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chapter III, p. 5.

admit, in advance, the futility of resistance, not willingly but necessarily, in order to avoid being destroyed by the powerful state.

### 3.4.1. The Policy of Equilibrium

Aron tells us that it is in Hume's brief essay entitled "On the Balance of Power" that the abstract theory of equilibrium is set forth with the most convincing simplicity<sup>98</sup>. David Hume takes as his point of departure this question: is the idea of equilibrium a modern one or is the formula alone of recent invention, the idea itself being as old as the world? The second term of the alternative is correct. In *Peace and War*, we read:

*In all the politics of Greece, the anxiety with regard to the balance of power is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the ancient historians. Thucydides represents the league which was formed against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian War, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedaemonians disputed for sovereignty, we find that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance<sup>99</sup>.*

Thus, the policy of equilibrium obeys a rule of common sense. It issues from the prudence necessary to the states concerned to preserve their independence and not be at the mercy of another state possessing irresistible strength. It seems blameworthy to those statesmen or doctrinaires who regard the clandestine or overt use of force, sometimes leading to violence, as the mark and expression of human wickedness. As Aron tells us, David Hume favours the policy of equilibrium because he is opposed to huge empires: "Enormous monarchies are probably destructive to human nature in their progress, in their continuance, and even in their downfall, which never can be very distant from their establishment." If the Roman Empire is cited as an objection, Hume answers that though the Roman Empire may have been of some advantage, this was because "mankind were generally in a very disorderly, uncivilized condition before its establishment<sup>100</sup>." The indefinite expansion of a monarchy- Hume means that of the Bourbons- creates obstacles in and of itself- "thus human nature checks itself in its airy elevation." We would scarcely simplify Hume's thought by offering the antithesis of the *policy of equilibrium* and that of *universal monarchy*, Since universal monarchy seems no less disastrous to Hume than to Montesquieu, the state inevitably losing

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<sup>98</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p.125.

<sup>99</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 127.

its virtues with the extension of its territory, the policy of equilibrium is rationally preferable in terms of historical experience and moral values<sup>101</sup>.

The policy of equilibrium, on the highest level of abstraction, is reduced to manoeuvring in order to prevent a state from accumulating forces superior to those of its allied rivals. Every state, if it wishes to safeguard the equilibrium, will take a position against the state or the coalition that seems capable of achieving such a superiority. This general rule is valid for all International systems. But if we seek to elaborate the rules of the policy of equilibrium, we must construct models of systems, according to the *configuration of the relation of forces*. The two most typical models are the ones that Aron calls multipolar and bipolar: either the chief actors, whose forces are not too unequal, are relatively numerous; or, on the contrary, two actors dominate their rivals to such a degree that both become the centre of a coalition and the secondary actors are obliged to situate themselves in relation to the two “blocs,” thus joining one or another, unless they have the opportunity to abstain. Intermediary models are possible, depending on the number of chief actors and the degree of equality or inequality of forces among the chief actors.

### **3.4.2. The Policy of Multipolar Equilibrium**

In order to illustrate the idea of the policy of multipolar equilibrium in International Relations, Aaron invites the reader to posit an International system defined by the plurality of rival states, whose resources, without being equal, do not create a disparity in nature—taking, for instance, France, Germany, Russia, England, Austria, Hungary, Italy in 1910. If these states wish to maintain the equilibrium, they must apply certain rules which stem from the rejection of a universal monarchy. The enemy being, by definition, that state which ventures to dominate the others, the victor in a war, that is the side which has gained the most advantages, immediately becomes suspect to its former allies. In other words, alliances and enmities are, in essence, temporary, since they are determined by the relation of forces. That is why Rousseau writes: “...as the strongest is always in the right, the only problem is how to become the strongest. But what can be the validity of a right which perishes with the force on which it rests?”<sup>102</sup> He wonders.

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<sup>101</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>102</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chapter III, p.6.

By the same token, the state whose forces are increasing must anticipate the dissidence of certain of its allies, who will rejoin the other camp in order to maintain the balance<sup>103</sup> so as to remain the strongest and keep its hegemony over weaker states. This means that the balance of power is not haphazard; it follows a logic, it is governed by rules.

### 3.4.3. The Rules Governing the Balance of Power

As we read in *Peace and War*, An American author, Morton A. Kaplan has formulated the six rules both necessary and sufficient for the functioning of a schematic system which he calls the balance of power and which, it seems to me, corresponds to the one that concerns us. These six rules are as follows:

1. Each actor must act in such a way as to increase his capabilities, but must prefer negotiation to combat.
2. Each must fight rather than miss an opportunity to increase his capabilities.
3. Each must cease fighting rather than eliminate a “principal national actor”.
4. Each must act so as to oppose any coalition or individual actor tending to assume a position of predominance in relation to the rest of the system.
5. Each must act so as to constrain the actors subscribing to a supranational principle of organization.
6. Each must permit the national actors, whether beaten or constrained, to return to the system as acceptable partners, or must bring a previously non-essential actor into the essential category. All the essential actors must be dealt with as acceptable partners.

Of these six rules, we may immediately detach the fourth, which is the simple expression of the principle of equilibrium, a principle valid for all International systems and already defined in Hume’s essay. Not one of the other rules, interpreted literally, is of obvious application, generally speaking. The first-which enjoins all the actors to increase their capacities that is their resources, their means and their forces to the maximum-is valid for any system defined by the struggle of each against all. Since each state relies upon itself alone, any increase in resources is welcome as such, provided it leaves all other things equal. Now it is rare for a state to increase its resources without modifying either the resources or the attitude of its allies or rivals. That negotiation is preferable to combat may be considered a postulate of rational policy, comparable to that of the least effort for a given economic yield in

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<sup>103</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p.128.

production or income. However, this postulate requires that the actors disregard their pride or glory. The rule of fighting rather than missing an opportunity of increasing capabilities is neither rational nor reasonable<sup>104</sup>. Of course, in the abstract, all other things being equal, any actor on the International stage seeks maximum capabilities. But if we attempt to determine in what circumstances it is rational for a state to fight, we shall be reduced to virtually meaningless formulas of the following type: the state must take the initiative in combat if the advantages it anticipates from victory are to exceed the probable cost of the struggle, the gap between advantage and cost widening with the risk of non-victory or defeat. Whatever the specific formula achieved, the possibility of increasing capabilities is not enough to justify recourse to arms.

The classical authors had acknowledged only the threat of hegemony brought about by the growth of a rival as a reasonable and legitimate motive for taking the initiative in hostilities. It is not immoral, but it is imprudent to contemplate passively the rise of a state toward a superiority so great that its neighbours would be at its mercy.

Rules three and six tend to contradict each other or, at least, illustrate the various outcomes possible. In a system of multipolar equilibrium, the wise statesman hesitates to eliminate one of the principal actors. He does not proceed to the extremes of victory if he fears that, by continuing the combat, he will destroy a temporary enemy necessary to the system's equilibrium. But if the elimination of one of the principal actors involves, directly or indirectly, the entrance on stage of an actor of equivalent stature, he will consider whether the old actor or the new is the more favourable to his own interests.

Rule five is equivalent to the following principle: any state which, in a given system, follows a supranational ideology or acts according to a supranational conception is, as such, an enemy. This principle is not strictly implied by the ideal model of a multipolar equilibrium. What is clear is that so long as this kind of equilibrium is expressed normally in a rivalry of states, each exclusively concerned with its own interests, the state that recruits partisans beyond its borders because it claims a universal doctrine, thereby becomes a threat to the others. But we cannot draw the conclusion from the inevitable hostility between national states and the state appealing to a transnational idea that the former must make war on the

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<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.*, p.129.

latter: it all depends on the relation of forces and on the probability of reducing the attractiveness of the transnational idea by arms<sup>105</sup>.

The diplomacy called realist, which the system of multipolar equilibrium implies, does not conform to the highest requirements of the philosophers. The state which changes camp the day after victory awakens the bitterness and resentment of its allies, who may have accepted greater sacrifices than that state for the sake of their common victory. A pure diplomacy of equilibrium ignores and must ignore feelings. Also, it has no friends or enemies as such, it does not regard the latter as worse than the former, it does not condemn war as such<sup>106</sup>. It acknowledges the egoism or, if one prefers, the moral corruption of states which is brought by the aspiration to power and glory, but such calculating corruption seems in the long run less unforeseeable, less formidable than passions, perhaps idealist but certainly blind.

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<sup>105</sup>*Ibid.*, p.130.

<sup>106</sup>*Ibid.*, p.132.



## CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed at presenting Aron's conception of International Relations. After defining International Relations in relation to Peace and War, we can say that in order to maintain peace by equilibrium, nations attempt organising themselves in a sort of power equilibrium. Yet, the balance of power, as the history shows, has never prevented wars. It refers to the capacity of each party to inflict "intolerable" destruction on the other in the event of aggression. But it is difficult to know in advance what the exact value of an army is. As a matter of fact, the fear of thermonuclear apocalypse establishes neither a stable nor a universal peace. The doctrine of massive retaliation is thus far from being a solution to the Cold War. While deterrence can often help prevent conflicts, it is in itself neither a preventive nor a curative solution to war. It is true that nuclear weapons inspire a salutary prudence in states, since all fear "the ascent to extremes", an expression that Aron borrows from Clausewitz. But the Vietnamese experience proved and the Palestinian experience still proves the limits of dissuasion. No one today can doubt the military power of Israel, just as no one doubted in the 1960s that it was dangerous to unleash the American military machine, but the North Vietnamese and the Palestinians have shown, by their obstinacy, the limits of the power of arms. Simply put, there is no such thing as military omnipotence. The Taliban's bitter setback in Afghanistan was proof of this: a troop of natives, poorly armed at the beginning, and divided into hostile tribes, inflicted on the body of the Taliban a heavy defeat but today, the Taliban have gained control of many towns in Afghanistan. If, therefore, the arms race did not produce the expected results, another solution had to be found. Logically, arms control is necessary. Arms control can be interpreted as a form of disarmament or as a substitute for the impossible disarmament. The theory is based, according to Aron, on a logical premise: a fortiori, states or peoples must have the same interest and avoid a war to the death which, in the nuclear age, would literally mean the death of all. The doctrinaires put forward another somewhat contradictory premise: general and total disarmament is neither possible nor desirable. Not possible because neither superpower would give up the monstrous weapon, if only for fear that the other would keep it in secret. Not desirable because nuclear weapons, through the horror they provoke, help to prevent or limit wars. In public opinion, arms control became a means of reducing the risk of this murderous madness, which people described as both threatening and impossible.

## PARTIAL CONCLUSION

In this first part of our work, we were concerned with presenting Aron's philosophy of peace as it appears in his work entitled *Peace and War*. After presenting the influences on Aron's political thought as they appear in the history of philosophy, we analysed Aron's conception of peace, following what he calls the dialectics of peace and war and we presented his vision of International Relations. At the end of this part, we can say that although Aron stands for power equilibrium among nations, he recognises that such power equilibrium is not the only condition to prevent war among nations. In this perspective, it seems that the balance of terror appears to some as the guarantee of peace, while other minds fear the suicide of humanity. This balance, based on the ability of adversaries to inflict intolerable destruction on each other, is not definitively assured. The invulnerability of retaliatory forces is never complete.

Faced with this distressing situation, convinced as Kant was that nothing in a confrontation can make future peace and harmony impossible, Aron proposed a number of political, military and economic measures likely to bring peace. Better than the arms race, he proposed a combination of rearmament and negotiation, a combination that would make it possible to prolong an uncertain and bellicose peace. The red phone was always open between the White House and the Kremlin, but Aron believed that the negotiations were not straightforward. He noted that the development of multiple-headed rockets allowed the Soviets to carry out the program they had set for themselves and at the same time obliged the Americans to make a greater effort to maintain the balance, which paradoxically contributed to maintaining tension. In other words, if nuclear weapons could curb Russian ambitions, they had to be combined with democratic virtues, which play no less of a role as a counterweight to the totalitarian threat. In an article in *Le Figaro* dated June 12, 1975, entitled "The Third World War did not take place", he proposed that it was necessary to continue to refuse both war and capitulation in the face of the Soviet threat. Moreover, the strictly defensive or dissuasive use of atomic weapons had a certain logic. It was rightly considered that the very excessiveness of these weapons made their effective use difficult. Dialogue then appears as the condition for peace, as long as it is the opposite of war. Nevertheless, Aron thinks that an International Law System firmly put to place and imposed to nations, is the way out to assure peace in International Relationships. The question remains: How binding is an International Law System to powerful nations? The answer to this will be the object of the second part of our work.

**PART TWO**

**QUESTIONING ARON'S PACIFISM TODAY**

## PARTIAL INTRODUCTION

Raymond Aron's pacifism as it appears in *Peace and War* proves to be a strong contribution to the reflection on how to make peace permanent in International Relations. Yet, in a global world facing injustice and asymmetric wars, including cultural wars, his pacifism needs to be critically examined. As Jean-Vincent Holeindre tells us that many scholars doubt the relevance of Aron's theory of International Relations, in particular his theory on War,

*Suggesting that the analyses of Aron belong to the bygone age of twentieth century wars. A child during the event in Sarajevo that triggered the Great War in 1914, Aron died a mere six years before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the event that brought the Soviet Union's confrontation with the United States to an end. Since then, international relations have significantly changed: the USSR has disappeared, making way for liberal democracy and the dynamics of globalization; interstate wars have gradually been replaced by internal wars and irregular conflicts that pit regular armies against actors who are subnational ("insurgents", "rebels," guerrilla fighters) or transnational (terrorist groups, mafias)<sup>107</sup>.*

In this part, following this remark of Holeindre, we would like to analyse matters arising from Aron's Pacifism in order to bring out its limits.

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<sup>107</sup> Jean-Vincent Holeindre, *op.cit*, p. 1.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### SOME PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO ARON'S PACIFISM

In this chapter, we would like to open the way of analysing the limitations of Aron's theory of International Relations. We are going first of all to discuss Aron's excessive and incoherent optimism as it is expressed in *Peace and War* and in other papers. We will also discuss Aron's views relating to the causes of war and finally analyse his political realism. Our aim, in raising general objections to Aron's pacifism, is to shed lights on the general critique that we think we can formulate against his theory, so as to be able, in the subsequent chapters, to discuss this theory in the context of globalisation and asymmetric wars.

#### 4.1 Excessive Optimism in Aron's Theory of International Relations

Even though war is inevitable, given the nature of International Relations, Aron believes that peace through preparing for war-never-to-be-fought is possible. This is, according to him the only kind of peace attainable unless the Western world wants to capitulate in this project of peace-safeguarding in the world. However, this peace is disturbed by limited wars that are likely and even necessary. With the proliferation of weapons, the growing inequalities in a world dominated by excessive capitalism, with the ever-rising global terrorism and other forms of asymmetric wars, to what extent can one really be optimistic as far as the possibility of the war-never-to-be-fought? How can we build a lasting peace by preventing a war that seems inevitable?

In our opinion, it is difficult to be optimistic towards the building of a lasting peace today not only when one considers the amount of conflicts existing in the world, but also when one considers the failures of the United Nations in its mission of safeguarding and maintaining peace in the world. As a matter of facts, Aron envisages peace by fear. According to Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "*we need to consider two phenomena – deterrence and limited war – that give him hope for the persistence of such a peace*<sup>108</sup>."

*According to Aron, "to be deterred is to prefer the situation, which will result from inaction to that which would result from action, when the latter would produce the anticipated consequences – that is, on the level of international relations – the carrying out of implicit or explicit threats. A state is more liable to be deterred the more it believes the threat would be carried out (in case it should persist), the more frightful the effects on the*

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<sup>108</sup>Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *A Critique of Raymond Aron's Theory of War and Prescriptions*, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, Issue 4, December 1968, Pages 419–442, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013526>, p. 428.

*state if the threat is executed, or the more tolerable the prospect if the state should abstain from action to be deterred*<sup>109</sup>.

As Kerkvliet tells us, effective deterrence is most likely when the real world closely approximates the model of ‘equality of crime and punishment’. Then the risks involved will be minimal.<sup>110</sup>

Aron’s optimism reaches its apex when he considers that no thermonuclear war, no matter how destructive it might be could lead to the end of humanity or to the end of history. When one considers the damages of the Hiroshima bomb only, one can imagine several nations bombing one another and leading to a collective suicide. Yet, Aron says, this is not possible:

*As a matter of fact, thermonuclear attacks on both sides, whether they aim at the enemy’s nuclear force or his cities, would bring about material damages and human losses which would be incommensurable with the cost of past wars but which would constitute in material terms neither the “annihilation of the enemy” nor “mutual suicide” nor the “end of history”<sup>111</sup>.*

In a more sententious way, he is confident that “No state has the means, if it wages the war it is preparing, to exterminate the population of the enemy state<sup>112</sup>.” In our opinion, the convergence of the NBIC<sup>113</sup> sciences, in a more specific way, the use of automatic weapons, which Aron did not certainly envisage in his days, render his optimism irrelevant in our days. The greatest threat to peace in mankind nowadays is not only the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapon, but also its use by terrorist organisations. Thus, Aron’s argument against peace through fear<sup>114</sup> does not hold even if he maintains his optimistic position as follows:

*An increase in the number of states belonging to the atomic club would add two other factors of instability: the possibility of launching a war, whether intentional or not, between the super powers as a result of a small state’s voluntary or involuntary action, and the greater probability of a war provoked by a statesman’s so-called irrational decision<sup>115</sup>.*

In order to back up our rejection of such an excessive optimism in Aron’s theory of International Relations, we can refer to Benedict J. Kerkvliet who informs us that in last page

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<sup>109</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit*, p. 414.

<sup>110</sup> Benedict, J. Kerkvliet, *op. cit*, pp. 428- 429.

<sup>111</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit*, p. 416.

<sup>112</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>113</sup> Nanotech, Biotect, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive sciences.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 636.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 639.

of the 1966 *Daedalus* article, Aron states that he will not choose between the pessimistic and the optimistic positions, even though, as we have just proven, he has chosen to be optimistic<sup>116</sup>. Added to that, Aron does not prove to be coherent with his optimistic position because admitting that proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the risks of nuclear war, Aron writes however: “*The greatest threat to mankind, despite what one hears, is not that a few more states should come to possess nuclear weapons, but that statesmen should make a different use of their weapons in the diplomatic game.*”<sup>117</sup>”

It is this possibility that statesmen will remain rational that pushed Aron to reject the idea of peace through fear. But his position has changed in the article quoted by Benedict, J. Kerkvliet. He tells us that when Aron wrote *Peace and War* and *The Great Debate*, neither France nor China had nuclear weapons; the proliferation of nuclear weapons had not yet started as it has developed today. Being optimistic, Aron could not accept the pessimists’ position that the proliferation of nuclear weapon<sup>118</sup> and as a matter of facts, the sophistication of terrorism and other asymmetric wars make Aron’s optimism at least unrealistic if not irrelevant today. Kerkvliet makes the following conclusion regarding Aron’s optimism: “*I cannot accept such assumptions; nor am I as optimistic as Aron. He contends that Western democracy is superior to the Soviet form of government. [...] I am sceptical that the Western or the United States way of life is worth the risk of a thermonuclear exchange*”<sup>119</sup>”.

There are indeed many sorrowful events in the United States which lead us to be dubious about the preservation of peace in this powerful state that plays a fundamental role in the United Nations System and in International Relations especially when it comes to war-related matters. We therefore agree with Kerkvliet that the strategy of nuclear deterrence is risky and that “*it would be more prudent to begin unilateral disarmament than to pursue the strategy of nuclear deterrence*”<sup>120</sup>.”

This is because Aron insists on the importance of democracy in tempering human violence, as he believes in the efficiency of law, precisely, the efficiency of an International Law System which, as we shall see in the next chapters, has proven to be a failure in its mission of safeguarding peace and maintaining it all over the world. As Kerkvliet says,

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<sup>116</sup> Benedict, J. Kerkvliet, *op. cit.*, p.427.

<sup>117</sup> Raymond Aron, “Daedalus article”, p. 498, quoted by Benedict, J. Kerkvliet, pp.427-428.

<sup>118</sup> Benedict, J. Kerkvliet, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 439.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 440.

*Aron offers a glossy coverage of Western democracy, overlooking the United States' alienated society, one in which people seek private, selfish interests rather than a common good, one in which humanity and human qualities are, at best, devalued or, at worst, completely absent*<sup>121</sup>.

We therefore think that war is rooted in the nature of human beings, an idea that Aron does not accept.

## 4.2. The Question of the Causes of War

Animals do not engage in war, though their relationships are, in the jungle, based on physical power. It is then possible to understand war as a specific human phenomenon which is rooted on all the aspects of human life. As Neno Hristov Hristov writes,

*Current war theories are based on many factors: policy, culture, technology, economics, security environment and history warfare experience. Human dimensions of an armed conflict continue to be the core, which is developing war theory. The technology is a minor factor. The behavior and cruelty that we see in last wars show that after many centuries history, human nature remains essentially unchanged. The core of the current and the past war theories are based on human values and human behavior*<sup>122</sup>.

This means that war has its deepest origins in the human nature. Yet, Aron does not abide to this anthropological pessimism. According to him, war does not have its origins in human nature. He writes:

*[...] if war is endemic, is it because man is naturally bellicose? Or, on the contrary, is it possible to conceive of a peaceful humanity whose nature has not changed? By an apparent paradox, the state of nature, conceived as the war of each against all, does not exclude a theory of eternal peace. Hobbes, having posited that men are by nature at war, relies upon absolute power to constrain them to live in peace. He does not explicitly envisage peace among states because, among the latter, the state of nature has not been surmounted*<sup>123</sup>.

Hence, while examining the question why men fight, Aron dismisses the notion that war is inherent in human nature either because of some sort of original sin as it is believed in the Christian religion, or because of an insatiable desire to fight. The first argument dismisses the ontological origin of war and the second dismisses the social origin of war. Let us discuss these two arguments.

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<sup>121</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>122</sup> Neno Hristov Hristov, "Modern War and its Asymmetric Nature", *IJASOS- International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences*, Vol. III, Issue 8, August 2017, pp. 467.

<sup>123</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 340.



First, the ontological argument that situates the origin of war in human nature cannot just be undermined in the name of International Relationships. In fact, actors of International Relations are human beings. International Relationships could be understood as a higher scale of intersubjectivity. What we would like to say is that where peace is valued by individual persons, there are more chances that their community will experience the same peace. Freud psychoanalysis demonstrates that violence finds its profound origins in human nature. Man is by nature a violent being. In order to explain violence, in his book entitled *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Freud concluded that all instincts fall into one of two major classes: life instincts or death instincts<sup>124</sup>. Sometimes referred to as sexual instincts (libido), life instincts (eros) are responsible for much of our behaviour. They deal with self-preservation, that is, our survival, pleasure and reproduction. These instincts are essential for sustaining the life of the individual as well as the life of the community with the need for the continuation of the species.

Positive emotions such as love, affection, pro-social actions, and social cooperation are also associated with the life instincts. These behaviours support both individual well-being and the harmonious existence of a cooperative and healthy society. The life instincts are focused on the preservation of life, both of the individual and of the species. This drive compels people to engage in actions that sustain their own lives, such as looking after their health and safety. It also exerts itself through sexual drives, motivating people to create and nurture new life.

Yet, life instincts alone cannot explain all human behaviour. They are opposed by the self-destructive death instincts, known as Thanatos. The concept of the death instincts was initially described in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in which Freud proposed that “the goal of all life is death and, casting back, the inanimate was there before the animate”.<sup>125</sup> Freud believed that people typically channel their death instincts outwards. Aggression, another word to express violence, for example, arises from the death instincts. In support of his theory, Freud noted that people who experience a traumatic event would often re-enact that

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<sup>124</sup>Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, The International Psycho-analytical Library, n° 4, C.J.M. HUBBACK, translator, online edition, [https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/freud\\_beyond\\_the\\_pleasure\\_principle.pdf](https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/freud_beyond_the_pleasure_principle.pdf) Consulted on August 25<sup>th</sup> 2020, p. 32.

<sup>125</sup>*Ibid.*, p.30.

experience. From this, he concludes that people hold an unconscious desire to die but that the life instincts largely temper this wish<sup>126</sup>.

In Freud's view, the compulsion to repeat was "something that would seem more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle which it overrides." He further proposed that the death instincts were an extension of that compulsion wherein all living organisms have an instinctive pressure toward death that stands in stark contrast to the instinct to survive, procreate, and satisfy desires.

Moreover, when this energy is directed outward toward others, Freud maintained, it is expressed as aggression and violence. Violence is an irrational symptom of unsatisfied desires that trouble the individual mind. Freud thought that social life originated in irresolvable conflicts and hence that civilisation was always vulnerable to radical disruptions. From World War I until his death in 1939, Freud witnessed increasingly violent social crises, which he considered to be irrational symptoms of these primal conflicts. Seemingly senseless wars, escalating anti-Semitism in the World War II and the Nazi domination were all interpreted by Freud in terms of his model of psychological conflict. Hence, violence, according to this psychoanalyst, is *prima facie* a psychological phenomenon.

While Freud's theories are not nowadays as prominent as they once were, understanding how our own self-preservation and destructive tendencies influence our behaviour can be helpful for our well-being. The life instincts might compel you to seek healthy relationships and social support, which are essential for emotional health. Destructive tendencies, on the other hand, might lead us to engage in actions that are less healthy, such as behaving aggressively or engaging in risky actions. Once we are able to recognize some of these tendencies in ourselves, we might be better able to temper these drives and replace negative behaviours with more positive choices. That is why education is fundamental in tempering man's desire to dominate, to aggress or to act violently towards others. If the motto of UNESCO is "building peace in the mind of men and women", it is because it is in the heart of men, in their mind, in their innermost being, that the desire for war grows and is nourished.

We can therefore say that Aron's anthropological optimism did not give any room to consider the origin of violence in human nature. Surprisingly, Aron also destroys the Marxist-Leninist argument that capitalist regimes inevitably cause war whereas communism eliminates war. Instead, he argues that communist as well as non-capitalist states have had

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<sup>126</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 33.

wars, and convincingly concludes that there is no necessary connection between the instigation of wars and the types of socio-economic systems<sup>127</sup>.

Unless we are convinced that exploitation, excessive capitalism cannot cause war, we would like to consider war like a social phenomenon too. Marxist-Leninist models of imperialism, like models of scapegoating, implicitly assume that external expansion and the use of force serve the interests of the ruling class or elite but not those of society as a whole. If society benefited from expansionist foreign policies then a rational unitary model of the national interest would suffice to explain behaviour and a distinctive societal component would not be necessary. The basic argument is that the benefits of expansion go to the ruling elite, who have concentrated interests, while the costs of expansion are diffused throughout society in the form of taxation.

War, according to Aron, could be traced in International Relationships not in human nature or in the socio-economic structure of intersubjectivity.

### 4.3. War in the Realm of Culture

Going back to Clausewitz's theory of war, we recall that according to him, war is a political means and therefore all wars can be considered as acts of policy. He writes:

*First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them*<sup>128</sup>.

He goes further to explain the diverse nature of war, following the diversity of motives that can lead to war:

*The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at*

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<sup>127</sup> Benedict, J. Kerkvliet, *op.cit*, p. 421.

<sup>128</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *op. cit*, Book I, Chapter I, §27, p. 88.

*variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character*<sup>129</sup>.

This means that depending on the nature of the motives, we will have different kind of wars: economic, cultural, the end being an implementation or an attempt to implement a policy. In this part of our work, we would like to look into cultural motives that may lead to war and that are, in their consolidation, the manifestation of culture wars. In the Wikipedia Encyclopaedia online, we read that a culture war is a cultural conflict between social groups and the struggle for dominance of their values, beliefs and practices. It commonly refers to topics on which there is general social discontent and disagreement and polarization in societal values. Such issues, in contemporary ethical issues include abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, sex with infants, sex with animals, transgender rights, women rights, children right, the absolute secularity of life, family values, church-state issues, racism, multiculturalism and other cultural conflicts based on values, morality and morals which are considered as “the major political cleavage”<sup>130</sup>. Clausewitz definition of war then still holds as cultural motives serve politics and they may lead to war. Then, Culture war appears as a political battle over certain sensitive issues. It is the mobilisation of political resources around positions on cultural issues. That is why James Davison Hunter concludes that “a culture war is really about politics<sup>131</sup>.” As a matter of fact, politics is an artefact of culture “culture underwrites our politics.<sup>132</sup>”

In such political cleavage, religion always has a fundamental role to play. When rejected, religion gives place to secularity, absolute relativism and when it is stressed, religion leads to fundamentalism, radicalism or extremism. Hence, we can say that Islamic terrorism is nourished by religious extremism which itself is at the basis of what Samuel Huntington calls the “clash of civilisations”, opposing the Western liberal culture to the Arab restrictive culture. Indeed, “Culture wars always precede shooting wars. They don’t necessarily lead to a shooting war, but you never have a shooting war without a culture war prior to it, because culture provides the justifications for violence<sup>133</sup>.”

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<sup>129</sup>*Ibid.*, Book I, Chapter I, §25, pp. 87-88.

<sup>130</sup>Encyclopedia Encarta online, <http://www.encycarta.com> consulted on July 14<sup>th</sup> 2020.

<sup>131</sup>Thirty years ago, James Davison Hunter , a sociologist popularized the concept of culture war. Today, he sees a culture war that’s gotten worse—and that spells trouble for the future of the American experiment. Read “How the ‘Culture War’ Could Break Democracy” in <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/20/culture-war-politics-2021-democracy-analysis-489900> consulted on July 20th 2020.

<sup>132</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>133</sup>*Idem.*

In the religious realm, concerning Islam in its relationship with the Western world, Huntington tells us that:

*Since the 1970s, a fairly consistent anti-Western trend has existed, marked by the rise of fundamentalism, shifts in power within Muslim countries from more pro-Western to more anti-Western governments, the emergence of a quasi war between some Islamic groups and the West, and the weakening of the Cold War security ties that existed between some Muslim states and the United States<sup>134</sup>.*

Culture war is not only based on religious motivations that oppose the radical Islamist to the Liberal Western world. It is also economic and geostrategic. It describes the tensions that permanently exist between the former coloniser and its colony. It appears as resistance to neo-colonisation which occurs with so-called international financial institutions, the Institutions of Brettonwoods. Huntington points out the fact that The Western world is attempting to integrate the economies of non-Western societies into a global economic system which it dominates. Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the Western world promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate.

Culture wars had largely happened since the early 1960s, with the civil rights movement, sexual revolution, the gay rights movement (LGBT<sup>135</sup> community), women's liberty and racism. Yet, important demographic and institutional structural shift took place in recent decades. Modern higher education has always been a carrier of the Enlightenment, and, in that sense, a carrier of secularization. What happened in the post-World War II period was a massive expansion of higher education and the knowledge-based economy. And with that came a larger cultural shift: Internet and the social media revolution. Thanks to the social media and to the Internet, we can say that the public place has been not only digitalised but also vulgarised, opened to the world instantly. It is in that sense that we understand this declaration of James Davison Hunter : "What used to be the province of intellectuals now became the province of anyone who had access to higher education, and higher education became one of the gates through which the move to middle class or upper middle class life was made"<sup>136</sup>.

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<sup>134</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations & the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2011. p. 203.

<sup>135</sup> Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Community.

<sup>136</sup> James Davison Hunter, *op. cit*

Hence, the rapid pace of modernization in recent years, accelerated by unprecedented advances in Information and Communications Technology and by economic and social globalization is universal. It has been particularly disorienting and stressful to members of traditional societies. According to Huntington, the roots of intercivilizational wars are based on particular behavioural eccentricities that are observable in some cultures. He writes: “The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness<sup>137</sup>”. Culture war then presents itself in a form of an enduring resistance and opposition to Western universalism which has born the garment of globalisation. As a matter of facts, Huntington demonstrates that “What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest<sup>138</sup>.”

The collapse of communism exacerbated this discordance by reinforcing in the Western world the view that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and hence was universally valid. The Western world, and especially the United States, which has always been a missionary nation, the world’s rulers, believes that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, human rights, individualism, the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions. Minorities in other civilizations embrace and promote these values, but the dominant attitudes toward them in non-Western cultures range from widespread scepticism to intense opposition. Such intense opposition has been systematically organised in asymmetric groups of terror such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, just to name these.

From all the above, it therefore appears that culture war is a set of measures taken by non-Westerners in order to resist Westernisation in all the spheres of their lives: religious, economic, geostrategic and even military. Because Western universalistic pretensions are full of lies, they cannot be accepted in all civilisations as the way to follow. That is why Huntington observes that non-Westerners do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western action. Hypocrisy, double standards, and “but nots” are the price of Universalist pretensions. The Western world wants to impose its own political organisation everywhere, without taking into consideration the particular realities of peoples. That is why democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power. That is why non-proliferation of nuclear weapon is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel. That is why free trade is the elixir of economic growth but not for agriculture. That is why human rights

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<sup>137</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia and so on. Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle<sup>139</sup> and lead to mistrust of Western culture.

Culture war has also been gaining ground in non-Western societies as a willingness to free themselves from Western domination. Hence,

*Having achieved political independence, non-Western societies wish to free themselves from Western economic, military, and cultural domination. East Asian societies are well on their way to equalling the West economically. Asian and Islamic countries are looking for shortcuts to balance the West militarily<sup>140</sup>.*

Unfortunately, Africa is still too weak in order to fight the Western world unlike Islam and China which Huntington considers as “the challenger civilizations” because they have consistently had highly antagonistic relations with the Western civilisation unlike “swing civilizations” such as Russia, Japan or India<sup>141</sup>.

In such a context, Aron’s pacifism is weakened as it shows its limits when it comes to facing the challenges of well-organised terrorists groups going for war as if they were expressing a cry of despair, unable to make their voice heard in the United Nations system. According to Neno Hristov Hristov,

*The emergence of transnational terrorism threat, directed against developed countries, broke illusions of increasing “control ability of” the international system and the possibilities to reach compromise between asymmetric antagonists. Contemporary manifestations of terrorism leaves open the fundamental question: “what political objectives are these groups pursuing and how consistent are the political objectives with terrorist objectives and are the values of countries against which they struggle”<sup>142</sup>.*

We therefore need to examine the weakness of the International Legal System today as far as the need of safeguarding and maintaining peace in the world is concerned.

#### **4.4. The Weakness of the International Legal System: U.N’s Failures**

In his days, as we have seen in the first part of our work, Aron believed that only an International Law System could foster and safeguard peace in the world. Nowadays, the

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<sup>139</sup> Samuel Huntington, *op. cit*, p.202.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.203-204.

<sup>142</sup> Neno Hristov Hristov, *op. cit*, p.471.

International Law System embodied in the United Nations has failed in many respects to its mission of safeguarding peace in the world. As Nile Gardiner writes,

*The U.N.'s failure has been multifaceted and cannot be ascribed to one single cause. It is partly a failure of leadership, combined with poor management, discipline, and widespread inefficiency, as well as a deep-seated culture of corruption. It is also due to a lack of moral clarity on the international stage—an unwillingness to confront acts of genocide or totalitarian regimes, coupled with a ready willingness to accommodate tyrants and dictators. It has led to a loss of faith in the U.N.'s ability to stand up even for its own Universal Charter of Human Rights or protect the world's most vulnerable people, including victims of ethnic cleansing and refugees seeking protection under the U.N. flag<sup>143</sup>.*

U.N's first failure appears in the safekeeping project in the world. In fact, within the U.N Security Council there is veto power so that any of the five permanent members could reject a Council resolution. In that way, the Security Council is more likely to fail when a great power really wants to do something that the international community generally condemns. There are many cases where this Security Council has failed. For example, "In the case of the Iraq invasion, the US didn't veto a resolution, but rather sought authorisation that it did not get. The UN, if you go by the idea of collective security, should have responded by defending Iraq against this unlawful use of force<sup>144</sup>". The invasion of Iraq proved to be a humanitarian disaster and it could be considered as one of the fundamental cause of the emergence of the terrorist Islamic State.

Moreover, the United Nations has proven to fail in the field of Human Rights in the world's weakest and most vulnerable populations in Africa and the Balkans. Niels Gardiner thinks that the cause of the U.N's humanitarian failures are linked to the composition of its Security Council which is made up of human rights abusers such as Sudan from 2002-2005, Zimbabwe, 2003-2005 and Algeria, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia which were elected after the Security Council reform. He therefore thinks that

*The United States was correct in its decision not to seek a seat on a Council tainted by the odor of despotism and tyranny. While making every effort to push for reform within the U.N., the United States must seek the creation of a complementary human rights body outside of the U.N. system that would*

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<sup>143</sup> Niles Gardiner, "Decline and fall of the United Nations: Why the U.N. Has Failed and How it Needs to be reformed", *Macalester International*: Vol. 19, Article 9. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol19/iss1/9>, 2007, p. 40.

<sup>144</sup> *Idem*.



*be composed solely of democratic states that adhere to the basic principles of individual liberty and freedom*<sup>145</sup>.

It is therefore regrettable that the supranational organisation put in place in order to maintain and safeguard peace in the world after the two World Wars is weakened from inside and is to be blamed for Human Rights abuses as it was the case in Congo. With Niels Gardiner, we are dumbfounded by the acts of gross misconduct that took place in Congo, as they are mentioned in a draft United Nations Report. Sexual exploitation by UN personnel in Congo was reported as “significant, widespread and on-going”. In the words of William Lacy Swing, Koffi Annan’s Special Representative to the Congo,

*We are shocked by it, we’re outraged, we’re sickened by it. Peacekeepers who have been sworn to assist those in need, particularly those who have been victims of sexual violence, instead have caused grievous harm. The sexual abuse scandal in the Congo makes a mockery of the U.N.’s professed commitment to upholding basic human rights. U.N. peacekeepers and the civilian personnel who work with them should be symbols of the international community’s commitment to protecting the weak and innocent in times of war. The exploitation of some of the most vulnerable people in the world-refugees in a war-ravaged country-is a shameful episode and a massive betrayal of trust*<sup>146</sup>.

With such Human Rights abuses from the United Nations personnel, it becomes difficult to respect and honour it or to trust it as far as peacekeeping in the world is concerned. Yet, in the present context of global terrorism and multifaceted crises, it is better to have a supranational organisation than not to have it at all. That is why the United Nations System needs to be reinforced. In the conclusion of the report on UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments<sup>147</sup> (2016), it is clearly stated that today, the UN is deployed to a range of environments where it faces asymmetric and violent threats, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Somalia, and while its activities are limited by security concerns, its presence alone is of significance. Although participants agreed that the UN is not the right actor for engaging in counterterrorism operations, they also concluded that the UN is not irrelevant in asymmetric threat environments and can play a useful role in its core activities of protecting civilians and facilitating political processes. However, a number of areas for strategic and operational improvements were identified for the UN to be able to operate more safely and effectively in such environments.

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<sup>145</sup>*Ibid.*, p.41.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.*, p.43.

<sup>147</sup> The Report is available online.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed at raising some preliminary objections to Aron's theory of peace and war. The general objection that appears is that Aron's pacifism is excessive optimism. We wanted to demonstrate that an International Law System is not sufficient to build peace in the world, more especially in a context of asymmetric or unconventional wars that fill the globe. The United Nations have been unable to stop terrorism or to prevent it. Among the many reasons presented in this chapter, we think that social justice, respect for the cultural diversity or cultural pluralism, the respect for the UN itself as a supra national organisation are some of the conditions that can help building peace in the world in a context of asymmetric wars. The motives of terrorists are usually cultural, specifically religious as they claim respect for their fundamental religious values that are more often than not incompatible with the spirit of democracy or absolute freedom that exists in Europe and America and that is promoted thanks to Globalisation which appears as a process of Westernisation. Is Globalisation somehow not jeopardizing peace in the world?

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE LIMITS OF ARON'S PACIFISM IN A CONTEXT OF GLOBALISATION

In the 1960s, when Raymond Aron got rid of the initial logic governing International Relations by putting inter-states conflicts at the centre of these International Relations, he already perceived what has come to be called today as the “international community”. Nevertheless, the global system analysed by Aron has been considered as a “closed” system where states were locked up in their own territories. In order to get out of this enclosure, we think that it is possible, today, to integrate the logic of world westernisation as a real factor jeopardizing peace keeping and peace building in the world in order to understand the cultural stakes of globalisation which Aron did not perceive in *Peace and War*. Conflicts of the 20th century radically changed the world. The developed world order after World War II, stored for four decades of the Cold War, also known as bipolar world, collapsed in the early 1990's. So at the end of the 20th century a multipolar world grew up with a global superpower - the United States, with some great and regional powers, with a wide range of risks and threats, with new horizons of global and regional cooperation and integration, with the wider opportunities and challenges: globalisation. A conclusion was widely spread that the originator of the threats to international security is rooted in the growing gap between developed countries and the rest of the underdeveloped world, and the collapse of fundamental values.

#### 5.1. Globalisation and the Challenges of Peace in the World

The concept of Globalisation has become commonly used nowadays in economy and politics but it appears to us that its origins are beyond historical considerations. It is a planetary movement of interconnections in economy, politics, culture and media but our principal objective is to consider it primarily from a metaphysical point of view in order to analyse its real nature and value for humankind. This phenomenon refers to the process of the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across international boundaries. Thus, it can be considered as an evolving phenomenon which is systematically breaking down barriers among nations in the areas of culture, commerce, communication and several other fields. According to the Wikipedia Encyclopaedia online, “Globalization is the

process of international integration arising from the interchange of world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture.”<sup>148</sup>

Indeed, we could have hoped that globalisation would considerably transform the world into a village where values are equally shared in an atmosphere of peace and unity in diversity. Yet, the reality is bitter and at the same time frustrating. The inequalities between Northern rich countries and Southern poor ones are gaining ground as time goes by, resulting into reclamations from anti-globalisation movements and the rise of Terrorism which appears to be a global war, a global threat for world's peace and security. Hence, we think that, Aron did not envision that globalisation is a problem, the source of diverse global problems related to multifaceted crises, excessive relativism, mercantilism, terrorism and many others. Globalisation is not a crossroads where the paths of all cultures meet. Instead, it is nothing else than a clash of geostrategic and diversified interests, a clash of cultures, a clash of civilisations. Samuel Philips Huntington in his bestseller entitled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* published in 1996 has this to say:

*It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future*<sup>149</sup>.

The Future of humanity and more especially of African culture then depends on the nature of Globalisation. This clash has resulted into a fight that opposes two antagonists: the Western world or Western civilization on the one hand and those who claim the right to identity and fight for it on the other hand. The globalization of Western values has to face the challenges of the globalization of Terrorism and other forms of reclamations. In its present form, globalisation appears to be a phenomenon of homogenisation, standardisation or westernisation of cultures. In our opinion, this multifaceted phenomenon of world interconnection seems to have done more harm than good to humanity in general and to Africa in particular. In our context, globalisation leads to identity crisis, depersonalisation, cultural, political and socio-economic dependence on the Western world, placing Africa on a situation that may end up resulting into cultural atrophy. In such a context, we can conclude

<sup>148</sup> <http://w.w.wikipedia.com> accessed on August, 18<sup>th</sup> 2020.

<sup>149</sup> Samuel Philips Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

that International Relations are bound to be conflict relationships even if conflict can be cultural and economic and not necessarily result into war.

As the world is witnessing the imposition of a unique culture, the Western culture armed with its economic, political, technoscientific and informational power, the multiple cultures that compose and express the diversity of races, peoples and nations are endangered by the Western hegemony and run the risk of perishing within a pseudo-universal culture. As time goes by, cultural diversity is jeopardized by neoliberal globalisation. Globalisation is characterised by the will to power of the North over the South, the Western World over the Third World. According to Douglas Kellner, the term is used as a cover concept for the heterogeneity of processes that need to be spelled out and articulated. He thinks that this notion describes a phenomenon which is neither innocent nor neutral in many of its uses and often serves to replace older discourses like imperialism and modernisation. As a replacement for imperialism, it could displace focus on domination of developing countries by the overdeveloped ones, or of national and local economies by transnational corporations.<sup>150</sup> This new form of imperialism carries along risks of alienation and depersonalisation for some peoples. Under the Neoliberal Ideology, the world is witnessing the domination of the Western world not only in politics and economy but more especially in the cultural realm:

*A global war involving the core states of the world's major civilizations is highly improbable but not impossible. Such a war, we have suggested, could come about from the escalation of a fault line war between groups from different civilizations, most likely involving Muslims on one side and non-Muslims on the other. Escalation is made more likely if aspiring Muslim core states compete to provide assistance to their embattled coreligionists<sup>151</sup>.*

Today, there is a real war opposing the so-called “Islamic state” and the Western world in general. The problem at stakes seems to be the imposition of Western cultural values and practices in the Arab world. These cultural values and practices include democracy with its freedom of speech, human rights, women’s rights, etc. It is easy to understand that Terrorism is the consequence of resistance to Westernisation with unjustified tools. A part from this, as Huntington tells us,

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<sup>150</sup> Douglas Kellner, “Globalisation and the Postmodern Turn” in <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu>, p. 1, accessed on June, 5<sup>th</sup> 2014

<sup>151</sup> Samuel Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 349.

*A more dangerous source of a global intercivilizational war is the shifting balance of power among civilizations and their core states. If it continues, the rise of China and the increasing assertiveness of this “biggest player in the history of man” will place tremendous stress on international stability in the early twenty-first century. The emergence of China as the dominant power in East and Southeast Asia would be contrary to American interests as they have been historically construed<sup>152</sup>.*

Today, the rise of China is perceived as a great challenge to the Western world as China’s approach to globalization, at least as far as its relationships with developing countries are concerned, seems to be fundamentally different from the Western approach. In their most recent book entitled “Re-globalisation: When China Meets the World Again”, Dong Wang and Dejun Cao present China’s vision of the world and involvement in globalisation<sup>153</sup>. They think that China’s involvement in globalisation has changed over time and how its role in leading the “re-globalisation” process is profoundly reshaping the world. The book discusses China’s strategies and challenges while interacting with the international community. They insist on several illuminating case studies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which really contrast with the Western approach to globalisation which is nothing else than Westernisation and marginalisation and whose resistance often leads to “just wars”.

It therefore means that present Globalisation jeopardizes peace in the world as it could be considered as a source of culture wars because it endangers cultural diversity. In our opinion, cultural diversity needs to be promoted in order to fight against all forms of cultural discrimination or marginalisation like racism, ethnocentrism or tribalism. This is the fundamental means through which the encounter of peoples can avoid being determined by a perpetual clash and become a real convergence of civilisational multiplicities. Each culture has its own personality. In this light, Yeboah Kwame considers that the fact that we are all human does not mean that we are the same. To ignore this would mean destroying God’s own beautiful rainbow made from many colours of cultural diversity. Culture is learned. This is considered the most common attribute. Such learning does not take place through natural inheritance. It is not genetically transmitted. Rather, it takes place by gradual process of absorption from the social environment or through deliberate instruction<sup>154</sup>.

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<sup>152</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>153</sup> Dong Wang and Dejun Cao, *Re-globalisation: When China Meets the World Again*, Routledge, 2020.

<sup>154</sup>Yeboah Kwame, “The Impact of Globalization on African Culture”, <https://www.semanticscholar.org>, Political Science, 2007, p. 5.

In the same light, Godfrey B. Tangwa insists on the necessity to defend, promote and value cultural diversity when he affirms that

*From the hand of God / Nature, human beings come in all dimensions, in all shapes and sizes, in all shades and colours, in a way very similar to the biodiversity of the living world in general. It does not appear to me desirable to attempt uniformizing and standardizing human beings according to putative humanly conceived blueprint of perfection. A world of perfect clones, which, at last, seems within reach of Western biotechnology to bring about, does not at all appear attractive to me and those who are fascinated by its prospect should try to conceptualize its consequences very carefully before bringing it about<sup>155</sup>.*

In this way, Tangwa calls our attention to the dangers of homogenisation, uniformisation or standardisation. Among these dangers, there is the weakening of the project of building peace in the world today. What happened during the colonial era in Africa seems to be taking place nowadays again under the appearance of globalisation. In fact, during colonial era, Western adventures made frantic efforts to marginalise the cultural heritage of various peoples around the globe; especially Africa. This has been accomplished by imposing Western religion and cultural practices on Africans. The assumption was that development for the colonized people must involve a denial of their history, a rejection of their cultural heritage and the adoption of Western cultural practices. The impact of the above policy in the case of Africa was untold damage to the African psyche, so much so that most Africans have to believe as truth, what is presented to them in the Western ideology.

We have seen with Samuel Huntington that culture wars are most often than not based on the interaction among civilisations; namely the search for a power-equilibrium, terror-equilibrium, expressions of resistance against domination, colonisation, imperialism, neo-colonialism or, at the largest scale, Westernisation. Culture wars are deeply rooted in the Western project of homogenisation of cultures (political organisation, economic structure, life patterns) according to the Western paradigm. This is a great challenge for peace and security in the world. If the world wants to experience peace, pluralism needs to replace the project of universalism.

## **5.2. Building peace in a Context of Bad Governance and Multiculturalism**

The question of peace is inseparable from that of good governance both at national level and at international level. Among the modern philosophers who reflected on the Social

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<sup>155</sup>Godfrey B. Tangwa, *Elements of African Bioethics in a Western Frame*, Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 2010, p.80.

contract, namely Hobbes, Locke, Kant or Spinoza, Rousseau's social contract appears to be more relevant for the promotion of effective participatory citizenship in political affairs rooted on the idea of the General Will. Such an effective participatory citizenship appears to us as necessary for good governance and social justice at national and international level. In *Peace and War*, Raymond Aron limited wars to interstate conflicts, thus undermining the influence of citizenship in fostering peace or conflict within states.

Good governance entails a minimum of effective citizen participation in public affairs. It is in such reciprocity that citizens demonstrate their pre-given powers to, among others, make choices on government; the choice, for instance, of who governs, for how long, and by what means. The recent political waves in Europe - Brexit, the Italian referendum and the subsequent resignation of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi - and in America - the triumph and decline of Donald Trump, and the demonstrations against his policies, the current Anglophone crisis in Cameroon and the subsequent measures taken to solve it, namely the organisation of a major national dialogue giving a special status to the two English speaking regions of the country- are examples of the exercise of the power of the citizen to not only choose, but compel leaders to take certain directions - in other words, conduct the conduct of leaders in managing different affairs of society.

The continuous practice of the ethnocratic state in terms of social justice has led at times to the absolute neglect of minority peoples and cultures, feeding resentment and rejection of the central government on the part of marginalized ethnic groups and fuelling conflict that has, in turn, produced grave human rights' abuses and furthered alienation. Hence, domination in culture and politics by one nationality group, however, is not an inevitable consequence of modern nation-state formation. The emergence of the nation-state is often connected to the terms of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which weakened the theocratic rule of the Holy Roman Empire, guaranteed a large measure of religious tolerance and gave local princes, particularly in Germany, more sovereignty over their territories.

In Africa, the beginning of the 1990s saw the devotion of attention to the question of governance, following the World Bank (1989) report that underscored the problem of development in Africa to be governmental. It is from this that the mantra 'good governance' deluged into frameworks that defined typologies of government, treated by the so-called international community, as conditions for development aid or otherwise, sanctions. In this



mantra, the concert in governance between governments and the citizenry is emphasized, embroidered with the term ‘participatory governance’.

Yet, Africa continues to display heterodoxies in ensuring productive citizen-participation. This has quite often been reduced to participation in electoral processes, whose outcomes are, in some cases predictable, to fulfil certain conditions. With consideration to the broad problem of limited participatory governance in Africa, the debate on governance in the broader sense, and citizens’ participation remains arguably at large on the continent. It is compelling to ask: Should citizens’ participation be limited to attending a one-off periodic event of exercising the political right of choosing leaders? Or should participatory citizenship be exercised in different realms of government? In the same perspective, the U.N. could reconsider the place that is given to Africa in the organization. Could the African particularity or effective participatory presence in the UN not contribute to global good governance and global justice as well in one way or the other?

In a context of multiculturalism such as that of African states in general and my home Cameroon in particular ravaged by corruption, favouritism, tribalism and the current Anglophone crisis that brings back on the national debate the question of the form of the state, it seems to us that the political theory of Rousseau is unavoidable if we have to reflect on good governance and justice. This is what happens, according to Rousseau, when the General Will is undermined:

*When the social tie begins to slacken and the state to weaken (as it is the case today in Cameroon); when particular interests begin to make themselves felt and sectional societies begin to exert an influence over the greater society, (as it is the case today with the U.N under the domination of a group of powerful states), the common interest becomes corrupted and meets opposition; voting is no longer unanimous; the general will is no longer the will of all; contradictions and disputes arise; and even the best opinion is not allowed to prevail unchallenged<sup>156</sup>.*

As such, in a multicultural context, the diversity of wills threatens the welfare of the state and consequently the well-being of the international community. As far as good governance is concerned, Rousseau’s *Social Contract* promotes democracy as the ideal form of governance. In a context of globalisation, democracy seems to be the model of governance of most states. In Africa, in a context of multiculturalism, democracy has to face the challenges of corruption, tribalism, mismanagement of state properties, unequal distribution

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<sup>156</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *op. cit*, Book IV, Chapter I, p. 123.

of common wealth, in brief, bad governance. Rousseau therefore appears in our project as a corner stone on which a theory of good governance could be built. He argues that property must be controlled by the General Will, the universal law that protects man's liberty in the society. Consequently, we find Rousseau's ideas on property relevant so much so that this project intends to recommend their application, as much as possible, to governance of modern (African) states.

### 5.3. Global Justice as a Condition for Peace in the World

*We do not live in a just world. This may be the least controversial claim one could make in political theory. But it is much less clear what, if anything, justice on a world scale might mean, or what the hope for justice should lead us to want in the domain of international or global institutions, and in the policies of states that are in a position to affect the world order<sup>157</sup>.*

This observation by Thomas Nagel introduces us in the need to reflect on global justice as a fundamental condition for peace in the world. As we have seen in the previous sections of this chapter, globalisation does so much harm to peace keeping and peace building in the international community. The current Westernisation process has been identified as a major challenge to peace. Raymond Aron thought that only an International Law System could maintain peace in International Relations. Yet, the question remains, is the International Law always just? What is certain is that, as Joseph E. Stiglitz puts it,

*The wrong kind of rule of law can help preserve and extend inequities. While a good "rule of law" is supposed to protect the weak against the powerful, we'll see how these legal frameworks have sometimes done just the opposite, and the effect has been a large transfer of wealth from the bottom and middle to the top. Ironically, while the advocates of these legal frameworks argued for them as promoting an efficient economy, they have actually led to a distorted economy<sup>158</sup>.*

The *Social Contract* establishes an obligation to the governed on behalf of those holding political power, as it is considered that the power they exercise emanates from the sovereign popular will of those who compose it. These obligations could be summarized in the concepts of order, security and justice. Because peace cannot be achieved in a context of bad governance, when we move from national level to international level, Rousseau's political theory could also be relevant for the promotion of global justice and be a great contribution for perpetual peace in the world.

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<sup>157</sup> Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice" in *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Blackwell Publishing, Inc., Vol.33 no.2., p. 113. *Ibid.*, pp.113-147.

<sup>158</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future*, New York & London: W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, 2012, p. 239.

Indeed, Rousseau's work was an answer to the pervading social and political gaps in order to initiate the ever living process leading to an egalitarian society. The same principles that lead to the rejection of religious exclusion and arbitrary divides over the worth of citizens, alongside with the wilful self-determination of the individual to form part of a social contract, are in fact timeless and discernible beyond historical contingencies. Therefore we advocate a "global contract" based on the normative framework of Rousseau's Social Contract in view of the promotion of global justice.

Much more recently, John Rawls continued building on Rousseau's Social Contract by making an analogous argument through what he calls the "veil of ignorance" behind which associates derive principles of justice without any knowledge the social, political, or economic status they may hold in the society they are envisioning. For both Rousseau and Rawls, these concepts are intended not as empirical accounts of how human beings reason but as normative accounts of how they ought to reason. In the light of Rousseau's political theory, there should be willingness of the world leaders, who are somehow involved in a global contract with world's citizens, to ensure adequate provision of the basic needs and security for them. Good world governance will surely foster global justice.

We think that global justice is a sine qua non condition for peace in the world and not only an International Law System which has been under the control of the U.S and other powerful states in the world. In order to build peace and security in the world, the solution, according to Joseph E. Stiglitz, lies in alter-globalisation with the need to reshape globalisation. He declares:

*Another world is possible. We can achieve a society more in accord with our fundamental values, with more opportunity, a higher total national income, a stronger democracy, and higher living standards for most individuals. It won't be easy. There are some market forces pulling us the other way. Those market forces are shaped by politics, by the rules and regulations that we as a society adopt, by the way our institutions (like the Federal Reserve, our central bank, and other regulatory agencies) behave. We have created an economy and a society in which great wealth is amassed through rent seeking, sometimes through direct transfers from the public to the wealthy, more often through rules that allow the wealthy to collect "rents" from the rest of society through monopoly power and other forms of exploitation<sup>159</sup>.*

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<sup>159</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

Power monopoly and other forms of exploitation are rightly at the core of present globalisation which is capitalistic in its essence. That is why globalisation has succeeded in enlarging the gap that exists between the Northern countries and the Southern ones which are always behind. Joseph E. Stiglitz recognises this ambivalent nature of globalisation while calling our attention on the necessity to temper it<sup>160</sup>. He writes:

*While globalization may benefit society as a whole, it has left many behind-not a surprise given that, to a large extent, globalization has been managed by corporate and other special interests for their benefit. Too often, the response to the threat of globalization is to make workers even more worse-off, not just by cutting their wages but also by lowering social protections. The growth of the anti-globalization movement is, under these circumstances, totally understandable<sup>161</sup>.*

Hence, the anti-globalization movement, born from the frustrations, the feeling of marginalisation brought by global injustice is a real challenge for peace in the international community. During “global meetings” or summits, anti-globalization activists usually march to denounce what they consider as the causes of global injustice. Such actions are not always pacific. Stiglitz then goes on reflecting on ways in which globalisation could be brought back into a better balance. He thinks that in many countries the onslaught of hot money moving in and out of the country has been devastating; it has caused havoc in the form of economic and financial crises. There is a need for regulations on cross-border capital flows, especially of the short-term, speculative kind. For most countries some restrictions in the unbridled flow of capital would create not only a more stable economy but also one in which capital markets would exert a less heavy hand over the rest of our society. This may not be a policy that is easily available to the United States. But because of the dominant role we play in the global economy, we do have opportunities to help shape globalization-opportunities not available to others<sup>162</sup>.

In this fight for global justice, Stiglitz engages the United States to assume its responsibility. He makes it clear that:

*In reshaping globalization, we have to realize that there has occurred a race to the bottom from which we have all suffered. The United States is in the best position to stop this (if its politics would allow it); it can fight for better worker rights and conditions, better financial regulations, better environmental conditions. But other countries, working together, can also fight against the race to the bottom. Even the advocates of globalization*

<sup>160</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, W. W. Norton, New York: 2006.

<sup>161</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 335.

*should understand that tempering globalization is in their interests. For if globalization is not managed better than it has been, there is a real risk of a retreat, into protectionism or forms of beggarthy- neighbour policies<sup>163</sup>.*

As such, there are specific policies that the United States can undertake to rebalance globalization in ways that are consistent with increasing global equity and efficiency. For instance, current U.S. tax law, where U.S. corporations are taxed only on profits that they bring back home, encourages outsourcing of jobs. Our system of global competition encourages firms to locate on the basis not of global efficiency but of tax competition; while it's understandable why corporations like this, since tax competition increases their after-tax profits, it distorts the global economy and undermines the ability to impose fair taxation on capital. The United States is in a position, for instance, to tax corporations that operate in the United States on the full basis of the profits they derive from their sales in the United States, regardless of where their production occurs<sup>164</sup>. This system of competition cannot succeed in achieving global justice and consequently, it cannot succeed in achieving global peace and security.

One of the solutions used in order to “help” developing countries is the contribution of global institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF. Yet, according to the Economy Price Winner, Joseph E. Stiglitz, the solution to help developing countries is not really aid granted to them by global institutions such as the IMF. He writes:

*The problems facing developing countries are difficult, and the IMF is often called upon in the worst of situations, when the country is facing a crisis. But its remedies failed as often, or more often than they worked. IMF structural adjustment policies – the policies designed to help a country adjust to crises as well as to more persistent imbalances – led to hunger and riots in many countries; and even when results were not so dire, even when they managed to eke out some growth for a while, often the benefits went disproportionately to the better- off, with those at the bottom sometimes facing even greater poverty<sup>165</sup>.*

As such, the promises of global institutions towards poor countries are sometimes misleading in their effort to come out of poverty. In such a situation, it is clear that global institutions are under the control of Northern powerful states and they act in order to protect their interests, to serve their hegemony around the world. Such capitalistic domination really jeopardizes peace in the international community. We therefore think that, if the world is a

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<sup>163</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>164</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>165</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York & London: W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, 2002, Preface, p. xiv.

village, made up of families, solidarity, real solidarity should accompany the actions of powerful states in view of helping poor ones. Yet, what happens most often is that help comes with strips attached to it.

As can be seen in our daily lives, Westernisation is progressing rapidly and effortlessly around us by means of techno-science, which is turning the Western world into a mega machine, a behemoth that is crushing other cultures. The facts speak for themselves in terms of structural adjustments, economic blackmail, unequal terms of trade, excessive paternalism, in short the neo-colonisation of supposedly independent colonies. The expansion of the Western world, which is taking place under the sign of planetary uniformity and not of respect for cultural diversity, arouses and develops among marginalised peoples a deep resentment that leads to revolt. Religious fundamentalism under the cloak of Islamism has emerged and grown in recent decades in opposition to neo-liberal globalisation or the globalisation of Western culture: Al Qaeda, Aq-mi, Daesh, Boko Haram are all groups organised against the globalisation of Western culture with the aim of establishing an Islamist state, i.e. a state that does not function according to the Western model with its attendant capitalism, excessive liberalism and neo-liberal democracy. We can immediately condemn the means used by these groups, but this desire to claim a non-Western cultural identity seems legitimate or at least understandable.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we were concerned with presenting the difficulties of applying Aron's theory of International Relations in a context of neo-liberal globalisation which has turned out to be nothing else than the Westernisation of the world. The incapacity of the United Nations to maintain peace in the world is a proof that Aron's solution of an International Law System is very limited as this International Law System today is controlled by the powerful states of the Western world. By denouncing the excesses of neo-liberal globalisation, we are not seeking to close the door on new values, provided that they contribute to the defence, promotion of respect and safeguarding of human dignity. We can therefore deduce that neo-liberal ideology favours the emergence of an unequal and unjust world with the sole ambition of widening the gap between North and South in an essentially capitalist ideology. Resistance to this situation often leads to political violence and Terrorism. The question remains: how can we safeguard peace in a context of asymmetric wars and more especially in a context of Terrorism?

## CHAPTER SIX

### BUILDING PEACE IN A CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRIC WARS

After the two World Wars and the Cold War that followed, the world is facing the challenges of a diversity of conflicts all over the world, most of which being unconventional wars or asymmetric wars. Although Jean-Vincent Holeindre thinks that despite the modernisation of war, Aron's theory of war remains relevant today<sup>166</sup>, we would like to demonstrate that the way Aron thought about war does not fit exactly with what is happening today. Even Aron discussed the question of guerrilla, we must admit that the way terrorism is gaining ground in our world today since the 11<sup>th</sup> September attacks in the US, offers a new framework for a theory on peace and war. More and more, groups are organised in order to impose terror and desolation in the world with various motivations including culture and religion. Added to terrorism, there are many intrastate conflicts which do not follow the path of conventional wars. One of the main purposes of the laws of war has been to tame the 'dogs of war' to ensure political control of the use of armed force. This was also the main purpose behind Clausewitz's claim that war was 'the continuation of policy by other means'<sup>167</sup>. But does this logic also apply in non-international armed conflict or in 'asymmetrical' conflicts between the armed forces of a state and non-state groups, or even terrorists as it is the case presently in Cameroon? Are the mechanisms of the 'classic' law of war, and international humanitarian law (IHL) in particular, still suited to the current situation, where states often only go to war against each other through the 'proxy' of non-state groups, or are involved in battles with such groups within and across borders<sup>168</sup>? As key risks and security threats, have become international terrorism and crime and the proliferation of weapons.

In this chapter we are concerned with presenting the limitations of Aron's theory of war with the rise of terrorism in the world. We are then going to discuss the ideas of asymmetrical warfare and cultural warfare as new battle lines from which the Aron's theory needs to be examined thoroughly.

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<sup>166</sup> Jean-Vincent Holeindre, *op. cit.*

<sup>167</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *op. cit.* p. 87.

<sup>168</sup> Andreas Paulus and MindiaVashakmadze, "Asymmetricalwar and the notion of armed conflict – a tentative conceptualization" in *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 91, Number 873, March 2009, pp. 95-96 (-125).



## 6.1. Asymmetric Wars and World Security

When we talk about asymmetric wars, we must bear in mind that “asymmetrical warfare, unconventional strategies and tactics [are] adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other<sup>169</sup>.” In recent years the international relations show that the “asymmetric” relationship emerges as an increasingly important element of analysis: “asymmetric threats”, “asymmetric warfare”, “asymmetric war”. Most often, the term “asymmetry” is used to characterize the relationship between incomparable in power and status opponents. The most popular mythological analogy in this context is about the battle between David and Goliath. With the exception of some relatively small number, military-strategic and normative-legal analysis, highlighting the asymmetry, as a rule is related to the paradoxical nature of relations in which the weaker opponent is able to cause detriment and even impose its will over the more powerful side, while powerful cannot always be at their interests and to subjugate the weak. An analysis of strategy and tactics of struggle of the weak against the strong is the nature of the problem of “asymmetric relations”. Moreover, if theorists and analysts are more interested to find the answer of the question “why it is possible victory of the weak or what makes the defeat of the more powerful side?” For practitioners that is, politicians and military men, it is more important to find the optimal strategy in behaviours for such cases.

After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the term "asymmetric threats" is used in relation to terrorism and the danger that international terrorist groups can acquire weapons of mass destruction. Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and political violence (to the British University “St. Andrews”) Paul Wilkinson defines this situation as a “realization of the strength of the weak against the weakness of the strong”, metaphorically compares the fight against terrorism with that of football goalkeeper: he can “hundreds of times to protect the door of his team, but people will still remember the only goal that has made”. Beginning of military operation in Iraq (in 2003) and the inability of the coalition, led by the most powerful country in the world, to end the war in accordance with their original plans (i.e. to establish full control over the country after the defeat of its army) and transformation of military operations into guerrilla warfare, is determined by experts as a classic example of “asymmetric war”, which can be compared to Vietnam. In the Iraqi war, there is a clear disproportion between the power capabilities of adversaries, their status and their military

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<sup>169</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica in [http://o:/:britannica.com/asymmetrical warfare](http://o:/:britannica.com/asymmetrical_warfare) consulted on July 18<sup>th</sup> 2020.

tactics. Moreover, in the early 60's of the last century, partisan wars in terms of occupation or colonial rule and national liberation movements, were assigned to asymmetric wars. Today's realities, however, make us re-analyze them as a specific model of armed confrontation. If deducing the matching elements of those cases, we can identify some basic features of asymmetric wars:

- Unpredictability of the result of them, obviously not equal power capabilities and status of the opposing sides;
- The use of strategy by the weak built on search of "the weakness of the strong";
- The use of the weaker party prohibited of means of conducting military operations;
- The tactics of "indirect" military action used by the weaker party;
- The inability of the strong party to withstand its position definitely crushes the weak.

Consequently, specifying the definition above, we can say with Neno Hristov Hristov that the asymmetry is typical of those paradoxical situations of war in which powerful opponent is unable to protect and achieve victory over the weak (1994). In most such conflicts, weak opponent is unable to achieve victory over the strong. As a rule, however, he first manages to impose over the strong beneficial way himself for development of the conflict. In this sense, the weak imposes his "will" to the strong and manages to achieve political victory, because that is actually used by, according to the classical definition of war. From the 1960s until present years, the concept of asymmetry is used by specialists in international relations, political scientists and military experts to analyze the conflicts between developed and developing countries<sup>170</sup>.

Among unconventional warfare are guerrilla warfare and terrorism, asymmetric wars could also be described as "Irregular Wars" (IW).

Let us recall Clausewitz's definition of war as politics by other means. In *On War*, we read:

*We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do*

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<sup>170</sup>Neno Hristov Hristov, "Modern War and its Asymmetric Nature", *IJASOS- International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences*, Vol. III, Issue 8, August 2017, pp. 468-469.

*more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose*<sup>171</sup>.

It means that there are always political factors interwoven in any kind of war. As a matter of fact, that seems to be the American experience of war as presented to us by Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna (ed):

*Historical U.S. experience with internal conflicts around the world provides ample testimony to the challenges of conducting successful military operations in environments where military and political factors are tightly interwoven—consider, for example, the Philippines and China at the turn of the 20th century, Russia after World War I, Central America and the Caribbean in the 1920s and 1930s, the Chinese civil war after World War II, Vietnam in the 1960s, Lebanon in the 1980s, Somalia in the 1990s, and Afghanistan and Iraq in the present decade.1 Intrastate conflicts are the most prevalent form of warfare in the world.2 Thus, even if the United States has been more selective about direct military involvement in such conflicts than this list suggests, U.S. participation in future IW operations has been and is likely to remain—barring a fundamental redefinition of U.S. interests—a persistent feature of U.S. defense policy*<sup>172</sup>.

The concept of Irregular War (IW) that appears in this quotation rightly fits in the description of Asymmetric war. First, IW is a form of armed conflict. As such, it replaces the term “low-intensity conflict.” Second, IW is a form of warfare. As such, it encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism, raising them above the perception that they are somehow a lesser form of conflict below the threshold of warfare<sup>173</sup>. Thus, irregular warfare is among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Because it favours indirect warfare, it is an asymmetric warfare. The distinction between regular and irregular forces is unrelated to the term irregular warfare. In fact, as we read in the Wikipedia Encyclopaedia online, the term irregular warfare was settled upon in distinction from traditional warfare and unconventional warfare, and to differentiate it as such<sup>174</sup>.

Furthermore, asymmetrical warfare refers to armed conflicts to achieve political objectives, and as the name implies, involves a disproportionate distribution of power. Unlike

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<sup>171</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.* pp. 87-88.

<sup>172</sup> Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna, *Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis*, Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation, pp. 7-8.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>174</sup> Wikipedia.org

most conventional warfare, it is usually (though not always) initiated by the weaker side. Perhaps the first question that needs to be addressed, therefore, is why rational persons who are overwhelmingly outclassed militarily would resort to armed conflict. Thus, asymmetric warfare most commonly refers to warfare between opponents not evenly matched where the smaller or weaker force must exploit geography, timing, surprise, or specific vulnerabilities of the larger and stronger enemy force to achieve victory. At the tactical level, asymmetric warfare doctrine often attempts to specifically avoid a confrontation with the enemy's strengths, preferring instead to disrupt or impair command functions (intelligence gathering and communications) or logistics (supply and medical care) so as to prevent the larger enemy from effectively bringing their larger force to bear in an effective manner. As PK Malick tells us,

*Asymmetric attacks are often characterized as tactical operations that are meant to achieve some strategic objective or outcome. At a strategic level, asymmetric war is designed to discourage and demoralize enemy forces and political leaders of those forces from using their greater strength<sup>175</sup>.*

Guerrilla warfare, occurring between lightly armed partisans and a conventional army, is an example of asymmetrical warfare. Terrorists tactics, such as hijackings and suicide bombings, are also considered to be asymmetrical, both because they tend to involve a smaller, weaker group attacking a stronger one and also because attacks on civilians are by definition one-way warfare. War between a country that is both able and willing to use nuclear weapons and a country that is not would be another example of asymmetrical warfare. The value of asymmetrical tactics can be seen most clearly in guerrilla warfare—indeed, *guerrilla* means “little war” in Spanish. Guerrilla fighters are generally fewer in number and possess fewer and less-powerful weapons than the opposing force. Guerrilla tactics include ambush, avoiding open battle, cutting communication lines, and generally harassing the enemy. Guerrilla warfare has been practiced throughout history, and it includes both military operations carried out against the rear of an enemy's army and operations carried out by a local population against an occupying force. The aim of the guerrilla fighter is erosion of the enemy's will to sustain the costs of continuing the war. Henry Kissinger observed that “*the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win<sup>176</sup>.*”

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<sup>175</sup>Pk Malick, “Asymmetric Wars, Lessons from recent conflicts and its relevance to India”, in <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344507149>, October 2020, consulted on September 20<sup>th</sup> 2020.

<sup>176</sup> Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna, *op.cit.*, .p.9.

Although usually exercising a smaller force, guerrilla fighters, especially in urban areas, can be formidable adversaries to a conventional military. Guerrilla fighters typically do not inhabit large, well-established bases, making it impossible for their enemy to exploit technological advantages such as aerial bombardment to destroy personnel and infrastructure. If the guerrillas are in an urban area, their opponents cannot use powerful conventional weapons unless they are willing to inflict large numbers of civilian casualties and risk increasing popular support for the guerrillas. Small guerrilla or insurgent groups also tend to be less hierarchical, meaning that a force cannot be neutralized by the capture or death of a handful of leaders.

Groups lacking the ability to take power either militarily or politically may resort to terrorist attacks within the heart of a state. Terrorist attacks in cities attract more media coverage than those in rural areas; car bombs, assassinations, and bombs left in crowded public places are common tactics of urban terrorism. As long as the survival of its state is not at risk, the nation under attack may be politically unable to use its full military power and thus may have to fight a limited war while terrorists commit themselves and their resources to total war. Terrorist groups are willing to rely on tactics that the states they attack are unlikely or unwilling to use, such as suicide bombings or targeting civilians.

In the same way that guerrilla jeopardizes peace and security in states, global terrorism fostered by globalisation jeopardizes peace and security at international level. Indeed, it is a truism that globalisation has contributed to the predominance of a market economy and an increase in technological development and communications. Although this has positive results, there are some negative results, such as security threats to humanity. Currently, the world faces challenges such as abatement of norms, national identity crises, financial instability, unemployment, and an absence of functional security. These challenges make societies a porous environment for global terrorism, necessitating the formulation of a new template for the concept of security by accentuating the importance of individuals to confront such threats. Human security represents an important challenge in the context of terrorism and is crucial to achieving various development indices such as human progression, the fulfilment of basic needs, and a tranquil existence without fear and risk for the future.

Terrorism at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is a version of asymmetric warfare as embodied logic of the struggle of “weak” against the “strong”. Terrorism differs from guerrilla warfare with its offensive nature, the weaker dependence on the local population and

the ability actively to use the infrastructure of developed countries for their own purposes. Modern terrorism is a form of war in its classical interpretation by forcibly imposing one's will on the opponent with this important feature, that terrorism combat is oriented to asymmetry whereby players who are infinitely worse in the technology and organization planning from their opponent, proved able to fight successfully in the past.

The difference between guerrilla warfare and terrorist strategies is in the deliberate use of the paradoxical advantages of strategic asymmetry. Traditional guerrilla movements are seeking to achieve symmetry in its relations with the enemy and then to achieve victory in armed struggle with it. In turn, terrorist groups seek to erode the moral and psychological potential of the enemy without coming into direct contact with its military machine. In doing so, they choose to hit the most vulnerable targets of in one or another country, thus avoiding all military barriers and safeguards, for which modern societies invest so much money trying to ensure their safety<sup>177</sup>.

Indeed, terrorism is a prominent global phenomenon of the 21st century that exceeds geographical, political, and cognitive fields and has spread across the African continent, from the Arab region to the sub-Saharan Africa and expands its activities all over the world, especially in Europe and America. Thus, since the Arab Spring, the Arab region has been burdened by political instability which resulted in the return of terrorism in various forms and patterns. These include hostages taking, bombing, armed attacks, etc. It involves persistent threats that are strategically, socially, economically, and politically motivated. Furthermore, the threat to human security has been linked to human rights.

Global Terrorism seems to be the result of international lawlessness, or international weak legislation, a harsh scenario where people opt for violent destructive acts to draw attention to their grievances, real or imaginary, legitimate or not, for which they feel that the system does not offer any remedy. The motives behind terrorism may be legitimate indeed, like the claim for a religious identity, the preservation of some cultural values that define peoples, but it does not justify wanton killings, violence and terrorism. At the same time, it is sad to observe that there are some states that "help" terrorist in their logic of war through sponsoring and the sale of arms. Sponsored terrorism cannot be justified, whatever the motivations accompanying it. The fundamental problem with the International Legal System

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<sup>177</sup>Neno Hristov Hristov, *op. cit.*, p.470.

which Aron presents as a major contribution to peace building in International Relations is that there seems to be no enforceable world law that is universally applicable to all the countries and peoples of the world. Today, international terrorism requires enforceable international laws.

We need not insist on the manifestation of terrorism in the world nowadays. What we would like to insist on is that, Aron's theory of war proves to be limited to deal with the question of global terrorism which weakens the efforts of the UN in its willingness to build, maintain and safeguard peace in the world. Aron believed that only an International Law System could foster the quest for peace in the world but today, the United Nations have failed in many respects in its efforts to achieve its mission.

We think that terrorism is a consequence of cultural frustrations of peoples who decide to become extremist believers or defenders of what they consider as just or legitimate fights. In order to avoid extremism, we think that education is the key to develop man's openness towards fellowman no matter his cultural origins, religion, beliefs and practices. Experience has proven that uneducated or less educated people are not only narrow-minded but also easily driven towards radicalism and fundamentalism in all the aspects of their lives. Because asymmetric wars and more especially global terrorism weaken the role of the UN as far as peace is concerned, Jan Tinbergen, the 1969 Nobel Laureate in Economics, enables us to conclude that "Mankind's problems can no longer be solved by national governments. What is needed is a World Government. This can best be achieved by strengthening the United Nations System."<sup>178</sup>

## **6.2. The Necessity of Limited Violence and Limited Wars**

In order to disagree with Aron's excessive-optimistic-pacifism, we would like to insist on the fact that war is either just or unjust, is fought justly or unjustly. This enables us to understand that at times, war is unavoidable, more especially when it is just. Yet even in a just war there should be a morality, what Michael Walzer calls the morality of war. It is this morality of war that could serve as a criterion to evaluate whether a war is necessary or not. He writes:

*The moral reality of war is divided into two parts. War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly*

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<sup>178</sup> Jan Tinbergen, picture quotes.com

*with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: we say that the war is being fought justly or unjustly. Medieval writers made the difference a matter of prepositions, distinguishing jus ad bellum, the justice of war, from jus in bello, justice in war. These grammatical distinctions point to deep issues<sup>179</sup>.*

He goes further to explain that

*Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgments about aggression and self-defense; jus in bello about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement. The two sorts of judgment are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules. [...] The dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at the heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war<sup>180</sup>.*

The moral reality of war could be examined under the framework of the doctrine of necessity because if one considers that a war is just, it means that such a war is necessary.

### **6.3. The Utilitarian Doctrine of Necessity**

The doctrine of necessity holds that certain conduct, though it violates the law and produces harm, is justified because it averts a greater evil and hence produces a net social gain or benefit to society. Granville Williams expresses the necessity doctrine in this way: “Some acts that would otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils<sup>181</sup>.” Williams offers the following example: Suppose that a dike threatens to give way, and the actor is faced with the choice of either making a breach in the dike, which he knows will result in one or two people being drowned, or doing nothing, in which case he knows that the dike will burst at another point involving a whole town in sudden destruction. In such a situation, where there is an unhappy choice between the destruction of one life and the destruction of many, utilitarian philosophy would certainly justify the actor in preferring the lesser evil<sup>182</sup>. The utilitarian idea is that certain illegal conduct ought not be punished because, due to the special circumstances of the situation, a net benefit to society has resulted. This utilitarian rationale is sometimes criticized as “ends justifying the means” in that the doctrine allows that, within certain limits, it is

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<sup>179</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, fourth edition, New York: Basic Books, 2006, p.21.

<sup>180</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>181</sup> Granville Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law* 198, Alfred A. Knopf 1957, in John Alan Cohan, « Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism », in *Stetson Law Review* [Vol. 35], 2006, p. 905.

<sup>182</sup> *Idem*.



justifiable, especially under exigent circumstances, to break the letter of the law if doing so will produce a net benefit to society.

Ashworth further opines that the necessity doctrine “represents a concession to human weakness in cases of extreme pressure, where the accused breaks the law rather than submitting to the probability of greater harm if he does not break the law<sup>183</sup>.” The idea, in its simplest form, is that it is unjust to penalize someone for violating the law when the action produces a greater good or averts a greater evil. Had the unlawful action not taken place, society would have endured a greater evil than that which resulted from violating the law. Therefore, under the necessity doctrine, those who violate the law in certain circumstances are justified in doing so. With the necessity defence there will always be a *prima facie* violation of the law. It might involve the violation of a minor traffic law, with no harm caused to life or limb, but the technical violation of the law will nonetheless count as harmful to society. In other instances the violation of law may involve tortuous conduct that causes damages to economic or property interests. Or, the violation of law may involve serious criminal conduct that results in the death or maiming of innocent people<sup>184</sup>.

Hence, we think that violence and war may be sometimes inevitable and necessary. The justification of violence and war, according to us, is the ever-growing feeling of resistance against oppression, domination, exploitation, assimilation, of some peoples our cultures by others in many aspects of life: culture, economy, and politics. In this vein, terrorism could be justified as a reaction against oppression. As John Alan Cohan tells us,

*There has been much talk about “getting inside the terrorist’s mind” in order to better understand the rationale behind terrorist attacks. A typical comment has been, “We may not agree with it, but in their minds, [the terrorists] have good reasons for what they’ve done.” The idea is that perhaps we should be able to win the “war on terror” by simply using a compassionate approach, so as to understand the cause of grievances of those who seek to justify the deliberate taking of innocent lives<sup>185</sup>.*

John Alan Cohan discusses both political violence and terrorism and attempt to distinguish these two species of violence. The distinction is important, if it can be made, because the international community in general supports political violence as an adjunct to political reform movements of various types, while this same community generally condemns

<sup>183</sup> A. J. Ashworth, *Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability*, 91 L.Q. Rev. London, January, 1975, p. 106.

<sup>184</sup> John Alan Cohan, « Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism », in *Stetson Law Review* [Vol. 35], 2006, p.903.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 906.

the species of violence that carries the label “terrorism.” In the end, one is hard-pressed to provide a clear demarcation between the two species of violence because both kinds of violence may involve indiscriminate targeting of non-combatants, and both kinds of violence are motivated in large part by a desire to effect political change. Even so, once the mode or scope of violence goes beyond a certain threshold, then even legitimate freedom fighters will be branded as terrorists by the international community. To terrorists, there is a pressing necessity for the kind of violence that is typically labelled “terrorism”-the targeting of innocent civilians, for example. Terrorists will concede that the maiming and killing of “innocent” targets violates basic human rights, but they insist that these actions are justified because they are designed to avert a greater evil: the brutal oppressiveness, the grave injustices, and the exploitation of their own peoples’ lives by the practices of the powers that be. Terrorists think, like President Abraham Lincoln did, that there is an “indispensable necessity” associated with their efforts to preserve “by every indispensable means” their way of life, free from the constraints of others<sup>186</sup>.

#### **6.4. The Justification of Violence in Utilitarianism**

Political violence is generally a legitimate, justifiable means to wage a long-term ideological battle against a hostile government. Political violence has been omnipresent throughout human history. Many governments have met with their demise through the means of coup d’Etat, by which the rulers of the government are overthrown by violent means. Numerous kings of England ascended to the throne as a result of regicide or other acts of treachery. Also, acts of political violence led to the American Revolution and the overthrow of British colonial rule as well as independence in African countries.

In his vision of American political identity, Thomas Jefferson praised periodic rebellion as “medicine necessary for the sound health of government<sup>187</sup>.” The major champion of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, argues that political violence may be justified based on what the balance of reason says is morally right in the circumstances in question<sup>188</sup>. Violence may be a *prima facie* evil, but “if good is to come of evil it must be practised with an awareness of the need to curtail its general tendency to produce yet more evil<sup>189</sup>.”

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<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 904.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 911.

<sup>188</sup> John Stuart Mill, *The Contest in America*, in *Essays on Equality, Law, and Education* XXI, John M. Robson ed., U. of Toronto Press, 1984, p. 137.

<sup>189</sup> Geraint Williams, *J.S. Mill and Political Violence*, 1 Utilitas, London, 1989, p. 103.

Mill argues that if a government has taken away freedoms of press and of speech, it has taken away a principal means by which the public may express its dissent, and in such circumstances, protestors are released from the normal duty to change society by nonviolent means. He writes:

*A government cannot be blamed for defending itself against insurrection. But it deserves the severest blame if to prevent insurrection it prevents the promulgation of opinion. If it does so, it actually justifies insurrection in those to whom it denies the use of peaceful means to make their opinions prevail. [. . .] Who can blame persons who are deeply convinced of the truth and importance of their opinions, for asserting them by force, when that is the only means left them of obtaining even a hearing? When their mouths are gagged, can they be reproached for using their arms<sup>190</sup>?*

What Mill says could be applied to the context of the current crisis in the North-West and South-West regions in Cameroon. Our opinion is that wars can be prevented by social justice and equity, respect of the law and of the dignity of the human person. Mill also asserts that there are two factors that together can morally justify political violence: that the cause is just and that there is likelihood of success in the deployment of violence<sup>191</sup>. The definition of “success” is similar to that required by the causal nexus factor of the necessity doctrine. The question is whether the violent action will be causally effective in changing society, either directly or in the long run. Sometimes success might be equated with simply drawing significant attention to one’s cause, but more concrete success is equated with pressure on the authorities to capitulate to the demands of insurrectionists. In some cases success may be measured over time. Over time, the dissidents’ persistence gradually may result in the intended change. In any event, Mill’s claim that an act of political violence, to be justified, must have a likelihood of success, will have to be questioned. The likelihood of success of an oppressed people in staging a revolt against a powerful regime is usually far from being assured. But their claim may well have moral justification despite their impotence against the status quo. Corlett wonders:

*Why should the moral justification of political action of any kind be contingent on its likelihood of success? Should a greatly oppressed people in a highly organized and militarily powerful regime wait until the regime is about to weaken and fall in order to finally attempt to gain its independence from brutal opposition?<sup>192</sup>*

The evident answer is no. Violence to come out of oppression is morally justified.

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<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p.104.

<sup>191</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>192</sup> J. Angelo Corlett, *Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis*, Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003, p. 53.

## 6.5. The Justification of Violence in the Philosophy of Kant

In contrast to the utilitarians' justification of political violence, Immanuel Kant is known for his view that participation in revolutionary violence is always wrong<sup>193</sup>. However, some Kantian scholars believe that there is little room in Kant's moral philosophy to consider political violence as morally justified under some circumstances, subject to certain constraints. For instance, one might argue consistent with Kant that political violence is morally justified to avert threats to the rational agency of an oppressed people. In this case, people would be defending themselves from a fundamental violation of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Moreover, an act of political violence could be justified as an act of self-respect and an assertion of human dignity. If violence were deployed in an insurrection against an oppressive regime, then under Kant's moral philosophy, the violence must be proportional; that is, no more violent than that which is sufficient to accomplish the end<sup>194</sup>.

In the Kantian perspective, violence is necessary when all channels of nonviolent protest have been exhausted. This means that one must avail oneself of all legal means of protest before engaging in violence. In this light, there would never be an insurrection, for there is really no end to the availability of nonviolent channels of protest. There will always be some further legal means available to seek political change other than starting a revolution. It is always possible to file one more petition to redress grievances, to hold one more peaceful rally, to write more letters to officials, to circulate more handbills, to seek further diplomatic solutions, and so forth. When dissidents are up against a tyrannical regime or recalcitrant colonial power, there simply may be no nonviolent political or diplomatic solutions available.

Yet, this Kantian perspective could also have suggested that it is possible to pursue all reasonable nonviolent means, or pursuing all nonviolent means that might be effective rather than futile, before engaging in political violence. Even if one interprets Kant categorical imperative to mean that the actor must first pursue all reasonable nonviolent remedies, sometimes awaiting the outcome of reasonable nonviolent political processes may be outweighed by the quantum of evil that will occur in the meantime—for instance, if the grievance pertains to egregious violations of human rights by a brutal dictator. This means that violence is legitimate when it because inevitable.

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<sup>193</sup> Thomas Hill, Jr., *A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence*, 1 J. Ethics, London, 1997, p. 106.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

## 6.6. The Justification of Violence in Marxism

A further way of analyzing the appropriateness of political violence is from a Marxist standpoint. According to Adam Schaff, Marx considered the violent overthrow of an unjust regime as a means of justifying social change<sup>195</sup>. John Harris interprets Marxist political violence in this way: we are causally responsible for whatever harm we could have prevented from happening by an unjust regime; the harm of an unjust regime is, in and of itself, violence; and failure to prevent harm may be in itself a form of violence<sup>196</sup>.

The United States shed the yoke of English colonialism principally through acts of political violence that eventually led to the Revolutionary War. Thomas Jefferson asserted, when he worked on the Declaration of Independence, that “people have the right of revolution whenever a government becomes destructive of ‘certain unalienable rights.’<sup>197</sup>” Some of the same claims are made by those who engage in political violence or terrorism—to wit, that they are impelled by necessity to act to avert the repetition of injuries that violate their rights of humanity, that the injuries are “unsufferable,” and that there is no prospect of relief by other means than violence. Members of al Qaeda or Hamas regard themselves as legitimate freedom fighters, and they have made clear that their objective is to attack the political, social, and economic structures of the Western world so as to thwart perceived inequity, tyranny, or injustice. In the same *modus operandi*, in the current Anglophone crisis, the “Amba boys” also claim to be freedom fighters.

The difficulty then appears, that of distinguishing ordinary political violence and terrorism. It is indeed a dilemma because legitimate political violence, which involves an ideological battle coupled with a military mission, may gain widespread acceptance, if not approval, in the international community. But terrorism, which also involves an ideological battle and violence, is uniformly condemned. The distinction, if one can be made, is important for the obvious reason that political violence is often perceived to be morally justified, while terrorism is not justified, except from the terrorists’ perspective who consider themselves as freedom fighters. In both instances there will be atrocities and violations of human rights.

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<sup>195</sup> Adam Schaff, *Marxist Theory on Revolution and Violence*, 34 *J. History of Ideas*, 1973, pp.263-264.

<sup>196</sup> John Harris, *The Marxist Conception of Violence*, 3 *Phil. & Pub. Affairs*, 1974, p. 192.

<sup>197</sup> John Alan Cohan, *Formulation of a State’s Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism*, *Pace Intl. L. Rev.* 77, 87 n. 48, 2002, p.14.

What is observed is that “Since the end of WWII, in almost every region in the world, there have been conflicts characterized by terror-violence<sup>198</sup>.”

Making a coherent distinction between the two brands of violence is difficult if not impossible. For example, subnational groups in a secessionist movement, like it is the case in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon presently, may at times engage in acts of violence that closely resemble acts of terrorism in that there may be the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, among other things. Alex Schmid writes that “Freedom fighters and terrorists are not mutually exclusive categories. Terrorists can also fight for national liberation, and freedom fighters can also carry out inhumane atrocities<sup>199</sup>.” Nearly all instances of guerrilla warfare and similar armed rebellions involve terrorist-styled tactics such as the killing of innocent civilian targets. “Over one third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists identified by the United States Department of Treasury are associated with self-determination movements<sup>200</sup>.” Hence, terrorists and freedom fighters also seem to have this in common: they deny that independence can be won by peaceful means. The only possibility they think to have of gaining liberty is through violence.

Both in terrorism and in legitimate political struggles, violence is directed by a dissident political group towards the political authorities, in an effort to avert some evil. Typically, domestic political struggles, around which the international community may rally, will pertain to civil rights, anti-colonialism, secessionism, an anti-corruption movement, democratic movement, efforts to elevate the group’s status in the face of a hostile government, efforts to overcome a tyrannical regime and form a new government, or other movements for political autonomy.

In numerous situations in which freedom fighters are hard-pressed to attain victory, other states will offer aid or military assistance, based on the principle of humanitarian intervention. Justifiable political violence is said to be a kind of recourse to the concept of just war, which is theorised by Michael Walzer, in which there is a failure to grant citizens effective means of peacefully gaining redress against tyrannical abuse of power. According to Robert Young, when these matters are not respected, revolutionary activity will be justified if

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<sup>198</sup> M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy”, 36 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 2004, pp. 299- 301.

<sup>199</sup> Alex Schmid, “Terrorism: The Definitional Problem,” 36 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L., 2004, p. 414.

<sup>200</sup> Paul R. Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, *Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination*, 40 Stan. J. Intl. L. 2004, pp.347-348.

there is a strong likelihood the government can be overthrown without ensuing tyranny or anarchy and bloodshed of an inordinate extent<sup>201</sup>.

From the above reasoning, it is possible to think that a struggle for political freedom can be justified regardless of the extent of violence deployed. Addressing the United Nations in 1974, Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Yassir Arafat made a strong statement: “*He who fights for a just cause, he who fights for the liberation of his country, he who fights against invasion and exploitation or single-mindedly against colonialism, can never be defined a terrorist*”<sup>202</sup>.

Hans Kelsen suggests that the international community should recognize insurgents as legitimate belligerent powers under these conditions: (1) The insurgents must have a government and a military organization of their own. (2) The insurrection must be conducted in the usual technical forms of war, i.e., the conflict must be more than a mere petty revolt and must assume the true characteristics of a war, as that term is generally understood. (3) The government of the insurgents must in fact control a certain part of the territory of the State in which the civil war takes place, i.e., the order established by the insurgents must be effective for a certain part of the territory of this State<sup>203</sup>.

It therefore appears to be the growing consensus in the international community that acts of aggression are justified based on the principle of *jus ad bellum*, or just cause, provided that just means are employed. Many in the world community may approve of the goals of insurrectionists, but might disapprove of certain tactics. The deployment of certain tactics will cause world opinion to label the action “terrorism” and erode public sympathy for the cause. For example, there seems to be universal condemnation of deliberate violence in the form of ethnic cleansing, genocide; that is, eliminating potentially hostile pockets of ethnic groups before they have a chance to arm and strike. This is deliberate violence by one group to create a climate of fear in the population of a rival group, resulting in population transfers.

Efforts to draw the distinction between legitimate political violence and terrorism are sometimes based on the legitimacy of the political changes sought. The perceived legitimacy, in turn, often will depend on one’s subjective point of view as to the legitimacy of the cause.

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<sup>201</sup> Robert Young, *Revolutionary Terrorism, Crime and Morality*, 4 Soc. Theory & Prac., 1977, p. 297.

<sup>202</sup> John Alan Cohan, « Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism », in *Stetson Law Review* [Vol. 35 ], 2006, p.918.

<sup>203</sup> Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, Harvard U. Press 1949, p. 229.

“*One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter*<sup>204</sup>,” is a maxim well worth keeping in mind. Opponents and advocates of a particular movement may disagree as to whether the tactics employed in the struggle constitute terrorism. Each side may accuse the other of unremitting acts of terrorism, to which it becomes necessary to deploy countermeasures. The countermeasures in turn are viewed by the other side as terrorism. This has been seen again and again over the years in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In that conflict, no matter what the violent action was, when performed by Israel it was considered legitimate, sometimes with the admission of possible excessive use of force, while when the violent action was performed by the Palestinians, it was almost always called terrorism. Thus, it is often the case that “terrorism” is used as a rhetorical device in political debates “*where charges and counter-charges compete for the moral indignation or approval of relevant audiences*<sup>205</sup>.”

In distinguishing terrorism from ordinary political violence, one is tempted to use the default position that the distinction lies in whether innocent persons, that is, non-combatants, are targets of attack. The ideal-type freedom fighter fights those who deprive people of their freedoms, not the civilians. When civilians are purposefully targeted by freedom fighters to achieve their political goal, they become terrorists. When terrorists, on the other hand, confine their targeting to legitimate targets-armed security personnel and installations-they could be qualified as freedom fighters. To achieve this, they would have to desist from attacking and terrorizing civilians; would have to discriminate in their use of force and not engage in tactics such as hostage-taking or killing of prisoners. However, this distinction is theoretical because, what usually happens is that civilians are purposefully targeted and armed security personnel also, as it is the case in the “Anglophone” crisis in Cameroon. The difficulty of distinguishing political violence from terrorism is therefore seen in the situation in the NOSO crisis.

In order to come out of the vicious circle of violence-terror and war, we can refer to Leon Trotsky, in his work *Terrorism and Communism*<sup>206</sup>, where he endorses the use of “terror” in the context of political revolution. He thinks that if human life in general is sacred and inviolable, we must deny ourselves not only the use of terror, not only war, but also revolution itself:

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<sup>204</sup> Walter Berns, *Mystic Chords of Memory: Cultivating America’s Unique Form of Patriotism*, *Am. Educator* (Spring 2002) (available at [http://65.110.81.56/pubs-reports/american\\_educator/spring2002/mystic.html](http://65.110.81.56/pubs-reports/american_educator/spring2002/mystic.html)).

<sup>205</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>206</sup> Leon Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism*, U. of Mich. Press 1961, p.62.



*As long as human labour power, and, consequently, life itself, remain articles of sale and purchase, of exploitation and robbery, the principle of the "sacredness of human life" remains a shameful lie, uttered with the object of keeping the oppressed slaves in their chains. [...] To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him. And this problem can only be solved by blood and iron<sup>207</sup>.*

This means that only constructive violence, leading to social revolution to put an end to exploitation and injustice can lead to lasting peace.

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<sup>207</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.62-63.

## CONCLUSION

At the end of this chapter, we come to the conclusion that war is sometimes legitimate be it in political violence or in terrorism. As a matter of facts, political violence and terrorism have features in common with conventional war<sup>208</sup>. Both have parallel goals and rationales, i.e., attacking the political, social or economic structures of a given state. As in war, terrorists believe the enemy threatens their very existence and they accept the possibility of their own death in pursuit of the cause. Terrorism and political violence are similar to war insofar as the combatants attack the political, social, or economic structures of a given state. Acts of self-determination are similar to warfare in that the objective is to gain the support of the people, disarm the military of the offending regime, and carry out a massive propaganda campaign in the international community. As with conventional war, in which attacks are sometimes made in retaliation for attacks by the enemy, political violence and terrorism often involve attacks to “punish” the enemy. For instance, Osama bin Laden claims that al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks are retribution for killings of Muslims by the United States and Israel<sup>209</sup>. War, political violence, and terrorism favour the technique of providing a “show of force” with attacks being carried out without warning, so as to provide an element of surprise. As with conventional war in which soldiers who win battles enjoy a heightened sense of morale, every act of a terrorist or guerrilla group not only intimidates the opponent, but invigorates and intensifies the faith of the actors. Terrorists and guerrillas alike believe that they are engaged in war. In order to come out of the vicious circle of violence-war-terrorism, we suggest that social justice should be the goal of any government at national and international level. Also, the promotion of cultural diversity, the respect of the differences existing among peoples may temper cultural warfare that often leads to terrorism.

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<sup>208</sup> John Alan Cohan, *op.cit.*, p. 925.

<sup>209</sup> Don Van Natta, Jr., *Sizing up the New Toned-down Bin Laden*, N.Y. Times D1, Dec. 19, 2004.

## PARTIAL CONCLUSION

At the end of this part which aimed at bringing out some limits of Aron's pacifism in a global world experiencing asymmetric wars and the failures of the International System (U.N), we can say that building peace in the international community requires not only a legal framework but also a concern for global justice and social justice within states. Insofar as the cohesion and tranquillity that characterise the living together of individuals are clear signs of peace, they constitute sure guarantees of the political stability of the state and the international community. Social cohesion and tranquillity guarantee political stability insofar as they ensure the long-term existence of the state and its institutions. A state that enjoys political stability has the chance to continue to exist. This is why a head of state that lives in harmony with his citizens holds power for a long time without facing a storm that could lead to his early ouster and the ruin of state institutions. It is therefore clear that there is a close link between peace and political stability. A peaceful state is necessarily a stable one, i.e. one whose institutions function in the long term. Peace and stability, insofar as they ensure that state institutions function for as long as possible, also have significant social benefits. They enable a state to improve the quality of life of its members considerably. Then, if all states experience political stability and if global justice becomes the main concern of International Relations, peace among nations will not be a vague idea but a reality. The need to strengthen the United Nations System is aggravated in the following words of Niel Gardiner:

*In more severe terms, Whatever the causes of the U.N.'s failure and weakness, there can be no doubt that it is an organization in a state of crisis, unsure of its future, mired in scandal, suffering from a lack of direction, and morally ambiguous in outlook. In other words, it is a world body that is increasingly ill-equipped for the demands of the 21st century, and working its way towards irrelevance unless it undergoes a transformation. The U.N. today is best described as a sickly patient awaiting a blood transfusion<sup>210</sup>.*

Our next part will help us deal with some reforms that could be undertaken within the UN so as to reinforce it so much so that it will be able to play its role more efficiently in the domain of peacekeeping and peace-safeguarding in the world.

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<sup>210</sup>Niel Gardiner, *op.cit.* p. 40.

**PART THREE**

**SECURING PEACE IN THE WORLD TODAY BEYOND  
ARON'S LEGACY**

## **PARTIAL INTRODUCTION**

The transformation of war is undoubtedly one of the major emerging strategic problems of recent times. The post-Cold War military situation is characterized by a growing vagueness concerning the nature of contemporary armed conflicts. We may even wonder if interstate wars, which so clearly marked the twentieth century, have not disappeared for good. Can terrorism and irregular conflicts, which seem to dominate the strategic arena today, be considered actual wars? Has war been transformed to the point that we should abandon the very concept of war and, by the same token, the Clausewitzian legacy that Aron evokes? We have only to read Aron-among others-to realize that, in fact, these transformations do not date back to the end of the Cold War. In this last part of our work, we are concerned with bringing out Aron's legacy as far as securing peace within the framework of International Relations is concerned. To what extent is his approach still relevant to understanding strategic problems today? In the age of "asymmetric" conflicts and nuclear proliferation, is his theory of war still relevant?

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE RELEVANCE OF ARON'S LEGACY IN UNDERSTANDING WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In this chapter, we would like to point out the relevance of Aron's theory of International relations today. In order to do so, we are going to show how his thought reconciled realism and idealism in order to become a great contribution to the promotion of peace in the world. After presenting this reconciliation, we are going to demonstrate how relevant his theory of peace and war is for present days International Relations. What could already be observed is that Raymond Aron's thought stands out as an example of lucid political judgment in an age of extremes in which many intellectuals shunned moderation and were attracted to various forms of radicalism<sup>211</sup>. His lucid political judgment is clearly expressed in the conciliation he makes between Realism and Idealism.

#### 7.1 Reconciling Realism and Idealism in International Relations<sup>212</sup>

Though Aron is considered as a realist political theorician, his realism is not radical. It gives room to morality in politics; unlike Machiavelli who clearly separated the field of politics from that of morality and religion. He begins by criticizing idealism in terms of idealistic illusionism. He writes:

*Relations between states are not, for all that, comparable to those of beasts in the jungle. Political history is not purely natural. Diplomatic-strategic conduct tends to justify itself by ideas; it claims to obey norms, to submit to principles. We call cynics those who regard ideas, norms and principles as mere disguises of the desire for power, without real effectiveness. Those who repudiate the fact that all international order must be maintained by force are accused of idealistic illusions. The idealistic illusion assumes diverse forms, depending upon the character of the imperatives and the values invoked. Ideological idealisms consists in considering a historical idea as the exclusive and sufficient criterion of the just and the unjust—for example, the right of peoples to self-determination, or the idea of nationalities<sup>213</sup>.*

By analysing idealism and realism, Aron puts us in a position of some tension between these two ontological positions<sup>214</sup>. According to him, it is an illusion to think that one can

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<sup>211</sup> Aurelian Crăiuțu, "Faces of moderation: Raymond Aron as committed observer" in *Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review*, Vol. V, no. 4 • 2005, p. 933. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56310-8> 933-952.

<sup>212</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p.579.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p.581.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 567-596.

avoid conflicts, particularly war, and that lasting peace can be achieved through only a diplomacy based on normative considerations of good conduct and principled morals. Idealism is seen by some authors as a deep conviction in total compliance with the rules and legal norms set in conduct among states in order to avoid war.

Moreover, this belief assumes that all states are interested in maintaining the law and that in the case of aggression against one of them, the others would volunteer to assist the attacked. But these principles of collective security are difficult to implement, because they imply too, from the start, an agreement by States on the definition of who is the aggressor and a shared sentiment about the acts committed. Even if the aggressor State is easily identified, the formation of alliances or coalitions for defence of the attacked State is required, which presupposes that other states are indeed interested and engaged in the maintenance of international order and agree to act in order to punish the offender. In this type of process a whole range of situations can be seen, and depending on the relative strengths of the aggressor State and coalition several outcomes are possible, from capitulation to total war – results that turn out to be contrary to the objectives intended. Idealist doctrine therefore becomes dangerous with respect to the conduct of foreign policy, to the extent that it closes in on itself through the adoption of normative principles. In this regard, Raymond Aron declares:

*The criticism of idealist illusion is not only pragmatic, it is also moral. Idealistic diplomacy slips too often into fanaticism; it divides states into good and evil, into peace-loving and bellicose. It envisions a permanent peace by the punishment of the latter and the triumph of the former. The idealist, believing he has broken with power politics, exaggerates its crimes. Sometimes states obey their principles and, with the excuse of punishing aggressors, go to the extreme of war and victory; sometimes, when their interests are at stake or circumstances oblige them to do so, they follow their opportunities<sup>215</sup>.*

However, it is interesting that, when it comes to this issue of the "idealist illusion", Aron compares the position of H. Von Treitschke and G. F. Kennan<sup>216</sup>. Treitschke was a German nationalist historian who fully accepted power politics, including war, considering it as necessary and an exalting prudence from power politics and nationalism; and Kennan, who resignedly accepted power politics as a way to avoid other greater evils. Both Treitschke and Kennan make an apology for prudence and consider power important. But curiously-and

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<sup>215</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 584.

<sup>216</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 590.

Raymond Aron stresses this fact-Treitschke considered himself an idealist while G. F. Kennan was not opposed to being classified as a realist.

What seems to be at stake is that the idealist, as well as the realist, must understand their era, not ignore the possibility of violence and accept that the resolution of conflict requires taking into account the balance of power among states, and that action should include prudence and diplomatic and strategic conduct. An incompatibility does not necessarily exist between being an idealist and recognising violence and war. What Raymond Aron truly opposes - referring to the “idealist illusion” – is the disregarding of war and violence to act in international relations, which most idealists of the time seemed to reveal. It is not, therefore, condemning idealism completely, but points out some weaknesses. He writes:

*States, engaged in incessant competition whose stake is their existence, do not all behave in the same manner at all times, but they are not divided, once and for all, into good and evil. It is rare that all the wrongs are committed by one side, that one camp is faultless. The first duty—political, but also moral—is to see international relations for what they are, so that each state, legitimately preoccupied with its own interests, will not be entirely blind to the interests of others. In this uncertain battle, in which the qualifications of the participants are not equivalent but in which it is rare that one of them has done absolutely no wrong, the best conduct—the best with regard to the values which the idealist himself wishes to achieve—is that dictated by prudence<sup>217</sup>.*

He goes further explaining that to be prudent is to act in accordance with the particular situation and the concrete data, and not in accordance with some system or out of passive obedience to a norm or pseudo-norm; it is to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the presumably guilty party or to a so-called absolute justice; it is to establish concrete accessible objectives conforming to the secular law of international relations and not to limitless and perhaps meaningless objectives, such as “a world safe for democracy” or “a world from which power politics will have disappeared<sup>218</sup>.” Beside this, Aron considers that realism best takes into account and recognises what the selfishness of States and their interests are compared to idealism<sup>219</sup>. However, when considering power as the ultimate objective of States, realists – particularly from North American – do not take into account the idea that although the States coexist without the existence of an arbitrator or a supranational politic,

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<sup>217</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 584-585.

<sup>218</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>219</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 593.



they limit their freedom of action through the obligations they incur, namely the signing of agreements and treaties, although they may also resort to armed force to resolve conflicts.

Thus, the absence of a sovereign power is not incompatible with the notion that international life cannot be contractually ruled, in the sense of modern political philosophy, with the existence of rules and norms of conduct, which, however, does not exclude or prevent the use of violence. And it stresses that the realist school is a little set back from traditional European thought, because the obsession of realists with power make them always see an alternative to law or morality, and ultimately define international politics by power and not by the absence of a arbiter or a politic above States. In reality, in the face of national egoism that prevails in between states in the “state of nature”, the diplomatic and strategic conduct of States - to use the terminology of Raymond Aron, and that includes the exercise of diplomatic functions of diplomats themselves as well as strategy and war, which are duties of the soldier, taking one another as symbolic characters of the two types of conduct – should seek to conform to normative principles and ideas, and not to what happens to animals in the jungle<sup>220</sup>.

This position is in line with the fact that, through their leaders, States need and have the obligation to safeguard their vital interests, acting in accordance with norms and customs that may be more or less respected, but with the risk – always latent – that war is decreed by the leaders. However, both idealist and realist thinking are considered extreme positions. The idealists, for reasons related to the occurrence of the atrocities of the First World War and its rejection of the importance of power in international relations; and realists, precisely because of their emphasis on power in opposition and reaction to this other school of thought. It is this need of reaction that explains the extreme positioning of realism in relation to idealism, in his inadequate opinion. The internationalist thought of Aron reflects numerous tensions and antinomies, among which it is worth pointing out idealism versus realism. For Aron, idealism and realism are not contradictory concepts, but complementary; this antagonism, at its core, is no more than a part of the “eternal debate” between Machiavellianism and moralism. According to Vítor Ramon Fernandes,

*The debate between realism and idealism can be characterised by two extreme and opposite ontological views on international relations, which results from different considerations and actions in relation to how States relate in international society. Still, they are not mutually exclusive. In the*

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<sup>220</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 580-581.

*context of the international politics of States, the question that arises is whether they, in their capacity as sovereigns, have the obligation to obey moral criteria or other interests, in particular legal or rules, or on the contrary, act in a way that best serves their purposes and interests, governed solely by the objective of maximising power*<sup>221</sup>.

As a matter of facts, Realism and Idealism are two different responses to the problem of order, which fall into a certain tradition of thought in the field of International Relations and political philosophy. The principal rigorous conclusion of the fourth part of *Peace and War* is that peace must first be grounded in the realist vision instead of seeking absolute pacifism: *“in the shadow of the thermonuclear apocalypse, as yesterday in the shadow of armored divisions, or the day before yesterday in the shadow of the legions or the phalanxes, statesmen or simple citizens must act according to prudence, without the illusion or the hope of absolute security”*<sup>222</sup>.

In other words, Raymond Aron’s conceptualisation leads to the theory of what Rousseau had called the “state of war”, not to that of transnational society or the world economic system, which obey other rules, another logic; and even in its legitimate domain, it does not make it possible to grasp, on its own, the behaviour of actors. When Raymond Aron deals with the latter, his analyses seem to be linked to the ‘realist’ school, an illustrious and venerable school, since its members include the founding father of the study of international relations, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, the sociologist Max Weber so much admired by Raymond Aron, and, among contemporaries, Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, the American Protestant theologian Niebuhr, and George Kennan: the necessity of the calculation of forces, the determining role of force among the elements of power, the permanence of national ambitions and the perils of survival, the imperative of balance, the impossibility of a "morality of law" and of peace through law, the wisdom of a morality of responsibility rather than an ethics of conviction, The importance of geopolitical factors in determining the objectives of states, the primordial role of states among all actors on the world stage, the possibility of conceiving politics as the intelligence of the personified state, rather than that of a class or an ideology, or as a complex and indecisive process, these are the points common to all realists thinkers.

However, if we compare Raymond Aron to the others, we discover four sets of differences. The most important one is conceptual. On the one hand, as we have already seen,

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<sup>221</sup>Vitor Ramon Fernandes, “Realism and Idealism in International Relations: An ontological debate” in *Janus.net*, Vol. 7, Nº. 2 (November 2016-April 2017), p. 23. (pp. 14-25).

<sup>222</sup>Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 604.

Raymond Aron differs from Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau by refusing to see the quest for power as the essence of all politics, by distinguishing between internal and external politics, and also between power as a means and power as an end. On the other hand, with regard to the specific field of international relations, he is wary of catch-all concepts that at first glance seem to capture the specificity of diplomatic-strategic conduct, but turn out to be equivocal or dangerous on analysis. Thus, he criticizes the notion of national interest, the keystone of Morgenthau's theory, but a formula drawn from "a practice and a theory of the happy times", when there was "an unwritten code of the legitimate and the illegitimate", whereas in revolutionary times "no power restricted its objectives to the national interest, in the sense that Bismarck gave to this term<sup>223</sup>", and that this interest is then largely defined in ideological terms.

The criticism of overly abstract and simplistic concepts is linked to an essential feature of Aronian "realism": it revives Thucydides by immersing theory in history, so to speak, in order to ensure that theory never goes beyond what history teaches, and is not more rigid and prescriptive than history allows: on this point, the contrast with the normative ambitions and the will to predict of American theorists is striking. It is also a question of subjecting general concepts to the critique of history. For Raymond Aron, the theory had to both complement and fit into the 'historical sociology' of international relations. It is history, in fact, that shows the indefinite nature of systems. Raymond Aron has always rejected determinism and monistic theses that seek to explain complex phenomena by a single factor.<sup>224</sup> He has always sought to separate the root causes from the accidents, and to show how distinct historical series come together: The course of international relations remains supremely historical, in every sense of the term: changes are incessant, systems, diverse and fragile, are subject to the repercussions of all transformations, decisions taken by one or a few men set in motion millions of men and trigger irreversible mutations<sup>225</sup>.

A third important difference concerns the idea, so frequent among the "realists", of the primacy of foreign policy. A contemporary American theorist, Kenneth Waltz, who can be linked to this school, in order to build a rigorous theory of international relations<sup>226</sup>, wanted to reduce the latter to the study of the relationship between the structure of the system -defined as the distribution of power among the units- and the relations that these units have with each

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<sup>223</sup> Raymond Aron, *Etudes politiques*, Paris: Gallimard, 1972, p. 475.

<sup>224</sup> Raymond Aron, *Mémoires*, Paris: Julliard, 1983, p. 293.

<sup>225</sup> Raymond Aron, *Etudes politiques...*, pp. 379-380.

<sup>226</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Addison- Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1979.

other: this amounts to excluding any consideration of these “sub-systems”. This amounts to excluding any consideration of the “sub-systems” that constitute the political and economic regimes, the social relations, the ideas, within the units.

Raymond Aron affirmed that the theory of international relations does not include, even in the abstract, a discrimination between endogenous and exogenous variables.<sup>227</sup> It is the kinship or, on the contrary, the hostility of the regimes established in the states that dictates the important distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous systems - a distinction that stems from the idea that the external conduct of states is not commanded by the relationship of forces alone<sup>228</sup>: the objectives are partly determined by the nature of the regime and its ideology. The outcome of the limited conflicts of the nuclear age is not dictated by the balance of power alone either, as the Vietnam War showed: there, it was the impossibility of achieving the “political goal” - a South Vietnamese government capable of defending itself - that led to the military defeat of the stronger<sup>229</sup>. Hence, when analysing the weight of domestic circumstances in international relations, Raymond Aron particularly emphasises two points. The first is the importance of the nature of the regime: contrary to what some “pseudo-realists” have said, the foreign policy of the USSR differs profoundly from that of the Russia of the Tsars<sup>230</sup>.

From *The Great Schism* (1948) to the still unpublished and unfinished text that was to serve as a preface to a new edition of *Peace and War*, Raymond Aron has carefully studied the particularities of Soviet policy and the different interpretations that clash on this subject. The second point is the inextricable link between civil wars and interstate wars, which is another point of contact with Thucydides. Aron writes:

*The conclusion obvious to me but so often misunderstood is that we cannot conceive a non-violent diplomacy so long as we have not eliminated violence from internal politics. What occurs within one of the member states of an international society cannot be a matter of indifference to the other members of that society. The latter declare themselves indifferent when the changes of regime and government do not substantially modify the international actor and the rules of the game, hence when the system is homogeneous. They cannot pretend to indifference when the substitution of one regime for another involves a change of sides<sup>231</sup>.*

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<sup>227</sup> Raymond Aron, *Etudes politiques...*, p.371.

<sup>228</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War...*, p. 108

<sup>229</sup> Raymond Aron, *Etudes politiques...*, p. 548.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 433.

<sup>231</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War...*, p. 730

This is why he was so interested in the theory and practice of revolutionary warfare, especially in the chapters on Lenin and Mao in the second volume of Clausewitz, and in the factors of internal conflict in the various countries of the Middle East, the most dangerous zone of turbulence.

The final difference between Aron and the contemporary “realist” thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau or Hannah Arendt concerns the relationship between the inter-state system and the world economic system. As far as the latter is concerned, the realists have tended either to neglect it insofar as the economy was much more a matter of transnational society, that is, exchange relations between individuals and private groups, than relations between states, or to annex it to diplomatic and strategic conduct, insofar as it was relations between states that constituted it, as in the case of mercantilism. In other words, the analysis was then made in terms of power rather than wealth, of a zero-sum game rather than growth, of conflict over resources rather than cooperation and exchange and of the rules of the game imposed by the strongest state in its own interest. Raymond Aron never wrote a systematic study of the world economic order comparable to *Peace and War*. But insofar as he did deal with it here and there, he came to much more nuanced conclusions.

Raymond Aron has never systematically examined the possibilities that exist for a kind of conciliation between this requirement and these constraints. He was annoyed by the kind of idealism that offers recipes for getting out of anarchy by assuming that the problem has been solved, and which superbly ignores the enormous weight of the constraints. He was eager to show the insignificant weakness of international law and the little chance of planetary federalism. He somehow curbed his own Kantian inclinations<sup>232</sup>. A passionate liberal, but convinced of the impossibility of a pacified world where relations between human groups would finally be governed by the categorical imperative, and knowing, as a good Kantian, that there is no moral obligation to accomplish the impossible, he recalled that, in the world as it is, it is often violence alone that allows liberal values to be maintained, the survival or liberation of the countries where they have been able to flourish, the defence against totalitarianism<sup>233</sup>, rather than trying to discover how, the world being what it is, citizens and statesmen could nonetheless tackle, more radically than in the past, the root causes of collective violence, and consolidate the chances of a lasting peace.

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<sup>232</sup>Hoffmann, « Raymond Aron et la théorie des relations internationales », In: *Politique étrangère* N°4 - 1983 - 48e année, p. 852. [pp. 841-857]

<sup>233</sup>Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz*, Vol. II, pp. 285-286.

## 7.2. A Relevant Vision of War in the Context of Thermonuclear Revolution

Raymond Aron is among contemporary thinkers who have sought more persistently to understand the nuclear age of international relations - to grasp the extent to which the invention of weapons of total destruction was revolutionising world politics. Along with Bernard Brodie, he was the first to define the meaning of this revolution: the ability of the state with a serious nuclear arsenal to destroy the enemy state and society without first, as in the past, having to defeat the adversary's armed forces<sup>234</sup>. Considering the consequences of a thermonuclear war, he writes:

*This brings us to the second argument underlying the thesis that in our time the unconditional rejection of this kind of war is the only reasonable and realistic policy, given the consequences of a thermonuclear war for the human race: the genetic heritage of humanity itself would be affected. Generation after generation of children would be born abnormal, a tragedy ascribable to the war mania of their ancestors*<sup>235</sup>

At the crossroads of philosophy and sociology, Aron proposes a typology of war that draws from the long history of war and strategy, but that is also relevant to the contemporary situation. As he sees it, there have been three forms of war since 1945: interstate war, which is also known as “conventional war” and which did not disappear with the Second World War; next, nuclear war, based on scientific and technological knowledge, which is a war that leaves no footprints, as it is based on deterrence, that is, the fact that weapons are not used as such but are wielded as threats, according to the famous principle of the non-use of weapons that Guy Brossollet names the “non-battle”.<sup>236</sup>

The main part of Raymond Aron's contribution to our knowledge of this new era consists of three series of analyses: the ambiguities of deterrence, the persistence of Clausewitz, the necessity and originality of the Cold War. As a tireless commentator and critic of the American authors and actors who shaped and implemented the strategy of deterrence, Raymond Aron always knew that one of the consequences of the appearance of weapons of “mutually assured destruction”, one of the effects of what McGeorge Bundy has just called “existential deterrence<sup>237</sup>” was that in the field of strategic thermonuclear weapons

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<sup>234</sup> Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p. 848.

<sup>235</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War...*, p. 616.

<sup>236</sup> Jean-Vincent Holeindre, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>237</sup> McGeorge Bundy, « The Catholics bishops and the bomb », *New York Review of Books*, June 16<sup>th</sup> 1983.

the notion of balance of forces is not reduced to a simple calculation of the devices available to rival states. Aron thinks that

*The balance of deterrence is established when each of the possessors has the same capacity as its rival to deter direct aggression or extreme provocation. In fact, this capacity does not depend merely on the instruments which each of the players possesses, but also on the move to resist, the willingness to run risks, the art of making people take an improbable threat seriously<sup>238</sup>.*

This means, firstly, that the nature of the weapons (their capacity to survive a first strike, and to penetrate the opponent's defences) matters more than an accounting equality; secondly, that, "*Since deterrence is a relation between two wills, the balance of deterrence is a psycho-technological equilibrium<sup>239</sup>*". Third, that "*recourse to allies to re-establish an endangered balance belongs to the past.<sup>240</sup>*" Hence, if one of the two Great Ones could either disarm or destroy the other without being destroyed or severely damaged in return, the fact that the victim has a cohort of allies would matter little; fourth, that the credibility of deterrence implies a reference to the Y whole picture and can never be reduced to a simple military calculation: it is a question of knowing "who can dissuade whom, from what, by what threats, in what circumstances<sup>241</sup>".

A fifth consequence of the nuclear revolution is that such terrible weapons, whose use exposes the person who uses them to possibly intolerable reprisals, are not very good weapons of political intimidation: nuclear blackmail, or the use of the nuclear threat with a positive end, does not belong to the mental universe of statesmen. These weapons serve to destroy the positive intention, real or supposed of the potential aggressor<sup>242</sup>.

So, deterrence is not an exact science. This is not only because willpower plays a major role in it, in line with the Clausewitzian idea of war. In deterrence, it is impossible, by definition, to remove one danger without increasing another. The more terrible the threat - the more the adversary is threatened with total destruction - the less likely it is, since each of the enemies has the means of mutually assured destruction, even after having suffered a first strike. But the more one tries to make the threat credible, by giving oneself the means to carry out limited nuclear attacks, and especially those that would allow, as it is the case in

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<sup>238</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 681.

<sup>239</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>240</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>241</sup> Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz...*, p. 247.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, p.242.

conventional warfare, to strike the opposing forces first, the more one risks making war itself conceivable, and all the more so because the one whose strategic forces are largely vulnerable to the other's blows will be afraid of losing them if he does not use them first. The supreme threat is very dissuasive, in the abstract, but not very credible, since it is suicidal; the anti-forces threat is very credible, especially with the recent revolution, but it is less dissuasive. If we want to reinforce the dissuasive aspect by increasing the risk of escalation, that is the nuclear version of what Clausewitz called the ascent to extremes<sup>243</sup>, for example by adding tactical nuclear weapons to strategic weapons, here again, an antinomy arises. Anything that increases the likelihood of escalation in advance contributes to deterrence, but also, by definition, makes it more difficult to limit the war that would have begun anyway. Or again: in short, escalation is both a danger that one wants to counter by seeking to maintain thresholds, levels, distinctions between conventional warfare, tactical atomic warfare, limited strategic nuclear warfare, and mutually assured destruction and a threat that one cannot and does not want to give up.

The question, which is both a moral and a political one, has shifted: to what degree is this limited use possible? Up to what point is it conceivable that the threat of an unlimited use of these weapons may not someday lead to the execution of the threat? The problem seems no longer to be whether the use of these weapons is justifiable in certain circumstances and according to a certain strategy, but whether the possession of these weapons by several states and their diplomatic use, in the strategy of deterrence, do not create an intolerable, morally culpable *risk* of this total catastrophe which so many philosophers and scientists have evoked<sup>244</sup>? Hence, Aron goes on asking the following question: "*Is it morally worse to compromise the health of human beings as yet unborn than that of the living*"<sup>245</sup>?

He answers:

*I do not know, but I am inclined to believe that the difference is above all quantitative and material, as it were. However considerable the destruction caused by a war, reconstruction—as we know from the experience of these last fifteen years—is possible and relatively swift as long as men have survived in sufficient numbers and with their technical capacity intact. Whatever the losses occasioned by a war waged with nuclear weapons, the recovery of nations remains at least conceivable —provided the health of the generations to come has not been irremediably compromised. A*

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<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

<sup>244</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War...*, p.616.

<sup>245</sup> *Idem.*



*thermonuclear war would indeed be incomparable to any other if it damaged the genetic endowment of humanity*<sup>246</sup>.

Following the dangers to which a thermonuclear war exposes humanity, Aron's calls for moderation. His theory of International Relations may rightly be considered as a wisdom-based political moralism.

### **7.3 Aron's Wisdom-based Political Moralism: A Philosophy of Moderation**

Raymond Aron's unique intellectual trajectory illustrates both the virtues and limitations of political moderation and his writings are a gold mine for students of political judgment, *phronesis*<sup>247</sup> and prudence. Since we have already pointed out the limitations of his positions in the second part of our work, we are concerned here with the value of his philosophy of moderation.

Three key principles define Aron's political outlook. The first is the rejection of any dogmatic interpretation of politics and society. As Aron wrote in his essay "Fanaticism, Prudence and Faith", any student of politics ought to take into account the plurality of considerations on which political and economic actions depend. In so doing, he must be aware of the inevitable conflict between various ideas and principles such as economic growth, equality, and justice. According to this view, a responsible politician must search for reasonable compromises between these values rather than seeking a fictitious harmonization, and ought to be aware that his solution is always a temporary one. The second key principle of Aron's political philosophy is the rejection of any global determinism of history such as Marxist historical materialism that deprives politics of its own autonomy. The third principle concerns the conditions of political action as defined by choice and decision in an environment that is in constant flux and is characterized by structural uncertainty. What these principles have in common is the emphasis on the complex nature of the "political" that represents one of the most important contributions of Aron to modern political thought<sup>248</sup>.

Raymond Aron has always maintained that nuclear weapons have the effect, not of eliminating but of decentralising violence, and this in two ways. Firstly, by breaking down the global system into sub-systems, each of which has its own configuration and rules, and its own factors of inter-state violence, this fragmentation of the system is all the more remarkable given that the other great contemporary revolution, so much emphasised by Raymond Aron,

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<sup>246</sup>*Ibid.*, p.616.

<sup>247</sup> Aurelian Crăiuțu, *op. cit.*, p. 934.

<sup>248</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 936.

was precisely the enlargement of the diplomatic field to the whole world; Because of the nuclear revolution, this field is breaking down into pieces that are somehow less dangerous for the whole, but more warlike, and the “total diplomacy” characteristic of a heterogeneous planetary system thus lends itself, despite everything, to a certain limitation of the stakes and means.

Secondly, this decentralisation of armed violence takes the form of intra-state violence, sometimes fomented, and often exploited, by the rivalry of the Big Boys. In this complex world, where it has been necessary, according to Raymond Aron’s formula, to save the war, or rather wars: limited, between states, and civil, often unlimited, in order to save humanity from the possibility of total nuclear war, the notion of a global balance of forces still counts, and that of a regional balance even more. But it must be understood that the outcome of armed conflicts does not depend on the ratio of thermo-nuclear forces. If the nuclear revolution - despite everything that tends to weaken it, or rather to minimise it, such as the return to the possibility of anti-force nuclear strategies, and to undermine the stability of deterrence at the global level, such as the new vulnerability of entire sections of strategic forces - still ensures peace at the global level, as well as peace in Europe, where the risk of escalation in the event of conventional war remains enormous, while violence is somehow preserved and even multiplied at lower levels and in other parts of the world, one conclusion is in order: the necessity of the Cold War, or, to use the formula that Raymond Aron used from *The Great Schism*, “impossible peace, improbable war”<sup>249</sup>. In this system, there will still be wars like those in Korea, Vietnam and the Middle East. But on the one hand, these remain limited: the Korean War appeared to be “a turning point” since it did not become hyperbolic. On the other hand, at the global level, it was the crisis between the Great Ones that replaced the war.

Even if the blurring of the line between peace and war is evident, peace has not become the continuation of war by other means. Although thermonuclear weapons are not a diplomatic instrument usable at all times and in all places to prevent aggression, for the foreseeable future it is probable that general and total war will not occur<sup>250</sup>. So, despite the threat of thermonuclear war, Raymond Aron remains optimistic:

*The result of these analyses might also be expressed as follows: since thermonuclear weapons make the complete destruction of the enemy nation -territory and population-possible, the use of these weapons remains*

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<sup>249</sup>Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p. 851.

<sup>250</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 851.

*admissible, in terms of the traditional rules of international relations, only provided Rousseau's formula that "we wage war on states, not on peoples" still retains a minimum of meaning, or again provided there is a limited use of these weapons: whether it is a case of the "Rotterdam" type, of the "limited reprisals" type, or of the "attacks upon the thermonuclear system" type, the aim is to obtain the capitulation of the state itself or to punish it, not to wipe out cities and their inhabitants*<sup>251</sup>.

But Aron's refusal of moralism, produced partly by his contempt for what Kant called the political moralists, that is, the ideologists in the service of the Prince, and partly by his scepticism about the possibility of a Kantian moral politics, never went as far as amoralism. Raymond Aron had a political morality to propose: the "morality of wisdom", which takes into account both the imperative of the calculation of forces, i.e. the duty of egoism imposed on states, and the aspiration to the universal, i.e. the victory of that part of human nature which is not an animal of prey. That is why he declares: "*Prudence and wisdom, not legalism, these must be the qualities of federative power*"<sup>252</sup>.

What gives chances to such a morality, what allows us not to treat the morality of combat as the only possible one, is the distinction, dear to Raymond Aron, between the rational and the reasonable. Diplomatic-strategic conduct does not lend itself to mathematical treatment, there are no games or games with mathematical solutions defining rational conduct. In the atomic age, this is even more true, since for the players thermonuclear war is the equivalent of an infinite loss and one cannot calculate the rational decision when the loss risks is infinite. Aron thinks that

*For there to be a game in the rigorous sense of the word, for a mathematical solution defining rational conduct to be possible, there must be a beginning and an end, a finite number of moves for each of the players, a result susceptible of cardinal or ordinal evaluation for each of the players. None of these conditions is, strictly speaking, fulfilled in the field of international relations*<sup>253</sup>.

The game is essentially historical and psycho-logical, so it does not exclude reasonable conduct any more than a traditional diplomacy does; on the contrary, the latter is all the more desirable since what is at stake is the survival of humanity, all the more possible since "*the strategy of the thermonuclear age is further from the model of rational strategy than that of the ages of pre-nuclear armaments*"<sup>254</sup>.

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<sup>251</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, pp. 615-616.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 722.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 772-773.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 780.

The morality of wisdom is therefore that of moderation, which Thucydides through the speeches of his characters and Clausewitz as analysed by Raymond Aron, who shows him presenting hyperbolic warfare as an ideal type and as one of the historical realities, and the subordination of violence to political calculation, as well as the limitation of objectives, as the other, most desirable reality also advocated. Like Thucydides, Raymond Aron knows that it is in civil wars that moderation is most excluded, and that it is when collective passions, class or race ideologies replace the intelligence of the personified State that the chances of moderation disappear. Aron thinks that if nothing guarantees the moderation of States, the politics of a personified ideology or of a saving class excludes moderation and implies the struggle to the death.<sup>255</sup>

What Raymond Aron pleads for is “political understanding”, which is necessary to limit wars, if they take place, slow down the ascent to extremes and bring back armed observation<sup>256</sup>, and overcome the inevitable crises. Thus, in the atomic age, it is the limitation of violence that wisdom demands. As far as strategic weapons are concerned, wisdom is on the side of the doctrine of “graduated retaliation”, rather than that of “massive retaliation”<sup>257</sup>; for the latter risks not deterring the adversary from partial attacks, and, in this case, forcing the attacked statesman to make a disastrous choice: capitulation or total and suicidal war. Graduated response is a way of avoiding the all-or-nothing approach; it effectively aims at reducing to a minimum the risks of escalation and total war threat it poses is, moreover, less implausible; and deterrence should not be based on an enormous and implausible threat.

Aron wrote in his usually balanced, non-partisan, and moderate style even when treating events that he disliked or disapproved of or when he faced tragic events such as the Algerian crisis. He justified his allegiance to liberalism by resorting to a complex and nuanced sociological analysis of modern society that sought to determine and evaluate critically the economic and social conditions that permit freedom and pluralism to survive in modern society. In so doing, he spent a great deal of time and energy studying various aspects of modern society: economics, social relationships, class relationships, political systems, and relations among nations. He rejected the once famous theory of the convergence of capitalism

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<sup>255</sup> Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz; Philosopher of War*, ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985.p. 263.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.

<sup>257</sup> Hoffmann, *op. cit*, p. 854.

and communism and believed that capitalist liberal societies could be peacefully reformed in spite of their inherent shortcomings<sup>258</sup>.

Furthermore Aron believed that even in difficult times, one can (and ought to) be committed to reason by upholding the idea of a decent society while also being fully aware of the inherent imperfections and antinomies of political world. This idea was Raymond Aron's guiding principle and pole-star. Although he lived in dark times, Aron retained confidence in rational inquiry and the individuals' ability to see the difference between illusions, emotions, hopes, and demonstrable truths. He refused to despair of any man, even though his century and contemporaries gave him many reasons to despair<sup>259</sup>. Aron confessed: "*I was a disciple of Kant and there is in Kant a concept to which I still subscribe: it is the idea of Reason, an image of a society that would be truly humanized. We can continue to think, or dream or hope – in the light of the idea of Reason – for a humanized society*<sup>260</sup>".

Aron's philosophy of moderation grew out of his awareness of the frailty and fallibility of human condition and allowed him to recognize the concrete possibilities for reasonable action in our imperfect world. While being fully committed to such principles as freedom, pluralism, and rule of law, Aron opposed the dogmatic interpretation of these values and realized that anyone who endorses the principles underpinning Western liberal democratic societies must resist the temptation to gloss over their inherent limitations. That is why Aron was never an ideologue of capitalism like, say, Ayn Rand or Milton Friedman<sup>261</sup>.

Aron's non-dogmatic position is finally evidenced by his attitude toward Marx, perhaps the most controversial modern thinker, capable of eliciting either uncritical admiration or outright rejection. Aron carefully read all of Marx's works, in particular *The Capital*, which he regarded as one of the greatest sociological works ever written. In this regard, it can be argued that Aron knew Marx much better than most of his own critics on the Left, who often referred to Marx without having carefully studied his works<sup>262</sup>. But Aron never converted to Marxism primarily because he grasped the serious contradictions of Marx's economic, social, and political thought. He saw Marxism for what it was, that is a global interpretation of history predicated on two main ideas: the pre-eminence of class

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<sup>258</sup> Aurelian Crăiuțu, *op. cit.*, p. 940.

<sup>259</sup> Raymond Aron, *Thinking Politically: Liberalism in the Age of Ideology*, eds. Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian C. Anderson, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 46.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>261</sup> Aurelian Crăiuțu, *op. cit.*, p. 939.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 940.

struggle and priority of the relations of production towards the forces of production. Aron perceptively noted that from the materialistic interpretation of history Marx drew a radical conclusion unsupported by logic or facts: he claimed that every progressive spirit must be on the side of the proletariat, the children of the light, in the fight against the bourgeoisie, the children of darkness and forces of evil<sup>263</sup>. The endpoint of history, argued Marx, is socialism and one must fully embrace it to be on the side of progress. Aron rejected this conclusion because he saw in it a leap of faith that he was not able to make in spite of his appreciation for Marx' genius as a perceptive critic of nineteenth-century capitalism. Aron writes:

*After having studied Marxism for almost an entire year I concluded with regret that, in this form, it was not acceptable. The analysis of history does not permit one to determine the policy to follow and to foresee, as an end result, a society from which contradictions among men would be eliminated [...] Even today, I am interested in the Marxism of Marx, but not in that of Brezhnev, which is very boring. But Marx's Marxism is very, very interesting.*<sup>264</sup>

The departure from Marx is further illustrated by Aron's nuanced position on determinism and probabilism in history. He opposed the idea that the forces of production determine history and acknowledged instead the importance of ideas and contingency in determining the course of history. Every political situation, argued Aron, "always allows for a margin of choice, but the margin is never unlimited<sup>265</sup>". Hence, he went on, the task of political theorists is to elucidate the goals that societies should pursue as well as the means that they have at their disposal. But they ought to investigate the realm of the possible by also taking into account prior goals, preferences, and principles. To study these goals in a vacuum, concluded Aron, would be absurd because ideas arise out of specific political, cultural, social, and economic contexts that always limit the range of the possible<sup>266</sup>.

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<sup>263</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>264</sup> Raymond Aron, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>265</sup> Raymond Aron, *Politics and History: Selected Essays*, ed. Miriam B. Conant, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p. 237.

<sup>266</sup> Aurelian Crăiuțu, *op.cit.*, p. 941.

## CONCLUSION

To conclude, it is Aron's moderation that makes him relevant today, in an eclectic age when doctrines and ideas are again mixed, after having lost their previous sharp contours and identities<sup>267</sup>. In this age of extremism, fundamentalism brought to light in a magnificent way by global terrorism, the principles of liberal democracy properly understood and properly put in application at states level and at international level, within the United Nations, can immunize the political body of the international community against the seduction of extremism. Yet, because of the many imperfections that exist at the U.N, securing peace today, in this era of thermonuclear and biotechnological revolution demands not only passion, but also moderation and prudence. In this, Aron's political thought remains relevant as it promotes the pluralism of ideas, principles, and interests that are essential to freedom in modern society. Hence it is useful to strengthen conventional forces, which increases the credibility of the threat of a limited or graduated use of nuclear weapons. Escalation, according to Raymond Aron, is by no means inevitable from the first use of nuclear weapons and all the less so as technological developments lead to more precise and less devastating weapons; even after such recourse, there are still chances for wisdom. This is one of the reasons why Raymond Aron does not see any contradiction between a graduated strategy of use of forces with a passage, if necessary, from conventional to nuclear, and the maintenance of the threat of the first use of atomic weapons in case of an attack.

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<sup>267</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 952.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE NEED TO RE-ENFORCE THE UNITED NATIONS

In the previous part of our work, we have presented the weaknesses and failures of the United Nations as far as the need to build, maintain and safeguard peace in the world is concerned. Going beyond Aron's legacy insisting on the necessity of an International Law System above states, we would like to suggest some measures in view of reinforcing the United Nations. In the absence of a system of public right and its enforcement, states exist in the so-called state of nature-the condition in which there is no rule of law and no state authority set above the states. In that condition, states settle their inevitable conflicts on the basis of their respective strength. And when a state seems to be more powerful than the others, it may lead to a malfunctioning of the supranational organisation whose aim is to regulate individual states' power in the net of International Relations. According to Niel Gardiner, the failures and the weaknesses of the U.N are not based on the mitigated role of the U.S.A in this Supranational organisation. He writes:

*There is a popularly held view, especially in the developing world, that the United States dominates the U.N., and that reform is merely an exercise in enhancing American power. This is, of course, a myth. U.S. power within the U.N. is limited, and all too often the U.N. is used as a multilateral vehicle with which to rein in the American superpower, especially by strategic competitors such as Russia, China, India, and France. However, the U.N. without the United States is a greatly weakened organization, financially, politically, and strategically. Without the presence of the world's greatest power, the U.N. would be an impotent body, lacking in legitimacy, financially insecure, and doomed to go down the same path as its predecessor, the League of Nations<sup>268</sup>.*

If this were true, what then needs to be done to reinforce the United Nations? What is certain is that the United Nations is at a crossroads. On the one hand, the majority of the international community calls for a more significant and effective role by this most important multilateral body of the world in maintenance of peace and security and promotion of sustained development of all the nations in the new millennium. On the other hand, critics complain that the organization seems increasingly incompetent in keeping with the change of time, incapable of performing its functions in a timely and effective manner owing to the division of positions of member states, and incredibly low in inefficiency caused by its own bureaucracy, redundancy of sub-institutions and management scandals<sup>269</sup>.

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<sup>268</sup>Niel Gardiner, *op.cit*, p. 37.

<sup>269</sup>Pan Zhenqiang, Conference on Reforms of the UN Security Council, Beijing, April 21, 2005.



## 8. 1. Improving Peace-Keeping Operations in the United Nations System

The Congo episode, that we mentioned in one of our previous chapters to portray the failures and weaknesses of the United Nations, further undermined the credibility of the United Nations and raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the U.N.'s leadership especially as far as peace-keeping operations in the world are concerned. The U.N. has consistently failed to publicize, prevent, and punish the criminal behaviour of its own personnel in trouble spots around the world. According to Niel Gardiner, Congress should make it clear to the United Nations that continued robust U.S. funding of U.N. peacekeeping efforts will be contingent upon the elimination of all forms of abuse within its operations. Congress should withhold a percentage of the U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations unless U.N. personnel responsible for criminal activity are brought to justice and safeguards are put in place to prevent future abuses<sup>270</sup>.

In order to improve Peace-Keeping operations in the United Nations System, we think that there is a need for improved understanding of the context and planning of missions before deploying them, including through liaisons and cooperation with regional organizations. In fact, peace operations should have clear mandates and appropriate postures and should be adequately resourced and capacitated for operating safely in such environments—all of which could be achieved through better cooperation between the Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and troop contributing countries. What is also needed is that missions should have the ability to adequately monitor what happens in their environments by deploying intelligence capacities and making sure these are well integrated into the mission. In order to avoid collateral damages, peace-keeping missions need to become more people-centric.

Although not provided for as such in the UN Charter, UN peace operations have proven to be a flexible and adaptable tool that has evolved over time to respond to evolving challenges. As peace operations find themselves in environments with new expectations and increased challenges, it is ultimately the prerogative of member states to ensure that they have the necessary capabilities and strategic guidance to be fit for purpose<sup>271</sup>. Among other measures to be taken in view of reforming the United Nations System as far as peace-keeping in the world is concerned, it could be added that the U.N. should lift diplomatic immunity or its own staff accused of criminal acts as it was the case in Congo, opening the way for prosecution. The Security Council could also exclude from future operations countries whose

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<sup>270</sup> Niel Gardiner, *op.cit.*, p.49.

<sup>271</sup> UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments (2016 Report).

peacekeepers have a history of human rights violations. The U.N. could publicly name and shame those countries whose peacekeepers have carried out abuses as it was the case in Congo. Further, the U.N. could make publicly available all internal reports relating to scandal-related issues during peace-keeping operations as the Congo scandal, and outline the exact steps it plans to take to prevent the sexual exploitation of refugees in both existing and future peacekeeping operations. Serious consideration could be given to the establishment of an elite training academy for U.N. peace keeping commanders. This effort could be backed by the U.N. Security Council. In an ideal world, membership in the United Nations should be restricted to free democracies.

According to Freedom House, just 89 of the U.N.'s 192 member states are "fully free" (46%). There can be little doubt, though, that any attempt to limit membership would be strongly opposed by the G-77 countries. U.S. interests are best served at present by building an alliance of democracies within the U.N. as well as developing human rights structures outside of the United Nations. As human rights scholar Joseph Loconte has argued, Congress should appoint an independent Human Rights Ambassador to head a new U.S. Commission on Human Rights. It could be modelled on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, a quasi-governmental group that monitors religious liberty abroad and makes policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress<sup>272</sup>. According to Niel Gardiner, The United States should mobilize a "Democracy Caucus" to protect human rights and expand democratic freedoms. The new U.S. Human Rights Ambassador would lobby other governments in the fledgling Community of Democracies, founded in 2000 in Warsaw, to establish their own human rights commissions and advisory bodies. They must be a morally serious coalition of the willing-operating both within and outside the official U.N. system-that offers a bright alternative to the existing Human Rights Council<sup>273</sup>.

## 8.2 The Security Council Necessary Reform


In view of playing its role more efficiently, the United Nations need to undergo reforms within its own constituency. The basic structure of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has remained almost unchanged since its foundation more than 75 years ago. Today, with profound change in the realities of the global community, the Security Council is being questioned in terms of its legitimacy, effectiveness and representativeness. The issues that the

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<sup>272</sup> Niel Gardiner, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

Security Council deals with have diversified over the past 75 years including: peacebuilding, conflict prevention, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and protection of civilians. The UN needs a Security Council which can come up with effective resolutions and implement its decisions in a timely and efficient manner<sup>274</sup>. The following diagram represents the missions of the UN Security Council.



Although the number of the Member States has nearly quadrupled and the regional composition of the membership has changed, the size and the composition of the Council have remained virtually unchanged since its foundation. For instance, Africa (54 members, 0 permanent seats), Asia (54 members, 1 permanent seat) and Latin America and Caribbean States (33 members, 0 permanent seats) remain underrepresented<sup>275</sup>.

It therefore appears that the structure of the Security Council is an anachronism. It is made up of 15 members, five of which are permanent members with a power of veto, ten elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The permanent five, the countries with the power of veto in the Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian Federation - hold their positions because they were victorious allies at the end of World War II. They were the “great powers” of their day and, in their privileged position in the Security Council, they took on special responsibility for the preservation of peace and security. They are arguably no longer an accurate reflection of the great powers of the world, as much for those that are left out as for those that are included. They do not reflect

<sup>274</sup> United Nations Security Council Reform, April, 2021.

<sup>275</sup> *Idem*.

any geographic balance. They are North and Euro-centric. No country from Africa, the Middle East or South America is a permanent member of the Council. The rise in wealth and strength of both Germany and Japan give each a claim to permanent membership, although the inclusion of either or both of these countries would not spread the geographic balance.

Hence, a major reform that would affect the U.N., as well as American interests, is significant expansion of the Security Council. The United States has correctly set increased effectiveness of the Security Council as the benchmark for Council reform. As the war on terrorism continues to unfold around the globe, as greater urgency is paid to limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as the free world faces a growing threat from rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea, the U.N. Security Council can play an important and useful role. It is in the U.S. national interest to have a lean and effective Security Council that can help address these issues on the international stage.

Among the measures that need to be taken, the UN, in honouring Article 23 of its Charter, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically, specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. The UN should also bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world and increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.

Security Council expansion will make it far more difficult for the United States to work through the Council. With the exception of Germany and Japan, the voting records of the main contenders for additional permanent Security Council seats indicate that they will likely vote against the U.S. on most key issues. In other words, a larger Security Council, with these nations as permanent members, will likely be less supportive of U.S. policy priorities. Moreover, any enlargement of the Council would make it more unwieldy and subject to conflicting interests. It would contribute to gridlock that could paralyze the Council and decrease the probability that it could act quickly or effectively to address threats to international peace and security.

The U.N. Security Council's legitimacy depends far more on its actions than its membership<sup>276</sup>. The Security Council is by no means perfect as it currently stands. It is subject to delay and indecisiveness, as its failures in Iraq and Sudan clearly demonstrate. However, a larger Council would not solve these problems. On the contrary, it would further undermine the Council's ability to act decisively because timely action would fall victim to political impasse, conflicting interests, or debate among nations that have little to contribute to the Council's ultimate responsibility, the enforcement of international peace and security. According to Niel Gardiner,

*However imperfect, the current composition of the Council is infinitely preferable to ill-considered expansion that will surely weaken its standing and ability to meet its mandate—ultimately making the Security Council less relevant and increasing the likelihood that crises will be addressed outside of the U.N. framework<sup>277</sup>*

For this scholar, from the point of view of U.S. national interest, there is a clear-cut case against Security Council expansion. We do not agree with this position. In our opinion, for the U.N Security Council to be efficient, the Security Council needs to be expanded so as to give room to less-powerful states like those of the African continent. Indeed, a frequent source of concern in International Relations is the inability of the international community to reach consensus on the restructuring of the composition of the Security Council, so as to more appropriately reflect the realities of the twenty-first century. Africa ought to be appropriately represented in the permanent membership of this Council, in order to be able to more efficiently make its own case.

While the active engagement of the United Nations in Africa in many capacities is widely appreciated, from the perspective of African Member States there is a sense that more needs to be done and that Africa remains under a paternalism that is not applicable to some few great powers. Africans surely recognize and to a certain extent appreciate the growing trend in the Security Council to defer to Africa's regional peace and security bodies, such as the African Union, in the first instance when a threat to international peace and security emerges. Yet, it is always preferable to be able to have African solutions to African problems and for this to happen more efficiently, Africa should take responsibility for her destiny. More often than not, it happens that the international response to crises is either late or inadequate. Since the beginning of the "Anglophone Crisis" in Cameroon, for example, the response of

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<sup>276</sup> Nile Gardiner, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>277</sup> *Idem.*

the international community is not loud enough to help this country come out of the current war. Hence, we think that Africa must then be given an important place in the Security Council so as to be able to speak of her problems with her own voice and to address global problems with its own wisdom. Aimé Césaire once insisted on the humanistic contribution of Africans to world civilisation and perhaps to world crises solving-tasks when he considered Africans as *“Those who explored neither the sea nor the sky but those without whom the earth would not be the earth”<sup>278</sup>*.

There are some problems that Sub-Saharan Africa could help in solving. Such problems include environmental problems. For instance, the question of world degradation could be dealt with more effectively if the African bio conservative culture is given much more attention in a world that is facing environmental problems. Unfortunately, through the power of globalisation, which is linked to the Western hegemony, the industrialised Western world is, as Godfrey Tangwa writes *“globalising not only its technology but its socio-cultural values as well, which, taken together, give some cultures, such as African culture, little or no chance of surviving globalisation”<sup>279</sup>*. Yet, there is still room to hope that African bio conservative culture will not be completely lost. As Mbessa Denis-Ghislain writes, *“Fortunately, there is a resilient presence of surviving traditions in African culture which are sometimes seen as useful in providing solutions to global problems caused by Western technology”<sup>280</sup>*.

If then the African voice is permanently being heard in the U.N Security Council, it could be helpful in solving global environmental problems thanks to her bioconservative culture. As Tangwa writes, *“The general African attitude to nature can be said to be bio-friendly. Such attitude, if lent and borrowed in the process of globalization, could help in tempering and balancing the Western outlook.”<sup>281</sup>* He goes further describing this bio-friendship that unites the African to nature as he states that in many traditional African communities, it was taboo to sell or otherwise commercialise certain things, such as water, housing, fuel, wood, the staple food, etc. Such taboos were meant to ensure that commodities which were in no way a luxury but were essential for mere survival and which had moreover been abundantly provided by God in nature, should be at the disposal of and within the reach

<sup>278</sup> Aimé Césaire, *Return to My Native Land*, Présence Africaine, 1971, p. 114.

<sup>279</sup> Godfrey B. Tangwa, *op.cit*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>280</sup> Mbessa Denis - Ghislain, «African Bioconservatism and the Challenge of the TranshumanistTechnoprogessism», *Open Journal of Philosophy*, 10, November 2020, p.444, <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2020.104031>.

<sup>281</sup> Godfrey B. Tangwa, *op.cit*, p. 44.

of all and sundry<sup>3</sup>. With our vision of the world, we can contribute to environmental protection. The sense of respect for nature is something that needs to be globalised as the world is facing global warming and global environmental destruction in the name of science and technology. African humanism, expressed in the African bio-friendship, is a great field to be developed in order to find solutions to global environmental problems. Indeed, Tangwa clearly establishes the fundamental difference that exists between the African approach to the environment and the Western one. He says:

*The pre-colonial traditional African metaphysical outlook can be described as eco-bio-communitarian, implying recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans, by contrast with the Western outlook which could be described as anthropocentric and individualistic. Within the African outlook, human beings tend to be more humble and more cautious, more mistrustful and unsure of human knowledge and capabilities, more conciliatory and respectful to other people, plants, animals, inanimate things, as well as a sundry invisible/intangible forces, more timorous of wantonly tampering with nature, in short, more disposed towards an attitude of live and let live<sup>282</sup>.*

This ecobiocommunitaristic attitude could serve as a cornerstone in the world debate about the protection of the environment whereas the Western spirit of omnivorous discovery and research which has unceasingly transformed nature has brought about pollution and the degradation of ecosystems resulting into global warming and climatic changes. One may argue that there is no development, industrialisation if one develops the African attitude towards nature. But we have to say that there is no real or sustainable development without the respect of the environment and of life in general. Nature must be transformed but if what Man earns thanks to this transformation of nature is more and more dangerous to life, then Man's action over the environment must be controlled. Here again, we can recall Tangwa's opinion that even if African culture is neither technophilic nor technophobic, it could show Western culture the way back to those natural human values that Western culture has sacrificed to the god of industrialisation/technology and commerce, if, indeed it ever had them<sup>283</sup>. Some of these natural values may include biofriendship, prolificness and reverence for the sacred, life, beings and Being.

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<sup>282</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>283</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 62.

This Western sacrifice to the gods of technology and industrialisation has led humanity to planetary destruction and now we are more and more conscious of the dangers and risks of techno science in our daily life. African culture could then act here as a conscience enlightening humanity's approach to the environment. This aspect of African culture deserves to be globalised because it will solve global environmental problems: global warming, global climatic changes and global pollution. It is possible for Globalisation to transform the world into a community of lovely human beings where values are shared. Yet, this objective is hindered by the will to dominate of rich countries over poor ones. Because it is capitalist in essence, Globalisation cannot achieve the Planetisation of love. Northern countries are mostly the ones occasioning wars in several parts of the globe in order to sell arms and acquire wealth. If Globalisation is the westernisation of the world as it has already been demonstrated, then the individualistic spirit of the Western culture will continue to prevail and dominate in the interaction of people. However, in the African culture, there is a profound sense of community life which could influence the international community and really transform the world into a planetary village. Africa has always been referred to as a continent full of customs, traditions, rites, legends. If the world has to become a village, the villagisation of the world could start from Africa.

As a matter of facts, security is not only related to peace-keeping. It also goes along with preserving nature, preserving life in general and human life in particular. That is why we think that security is jeopardised by high-tech and bio-tech related problems that are globalised thanks to the phenomenon of globalised. That is why the International Group “Together First” makes the following recommendation to the UN Security Council:

*move away from the “single penholder” system whereby a small number of, predominantly permanent, members of the UN Security Council draft most Security Council resolutions and move towards more collaborative working methods where elected members have a more equal and active role in the drafting and consultation process<sup>284</sup>.*

This means that the UN Security Council must open its doors to the poor, the less powerful, those who are constantly under domination and exploitation by great powers. Their voice also counts and could contribute in fighting global affairs such as clandestine immigration, global warming, and global terrorism. All these global affairs are permanent obstacles for the developing world and they constantly jeopardize peace and security in the

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<sup>284</sup> Reforming the UN Security Council, a New Report from Together First, [www.together1st.org](http://www.together1st.org) consulted on August 15<sup>th</sup> 2020.



world. There is need of collaboration between the UN in general and poor nations and, in a special way, as far as peace-keeping operations are concerned in the world, the Security Council must collaborate with the developing world.

In order that the Security Council functions in a logic of equal opportunity or equal voice for all the members of the UN, the permanent seat would belong to the region rather than to an individual country and the states of the region might occupy it on a rotational basis. It might be possible to apply this to new permanent members but it is unlikely that either Britain or France or even Russia would be willing to give up their permanent seats for a European seat to be shared with other European countries. The larger number in the Security Council would increase the influence of the developing countries, although the continued existence of the veto power would limit this influence to moral pressure only. The argument of developing countries for expansion reflects their demands for representation, rather than any concern with the workability of the Council. An expansion would have the effect of improving the legitimacy of the Council and its decisions, even if it made some decisions more difficult to achieve or less acceptable to the permanent members.

This means that the greater challenge that the UN Security Council has to face is the idea of power equilibrium within the members of the UN System, a power equilibrium that could hardly be reached as long as the terror equilibrium will not be reached. If some states still have the veto power added to their Nuclear bomb potential whereas others do not have it, it will always be unrealistic to think of power equilibrium among states be them under a supranational organisation or not. The veto power itself is also contentious. For those countries that hold it, it gives them a powerful and privileged position in world affairs, which militates against the more democratic aspirations of the organisation. The veto was a matter that aroused strong opposition and frustration during the inquiry, with a number of submissions believing it should be abolished. Reform of the Security Council entails a change to the Charter of the UN. That requires approval by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratification of this vote by the Governments of two-thirds of the UN members, including the members of the Security Council<sup>285</sup>.

As a matter of fact, it is a truism that the veto powers are in a position to veto any change that disadvantages them. The Permanent Five should be put on notice that their action in using their power for narrow, national interest has the effect of alienating the members of the United Nations and undermines and damages the reputation of the organisation as a

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<sup>285</sup> Sam Daws, *The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century*, Wilton Park Paper No 135, 1997, p. 30.

whole. Therefore, it appeared to the committee that the proposal that the veto should be limited and that its use should be justified to the General Assembly was the most effective way forward.

In order that the UN Security Council may be more efficient and better reformed, we think that the UN System itself needs to be endowed with much more power.

### **8.3 The Future of the United Nations: More Power**

In order to effectively play its role, the United Nations System needs to be given more much power than it effectively has now. As a matter of facts, there can be little doubt that only enforceable international world law enacted by properly represented and duly constituted world body can ensure world peace, implement global steps to conserve the environment, outlaw and check acts of terrorism and eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, thus safeguarding the future of world's children, those who are already born and those yet-to-be-born. This implies that a powerful executive authority will be imperative to ensure and enforce compliance. In the present situation, some few powerful states seem to have much more power than the U.N itself and the fate of poor nations, precisely of African nations is that of permanently dominated nations which have to pay the price of not having a nuclear power in order to make their voice heard in the concert of nations. Niel Gardiner lays emphasis on the role that the United States of America plays in the United Nations in the following declaration: "*Without the United States, the U.N. is little more than an emperor with no clothes*<sup>286</sup>".

In our opinion however, the future of the U.N lies in gaining more power so as to be able to prevent conflicts often organised by powerful states in view of maintaining their hegemony in several parts of the world. In order to ensure obedience to its supranational power, the executive authority must have sanction and support of all the nation states so as to enable such authority to compel any state to surrender to international or world law and provide effective global governance. Such a world order will be able to address important problems of lawlessness, terrorism, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and other global problems. As we have just said above, there are many problems caused by the powerful-western states, by their high-tech culture that cannot be solved by them. It is therefore important that the U.N gives an attentive ear to what other less-tech cultures can bring to the world.

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<sup>286</sup> Niel Gardiner, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we aimed at defending the need to re-enforce the United Nations System in view of strengthening its potential not only in preventing, keeping and maintaining peace in the world but also in acting as a supranational power over powerful states which seem to dictate their law throughout the world. Emphasising the need to reform the U.N system in order to deal with global problems more efficiently, we conclude with Niel Gardiner that

*Whether the U.N. goes the way of its predecessor, the League of Nations, and sinks into the abyss of history as an irrelevant failure depends upon its willingness to be reformed, as well as its ability to aggressively confront the challenges of today, whether it be the threat of global terrorism, the aggressive actions of a dictatorial regime, or the mass slaughter of one ethnic group by another. Terrorism, tyranny, and genocide remain the three great evils of our time, and the United Nations will be judged by how it responds to them. If it is not up to the task, then it will be time to take a bow and give way to a successor<sup>287</sup>.*

The context in which the UN was settled is no more the same more than fifty years after. That is why we think that some reforms must be undertaken within this organisation. Indeed, with the rapid developments in science, technology and communication, the world has become a global village where peoples from all countries have to live in close cooperation for mutual progress, development and survival. In this post-cold war scenario, the old mindset has become redundant and a new mindset within the UN System is needed. There is an urgent need for a legally constituted law-making body for enacting enforceable international or World Law that is applicable to all the countries and peoples of the world at the same time. Only such a World Law can ensure unity of humankind and preserve world peace. This can be done either by strengthening the United Nations System or by creating a new body and a new world executive under a new world order.

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<sup>287</sup> *Idem*

## CHAPTER NINE

### FOSTERING EDUCATION AND HUMANISM FOR LASTING PEACE

Our reading of Raymond Aron's *Peace and War* enabled us to observe that the concept of education is used therein in its sociological and economic sense and in its moral sense only with reference to Kant's Pacifism<sup>288</sup>. We therefore think that going beyond Aron's Legacy, we need to consider education and humanism as two cornerstones of the quest and conquest of peace among men and among nations. Indeed, the battle for peace must be won in the heart of men, in their wholesome being so as to have a positive impact on their behaviour. The Preamble of the Constitution of UNESCO declares that "*since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.*"<sup>289</sup> As a matter of facts, in 1945, UNESCO was created in order to respond to the firm belief of nations, forged by two world wars in less than a generation that political and economic agreements are not sufficient to build a lasting peace in the world. Peace must be established on the basis of humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity. Hence if the idea of perpetual peace sounds utopical or unrealistic for human beings, in line with UNESCO, we think that there is a possibility to achieve lasting peace within states and at international level. New revolutionary changes brought by the high-tech industry in all domains have reduced the world to a global village. In such a close-knit world, the emergence of a new world order – that of social justice, cultural pluralism, tolerance and living-togetherness – is possible. The question is to know whether the unification of humankind will happen after unimaginable horrors precipitated by humanity's stubborn clinging to old patterns of behaviour, or is to be embraced now by an act of consultative will. In this final chapter of our work, we would like to defend the idea that education and humanism are the two pillars on which lasting peace could be firmly grounded. As UNESCO says, "*Peace must be established on the basis of humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity*"<sup>290</sup>.

#### 9.1. Education for Global Peace to Counter Global Challenges

The growth of global challenges such as inequality, exclusion, violence and sectarianism has resulted in a foreseeable social intolerance that drives humanity towards perpetual conflict and ever-jeopardized peace. In order to successfully meet the deadly threat of international terrorism, unprecedented levels of international cooperation and global efforts

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<sup>288</sup>Raymond Aron, *Peace and War...*, p. 18 &704.

<sup>289</sup>[www.unesco.org](http://www.unesco.org) consulted on September 23rd 2020.

<sup>290</sup>*Idem.*

are needed in line with *the “profound and perhaps prophetic view of Immanuel Kant, humanity must travel the bloody road of war to have access one day to peace. It is through history that the repression of natural violence is achieved, the education of man to reason”*<sup>291</sup>. This is one international problem that can in no way be solved by any national government alone, even if it is the world’s super power.

Present situations such as the rejection of migrants in some parts of the world, terrorism, ever-resisting-racism, religious and political fanaticism give us reasons to think that the way out is education. If then there is to be effective international cooperation, such as was hoped for by the League of Nations resulting from Kant’s treatise on Perpetual Peace, and the United Nations later on, then there has to be a very widespread effort at inculcating humanism, tolerance and the spirit of one-world-belonging in children all over the world and shaping their mindset towards humanism. It is on this condition that a true generation of world citizens will arise. For this to happen, parents and teachers, the civil society, politicians, religious chiefs will have to cultivate tolerance and co-existence in children who must be taught to love humanity in any single human being regardless of his origin, his social status, his age, his personality, his talents or weaknesses. Like wars, terrorism too begins in the minds of men and it is in the minds of men where the defences of peace have to be constructed. This can best be done in homes and in schools when children are young and impressionable.

Indeed, true education – not only instruction but wholesome training of the individual person, body, mind, heart and soul – releases capacities, develops confidence in oneself, will-power and goal setting abilities. It instils the vision that enables one to become a self-motivated agent of social change, serving the best interests of the community. At a certain moment in our history, education will have to act as a powerful instrument for profound social transformation. According to UNESCO,

*Education is vital to achieving acceptance and respect for all people regardless of colour, gender, or national, ethnic or religious identity, being especially important to reach out children and young people during their formative years through their formal education*<sup>292</sup>.

That is why since 2002, following the terrorist attacks of the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, UNESCO has decided to celebrate a World Day of Philosophy all over the world in order to

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<sup>291</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>292</sup> [www.unesco.org](http://www.unesco.org).

promote the ideals and values of this field of study in which we seek wisdom in our relationship between fellowman, nature and transcendence. From experience, tribalism and xenophobia find fertile grounds where people are not educated, where they have not travelled, where they are closed up in their world vision. We think that after two World Wars followed by a Cold war and today, with the rise and establishment of global terrorism, time has come to lead humanity out of the vicious circle of peace-keeping and peace-building before, during and after war.

As far as the African continent is concerned, education to peace has to be grounded in her cultural practices, in her wisdom. This wisdom is contained in the African traditions that are progressively dying out with the passing away of elders in villages. That is why it is important that future generations be given the opportunity to learn about these traditions. This is a great challenge as westernisation is gaining ground in Africa, replacing African traditional values of communitarianism by ever-growing individualism enhanced by the high-tech industry. Tim Murithi gives us several strategies required to ensure that indigenous wisdom does not disappear completely from the face of Africa<sup>293</sup>:

- To conduct the necessary interviews and research to document these traditions;
- To prepare teaching and training material and develop curriculum on how indigenous approaches will be transmitted in educational programmes;
- To train, where necessary, qualified teachers and trainers who can facilitate learning on indigenous approaches;
- To establish partnerships between organisations such as the African Union, the University for Peace, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, educational institutions, professional teachers associations and non-governmental organisations which are working in this field of peace education to disseminate and share the training material and curricula;
- To disseminate and operationalise educational and training programmes on indigenous approaches to building peace.

The responsibility to implement all these strategies is bestowed on governments. There are the ones to make it possible by policy-making and policy-implementation which include the positive role that indigenous approaches can fill in resolving conflicts and building peace

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<sup>293</sup> Tim Murithi, « African Approaches to Building Peace and Social Solidarity » in *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, n°2, 2006, p.28.

across the continent and at global level. Apart from policy-making and policy-implementation, Tim Murithi emphasises the role that media have to play in the dissemination of indigenous approaches in solving conflicts:

*A media strategy that promotes the awareness and reflection on how indigenous traditions can inform efforts to build a more peaceful society is necessary. More Africans, including those in rural areas, are increasingly able to access newspapers and radios, so this should be considered as a means to buttress the dissemination of knowledge on indigenous approaches<sup>294</sup>.*

Apart from these classical media, there is the blooming of social media that connect people even back in villages and these social media could also be used to disseminate indigenous approaches to peace-building from the village to town, from tradition to modernity, from the periphery to the centre. In this way it clearly appears that tradition and modernity are not bound to be opposed, African culture and Western culture, can meet in a peaceful interaction to be at the service of peace-building in the world. That is why we would like to insist on cultural relativism through which we defend the idea of the complementariness of cultures.

## **9.2. Cultural Complementariness: Fostering Tolerance and Mutual Acceptance**

When we talk about the complementariness of cultures, we insist on the fact that each culture has positive and negative values. It is very important to note that while Globalisation offers great opportunities for growth and development, its benefits are very unevenly shared and its costs are unevenly spread among, across and within countries. This is particularly true with respect to African countries. Both in concept and practice, while Globalisation has positive, innovative, dynamic aspects, it also has negative, disruptive and marginalising aspects. Globalisation must be seen as a change process full of opportunities and challenges that must be carefully and skilfully harnessed and managed to ensure human development.

Cultural complementariness enables us to perceive the riches of all cultures and to see in cultural diversity a blessing, a source of progress, that which makes unity possible. Yet, history teaches us that ethnocentrism has oriented and keeps on orienting human relationships at all levels. Back to our villages, strangers are more often than not despised and considered as inferior. Tribalism, racism and contempt are permanent attitudes of the human being.

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<sup>294</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 29.

According to Patrick Wachsmann, ethnocentrism is a great challenge for any individual person<sup>295</sup>. Cultural complementariness is a process of awareness that leads practitioners from the traditional mindset of fear of cultural differences to one that envisions enrichment and synergism. According to UNESCO, through learning and understanding, individuals become more interculturally competent to comprehend the richness that lays within a diverse world, resulting in tools for the on-going construction of lasting peace, when they become prepared to appreciate, rather than reject, diversity as well as to manage conflicts in accordance with the values of pluralism and mutual understanding<sup>296</sup>.

Culture reflects the way in which groups and societies perceive and manage reality. Since cultures have different perceptions of reality, their collective view can be by far superior to that of any individual culture and lead to improvements in the management of reality. Cultural complementariness is not restricted to ethnic cultures or relations between a dominant and minority cultures; it encompasses these as well as national, organisational and disciplinary cultures. It leads us to realise that there is a dimension of reality in which win-win rather than win-lose scenarios can be created and that we can better understand and manage paradoxical situations when we have multiple cultural perspectives from which to observe them. In a world where cultural diversity seems to disappear with the globalisation of cultures, westernisation, cultural homogenisation or ethnocide, it is important to use cultural complementariness as a paradigm through which a crossroads civilisation can be built.

Hence, if we do not assume *a priori* that one given culture must be superior, except within a limited scope of circumstances in time and space, but assume instead that all cultures are seeking together a deeper understanding of reality and its better management, automatically multiple options of cooperation will surface. This is akin to the magnified perception of travelling to the Orient from Europe. Once it became evident that the earth was round, among other benefits, greater creativity became necessary to determine the best means possible to circumnavigate the world. This increased number of options then creates the need for dialogue and cooperation. Simplistic perceptions derived from the visions of a flat earth, of a master race or of a dictatorship call for simplistic rules, commands and force; larger and cooperation.

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<sup>295</sup> Patrick Wachsmann, *Les droits de l'Homme*, Paris: Dalloz, 1995, p. 42.

<sup>296</sup> [www.unesco.org](http://www.unesco.org).



True dialogue and cooperation are essential to the processing of the Cultural complementariness paradigm. Cultural complementariness is an evolving vision that leads humanity to tolerance and harmonious community life within the planetary village. In today's era of Globalisation, the pragmatic benefits of complementariness are slowly but forcibly becoming evident because of the challenges the world faces. It is imperative that the paradigm be clearly stated, understood and applied. Globalisation which vehicles Western culture does not just have negative aspects, it also has positive aspects that need to be promoted. At the same time our traditions need to be purified of those negative values which cannot be promoted in the civilisation of the universal, the crossroads where the paths of all cultures meet. It is in this sense that Tangwa considers that all cultures are perfectible as he says:

*Cultures qua cultures can be said to be equal in the same sense in which human beings are equal, in spite of great differences in their individual and individuating attributes and characteristics. We could qualify such equality as 'moral' equality, not to be confused with other senses of equality. All human cultures are, however, perfectible, because none is perfect; and none can be perfect, given that human beings, the creators of culture, are imperfect beings. Particular cultures or even human culture in general, can, however, with time, progress or retrogress in relation to some putative intersubjective standard of perfection<sup>297</sup>.*

Instead of setting a particular culture over others as the model, the culture, it is necessary to promote, defend and safeguard cultural relativism. In this way, each culture will be appreciated without any bias or preconceived judgment that often leads to racism. For Tangwa, *"there is no human culture that, if approached with an unprejudiced open mind, without any ulterior motives, would not reveal something positively fascinating and rewarding about itself<sup>298</sup>."* The promotion of cultural relativism is therefore the promotion of positive values inherent in all cultures and expressed by an authentic dialogue of cultures. This dialogue is possible since communicability exists. It can only be successful if everyone is ready to make concessions. We are of the opinion that each culture has much to learn from others and that it can be enriched by multiple foreign contributions. Cultural relativism also introduces the necessity to respect cultural diversity or cultural pluralism. This is important if we want to reflect on a reconstruction of the African way of organising social life in general and political life in particular. With the advent of Western democracy, the need to construct a national conscience seems to prevail over all forms of pluralisms. These pluralisms take the names of tribalism or ethnocentrism and are considered as just being negative or obstacles to

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<sup>297</sup> Godfrey B. Tangwa, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

the construction of nations. Africa is characterised by a great cultural diversity, a plurality of tribes, languages and customs. Yet, despite this cultural diversity, it is necessary to make the promotion of solidarity, a pan-African solidarity that used to characterise indigenous African peoples.

### **9.3 The Power of Solidarity in Building Peace: Towards Pan-African Solidarity**

Taking into consideration the weaknesses and failures of the UN system in its endeavour to keep and maintain peace in the world in general and in Africa in particular, we would like to consider the Indigenous African way of establishing peace as a tool for conflict resolutions around the world through the promotion of social solidarity. The world has been facing many peace challenges and added to these peace challenges, the African continent has to face the challenge of underdevelopment. The major causes of conflicts in the African continent are related to poor governance. Conflicts have actually plagued the African continent because of the poor leadership in many of these countries.

Indeed, competing self-interested political and military elites have made *good* use of the divisions and legacies of colonialism and the illegitimate nature of the post-colonial African state to exacerbate tension and fuel conflict. The basis of African personality was destroyed, historically, by slavery and colonialism. Colonialism led to the alienation of Africans through the promotion of the ideology that the Western culture and way of life were superior to the African culture and way of life. The effect of this is the process of dismantling the cultural norms and values which informed African society and thus it began imploding the social solidarity that existed in Africa prior to colonialism. The process of modernisation led to the emergence of nations-states heavily centralised in the capital city. Due to over-centralisation of the state, the populations back in rural areas or again the periphery have then been marginalised and excluded from benefiting from the wealth and resources of their own countries.

Thus being over-centralised, African states have not been able to settle efficient social security systems and when people are deprived of access to education, wealth and resources, poverty is widespread and peace is jeopardized because poverty increases social tension, a feeling of rejection or marginalisation which further weakens the social fabric<sup>299</sup>. All the means and resources devoted to on-going wars in Africa could have been used to build more

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<sup>299</sup> Tim Murithi, *op. cit*, pp. 11-12. [p.9-34].

schools, more and better hospitals and other infrastructure for development. It is therefore clear that war is an obstacle to development and that, the other way round, there is no development without peace.

What we would like to stress is that the quest for positive peace is a preventive measure against war and should therefore precede negative peace. Negative peace is just the absence of war but positive peace is all about the promotion of social solidarity and tolerance. Achieving social solidarity means that members of the society recognise each other as fellow human beings and begin to share a concern in the common welfare and wellbeing of each other.

It could therefore be opined that in order to achieve lasting peace in the world, there is need to promote social solidarity. In pre-colonial African villages, social solidarity prevailed in the relationships among the members of communities. There was a sense of belonging to the same community and labour was organised in the perspective of preserving common interests, common wealth, a communitarianism. Social solidarity is fundamental in the quest for lasting peace because it is only when we start being concerned with the security and wellbeing of other people that we can hope to guarantee our own security and wellbeing. We emphasize the need for social solidarity because we recognise the inter-connectedness of each human being.

Colonialism did not only destroy the basis of African personality but it also used the indigenous structures and mechanisms of governance and conflict resolution to serve the interests of the colonial administration. Indigenous traditions with regard to governing and resolving conflicts were then corrupted by the centralising power of colonialism. But we must acknowledge that the system of governance and dispute resolution in the African traditional setup was not perfect. While indigenous approaches and institutions provide us with many lessons which can be incorporated into on-going peace-building efforts, such as the ability to discuss publicly and dialog frankly under a palaver tree, we must also recognise that some traditions have not always promoted gender equality. For instance, women were usually excluded in the primary structures of decision-making. It is therefore more relevant to combine contemporary principles such as gender equality with progressive indigenous norms and principles to create an African way of governing and solving conflicts.

This African way will have to be a synthesis between indigenous African traditions essentially community-oriented and modern principles essentially individual-oriented in order

to safeguard human dignity and inclusion of all members of society, be them women or young people. Instead of abandoning the African way in a legitimate search for modernisation, cultural attitudes and values, which are useful for peacekeeping and justice in communities must be revalorised and handed down to future generations. The combination of tradition and modernity could enable Africans to reconstruct their continent by drawing upon their cultural heritage<sup>300</sup>.

Hence, in order to re-establish social solidarity in war-affected communities, a key step would be to find a way for members of these communities to re-inform themselves with a cultural logic that emphasises social solidarity, that is, sharing and equitable distribution of resources. This means that importance must be given, in policy making, to reviving progressive cultural attitudes and values that can foster a climate within which peace can flourish and last. All the positive cultural values in indigenous Africa which foster social solidarity could be summarised in the concept “*Ubuntu*”. *Ubuntu* is found in diverse forms in many societies throughout Africa. More specifically among the Bantu languages of East, Central and Southern Africa, the concept of *Ubuntu* is a cultural world-view that tries to capture the essence of what it means to be human. In South Africa, we find its clearest articulation among the Nguni group of languages. Desmond Tutu defines it as follows:

*Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the very essence of being human. When you want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u no buntu’; ‘Hey, he or she has ubuntu’. This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say ‘a person is a person through other people’. It is not ‘I think therefore I am’. It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong.’ I participate, I share. A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are<sup>301</sup>.*

This idea of *Ubuntu* sheds light on the necessity of peace-making through the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of shared destiny between peoples. It provides a value system for giving and receiving forgiveness. It provides a rational basis for sacrificing or letting go of the desire to take revenge for past wrongs. It provides an

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<sup>300</sup>WaThiong’o Ngugi, *Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms*, Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1993, p. 31.

<sup>301</sup> Desmond Tutu, *No Future Without Forgiveness*, London: Pinter, 1999, pp. 34-35.

inspiration and suggests guidelines for societies and for their governments, on how to legislate and establish laws which will promote reconciliation and peace-building. In brief, *Ubuntu* can culturally re-inform our practical efforts to build peace and heal our traumatised communities. It is to be noted that the principles found in *Ubuntu* are not unique. They can be found in diverse forms in other cultures and traditions.

Nevertheless, we think that although *Ubuntu* principles are not specific to Africa, the fact is that in many cultures, they have been minimised and somehow rejected because of capitalism that brought up individualism. As a matter of facts, when we compare African and Western cultures in their relation to universal principles of *ubuntu*, we can clearly see that while African cultures have somehow kept a positive relationship with these universal principles of love, solidarity, hospitality and the sense of togetherness, Western cultures have replaced them with individualism and mercantilism which cover several aspects of the Western life. For instance, in our African villages, grandparents are never abandoned to their fate. They are surrounded with tender loving care of all the members of the family and the community. They die in their community, surrounded by their children and grandchildren. In contrast, in the Western world, old people are packed in asylums and health personnel are paid to take care of them, exactly like sick people, far from their families. How then were the principles of *Ubuntu* traditionally articulated and translated into practical peace-building process? The answer that follows is given to us by Tim Murithi<sup>302</sup>.

*Ubuntu* entails maintaining a high value on communal life, and maintaining positive relations within the society. This is a collective task and everybody is involved. A dispute between fellow members of a society is perceived not merely as a matter of curiosity with regard to the affairs of one's neighbour; but in a very real sense an emerging conflict is seen to belong to the whole community. For instance, a child belongs to the whole community and any adult can punish him as his own child, without asking or waiting for the permission of his genitors. According to *ubuntu*, each member of the community is linked to each of the disputants in such a way that a bad action from an individual person harms the whole community. If everybody is willing to acknowledge *ubuntu*, then people may either feel a sense of having been wronged, he or she may depend on the group to remedy the wrong, because in a sense, the group has also been wronged.

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<sup>302</sup> Tim Murithi, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

Hence, thanks to *ubuntu*, there are mechanisms for resolving disputes and promoting reconciliation and peace-building with a view to healing past wrongs and maintaining social cohesion and harmony. Consensus building was embraced as a cultural pillar with respect to the regulation and management of relationships between members of the community. Depending on the nature of the disagreement or dispute, the conflict resolution process could take place at the level of the family, at the village level, between members of an ethnic group, or even between different ethnic nations situated in the same region.

Following *ubuntu*, in the African traditional setup, the entire society was involved at various levels in trying to find a solution to a problem which was reviewed as threatening the social cohesion of the community. In principle, the proceedings would be led by a Council of Elders and the Chief or, if the disputes were larger, by the King himself. The process of finding out wrong-doing and looking for a resolution included family members related to the victims and perpetrators, including women and the young. The mechanism therefore allowed members of the public to share their views and to generally make their opinions known. The larger community could thus be involved in the process of conflict resolution. In particular, members of the society had the right to put questions to the victims, perpetrators and witnesses as well as to put suggestions to the Council of Elders on possible ways forward. The Council of Elders, in its capacity as an intermediary, had an investigative function and it also played an advisory role to the Chief. By listening to the views of the members of the society, the Council of Elders could advise on solutions which would promote reconciliation between the aggrieved parties and thus maintain the overall objective of sustaining the unity and cohesion of the community.

What is sure is that the process leading to reconciliation and peace was not always straightforward. However, as Tim Murithi writes,

*The wisdom of this process lies in the recognition that it is not possible to build a healthy community at peace with itself unless past wrongs are acknowledged and brought out into the open so that the truth of what happened can be determined and social trust and solidarity renewed through a process of forgiveness and reconciliation. A community in which there is no trust is ultimately not viable and gradually begins to tear itself apart*<sup>303</sup>.

*Ubuntu* could be very useful in solving conflicts around the world as it was the case in South Africa and Ivory Coast where commissions were created for justice and reconciliation

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<sup>303</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.

through a frank dialog. People, perpetrators and victims are called together to speak out, without any taboo in order to cast off the evil and bring back peace in the community. In the on-going Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, we think that the dialog was neither frank nor inclusive. This might, among other reasons, explain why the crisis keeps on going on despite the efforts of the government. In our opinion, a frank and inclusive major national dialog has to take place as it was the case in the nineties with the “tripartite”. Only an inclusive and tabooless dialog can restore peace through truthful reconciliation in a broken society. That is why

*the guiding principle of Ubuntu was based on the notion that parties need to be reconciled in order to re-build and maintain social trust and social cohesion, with a view to preventing a culture of vendetta or retribution from developing and escalating between individuals and families, or in the society as a whole<sup>304</sup>.*

Leaving the sphere of intersubjectivity or that of nations-imposed solidarity, social solidarity at international level implies a higher degree of humanism through the fight of racism, xenophobia and see how to help those who seek refuge or better living conditions out of their home countries. As far as Africa is concerned, there is a need to develop a Pan-African social solidarity that will lead them through development. The fundamental problem in order to foster such social solidarity across the continent is to bring the Pan-African project of continental integration from the political and business elites in the society to the level of grassroots communities across Africa<sup>305</sup>. For this to happen, policy-makers must remove the barriers that continue to be imposed on those who have to travel from one part of the continent to the other. Francis Kornegay acknowledges that

*Our educational, training and research initiatives in peace and development would be greatly enhanced if Africans could travel across countries, without the tedious and absurd visa process that they have to go through. We cannot improve Pan-African solidarity if at every basic level Africans are unable to travel, meet, to strategise and to implement their ideas. We are citizens of Africa and the policies to institutionalise this have to catch up with this reality.<sup>306</sup>*

It is the responsibility of the African Union to solve this question of visa imposition for travellers and researchers within the continent. The United Nations Peace-building Commission will also have to get great interest into some useful insights from the work that is

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<sup>304</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>306</sup> Francis Kornegay, Pan-African Citizenship and Identity in Southern Africa: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions in *Synopsis*, Vol. 8, N°1, May 2006, p.6.

being done at the grassroots level and will also have to contribute towards the dissemination of the knowledge about indigenous approaches to building peace. While waiting for the African permanent seat at the Security Council of the UN, much can already be done in terms of the education of masses and grassroots populations to peace-building and much can also be done in terms of disseminating the African Peace-building wisdom. As the saying goes, wisdom is scattered in tiny morsels throughout the universe. Let all the cultures of the world come together and build a global net of social solidarity, sharing their positive values and accepting themselves in their diversified differences.



## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we set ourselves the task of placing education and humanism at the foundation of lasting peace in the world and more especially in Africa, rooting peace on African cultural values that could be summed up in the concept of *Ubuntu*. Following our reflection, we reach the conclusion that it is important that governments, civil society and communities work together to implement lasting solutions to reduce violence, deliver justice, combat corruption and ensure inclusive participation at all times. Freedom to express views, in private and in public, must be guaranteed even if freedom of speech has its own limits that are defined by responsibility. In order to be responsible, people must receive a wholesome education to tolerance, openness, respect of the difference and solidarity. They must be able to contribute to decisions that affect their lives. Laws and policies must be applied without any form of discrimination. Disputes need to be resolved through functioning political and justice systems. National and local institutions must be accountable and need to be in place to deliver basic services to families and communities equitably and without the need for bribes. We have intentionally avoided the debate on democracy because we think that it is not democracy itself, as a form of government that could contribute to lasting peace but the promotion of humanism which often lacks in democratic states. More often, Democracy has been used as a leitmotiv for war and political destabilisation of many countries around the world. In the name of democracy, many states have endured political violence. That is why we think that the World could learn from indigenous African solidarity or humanism in general so as to build lasting peace among men. African leaders must be more preoccupied with ameliorating the living conditions of their people than with their stay in power. In a spirit of communitarianism, Africa should take the lead of the race for lasting peace by renewing its legendary culture of solidarity and hospitality and spreading it all over the world, beginning from the continent itself through Pan-African solidarity. We conclude this chapter with this observation of Timi Murithi: *“To enable culture to begin to play a significant role in the reconstruction of Africa [and the world], it will be necessary to establish education and training programmes for governments, officials, civil society actors and other citizens<sup>307</sup>.”*

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<sup>307</sup> Tim Murithi, *Op.cit.* p. 31

## PARTIAL CONCLUSION

At the end of this part which aimed at making a contextual reading of Raymond Aron's peace theory as developed in *Peace and War*, we can say that going beyond Aron's legacy on a conception of peace as a relation to power between political units, we wanted to insist on positive peace which is built not in the political unit first, but in the mind of the individual person first. Such peace, in order to be effective, needs to be grounded on education and humanism. Indeed, the crisis that often lead to conflicts usually rise in the heart of men. We therefore think that education to peace at individual level could foster a lasting peace among men and, by way of consequence, among states. Also, we had to demonstrate that global problems, to be dealt with more efficiently, need the contribution of poor nations whose voices are not always heard because they are not permanently represented in the Security Council of the United Nations System. We therefore presented a battery of reforms that could be undertaken within this organisation in charge of securing peace in the world. In view of giving much more importance to powerless nations in the concert of nations, in this part, we gave a particular attention to the African approach to peace-building which is based on the *Ubuntu* philosophy, a philosophy of peace by communion and togetherness. There are many global problems that could be addressed and many conflicts in the world that could be resolved in line with *Ubuntu*, yet for this to happen, Africa must be given the place she deserves in the United Nations Security Council. As far as Africa is concerned, before preaching *Ubuntu* to the world, she has to preach it to herself because she is experiencing many conflicts mainly caused by bad governance and poor leadership. That is why we insisted on the idea of a Pan-African social solidarity that will serve as the local implementation of *Ubuntu* before its exportation worldwide to foster a Global social solidarity.

## **GENERAL CONCLUSION**

The main goal of our dissertation was to reflect on the question of peace in our world today from a contextual reading of Raymond Aron's *Peace and War*. It is a reflection that wishes to contribute to build a more peaceful, fairer, and secure world. Raymond Aron was very much preoccupied with the promotion of human rights and justice as factors of a sustainable peace and development. His masterpiece *Peace and War* is a thorough contribution, following the paths of Immanuel Kant, to the necessity of the prevention and management of wars through diplomacy. Kant was well aware of the distinction between abstract laws and government rules just like other philosophers of the Enlightenment period. Like Hobbes, Kant conceived of a state of nature as a condition "like lawless savages", which, for nation-states, is "a state of war, the right of the stronger, even though there may not be an actual war or continuous fighting. What was lacking in this contractualist vision was a juridical state, a condition of "universal laws", not necessarily civil government. Indeed Kant explicitly rules this out:

*A league of nations in accordance with the Idea of an original social contract is necessary, not, indeed, in order to meddle in one another's internal dissensions, but in order to afford protection against external aggression. [...] But this alliance must not involve a sovereign authority (as in a civil constitution), but only a confederation*<sup>308</sup>.

If Aron agrees with Kant on the necessity to have a supranational organisation to play the role of confederation with the mission of preserving peace in the world, he goes a step further considering that there can be no peace without power equilibrium. Peace, according to Raymond Aron in *Peace and War*

*Is based on power, that is, on the relation between the capabilities of acting upon each other possessed by the political units. Since the relations of power, in peacetime, without being the exact reflections of the actual or potential relation of forces, are a more or less distorted expression of it, the various types of peace can be related to the types of relation of forces. I distinguish three types of peace: equilibrium, hegemony, empire*<sup>309</sup>.

The meaning of peace as a balance of power is not explicit but implicit. Aron first defines peace as a suspension of violence. Second, as quoted, he says peace is based on power. Third, he qualifies peace by different relations of power. Therefore, he is conceptualizing peace as a suspension of violence involving one of the three power relations; that is, a balance of powers, but is not itself such a balance. A balance may be an equilibrium; or an equality or dominance; or a hierarchy, empire or enslavement. That is, it is any relation

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<sup>308</sup> Immanuel Kant, *op. cit*, Section 54.

<sup>309</sup> Raymond Aron, *op. cit*, p. 151.

of powers that parties will accept in order to terminate a conflict. The concept of this balance of powers in Aron's political theory must not be confused with that of peace as a social contract. The idea of civil government as a contract to secure life and property and thus end a state of war is obviously consistent with the concept of peace as a social contract. Balance of powers entails that peace is an outcome of the balancing powers in a conflict situation, and is initially grounded on the resulting balance. This balance can change significantly as interests, capabilities and wills shift, while the associated social contract remains unaltered.

In the perspective of Aron's Pacifism, we have acknowledged that armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country's development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long-standing grievances among communities. Violence, in all its forms, has a pervasive impact on societies. Violence affects children's health, development and well-being, and their ability to thrive. It causes trauma and weakens social inclusion. Lack of access to justice means that conflicts remain unresolved and people cannot obtain protection and redress. Institutions that do not function according to legitimate laws are prone to arbitrariness and abuse of power, and less capable of delivering public services to everyone. To exclude and to discriminate not only violates human rights, but also causes resentment and animosity, and could give rise to violence. Crimes that threaten the foundation of peaceful societies, including homicides, trafficking and other organized crimes, as well as discriminatory laws or practices, affect all countries. Even the world's greatest democracies face major challenges in addressing corruption, crime and human rights violations for everyone at home.

We have seen that Aron's theory of International Relations needed to be revised in the light of asymmetric wars that have systematically been gaining ground in the world today. An International Law System is not enough to build peace in the world, more especially in a context of unconventional wars that fill the globe. The United Nations have been unable to stop terrorism or to prevent it. Among the many reasons presented in our work, we think that social justice, respect for the cultural diversity or cultural pluralism, the respect for the UN itself as a supra national organisation are some of the conditions that can help building peace in the world in a context of asymmetric wars. As we have seen in the second part of our work, the motivations of terrorists are usually cultural, specifically religious as they claim respect for their fundamental religious values that are more often than not incompatible with the spirit of democracy or excessive freedom that exists in Europe and America.

Beyond Aron's legacy, we think that the UN system needs to undergo profound reforms so as to give much more place to poor countries in its Security Council so as to make their voice heard in the concert of nations. The African voice for example will contribute in looking for solutions to global problems such as the environmental crisis, terrorism and poverty. With regard to poverty and misery alongside with the conflicts that jeopardize peace all over the world, we think that *Ubuntu* approach or philosophy could serve as a corner stone for promoting peace-building and social solidarity throughout the world because, as Susan Collin Marks tells us, it gives us four key lessons<sup>310</sup>:

- The importance of public participation in the peace making process, since social solidarity is strengthened if members of the society take part in building the peace;
- The utility of supporting victims and encouraging perpetrators as they go through the difficult process of making peace;
- The value of acknowledging guilt and remorse and the granting of forgiveness as a way to achieve reconciliation and
- The importance of referring constantly to the essential unity and interdependence of humanity, as expressed through *ubuntu*, and living out the principles which this unity suggests, namely: empathy for others, the sharing of our common resources, and working with a spirit of cooperation in our efforts to resolve our common problems.

From this last lesson, it is clear that there is a need to develop a global network for solidarity, Global solidarity in order to come out of mere sporadic interventions during urgencies and put in place a systematised social solidarity at global level and in Africa, a Pan-African solidarity among the African nations.

At the end of our philosophical endeavour, we can conclude that philosophers have to take a genuine interest in what their governments are doing. They have to raise awareness in their community about the realities of violence and the importance of peaceful and just societies. They also have to promote inclusion and respect towards people of different backgrounds, ethnic origins, religions, gender, sexual orientations or different opinions and help to improve conditions for a life of dignity for all. As the UNESCO's Director General once said, "*Peace is more than the absence of war, it is living together with our differences –*

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<sup>310</sup> Susan Collin Marks, *Ubuntu, Spirit of Africa: Example for the World, in Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution during South Africa's Transition to Democracy*, Washington, D.C, United States Institute for Peace, 2000.

*of sex, race, language, religion or culture – while furthering universal respect for justice and human rights on which such coexistence depends<sup>311</sup>”.*

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
<sup>311</sup>[www.unesco.org](http://www.unesco.org).

## **APPENDICES**

Albert Einstein and Freud exchanged letters for purposes of publication in this book. Both expressed a horror of war and the belief that it could be avoided only if nations were willing to renounce some of their sovereignty in favour of an international body. Neither Einstein nor Freud was optimistic that this renunciation would happen. We present their two letters in these annexes alongside with the Yamoussoukro Charter for peace.



## APPENDIX 1: WHY WAR? A LETTER FROM ALBERT EINSTEIN TO SIGMUND FREUD<sup>312</sup>



Albert Einstein

The text below is a slightly abridged version of a letter written by Albert Einstein to Sigmund Freud. Under the title *Why War?*, the letter and Freud's reply to it were published in 1933 by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. They formed part of an international series of open letters, sponsored by the Institute, in which leading intellectuals exchanged ideas on major questions, the most crucial of which was the threat of war.

Caputh near Potsdam, 30 July, 1932

Dear Professor Freud...

Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?

It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern science, this issue has come to mean a matter of life and death for civilization as we know it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed, every attempt at its solution has ended in a lamentable breakdown.

I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the problem professionally and practically are growing only too aware of their impotence to deal with it, and have now a very lively desire to learn the views of men who, absorbed in the pursuit of science, can see world-problems in the perspective distance lends. As for me, the normal objective of my thought affords no insight into the dark places of human will and feeling. Thus, in the enquiry now proposed, I can do little more than seek to clarify the question at issue and, clearing the ground of the more obvious solutions, enable you to bring the light of your far-reaching knowledge of man's instinctive life to bear upon the problem...

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<sup>312</sup> <https://en.unesco.org/courier/may-1985/why-war-letter-albert-einstein-sigmund-freud>.

...As one immune from nationalist bias, I personally see a simple way of dealing with the superficial (i.e. administrative) aspect of the problem: the setting up, by international consent, of a legislative and judicial body to settle every conflict arising between nations. Each nation would undertake to abide by the orders issued by this legislative body, to invoke its decision in every dispute, to accept its judgments unreservedly and to carry out every measure the tribunal deems necessary for the execution of its decrees. But here, at the outset, I come up against a difficulty; a tribunal is a human institution which, in proportion as the power at its disposal is inadequate to enforce its verdicts, is all the more prone to suffer these to be deflected by extrajudicial pressure. This is a fact with which we have to reckon; law and might inevitably go hand in hand, and juridical decisions approach more nearly the ideal justice demanded by the community (in whose name and interests these verdicts are pronounced) in so far as the community has effective power to compel respect of its juridical ideal. But at present we are far from possessing any supranational organization competent to render verdicts of incontestable authority and enforce absolute submission to the execution of its verdicts. Thus I am led to my first axiom: the quest of international security involves the unconditional surrender by every nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty of action, its sovereignty that is to say, and it is clear beyond all doubt that no other road can lead to such security.

The ill-success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work, which paralyse these efforts. Some of these factors are not far to seek. The craving for power which characterizes the governing class in every nation is hostile to any limitation of the national sovereignty. This political power-hunger is wont to batten on the activities of another group, whose aspirations are on purely mercenary, economic lines. I have specially in mind that small but determined group, active in every nation, composed of individuals who, indifferent to social considerations and restraints, regard warfare, the manufacture and sale of arms, simply as an occasion to advance their personal interests and enlarge their personal authority.

But recognition of this obvious fact is merely the first step towards an appreciation of the actual state of affairs. Another question follows hard upon it: how is it possible for this small clique to bend the will of the majority, who stand to lose and suffer by a state of war, to the service of their ambitions? (In speaking of the majority, I do not exclude soldiers of every

rank who have chosen war as their profession, in the belief that they are serving to defend the highest interests of their race, and that attack is often the best method of defence.) An obvious answer to this question would seem to be that the minority, the ruling class at present, has the schools and press, usually the Church as well, under its thumb. This enables it to organize and sway the emotions of the masses, and make its tool of them.

Yet even this answer does not provide a complete solution. Another question arises from it: How is it these devices succeed so well in rousing men to such wild enthusiasm, even to sacrifice their lives? Only one answer is possible. Because man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction. In normal times this passion exists in a latent state, it emerges only in unusual circumstances; but it is a comparatively easy task to call it into play and raise it to the power of a collective psychosis. Here lies, perhaps, the crux of all the complex of factors we are considering, an enigma that only the expert in the lore of human instincts can resolve.


And so we come to our last question. Is it possible to control man's mental evolution so as to make him proof against the psychoses of hate and destructiveness? Here I am thinking by no means only of the so-called uncultured masses. Experience proves that it is rather the so-called "Intelligentzia" that is most apt to yield to these disastrous collective suggestions, since the intellectual has no direct contact with life in the raw, but encounters it in its easiest, synthetic form upon the printed page.

To conclude: I have so far been speaking only of wars between nations; what are known as international conflicts. But I am well aware that the aggressive instinct operates under other forms and in other circumstances. (I am thinking of civil wars, for instance, due in earlier days to religious zeal, but nowadays to social factors; or, again, the persecution of racial minorities). But my insistence on what is the most typical; most cruel and extravagant form of conflict between man and man was deliberate, for here we have the best occasion of discovering ways and means to render all armed conflicts impossible.

Yours very sincerely,

A. Einstein

## APPENDIX 2: WHY WAR? A LETTER FROM FREUD TO EINSTEIN<sup>313</sup>



### Sigmund Freud

Is there a way of freeing humankind from the threat of war? Can human aggression be channelled to help protect people against the impulses of hatred and destruction? These questions were put to Sigmund Freud in an anxious letter from Albert Einstein dated 30 July 1932, when Fascist and Nazi violence was spreading in Europe. The father of psychoanalysis, whom Einstein described as an "expert in the lore of human instincts", replied two months later, spelling out his thoughts on the psychical foundations of behaviour and defining possible ways in which the conflicts rending humanity could be brought to a halt.

By Sigmund Freud

You begin with the relations between Might and Right, and this is assuredly the proper starting-point for our enquiry. But, for the term "might", I would substitute a tougher and more telling word: "violence". In right and violence we have today an obvious antinomy. It is easy to prove that one has evolved from the other...

Conflicts of interest between man and man are resolved, in principle, by recourse to violence. It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which man cannot claim exclusion; nevertheless men are also prone to conflicts of opinion, touching, on occasion, the loftiest peaks of abstract thought, which seem to call for settlement by quite another method. This refinement is, however, a late development.

To start with, brute force was the factor which, in small communities, decided points of ownership and the question of which man's will was to prevail. Very soon physical force was implemented, then replaced, by the use of various adjuncts; he proved the victor whose weapon was the better, or handled the more skilfully.

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<sup>313</sup> <https://en.unesco.org/courier/marzo-1993/why-war-letter-freud-einstein>

Now, for the first time, with the coming of weapons, superior brains began to oust brute force, but the object of the conflict remained the same: one party was to be constrained, by the injury done him or impairment of his strength, to retract a claim or a refusal. This end is most effectively gained when the opponent is definitively put out of action in other words, is killed.

This procedure has two advantages; the enemy cannot renew hostilities, and, secondly, his fate deters others from following his example. Moreover, the slaughter of a foe gratifies an instinctive craving a point to which we shall revert hereafter. However, another consideration may be set off against this will to kill: the possibility of using an enemy for servile tasks if his spirit be broken and his life spared. Here violence finds an outlet not in slaughter but in subjugation. Hence springs the practice of giving quarter; but the victor, having from now on to reckon with the craving for revenge that rankles in his victim, forfeits to some extent his personal security.

From violence to law

[...] We know that in the course of evolution this state of things was modified, a path was traced that led away from violence to law. But what was this path? Surely it issued from a single verity; that the superiority of one strong man can be overborne by an alliance of many weaklings, that l'union fait la force. Brute force is overcome by union, the allied might of scattered units makes good its right against the isolated giant.

Thus we may define "right" (i.e. law) as the might of a community. Yet it, too, is nothing else than violence, quick to attack whatever individual stands in its path, and it employs the selfsame methods, follows like ends, with but one difference; it is the communal, not individual, violence that has its way.

But, for the transition from crude violence to the reign of law, a certain psychological condition must first obtain. The union of the majority must be stable and enduring. If its sole raison d'être be the discomfiture of some overweening individual and, after his downfall, it be dissolved, it leads to nothing. Some other man, trusting to his superior power, will seek to reinstate the rule of violence and the cycle will repeat itself unendingly.

Thus the union of the people must be permanent and well-organized; it must enact rules to meet the risk of possible revolts; must set up machinery ensuring that its rules the laws are observed and that such acts of violence as the laws demand are duly carried out. This

recognition of a community of interests engenders among the members of the group a sentiment of unity and fraternal solidarity which constitutes its real strength.

[...] Now the position is simple enough so long as the community consists of a number of equipollent individuals. The laws of such a group can determine to what extent the individual must forfeit his personal freedom, the right of using personal force as an instrument of violence, to ensure the safety of the group.

But such a combination is only theoretically possible; in practice the situation is always complicated by the fact that, from the outset, the group includes elements of unequal power, men and women, elders and children, and, very soon, as a result of war and conquest, victors and the vanquished i.e. masters and slaves as well. From this time on the common law takes notice of these inequalities of power, laws are made by and for the rulers, giving the servile classes fewer rights.

Thenceforward there exist within the state two factors making for legal instability, but legislative evolution, too: first, the attempts by members of the ruling class to set themselves above the law's restrictions and, secondly, the constant struggle of the ruled to extend their rights and see each gain embodied in the code, replacing legal disabilities by equal laws for all.

The second of these tendencies will be particularly marked when there takes place a positive mutation of the balance of power within the community, the frequent outcome of certain historical conditions. In such cases the laws may gradually be adjusted to the changed conditions or (as more usually ensues) the ruling class is loath to reckon with the new developments, the result being insurrections and civil wars, a period when law is in abeyance and force once more the arbiter, followed by a new regime of law. There is another factor of constitutional change, which operates in a wholly pacific manner, viz: the cultural evolution of the mass of the community; this factor, however, is of a different order and can only be dealt with later.

### **A supreme authority**

Thus we see that, even within the group itself, the exercise of violence cannot be avoided when conflicting interests are at stake. But the common needs and habits of men who live in fellowship under the same sky favour a speedy issue of such conflicts and, this being so, the possibilities of peaceful solutions make steady progress. Yet the most casual glance at world

history will show an unending series of conflicts between one community and another or a group of others, between large and smaller units, between cities, countries, races, tribes and kingdoms, almost all of which were settled by the ordeal of war. Such wars end either in pillage or in conquest and its fruits, the downfall of the loser.

No single all-embracing judgement can be passed on these wars of aggrandisement. Some, like the war between the Mongols and the Turks, have led to unmitigated misery; others, however, have furthered the transition from violence to law, since they brought larger units into being, within whose limits a recourse to violence was banned and a new regime determined all disputes. Thus the Roman conquests brought that boon, the *pax Romana*, to the Mediterranean lands. The French kings' lust for aggrandisement created a new France, flourishing in peace and unity. Paradoxical as it sounds, we must admit that warfare well might serve to pave the way to that unbroken peace we so desire, for it is war that brings vast units into being, within whose frontiers all warfare is proscribed by a strong central power. In practice, however, this end is not attained, for as a rule the fruits of victory are but short-lived, the newly-created unit falls asunder once again, generally because there can be no true cohesion between the parts that violence has welded. Hitherto, moreover, such conquests have only led to aggregations which, for all their magnitude, had limits, and disputes between these units could be resolved only by recourse to arms. For humanity at large the sole result of all these military enterprises was that, instead of frequent not to say incessant little wars, they had now to face great wars which, for all they came less often, were so much the more destructive.

Regarding the world of today, the same conclusion holds good, and you, too, have reached it, though by a shorter path. There is but one sure way of ending war and that is the establishment, by common consent, of a central control which shall have the last word in every conflict of interests. For this, two things are needed: first, the creation of such a supreme court of judicature; secondly, its investment with adequate executive force. Unless this second requirement be fulfilled, the first is unavailing. Obviously the League of Nations, acting as a Supreme Court, fulfils the first condition; it does not fulfil the second. It has no force at its disposal and can only get it if the members of the new body, its constituent nations, furnish it. And, as things are, this is a forlorn hope.

Still, we should be taking a very short-sighted view of the League of Nations were we to ignore the fact that here is an experiment the like of which has rarely been attempted in the course of history, and never before on such a scale. It is an attempt to acquire the authority (in

other words, coercive influence), which hitherto reposed exclusively on the possession of power, by calling into play certain idealistic attitudes of mind.

We have seen that there are two factors of cohesion in a community: violent compulsions and ties of sentiment ("identifications", in technical parlance) between the members of the group. If one of these factors becomes inoperative, the other may still suffice to hold the group together. Obviously such notions as these can only be significant when they are the expression of a deeply rooted sense of unity, shared by all. It is necessary, therefore, to gauge the efficacy of such sentiments. History tells us that, on occasion, they have been effective. For example, the Panhellenic conception, the Greeks' awareness of superiority over their barbarian neighbours, which found expression in the Amphictyonies, the Oracles and Games, was strong enough to humanize the methods of warfare as between Greeks, though inevitably it failed to prevent conflicts between different elements of the Hellenic race or even to deter a city or group of cities from joining forces with their racial foe, the Persians, for the discomfiture of a rival. The solidarity of Christendom in the Renaissance age was no more effective, despite its vast authority, in hindering Christian nations, large and small alike, from calling in the Sultan to their aid. And, in our times, we look in vain for some such unifying notion whose authority would be unquestioned. It is all too clear that the nationalistic ideas, paramount today in every country, operate in quite a contrary direction. Some there are who hold that the Bolshevist conceptions may make an end of war, but, as things are, that goal lies very far away and, perhaps, could only be attained after a spell of brutal internecine warfare. Thus it would seem that any effort to replace brute force by the might of an ideal is, under present conditions, doomed to fail. Our logic is at fault if we ignore the fact that right is founded on brute force and even today needs violence to maintain.

### **Life-force and death instinct**

I now can comment on another of your statements. You are amazed that it is so easy to infect men with the war-fever, and you surmise that man has in him an active instinct for hatred and destruction, amenable to such stimulations. I entirely agree with you. I believe in the existence of this instinct and have been recently at pains to study its manifestations.

In this connexion may I set out a fragment of that knowledge of the instincts, which we psychoanalysts, after so many tentative essays and gropings in the dark, have compassed? We assume that human instincts are of two kinds: those that conserve and unify, which we call "erotic" (in the meaning Plato gives to Eros in his Symposium), or else "sexual" (explicitly



extending the popular connotations of "sex"); and, secondly, the instincts to destroy and kill, which we assimilate as the aggressive or destructive instincts. These are, as you perceive, the well-known opposites, Love and Hate, transformed into theoretical entities; they are, perhaps, another aspect of those eternal polarities, attraction and repulsion, which fall within your province. But we must be chary of passing over hastily to the notions of good and evil. Each of these instincts is every whit as indispensable as its opposite and all the phenomena of life derive from their activity, whether they work in concert or in opposition.

It seems that an instinct of either category can operate but rarely in isolation; it is always blended ("alloyed", as we say) with a certain dosage of its opposite, which modifies its aim or even, in certain circumstances, is a prime condition of its attainment. Thus the instinct of self-preservation is certainly of an erotic nature, but to gain its ends this very instinct necessitates aggressive action. In the same way the love-instinct, when directed to a specific object, calls for an admixture of the acquisitive instinct if it is to enter into effective possession of that object. It is the difficulty of isolating the two kinds of instinct in their manifestations that has so long prevented us from recognizing them.

If you will travel with me a little further on this road, you will find that human affairs are complicated in yet another way. Only exceptionally does an action follow on the stimulus of a single instinct. [...] As a rule several motives of similar composition concur to bring about the act.

When a nation is summoned to engage in war, a whole gamut of human motives may respond to this appeal; high and low motives, some openly avowed, others slurred over. The lust for aggression and destruction is certainly included; the innumerable cruelties of history and man's daily life confirm its prevalence and strength. The stimulation of these destructive impulses by appeals to idealism and the erotic instinct naturally facilitates their release. Musing on the atrocities recorded on history's page, we feel that the ideal motive has often served as a camouflage for the lust of destruction; sometimes, as with the cruelties of the Inquisition, it seems that, while the ideal motives occupied the foreground of consciousness, they drew their strength from the destructive instincts submerged in the unconscious. Both interpretations are feasible.

[...] I would like to dwell a little longer on this destructive instinct which is seldom given the attention that its importance warrants. With the least of speculative efforts we are led to conclude that this instinct functions in every living being, striving to work its ruin and reduce

life to its primal state of inert matter. Indeed it might well be called the "death-instinct"; whereas the erotic instincts vouch for the struggle to live on. The death instinct becomes an impulse to destruction when, with the aid of certain organs, it directs its action outwards, against external objects. The living being, that is to say, defends its own existence by destroying foreign bodies.

But, in one of its activities, the death instinct is operative within the living being and we have sought to trace back a number of normal and pathological phenomena to this introversion of the destructive instinct. We have even committed the heresy of explaining the origin of human conscience by some such "turning inward" of the aggressive impulse. Obviously when this internal tendency operates on too large a scale, it is no trivial matter, rather a positively morbid state of things; whereas the diversion of the destructive impulse towards the external world must have beneficial effects. Here is then the biological justification for all those vile, pernicious propensities which we now are combating. We can but own that they are really more akin to nature than this our stand against them, which, in fact, remains to be accounted for [...]

The upshot of these observations, as bearing on the subject in hand, is that there is no likelihood of our being able to suppress humanity's aggressive tendencies. In some happy corners of the earth, they say, where nature brings forth abundantly whatever man desires, there flourish races whose lives go gently by, unknowing of aggression or constraint. This I can hardly credit; I would like further details about these happy folk.

From our "mythology" of the instincts we may easily deduce a formula for an indirect method of eliminating war. If the propensity for war be due to the destructive instinct, we have always its counter-agent, Eros, to our hand. All that produces ties of sentiment between man and man must serve us as war's antidote.

These ties are of two kinds. First, such relations as those towards a beloved object, void though they be of sexual intent. The psychoanalyst need feel no compunction in mentioning "love" in this connexion; religion uses the same language: Love thy neighbour as thyself. A pious injunction easy to enounce, but hard to carry out! The other bond of sentiment is by way of identification. All that brings out the significant resemblances between men calls into play this feeling of community, identification, whereon is founded, in large measure, the whole edifice of human society. In your strictures on the abuse of authority I find another suggestion for an indirect attack on the war-impulse. That men are divided into leaders and the led is but

another manifestation of their inborn and irremediable inequality. The second class constitutes the vast majority; they need a high command to make decisions for them, to which decisions they usually bow without demur. In this context we would point out that men should be at greater pains than heretofore to form a superior class of independent thinkers, unamenable to intimidation and fervent in the quest for truth, whose function it would be to guide the masses dependent on their lead. There is no need to point out how little the rule of politicians and the Church's ban on liberty of thought encourage such a new creation.

The ideal conditions would obviously be found in a community where every man subordinated his instinctive life to the dictates of reason. Nothing less than this could bring about so thorough and so durable a union between men, even if this involved the severance of mutual ties of sentiment. But surely such a hope is utterly Utopian, as things are. The other indirect methods of preventing war are certainly more feasible, but entail no quick results. They conjure up an ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, men are dead of hunger.

[...] But why do we, you and I and many another, protest so vehemently against war, instead of just accepting it as another of life's odious importunities? For it seems a natural thing enough, biologically sound and practically unavoidable. I trust you will not be shocked by my raising such a question. For the better conduct of an inquiry it may be well to don a mask of feigned aloofness.

The answer to my query may run as follows: Because every man has a right over his own life and war destroys lives that were full of promise; it forces the individual into situations that shame his manhood, obliging him to murder fellow men, against his will; it ravages material amenities, the fruits of human toil, and much besides. Moreover wars, as now conducted, afford no scope for acts of heroism according to the old ideals and, given the high perfection of modern arms, war today would mean the sheer extermination of one of the combatants, if not of both.

This is so true, so obvious, that we can but wonder why the conduct of war is not banned by general consent/Doubtless either of the points I have just made is open to debate. It may be asked if the community, in its turn, cannot claim a right over the individual lives of its members. Moreover, all forms of war cannot be indiscriminately condemned; so long as there are nations and empires, each prepared callously to exterminate its rival, all alike must be

equipped for war. But we will not dwell on any of these problems; they lie outside the debate to which you have invited me.

I pass on to another point, the basis, as it strikes me, of our common hatred of war. It is this: we cannot do otherwise than hate it. Pacifists we are, since our organic nature wills us thus to be. Hence it comes easy to us to find arguments that justify our standpoint.

This point, however, calls for elucidation. Here is the way in which I see it. The cultural development of mankind (some, I know, prefer to call it civilization) has been in progress since immemorial antiquity. To this phenomenon we owe all that is best in our composition, but also much that makes for human suffering. Its origins and causes are obscure, its issue is uncertain, but some of its characteristics are easy to perceive

The psychic changes which accompany this process of cultural change are striking, and not to be gainsaid. They consist in the progressive rejection of instinctive ends and a scaling down of instinctive reactions. Sensations which delighted our forefathers have become neutral or unbearable to us; and, if our ethical and aesthetic ideals have undergone a change, the causes of this are ultimately organic.

On the psychological side two of the most important phenomena of culture are, firstly, a strengthening of the intellect, which tends to master our instinctive life, and, secondly, an introversion of the aggressive impulse, with all its consequent benefits and perils. Now war runs most emphatically counter to the psychic disposition imposed on us by the growth of culture; we are therefore bound to resent war, to find it utterly intolerable. With pacifists like us it is not merely an intellectual and affective repulsion, but a constitutional intolerance, an idiosyncrasy in its most drastic form. And it would seem that the aesthetic ignominies of warfare play almost as large a part in this repugnance as war's atrocities.

How long have we to wait before the rest of men turn pacifist? Impossible to say, and yet perhaps our hope that these two factors man's cultural disposition and a well-founded dread of the form that future wars will take may serve to put an end to war in the near future, is not chimerical. But by what ways or by-ways this will come about, we cannot guess. Meanwhile we may rest on the assurance that whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war. [...]

Sigmund Freud.

## **APPENDIX 3**

### **THE YAMOUSSOUKRO DECLARATION OF UNESCO (1989)**

Peace is reverence for life.

Peace is the most precious possession of humanity.

Peace is more than the end of armed conflict.

Peace is a mode of behaviour.

Peace is a deep-rooted commitment to the principles of liberty, justice, equality and solidarity among all human beings.

Peace is also a harmonious partnership of humankind with the environment.

Today, on the eve of the twenty-first century, peace is within our reach.

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