# THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY: AN APPROACH FROM THE LEVINASIAN NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OTHER

**Doctorate Thesis in Ontology and Metaphysics, defended on 16th July 2024**

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To those who suffer from political, socio-economic and environmental oppression.

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# ABSTRACT

Emmanuel Levinas interrogates, on what it means to be human in an unjust world by approaching the Other in the face. He exteriorizes Being, intelligibly beyond the sense of western Metaphysics. The face, opens the existential ethical-metaphysics encounter and human responsibility for the Other. The Other is the exteriority; the exterior conscience which otherness is located in ethics, "the putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other." He prioritizes the Other who inhabit the horizon of one's experience to a moral duty. The Other for Levinas, is the starting point of all significations and meaning. The inherent dialectic served the spirit of moral dualism and the historical optimism at its peak which rendered invisible the intrinsic link between metaphysics, ontology, critique and crisis of humanity in the historico-political actuality of the global society. The crisis of humanity exteriorizes Being and incorporates both annihilation and revelation with regard to the challenges we face in our own ways of life. It constitutes the ontological-existential order of Being: material and spiritual aspect of humans. The human crisis brings us to the dimension between the nature, relation of man, and its horizons (visible and invisible): to the problem of the meaning of existence. Man has become ever more hostile to his fellow man. The human person is found fragmented in several independent series. As a momentum between two continuous states of affairs, the crisis of humanity is not only destructive, exclusive or linked to the destruction of free thinking, but also the sign of sudden, often unexpected, and flourishing. The rational power to decide upon the course of humanity's progress and crisis, is a decision regarding the humanity's future. Therefore, the global society has reflected upon its condition as a condition of plurality of crisis, which is a "critical" condition. This shift in the understanding of the crisis of humanity and the disentanglement of metaphysics and ontology often leads to the weakening of philosophical reflection on the state of crisis of the human person. The ontology of the latter has often been identified as a state of moral decadence, dehumanization, degeneration and philosophically speaking, loss of meaning and nihilism. It is this complex epistemological and semantics of the "crisis of humanity," and its historically situated juncture with philosophy that brings the dialectical-philosophical ramifications of the current discourse on moral and ecological crisis in the global society. Moreover, two lines of thought are developed, which link the crisis of the human person to those of openness and disruption. The complex dialectics of the crisis of humanity is viewed in the vertical breakdown of trust (the relationship) between us (man) and the Creator. Philosophically, this crisis reveals a dense relation with morality. At this level, moral rises beyond ethics. Moral brings us to the dimension of the Divine. The nature and sense of the man is absolutely spiritual. The philosophical issue of the crisis of humanity is close to the solidarity of humanity and religious discourses in role of faith in today's world of separatisms and religious conflict. The blindness to what is a self-conscious state of critique in philosophical discourse and scientific thought of thinking undoubtedly include a condition of crisis of the human person and progress.

**Keywords:** Crisis, crisis of humanity, global society, metaphysics, ontology, Being, human person, moral decadence, dehumanization, degeneration, loss of meaning, moral and ecological crisis, Levinas, responsibility, Other, Face, ethics.

# RESUME

Emmanuel Levinas s'interroge sur ce que signifie être humain dans un monde injuste en s'approchant de l'Autre dans le visage. Il extériorise l'Être, intelligiblement au-delà du sens de la métaphysique occidentale. Le visage, ouvre la rencontre existentielle éthico-métaphysique et la responsabilité humaine pour l'Autre. L'Autre est l'extériorité; la conscience extérieure dont se situe l'altérité dans l'éthique, « la remise en cause de ma spontanéité par la présence de l'Autre ». Il donne la priorité à l'Autre qui habite l'horizon de son expérience à un devoir moral. L'Autre pour Levinas, est le point de départ de tout sens et de toute signification. La dialectique inhérente a servi l'esprit du dualisme moral et l'optimisme historique à son apogée qui a rendu invisible le lien intrinsèque entre métaphysique, ontologie, critique et crise de l'humanité dans l'actualité historico-politique de la société globale. La crise de l'humanité extériorise l'Être et intègre à la fois l'anéantissement et la révélation en ce qui concerne les défis auxquels nous sommes confrontés dans nos propres modes de vie. Il constitue l'ordre ontologico-existentiel de l'Être: aspect matériel et spirituel de l'humain. La crise humaine nous amène à la dimension entre la nature, la relation de l'homme et ses horizons (visibles et invisibles): au problème du sens de l'existence. L'homme est devenu de plus en plus hostile à son prochain. La personne humaine se retrouve fragmentée en plusieurs séries indépendantes. En tant qu'élan entre deux états de choses continus, la crise de l'humanité n'est pas seulement destructrice, exclusive ou liée à la destruction de la libre pensée, mais aussi le signe d'un soudain, souvent inattendu, et florissant. Le pouvoir rationnel de décider du cours du progrès et de la crise de l'humanité est une décision concernant l'avenir de l'humanité. Par conséquent, la société globale a réfléchi à sa condition comme une condition de pluralité de crises, qui est une condition « critique ». Ce changement dans la compréhension de la crise de l'humanité et le démêlage de la métaphysique et de l'ontologie conduisent souvent à l'affaiblissement de la réflexion philosophique sur l'état de crise de la personne humaine. L'ontologie de ce dernier a souvent été identifiée comme un état de décadence morale, de déshumanisation, de dégénérescence et, philosophiquement parlant, de perte de sens et de nihilisme. C'est cette épistémologie et cette sémantique complexes de la « crise de l'humanité », et sa jonction historiquement située avec la philosophie qui apporte les ramifications dialectico-philosophiques du discours actuel sur la crise morale et écologique dans la société globale. De plus, deux lignes de pensée sont développées, qui relient la crise de la personne humaine à celles de l'ouverture et de la rupture. La dialectique complexe de la crise de l'humanité est vue dans la rupture verticale de la confiance (la relation) entre nous (l'homme) et le Créateur. Philosophiquement, cette crise révèle un rapport dense à la morale. À ce niveau, la morale s'élève au-delà de l'éthique. La morale nous amène à la dimension du Divin. La nature et le sens de l'homme sont absolument spirituels. La question philosophique de la crise de l'humanité est proche de la solidarité humaine et des discours religieux dans le rôle de la foi dans le monde actuel de séparatismes et de conflits religieux. L'aveuglement à ce qui est un état de critique conscient dans le discours philosophique et la pensée scientifique de la pensée inclut sans aucun doute une condition de crise de la personne humaine et du progrès.

**Mots clés** : Crise, crise de l'humanité, société globale, métaphysique, ontologie, Être, personne humaine, décadence morale, déshumanisation, dégénérescence, perte de sens, crise morale et écologique, Levinas, responsabilité, Autre, Visage, éthique.

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# GENERAL INTRODUCTION

*A problem cannot be solve with the same mind-set that created it in the first place.*[1]

The spatio-temporal and metaphysical reality of being reveals a clash of metaphysics and politics in the forgetfulness of Being. The human person (Man) has been degraded in the course of society evolution, in the name of reason view and defined as determining instrument of domination of the world and the Other. On the one hand, *the forgetfulness of being* in philosophical discourse and scientific thought of thinking has led to the complete failure of the West, then spread to the periphery of the Western world as if by etastasis, to our becoming displaced and cast into the crisis of humanity. The forgetfulness of being shows are gain of the fullness of being as inconsistency to reinstate oneself in being and progress. We live in times of onto-existential crisis, where our union is under threat. On the basis of rationality that is modern rationality of 18th century contemporary society has realized the forgetfulness of being. On the other hand, on a shared scale, such lack of personal fulfilment has produced alienation from nature and anthropomorphic (anthropocentric) arrogance in the relationship between people, nations and cultural civilization. These distortions of the human behaviour is ultimately destructive to both the individual, society, and the environment.[2] The eventual diagnostic analogy is that humanity is suffering from a collective forgetfulness, in that we have forgotten our former closeness with the Earth.

The course of human history and evolution has shown that man has always been in the state of crisis. The Crisis of man unveils his existence and consciousness of his being and nature of the society which he makes a whole (part). The current nature of the crisis of humanity in the global society is link to the material and spiritual dimension (i.e. visible and invisible which constitutes the social character, as well ecological) and also the forgetfulness of the self and Divine divided into choices. The declines of humanity lead to the decline of metaphysics as nihilism. The drama and decline of humanity and of human existence is not only that existence is divided into choices between desires but that existence is also suspended between the Law that is given me and my nature, which is incapable of submitting to the Law without restriction. Secularism blocks freedom which defines the human being. Politics in form of laicity unveils obedience which defines him[3]to a degraded state mainly paradoxically in the context of globalization. The panoramic historical

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[1]A. Einstein, *Relativity the Special and General Theory.* Trans. Robert W. Lawson. University of Sheffield, Henry Holt and Company. 1920, pp. 127-130.

[2]A. J. Vetlesen, *Evil and human agency: Understanding collective evildoing.* Cambridge University Press. 2005, p. 91.

[3]E. Levinas, "And God Created Woman," in *Nine Talmudic Readings*, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 166.

view of the progress of humanity shows that man has been degraded in the course of society evolution, in the name of reason viewed and defined as determining instrument of domination of the world and the Other. Such degraded tendency of the crisis we are experiencing is multidimensional and yet refers us back to the "Origin," the very roots of our civilization, the discovery of the divine self and human as well the source of identity and meaning.[4] Our global society is made of historical domination of human by human which has extended outward from society into the natural world of reason.

On the other hand, reason has become an instrument of domination use to liquidate the power of Negativity. Reason finds itself with reality: what is real is rational, while what is sensible is not yet an actuality. In its realization, the pretention of rationality extended its dominion over the external world and liquidated what it could not dominate, among other things, the sensible in its negative dimensions. Today's technological society is only a survival of the metaphysics of the subject, which can be summed up in manipulation and domination. For this reason, the current crisis cannot be solved politically, because every problem in philosophy and in the knowledge in general has an ontological underpinning as the problem of dark energy in physics. It is, not only, because we experience the same worldviews in the other aspect of the social, spiritual and scientific lived in these contemporary times. The global historical rise of a technological world is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of techniques and which overpowers and controls its subjects by the inherited level of the material and intellectual culture. A choice which originates from dominant interest.

In view of this reality, the global technological world constitutes an outdated metaphysics of subjectivity. This unveils a weakness in an active subject confronting a manipulative world of objects. The world of object is replace purely by efficacy and instrumentality which are arrange means and ends of pre-established universe by hegemonic powers in principles of common action and thought of man.[5] One can interpret such thinking as a global, totalizing theory of a new type and order of society that eliminates individuality, opposition and dissent that transcends the capitalist society of contradictions. We live in a global society of domination and social control. Global society is a society where the creation and integration of data via information and knowledge is a significant process in all fields of human activities. It is a perceive destructive

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[4]M. Golfo *at el., Philosophy and Crisis: Responding to Challenges to Ways of Life in the Contemporary World*. United States of America, 2017, p. 14.

[5] H. Marcuse, "*Epilogue," Reason and Revolution*, 2d ed. (Humanities Press, 1954), p. 433ff.

tendencies most celebrated achievements which sees irrationality in its self-proclaimed rationality. Society's prosperity and growth are based on waste and destruction, its progress is fuelled by repression and exploitation, meanwhile its democracy and freedom are eventually based on the tendency of manipulation. This manipulative and dominating nature have undermined, the subject esteems and man is forever considered as an object.

Like in Marcuse *One dimensional Man*, such manipulative tendencies of domination in the global society have tremendously engendered a mode of thought and behaviour which undermines the very foundations of the traditional culture. The main distinctive of this new mode of thought and behaviour in the global society is the repression of all values, ideas and aspirations which cannot be defined in terms of the arrogances (i.e. attitudes) and operations validated by the prevailing forms of rationality in society. The most striking consequence is the weakening, the integration of all opposition in the established global system[6] and even the disappearance of all genuinely radical critique. To an extent, it describes what has become known in our global age as the "technological society," in which technology restructures labour and leisure, influencing human life from the organization of labour to modes of thought. This is a threat to human freedom and individuality in a totally administered society. The Hegelian and Marxian model of intellectual and dominant philosophical concept are the very foundation of technological rationality, analytical and positivism philosophy of modes of conformist thinking.

The domination of this character has tremendously suppressed the social life and values of man in society. For instance, the modern market societies that we call global capitalism and its alter ego, state socialism, have brought all the historic problems of domination. Man has lost his egalitarian core of being and of sharing society, his technological, powerful ideological and systemic forces are used by existing society to degrade the environment and the entire biosphere of which man is part.[7] Consequently, this has led to the destruction of the natural basis for complex life-forms, including humanity. Of course, humanity in this sense is essence of human being that is, man's peculiar nature which makes him distinct from other beings on earth. Humanity is united with universal beings to co-create peace, harmony, balance, justice, truth and prosperity on planet earth for the benefit of everyone. On this note, Jean Bertrand AMOUGOU stipulates that, the

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[6] H. Marcuse, *Prospectus for One-Dimensional Man*, Beacon Press archives, 1953. p. xii.
[7]Osuntokun cited by Philomena A. Ojomo, in "Environmental ethics: An African understanding:" *African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology*, Vol. 5(8), Lagos State University, 2011, p. 577. Available online at *http://www.academicjournals.org*.Consulted online 24/4/2020

concept of humanity indicates the being of man, that is, his essence or nature.[8] This is a foundational issue that arises as the point of departure in all decisive research. It is here that man's existential difficulty-in man and for man-appears, for it is a question of safeguarding one's humanity.[9] The philosophical research approaches, the challenges humanity face today that demands an understanding of the highly existential implications of the socio-economic, environmental and problem of identity as a reality of the new global space. This demands we comprehend the aforementioned in relation to our present life as well as our destiny.

The upshot of our analysis on the ontological problems in metaphysics is that, it is metaphysics which is concern with the analysis of those everyday life problems (crisis). Metaphysics therefore deals with the ontological problems of life and the fundamental nature of Being and world. It is the philosophical investigation of the ultimate nature of reality which is seen as a return to the root of things. It is benefits for the human mind to be acquainted with metaphysical principles. We have in the line of our development some problems of metaphysical philosophy[10] and those problems are frequent because, they defy any attempt of the mind to produce any final answer(s) to them. Perhaps, life is itself a huge problem which continues and will always throw puzzles. Being in metaphysics, we can say that, is one of the basic ways that philosophy employs in looking problems of existence with the aim of founding solutions. In order not to lose sight on our focus, we will say that, those problems of metaphysical philosophy are both group as the ontological problems and the anthropological problems. But we will lay emphasis on the anthropological problems in metaphysics, that is those which fundamentally dealt with "Being" (man) in crisis.

The anthropological point of view on man is that, man has inexhaustible attributes in the sense that man is capable of so many activities. The first philosopher (even anthropologist) to make the analysis of that power which endows man with inexhaustible attributes is Emmanuel Kant. He is popular in the investigation of man by posing the question" What is man" dealing with the problem of human being he asked: what must I be in order to be a man? He answered, "Man is first and foremost a metaphysical being." Man is a being of Transcendence. The question of man

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[8]J. Bertrand AMOUGOU, *Psychological and philosophical dimension of identity*, in George F. Mclean and Andrew Blasko, Globalization and Identity, cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series VII, seminar: culture and values, volume 25, Washington. 2010, p. 35.
[9] *Ibidem.*
[10] When we speak of the problems of metaphysical philosophy, we mean those recurrent issues in metaphysics which border on human existence our daily existence.

is etiological in nature and tries to justify the present state of his life. Also, what do the existentialist say about this problem of human being? The question on man will only illuminate holistically human existence without a reduction on his life lived experience of solipsism, the epiphenomenalism of totality and monism. The metaphysical reality is based on the personal nature of human existence and individualism.[11]What weakens human transcendence by rationality and scientific positivism is the aggressive evidence of hostility and intolerant secularism (religion) and inequality between persons and nations as observed in Nietzsche and in Heidegger on *Science and Technology*, since it replaces a religious view (God) of the aims of economic activity with one which absolutizes profit. God is replaced by profit as the end of human activity. Moreover, the social crisis that plagued humanity, arising in the West, has now become a global phenomenal with the rise of individualism and the focus on individual rights, as opposed to recognizing that human beings are social animals.

Furthermore, globalization and the capitalist transnational power have worsened social and environmental problems, including global climate change, with serious ecological and socio-economic implications. The global danger of the crisis of humanity interconnected to the environment are therefore, the consequences of massive migration and poverty, exclusion, social inequalities, unemployment, labour exploitation and degradation, the loss of drinkable water and pure air, the depletion of non-renewable resources, accumulation by dispossession, rent and resource extraction. The failure of the world governing global politics, economics, environmental norms, migration policies and democratic alternative to nation-state and the market society has led to the dehumanization of man in society. The crisis of humanity equally has links with modern techniques, which has led to the dehumanization of man and this technique are mark by ideas. In view of this, modern techniques are deeply rooted in the process of dehumanization which has destroyed the efficacy of culture and human ideology.

Broadly, a flash of the ripple waves of the 18th-20th century man is actually an emancipation of the 21st century man in crisis. The 20th century held on ethical criticism and the fall of humanity. It therefore did totaling different hypothetical movements like the Marxism, post-colonial studies, Freudianism and deconstruction which tended to discredit ethics as a general human enterprise for

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[11] E. Mario Derobertis, Metaphysics and Psychology: A Problem of the Personal. *in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* · January 2005. DOI: 10.1037/h0091261.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232594455.

societal development. Certainly, the 20th-century legacy of critical thinking, highly influenced by the historical developments of this era-the two great world wars, a technological revolution, a surge in capitalism, environmental denigration, the dynamic forces of globalization and mass immigration has brought a great measure of instability and uncertainty to the discourse of metaphysics and ethics. This uncertainty has been discussed extensively by postmodern thinkers who, since the last decades of the previous century, have pointed out different aspects of "crisis" in Western philosophy, in dissolution of the consequential forms of traditional art and politics as well as ethical thinking.[12]

Modern philosophy, begins not in wonder but in disappointment-either religious or political disappointment in the failed promises of a naïve modernity that promised secular redemption (after the death of God denounced by Nietzsche), the end of history (by Fukuyama, Comte, Hegel), or liberty, equality and fraternity. Nietzsche in his deep analysis, is against the choices and values of modernity. Could one not, especially in the early part of the twentieth century, say as well that philosophy's anguished birth is of the experience of trauma, and consequently, that the subjective imperative is one of (self-) recuperation? The global emancipation is consequence of the decline of Metaphysics. Besides these, Gianni Vattimo affirms that; the decline of Metaphysics, led to the decline of humanism. The critiques of humanism are link to the critique of Metaphysics, in the sense that humanity does not recourse to the transcendence due to the death of God (Nietzsche). The death of God is inseparable from the crisis of humanity, because with Metaphysics man was at the centre of truth, centre of history and the foundation of all things. Thus, in our view, there is benefit to be found in ethics that is in dialogue with a metaphysics having two fundamental, interrelated characteristics.

Despite the mentioned achievements "the global society is irrational as a whole. The destructive productivity of human free development and faculties, requires dependent repression of real growth in pacifying individual existence struggle at both the national and international level."[13] The plights of such result in supremacy, migration, exclusion and domination, confronting Anthropolitics with ecological realism at the present so-called War on Terror, seems to have reached an impasse, by incessantly engendering violence on man and the environment it claims to

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[12]See, J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis1984. http://www.jltonline.de/index.php/articles/article/view/734/1686.
[13]H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, Beacon Press, 1964, p. xl.

fight against, is even more pressing. This has affected the existential essence of humane in our globalized and complex world, were human dignity has no worth. All this aims to eradicate the individual's *psychological* status by destroying his or her personality and bodily capacity for free action and feelings of affiliation with a shared world. Furthermore, the crisis of humanity is also more of materiality, consumption, a close society that rejects the Other, a society that does not respects human dignity and has no sense and essence of the moral worth value of human life.

The political order in the face of the crisis humanity is unstable, hypothetical and precarious, thereby not equipped to recognize man's existential political conditions in society. This undermined the public sphere in the global society. The new global political situation is contingent upon transgressions such as the destruction of human life through mass murder, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The violations of human dignity across nation states in terms of citizens' membership do not *de facto* protect all human beings.[14] This is inherently, a failure of the global society and high risks of vulnerability and the crisis of conscience. Subsequently, violence appears to be one of the fundamental principles in the present crisis of humanity that reduces citizens to means rather than ends in their own right. Significantly, the global totally administered society, has mechanisms of control and suppression that have penetrated into the deepest layers of subjectivity. The subject is nothing but a reflection of the totality. Like the totality of which it is an image, the liquidated subject of the global society is allergic to the otherness of the Other and fearful of whatever resists its totality, as well, it can only perceive the Other as a potential threat to its self-preservation. However, the crisis of value has become the crisis of humanity which is also more of materiality, consumption; a close society that rejects the Other, a society that does not respects human dignity and has no sense and essence of the moral worth value of human life.[15]

Based upon the concrete devaluation of man and the human existential crisis and moral decadence that are, made manifest in the global society, man is reduced to a mere object. Man has become a means to an end. The oppression of man is one of the fruits of totalitarian politics experienced more in daily life than in theories.[16] Man now seems to be an abstract mass of particle of no value. Starting out from the axiom that only subjects can be involved in crisis; a number of

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[14]H. Arendt. *The origins of totalitarianism.* Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951, p. 298.

[15]R. J. Holton**,** The Idea of Crisis in Modern Society. *The British Journal of Sociology.*Vol. 38, No.4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 502-520 (19pages) DOI: 10.2307/590914.https://www.jstor.org/stable/590914.Consulted online 08/09/2020

[16]R. Coste, *Le devenir de L'homme, projet marxiste, projet chrétien*, Editions Ouvrières, 1979, p. 17.

reasons are presented for the universality of the crisis of humanity, hinging on a western loss of faith in European Enlightenment rationalism, Eastern and the African rationalism perspective. We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the Western, European, Asian and African contexts. Our Union is under threat.

By a crisis of humanity we mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilization and degeneration into a new "Dark Ages."[17] There is crisis when at least two conditions are met: firstly, the system must be concretely affected as a whole and, secondly, the fundamental principles of the actors must be put to the test point that the latter are obliged to either recognize the fallacy of their basic assumptions, or to develop important defense mechanisms against attacks that target these basic assumptions. However, echoes of crisis, in the sense of a crucial point in time or a state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending, were already present in Socrates' unceasing quest for a general definition of the moral virtues or even in his fundamental question "how should one live."[18] It constitutes a metaphysical crisis a state of inner confusion related to questions about the nature of reality-existence and the purpose of life.

The crisis of humanity in our global society remain central to our lives, especially in a time of conflict so intense that threatens thought. In order to gain insight into our global predicament, this crisis offers a moral psychology of the human subject, the social changes of modernization, including the rise of capitalism, totalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism, moral decadence, the decline of aristocratic, religious authority, the growth of technology, environmental denigration and the mastery of nature. It is no longer exclusively a problem for the Western society if it ever was, but now a global socio-political human phenomenal. Undeniably, Nyerere underpins that: the socio-political and economic problems of every society should not reject the history and culture of other far off societies.[19] To him, other cultures can broaden and perfect the world global order. Nyerere opines in Freedom and Unity:

> A nation which refuses to learn from foreign cultures is nothing but a nation of idiots and lunatics.
> Humanity cannot progress at all if we refused learning from each other. But to learn from each

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[17] Sing C. Chew, *The Recurring Dark Ages: Ecological Stress, Climate Changes, and System Transformation,* Alta Mira Press. (2007). https://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/Crisis%20of%20Humanity.pdf
[18] Plato, *Gorgias* 492d. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 500c; *Republic* 352d.
[19] J. K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-1965, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 95.

other does not mean we should abandon our own [for] the sort of learning from which we can benefit is the kind which can help us to perfect and broaden our own culture."[20]

What underlies this assertion is that: progress involves learning from other cultures, especially in our global context and that being open towards other cultures, does not mean rejection of one's own. In reality, Nyerere in *Ujamaa* drew some lessons from Western European culture, a prototype culture of liberalism, in the Kantian liberalism perspective. In fact, considering the human unbearable conditions of life in many regions of the world, the sanctification of non-violent praxis as the only viable response to abortion and violence might even seem rather too ideal. A crisis of values has become today a crisis of humanity who fails to recognize his personal dignity, identity, and for this reason, does not respect the dignity of others. The crisis of humanity has become such an all-pervasive rhetorical metaphor that its analytical utility for contemporary social thought has become devalued and confused.[21] These difficulties pose a grave challenge for the basis on which humanity had built and the challenges of the modern global society whereby, human reason is link basically to a machine.

Historically, at least in these most assertive philosophical versions, humanity "refers to any thought emphasizing the central role of man in cosmology and even ontology, and highlighting his capacity for emancipation and self-determination by an educational process. The historical culture of man can only be understood through its historical-philosophical mutations. Of course, from the 15th to 19th century, man becomes a project rather than an essence: *"the nature of man is inscribed in the process of becoming and the reference to the divine ideal fades away ... humanism now designates the theory of the formation of mankind ideal."*[22]This humanism will find a radical philosophical translation in *existentialism-a humanism of* Sartre.[23]Parallel to this humanism, carried essentially by Marxist philosophies and, having been built against all that is superhuman, is developing anti-humanism which would like to think of concrete man. It is about getting rid of the abstract concept of man that until now humanism has conveyed; to depart from that metaphysics of man which creates an ideal humanity by imposing inhuman restrictions on man.

Man is constantly under threat and judgment from this ideal man whom we never reach. Therefore, the humanistic theories tend to derive universal values from cultures, to form a

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[20]*Ibidem*, p. 187.
[21]R. J. Holton**,** *The Idea of Crisis in Modern Society*. *op. cit.,* pp 502-520.
[22]P. Rateau, « les quatre étapes de la théorie de l'humanisme", in M. Blay (dir), *Grand dictionnaire de la philosophie*, Larousse et Cnrs-Edition, 2013, p. 493.
[23]J. P. Sartre, *L'existentialisme est un humanisme*, Gallimard, 1996.

universally valid type of man. The humanistic theories, generally developed against all that is super-human; even spiritualist theories wishing to take into account the totality of man in his Ethico-axiological nature, historical, spiritual, social and economic reality without restriction, have always existed.[24]The second half of the 20th century will be a time of improvement in terms of the tragedies of the two world wars and the fast-growing or booming techno-scientific challenges. This is the case, in particular, of the ethical approach of the human with Emmanuel Levinas,[25] or of the political approach with a consideration not of the generic man but of the human plurality with Hannah Arendt,[26] or the ecological approach to respecting and preserving nature with Hans Jonas.[27] Primarily, man is able to destroy the earth himself in the name of his beliefs, ideologies and religions.[28]

With regard to Levinas' context of emergence and his concept of responsibility developed, the human and historical situation to which Levinas seeks to cope, is that of the aftermath of World War II.[29]The experience of and his conception of responsibility is seen against the backdrop of a characterizes era of *"fratricidal millennia struggles, imperialism, political bloody political and scorn exploitation of the human being, century of wars, the genocides of the Holocaust and terrorism; unemployment and continual desperate poverty of the third world; ruthless doctrines and cruelty of national social fascism."*[30]This era consisted of theoretical European reason, well anchored in the Hellenic reason, which did not prevented the mentioned catastrophes. Levinas' notion of responsibility in the aforementioned catastrophes exalt a different thought and logic than that of Aristotle and the enlighten so-called philosophers. It is in this perspective that, Levinas' philosophical stance offers a theoretical reconsideration of the empathetic complexities response. It is the rejection of the idea that others are "like me" and, consequently, the search for a politics beyond human exploitation and violence of the state and also beyond the violence of being.

The neoliberal imperialism and techno-science has given rise to new forms of alienation and dissolution of the human being. This has extremely produced the imperialism of races, which

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[24]Cf. J. *Maritain, Humanisme intégral*, Ferdinand Aubier, 1936.
[25]Cf. E. Levinas, *Humanism of the Other*, trans. NidraPoller, intro. Richard A. Cohen. University of Illinois Press, 2006.
[26]Cf. H. Arendt, *la condition de L'homme moderne*, Calmann-Levy, 1983.
[27] H. Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age.* Trans by David Herr. Chicago University Press, 1984, p. 4.
[28] R. Coste, *Le devenir de L'homme, projet marxiste, projet chrétien*, Editions Ouvrières, 1979, p. 25.
[29]E. Levinas, "Paradox of Morality," *The Provocation of Levinas,* 1989, p. 175.
[30]E. Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence,* trans. M. B. Smith, Colombia University Press, 1999, p. 132.

is far from having disappeared, changes and drinks from this new source. Thus, what seems to have exception of man is gradually becoming a universal question of humanity. The question of humanity is therefore resurfacing in new forms in the global society. Ultimately, it will be a question of leading a critical reflection for a humanity that will unfold beyond particularisms and fragmentation to propose a conception of man, capable of taking into account the challenges of globalization, of integrating powerful scientific research while realizing the permanence dynamic of human nature. It is about affirming and proposing the authentic values of humanity for the construction of the civilization of the universal. Therefore, in order to fully unfold the dialectics of crisis, we have to go through a wide range of themes which manifest their importance in the progress of humanity not only for philosophy's self-understanding, but also for the way in which we understand ourselves with regard to the challenges we face in our own ways of life in times of crisis.

From the above-mentioned crisis of humanity in the global society, we focused on an approach from the Levinasian notion of responsibility for the Other which is based on an asymmetrical relation, an outward response towards the exteriority of the Other.[31] On this note, Levinas ethics reflects the thematic systematization of understanding the world. It is invariably the philosophy of society and the wisdom of love and not the traditional definition of philosophy as the love of wisdom. Faced with this generalized crisis, the central question is to know whether Levinas' notion of responsibility, which posits the Other as an other, whose being I cannot appropriate as one does an object, can offer ways of solving the crisis humanity in the global society?. How really responsible is man? We can further interrogate on fundamental questions like: In the optics of the crisis of humanity, how can we response today to the challenges that man pose to the crisis of humanity or what are the causes which introduce human in the crisis of the global society? What are the possibilities which can define and glorifies human in an order state that is out of crisis? How possible is the religious and spiritual value to postulate a global society and to solve the problem of humanity if close to history? Is it necessary and justify to postulate our thought into humanity in the view of reality in event? Can the crisis of humanity be justified ontologically? Is the global state possible or Can we affirm the reality of the many and one in the

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[31]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans, Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 21.

plurality and diversity of the global society? Can we postulate the necessary of the human and society if want to solve the crisis of humanity?

This thesis uses the method of dialectic. Based on the method of dialectics chosen to approach the crisis of humanity we think that dialectical philosophy could promote critical thinking. For dialectical thinking involves the very ability to abstract one's perception and thought from existing forms in order to form more general concepts. This conception helps explain the difficulty of the crisis of humanity in the global society and the demands that it imposes upon the material and spiritual reality. We therefore abstract from the complexity and multiplicity of the crisis and existing society its fundamental tendencies and elements, as well as those categories which constitute forms of critical thinking. The dialectical thought thus posits the existence of humanity in another realm of ideas to make a distinction between existence and essence, fact and potentiality, as well as appearance and reality.

Consequently, we will take a historical journey of humanity. It will be a question of starting from the genesis of the concept of humanity until its seizure by modern rationalist philosophy in order to understand it and clarify it. This will help present modern prepositions of the values of true humanity. These difficulties pose a grave challenge for the basis on which humanity had built and the challenges of the modern global society whereby, human reason is link basically to a machine. The central problem of this thesis is viewed or understood in the vertical breakdown of trust (the relationship) between us (man) and the Creator. The crisis of humanity is fundamentally concerned with reasserting the restoration with the fracture relationship with God. A radical relationship that empowers us to live ethically from God. The entire human race is undergoing an ontological crisis. The culture world is a class struggle.

This thesis has three parts with twelve chapters. Part one turns onto the archaeology and understanding of the metaphysics of the crisis of humanity in the global society. It has four chapters. Chapter one turns between metaphysics and moral in the crisis of humanity: Being in crisis as an ontological foundation. It unveils metaphysics, moral Divine law and phenomenon of dehumanization reality and its role in the 21$^{st}$contemporary society. Chapter two constitutes an existential study of the crisis of the person which is a phenomenon of both personal and community decadence. It is a reading that plunges us into the heart of faceless societies characterized by

established disorder and the crisis of civilization[32] which absorb and fragment human beings in their process of realization or total accomplishment. This phenomenon of decadence constitutes depersonalization. It dissociates the human being from nature, from the community and from himself. This crisis of the human person, we are going to study it under two aspects: first, as a dislocation of the total volume of man, of his interior life; then, like a community dislocation (the question of the social bond).Chapter three is anchored on the critical look which is not the first-time humanity is facing a pandemic. Humanity has experienced a systemic series of health devastating pandemic crisis in its course of progress. Previous health crises have shown how an economic crash had dreadful consequences for public health. It further intricate on the identity crisis. Chapter four centre on the phenomenological sense and root of crisis in the global society. It further treats on conceptualizing the present human crisis, the crisis of global leadership domination, crisis of global leadership and the making of history, global crisis of neoliberalism in the 21st century, contextualizing and conceptualizing the structural perspective of leadership crisis in Africa. This shift in the understanding of crisis often led to the weakening of philosophical reflection on what is after all a state of crisis. This state of crisis unveils global decadence, loss of meaning, degeneration and metaphysically speaking nihilism.

Part two has four chapters on the dialectics and concept of the Other according to Levinas and what becomes of Levinas. It focuses on a global racial treatment of humanity and the Levinasian critique of western philosophy and responsibility for the Other. Western philosophy, according to Levinas has been the reduction of the other to the same through ontology. Chapter five focuses on slavery a holocaust not recognize as holocaust internationally. The western treatment of African slaves undermined their dignity as human. Such a horror reflected on the metaphysical tendency of dehumanization. Such a chaotic metaphysical experienced of the black race will later unfold in the progress of human history.

Chapter six is circumscribe within the ambit of phenomenological-existential-ontological foundation of Levinas' philosophical itinerary experience of war and holocaust as the germs of his thought. Heideggerian fundamental ontology. Husserl attempted to limit himself to a description of that which shows itself phenomenally to a perceiving ego, while Levinas insists on "discovering" a phenomenon that exceeds phenomenality thus *allows a trace lies beyond being*

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[32]By civilization, Mounier means, in the narrow sense, "the coherent progress of the biological and social adaptation of man to his body and to his environment" (Cf. E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme* (1936), Chicoutimi, Édition numérique, Collection Points Essais, p. 7).

*and outside of subjectivity*. Chapter seven treats the Levinasian critique of Western philosophy and an understanding of the Levinasian notion of responsibility as an outward movement towards the Other. It also, explores the subjectivity of the human subject that makes possible the responsibility it carries for the Other. The dynamics of Levinas is a moral response to evil in the world. The chapter ends with Sensibility as the basis for human subjectivity and the responsible subject. Chapter eight of this thesis is an evaluation and reflection of Levinas' ethical metaphysics in face to face relation and moral obligation (responsibility) as a form and substance of human inter-subjectivity and human ethical relation (inter-personal-relation).

Part three centre on implications of African values, critique of Levinasian ethics, global secularism and politics, Ubuntu ethics in face of the crisis of humanity in the global society. It has four chapters. Chapter nine focuses on the contributive dimension of African moral values beyond the Levinasian notion of responsibility for the other. It treats on Levinasian ethics as hard anthropocentric ethics. Levinasian individualistic ethics and anti-rule. The chapter ends with the discussion of the strength of Levinasian Ethics for the Other and how it valorizes the humanity of the Other person in the global society. The ethics of self-sacrifice for the Other. Ethics for the 'Other' is benevolence. Chapter ten studies secularism and religion in Cameroons politics. It takes on strata the global outlook of secularism and politics, the expression of secularism in the legal State of Cameroon, the legal principle of secularism in the State and the political foundations of religions in Cameroon. The chapter ends with Secular and religious relation in Cameroon political sphere**.**

Chapter eleven deals with the global personalist community and its foundation. It details out the need for global personalist revolution, the revolutionary requirement: the restoration of the person and the creation of a new city of people and Levinas and the Ethico-moral vision of global dialogue. Its further studies on the humanity and inhumanity of human rights in the global society. Finally, chapter twelve is a conclusive note on the Ethico-moral challenges and impossibility of global justice prospective contribution as foundation of philosophical ecumenism. It therefore turns on the problem of global justice in the twenty first century. The problem of cosmopolitan view in the crisis of humanity and global justice. The history of depoliticization in the global society. The problem of justice and the ethical state in the political foundation of the global society. It studies also Ubuntu ethics prospective contribution in the metaphysical-Ethico-moral resolution of the global crisis of humanity and the chapter ends with an appraisal of metaphysics and religion as foundation for philosophical ecumenism in resolution to the crisis of humanity.

**PART ONE: THE ARCHAEOLOGY AND UNDERSTANDING OF METAPHYSICS OF THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY**

**INTRODUCTION**

Part one is an archaeological and metaphysical in-depth knowledge of the crisis of humanity in the global society. It turns to the ontological-existential crisis of being, moral influence of the crisis of humanity and the divine supreme law in the 21st contemporary society. The core influence lies in the metaphysics of historical knowledge which probes into the metaphysical problems of our time and the necessary accessible solutions by the different philosophers in the world. The ancient philosophers defined metaphysics as the science of reality and of being as being. The stratum of such reality unveils the existence of humanity in crisis in the global society. It therefore, pursues a comprehensive so essentially and simple to everything, being divine (i.e. applied to special ontology-metaphysics), to anything and human as well.[33]The metaphysical realities are consequences of a metaphysics of dehumanization and a politics of desacralization. The metaphysics of dehumanization has a historical character in so far as the metaphysical reflection unfolds historically in human history. Being the foundational discipline in philosophy, metaphysics is related to other branches of philosophy, especially epistemology, cosmology, philosophical anthropology, natural theology; for, the nature of ultimate reality determines material objects, man and God.[34] It is also related to ethics in so far as morality is determined by the nature of man, which in turn is dependent on the interpretation of ultimate reality. In this sense, Aristotle's notion of ultimate reality in relation to man and the cosmos is the most fundamental or highest level of generality. Aristotle therefore, distinguished between things that are "better known to us" and things that are "better known in themselves.[35] This unveils the principles of 'first philosophy seen as the world of ordinary experience. Reality is therefore, the ultimate subject

This reality also claims, implicitly, that to reflect on these narratives pushes inexorably towards a particular vision of what the constants must be in human reflection and negotiation; that is the difficulties pose and generated in fundamental ontological and political discourse.[36]At this preliminary stage, there *is* a sense in which, classically, metaphysical reflection arises from the

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[33] A. Anderson, *Metaphysics: Multiple Meaning, 2004 in* http//website.com /alan/ metamul. Htlm.

[34] F. A.Thilly, *History of Philosophy*. Allahabad: 1965; revised edition, 2007, p. 15.

[35] D. Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence*, Clarendon Press. 2002, p. 45.

[36]R. D. Williams, 'Trinity and Ontology,' in Kenneth Surin (ed.) Christ, Ethics and Tragedy. Essays in Honour of Donald MacKinnon (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 71-92.

impulse to look for a ground in the discussion of justice and injustice in political affairs. Here, Plato's *Republic,* after all, begins. Since traditional philosophy was 'forgetful of being,' Heidegger proposes to ask the question of being anew. As such, the fundamental in tradition of western philosophy is the reductionist approach that defines the human in principle of dehumanization.

It is our contention, that studying the metaphysics of dehumanization and the crisis of humanity-that is, the ontological assumptions that are held by the 21st contemporary global society has occurred and-we can gain a better understanding of the structure of dehumanization, paving the way for the possibility of dismantling the foundations of dehumanization thinking and reasoning rather than treating the effects and symptoms of those metaphysics as conventional. We aim to make apparent the structure of human oppression through a study of dehumanization and present an alternative set of metaphysical principles upon which an effective dehumanization was and is presently built. This is a risky topic because it will not just clarify how human oppression, facial society of disorder, Ethico-moral problem in the global health and crisis of identity, onto-phenomenological approach to the Ethico-moral roots of the crisis of humanity in the global society work, but reveal dehumanization that exists in the very notion of the concepts "human," systems of belief, all institutions, and doctrines that depend on those concepts. The most brutal misconducts (crimes) against humanity is the expression of a metaphysics of dehumanization.

Conversely, it is an effective tool of extermination because it turns on a shared set of metaphysical principles within Western philosophy. Failure in advocating human rights is often the primary political and ideological response to dehumanization. In particular, it actually reproduces the very logics that make human oppression thinking possible. This part lays out dominant paradigm for generating massacre. Showing failed expanding rights will also be insufficient for addressing the metaphysical problem and consequences of the exclusion of humans. In dehumanization, the logic of the us/them dichotomy and the metaphysics of essences are mapped onto the concepts of and boundaries. Approaching the crisis of humanity as a metaphysical problem leads to new problems with the notion of intent. Such emerge from the minds of crazy or evil individuals who coerce, brainwash, blackmail, and force others to participate in underlying metaphysics of human oppression thought and practice principle grounded on particular cultural values of the perpetrator group. Perhaps the most important question in relating to metaphysics of dehumanization is that of the status of evil. This question boils down to how evil relates to the source of all reality in society.

## CHAPTER ONE: BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND MORAL IN THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY: BEING IN CRISIS AS AN ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

**Partial Introduction**

Right from Plato to Heidegger, the *statuo qua* of Being in western philosophy undermined the metaphysical reality of Being in its essence and concreteness. The views of such revolves in the totality of the Same. Such totality floats in knowledge seeking. Since this was actually the basis to inquire of what kind are the principles and causes, we must search for the knowledge of which is wisdom. All men by nature desire to know.[37] Knowing is essentially the nature of wisdom. It is this high pursue of human wisdom and not divine in a cruel world that led to the ontological reduction of Being. The ontological reduction of Being as an object of comprehension posed enormous challenges to man as a social animal. In the same line, the abstraction of Being becomes central to Kant philosophy. He therefore stipulates a new approach to the moral imperative as a foundational basis on which every principle should be base. The metaphysical and moral dimensions unfold in the particularity of Being as an ontological foundation in the crisis of humanity in our times. The machination by rationalist philosophers led to a reductionist value as man became an abstract, tainted and ghost entity in society. In fact, the exaltation of human reason are the consequences of the negation of the supreme moral Divine law. The end and goal of life lie beyond consciousness. This aspect, becomes the core of the historical situation of Being in crisis.

## 1.1 THE HISTORICAL SITUATION OF BEING IN CRISIS

The great conflict in the Middle Ages, for example, over singulars and universals shows the very need to explore what exactly is meant by Being.[38] The question of Being might best be articulated in terms that are not based on traditional concepts that have yielded few results. The question towards the sense of Being in the global society is today forgotten. Heidegger believed this to be the cause of this crisis of forgetfulness? The forgetfulness of being emerges from the general context of the motivations that underlie Heideggerian thought: to deconstruct ontological subjectivism for an authentic appropriation of the fundamental ontology. This requires a more decisive method of analysis, insofar as what moves the fundamental ontology is the question of

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[37] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Trans by Ross, William David, (2 vols), Oxford 1924. (Book I & II, Index).
[38] R. P. Buckley, Heidegger's Account of the Crisis. In: Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility. Phaenomenologica, vol 125. Springer, Dordrecht. (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2470-6_8. (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-2470-6_8).

being. The latter, being the question of all questions, goes beyond the sphere of the thinking subject to be understood in its original sense. In other words, what the understanding of being requires, from the perspective of fundamental ontology, goes beyond the thinking subject, even if paradoxically it is to him that we must address ourselves to understand the meaning of being. The forgetfulness of being has to do with the nature of the question of being. This self-evident universality of Being is then taken to mean that there is little to question about Being in the word. Heidegger, affirmed is this praiseworthy that the tradition of philosophy has expended such energy in discussing the universal nature of Being, and this is a revelation of the problematic nature of Being's universality.

Heidegger's assessment of the genesis of the crisis of being in history is a long one, intimately connected with philosophy, and that this connection seems to arise from the beginning of thought itself. An understanding of the crisis has already been uncovered by Husserl crisis of consciousness. It is fundamentally the view that the crisis is somehow the simple case of a malfunctioning that must be fixed, a lack of efficiency which must be overcome, a poor operation that must be improved.[39] This common understanding sees the crisis solely in terms of a pressing problem which requires an immediate answer. The crisis of the historical situation of being consists not so much in a lack of "knowledge" about Being, but in overlooking the mystery of Being itself. The tenet of the crisis is most evident in the forgetting that Being is questionable. The Western view of Being centers on the Heideggerian conception of human intentionality and unity to the very foundation of Being crisis. Heidegger's belief that the ancient Greeks had a pre-theoretical understanding of Being as the center of meaning, mysterious source that fundamental (i.e., ontological) Truth is the manifestation of Being in the finite, and man is the locus of the antisocial (disruptive) revelation of pure intentionality of Being to the essential discovery and meaning of life.[40] This implies Heidegger went further to finds the basic condition for the ontological concerns of Heraclitus and Parmenides and also for the whole tragic vision of the Greek writers. Heidegger esteems the pre-theoretical intuition of man's ontological status as essentially true and as the source of the all philosophical tradition that begins with Plato and Aristotle. In a broader perspective, Heidegger saw western tradition as a "devolution" in the sense that it is ontologically eccentric, in the sense that philosophical tradition struggle to uncover the obscures ontological foundation of

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[39] *Ibid*

[40] https://open.bu.edu/handle/2144/34725

certain structures of meaning and human existence being at the same time progressively of its own activity. Heidegger claims that the philosophical tradition extending from Plato to Nietzsche represents an ever more radical descent into ontological error in the being's existence.

In spite the ontological error, the historical situation of being will unveil it pure form, the self-thinking thought of Aristotle's metaphysics which is decisively interpreted as a supra-temporal entity and identified with an absolute rational Subject, the unlimited personal Creator of Hebrew Christian mythology.[41] In modern thought, Heidegger thus claims that, this complex of quasi-fundamental notions being enters into a period of crisis through the critical work of Rene Descartes. In a strict of sense of rejecting authority as a source of philosophical certainty, Descartes further tries to establish the indubitable ground of all representative thinking as the subject engaged in that thinking, thus in effect rendering the cogito the judge and certifier of the being of all objects of thought and life that excludes alterity. In this situation, we do not live our life but life, we can even say our life, but not in the sense of responsibility for the Other, but in the sense that all life is equal to the same, equal to a totality that excludes any idea of the alterity of the Other. This situation is well explained by Levinas himself by the term There is-the situation where one is there, one is embarked, a state where one is embarked, where one is in a state of insomnia. This way of seeing being is the reduction, the annihilation of the Other. The situation where the being, to borrow a Heideggerian terminology, is thrown, that is to say a being doomed to death; a situation where there is no place for an individual and personal existence. The "I" or the "you" in this situation only makes sense when referring to an other (man). Faced with this situation, Levinas calls for an immediate exit from an unbearable and overwhelming state. That is, a nauseating state that proceeds from vomiting and from which vomiting can liberate.[42] A state where there is nothing else to do but exit.[43] To do this, we must first understand how and why politics in the broad sense is not only a necessity that finds its foundation in the ethical relationship, but above all a danger incessant for this same relationship bringing the outset nature of Being.

### 1.1.1 The Onto-existential crisis of Being

At this point of view, philosophy in our world is urgent; mainly in our society under the value crisis. The main parts of origin of this crisis come from ignorance. Being in metaphysics is

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[41]*Ibid*
[42]E. Levinas, *De l'évasion,* Fata Morgan, 1982, p. 89.
[43]*Ibidem*, p. 90.

one of the basic ways that philosophy employs in looking problems of existence with the aim of founding solutions. We must therefore, first of all postulate the existence of crisis, before looking into the nature of being in crisis (anthropological metaphysics). The onto-existential crisis of being is incorporate in existence and essence in an Ontological sense that is linked with that of a human being. On the one hand, existence is the principle element of being. And this is what expresses the metaphysical truth that everything is, that no reality is not. On the other hand, Essence is what makes things to be what it is "*id quo res est quod est*". Everything is, since everything has a nature that specifies it as this or that thing. By existence, existentialists mean human existence. Only man has the ability to exist because he can reason alone. Existence manifests a very distinctive content when it is assessed as the object of judgment, and not of conceptualization. But or of course, this is a content that is studied with difficulties as well as with challenge. First of all, how can it be characterized in any way?

The being that exist is man. Meaning that, "Man is that being whose Being is distinguished by open-standing in the un-concealedness of being in Being."[44]Only man can describe his one activity and that of other things in the universe in relation to man in crisis. It is essential to know that Emmanuel Kant want has put an end to the traditional Metaphysics which was identifying itself with the Ontology of Being as substance. Kant then came with his *Critic of pure Reason*; by conveying a fundamental question to metaphysics "What is man?" in regards to the problem of human being: arises the question of the order of man and what to be? We can then talk of Metaphysics on the human reality. Kant answered, "Man is first and foremost a metaphysical being". Man is a being of Transcendence. Thus, transcendence is the act of forming connectedness between beings in order to render them accessible. Perhaps, it is that which enable man to project from one state of things to another.

"Man is the being that is there in the world", he is "being there", "dasein".[45] As far as Heidegger is concerned, it is impossible to investigate Being without using the question of man. Only man, among other beings is the only who is capable of understanding the relationship between Being and Human beings. As man alone who raises the question about being and understands what it means to be. And such contribution makes a lot to the perspective of being according to Heidegger. The metaphysics of human reality being at the base of Metaphysics is

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[44] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie -E. Robinson (trs.), Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. 438.
[45] *Ibidem*

therefore this fundamental Ontology which is at the base of this Metaphysics of the human reality. Being is then a fundamental and propounded base of all things even metaphysics. By focalizing on the ontological and metaphysical reality, therefore postulates Being as the grounds of metaphysics and man as the source. The point is that the Onto-existential (ontology) as metaphysic deal with the ground, the soil or foundation in which reality is rooted.

In the historical chronicle of human evolution and the great recession of the 1930s crisis of humanity, Hannah Arendt writes, all human beings have the right to a humane politics.[46] The fundamentals of such politics should be based on existential conditions, such as natality, plurality, and freedom. This aspect of the existential condition makes Arendt a great controversial and political existentialism in the 20th century.[47] The idea of crisis is the first component in Sluga's reconstruction of the historical *a priori* of 1933. Towards the end of 1930s and the beginning of 1940s, Nietzsche, submitted criticism on the tradition of western metaphysics, described by him as nihilistic, and made allusions to the irrationality of war of his contemporaries. The illogicality swept above human beings and metaphysics simply cannot be negated though it might be demonstrated as nihilism. The Heideggerian nihilism refers to the forgetfulness of being. The most essential question of the forgetfulness of Being in metaphysics is the nihilistic tendency. At the outset of Heidegger quest for the meaning of Being, he laid a charge on western metaphysics that it has always concerned itself with particular beings and not with Being as such. Western metaphysics, according to him, was Ontical not ontological. In dealing concretely with particular beings, he affirms traditional metaphysics was Ontical. Thus, Heidegger introduced a new approach to the study of Being which he called ontology, which is concerned with Being as such and not with particular beings.

According to Heidegger, Western humankind in all its relations with beings is sustained by metaphysics (which gives primacy to essence over existence as opposed to existence precedes essence[48] by Jean-Paul Sartre that is man's existence is confined to his essence as man and not otherwise). The modern German sense of crisis originated with the loss of World War I and increased with the instability of the Weimar Republic. Spengler's *Decline of the West* crystallized the sense of crisis and provides Germans of all cultural levels with the language of crisis. The

[46] H. Arendt, *Men in dark times.* Brace and World. 1968, p. ix.
[47] S. Benhabib, *The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt.* Thousand Oaks: Sage. 2003, p. xxiii
[48] J. P. Sartre*, Existentialism is humanism*, Nagel, 1970, p. 17.

metaphysical and existential realities since the two Great War Worlds are panoramic to the decline of the individual and the humanity of the Other. The problematic of crisis in Hans Sluga perspective creates an environmental prominence on action and decision in society.[49] This idea of crisis is destructive to modern thought and historical changes is not part of the essential break of the present and the past. In the meanders, when historical crises do occur, they are not sudden transformations that are brought about by heroic acts of will. More often they are the results of the accumulation of incremental and almost imperceptible actions and decisions.

The complex and globalized world of metaphysics of the crisis of humanity is deeply enshrined in the humane politics that contribute to an analysis of totalitarian ideologies, the depoliticization of democracy, and the dehumanization of human dignity. Far concern with these ideologies, unveils the generic misrepresentation of the existence of Being outside its material and spiritual dimension of Western philosophy. Historically on this note, Being must first be all-inclusive in the Parmenides' view. Parmenides is the first to whom we attribute the merit of having first seen with clarity that being is first both on the objective side of reality and on that of thought.

In his view, 'what cannot be thought cannot be real.'[50] The underlying principle of the aforementioned statement is that it is only when an idea is initiated that we can insinuate about the actuality of the idea in question (man is a spiritual being in that there are differentiation as regards the ideas initiated by men). But Parmenides is attached to a tradition of physical philosophers, also this immobile and indivisible being that he had conceived merged with the totality of the world perceived by the senses. The ontology of Parmenides is at the level of the corporeal being a lower point of view and to give back to being its multiplicity and its becoming. For Parmenides, being is given to us by revelation. Being is what intelligence grasps first as its most well-known object and in what it resolves all its meanings. This term is the object of the generating intuition of metaphysical thought. Saint Thomas affirms the universality and the primacy of the notion of being. For him everything that is conceived can be reduced to the notion of being.

Objectively, therefore, everything is being and this observation is primary as relating to the object which of itself is better to be known. Being is given to us in a real way and in thought or immaterial only to which the spirit rises by this effort of absolute separation from matter which characterizes metaphysical abstraction what Heidegger termed Dasein. At this proliferation,

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[49] H. Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany,* (Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 246.
[50] G. P. Kneller, *Introduction to philosophy of Education* (2nd editions). John Wile and Sons Incorporation 1971, p. 9.

Heidegger's concern was the problem of Being, meaning of Being and not Man. Being is the most universal concept. Rather, it is the darkest of all. Heidegger's elusiveness of being is a call of such question in the face."[51] Underscoring the meaning of Being, he lecture on 'the law of sufficient reason' concluded with the exhortation: "Does not the essence of man, does not his belonging to Being, does not the essence of Being itself remain ever yet and ever more overwhelmingly what befits thought?"[52] To him, the most topical issue on Being had been forgotten in history. Thus, he believed it was worthwhile restating this ancient problem:

> Avons-nous, à notre époque, une réponse à la question de savoir ce que nous entendons vraiment par le mot « être » ? Pas du tout. Il est donc approprié que nous soulevions à nouveau la question du sens de l'Être. Mais sommes-nous aujourd'hui même perplexes face à notre incapacité à comprendre l'expression « Être » ? Pas du tout. Donc, tout d'abord, nous devons réveiller une compréhension du sens de cette question.[53] Notre but dans le traité suivant est d'élaborer la question du sens de l'être et de le faire concrètement. Notre but provisoire est l'interprétation du temps comme horizon possible pour toute compréhension de l'Être.[54]

Human beings have been caught up in the web of their own ideas.[55] Particular beings and not Being itself in Heidegger's viewed has always been the core of Western Metaphysics. The reality at hand was the ontical and not ontological nature of western metaphysics. Ontological metaphysics studies Being *qua* Being rather than particular beings. Heidegger further interrogates on *essents* rather than why nothing? That is the question. Evidently, it is no longer an ordinary question. He was to an extent, preoccupied on 'Why there are *essents* than nothing?'[56] Heidegger was, therefore, concerned with what he considered the most essential philosophical question: what is it, to be? He was accordingly interested in the meaning of Being, its sense or its purpose, that is, what renders it intelligible.[57] Having established that Heidegger was concerned with Being; that which is common to all that exists and which is present in all particular beings, how does one approach the study of Being? Heidegger himself answers this question thus:

> … the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity–the inquirer–transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this is an entity's mode of *Being*; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about-namely, Being. *"Dasein"* is that entity of the term which we shall denote as well includes each of us and is himself the inquiring of one possibilities of its Being[58]

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[51] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit*., p 23.

[52] M. Grene, "Martin Heidegger," in P. EDWARDS (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vols. 3 & 4,* p. 459.

[53] M. Heidegger: A Guide to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger: https://thegreatthinkers.org/heidegger/

[54] M. Heidegger: On the Wisdom of Love, Man and Being: (2019). https://excellencereporter.com/2019/12/30/martin-heidegger-on-the-wisdom-of-love-man-and-being/

[55]B. Moore-K Brudder, *Philosophy: The Power of Ideas,* Mayfield Publishing Company, 1990, p. 540.

[56] M. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale University Press Inc., 1959, p. 1.

[57] W. Sahakian, *History of Philosophy*, Barnes & Noble Books Inc., 1968, p. 349.

[58] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op cit*., p 27.

*Dasein* is an entity which is concerned about Being. *Dasein's* mode of being is the very fact of asking the question of Being. Hence *Dasein* is a being in whose very being, Being itself is in question.[59] This explicates the Heideggerian crisis of Being. As for Dasein, it is a German concept which means being there. It is a being thrown into the world, abandoned for him-self in the world but remains a being in relation to the world. Heidegger's encounter things gives attention to different modes in which we exist. The constitutive structures of things analyses by Heidegger does not encountered a detached and theoretical attitude of consciousness, but in daily life is a special moods "utensils" (*Zuhandene*), most especially in its anxiety (*Angst*). Dasein therefore exhibits clearly the structures that are constitutive there of the particular kind of being which the human being is. This, to an extent, is not pure consciousness which are originally constituted beings. Heidegger's imminent perspective of Dasein in its being, indicates that the starting point of philosophy is not consciousness. This simply means that Heidegger's philosophy is not based on consciousness as that of Husserl. The theoretical and phenomenological attitude of Husserl's consciousness is the core of his doctrine and is the only possible mode of that which is more fundamental, namely, Dasein's being (it will further be expatiated in chapter 6). The definition that Western philosophy, starting with Aristotle, gives to being encloses it in a box in such a way that being ends up possessing a generic existence. An existence that reduces everything to the same; which contains being, better, in the sense of Levinas, which includes being.

It is this same philosophy that Levinas denounces and calls a philosophy of exploitation, because, in this situation, we are only there and a certain happy few can determine what can happen for everyone. We are there and there is nothing more to do or to add…"[60]This situation is what Heidegger explains in Dasein. For, Dasein must assume an existence that it did not choose, as having been "thrown into the world".[61] This analysis of Heidegger, which installs the dictatorship of the one, erases all the possibility of an individual or personal existence. However, this need to get out of the "*There is*" is neither the sign of flight from the human condition, nor the refusal to courageously assume one's human condition as Heidegger claims,[62] but a search for refuge, a redefinition of the essence of being (man).

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[59] J. Omoregbe, *Metaphysics Without Tears*, Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd., 1996, p. 198.
[60] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p 27.
[61] D. Huisman, Histoire des Philosophes, illustrée par les textes, Nathan, 2004, pp. 307-432.
[62] Cf. Maurice GEX, La Philosophie Contemporaine, Griffon, Neuchâtel 1964, p. 54.

Man (i.e. human being) is known as being compact and complex reality. Man onto himself is a problem. Man is unable to answer questions about him and he follows humans, but about other things in the universe. Posing unravel that essence that makes man a most complex being. For religion, man is a finished product whose creation had already fixed his essence. On this note, the existentialist Sartre agrees with the Heideggerian opinion that man is not a finish product. Fixated to finish only stereotyped projects of suppose divine creation of the universe. Therefore, for Sartre, man is a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not" and for him, emptiness or nothingness constitutes the essence of man. In this line, let us note that both Heideggerian and Sartrean conceptions of man, in contradicting the ancient notion of man for which man is a mere design of God whose interest alone man must serve. There, their view is anti-deterministic.

Throughout the history of traditional western philosophy, emphasis has been placed on essence over existence. But later on the existentialist philosophy (Sartre, Heidegger will rebuke this point of view; for them, a thing must first exists before it can possess an essence). Man must first exist before having an essence, and the essence of man is the foundation of civilization (that is, crisis). What is clear here is that man exist first, experience himself, springs up in the world, being a project which live subjectively and defines himself after words. If existence really precedes essence, man is responsible for what he is. This implies, a person's essence is his subjective state of existence. By existence, existentialists mean human existence. As such, man is distinct from other creatures with the faculty to reason.

In solving the problem of existence, it is obvious that, the individual becomes aware of himself as a subject who not only thinks but who is a person in active and conscious activity of the will and choice. In contrast to this, the anthropological point of view on man is that, man has inexhaustible attributes in the sense that man is capable of so many activities. Anthropologist and the first philosopher make the analysis of that power which endows man with inexhaustible attributes in Emmanuel Kant. Man is a being who by his very nature cannot abstain from action. Although man has not chosen to live, he is continually taking action and engaging in chosen policies.

In acting, man is faced with the problem of stating whether his actions are free or determined. This describes determinism which is a negation of the fact that man is free. "Determinism in itself is usually the thesis that all our mental states and acts, including choices

and decisions, and all our actions are effects necessitated by preceding causes."[63] Hence, the future is in fact fixed and unalterable in much the same way that the past is. This implies that for everything that ever happens there are conditions such that given them, nothing else could happen.[64]For the fact that man is a metaphysical being, he is often being fascinated by his creation and other things around him especially on the existence of spirit and God. Although determinists oppose that human action is not free, one agrees with the existentialist philosophers and with Heidegger that *Dasein* is a free being who makes free choices in his daily life. Man's freedom is accompanied by responsibility, for man is free to make of himself whatever he wants to be. Being itself has been forgotten, although in its sense, Being is continuously manifesting itself in things. Human beings have been caught up in the web of their own ideas.[65] To be authentic, therefore, is to stand out as an individual, to acknowledge responsibility for one's free actions.

Man therefore could go beyond the world of imagination in an attempt to acquire knowledge.[66] This has an important place in ascertaining whether man is responsible or not for his actions. Man can be responsible for his free actions but this cannot be the case with actions that are determined. There is also the problem of just acting in conformity with the majority of persons regardless of the rightness or wrongness of what they do. This makes man lose his unique individuality and authenticity. The Existentialist[67] sought to understand how man can achieve the richest and most fulfilling life in the modern world. The real base of thing is what we experience as far as human condition is concerned. Man, for the Existentialists, is a free being who acts freely and as such is responsible for his actions. Freedom helps man to live an authentic life. What is clear here, is that the freedom does not mean absolutism, otherwise, the people can be plunge or experience again "a state of nature" that is a state where everybody lives independently.

Husserl viewed this authentic life in line with phenomenology. Phenomenology proceeds from a critique of classical metaphysics, and its fundamental tendency is that of a return to the concrete ("to things themselves"). But phenomenology is also a philosophy that places essences back into existence. Its deployment promises the restitution to man of a humanity reformulated through universal knowledge. In fact, for Husserl the certain foundation rests on apodictic truth

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[63] R. Weatherford, "Freedom and Determinism," in T. Honderich (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, 2003, p. 313.
[64] R. Taylor, "Determinism," in P. EDWARDS (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vols. 1 & 2, p.* 359.
[65]B. Moore K. Brudder, *Philosophy: The Power of Ideas,* Mayfield Publishing Company, 1990, p. 540.
[66]M. P. Eboh, *Introduction to philosophy and Philosophizing*. Snaap Press Ltd, 1998, p. 20.
[67] Philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries who made the concrete individual central to their thought.

(of a necessary evidence). It is in the cogito that Husserl finds the absolute foundation of his philosophy following Descartes. But he radicalizes the Cartesian cogito by making it no longer a first axiom, but the very foundation of all axioms. This cogito is the transcendental Self, that is, the pure Self that is revealed by phenomenological reduction. Why is the cogito absolute? This is the principle to which all experience returns and which is the basis of all experience. It is not itself founded. It is universal, that is, shared by all humans at all times. Unlike Descartes, Husserl's pure Self is pure intentionality. It is neither an obvious axiom, nor something capable of giving itself to itself as things are given to it.

The acceptance of the cogito as an absolute foundation has the consequence of placing the study of consciousness at the center of the concerns of phenomenology. Phenomenology is then an eidetic and transcendental science. True knowledge is the knowledge of essences, that is, of what remains invariant in the changes of perspective that the mind has on things. Indeed, every object holds its determinations according to the perspective of consciousness; the lived object will therefore be given in its entirety only by the total synthesis of points of view. Following the Cartesian tradition, he saw the foundation and absolute starting point of philosophy in the subject. The parenthetical procedure is essential to Husserl's "phenomenological reduction" -the methodological procedure by which we are led from the "natural attitude", in which we are involved in the world and its affairs, to "the phenomenological attitude," in which the analysis and detached description of the content of consciousness is possible. This mode of phenomenological reduction free one's self from prejudices in return to things themselves as independently of any presuppositions. The object of Husserl phenomenology correlates and constitutes a descriptive and detached analysis of consciousness.

According to Heidegger, the way to access what will become ontology is phenomenology. The being must be grasped by means of the phenomenological method. However, the being is always the being of a being, and therefore it becomes accessible only indirectly through an existing entity. Here, it is important to state clearly the fact that the central question which Heidegger set out to investigate was the problem of Being and not man as such. He was concerned with developing the meaning of Being. Being the most universal concept does not presuppose all understanding. Rather, it is the darkest of all. But, Being does not hinder the search for the meaning of Being.

On the contrary, it upholds that, the indefinability of being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; this requires us to face this issue."[68] Metaphysics inquire about the being of beings. But in such a way that the question of being is disregarded and being it-self is obliterated. Heidegger's context and the history of being is understood as the history of metaphysics, also known as the history of being's forgetfulness. In broader perspective, metaphysics for Heidegger, is any discipline which explicitly provides or not an answer to the question of the being of beings and of their ground. The medieval epoch, it was scholastic philosophy at the heart of such a discipline, which defined beings as created things (*entia creatum)* and provided them essentially with their ground in the perfect being (*ens perfectissimum)* God. In our modern technology age, the discipline is through human being that establishes himself in the world working on the various modes of making and shaping. Technology controls and forms the human position in global society of today. It has as objective to masters and dominates beings in several ways.

### 1.1.2   The semantics of the crisis of being

The semantics of being in crisis is a holistic approach to understanding the configuration of ideas and values through which society understands it-self. Society represents Being and its capacity for integration (synchronic) and balance (diachronic). The crisis of being legitimacy, questions being the need for legitimation at all levels: metaphysical, political, and epistemological. This generalization finds its limit in the question of the ultimate justification of knowledge, the place where all the ideas and values that underlie the global social phenomenon are integrated. Western philosophy must therefore structure the memory of Europe, which is not a region as Husserl says, but "an Idea.[69] The Crisis of European Sciences shows her arrogance when she proclaims herself "civil servant of humanity." Thus the crisis is, for Paul Ricœur, all at once an organic crisis of the social body, an identity crisis in the ageless growth of societies and of the human race, a crisis of legitimacy linked to the phenomenon of domination, a "transcendental" crisis foundation, and crisis of the economy more than of the ideology of economic liberalism.[70] We are then tempted to move towards holistic methods, such as existential methods which encounter the notion of Being in crisis as a permanent structure of the *humana conditio*. The

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[68] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.,* p 23.
[69] See, E. Husserl. *La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale*, trad. Gérard Granel, Gallimard, 1976.
[70] P. Ricœur, « La crise, un phénomène spécifiquement moderne ? », *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* 120 (1988), p. 8.

aggressive conception of the committed man gives a large place to conflict, to rupture, to risk and, in this sense, to the notion of crisis.

The person is depicted in dramatic features, as torn between the vital forces which pull him towards a black ecstasy (inferior) and the spiritual forces which attract him towards a higher ecstasy (superior). The crisis is then "the in-between" and expresses "the courage to exist." Man must find a place in the Cosmos which is not a natural place by "a hierarchical operation, which itself does not go without a judgment of preference, a crisis, which cuts through the drive confusion. To perceive a situation as a crisis… is to no longer know what my place is in the Universe."[71]The crisis of Being is a specifically modern phenomenon. In fact, Ricœur admits here that, transitory or definitive, the crisis supposes a crossing which necessarily characterizes a human itinerary; the crux lies in the confrontation of the future with the past in the process of personalization. Through a historical approach, it shows that, the two transcendental are "the horizon of expectation" and the "space of experience," which the crisis occurs. For instance, in the age of the Enlightenment, we witness the novelty of times (modernity), the shortening of the time periods which separate us from adult humanity, the docility of history to "human doing", which provided a grip of consciousness so lively that it could serve as a revealer with regard to the categories under which this category can be thought of.

The crisis is the pathology of the "process" of the temporalization of history: it consists of a dysfunction of the normally tense relationship between "horizon of expectation" and "space of experience." The determinants of the crisis are: crisis of the individual, crisis of rationality, crisis of humanism (which has become the victim of the crisis, through internal decomposition).[72] To this, Ricœur responds with a kind of hope, in the form of an appeal to the Christian community that has become a minority in a secular world, by this double chance of renewal and reinterpretation that the crisis allows. Indeed, for him, it is necessary to work in a consensus between tradition, modernity and post-modernity; to work for the capacity to engage on forged convictions and to work in favour of the sacred, whether horizontal (political) or vertical (religious in the broad sense). Here is the characteristic of what Lafontaine calls ethical-Metaphysics

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[72] P. Ricœur cite M. Mauss, *Sociologie et Anthropologie*, PUF, 1985.

infraction: we do not dangle the fight against being in crisis, but rather against finitude itself in the sense of the machine man or the man without essence.[73]

The technical imagination will open up a new time, a time oriented by a recognizable goal in the development of what might be called the productive forces. The machine object will thus give the means to the intellectual elite to build a new device to deploy "the power of the rational" and to move the world of ideas (theoretical science) to that of matter.[74] The machine will then be an opportunity, no doubt unexpected by nascent capitalism, to amplify the effects of the new way of reading the world, which we nowadays call "techno-scientific world." The Cartesian machine animal seems a negation of man. This figure, at that moment, is not thought of simply as an artificial creature in the image of man, it also supposes the eviction of this man in favour of a machine: the power of motor fire will conquer the minds but also disturb them, because this bifurcation will amplify the exploitation of man by man.

The coexistence of poverty and progress will constitute, in the eyes of our contemporaries, the great enigma of our time: matter, the machine and death. Essay on the time of techniques, is surprised about the strange desire to evict the human world, the sensitive and carnal being, the interest passing to the machine, the clone or the drone, the expert system or to the industrial robot, all enveloped in the screen of cyber-culture. The ethical drama then reaches its climax because instead of saving the human body, it is the whole being that is reduced to the status of machine, a radical inversion of the intention of both Descartes and the Lights. It therefore, announces the sweep of the old elites and calls for opening the way to a new social creativity, inducing "another way of living." Under these conditions, it is preferable to speak of subjective possibilities rather than subjective probabilities. We consider that, in times of crisis, a rational individual is no longer able to produce a coherent set of preferences in relation to the options available. The successors of Keynes underline the weakness of demand in crises and advocate the intervention of the State, responsible for reviving aggregate consumer demand. The neo-classics opposed this and make the non-observance of "spontaneous mechanisms" the origin of the crisis. The emergence of the moral community of humanity in international law took the form of human rights. They are based on the

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[73]Ch. Herve, P. P. Molinari, M. A. Grimaud et E. Laforet (éd.), *L'Humain, l'Humanité et le progrès scientifique.* 2000.

[74]See, C. Lafontaine, *Le Corps régénéré : la lutte anti-âge et la quête d'immortalité*, Paris, Dalloz, 2009 ; du même auteur : *La Société post-mortelle. La mort, l'individu et le lien social à l'ère des technosciences*, Éd. du Seuil, 2008.

principle of dignity: inherent in human beings according to the capacity to think, for some, according to other capacities for others, but, in reality, only human beings are part of this moral community, the purpose of which is the common good of human beings. They found two priority expressions: crimes against humanity (the one who commits them is no longer worthy of being a member of this community) and the common heritage of humanity (allowing us to say that we are witnessing the progressive emergence of humanity as a subject of law). No authority is responsible for control; it remains very abstract. Admitting new members to the moral community that seemed to constitute the human species requires an effort of the imagination, this community being able to mutate and leave to the word "humanity" the meaning of kindness as an ideal of conduct, compassion for others who will have changed a great deal.

The classic definitions of the human no longer allow us to think of today's man, "this post-human." The post-Derridian deconstruction of representations was accompanied by the decomposition of beings and values. The biological reference is no longer the whole body, but the genetic materials.[75]The social, ethical, legal and economic questions facing the world arise in plural societies where very diverse spiritual, cultural and political paths come together. As a result, advances in science question the relevance of the concepts of human dignity and respect for human beings. The second believes in the usefulness and the possibility of having a universal and social approach in the name of the need for a global approach to the ethical questions raised by scientific progress (Hans Jonas). The concept of common good resurfaces with this question: can we re-examine its foundations and possible applications at the present time in order, in a way, to re-find it.[76] The crisis thus gives us food for thought on our being and our future, it orients us by telling us that the future of techno-scientific issues must be considered; this is the current place of bioethics. To do this, we ultimately return to the openness of the mind to diversity, advocated by Paul Ricœur, to better think about our daily lives. How to integrate it into a universal implementation taking into account the experience of other civilizations?

### 1.1.3 Moral influence of the crisis of humanity and the divine supreme law

The present global age in which we are living is an age of both declining morals and values in every sphere of the global society. This actually does not remain confined within the boundaries

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[75]See, Ch. Herve, B. M. Knoppers et P. Molonari (éd.), *Génétisation et responsabilités*, Dalloz, 2008.
[76]See, le hors-série de la RETM 2006 : COLLECTIF, *Bien commun et systèmes de santé* (colloque de l'ATEM, Québec 2005), Éd. du Cerf, p. 164. https://doi.org/10.3917/retm.276.0011.

of a particular country but it has become a global concern. The new trend of progress in the global society are now the very consequences of an eroding declined moral values in our civilization. This decline has taken a dangerous turn and in consequence it is very difficult for the peace-loving people in society to bear the miserable aspects of human life. The climax of such moral value decline is intrinsically link to moral degradation amongst people in society due to loss of ethical values, irrespective to life in society as a whole. This requires a change of mind set and above all a holistic stance that may invigorate humans to eliminate the evil and inculcate proper values and morals for national standard and eminence. Man, in the global society has become so careless about his environment that he does not think of the pains, sufferings and sorrows of his fellow-men. The crisis of humanity thus leads to morals and values that has rendered man to animals in nature. To some extent, it is clear that people animal nature dominates more that the human nature. It is, in line with the above that necessitate an argument in the holy Bible and Holy Quran that God (Allah) said, "They are aware of the external aspects of the world but they have no knowledge of the other world." Without morals and values there can be no character human formation.

There is a common idea that we are living a moral crisis (an ethical crisis), that is a crisis of values in the global society. One of the principal reasons for the uncertainty about the 'crisis of humanity in the global society is possibly in the confusion that many people do between ethics and morality and in its relation with values in general.[77] The imposition of morality on us comes from the social environment, a space in which humans live in relations to external norms.[78]There are different moral norms that is religious or professional. On a more critical turn, ethics is understood as a second-round discourse about moral problems humanity is facing. That is, ethics is fundamentally a critical reflection on morality. Morality becomes the law as principle of the Divine supreme law. At this juncture morality sets in. Morality is thus considered as the first and foremost asset of a human being in society. A man having this quality do good to himself, his family, society, the country he was born and living in and the world as well. Aristotle believed that, while any state must prepare its citizens for useful pursuits (that is, being the economic and the military), these are secondary…."It is true …he said: that they must be able to do necessary or useful acts; but they must be even more able to do good acts."[79]This state of moral degradation of the society should

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[77] https://www.scielo.br/j/sdeb/a/vLr7McrVNSBfzTDHC878Vnb/?lang=en&format=pdf
[78] *Ibid*
[79] Barker. *The politics of Aristotle*. Oxford University Press. sec. 1333b, (2012), p. 373.

not be allowed to destroy our global age of old values and traditions that our ancestors worked hard to teach us.

The current morality of reasoning unpersuasive as modern natural law of morality does not rest on the teleology of individual ends. The dominant theories remove God's supervision showing more tendencies towards utilitarian outlook. This moral crisis is entwined with a specific right and left political party, to democracy as a whole, to the blame game of human nature and narcissism which is progressively establishing itself as a characteristic of Post-Modernity. In such a discourse, there is the tendency to unveil the material and spiritual dimension of the crisis (social and economic crisis) which parameters of functioning of the economy is significantly affected; political crisis, when the political stability of the global society is significantly altered. But more fundamentally, we can, thus refer to the moral crisis (ethical crisis) and even crisis of values. In concrete reality, the crisis of humanity is inherent to free choices operated by man in his existence. This simply means nothing is static, but, rather, in permanent transformation. Even without the interference of man, the physical world changes and the only action of elements of nature are air, fire, physical particles and water.[80]In the same way, the social world is also in permanent transformation. Societies thus changes the ways humans relate to each other changes, how they group or organize, how they work, how they have fun. For sure, these changes are often related to the development of technique and knowledge, as a result of the prone human development itself.

The values of our global society have changed and change over time, and not just those of our global society. We can borrow from Luc Ferry, in his book '*Face à la crise,*'[81] which makes a brief analysis of the transformations in western societies since the industrial revolution, in order to demonstrate that the traditional values of western families have been completely deconstructed. Ferry perceives that there has been a real deconstruction of the traditional values related to the Old Regime, which culminated, at least until now, in this overvaluation of consumption, as the ultimate end of the economic process. The idea that the economy must provide the development of the common good has been subverted in favour of consumerism and individualism. In a period of major global social distress preceded by the so-called 1930 Revolution is known as Narcissism in dark times'[82] what Slavoj Zizek called the pessimistic (cynical) view of the world. In fact, we are

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[80]*Ibid*

[81]L. Ferry, *Face à la crise: Matériaux pour une politique de civilization*. Ed. Odile Jacob, Broché. 2009. p. 15.

[82]J. F. Costa, "Narcisismo em tempos sombrios". In: Fernandes, H. R. (Org.). Tempo do desejo. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1989. Disponível em:  Acesso em: 5 out. 2016.

identifying some of the bases that permeate our time and the crisis we are experiencing. It is not only a crisis that is simply economic, it is not a crisis of isolated values alone, but more critically it is a crisis of the neglect of Divine supreme law inherent in the development of the systematic transformations of capitalist that occur in societies in general.

The practical consequence of God's sovereignty is that the supreme divine laws are not subject to modification by human beings and are therefore permanently valid. The Divine supreme law, thus rightfully demands our unwavering obedience because it is the product of a wisdom that infinitely exceeds our own. The Divine supreme law commands are not a different type of normative thought, added to the normativity of the moral law. This means two different things can be thought of distinctly: the divine will another and the moral law remained one thing. Instead, the Kantian religious person is led from morality to religion and she comes to see that the moral law is the necessary principle of the will of a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, holy, and just.[83]

As such, reason cannot hope to penetrate the meaning of revelation. Human knowledge is in fact 'the thickest of all veils', and a man who becomes 'preoccupied with rational … concepts' is hindered from the path of God.[84] The proper course of action for man is to submit to God in the 'moral and social' realm just as we cannot help but do in the physical realm. The moral submission to God's moral rule requires without doubting questions on his classification of Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, the most Permissible and Prohibited.'[85] The epistemology of morality deals with how we can come to know what is morally right and wrong. God's sovereignty must be extensive and ongoing. The moral law issues from God's will, and God's will is free, the moral law must be contingent; but it seems that we do not want to say that the moral law is contingent in that way.[86] On this note, Kant affirms that morality leads the concept of the highest good to religion, which is the [*Erkenntis*] "recognition of all responsibilities as divine law commands." Moral law essentially should be regarded [*angesehen werden*] as the commands of the Supreme Being."[87]It looks more

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[83] E. Kant, Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion. Translated by Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press). 1996. (Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion 28:102: first emphasis added).

[84]Ahmed Ali Siddiqi, Moral Epistemology and the Revision of Divine Law in Islam. *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion*, Volume 10, Issue 1, February 2021, Pages 43-70, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwab006. 06 August 2021

[85] *Ibid*

[86] P. Geach, "The Moral Law and the Law of God," in *God and the Soul* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).

[87]E. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press). 1996 (1788). p. 5:129.

reasonable to consider ordinary instances of obedience as well starts with the attitude of obedience to command. Human life after all, are a familiar feature of such commands.

In order to grasp the feature of human life, we therefore, solicits Hegel view on morality which refers mainly to the "moral world-view."[88] The apex of the Hegelian position on morality, as defined by the moral world-view, seems that it is inadequate and must be redirected into the societal norms of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit)*. Accordingly, Hegel's moral certainty and completeness is that, the subjective will must complete the dialectic of final synthesis of ethical life. Within this context of synthesis, the moral agent becomes subject as absolute (i.e. in society) and the particular (i.e. the individual) becomes united in ethical life. The intrinsic value of morality is found in religion which has as objective outside of the human being a mighty moral lawgiver as the ultimate end (that is, of the creation of the world) is what can and at the same time ought to be the ultimate human end.[89]If being human morally necessitates respect, then on the moral con-currentist view the goodness of God and the humanity of a substance cooperate in necessitating respect for humans. But the goodness of God is as necessary if humanity is a particularization of God's perfectly complete, general goodness, then humanity morally necessitates respect, and it does so necessarily, whether the global world is as ordinary or extraordinary.[90]

## 1.2 THE CRISIS OF THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM

The crisis of humanity has a socio-philosophical reflection on the metaphysical foundations of human existence, deeply rooted in society, the self-analysis of oneself and consciousness thus acts as a global problem which is a direct reaction to crisis phenomena in the global society. The new global system of ideas is unable to simulate real solution of the metaphysical problems of existence and its numerous manifestations of the crisis. The more practical and conclusive importance in this issue of crisis is played by the systems and mechanisms for solving the global problems, the methods of interaction between material (socio-economic) and spiritual world,

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[88]G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1971.
[89] E. Kant, *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Translated by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge University Press). 1998 (1793). p. 66.
[90] Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 66, [6].

subject and object, being and consciousness, the specific conditions of their existence, being the ontological and metaphysical, the logical and ontological, as well as the critical and existential.

The global context of the world is facing many problems that scientists predicted back in the 1970s, namely climate change, mass extinction of biological species, climate change and scarcity of water and fertile land. However, the social condition on the planet today remains very unsatisfactory, associated with the problems of all countries of the world, since almost about 5 billion of people today live in very unsatisfactory living conditions as well under the threat of military actions (test of nuclear bombs) and natural disasters. Accordingly, growth rate and natural resources are shrinking as the environment becomes more significantly polluted with numerous crisis phenomena which will lead to a final collapse if care is not taking. It is necessary, we question the legitimacy of the global ideals of materialistic egoism, which is a powerful destructive force throughout the global society with contributions to the elimination of a deep crisis of values.

In line of the aforementioned, most progressive 21st century philosophers around the world thus believe that the time for a new enlightenment has come. They seem to put forward new global principles (ideas) and which can lead the world to sustainable development and prosperity. This is inherently based on new ways of relationships between the individual and social, dialogue between man and his environment (nature), increasing knowledge about man, the metaphysical and philosophical, the ontological and economic, the religious and legal, as well as the integral and philosophical.[91] By humans using such power of creativity, a person is able to fully realized the process of his social life, showing his social activity to solve the problems of human existence. To solve the global problems of degradation of our planet, it is necessary to overcome the instability of the metaphysical foundations of human existence as a significant gap in well-being and income. The global society is in a state of misunderstandings, chaos, passivity, isolation, uncertainty, loss of optimism and fear in most countries of the world. Such has undermined the self-construction of both the crisis of modern and postmodern values.

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[91]V. A. Nikitenko, *et al*., The crisis of the metaphysical foundations of human existence as a global problem of post-modernity and the ways of managerial solutions. Propósitos y Representaciones, (2021). 9 (SPE1), e928. Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.20511/pyr2021.v9nSPE1.928

### 1.2.1 Self-construction of the crisis of modern and postmodern values and the politics of domination

The public actions in the global society has only contributed to the political and social alienation of the segments of our population. In conceptualization of the socio-philosophical reflection of the crisis of humanity and of the metaphysical foundations of human existence, the global problem of our time has threatens our civilization, as it is associated with many problems, such as the expansion of poverty, climate change, disorganization of the entire integral social organism, tackling health problems, the creation of jobs, inclusive development and sustainable energy. The most important question of our global time is how to defeat modern and postmodern values. The conquest of such depends on whether our government gives us concretes and adequate information. Whether in the global world of today, we are all mired in lies and how to possibly defeat the post-truth, which today is the strongest global ideology of moving forward and to achieve progress and development. Our global context consists of more and more inappropriate news forms of a complete manifestation of post-truth.

The principal influential force of the current crisis of humanity and of the metaphysical foundations of human existence is self-deconstruction and the collapse of modern and postmodern philosophy. The basis of such collapse is post-truth for instance falsifications, lies and manipulation of facts. Our concern will center more on postmodern philosophy. It was postmodern philosophy that failed to make adjustments of values, reformat and find reliable grounds for a global problem that shook both the metaphysical and ontological foundations of human existence and has led to the formation of new axiological values. In the exacerbation of a perspective madness of the advanced precursor of humanity, the elite in society found itself in a situation of constant systemic illness of their own diseases, untruths and lies which infected all segments of the population. We are more interested when a real cultural and intellectual unconventional comes to power, to form programs of development of science, breakthrough technologies, effective digital education and health protection, that will lead on the path of truth, wherein, progress and truth help to regain its role. The unconventional becomes the engine to overcome the performance of contradiction, of an effective self-organization from which a hopeful madness has grown, which led to the crisis of humanity and the metaphysical foundations of being to cleanse the world of extreme, false and destructive forms of human being "in masks".[92]

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[92] *Ibid*

The crisis of humanity and the metaphysical foundations of human existence is a global problem of postmodernity. The crisis of postmodern values are expressed three principal constructions: 1) contextualism: there are no universal truths, each truth depends on the context; 2) constructivism-truth-is not a given phenomenon, all truth is the result of constructing truth; 3) a perspectivism - there are no ahistorical, in advance given, privileged perspectives.[93] Therefore, everyone should find their place in the context of the three above-mentioned constructs of being-contextualism, constructivism and a perspectivism; to find their place in the system of metaphysics of human existence-to return from a dysfunctional, unhealthy state of being integrity, self-realization and self-organization, growth and integration through self-transcendence. The ideas conceive of self-transcendence can be well formulated through the concepts of integration and differentiation through the revitalization of real truth, into non-truth of post-truth.[94]

The general idea of development and progress is considerable significant for actual progress, as it is necessary to develop an integral metaphysics and ontology, integral axiology, integral phenomenology, which will lead to the integrity of being; to assert their diversity and inclusion; to give everyone the same rights in the global society. It is, to an extent the most important to comprehend that in this process of development and progress, the performative contradiction of the crisis of humanity and the metaphysical foundations of human existence is a very serious problem in the global society and such contradictions ought be overcome at all levels of human existence, since it thus rejects and undermines the very reality of our existence in society. The performative contradiction of the crisis of humanity and its metaphysical foundations of human existence has led to the emergence of a post-truth culture in society. Therefore, to practically overcome it, it is necessary that the elite essentially move from aggressive deconstruction to cultural diversity, from domination to development, integral ideas and real inclusions. It is, only if, the path of the internal development of the individual, human consciousness and culture can lead to complete inclusion and real diversity in the characteristics feature of modern politics.

In line with the above, Hebert Marcuse brings out the characteristic feature of a modern individual and society which is the rational and consumer attitude towards the world. In setting the priorities related to technological development and being oriented towards socio-economic and

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[93]*Ibid*
[94]*Ibid*

environmental challenges, one is losing the innermost, the sacred, and most fundamentally the integrity of existence is being destroyed.[95] These circumstances lead to radical re-thinking of living space which ensures a person's existence in the world (i.e. Heideggerian being in the world). Here we are facing the inevitable contradictions which the modern age holds. The process civilization is moving ahead inevitably through speeding up of the rhythm of life, promoting materials and new technologies. Yet the more the civilization develops, the more culture is devastated morally, culture that is aimed at contemplating the eternity.[96]The loss of meaning that is material and spiritual keeps eternal values which must become vitally important for a person's soul within the completeness of the human existence.

The characteristic for various ages resides in the dominating values which have been singled out with their interconnections and understanding of the innermost life in the living space of civilization.[97] As the key to understanding the phenomenon of culture lies within the history of human civilization development and is related to perceptions of the world (the ancient world, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the early modern period).The cultural approach in understanding the philosophical-cultural, psychological and esoteric interpretations make it possible the spiritual space which possesses meanings (divine, sacred) and as a space which has feelings, atmosphere, energy, harmony, and as a space given etc., which support a person, lead to re-thinking of the old and searching for the new and loss of meaning (solutions, reactions, thoughts, ideas and feelings).[98]

The lost meanings within the context of the global society are related to transformations of the personal, secret, invisible, hidden space into open and naked space. The reality of such loss of meaning is found at the level of deconstruction, delocalization, decentralization and desacralization of the global sphere. Consequently, its traditional understanding is still relevant in the modern world. Philosophers, specialists in cultural studies, psychologists and other specialists note the existence of two realities: external (obvious, visible) and internal (not evident, invisible), objective and subjective. Based on this, the space of a person being the visible, material and invisible, spiritual occurrences are interlaced of the true value of the existence as the internal in all its external manifestations. The fervent rejection of the existence of God by some philosophers

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[95] V. A. Kutyrev, *Philosophy of post-modernism*. Nizhny Novgorod: Publishing House of the Volgo-Vyatsk. (2006).
[96]N. A. A Berdyaev, *The meaning of history: an experience of philosophy of human fate*. Berlin: Obelisk, 268 p. Academy of Civil Service, (1923). p. 95.
[97]E. Zh. Shupletsova, Philosophical-cultural understanding of living space. *Bulletin of the Chelyabinsk Academy of Art and Culture*, (2012). *4(32)*, pp. 71-73.
[98] *Ibid*

such as Nietzsche who says that God is dead, provoke a fall in societal moral standards since everyone will behave the way he wants, men will not value each other, the value of material things will be the order of the day with the rich suppressing the poor, people will be living as if they are in a jungle and life will become a survival of the fittest as Jean Paul Sartre thinks.

In the field of politics, "there is in the human capacity to make promises and to keep them an element of the human capacity to build a world."[99] The action contributes to the formation of power and the power by the promise or the pact is combined with the act of foundation. It could be the highest human faculty. By definition, politics is an action guided or leaded by a group of persons who aim to conquer the power and into a state, to direct it and to maintain it. The conquest and the direction of power push the politicians to use all means to dominate (i.e. lying, killing etc.) and strategies without measuring their consequences. It supposes that there is not ontological-axiology and the reasoning in political activities. In other for any society to experience socio-economic and technological progress there must be the existence of a dominant politics and culture of science in the way it interacts with itself and its interpretation of social reality. This deterministic outlook is the sense that man in the global society has becomes timid, weak and helpless in his interaction with others, societal (human) problems, institutions and most especially his natural habitat[100] (nature) that he makes a part.

The metaphysical crisis of humanity must be viewed or understood in the meanders of breaking the relation between man and his creator in the global society. In face of the denigration, Hannah Arendt therefore, defined the modern age as alienation. The modern age, is an extremely twisted phenomenon that is caused by alienation. The consequences of alienation are loss of unity exhibited by the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre. For Sartre, human freedom inevitably expresses itself in futile attempts to achieve a synthesis between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The alienated one is not only from one's fellow human beings but even more from oneself. This self-alienation in the global society dramatically alters the nature of moral action. One's attempts to unify being-in-itself with being-for-itself bring value into existence. On this note, Sartre urges man to abandon the belief which considers values as transcendent givens independent to human subjectivity.[101] To him, the moral agent is the being by whom values exist and the unique

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[99] H. Arendt, *On revolution*. London: Faber and Faber.1963b p. 258.
[100]F. Heylighen, What is worldview? 1996. Available at: www. principiacyhermetica.com (Retrieved on 24 November, 2022).
[101] J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel Barnes. Trans. (New York-Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 626.

source of values. This divisiveness of this sort of relativism should not be undervalued to isolation. It deprives man of his identity, demolishes plurality as well as the common public world by crushing many individuals. That is what demotes man to a living being in order to die. That is to say, man rediscovers an ephemeral life which obeys only the law of natural fatality, mortality. The life of man rushing towards death would inevitably lead to the ruin, to the destruction, of all that is human.[102]

Our time is different from modern times. But it manifests another tendency of the political regime that everything is reduced to the uniform value of technology and the economy. If a political regime is assumed to be the result of rational choices rather than a cultural or a random event, what can explain the existence and persistence of a decried political regime in many societies? Adopting the assumed dehumanization concept of the fundamental technique of the Marxist school of criticism, paved the way to examine the main idea of the loss of love and relationship, family bonds as well as the loss of human qualities and morals. Such unravel ideology and terror in the global society which freezes men.Terror freezes men […] It eliminates individuals for the good of the species; it sacrifices men for the good of humanity."[103] Therefore, it both hinders the freedom of men, slow down its accomplishment,[104]as all men make one, provides a speed that the movement of nature or history could not reach alone. The consequences of ideology results in the experiences of the masses of modern society such as loneliness painfully appears when one is with others, the shame of oneself as a superfluous being that its own value is nowhere recognized as if it no longer existed. This unveils an era distinguished by exceptional injustice, social bondage and the problem of evil that leads to a destructive of welfare of open society and freedom used to represent the suffering of societies at any time where social injustice and meaning occur. The problem of evil has been an issue that has always troubled mankind. Given the suffering pain and misery deaths, natural disasters, wars that man experiences in the world, have made man to ask questions about the cause of this evil. Evil can be defined as wrong doing on a fellow human being receive from somebody or from an external force. This evil encountered by man is metaphysical that is, linked to the Imperfections, moral evil which is linked to the miss use of freedom or free will and the natural or physical evil which entails pain and suffering coming from

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[102] H. Arendt, *Condition de l'homme moderne*, trad., Georges Fradier, Pocket, 2008, p. 313.
[103]H. Arendt, « La nature du totalitarisme-Essai sur la compréhension », in *La nature du totalitarisme*, trad., Michelle-Irène B. de Launay, Payot, 1990, p. 102.
[104]T. W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia : Réflexion sur la vie mutilée*, trad., Éliane Kaufholz et Jean-René Ladmiral, Payot & Rivages, 2003, p. 51.

natural disasters. The implicit meaning represents the abuse practiced by governorates as well as the changing metaphysical reality. Ideology is therefore built on the basis of rigidity, indulgence and oppression not discipline but on system of inhumanity.

Based on the system of inhumanity we solicits Hannah Arendt claims that human beings recognize this right only after millions of people have lost their lives and can no longer recuperate this right, due to a new global political situation that is contingent upon transgressions such as war crimes, slavery, terror, violence, genocide, and crimes against humanity.[105] To this extent, individuals are excluded by totalitarian government from the international human rights system. As a result of this, the public sphere is also undermined with human rights. The public space is a prerequisite for the democratic society and the consequences of making individuals' legal status redundant are catastrophic.[106] The crisis of humanity is possible because the population accepts that the democratic public sphere is being dismantled and that they are being deprived of their civil rights so as to resolve critical social problems. Moreover, it is this act of eradication of meaning and shared humanity that Arendt further introduces the concept of 'radical evil', in reference to the making superfluous and the human destruction of life through war crimes, mass murder and crimes against humanity.[107] Consequently, this seem as a historical approach that seeks continuity between the past, present and future in order to explain the sources of totalitarian ideologies and movements. The reason for this is that such an approach will make the recognition of what actually took place difficult.

In the meanders, we solicits Mouniers' challenges to the human crisis of the twentieth century which crushed the individual and denied the primacy of the person like in our global age. The premises of Mounerian approach further elucidates what Bergson defines as closed society "one whose members stand among themselves, indifferent to the rest of men, always ready to attack or defend themselves, finally compelled to an attitude of combat. When the human society comes out of hand, such becomes evident. Man was made for her, like an ant for an anthill."[108]It is a closed society based on closed morality and static religion. He opposes it to the "open society" understood as a society based on open morals and dynamic religion. Indeed, an open society from

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[105] H. Arendt, *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1951. p. 177.
[106] *Ibidem,* pp. 460-467
[107] *Ibidem,* p. 443.
[108] H. Bergson, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, electronic edition produced by Gemma Paquet from the 58th P.U.F edition of 1948, 2003, p. 143.

Bergson's perspective embraces the whole of humanity. For it would in principle embrace the whole of humanity.[109]In other words, it is a society that emphasizes a morality of love and a religious experience, thus bringing together all of humanity.

It is based on "a political ideal which considers the social whole as alone having value in itself, and individuals as only organs at its service."[110] It constitutes the first step in the restoration of the social community, but its domination, its grip on the values of the human person, makes this regime a tyranny because it oppresses people. It is militarized to ensure terror and to establish its domination over individuals. However, its reaction should be congratulated if it did not at the same time compromise the inalienable guarantees of the human person. Because by wanting to restore the social community, it established it on oppression.[111] Mounier sums up, in fact, that "in a country exhausted or disappointed by the crisis, in any case possessed by a powerful feeling of inferiority, a collusion occurs between a desperate proletariat, economically as well as ideologically, and the middle classes dominated by the anguish of their proletarianization (which they equate with the success of communism).[112] In fact, he intends to make the nation a unique community gathered behind a single man, with an individual who must step aside before the state. This means that the state becomes an absolute, the object of a true cult (the cult of the personality and the importance of the hierarchy). This oppression of man finds its basis in the ideology that guides the state because "the greatest danger which threatens man today is in the metaphysical and religious forms states."[113] One of the realities in most of our present countries is where the state exercises domination over its people through military force and reactionary policies. This is the case with centralizing states. In this way, by denying the primacy of the person to found and maintain the community like communism and fascism, have failed from the personalist perspective. In fact, the error of fascism and Marxism is to "believe that the nation or the state or humanity can and must assume in its collective development what each human person can and must alone assume in his personal development"[114]and indoctrination.

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[109] *Ibidem,* p. 144.
[110] A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie,* Volume 2, P.U.F., 1926, p. 1138.
[111] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 21.
[112]*Ibidem,* p.18.
[113]T. Maulnier quoted by M. Raimond, "Péguy et la critique du monde moderne dans les années trente " In *Cahiers de l'Association internationale des études françaises,* n ° 49, 1997, p. 361.
[114] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 44.

The level of Propaganda is consists in basic element of techniques. These include intimidation, discrimination, racism, information control, severance of previous relationships of authority and loyalty and ritual hatred of an enemy.[115] This creates a strange mixture of cynicism and unwariness.[116] A recourse to cynicism revolves on deprivation of assess truth and veracity as well their state misery. This policy is affiliated with Marxism that is "the system of economic and political thought developed by Karl Marx, especially the doctrine that the state throughout history has been a mean of human exploitation of the dominant class."[117] The human spirit in such a system can be crumble. This can only happen through the powerful machinery of big government possessing powerful mechanism of oppression which set freedom, privacy and individuality. Subsequently, privacy is lost through the complete impose system to deprive them of their watch on individuals. This cruel type of feelings caused the transformation of individuals against their will is like an electric current wherein people lose their freedom, and in short their human rights have been seized by the government.

The dominant context by fellow humans has extended to the natural world. The crime is that of a society in which the growing population aggravates the struggle for existence in the face of its possible alleviation. The crisis of humanity stemming from social isolation, growing alienation and fragmentation characterizes the global society. The planetary rise in inequality around the globe has contributed to the critical nature of our present society in crisis. The political order in the face of the human crisis is abstract and thereby not equipped to recognize man's existential political conditions in society. The consequence are based on an undermined public sphere. The new global political situation is contingent upon transgressions such as the destruction of human life through mass murder, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The question of humanity is therefore resurfacing in new forms in the global society. Ultimately, it will be a question of leading a critical reflection for a humanity that will unfold beyond particularisms and fragmentation to propose a conception of man, capable of taking into account the challenges of globalization, of integrating powerful scientific research while realizing the permanence dynamic of human nature.

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[115]F. K. Salter, "Indoctrination as institutionalized persuasion: Its limited variability and cross-cultural evolution." In Eibl-Eibesfeldt I, Slater FK (eds) Ethnic Conflict and Indoctrination: Altruism and Identity in Evolutionary Perspective. New York: Berghahn Books, 1998. pp. 421-52.
[116]H. Arendt. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego, (1951).
[117] www.https://int.search.myway.com/search/GGmain.jhtml

Approaching the crisis of humanity as a metaphysical problem leads to new problems with the notion of intent. Man in the metaphysical global context, has lost his identity and has been transformed into something abstract, into a ghost without reality. Being humiliated or reduced to linguistic expression, man has become ever more subject to manipulation, ever more exposed to being a victim of totalizing ideologies, such as Marxism and consumerist materialism. Since man has been deprived of his identity and uniqueness by this ideology,[118] he has become an object of no value, immolated upon the same altar of ideologies. Today we understand that human impact has cumulated and become stronger as economies and populations have grown, and have global consequence. A collapse of one will gravely affect the others. Humanity's impact on the global society is ever more, clearer but its response has yet to address the deep injustices created by too little adaptation support for such vulnerable populations.

## 1.3 UNDERSTANDING HUMANITY

In order to challenge the dehumanization strategies that characterized the twentieth and twenty-first century periods of civil war and dictatorship, it is crucial to probe into the distinctive dynamics of humanity. Although to an extent, little description has been agreed about what it is to be human, there are several unique human complex emotions conceptualized as "human uniqueness." These are emotions optimism; contrariwise, more basic emotions such as pleasure or fear are associated with animals. Bain argue that "humanness can be defined not only as what is uniquely human but also as what is typically human."[119] These typical core characteristics of humans shape the "human nature" covering emotionality, cognitive flexibility and agency. However, it is hard to come to a unified definition of humanity because of the abstract nature of the term. Furthermore, focusing on humanity violations, that is, dehumanization makes the concept more perceptible which typically occurs between social groups when people belonging to a group, they feel identified with-in-group-deny the humanity of a group outside of themselves-outgroup. These forms of denial proliferate with the abundance of armed conflicts, terror and genocides committed in the last century.

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[118]Ideology creates an order into the specific total life of a society. The ideology of society displays itself in political theory, social theory and moral theory, and uses these as instruments for development. See Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonization*, USA, 1970, p. 59.

[119]P. G. Bain, *et al.*, *Humanness and dehumanization*. (Eds.)Taylor and Francis.2013.p.3. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203110539

The consequences of such banal evil are dehumanization, which implies the negation of human dignity or what Arendt thus terms humanity. The term *dehumanization* can be understood here in a double sense.[120] On the one hand, dehumanization entails *degradation*, which means when an offender reduces the status of human beings as individuals to something purely instrumental. On the other hand, dehumanization is about a type of *self-instrumentalization* in Arendtian view which the offender personally degrades his/her own status as an acting and responsible individual.[121] In this sense, the latter form of dehumanization is a matter of acting in a manner that reduces the self to nothing more than a tool for something else. The subjugation to the Nazi ideology (alienation) band followed orders without questioning. The transgressor thereby killed the moral individual, both in the victim, and in himself….This making superfluous and eliminating a person as a moral being works thereby counter to her/his existential political conditions….. if a person is changed into a non-human because a human being is understood as being dependent upon plurality, action, and natality, then the will to moral capacity is destroyed.[122] Besides, the transgressor's self-dehumanization (alienation) can therefore serve as justification for the person's not assuming moral responsibility for his/her actions, even for crimes against humanity. This is due not exclusively to the offender's dehumanization, but also to an understanding of both the transgression and oratory used to defend it as being rational. Arendt holds on this view to a specific form of bureaucratic logic depicted as a duty-bound ethicist that had acted in line with Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics.

More practical is the metaphysical phenomenon of dehumanization found within oppressive and warfare regimes is alienation. Alienation occurs in three forms: Alienation of human existence, imbalance between collective existence and personal life and social alienation.[123] In the course of the last century in which we suffered the destructiveness of two great world wars, due to the end of the system's historical dominance, it is imperative to face up to the great challenge of capital's global uncontrollability in our present global society. The historic determination of the critique of alienation, the Marxian spirit, could not be ever more greater than it is today. Alienation stands as a process of dehumanization whereby the individual experiences despair, isolation and

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[120]A. J. Vetlesen, *Evil and human agency: Understanding collective evildoing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005, p. 91.

[121]H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of Evil*. Viking Press. 1963a. p. 74.

[122] O. Lysaker, Humanity in Times of Crisis Hannah Arendt's Political Existentialism, *op. cit*., p 302.

[123]A. Crossman. "Understanding Alienation and Social Alienation." ThoughtCo, Oct. 29, 2020, thoughtco.com/alienation-definition-3026048. https://www.thoughtco.com/alienation-definition-3026048

torment, which deteriorates the self as a social being.[124] What underscore the aforementioned is that, the alienation of humanity in the fundamental sense of the term means the loss of control. The alien force is an embodiment which confronts the individuals as hostile and potentially destructive to power. The self-evidently global dominant character of the socio-economic crisis of our time requires global remedies: as the 'positive transcendence of labour self-alienation' and in all its many-sidedly conditioning complexity.

The ensuing sense of self-alienation involves the loss of a feeling of powerlessness to affect social change, a sense of identity and of depersonalization in a large and global administrative society. We argued that alienation also affects the way humans relate to each other, as the productive relationships they enter into are subjected to capitalist domination. In line with alienation, Marx in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 1844*, specified four principal aspects of alienation: (1) human beings alienated from nature; (2) their productive activity in society; (3) the "species of being" as new members of the human species; and (4) from each other.[125] Humans are alienated from their very nature as humans, what Marx called their "species being." No one would wish to deny the global character of our predicament. Karl Marx therefore, hypothesized on this notion focusing, particularly, on the psychological exploitation caused by the capitalist economy. These philosophers theorized that, although capitalism improves living standards, it also jeopardizes human nature by turning the behaviour of the individual into a mechanized one, and, thus, into a less human behaviour.[126] Such are foundation of dehumanization which is motivated by the metaphysics of dehumanization throughout human history.

**1.3.1 Understanding the metaphysics of the crisis of humanity and dehumanization throughout history**

For an understanding Metaphysics of the crisis of humanity in the global contemporary world there is a deepen historico-analysis of the global crisis base on finance, ecology, the transnational state and an array of political and cultural (ethical) questions. It is our contention to comprehend the global crisis of humanity as one that breaks with traditional views that confine metaphysics, ontology, politics and economics to the geographical and historic limits of nation-states in the global society. From this outlook, one must look briefly into the social relationships

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[124]M. Muarif, *Psychosocial Alienation as Dehumanization: Dostoevsky and Tolstoy Revisited*. Department of English and Humanities, Brac University. 2014. p. 25.

[125]J. Cox. An Introduction to Marx's Theory of Alienation, http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj79/cox.htm

[126]M. Muarif, *Psychosocial Alienation as Dehumanization: Dostoevsky and Tolstoy Revisited. op. cit.*, p 56.

rather than the concepts of the state or geographic territories such as north and south system of oppression. Oppression in this sense has currently been accelerated because of the ecological and financial crisis. Ever today, humanity faces a historic juncture confronting fundamental contradictions as a world system, just as it did in previous structural (capitalism) crisis in the 1930s and 1970s.

At the political and economic level of the problem at hand, the ecological crisis approaches the limits to capitalist expansion. The financial crisis and military interventions has provoke the global war economy to become a major path for super-exploited, accumulation, and super-controlled of the working class. Such forms of domination and exploitation have been historically used in the U.S. to build a white racial hegemonic bloc, which the "moral panics" over immigration helped to reinforce. But constructing hegemony does more than exclude the Other, it must include material rewards for those inside the bloc. This picture of growing dehumanization, poverty, repression and militarization goes to the internalization of imperialist social relations and the threat of oppression (fascism). The key is that the hegemonic rule of capital which combines consent and coercion will turn decisively to the control of dissent and repression irritating incompatibility of modern man. The irritating incompatibility of the metaphysics between the actual powers of modern man (i.e. it is greater than ever before and challenges the very existence of his own universe) lies in the ineffectiveness of modern men to live and understand the true sense and value of a world which their own strength has totally established.

The attempt at global conquest and total domination has been the destructive way out of all impasses. The destruction of humanity coincide with its victory; anywhere it has ruled, has begun to destroy the very essence of man. The destructive forces of the century turn our backs on the harm of little avail. Instances of dehumanization have remained central throughout the history of humanity. One of the first dated cases of this phenomenon of dehumanization took place during the early historical Christian period, when Africans started to be associated with the devil because of the colour of their skin.[127] As a result, the hazardous medieval perceptions of the black people were fostered and, as evolutionary theories were loosely developed in the 15th century, scientists and anthropologists began to associate Africans with apes.[128] Africa was presented as primitive and bereft of its capacity for rational (and moral) thinking. All this categorization had an impact

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[127]Cf. G. Jahoda, *Images of Savages: Ancient roots of modern prejudice in Western culture*. Taylor and Francis. 1999.
[128] *Ibidem*

on the political colonization life of the Africans. This was an attack on the dignity of Africans that dehumanized them as object to achieved self-interest. The preliminary rest on the idea of grades of humanity.[129] Western oppressive treatment African slaves did undermined their value and dignity as human. A fear reflected on the metaphysical tendency of dehumanization.

Such a chaotic metaphysical experienced of the black race will later unfold in the progress of human history with the Jews around the twentieth century. What is evident is the full terror of Nazi Germany directed against Jews, for instance, against people with certain common characteristics which were independent of their specific behaviour. Slavery like Holocaust stands as a system designed to cruelly ill-used and murder millions of human beings and it represents a dark period for humanity which cannot be forgotten or denied.[130] A fundamental difference between modem dehumanization and all other dehumanization of the past hovers on terror being used as a ruling instrument to oppress a perfectly obedient masses of people in the global society. Terror in the global society as we know it today, strikes without any preliminary provocation, its victims are innocent even from the point of view of the persecutor.

### 1.3.2 Why do we dehumanize?

The global society we live in exposes us to a perplexing array of people with diverse attitudes, beliefs and emotions which may not bear closeness to ours. The denial of the humanity (self-esteem) of an individual is a reduction of his personality and moral worth of dignity. The consequences of this are the alienable tendency that reduces man to less-human. These tendencies of reduction are manifested in the alienable fragmentation and depersonalization of the individual to an abstract entity. What is inherent is the loss of meaning in reality and what it means to be human. The huge effects plunges the vulnerable masses with the collapse of world civilization into a "New Dark Age."

The disastrous crimes of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries prompted within the phenomenon of modernism, an artistic movement triggered by widespread dissatisfaction and social anxiety, heightened by colonialism (Slavery), the Nazi Holocaust and the failing endeavour to establish (socialism) Asian communism in the Soviet Union then led to an unrestrained impending capitalism. For this reason, the bourgeois tend to reflect an acute prediction of a dark global future

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[129]D. Boucher, Reclaiming history: dehumanization and the failure of decolonization, *International Journal of Social Economics, 46(11),* 1250-1263. (2019). https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSE-03-2019-0151.

[130] See chapter 5 & 6 for details on slavery and the Holocaust experience.

while instigating skepticism towards the Western convictions of progress, African intellectual restriction and exploitation. Thus, they emerged as a reaction of a shared crisis of humanity (worldwide).

The tenets of dehumanization range from exclusion, discrimination, war crimes, violence and more explicitly the denial of humanity. The extended tendency to perceive the mind of the others as inferior (dehumanize) to ours has to do with perceiving the characteristics of our in-group superior compared to those of outgroups in society. Indiscriminately, dehumanization emerges from the obstacle to fully understand other people's minds. Couples to these, two hegemony (capitalist) manipulation strategies were controlled by the western leadership, the leader of that society.[131] The leadership revolves around overt acts of dictatorial policies in society such as the denial of freedom not only of speech but also of thought which dehumanize the man's ability. Thus, we delve into a political and crisis of humanity mirroring discontent in the global society.

The social crisis of humanity in the contemporary world is also described through the representation of a social hierarchy whereby the privileged elites belong to the Inner Party of the right, the middle class belongs to the Outer Party of the left, and the vulnerable live in poverty, loss of moral values and are marginalized. The far reaching embraces its relevance today by warning about perversions and corruptions of power, regardless of the political system that causes them. To counter this dehumanization of the individual by political system, there is need to rationalize metaphysics for an understanding of world ethical action towards the humanization of the man in society. Thinking about the man as individuals, this is the so-called individuation. Individuation will help approach humanization since it involves considering another person's intentions, beliefs, feelings and thus, considering them as more of being humans.

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[131]H. Bloom, *Modern Critical Interpretations:* Chelsea House. (Ed.). (2006).   p. 25.

**Partial Conclusion**

The question of how we are to construe an Onto-existential crisis of Being and the condition of politics (difference) is in the long run a metaphysical one; that is, it is not a question that can be settled by appeal to a tangible state of affairs, yet at the same time not a question that can be downgraded to a matter of private judgement, since the matter is one that, as we have just seen, shapes decisively the way in which political options are understood. Is this, then, simply an appeal for philosophy to produce a spiritual (transcendental) ground for political options already determined? And thus the political location of metaphysical discourse is not the reduction of metaphysics to functional subordination within an alien setting, but something more like the laying bare of a contemplative dimension to the political, the element of 'seeing' that is contained in any idea of intelligible action in a world of diverse agents. In spite the above, they are exposed to devastation (violation), in the form of misrecognition, something which can establish a sense of 'consciousness of injustice' that is based on experiences of disrespect. More importantly, the global society is unjust as long some groups are exposed to violation. Accordingly, it is therefore crucial for the political that all groups are recognized and thereby free to take part on equal standing with other citizens in public life on the basis of their shared human uniqueness in the global society. Here, we note a double view regarding the political which maintains that in the of crisis humanity, human beings are free to act on the basis of a humane politics. The political sphere in the global arena must as such be grounded existentially in the struggle for recognition of human beings' shared and irrevocable bodily vulnerability and dependency. More particularly, the original insight about the affinity between the existential (metaphysical) conditions and political action can thus be said to be important, also in today's globalized and complex world. This, therefore, represents a force in opposition to all metaphysics and politics that degrade human beings so that they are treated as superfluous or illegal. Only then will metaphysics and politics not exclusively be about a shared humanity, but also about an actual recognition of a life of equal human dignity.

# CHAPTER TWO: THE ONTOLOGICAL SENSE OF GLOBAL IMPERSONAL WORLD OF ESTABLISHED CRISIS DISORDER AND FACIALS SOCIETIES OF CONFLICTS IN AN EMERGENT AFRICA

## Partial Introduction

This chapter constitutes an ontological-existential study of the crisis of the person which is a phenomenon of both personal and community decadences. It plunges us into the heart of faceless societies characterized by established disorder[132] and the crisis of civilization[133] which absorbs and fragments human beings in their process of realization or total accomplishment. This denounces the aspects of evil constituting the crisis of the twenty first century: political, economic and social disorder constituting the betrayal of essential values of Western civilization whose root, above all spiritual, lies in individualism. This phenomenon of decadence constitutes what Emmanuel Mounier calls depersonalization. It dissociates the human being from nature, from the community and from himself. This crisis of the human person, we are going to study it under two aspects: first, as a dislocation of the total volume of man, of his interior life; then, like a community dislocation (which involves the question and foundation of social bond). The ultimate of human tribes are civilizations, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict in the global society.[134] By civilization, Mounier means, in the narrow sense, "the coherent progress of the biological and social adaptation of man to his body and to his environment." The level of violent conflict between Islam and Christianity (in the East and Africa) over time has radically influenced the decline of economic developments and demographic growth, the intensity of religious obligation and technological changes. The repressive agenda of West lies in their materialistic, decadent and brutal fundamentalist who would consider their natural allies and supporters. Since the last century, the individualist order of the modern Western world has met with global challenges that have rendered its beliefs and doctrines problematic. In effects, certain social challenges, historical developments such as industrialization, have changed the philosophical foundations in which individual identity and responsibility are conceived. One tremendously needs to reflect a new on the status of the individual in our contemporary world plague with crisis of man and value on the notion of individualism, which has played a central role in the formation of the world since post-

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[132]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme* (1936), Chicoutimi, Édition numérique, Collection Points Essais, 1961, p. 26.
[133]E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?* (1946), Québec, Edition numérique, 2016, p. 7.
[134]S. P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, op. cit*., p 207.

Renaissance. This chapter therefore intends to make a dialectical and phenomenological examination of the conditions of depersonalization in the modern and contemporary world. In this perspective, three moments will be highlighted for this study: the first moment will focus on the phenomenon of individualistic decadence; hence a brief historical outline of the individual in the global society follows by the question of individualism and the metaphysics of integral solitude.[135] The second will present another aspect of this crisis in the human axiological global challenging society of differentiation in crisis. And the third will focus on the implication of this personal crisis in contemporary societies.

## 2.1. INDIVIDUALISM AND THE METAPHYSICS OF INTEGRAL SOLITUDE

The term individualism is more often used to characterize modern and contemporary societies. What do we mean by individualism? Is this a particular feature of modern and contemporary societies? In other words, is it a recent phenomenon? What are its achievements and how does it feed human depersonalization? To answer these questions, it is important to have some ideas about the individual and the philosophy of personalism in the global society.

### 2.1.1 Brief historical outline of civilizational crisis, individualism and philosophy of personalism in the global society of conflict

At the turn of the 21st Century, great civilizational changes in the global society disturb the foundations of the social order. Today's global reality is characterized by the break-up of industrialism, brought about by the scientific and technical achievements of the post-World War II period, which have been causing important technological changes in the most advanced developed societies since the 1970s. The central concept of crisis of humanity is the understanding of the situation of the human being in civilizational crisis which is the horizons of reference today. This horizon of reference is the fundamental category describing the person's reflexive relation with the global society. The deep changes occurring in the global society therefore, constitute a crisis of all the dimensions of today's collective and individual life. The hoax of these changes brings challenges on the relatively autonomous, subjective, free and agential individual, social structures, and culture have to respond. This is likewise a crisis of the horizons of reference, such as fundamental dimensions, crisis of life orientations, and crisis of the meaning of the world

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[135] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.,* p 28.

and of the significance of one's own life. This is on the one hand, a crisis of the essence of humanity and on the other hand, the way we understand ourselves and the world.

One of the characteristics of the contemporary culture is that, it shattered horizons of reference both at the individual and collective ones which is becoming more global and narcissistic, as well as, its egocentric individualism.[136] The evil in it is located not within the individualistic tendency, but within the egocentric (self-centered). On the other end of ideological attitudes related to the individualistic egocentrism, there is collectivism (socialism). Most especially in its extreme form, there is racism, chauvinism and communism. All of these global ideologies invalidate and devaluate the individual (man), consider its good as absolutely secondary in respect to some social collective: a nation, a social class or a race. And yet, a human being cannot exist outside society and outside culture in our present context.

More clearly, society and culture cannot exist without individuals. The subjectivity of human being and his/her human collectives is therefore a relational category, reflecting the relational nature of human and of their society. The global civilizational changes, includes the western egocentric individualism, which is strongly attached to it cause and to a great extent, a crystallization of the narcissistic culture, a massive spread and advancing of the individual and collective narcissism. Consequently, they become a significant cause of the crisis of global liberally democracy. The collective western proclaimed narcissism manifests itself, among others, on the level of systems of values, which in a society with narcissistic features are treated in a superficial and more selective manner. In a paradoxical form, social sphere poses gestures on forms and meaning with domination of the cult of success and over-exposure of one's virtues both in the public and in the informal relationships. At the global pace, other persons, nations, cultures and races, experience more real values which are diminished.

The relationships in the global society with others are marked with more or less publicly expressed sense of grievance in all kinds of claims, together with a demonstrated sense of Western and European superiority, covering a disbelief in oneself, and a deeply hidden Asian and African inferiority complex. In such a global society, we observe a lack of social sensitivity, and of systematic, quiet work for others' sake which is spreading. Hence, deep bonds fade and decline

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[136]Cf. M. S. Archer, Collier, A., Porpora, D. *Transcendence: Critical Realism and God*. Routledge, (2004).

amongst cultures, while loose numerous superficial relationships grow. The global narcissistic culture is manifesting itself also in the hegemony of entertainment over other forms of media transmission, in retreat of real cultural content from private and local relationships, with mass communication in its place. The media heighten and impose the most important goals, lifestyles and values.

The "global" narcissistic culture is distinguished by its medialization of life, up to invalidation of everything which remains outside the media spectacle. Narcissism in this sense is mostly a representation of what de Tocqueville used to call egoism.  Egoism in this sense is therefore a passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think of all things in terms of him-self and to prefer himself to all.[137]Besides, as it seems, egoism is a result of individualism, especially in its egocentric form.  Individualism therefore continues in de Tocqueville perspective which is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw from the circle of family and friends, gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself."[138] The result of self-centeredness is that, it sterilizes the seeds of every virtue.[139]

The French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville In his second book on *Democracy in America* published in 1840 argues that individualism manifests itself in that: *"people feel no longer bound to their fate by a shared interest; standing indifferent, each of them, therefore thinks that he is reduced to care for just for himself alone."[140]* He further opined that selfishness originates in blind instinct. The principle is, individualism is fundamentally "of a democratic origin", which forms the greatest threat to humanity and democracy. It leads people to be identify less and less with other people *and destroys all others in society and is at distance absorbed in downright selfishness"[141]*Under such disguised, Lasch asserts that contemporary individualism consists of a "present-oriented hedonism", "a cult of consumption with its immediate gratifications" and *"the pursuit of self-interest identified with the rational pursuit of accumulation and gain of wealth, which has become a search for pleasure and psychic survival".[142]* With this, de Tocqueville's

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[137] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1998), p. 506.
[138] *Ibidem*
[139] *Ibidem,* p. 507.
[140] *Ibidem,* p. 208.
[141] *Ibidem,* p. 205.
[142]C. Lasch. The Culture of Narcissism, American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. W.W. Norton & Company, 1978. pp. 66-69.

alarm for the future of democracy in individualistic societies has come to dominate a considerable amount of the studies on individualism; not only in sociology but in political science, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy in general.

On most accounts, just as seen above, individualism is equated to amorality and selfishness, and the idea that such behaviour is somehow justifiable. It is taken to mean, or be inherently linked to, hedonism, materialism and even alienation; understanding of the meaning in life to consist of little or more than striving towards one's own self-fulfillment. Moreover, the individualists lack a greater goal of their own self-fulfillment and to an extent their rejection to compromise this goal and disinterest is found in "normative commitments" that could results in psychological depression, malaise to some scholars, it could lead to growing tensions within society and on the most radical version a risk for full-blown anarchy.[143]One practical aspect of individualism is the tendency to neglect *individualists* focusing more on the phenomenon in society. For instance, Robert Putnam sees individualism as "the opposite of a sectarian community."[144] This indicates that individualism is more like an infiltrating disease or a climate than a characteristic one can have at the individual level.

Aside the effect of the civilizational crisis described above is the crisis of human. Upon our own request, sometimes in high spirits of a deceptive sense of freedom and power, we (humans) end up alone. Humans as such fall into egocentric individualism, which separates them from other people in society (i.e. family, from God and from church) which renders the course of reintegrating the human horizons of reference more difficult. Perhaps we might say, it is, above all, a mental crisis of human and their culture at the turn of the global society. The most fundamental aspects of the individual cosmic loneliness is the crisis of mental health. We cannot psychically outlook it effects.

The great civilizational change ploughs the whole global society before our own eyes with loss of meaning. It seems we are unable to design our identity, a sense of the inclusive world making sense, importance of our own existence on the quicksand of the turn of evolutions.[145] The

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[143]S. C. Flanagan and Aie-Ree Lee, "The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 3 (2003): 267.
[144]Z. Bauman. "Foreword: Individually, Together." In *Individualization*, edited by Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. Sage Publications, 2002, p. xvi.
[145]W. Krzysztof. Beyond Contemporary Civilizational Crisis of the Human Being and the Humanities. A Chiara Lubich's Perspective, *Journal for Perspectives of Economic Political and Social Integration*. DOI: Volume 23 (2017): Issue 1-2 (December 2017) https://doi.org/10.1515/pepsi-2017-0002. 21 Jun 2018, pp. 49-68.

crisis of humanity in the global society therefore concerns the crisis of all spheres of human life, but especially the crisis of human person and humanity as a whole. For us, what is principally important is the connection that exists between the mass cultures as a product of the civilizational crisis in the world undergoing globalization. The above mentioned crisis of the human being and today's intellectual trends, therefore have a dramatic impact on the crisis of humanity in the global society.

A look in the second half of the 70s shows humanity fell into severe crisis probably the most dangerous collapse to the end of history.[146] Our global society is in a state of a serious paradigmatic fragmentation. Our main point of contention explains the crisis of post-modernity which is a non-coincidental affliction of culture at a time of a civilizational turning point. The affliction of culture is about a useful discourse of the times of arrogance and absurdity. The dialectics of arrogance and absurdity gives a much needed impulse for development. In our global age, boundaries are getting indistinct, identities are vanishing and dialectics does not work. This is the time of eclecticism, when arrogance and absurdity co-occur, merging and incapacitating one another. Ours is not the time of seriousness, but one of degeneration. Consequently, the post-industrial civilization provides probably more opportunities for human celebration than ever before. Globalization, with its famous attenuation of time and space, makes us live in a great array of nationalities, religions, cultures and values. To the contemporary human, the world appears as a web of wavering colours, pictures and impressions.

From a standpoint, civilizational change has to be difficult and also one cannot rule out that the future will be better than the past. The freedom gained by the contemporary human should be understood as the result of a double crisis which emanates against the broken horizons of reference which will not get united in the secularized world of the post-industrial and postmodern crisis.[147] As such, we are, in present time with a fast depression of the lonely, the neurotic, the lost and sometimes the suicidal, drug addicts and those suffering from other effects of the present crisis. The reality is that post-modernism is not the solution to the crisis, but one of its manifestations. In the global society affected by all kinds of serious dramatic crisis;

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[146]F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, 1999. p. 10.
[147]W. Krzysztof. Beyond Contemporary Civilizational Crisis of the Human Being and the Humanities. *op. cit*., pp 49-68.

spiritual, metaphysical, moral, mental, cultural, environmental, political and economic, the intellectual games are like a sinking Titanic in an advanced industrial society.

We now propose to examine whether the advanced industrial society has not negated the traditional notion and possibility of the individual in reality, while at the same time perpetuating and exalting it ideologically. In other words, does the individual in the global society have a progressive and productive social function? Is the individualism being surpassed by new forms of productivity and their organization? Or is individuality a vehicle of technical progress in the global sphere? As such, we propose to discuss this question without any prejudice in favour of transmitted values. It may well be that the passing of the individual can be called positive in terms of human as well as technical global progress. We begin with a re-examination of individualism as it has become representative of the modern period.

In this line, its new historical function, the notion of the individual originates in the Protestant Reformation (i.e. One can juxtaposes, One of the fundamental characteristics of disputes today seem to be war over religiousness that is, the dispute with God, the Church and the believe is taking place in some computer-generated world). Both in the religious and the secular, the internal and external manifestations develop simultaneously. In these dualistic functions, the individual becomes the unit of the new society: in spirit, as the responsible subject of faith, conscience and thought, and in the spirit of capitalism, as the responsible subject of free enterprise in the global society. The two manifestations of the individual function remain inter-related, but two trends may be distinguished which increasingly conflict with each other as the new global society advances.

On the one hand there is the global development of the free moral and intellectual subject, on the other hand the global development of the subject of free enterprise in free competition. Perhaps, we may say: the individual in the struggle for himself in the global society, for moral and intellectual autonomy, and the individual in the struggle for existence are separated. Consequently, they are still at harmony in Descartes' cogito ego. But the subject of science of the individual conquers and comprehends nature in the service of the new global society, and the subject of methodical doubt, of critical reason against all established prejudices. But to an extent, the harmony is fallacious since the unity of the two spheres is dissolved. With the above mentioned, the individual as subject of the capitalist struggle for existence, economic competition and politics takes shape in the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith, Bentham, while the subject of

individual autonomy, moral and intellectual, is epitomized in the philosophy of Enlightenment, in Leibnitz and Kant. The very notion of individualism, dominates philosophical theory from Hobbes to Hegel, was hardly applicable, in any general sense, to the materialistic global society, in which the majority of the population remained deprived of such autonomy.

In view of this global historical development, the question arises where and how, in the advancing global industrial society of our type, we can envisage the development and expression of creative individuality. In the fully global developed bourgeois society, market value supplants the value of individual creativity; where the latter serves to increase the former, it is the market rather than the individual which asserts it-self. We are to an extent far more limited but rather looking briefly at the concept of individuality, in relation to the historical phenomenon of individualism in our global society. The complexity of such an approach to individualism in the global society is due to the fact that in accounting for the individuality of individuals, and the history of individualism, one does not start with the logic of structural orders but with the evolution of social practices. In the history of philosophy, the question of how to conceive individuality has a long scholastic tradition, and so even before the modern period we have evidence of interest in this notion.[148] In the last two decades, sociological theory says history is conceived as a process of increasing individualism, which has two different traditions. The other tradition conceives the individual as an emerging unit from social encounters.

A profound look at European intellectual history in general highlights a great number of attempts to define and promote individuality. By Descartes's period, the medieval scholastic debate had settled that the individuality of the individual could not be defined by merely pointing to some special quality of the individual in counter distinction to other qualities, and that it is not something given to an individual from the outside. As a fact, an individual is the source of his/her own individuality; the concept of individuality therefore has to be defined by self -reference. Lately in the seventeenth century, on the basis of the Christian beliefs and religious worldview, there was a tendency to associate individuality with libertinage or as Luhmann put it "with a *fort esprit* that

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[148] The *Principle of Individuation* supposes two distinct problems: the causes of metaphysical individuation, and of epistemological individuation. Efforts to determine these problems presuppose an understanding of the nature of *individuality*. According to these conditions, there is no need for a metaphysical principle of individuation, the principle of individuation is identified as the individual entity itself.

defied religion".[149] One century later, religion was replaced by a new cult of moral sensitivity and friendship, and the individual was seen as a sociable person with a new way of looking at nature as well as society in a whole. In making a dire judgement, the individual would no longer depend on his/her social stratum but on realization of his/her self-fulfillment. With Kant the individuality of the individual now reaches a new intellectual level, given the turn to the "transcendental", the facts of consciousness had to be evaluated by a kind of double standard: empirical and transcendental. As a result, the individual and not only the Cartesian mind emerged as the subject, as subject of the world. Experiencing the world, the individual could claim to have a source of certainty within him or herself. He or she could set out to achieve self-realizations in the world. The fundamental history of the individuality of the individual does not continue beyond this point but rather, it continues only as the history of individualism.

In line with this, the Enlightenment era with its roots in liberalism, has become identified with the idea that "the fact of living with others is not generally conceived as being essential."[150] As such, every individual human being is morally autonomous and should be held fully responsible for his or her actions, when their actions intrude upon the well-being or rights of others. Rather, only when human uniqueness and the right of autonomy are respected can each individual achieve a certain measure of self-actualization or similarly to necessarily develop his or her individual potential to the fullest. From the general outlook, central to the idea of autonomy is the notion of self-governance. The human agent is regarded by nature free, as an individual, independent and equal with authority to regulate his or her own behavior (and autonomy).

Autonomy in ancient Greece society was applied to the city-states and was, therefore, a political concept. *Autonomous therefore comes* from *autos* meaning self and *nomos* meaning law. In the modern period, Kant on the one hand, who gave autonomy a central place in his philosophy, extended the notion to persons. Wolff on the other hand, gives a sound explanation of the Kantian notion of autonomy when he says that, "The responsible man is not capricious or anarchic, for he does acknowledge himself bound by moral constraints".[151] He alone is the judge of those constraints and advice of others, he determines for himself whether it is good advice. He learn

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[149]N. Luhmann, "The individuality of the Individual: Historical meanings and Contemporary Problems". In *Reconstructing Individualism-Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought*, ed. by Thomas Heller & M. Sosna. Stanford University Press. 1986. p. 315.

[150]T. Tzvetan, "Living Alone Together". *New Literary History*, no. 27.Udéhn, Lars. (2002). "The Changing face of methodological individualism". *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 1996.  p. 43.

[151]R. P.  Wolff, *In Defence of Anarchism.* Harper and Row. 1970. pp. 13-14.

from others moral obligations only in the sense that a mathematician learns from another mathematicians (…).[152] He does not learn in the sense that one learns from an explorer, by accepting true accounts of things one cannot see for oneself. The responsible man arrives at moral decisions which he expresses in the forms of imperatives and laws as is self-legislating.

The thinkers of Enlightenment have been accused of obsession with the individual rights, striking a lack of interest in the tradition, community, social practices and culture which plays as role in individual development. In view of the Enlightenment project, Macintyre affirms: the individual moral agent is independent in his moral power."[153] In his book *Whose Justice? And Which Rationality?* Macintyre reinforces his position when he says, "What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to and what we now need to recover is… a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according to which standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are a part of a history."[154] What underlines this assertion is an understanding of oneself, which can only be attained in the context of the community. Thus individualists think only in terms of the priority of the self over its aims with collectivists regard this distinction and this priority as artificial, even impossible. Individualism is called *individualism* because it asserts that the individual, and not the group, is the primary constituent of society.

The metaphysics of individualist social philosophy is reductionist. The claim of reductionist reveals all complex social phenomena which are ultimately explained in terms of the actions of individual agents. Akin to the reductionist claim is the Hobbesian thesis that come into existence as a dramatic form like mushrooms. According to the real entity that exists in the social universe, the individual human being forms all other entities, such as the family or society in general are not real and do not exist, as these ultimately are nothing more than logical constructions out of the individual beings, which alone are real and exist. However, individualism is the dominant social modern Western thought, which is seen as the rival social philosophy to that of individualism and the Metaphysics of integral solitude.

The tenets of such saw much light on post-modernism that is rampant in literature and some social sciences that our identity and subjectivity are constantly shifting, with no enduring concerns (*homo inconstantus*). In contrast, Jacques Maritain, describes man as the human person and as an

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[152] *Ibidem*
[153] A. Macintyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality*. Notre Dame. 1988. p. 60.
[154] *Ibidem,* p. 7.

animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man being in personal relation with God, whose supreme virtue consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; and man as a sinful being and wounded creature called to coheir in the divine life and to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love. As evidenced personalists defend the inviolability of the person, stress the fundamental relationality of persons, see the person as a subject and object of free action, and emphasize the person as a center of meaning and value.

In the personalists view, a person subjectivity includes their spiritual nature which is real and exerts underlying force in the world. This entails that, humans are not just material beings, but are also spiritual beings. A person's thought and action are creative, not determined. In line with aforementioned, a person has an interior world in his souls that guides reflective thinking on his meaning and purpose in the world. It shows that individualism is more likely a disease or climate than a distinctive one that can have at the individual level. Mounier opposes the mention above individualism to personalism. This bipolar conceptual distinction is to be understood, at first glance, by its differential approach to the notions of the individual and the person.

The differential approach to the notions of individual and person from the perspective of the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier should be placed in a constructive dialectic. He defines the individual on the basis of what the person is not. In sum, the individual constitutes what the person is not, that is to say the consciousness that I have of him, of the characters that I play or that I would like to be, the personality.[155] The individual and the personality thus constitute objectified and materialized aspects of the person. Unlike the person, the individual is defined as a living being in a closed world, the impersonal world, which seeks to separate, to oppose, to make and to claim selfish securities. It is characterized by a movement of dispersion. The person as individual is first of all "a dissolution of my Person in matter, who recede in me of the impersonal and disordered multiplicity of objects, forces, matter, and influences where I move."[156] It is the dislocation of the person in the matter. "Dispersion, avarice, these are the two marks of individuality."[157]His avarice, understood here in the sense of selfishness, manifests the instinct of property which determines him. Indeed, one of the typical examples of this individual would be the bourgeois or capitalist individual. In this sense, the individual is considered "death", in the

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[155]*Ibidem*, p. 42.
[156]E. Mounier, Œuvre Tome I. 1931-1939, Seuil, 1961, " *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*", p. 525.
[157] *Idem.*

sense of spiritual vanity.[158] To this individual, particularly the closed individual, who is the principle separating man from his humanity, Mounier opposes this conception of the person.

In our contemporary linguistic uses the reference of the term person is the human being. These two terms (person and human being) are almost co-referential. But when we say that the human being is a person, it is because of the status of his dignity. The stakes can be drawn in several directions: philosophical, psychological, anthropological, sociological, ethical, legal, theological, medical, etc. What then is the person? According to the traditional etymology, the word "person" comes from the *Latin persona* which designates the theatrical mask, the role or the character. This notion has long been the sole responsibility of psychology and philosophy. The person forms a constitutive and evolving dimension of the human being in that he has a personal potential (to become a person). Inspired by the Kantian definition of the person-as an end and not a means[159]Mounier defines the person as a value. Indeed, unlike a thing, it can be understood as something that is priceless but rather a dignity or a value. This supposes that, in a community, "a person can never be taken as a means by a collectivity or by another person."[160]

At the center of concern for personalism is therefore the person. This notion "is the product of a long childbirth through centuries of Jewish, Greek, Roman and Christian culture, until Descartes whose methodical doubt marks, as Jean Lacroix said, his "very advent," but Mounier took his property from different lives (…)."[161]This is the reason why Jean-Marie Domenach will conclude that "the person is therefore the man who is founded, but in the very movement by which he denies his individuality, opening himself to the community and to the universe."[162] The person is, in a way, an absolute of the individual. It does not give itself anywhere because it is not an object or a state of human existence. It comes about by purifying itself of the individual who is in it. It is understood in logic of process or permanent dynamism, because it is this displacement from being to being. It is this progressive unification of my acts, my characters and my states. What characterize her are mastery, choice and generosity.

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[158] *Ibidem*
[159]E. Kant, *Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs*, Bordas, 1988, p. 56.
[160]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.,* p 41.
[161]J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, Seuil, 1972, p. 78.
[162]*Ibidem,* p. 67.

A person is "a spiritual being constituted as such by a way of subsistence and independence in his being […]"[163]. He is therefore "the total volume of man",[164] because he is indivisibly flesh and spirit. It is the entire being of man, a concrete carnal and spiritual reality, tending to total fulfillment. Through his body, the human being is the omnipresent mediator of the life of the spirit in the world because he exposes himself through his body through sensations, to the world and to others. It is through the body and exposure to the world that one escapes the loneliness of a thought. The body constitutes my relationship to the world. This implies that I am a being located in the world and in time. Although this is the truly human mode of existence, the person must be conquered permanently. In this logic, it is understood, unlike the individual, as an existence capable of detaching itself from itself, of dispossessing itself, of losing focus in order to become available to others.

Moreover, the person is movement, eminently embodied. It is movement in the sense that it is never definitively completed, that it always remains to be done. In this sense, it constitutes a permanent search for a unity felt and never fully realized, hence, the notion of vocation which characterizes it. Mounier suggests that it should be conceived as a process, an impetus for personalization in which everyone participates from within.[165] This life is a conquest offered to all. In opposition to things, it is also characterized by a structure of interiority and movement towards others, "being-towards." This assumes that she is sociable from the start and it is embodied in the sense that it is located in the concrete world. It is a live activity, carnally embodied, of self-creation, hence creative freedom and commitment. Through this differential approach, we can detect the opposition that Mounier makes between individualism and personalism. Conversely, personalism refers to "any doctrine, any civilization affirming the primacy of the human person over material necessities and over the collective apparatuses which support its development."[166] It thus constitutes a philosophy of openness, that is to say a way of being in the world which opens up life (religious condition). But, if individualism is based on these principles, how would it constitute a basis for affirming the crisis of the human person in modern societies? And how did we get there? How does this ideology, plunge the individual into complete solitude?

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[163]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme op. cit.,* p 38.
[164]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.,* p 44.
[165] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme, op. cit.,* p 42.
[166]*Ibidem,* p. 5.

## 2.1.2. An individualistic movement of decadence in global modern societies

We can derive from Mounierian thought that, individualistic movement of decadence is a recent attitude in the history of humanity. It constitutes an ideology and a structure specific to modernity, particularly the ideology of bourgeois civilization. The end of medieval civilization is marked by the prelude of individualistic civilization which is projected with very different values. It is in this sense that Mounier presents individualism as the culmination of a period of civilization that has developed from the Renaissance to the present day.[167] In other words, our world takes its individualistic conception of Renaissance man. Initially, the legitimate demands of the person quivered in individualistic civilization; because, it proceeded, at the base, of a revolt of the individual against a device social become too heavy and against a crystallized spiritual apparatus. However, "this revolt was not entirely disorderly and anarchic."[168] Indeed, "towards the end of the Middle Ages, and especially during the Renaissance, modern man discovers his rights and his freedom: he wants to freely assume a role which he intends to choose in society, and not be obliged to endure the one that society attributes to it".[169]

On this basis, Mounier considers this individualist revolt acceptable in itself. It is therefore legitimate to defend this value of autonomy and human freedom in the face of the dictatorship of collective apparatus. Thus, starting from a heroic phase, the first human ideal of the individualistic age was the hero, that is to say "the man who fights alone against massive powers and in his singular combat shatters the limits of man."[170] Among his virile types, we can cite the conquistador, the tyrant, the Reformer, Don Juan; and as virtues, we have adventure, daring, independence, pride, and skill too, but only to the extent that it increases daring (heroic). However, in civilized forms, the values that Mounier raises consist of the defense of initiative, of risk, of emulation with which the last faithful of liberalism still try to play on the prestige of its origins.[171] But this individualism will decline with the advent of the modern bourgeoisie and capitalism: this is the era of closed individualism, strictly speaking. This civilization of closed individualism was

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[167] *Ibidem*, p. 11.
[168] *Idem.*
[169] Coll Théo. *L'encyclopédie catholique pour tous*, Droguet-Ardant / Fayard, 1992, 796 b-c.
[170] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 12.
[171] *Idem*.

primarily initiated by a few systems of thought that characterize the metaphysics of subjectivity. Among the latter, Mounier cites abstract idealism like Cartesian solipsism.[172]

Despite the fact that he recognized the Socratic "know thyself" as one of the first great personalist revolutions, René Descartes left, in the Cogito, the seeds of metaphysical idealism and solipsism still continues to undermine deeply personalism. In the Descartes sense of affirmation: "I am not a sovereign and light of the Cogito in the sky of ideas, but a heavy being of which a heavy look alone will give the weight; I am a me-here-now; it would perhaps be necessary to weigh down even more and say a me-here-now-like that-among these men-with this past." In other words, the human being is both body and mind; it cannot be rid of its bodily dimension because it is embedded in a body, in a family, in an environment, in a class, in a homeland or in an era that he did not choose. That said he realizes his vocation in this determinism. Romanticism, on the other hand, contributed to the advent of individualism by developing the passion of the individual on all levels of affectivity.[173] Finally, materialism, liberalism, capitalism, technology, etc.. supported individualism by reducing human existence to its material dimension and emptying the world of the presence of God as well as the negation of the inner being in things. Because of this, materialism as a philosophy considers other no less essential dimensions of man to be illusory, notably interiority and transcendence. […].[174] Indeed, materialism characterizes a "historical philosophy" which supports the primacy of economic solutions and the importance of economic and structural factors in a society.

Moreover, by going in this same perspective, the French philosopher Alain Renault will say that individualism "constitutes the cardinal value of modern societies, in particular in the economic-political register where the application of the principle of equality takes the form of liberalism."[175] And, since "each era, each humanity sees itself carried by a metaphysics (...)",[176] individualism was initiated by Leibnizian monadology. This constitutes the real inaugural and decisive moment of the modern period. Indeed, Martin Heidegger designates this monadology as

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[172]The emblematic figure of rationalism here is the Cartesian cogito. Indeed, Descartes, in founding the modern spirit, consecrated the split between the person and the community.

[173] E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?*, *op. cit.*, p 23.

[174] *Ibidem,* p. 14.

[175] L. Dumont quoted by A. Renaut, The era of the individual. *Contribution to a history of subjectivity*, Gallimard, 1989, p. 72.

[176]Nietzsche cited by A. RenaulT, *Ibidem,* p. 29.

"the true philosophical beginning of modernity."[177]Seen in this light, bourgeois and individualistic civilization greatly permeated the societies of this period, especially in the Western world.

It is therefore, this closed civilization that carried within itself from the start its principle of decadence. It is on this basis we conceive of "a decadence of the individual before being an isolation of the individual." It isolates men to the extent that debased them. This is the reason why Alain Renault says that "it could with the emergence of the monadological perspective, one of the first foreshadows of the distant "death of man."[178] In this, the intrusion of egoism has consecrated the reign of so-called impersonal and faceless societies. Consequently, it is at the origin of the crisis of the human person. Therefore, any society based on the individual-unlike one based on the person (the personalist community)-is part of the impersonal world. Hence, the first reign of impersonality and/or depersonalization is that of bourgeois and capitalist individualism. It favours the depersonalization or the crisis of the human person which extends to our era. What are the means that can fuel this personal crisis at the level of individualism? How would individualistic civilization be against the realization of the meaning of the 21st century person?

## 2.1.3. Closed individualism as a factor of depersonalization

Absolute individualism has degraded and isolated human beings. As we have presented it previously in its decadence, it is understood not only as a moral but also as an ideology of loneliness and the fragmentation of human beings in all their dimensions. This is the reason why it constitutes "the metaphysics of integral solitude, the only one left to us when we have lost the truth, about men in the community and world."[179]The initial approach is, he is against the person, because he holds the ego as an isolated reality, in an original form of separation from the world and from others. It gives us as a precious task a culture of our difference and our autonomy. In this wake, "he then postulates the more or less sealed incommunicability of consciousness's and sets them up one in front of the other in a fundamental attitude of loneliness or demand."[180] It creates drama for humanity. Based on this statement, we can consider absolute individualism as an evil that attacks the person. It puts in place of the person "a legal abstraction without ties, without material, without entourage, without poetry, interchangeable, delivered to the first forces to

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[177]A. Renault, *Ibidem,* p. 46.
[178]*Ibidem*, p. 47.
[179] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.,* p 28.
[180] E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?, op. cit*., p 42.

come."[181]The hero's age is dead. It presupposes that he builds societies on individuals, societies without faces; because each is a stranger to the other. However, what we highlight as one of the dimensions of the personal crisis in this system is the concept of loneliness which makes communication impossible and disperses the person in his material aspects.

The metaphysics of integral solitude manifests itself in three dimensions characterizing the crisis of the person. The first aspect of this loneliness lies in the face of the truth. Indeed, faced with the truth, "I do not think with others, in common forms and under a common light, but separately, in the shaking of emotion and the concrete notes which make my knowledge unique and incommunicable."[182] This assumes that the truth holds from the point of view of the individual and not of the collective. However, each one has its truth only connected with all the others. From this point of view, individualism is one of the obstacles to building consensus, establishing intersubjective communication between people or living together. But in communication or rational discussion in the Habermassian sense, there is this concern for the other. This is the reason why Jürgen Habermas goes beyond the philosophy of the subject (solipsism or the philosophy of consciousness) to recognize the place of the Other in the establishment of social harmony and practical truths.

Regarding the latter, "no one can now hope to find them each starting from oneself, but only in this confrontation of the arguments which obliges each one to place oneself from the point of view of all the others, and thus produces a kind of implementation effective of the categorical imperative."[183] This assertion thus gives importance to communication as a condition for social reconstruction and public space. This intersubjective communication is one of the conditions of personal life, unlike that of individual life. The second dimension of loneliness is the one that places us in front of the world. It is properly the loneliness resulting from closed and abstract individualism that locks me in the volubility of my sensations or in the immanent adventure of my reason. Mouneir, further adds that: "It is no longer a question, but to give me value before my tribunal, but to be sincere, conscious and total; the concern for psychology, pictures that psychology known as psychopathology, replaces in me the metaphysical concern: I only care about what differentiates me, even if the difference is taken with a grimace or evil".[184] The individual

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[181] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.,* p 44.

[182]*Ibidem*, p. 28.

[183]J. Habermas, *L'Ethique de la discussion et la question de la vérité.* Trad. de Patrick Savidan. Grasset, 2003, p. 12.

[184] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 28.

here refers to an isolated being, pure abstraction and illusion of mind. It is an arithmetic object, an element of a sum which interacts with others only by calculation.

The last aspect of loneliness brings us back to the very heart of the individual's relationship to the other, that is, to being with others. Solitude in the face of men: can I say, I of this abstract individual, a good savage and solitary walker, without a past, without a future, without ties, without flesh, on whom descended the fire of a Pentecost which does not unite its sovereign freedom. The modern world wanted him sufficient as a god, light in all ties and living from the precious unfolding of his spontaneity. He pictured devotion, communion, and gift under the crudely spatial image of exteriority and persuaded himself, by joining his fundamental egoism by a skillful moral delicacy, that any relationship with the other is an odious one constraint […].[185] We want the individual, so, light and inner to himself that his own decisions annoy him. He even feels his weight weighs, his will is a burden to him and with it all fidelity which has a thickness of time: the apology for the gratuitous act breaks this last chain which held him in conversation, in the choice, with him-even and recreated society in the midst of solitude. And if Mounier fights individualism, it is because it makes human beings isolated, selfish, and living without any concern for others. Individualism instills in the individual this belief that he can realize himself on his own account, which can only be done by humanity in its continuous development. These three aspects of loneliness constitute obstacles to the total fulfillment of the person through a movement of personalization (characterized by a relation to others and to the world, a relation to oneself and a relation to God).[186] Individualism is thus understood as an ideology of loneliness and the fragmentation of the person in all its dimensions. This is why it constitutes, the metaphysics of integral solitude.

Moreover, with the support of capitalism, individualism has plunged the individual into spiritual deprivation and material bondage. In view of this, Hebert Marcuse asserts: "this is because capitalism works to maintain a consumer society that reduces human existence to its material dimension."[187] It produces institutions whose aim is to ensure the non-encroachment and the best return from selfishness. It is for this reason that the capitalist economy constitutes an entirely subverted economy, where the person is subject to consumption, himself subject to production

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[185] *Idem.*

[186] E. Mounier*, Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 96.

[187] H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, Beacon Press, 1964, p. 25.

which is in turn at the service of speculative profit. This assumes that capitalism, especially liberalism, is driven by human desire which is never fully satisfied. It therefore, claims to be based on the satisfaction of needs; however, this consumption needs constitute, in the personalist economy, the most elementary. This leaves to consider that the right to the subsistence minimum constitutes the first right of the economic person. This right requires the establishment of a public service intended to satisfy it.[188] However, capitalism has been made possible by technical progress which is only incidentally linked to its legal apparatus and ethics.

Further, technical civilization is not the fact that it is inhuman in itself, but the fact that it is not yet humanized and of serving an inhuman regime.[189] Technicism has then accustomed man to restrict reality to the sensitive object, value to utility, intelligence to manufacture, action to tactics. Thus, technology, in support of capitalism, tends to replace, in relation to the world and to others of the person, the uncertainty of man by the precision of the machine. In such a system, money is the key to positions of command and authority. The individual thus sacrifices his spiritual dimension and his potential for creative energies and freedom for the benefit of a petty-bourgeois ideal which aims only for material well-being. However, the person as the energy of creation "is fulfilled by transforming the world. Work, the maker of man, will therefore take precedence over capital […]"[190] So, under the mask of ideals, capitalism came to this declassified, [the individual], he named spiritual values the preciousness from its code of bourgeois morality, and the virtuous masks of its disorder. He called the demands for justice and the anger of poor men materialism, who believed it to be true and went where they were rejected.

What is fundamental is that, this system breeds both economic and spiritual disorder, because it is organized outside the person, hence its qualification of established disorder. It is organized against the integral realization of the person because it constitutes a subversion of values. This is the reason why Mounier, will not make any concessions to this system. Despite this, this individualism supported by capitalism and technology can also crown inauthentic life in the "masses" or totalitarianism that alienates the person. The intention of our next point will therefore be to examine this phenomenon of depersonalization which feeds a phenomenon of communal decadence.

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[188] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 97.
[189] *Ibidem*, p. 89.
[190] J. M. Domenach, *op. cit*., p 91.

## 2.2 ENLARGED INDIVIDUALISM AND DOMINATIONS

The phenomenon of global communal decadence is characterized by the world of obscurity the world of the masses and primacy of domination. These latter constitute conditions of depersonalization because they dispossess the person of his meaning and his essence.

### 2.2.1 The masses and the "we" world: the life of obscurity

By resorting to the concept of mass, Mounier sees it in a technical sense. He does not claim that every reality to which this concept is applied reduces to this limiting image, although it always tends to do so. It constitutes what he calls the "we" world. In other words, it is the world's where among characterless individuals float general ideas and vague opinions, the world of neutral positions and objective knowledge. This is the world of obscurity. This analysis of the life of obscurity is a reinterpretation of the reign of the Heideggerian "one"[191] which has a homogeneous meaning with this concept of Mounier mass. The world of "we" refers to the world of the masses, the world of depersonalized, alienated and lacking creative freedom. It is the association, the sum of individuals. "It is from this world," said Mounier, "reign of 'we say' and 'we do,' that the masses come under, human agglomerates sometimes shaken by violent movements, but without differentiated responsibility." [192]It corresponds to the cavernous world of Plato.[193] So this is the world of obscurity, the world of depersonalization, a world of global communal decadence.

In this way, depersonalized in each of its members, and consequently depersonalized like everything else, the mass is characterized by a singular mixture of anarchy and tyranny, by the tyranny of the anonymous, of all the most vexatious, especially as it masks all the forces, those authentically denominable, which cover themselves with its impersonality. It is towards the masses that the world of the proletariat tends, lost in the dismal servitude of big cities, barracks, political conformism, the economic machine. It is towards the masses that desolation tends constituting the ontological characteristics of daily submission to the influence of "others." The 'one' who is nobody determines; and who is everyone although, not the sum of all, prescribes daily reality its

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[191]The world of "we" refers in Mr. Heidegger's work to the "immediate surrounding world". It is a world characterized by conformity to the "average", "distance", irresponsibility, etc.

[192]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 49.

[193] The myth of the cave (Cf. PLATO, *The Republic*, Book VII).

mode of being"[194]petty bourgeois. It is towards the masses that a liberal and parliamentary democracy slips, oblivious to the fact that democracy was originally a claim of the person.[195]

Obscurity, unlike the world of 'us', is a world without willpower, where hostility subsides and indifference grows. The mace is also considered an "instrument for training the person."[196] This life brings to the person only the conditions of existence and environment, which are necessary, but not creative. Such an impersonal world is against the process of personalization or fulfillment of the human person. The world of the masses refers to conformism and sociability. It is the life of the average man who "remains halfway between genuine humanity and perfect sub-humanity. However, belonging to an environment, from this perspective does not necessarily lead to unevenness (weakness), but rather, it is the inability to take a step back from the environment, total adherence, to it that surely leads to mediocrity. In this situation, the mediocre man, or the common man, is characterized by personality flaw and lack of originality. What makes people mediocre or leads to weakness, is the instinct for self-preservation, the need for security, which manifests itself in a double dimension: that of the environment and that of the individual. As such, a human environment is an organized group of individuals who follow a given way of life. The environment, therefore, as a phenomenon, can only be observed through the behaviour and the way of life of these individuals, since it is according to the way of life and not according to the individuals that an environment, that a society stand out and distinguish itself from another environment, from another society.

In this living environment, this mass society, each individual conforms to the way of life, to beliefs; in short, to the culture and ideology that define this society. This environment characterizes the "closed society" according to Henri Bergson.[197] It is closed in on himself or tends to be closed in on himself in a selfish way. In this environment, man "abdicates his responsibility and his autonomy in order to submit to the most complete heteronomy. It does not happen, as Bergson would say, but it is done, it does not act but is acted by events, people, entourage, or environment. It is therefore the man of superficiality, the man who lives and alienates himself in the anonymity of conventions and preconceived ideas. This means that the man of the mass, refers

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[194] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* Gallimard, 1964, Chapter IV, § 27, p. 159.
[195] E. Mounier, *Œuvres Tome I.* 1931-1939, "*Manifeste au service du personnalisme*", *op. cit.*, pp 536-537.
[196] *Ibidem,* p. 520.
[197]H. Bergson, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, édition électronique réalisée par Gemma Paquet à partir de la 58e édition P.U.F de 1948, 2003, p. 143.

to the depersonalized man, an inauthentic man who must regain his identity, his freedom and his responsibility. Thus, the crisis of the human person, in the mass, is characterized by a life of authenticity. In the mass, the human person loses his originality and his autonomy. In this sense, personal crisis constitutes the alienation[198] of the very being of man. Such personal alienation is also articulated at the level of the human axiological global challenging society of differentiation in crisis.

## 2.2.2 The human axiological global challenging society of differentiation in crisis

The axiological human contemporary challenging society, approach the problem of relationship between personal, historical-social and common values, in connection to an ideal of humanity. From this, the human being is essentially determined by spirit, identifies itself through a set of values freely appropriated on the grounds of its own cognition, aspirations and cultural tradition. These values permanently diversify as a result of increasing spreading of information, the development of knowledge and as well as under the pressure of the changes produced in the historical-social environment. Such a process is significantly accompanied by a conflict of morals that explains the crisis of humanity in our global cultural society. Culture cultivates certain values proper to its specific period of societal evolution. At present, the global society process promotes and imposes the utilitarian values that feed the conflict between values, which is detrimental to the spiritual nature of the individual and collective person in the environment. Person as a human being is part of humanity identifying itself through its own values. The consequence of such perils to humanity is injustice and violated human rights of the ideal person's self-improvement. The unsubordinated educational and norms derived from personal and collective values are the results of our global upheavals.

Among the major phenomena of the global society, one should take into consideration the tension between the increasing trend of globalization and highlighting of diversity: two opposite factors that deeply affects the existence of humanity nowadays. To the inclination toward annihilation of cultural particularity and cultural homogeneity, opposes heterogeneity and differentiation. Practically, being placed at the crossroads of both heterogeneity and differentiation, the human person, in both its collective and individual aspects, engenders

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[198]By alienation, we mean this inability for man to realize himself fully (alienation in closed individualism, conformism, anonymous life, collectivism, capitalism, etc.). This is one of the characteristics of the crisis of the human person.

contradictory effects; effects while trying through action and creation to preserve and assert its identity, as well to understand itself and decode the meaning of the world. The human person in Scheler's philosophical viewpoint is understood as a center of action whose finite inner existence emerges in the spirit;[199] or to another perspective, as a relational identity of human existence which is distinct due to its singularity and position in the world.[200] The facts outlined above, brings about two critical questions. In which way does the person react[201] to the value of global society differentiation, and, on the other hand, what kind of relation is established between personal individual and common collective values in the global society? To answer these questions, our investigation starts from the opinion according to which person, as far as its spirit is an essential determinative factor, who leaves in an unlimited value universe. Indeed, on this presence of spirit, the human person grounds its conscience of value, which guides it to freely choose the personal values that it joins and transforms into landmarks of its own life in society. The idea just highlighted, compels us to remember that, the being of value in its ideal state is different from its actual being, especially the reality in which value is embodied. That is to say, at the level of experience, value presents itself as a definite modality of the real, which is not the case for the "pure value."

Subsequently, the value embodied shows itself together with its bearer, and could be more of a person, a work of art and a utilitarian object. The person only becomes a bearer of values, as such, it can represents only the exact conditions of value embodiment.[202] As a consequence, personal values such as friendship, dignity, courage, love, faithfulness, humility, piety, prudence, etc., embody themselves in a person without exhausting their universality. Anybody that respected these values could realize them through behaviour. This is a very significant aspect that, on one hand, certifies the difference and, at the same time, the unity between the transcendental and the empirical being of value, and, on the other hand, validates the extraordinary power of the value to join people together.[203] It is necessary to add that the choice of the human personal values is not a

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[199]M. Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (*The Human Place in the Cosmos*), translated into Romanian by Vasile Muscă (Paralela 45 Publishing House, 2001), p. 40.
[200]*L'Enciclopedia della Filosofia e delle Scienze Umane* (Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Human Sciences), translated into Romanian (All Educational Publishing House, 2004), p. 814.
[201]We make a distinction between individual and person. By individual we mean human being taken separately, while person stands for human being in relation with others.
[202]N. Hartmann, *Vechea şi noua ontologie şi alte scrieri*, translated into Romanian by Alexandru Boboc (Paideia Publishing House, 1997), p. 104.
[203] *Ibidem*, p. 32.

mere functional exercise: but rather in the first place, it implies the ability to hold the axiological universe as well to perceive the plurality of values.

In the meanders, the opening of the axiological dimension of human consciousness might be certainly the person's choice of commitment to certain values that involves the act of preference that proves the difference between values and their arrangement in a hierarchical system in society. In such preconditions, preference entails, according to Scheler, the intentional aiming at plurality of values, employing only the individuality of the person, which is determined by its own vocation and place in the world.[204] Therefore, the preference facing the plurality and differentiation of values exercises itself according to a series of criteria such as: the development stage of the feeling of value, cultural tradition, the historical change of life conditions, and most important, perhaps, the vocation and aspirations of the axiological subject. As a result, the preference, depending on its alteration, has a decisive influence on the choice of personal values and significantly prompts the will to realize or embody them in cultural goods, thus maintaining movement in the horizon of humanity and giving meaning to life.

The differentiation of value phenomenon that came through ages from the depths of the history of culture brings about contradictory consequences. The philosophical critique points out the advantages, and at the same time, the difficulties of this phenomenon that has been grounded on the Kant's principle of irreductibility of values. According to this principle, value has no other *genus proximum* than the totality of values, as the end of any value is an intrinsic one. Hence, the autonomy of value cannot be subordinated in order to define another value(s).[205] From the viewpoint of the afore-mentioned, the modern differentiation of values are necessary condition for cultural progress and personal freedom; and at the same time, for social tolerance. However, the mentioned phenomenon gave rise to a series of inconveniences that led to the disorganization of society and instilled into the modern man the depressing feeling of not having a central life. The entirely differentiation of modern values made man unable to encompass life, hence contributing to its breakup in society. The damaging consequences of the differentiation of values affect the destiny of modern man and of the entire global society. The differentiation of such values are the essential source of the conflict of values and thus of the crisis of global culture. It is important to

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[204]L. Lavelle, *Traité des valeurs*, Tome Premier, *Théorie générale de la valeur* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), p. 601.
[205]T. Vianu, *Introducere în teoria valorilor* (Introduction to the Theory of Values), in "Opere" (Works), vol. 8 (Minerva Publishing House, 1979), pp. 162-164.

specify here that, by crisis of culture we do not necessarily mean destruction, but rather creation and particularly rearrangement of values according to different criteria.[206]

Consequently, the modern differentiation of values, are worthy of attention, but rather on the conflict of values, whose disturbing effects are more visible nowadays. This is not a conflict between values themselves, but involved in a true competition for their realization. And such conflict affects in the first place the bearers of the values, whose process of evaluation sustains the embodiment of certain values and rejects the others, therefore, making values as being in conflict with one another. For instance, a person, either individual or collective, can embrace a certain value, such as a religious one, and organize his life in terms of the adopted value, being indifferent to, or even intolerant of, all the others. This attitude might result in religious fanaticism, a behavior that devastates our historical era as well as others. Perhaps, an example of axiological exclusiveness might be also encountered by those people who live according to the viewpoint of a single value in society, which can be the one related to their profession, or other values such as the economic, political and aesthetic ones. The distortion of the axiological proves an attitude of consciousness that has a negative impact on the entire culture and on other people globally.

To the same effect, this is the chief feature of value conflicts in the present global society. This kind of value conflict is much different from those that occurred before the twentieth century, especially before modern time."[207] Consequently, it is undeniable that the global society of today is one of the consequences of value differentiation and conflict, at both individual and collective levels of the person and consists in the fact that humanity is marked not by isolation, but rather by tendency of fusing and merging values, at least with respect to the fundamental ones. Instead of the personal values that belong to the local and national level of cultural tradition, there are gradually embraced under the pressure of globalization ideas such as: equality, democracy, liberty, justice, market economy and environmental protection. These values have acquired a universal validity and became, in Jiang Chang's terms, goals of the entire world.[208]

The worldwide differentiation of values, accompanied by the conflict it causes, is related, *inter alia*, to the phenomenon of globalization. The reality at hand is, globalization does not confine itself to universalizing of some personal values as judging by its consequences and exterminating

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[206]M. Aiftincă, *Filosofia culturii* (Philosophy of Culture) (The Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2008), p. 10.
[207]J. Chang, *Value Conflict and Identifying in the Background of Globalization*. Paper presented at the 21st Philosophy World Congress *(*Istanbul, August 2003), p. 1.
[208]*Ibidem*, p. 2.

others. On the contrary, some critics of globalization accuse it of having dangerous effects on both the individual and community level. To an extent, being a practical source of different conflicts and discontents, globalization is experienced in everyday life as making people vulnerable to various tyrannies, cults, as well as uncertainty and anxiety. It also implies migration of capital and job loss, the distress of local wars and religious collisions, the split of societies in groups involved in weird ruinous struggles. All of these have a negative influence on the structure of individual and collective values, giving way to the temptation of embracing non-values and clash of interest. Strengthened by several defining factors as information, trade, finances, industry and technology, globalization is the agent of a single civilization, that is, of a so-called global culture that is detached from any cultural tradition.[209]

In the same line, the persuasive ideology that modifies the axiological global scale of crisis make up a stunningly less dogmatic but more by overthrowing spiritual values instead placing utilitarian values on the highest level. Utilitarian values always lead us towards an easier, enticing, but perverse way, as it lures human beings into a cheap life, while spiritual values that guide the person toward self-knowledge and self-improvement call for serious efforts, renunciation and sacrifice. The destruction of the relationship between spiritual and utilitarian values, ensuring the prevalence of the latter, explains the present global crisis of culture. This announces another kind of brutality, whose signs are visible today in the entire realm of culture, especially in what constitutes moral behaviour. Such differentiation of values can also be described through some degrees of societies.

## 2.2.3. The degrees of societies: societies without faces and societies in us

The two types of enlarged individualism that we have just examined highlight a phenomenon of communal decadence, which characterizes faceless societies. Society without faces simply means a society that is made up of faceless men, the world of one, in which floats among weak (characterless) individuals, vague opinions and general ideas; the environment of neutral positions and objective knowledge."[210] They correspond to mass societies whose nature we have presented above. In other words, faceless societies are societies based on the individual. These are societies where there are no more ones, no others and no neighbours. There are only similar ones. To this end, we mean the societies can multiply there, the communications bring

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[209]M. Aiftincă, *Filosofia culturii* (Philosophy of Culture), *op. cit.,* pp 127-149.
[210]*Ibidem*, p. 49

together the members, [but] no such community is possible in a world where there is no longer a neighbour, where there are only similar ones, and who do not look at each other. Everyone leaves there in a solitude, which is ignored even as solitude and ignores the presence of the other: at most he calls 'his friends' a few duplicates of himself, in whom he can be satisfied and reassured.[211]

It is therefore the reign of the impersonal world, a world without a common will, an anarchic world and a world of dictatorship or totalitarianism. Such societies do not provide the political conditions for the development of a personalist democracy. However, sometimes they can turn into what Emmanuel Mounier calls "societies in us", degrees of societies which allow it to seek the first organic conditions of a true ideal community. The "societies in us" constitute the first degree of the personalist community, the elementary form of the community of persons (subject of our second chapter). They are distinguished from mass societies. As a result, the founder of the Revue Esprit makes this distinction in these words:

> The world of 'on 'was without design: the world of us-others gives itself definite references, habits, enthusiasms. The world of one was without a common will: the world of us-others has borders and stands there with vigor. The world of "We" is the world of carelessness and indifference: the world of us is tempered by a willing and often heroic abnegation to the common cause. But this "we" violently asserted is not, for each member who professes it, a personal pronoun, a commitment to his responsible freedom. Too often it is used to flee the anguish of choice and decision in the conveniences of collective conformity.[212]

This elementary form of community is also constituted against the person because it tends to hypnosis as the anonymous mass tends to sleep. It tends towards apparatus and oppression. One of the personalist revolutions inspired by the Socratic revolution aims at this level to awaken man from this sleep of anonymity. This wake-up call translates into this thought: "Man, wake up! The old Socratic call, still current, is our cry of alarm to a world which is dozing off in its structures, comforts, miseries, work and leisure, wars, peace, in his pride and his weariness."[213] But this must go through a permanent fight, personal and community commitment, education, etc. A first form of these societies in us is that offered by camaraderie or companionship. In this form, it circulates privacy. But "it is still only a surface community, where there is a risk of distraction from oneself, without presence and without real exchange".[214] It includes, for example, a work team, a sports club, a group of young people, etc.

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[211]*Ibidem,* p. 50.

[212] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 50.

[213] E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?*, *op. cit*., p 55.

[214] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 51.

The second form of this degree of community includes vital societies. They are biological societies, inferior in spirituality, but superior in organization. In these societies, "the link is made by living a life together and organizing to live it as well as possible". It is therefore, in the broad sense biological. The values that guide them are tranquility, good living, and happiness: namely the useful, more or less distantly directed to the pleasant.[215] Among these forms of society, we note a small homeland, an economy, a family. There is a distribution of functions and the person does not gain anything yet. This is the perspectives of philosophical biologists for whom there are questions only in relation to species (or race), not in relation to people. This pure biological point of view always results in oppression.

However, the family cannot be reduced to a biological or functional association. In addition to its internal functions, the family is reduced by totalitarian, statist or nationalist regimes to "a political society at the service of the nation."[216] It is considered by external function as a cell of the city. Subsequently, "every vital society leans towards a closed, egoistic society, if it is not animated from the inside by another spiritual community into which it is grafted."[217] This community awakening is based only on an exaltation of the vital powers or on a scientific organization of the city. One of the ambitions of personalism, in this logic, is to save the family by discovering its wounds. In this perception, "this community of people is neither automatic nor infallible. It is a chance to run, a commitment to fertilize."[218]

The last form of societies in us concerns the reasonable society. It oscillates between two poles: a society of minds and contractual legal societies. The "society of spirits" is one where the serenity of an impersonal thought (at the limit a rigorous logical language) would ensure the unanimity between the individuals and the peace between the nations.[219] Mounier uses, for example, aristocratic societies. Contractual legal companies are not interested in people or in the terms of their engagement or the evolution of their will, but rather in the content of the contract between them. They would carry a germ of oppression in their very legalism.[220] With these forms of society, it turns out to be impossible to found community by dodging the person. This is the reason why Mounier reserves the name of community for the only valid and solid community, "the

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[215]*Idem.*

[216] *Ibidem,* p. 73.

[217]*Ibidem,* p. 51.

[218]*Ibidem,* p. 74.

[219]*Ibidem,* p. 51.

[220]*Ibidem.*

personalist community, which is, more than symbolically, a person of individuals."[221] The above usher us to explore the phenomenon of individualistic decadence and depersonalization within our contemporary societies.

## 2.3. DEPERSONALIZATION IN GLOBAL CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES

Mounier defined the society of his time by the crisis of civilization, bourgeois civilization and established disorder. Our era is characterized by a subversion of values fueled by the decay of individualism supported by capitalism and technology. Obviously, our current societies are mark by crisis which affects the human person. It is certainly wise to recognize in all justice the irreplaceable contribution of the organization of labour and industrial progress to the work of development, but liberal capitalist civilization and techno-science equally favour the crisis of the human person in our contemporary societies. Let's talk about capitalist civilization!

### 2.3.1 Capitalist civilization

Capitalist civilization is considered to be established disorder in the sense that it produces institutions whose purpose is to ensure the non-encroachment and the best return from egoisms. This criticism contains more of a personalist confrontation with economic liberalism. This disorder of which the French personalist speaks of is characterized by profit to the detriment of the spiritual (i.e. society considered to be "established disorder" because of the alliance between capitalist bourgeoisism and religious pharisaism). It constitutes subversion for societies because "the capitalist economy tends [still] to organize itself entirely outside the person, for a quantitative, impersonal and exclusive end: profit."[222] The profit of money thus constitutes the dominant motive of capitalist economic life. It is not the normal remuneration for the service rendered or the work provided, but a doubly deregulated gain. First, it tends to gain acquired without work, that is, to windfall. Then, it is not settled on needs, but in principle indefinite. It is in this wake that the founder of the journal Esprit writes: "Capitalist profit lives on a double parasitism, one against nature, capital, on money, the other against man."[223] The yield is what is monstrous to the fertility of money and what the old language essentially calls windfall. Liberal capitalism thus works to maintain a consumer society that reduces human existence to its material dimension.

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[221]*Ibidem*, p. 52.
[222]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.*, p 91.
[223]*Ibidem*, p. 92.

As Marie-Paule Lebel recalled, "experience shows that liberalism is being based more on economic needs than on other human needs, it leaves room for the determinisms of evil where the stronger oppresses the weaker."[224] In other words, the concern for profit progressively expels or deviates all human values such as love for work and its material, sense of social service and of the human community, poetic sense of the world, private life, interior life, religion etc. Capitalism thus constitutes a veritable parasitism, the forms of which are invasive. The economy should normally be at the service of man and not the other way around.

In addition to this, the author of the Personalist and Community Revolution emphasized that the capitalist spirit is by no means reserved for a social class, because we are all concerned. Indeed, it affirms, "each of us carries within himself a half, a quarter, an eighth or a twelfth of bourgeois."[225] The term bourgeois qualify contemporary men and women in their relationship and attachment to wealth or material to the detriment of the spiritual. In this line, the bourgeois is nonetheless a non-imaginary moral entity, a historical entity, like the Stoic, the Epicurean, etc. He is not only curious or amusing, "he represents, for what concerns us here, a good-natured form of the Antichrist: it is not the least (horrible) odious [...the bourgeois is the man who has lost the sense of Being. [...] The bourgeois is the man who has lost Love."[226] He walks among things and thinks he loves because he cannot live without sympathy. Its value is order (tranquility), comfort, security. It is in the soul of a man who is afraid. Fear of struggles, fear of that unpredictable day that will meet its predictions tomorrow, fear of the changing faces of men, fear of all that it does not have. It takes out insurance and insurance [...] He surrounds himself with security and insulation, him, his property, his children, his country. It has habits of regularity. He gives his respect to everything that secures the outer face of order: police, army, etiquette, reserve and discretion.[227]

His moral life is therefore ordered to happiness, that is to say happiness in terms of installation, of enjoyment within reach. It is ordered to the property, to the feeling of the solidity of the comfort. This is all gold mediocrity. In comparing him to the Christian, the latter's concern is to be whereas the bourgeois has for goal only to have. Mounier thus defines the typical bourgeois

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[224]M. P. Lebel, *Mounier ou l'audace d'une civilisation nouvelle*, Mémoire présenté à l'Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières comme exigence partielle de la maîtrise en philosophie, novembre 1987, p. 55.
[225]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, op. cit., p 211.
[226]*Idem.*
[227]*Ibidem,* p. 212.

by his attachment to wealth and its partial transformation reducing everything and everyone into objects. Therefore, it turns out that the human being is stripped of his personal vocation, one in the form of renunciation, the other in that of possession. By leading such an existence, the bourgeois knows neither religion nor love, because he brings everything back to order, security, unevenness, having it. Moreover, the constancy of having, the human being follows a process of depersonalization which mutilates the deepest human vocation and accentuates the harmful values if considered in oneself, of the effect and of the socio-economic function. As a result, we come to a society where the roles of each are both exalted and confined to aspects of biological or psychological individuality.

In fact, in a society governed by such a biological and psychological system, the problem of sex or gender is grafted onto this problem of the relationship between the public and the private, considered in their final separation. Logically, in a private life, the woman, withdrawn into herself, experiences an alienation of her person in the "golden prison, but sealed."[228] It faces a public and foreign world, a world of men in which they have a voice and decide, but which is also a world deprived of this human responsibility. It is a world where social discrimination reigns, a world where biological and psychological characteristics have been erected into essential attributes of the human being, thus governing moral principles and customs. It is such civilizational or cultural pride that personalism fights in order to restore the human person to their full dignity. It would therefore, be a serious error to take as essential attributes, of biological individuality in terms of secondary sexual characteristics, even psychological ones, which are the only aspects.[229] This situation is not only characterized by man of the bourgeois civilization or of the bourgeois in the era of modernity and postmodernity. It is still rife in today's societies despite the different cultural contexts.

On the one hand, human steadfastness in having has plunged our world under the influence of material and the oppressive power of money. This does not mean that money is in itself a bad thing, because it has no soul and conscience. What we want to show is that it participates, in the value placed on it, in the oppression and depersonalization of man. On the other hand, money does not have a conscience to impose its power and oppression on man; but it is the value (the price) that the latter places on it by putting it above all other human values that is problematic. In his

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[228]*Ibidem*, p. 69.
[229]*Ibidem,* p. 70.

possessive tension, the egoistic human being seeks to possess everything by this means; and in his inordinate quest for material goods, he constructs a class division around himself. If we categorize human beings between rich and poor, between moderately poor and moderately rich, it is much more as a result of the capitalist system.

Indeed, the capitalist spirit is the source of the dislocation of bourgeois man and his society. In ordinary thought, we think of money as the driving force behind the division between people and sources of conflicts of interest. These sometimes result in violence around the world. In this wake, it is obvious to think by affirming, with Raimond Michel, that: "Money is everything, dominates everything in the world (…)', said Péguy, who wanted to 'free humanity from economic constraints,' because the violence of money is no less odious […] than the violence of weapons."[230] Such crisis characterizes a lack of spirituality in the personalist sense. Because of the capitalist economy, our contemporary world is solidly built on the might and power of capital. Money has become a major agent of domination and governance as well as the motor of human relations, since "the profit of money is the dominant motive of economic the life"[231] and the value is attributed to him.

In other words, the capitalist system favours the primacy of money and profit. For example, money has become the engine of corruption. One aspect of this sovereignty is the primacy of capital over labour, in remuneration and in the distribution of economic power; in such a system, money is the key to leadership positions. Thus, the fulfillment of man is not in material comfort but more essentially in spiritual life. And the needs of creation must know no other limit than the fundamental demands of morality and the creative possibilities of the person. And in a non-capitalist society, whatever its mechanisms, capitalism will have to defend the initiative and the freedom of all, not just a few. Realism would be to frame complete material freedom by institutions that prevent its temptations.[232] It is about ensuring safe material freedom for all. One of the challenges of this current capitalism is the impact of techno-science which constitutes one of the means of this subversion and of the crisis of contemporary man in his relationship to materials.

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[230]M. Raimond, "*Péguy et la critique du monde moderne dans les années trente* " *op. cit*.,  p. 357.
[231]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 118.
[232]*Ibidem*, p. 120.

## 2.3.2. Techno-science

With the advent of technology, the stakes of the established disorder of the capitalist system of this century resemble those of the century of modernity and postmodernity that we diagnosed. The French economist Alain Cotta underlined, in his book entitled Capitalism in all its states, that contemporary societies are faced with a mediatized capitalism which gives the means to the game of economic and financial powers of social communication, starting with television and then other communication tools such as telephones, machines, etc. His analyzes, allow us to take a look at this crisis of the humanity, within contemporary technological societies. Indeed, we believe that techno-science, apart from its positive impacts on the development and improvement of human living conditions, paradoxically contributes to the dehumanization of the latter and to his depersonalization. Instead of being at its service, it establishes it in the law of least effort, of the flattery of the senses and of consumption. It organizes the contemporary individual on his material dimension to the detriment of his spiritual dimension. It contributed to the production of individuals through her tools. It is in this logic that Alain Cotta, by analyzing mass communication, noted that:

> For ten years, the explosion of communication has been elsewhere, determined not by its use for productive ends, but by its mass consumption, almost exclusively in a televised form, the success of which first reflects the game of the law of the lesser effort. The victory of the eye over the hand (writing) and over the brain to which it belongs (reading) is now complete. The look is sufficient in itself and cannot be learned. He lives in the flattering light of a self-sufficiency that proclaims that of conscience. It dispenses with all teaching, therefore all humiliation. He is consumed in the screen that kills time. Thus, over the past twenty years, the proportion of individuals over the age of fourteen who watch television every day has fallen from 61% to 83%, while that of readers of daily newspapers has fallen from 60% to 41%, and the average time spent in front of the screen has continued to increase.[233]

This analysis allows us to discover, despite its limitations, the condition of man in contemporary societies. Man today experiences several forms of alienation through the technological tools that surround him. Let us simply start from the effects of media capitalism through the seduction it attributes to society. Even more, we have to go to the depths of this analysis to see how technological tools contribute to the loss of the value of speech in the world and in the African background.

We are in the century of "graphic reason", to the detriment of oral reason. The oral tradition in African societies was full of several human dimensions: incarnation, morality, communion,

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[233]A. Cotta, *Le capitalisme dans tous ses états*, Fayard edition, Paperback, 1991, pp. 39-40.

metaphysical and fidelity. This outline the principle of incarnation in the sense that it embodies cultural values and the customs of the community; morality in the sense that it gives moral lessons to speakers; communion in the sense that it maintains the social and family bond between people; Metaphysical in the sense that it links the visible and invisible world; and fidelity because it is transmitted from generation to generation. Today, we see this lack of human warmth in human relationships because of technological tools (smartphones, computers, etc.). It is true that these tools help us to get closer to those who are far from us; but on the one hand, they distance us from those who are close. Each is isolated and dislocated in these tools which are supposed to serve us for necessary and vital needs. Thus, techno-science can give us today everything we could dream of and at the same time it can rob us of everything we really need (the joy of community life, the development of the whole human person).

Another effect of capitalist techno-science, is the "certainty of an even clearer victory, over the traditional forms of education of school and family."[234]This victory is on the one hand at the origin of the crisis in the school environment, and on the other hand of the crisis of parental responsibility and of the man himself facing the process of his personalization. The most dangerous effect of this capitalist techno-science is the suffering it attributes to solidarity within the family in daily life through the competition that, for example, a screen constantly illuminated against personal relationships delivers involving attention, common presence and a certain amount of altruism.[235]This is the case with the effect that the narcissistic screen has on this family solidarity. These enumerations help to show how contemporary man is experiencing the global unscientific atmosphere of disorder and a crisis in his person.

### 2.3.3 The global unscientific atmosphere of disorder and the metaphysic of the crisis of man

The unscientific character of metaphysics springs from its worldview function, more precisely, from its social orientation and claim to disclose the essence of the world, as well as from the fact that its propositions are based on convictions.[236] On these grounds, metaphysics is viewed as a false projection of subjective human qualities and emotions on knowledge and on the world in general. The life-threatening possibility of a scientific world outlook is dismissed totally, since

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[234]*Ibidem,* pp. 44-45.
[235]*Ibidem*, p. 46.
[236]A. J. Ayer "The Elimination of Metaphysics", in: *Philosophy Matters,* Ed. by A. J. Lisska, Charles E. Merril Publishing Comp., 1977, p. 236.

scientific theories, cannot give answers to questions pertaining to human crisis and world views. Most fundamentally, the positivists maintain that metaphysics meets man's psychological need for understanding the world as a whole and his place in the world, and is called to the human meaning of life, human values and ethical responsibility.[237] These questions, will always remain the objects of unscientific methods of comprehension. Man in the global society, is permitted to use any means to express his world views, that is, metaphysics, but in that case he should not claim it to be what it is not and will never become-a science, a system of knowledge.[238]

The world-view character of philosophy is considered the main cause of its incompatibility with science. The inseparable ties between the world view, on ideology and politics, come to conclusion that no problems relating to nature, society and cognition can be solved by metaphysics (philosophy). On a scientific basis simple reason of these problems are treated in an extensive context of the world outlook and their solution depends, on the views and ideological stand of the truth-seeker (philosopher). The desire to attain the most difficult questions of life, leads often to the construction of systems of metaphysical suggestions. The 20th century seemed to have been predestined to free philosophy from the fetters of religious, idealistic dogmas and to become the age of triumph. Undeniably, it was accompanied with fundamental scientific discoveries and its closing decades are typically marked by a profound revolution in the entire world system of scientific knowledge. Technology and social relations are being successfully restructured on truly rational and scientific principles. Paradoxically, this century has also borne witness to the decline and fall of humanity, and philosophy that has actually made science its idol (fetish).

Intense as it may be, the situation does not likely rouse our emotions unless we perceive a human tragedy behind the ideological vicissitudes. In point of fact, on a blame game, mankind would have long ago found a way to avoid the realm of ideas never divorced from the destinies of human beings which entail a tragedy (drama) of a whole group of outstanding personalities. The role of social conditions in an emergence African context in development separate the subject that lies exterior. The point here, lies on the laws and tendencies of scientific cognition which provide, an epistemological background of the developing ideological tragedy in Africa. It is inherently,

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[237]N. Z. Igor. translated from the Russian by Vladimir Stankevich. *Alternatives to Positivism*, (Progress Publishers, 1984), Chapter One: Between Science and Metaphysics, section 1: Metaphysics and Anti-Metaphysics of Positivism, pp. 23-58. http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/naletov11.html
[238] *Ibid*

these ideas developed that underlie its understanding of the subject matter of intellectual thinking. The metaphysical content retrospectively become a peculiar tradition with the inconsistency in the struggle with metaphysics, and deviations from the principle of neutrality in the history of philosophy. As regards the phenomenalistic analysis, inclination to metaphysics, transpires, some materialistic affirmations.

A curious paradox consists in relations with science its struggle against metaphysics, dialectical materialism which has synthesized the most valuable progressive achievements of philosophical thought.[239] It is on this note that, positivism is at all stages of its evolution consistently a snare of metaphysical concepts of Hegel's idealistic dialectics or the 18th-century materialism. The denial of the traditional philosophical problems as the relationship of consciousness to being, spirit to nature is by no means identical to the denial of the idealistic and materialistic metaphysics. The antithesis between materialism and idealism with the help of neutral world elements and economy of thought, simply represent metaphysical and transcendental reality. The true essentially metaphysical problem of human existence are the ultimate elements of knowledge. Instead the objective reality is the "absolute." Accordingly, Man is incapable of breaking out of the jail built by his activity which proceeds not in real space and time.

The mystification of the relation of knowledge to reality is characteristic of all idealistic philosophy which regards the world as the materialization of an ideal form, as logic incarnate represented in language.[240] Subjective idealist like Carnap, Berkeley, Hume, puts the true relation of knowledge to objective reality upside down. Man cannot go beyond the facts of logical structure of language. Such transcendence would call for a truly mystical ability to abandon the sphere of language and intellect. The philosophy of science in the end reject the struggle against metaphysics and give up attempts to discard all general problems pertaining to being, nature, society and thinking.[241] This crisis also often translates into a crisis of values in African man followed by a crisis of identity, conscience and absolute individualism.

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[239] M. Schlick, "The Turning Point in Philosophy", in: *Logical Positivism*, Ed. by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press Glencoe, 1959, p. 56.
[240] N. Z. Igor, *Alternatives to Positivism, op. cit.*, pp 23-58.
[241] A. Ayer, *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, London, 1973, p. 4.

**2.3.4 The ontological sense of the crisis of African man in the face of absolute individualism**

The personalist approach to the crisis of man in the 21st twenty first century inaugurates a reflection on the crisis of African man initiated by individualism under the support of capitalism and techno-science. Individualism and technology are also conditions for the depersonalization of African man in that they overwhelm his transcendent nature and authenticity. We will analyze this crisis of African man from a double dimension: personal crisis and community crisis. The first crisis of the African man is what we can call the personal crisis or the crisis of values. The notion of value is often used in the plural to imply different meanings depending on the field of study (economics, axiology, sociology, etc.). By value, we mean that which gives esteem to man on the moral, intellectual, spiritual and community levels. This value is the very person of the human being, which gives it meaning. And we have defined the person as the total volume of man characterized by incarnation, communion and commitment. The elements that can fit into this line of values we are talking about include creative freedom, commitment, and responsibility. They contribute to the total fulfillment of the person. And if we are talking about the crisis of values in Africa, it is because of the decadence of these values which characterizes personal life from the same perspective, characterizes this crisis by a few evils which overwhelm the continent, namely: subjective misery (painful awareness by man of the fault which separates his current being from this that he wants to be) and more objective which is called resignation, anti-effort, ignorance, superstition, illiteracy, irrationality, ignorance of the extent of man's power, cultural alienation, the frantic search for the modern as actual.

Faced with this personal crisis in its double dimension material and spiritual, it is necessary to promote a new type of man who would be a creator, a consumer by necessity and not by essence. To restore this type of man, "it is imperative to substitute for characteristic the essential features of which are: freedom, creative initiative underpinned by an intuitive understanding of the will, general, responsibility and incessant activity."[242] If we put emphasis on these personal values that are considered, it is because personalism makes it possible, by restoring the primacy to the human person, to rediscover the emancipatory hierarchy of the values that define the person. And since the community is also in the person, it would be important to look at the community crisis in

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[242]I. Mvuenzolo Mikembi, "Development theories as an attempt to get out of the African anthropological crisis" In Proceedings of the XIth Philosophical Days: How to overcome marginalization in Africa?, Canisius, Loyola, April 2009, p. 84.

African societies. The second aspect of the African man's crisis is linked to a community crisis. It is explained through the impacts of individualism and technological capitalism on the social bond. Indeed, in the universal dynamic of modernity, the modernization of African societies has induced the process of individualization carrying the values of individualism and autonomy. A priori, writes Alain Marie, this can be taken for granted, since the two agents of individualization, the modern state and capitalism, have been at work there for a long time already with their usual corollaries:

> The construction of a public space made up of legal and political subjects individualized by the universalist and impersonal rules of written law and bureaucratic regulation; the advent of a civil society made up of economic agents individualized by private property, by the commercialization of production relations and by the monetization of social relations; the domination of 'graphic reason' over oral traditions and of schooling over imitation learning […]; the development of mass, transnational means of communication, ignoring community cultural mediations, to address only anonymous and serialized consumers, etc.[243]

The absolute or closed individualism that Mounier challenges constitutes a danger for African solidarity, because it cuts the African off from the social bond and from the shared meaning, that is to say from the characteristic dimensions of his person (incarnation, communion and commitment). In other words, the human being, defined as a person, necessarily constitutes a being in solidarity and responsible for others; since the individual and the community constitute two fundamental aspects of the person.

Individualism in Africa is supported today by the value that man places on profit and capital to the detriment of his person and that of his neighbour as well as the technological objects that we have diagnosed in the previous point. Speaking of capitalism, we have seen that the strength of man resides in capital which tends to the concentration of power and the accumulation of goods: "This is why, in a capitalist society, we witness the primates of the production of money and profit. The economy is no longer at the service of man but man at the service of the economy."[244] Consequently, as capitalism has the right to the world, it arrogates to itself the rights over human relations by fostering dislocations and conflicts of interest between men. It maintains constant conflicts in economic life by using wars to justify certain productions and by colonizing for enrichment. This is the reason why Mounier said:

> In this capitalist system, we know why the crisis, and the wars, and the corruption, and the strikes and the hatreds. The question no longer arises for us whether the regime meets the definition of a tyrant. Rather, it must be said that never did a tyrant have such a universal power to crush men, through poverty or war, from one end of the earth to the other, that no tyrant accumulated, in the silence of

[243]M. Alain, "From the community subject to the individual subject." An anthropological reinterpretation of contemporary African reality, In Marie Alain & Coll., *L'Afrique des individuals. Itinéraires citadins dans l'Afrique contemporaine*, Karthala, 1997, p. 85.
[244]M. P. Lebel, *Mounier ou l'audace d'une civilisation nouvelle*, *op. cit.,* p 55.

*normality, so many ruins and injustice. There's more* between the *personal tyrant and his subjects there remain some human relations, even hatred.*[245]

Capitalism has inserted into the hearts of men the savage, irresistible and unpunished possession of a subject that is slave and extensible under desire: selfishness. It is this beast that is responsible for the class struggle. This does not endorse all forms of anti-capitalism because it is wary of those who propose to overthrow without attacking his ethics, which keep as a value the generalization of comfort, wealth, self-assurance and consideration. Such a technical judgment (Marx) of system does not fall only under a moral judgment but, also in both one and the other."[246]

This capitalism constitutes one of the agents of the depersonalization of the African man in the sense that it constitutes, according to Kwame Nkrumah, a betrayal of the personality and the conscience of Africa. It pits one against the other like landlords arguing over public goods for selfish interests. Speaking of interests, highlights big international capital, which tend to prolong the colonial state in an insidious form. There are the interests of those who, nationals operating within their own country are the essential relays of big international capital […].[247] There are the interests of the great mass of peasants and other workers on whose behalf, often, everyone wants to speak. The conflicts of interest that divide men occur not only between African nations, but also between members of the same family. This explains the problem of inheritance within families. This situation demands a revolution inspired by the demands of the person in order to establish an ideal community.

Moreover, at the base, human beings are defined, in traditional African societies, as being in relation to their neighbours, culture, nation, tribe, and clan, etc. Man is a sociable being and will only be able to live and fulfill himself in harmony with others. This is the reason why Léopold S. Senghor mentioned the fundamental nature of this openness. For Senghor, the African is the man "who sympathizes and identifies with himself, who dies to himself to be reborn in the other. He does not assimilate, he assimilates. He lives with the other in symbiosis; he knows the other, to speak like Paul Claudel."[248] This would mean that he lives in harmony with the other that is to say in a community. There is this dimension of openness and of being with the other that characterizes

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[245]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.*, p 207.
[246] *Ibidem*, p. 107.
[247]K. Nkrumah in Azombo-MENDA S. and Enobo KOSSO M., African philosophers through texts, Paris, Ed. Fernand Nathan, 1978, p. 48.
[248] L. S. Senghor cited in Azombo-MENDA S. and Enobo KOSSO M., *op. cit.*, p 32.

the African in the Senghorian approach. This social link constitutes the basis of paradigms on the question of solidarity as an African cultural value despite its variants.

Regarding this solidarity which is one of the marked values characterizing African culture, the African is to be considered as this sociable and united being. His solidarity is manifested in his attitudes and his relationship with others. It cannot be conceived as a break with this social bond. We can take for instance, the practice of this socio-cultural value through the practice of "Sourgha"[249] among the Tupuri people. This socio-cultural practice manifests the feeling of unity and characterizes the socio-cultural bond that animates this people. In an economic dimension, it constitutes collective mutual aid towards a member of the community. Likewise, it constitutes teamwork carried out within the framework of field work in order to safeguard the spirit of collaboration in the management of property.

In this, it manifests the community spirit and solidarity. It makes it possible to build a community economy and collective prosperity within this people despite the disputes that afflict them because community life does not exclude conflicts and disagreements although the practice of "*palaver*" contributes to the resolution of disputes. This practice of solidarity may be similar to that of another people or vary depending on the context. But what matters to us here is this culture of solidarity which helps build collective prosperity. It must inhabit every African in order to consolidate unity despite cultural differences. This practice, however, does not encourage the spirit of parasitism. Therefore, if Africans have this culture of living happily with others, while having the essentials, the problem of individualization will not arise fundamentally. Because it is not necessarily the fact of seeking independence and autonomy at all costs to the detriment of one's community that one manages to accomplish perfectly, but, the fact of living one's creative freedom within the community, in leading a harmonious life with others, which can be accomplished in communion with them. It is therefore important to think about the autonomy of African men in their community dimension, to avoid falling into absolute individualism. This is the reason why Alain Marie maintains that "it is undoubtedly still impossible and even unthinkable to assume a fully individualistic position in Africa today."[250] On the contrary, the crisis of African societies are confronted not only with deep political and economic problems, but with a moral crisis

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[249]The term "Sourgha" (in the Tupuri language) is a concept that we have used to translate a characteristic practice of solidarity among the Tupuri people in North Cameroon, in particular community assistance in agricultural tasks.
[250]A. Marie & Coll., *The Africa of Individuals*. *op. cit*., p 90.

characterized by the loss of moral values, growing mentality of dependency and criminality on financial assistance from the developed countries. The reason for the moral crisis is, according to Wiredu, that African states took over Western political systems and their values uncritically.[251] For instance, Western systems embraced a classical notion of human dignity different from the African perspective.

The risk would be serious on the unity of man with his society, his culture, his nature, his world, because if the person understands this tension towards others and towards the Absolute, the African must exist authentically and originally with others, things, without however losing his intimate life which vibrates in all his actions. It is the "solid rhythm of human existence",[252] that is, the life which responds to the need for its authenticity, its commitment and its wholeness. This life is irreplaceable because it characterizes the humanity of man. Thus, what an institutional regime must do, for the African person, is to level certain external obstacles and promote certain paths presented by Mounier, namely: 1-Disarm all forms of oppression of people. 2-Establish, around the person, a margin of independence and privacy, which ensures their choice of a subject, a certain play and a guarantee in the network of social pressures. 3- Organize any social apparatus on the principle of personal responsibility; make use of its automatisms, in the sense of greater freedom, offered to the choice of each one.[253]This assumes that spiritual freedom is a personal quest for everyone in a community. But what would this ideal community be, the place of total fulfillment of the person? What would be his status? And how do you get to the foundation of a perfect community?

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[251]Cf. O. Oladipo, *The Third Way in African Philosophy*, Hope Publications, Ibadan 2002. p. 252.
[252]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personalisme*, *op. cit*., p 44.
[253]*Ibidem*, p. 47.

# Partial Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to present and understand the auspices and the conditions for the depersonalization of the human person as well as the faceless societies that result from it. We have been able to note a real degradation of interpersonal relations mainly due to the crisis of the notion of person and the erosion of the community. Our definition of individualism resonates with recent conclusions from meta-analyses of psychological research on individualism, which have argued that "the most salient feature of individualism, as defined by the majority of studies, was valuing personal independence."[254] So, by reinforcing individualism in one way or another, totalitarian and capitalist systems have reduced the advancement of the human person and removed the human being from his essential biotope, of the personalist community. We wish to clinch on a less Utopian note. Perhaps our most serious doubt concerning the global Society is caused by the fact that, the American foreign policy all but invalidates the domestic program for the global Society. The issues of coexistence, of neo-colonialism, of the relations with the have-not countries, the military establishment are not contingent external factors. Rather they determine the prospects of growth, improvement, and even continued existence of society, not so great or great. The global Society will be a society that can exist and grow in peace, without the built-in need for defense and aggression on individuality and modern technological development. The value of modern technology offers an immense opportunity not only to the Africans, but the global society and allows us to perceive the human person outside the situation in which, they are placed and let the human face shine in all its nudity (vulnerability).

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[254]C. Oyserman, and Kemmelmeier, "Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses." 2005.

**CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICO-MORAL PROBLEM IN THE GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS: CONTEXTUALIZING GLOBAL CRISIS OF IDENTITY-CONFLICTS**

**Partial Introduction**

This is not the first-time humanity is facing a pandemic. Humanity has experienced a systemic series of health devastating pandemic crisis in its course of progress. Previous health crisis has shown how an economic crash had dreadful consequences for public health. First is the aftermath of Black Death which overturned the structures of economies and societies in medieval Europe[255] as well Italy containment measures during the Renaissance era. Throughout the history of humanity, the spread of infectious diseases has tremendously killed millions of people, sickened billions, and cost huge trillions of dollars to the global economic output. Almost precisely one century (100 years) ago, large movements of people around the globe after World War I, contributed to the spread of an influenza virus that led to the most deadly pandemics the 1918 Flu. AIDS like abortion has caused more than 32 million deaths since the early 1980s.[256] These pandemics had prepared the world so that people, nation states and governments around the globe would be more prepared to tackle similar dangers in future. With all the means and mechanisms put into place, one would have hoped that no such pandemics like MERS, SARS and Ebola would hit the globe. To an extent, it was a mere dream with the rapid outbreak of the corona virus pandemics which seems to have been predicted. The COVID-19 pandemic a health crisis outbreak in Wuhan-China, possibly, defying all scientific laws and undermined all its measures. How possibly this came about? Where there no preventives measures? What actually went wrong? Can the health sector put a human face on the other problems we perceive in this troubled world? Is the health sector able to bring a moral dimension to the policies that govern our international systems, to introduce a system of values?

**3.1 OUTBREAK OF OTHER PANDEMIC BEFORE THE COVID-19: THE GLOBAL CONSEQUENCE OF HIV/AIDS ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN**

AIDS has been announced the World Health Organization as the fourth biggest cause of worldwide death and most precisely, the globally number one killer and more especially in Africa. HIV/AIDS is not only a health crisis in our global society, but it is also a moral problem. Morality

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[255] Fund Blog, 1 April. https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/01/economic-policies-for-the-covid-19-war/.
[256] Based on WHO factsheet (https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/hiv-aids; (Accessed 14 May 2020).

is the judgement of the rightness and wrongness of a human act. HIV/AIDS constitutes a triple jeopardy for both men and women as victims. For almost 6 (six) decades, HIV/AIDS claims more victims than even wars.

The relative poverty situation of many people is one of the causes underlying this epidemic as it leads them to engage in sexual relations that puts them at risk of health. HIV is abbreviated for Human Immunodeficiency Virus. A virus that attacks immune cells called CD4 cells in the human system, destroys it, weakens it and renders it vulnerable for attack by other opportunistic infections like diarrhea, tuberculosis and malaria. Besides sex, HIV can be transmitted by blood infusion and use of unsterilized syringes, blades and other instruments. This virus can lead to full gloom AIDS. AIDS is the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. It is not a disease but a syndrome because of the fact that there are a number of illnesses or symptoms that define a person as having AIDS. But the crux of the matter here is: what are the consequences of HIV/AIDS especially in the productive segment of the population in the educational, social, industrial and economic perspective of the global society?

### 3.1.1 Natural History and Causes of HIV/AIDS

The world faces an unknown and new virus unlike HIV and AIDS epidemic which began in fear, illness and death. Responsible for the pandemic that has killed more than 36 million people worldwide,[257] HIV would find its origin in the Congo Basin as early as 1920, after crossing the species barrier from ape to man.[258] The Human Immunodeficiency Virus is a retrovirus that attacks the cells of the immune system and destroys or renders them ineffective. At the first stage of infection, the subject has no symptoms. However, the evolution of the infection leads to a weakening of the immune system and an increased vulnerability to opportunistic infections. Currently two types of viruses are known HIV-1 and HIV-2.[259]

The clinical manifestations are identical, concomitant infection of both viruses is possible. These two viruses are antigenically distinct (but there are cross-antigenic reactions between the two types). They share 42% genome-level homology. They differ in a regulatory gene (vpx for

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[257]UNAIDS Global HIV and AIDS statistics-2018 fact sheet [Online] 2018; Available from: http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/fact-sheet/. [Accessed November 2022].

[258] N. R. Faria, Rambaut A, Suchard MA, et al. The early spread and epidemic ignition of HIV-1 in human populations. Science 2014; 346:56–61.

[259] P. M. Sharp, Hahn BH. Origins of HIV and the AIDS pandemic. Cold Spring Harb Perspect Med 2011; 1:a006841.

HIV-2 and vpu for HIV-1). There are two variants of HIV, denoted HIV-1 and HIV-2. The research teams agree on the hypothesis that the virus was transmitted from monkeys to humans accidentally.[260] HIV-1 is subdivided into 4 genetic variants: M (responsible for 99% of HIV-1 infections), N, O and P.[261] This virus is the cause of the vast majority of infections worldwide. The M and N variants have been transmitted to humans by the chimpanzee during hunting or preparation of simian meat. The O and P variants, on the other hand, are much less common, come from the gorilla. The Groups have variant names which are M ( the Major), O (the Outlier), N (the non-M, non-O) and the most recent group P.[262]HIV-2 is only very uncommon outside Africa and is thought to have been transmitted to humans by another monkey species, the mangabey. HIV-2 infection is consistent with very long-term survival without anti-retro-virals.

In Europe, it is very low and is responsible for about 1% of all HIV infections. HIV has been responsible for a pandemic for more than thirty years. The human retrovirus that has had the greatest medical impact is HIV1, which was identified in 1984 as the cause of a large epidemic of immunosuppression called Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). AIDS is a cell-mediated immunity disorder characterized by opportunistic infections, tumors, neurological disorders, and other various syndromes. Over the decades, the virus spread through the continent and to other parts of the world. Since the outbreak, the B subtype is prevalent in almost all parts of America and Europe meanwhile variety subtypes are more common in West Central Africa.[263] In subsequent time, other groups like M viruses have dominated the global society HIV pandemic since its inception, whereas other groups N, O and P viruses have not been disseminated widely.

The global tension of HIV/AIDS is one of the most genetically diverse pathogens due to its high-mutation and large population size, rapid replication and recombination rates. The viral diversity poses enormous challenges to global health system. Recent data suggests a significant increase in sequences of the Subtype A of HIV which remains as parts of prevalent strain in East Africa, Russia and former Soviet Union countries. The subtype B of HIV in Europe, Americas and the Oceania; the subtype C of HIV in Southern Africa and India; with the prevalence of both CRF01-AE in Asia and CRF02-AG in Western Africa.[264] The subtype C is reported to have

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[260] https://journals.lww.com/co-hivandaids/Fulltext/2019/05000/HIV_subtype_diversity_worldwide.3.aspx?
[261] *Ibid*
[262] *Ibid*
[263]*Ibid*
[264]*Ibid*

devastated effects in South America with an overall 50% estimate of all infections worldwide. It is more concentrated in East and Southern Africa as well India. The CRF01-AE has the major strain throughout Southeast Asia while the CRF02-AG is the dominant virus in West Africa with about 30% of its strains in East Africa that consist more of URFs.[265]Increase in both subtype C and subtype B are reported among HIV/viral hepatitis who are co-infected patients in the Southern part of Brazil.[266] However, there is increased and extensive HIV-1 genetic diversity in Asia[267] and Eastern Africa.[268] From 1986 till present-day UNAIDS reported that AIDS was now by far the leading cause of death in the absence of treatment.

### 3.1.2 Global AIDS impact on human prosperity

The predominance of HIV/AIDS during the last decades has seen a globally exponential growth. Africa is mostly affected by this epidemic hindering the component of human development, and reduction in African agriculture labour force, by 25% in some African countries. HIV/AIDS is affecting the global human development through its devastating impact on health, econmic and demographic indicators such as life expectancy at birth, healthcare assistance, age, education, gender inequality, work force, human rights, and sex distribution. Over 42 million people globally are currently living with HIV/AIDS.[269] The high infection and mortality rate has an impact on the workforce of the economy and upon human dignity. The effects on human dignity are the abandonment of family relatives, upon discovering a family member with the disease.  The epidemic affects every aspect of human life, with devastating consequences. It has imposed heavy burdens on families, individuals, communities and nations.

In many countries, the epidemic is undermining family well-being, personal aspirations and national development. The epidemic is threatening the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In third world countries with inadequate health resources, the impact on mortality and on population size and growth is already substantial. In many countries, especially in Africa and precisely in Sub-Saharan Africa, the hardest-hit countries such as Botswana,

[265] F. E. McCutchan. Global epidemiology of HIV. J Med Virol 2006; 78 (S1):S7–S12.
[266]V. M. Avanzi, Vicente BA, Beloto NCP, *et al.*, Profile of HIV subtypes in HIV/HBV- and HIV/HCV-coinfected patients in Southern Brazil. Rev Soc Bras Med Trop 2017; 50:470-477.
[267] Li K, Ou W, Feng Y, et al. Near Full-Length Genomic Characterization of a Novel HIV Type 1 Recombinant Form (CRF01_AE/B) Identified from Anhui, China. AIDS Res Hum Retroviruses 2018; doi: 10.1089/AID.2018.0144.
[268] Lee GQ, Bangsberg DR, Mo T, *et al.*, Prevalence and clinical impacts of HIV-1 intersubtype recombinants in Uganda revealed by near-full-genome population and deep sequencing approaches. AIDS 2017; 31:23452-354.
[269] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19922687/

Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the AIDS epidemic has spread rapidly, leaving illness, poverty, death and misery in its wake. In other countries like Cameroon, Nigeria, Egypt, the disease is still in its early stages but eating up the fabrics of the younger population.

Remarkably, HIV/AIDS has now taken hold in the largest countries of the world: the number of people infected with HIV has reached one million in China and six million in India, 4.5million in US and the destructive effects of the epidemic are already being felt in those countries. It is not just a recent demographic disaster, but the epidemic has consequences for every sector of the society. This reveals wide ranging societal impacts of HIV/AIDS: on families, individuals and households; on business; on agricultural sustainability; on education; health sector and on national economic growth.[270]The high burdens of the disease on families and households are staggering. If the HIV vaccine were discovered today, approximately 40 million people would die prematurely as a result of AIDS.[271] The first devastating impact of HIV/AIDS is felt on the agricultural sector due to lack of the manpower or human labour.

In the agricultural sector of most countries, the loss of farm workers to HIV/AIDS has ramifications for food security. A survey in Zimbabwe and South Africa found that agricultural output declined by nearly 50 per cent among households affected by AIDS.[272] The United Nations alongside with the Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated that, the ten most affected African countries will lose gradually amid 10 and 26 per cent of their[273] agricultural labour force by 2020. AIDS reduces the means and the inducements (incentives) to invest in human capital. Contrary to the majority of global pandemics and diseases, HIV/AIDS kills and disables adults in the most productive part of their lives, which lead to a decrease in economic development, productivity and sustainability of the society. Consequently, it is affecting industry, business, investment and agricultural sustainability, and ultimately reducing at the same time families' income and economic growth. This renders the enterprise, the economy very weak, fragile, vulnerable and less competitive and open to criticisms from external bodies. At the moment of health crisis, it is difficult to estimate precisely the real economic impact of HIV/AIDS on the globe and precisely on the whole African continent. It should also be stressed with urgency that

[270]Centers for disease control and prevention (CDC) 'CDC Global HIV/AIDS Milestone: On the path to an AIDS-Free Generation' (2012).

[271]https://prezi.com/xy6ajgb3rio8/hiv-aids/

[272]UNAIDS: HIV/AIDS estimates. Accessed 4/12/2008, (http://data.unaids.org).

[273] https://www.coursehero.com/file/p53aqfk/Avoid-unwanted-pregnancies-among-HIV-positive-women-through-counseling-to-help/

the HIV/AIDS epidemic worsens the situation of other diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, malaria and tuberculosis. The burdened program threatened the viability of the entire health-care system in a growing number of developed and underdeveloped countries. A long and healthy life is one of the most highly desired components of human existence. Health and longevity are not merely intermediate goals on the path to socioeconomic development, but rather are among the fundamental pillars of development.

Another aspect, AIDS does not permit to achieve universal primary education with the increasing number of children leaving school to care for ill relatives or to replace them on the farms and in the workplace. The AIDS epidemic has made the goal of universal primary education much more difficult to achieve globally and especially in the hardest-hit countries. HIV/AIDS is reversing the universal globally primary educational trend in most parts of African countries. Experienced teachers are also dying of AIDS, eroding the quality of education and the educational system. Globally, AIDS is seen to have a threefold effect on education: It affects the capacity of teachers, cognitive ability of children and efficiency of managers and staff.[274] The next generation will be less healthy and less well educated than the previous one. In particular, HIV/AIDS seriously threatens the education of the next generation.

The moral denigrating causes of HIV/AIDS does lead to psychological and mental problems, social exclusion, stigmatization and discrimination. Several persons living with HIV/AIDS are often considered to be people with some degree of immoral character even if the victims had been faithful to one another. This degree of discrimination affects the person psychic life thus leading to frustration and as well abject poverty. In actuality, AIDS being cause and consequence of underdevelopment and poverty, constitutes a great challenge to human security and development by weakening the chances of relieving hunger and poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary educational goal, reducing child and maternal mortality as well promoting gender equality.[275] It does shortening the lifespans of humans, eroding their sense of dignity, self-esteem, social exclusion, traumatizing and impoverishing individuals, families and communities. The principles of sustainable development needs to be a global major focus and priority for the policies and program in African countries.

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[274] UNAIDS: HIV/AIDS estimates. accessed 4/12/2008, (http://data.unaids.org)
[275] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19922687/

The complexity nature of HIV/AIDS imposes the necessity of multidisciplinary approaches model that would estimate and predict the real impact of HIV/AIDS of the disease on human development in African countries in order to optimize the strategies proposed by individual countries, international institutions and their partners.[276] The neglect by pharmaceutical industries to create a vaccine to eradicate the virus has undermined human life and value in the global society. HIV/AIDS is impeding development by imposing a firm decline in human development, as well deteriorating the socio-economic gains in African countries and the global society are striving to attain. With afford standard still outbreaks the malaria in Africa.

### 3.1.3 The burden of malaria crisis in Africa without cure

Since the outbreak and persistence of malaria in the African continent, less global efforts have been made by the west and said pharmaceutical industry to curb its impact on human life and prosperity. The dreadful effects of Malaria on the African soil are burdensome to the continent youthful population and underdevelopment. The poor health system due to inadequate research sectors and health facilities has moral impact on the lives of adults and youths population. Western concerns on the African continent since the colonial era hovers on the exploitation of the continents' resources. This reveals the crisis of the African man in face of other global crisis. Insofar, as Africa's resources are exploited for the detriment of the continent: in favour of the Western world, failed inherited western health system and dependence on foreign aid will have a continuous impact and denigration on the lives of Africans as a whole. But before a further clarity on the impact of malaria on the African continent, it should be noted that certain parts of the Northern hemisphere of Africa countries (i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, and Tunisia) have long stabilized the prevalence of malaria as compared to Africa south of the Sahara. The malaria situation in these mentioned countries is not considered further in this Thesis.

Approximately 90% of malaria deaths occur in Africa south of the Saharan.[277] The majority of malaria infections in Africa is cause by *Plasmodium falciparum*, which is the most precarious among the four human malaria parasites.[278] It is also because, the most effective malaria vector- the female *mosquito Anopheles gambiae*-is the most widespread in Africa and the most difficult

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[276] A. Boutayeb. The double burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases in developing countries. Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. 2006, 99: 191-199.101016/j.trstmh.2005:07.021.

[277] https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/eiu_abbott_malaria_in_ssa_report_1.pdf

[278] https://www.againstmalaria.com/downloads/RBMBurdenMalariaAfrica.pdf/

to control.  Recent statistics shows that about one million people die of malaria in Africa each year and most of these are children below 5 years old. Malaria thus affects the lives of almost all people living in the area of Africa defined by the southern borders of the Sahara Desert in the north, and latitude of about 28° in the south of the equator. People living in the tropical countries, risk contracting highest malaria disease due to the ever-present humid weather that permits yearly infections.[279]

The infection is common and occurs with sufficient frequency that some level of immunity develops. Subsequently, sub-Saharan Africa has a disproportionately higher rate of death among women and children with malaria. Conversely, a smaller proportion of people live in areas, where risk of malaria is more seasonal and less predictable (in the north or south peripheral areas), because of altitude, rainfall and water patterns. In the East, malaria is endemic in Madagascar, in the Comoro islands and on Pemba and Zanzibar, but has been eliminated from the island of Reunion.[280] In some of the offshore islands, malaria disease is highly endemic to the west of mainland Africa-Sao Tome and Principe as well as, the São Tiago Island of Cape Verde.

The burden of malaria on the African continent health systems is quite alarming. In all malaria-endemic countries in Africa with alarming effects, 25-40% (i.e. average 30%) of all outpatient clinic visits are for malaria with most diagnosis made clinically. A high proportion of public health expenditure is responsible on curative treatment of malaria in Africa. The general reporting from facilities to districts and from districts to the ministry of health varies in its entirety and appropriateness (timeliness) from country to country and often does not include several nongovernment facilities. Therefore, the routine reports of the number of malaria cases and deaths toils have limited value for comparisons of the malaria problem between countries. To this light, demographic and health surveys (DHS) indicates that less than 40% of malaria morbidity and mortality is seen in formal health facilities-a small fraction of the total burden over a wide geographical area in the continent.

Most poor people in Africa are often at increased risk of becoming infected with malaria. In a demographic surveillance system conducted in rural areas of the United Republic of Tanzania, under-5 mortality following acute fever was 39% higher in the poorest socio-economic group than

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[279] https://ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/35365?mode=full
[280] https://www.againstmalaria.com/downloads/RBMBurdenMalariaAfrica.pdf

in the richest.[281] Furthermost, poor families do live in dwellings that offer little protection against mosquitoes bites with a poor drainage system and some are less able to afford treated nets and insecticide. Close to 1.5 billion malaria and 7.6 million malaria cases deaths have been averted since the year 2000s.[282] Despite the achievement made, growth has extremely slowed down in the past five years, with a global incidence case decreasing by less than 1% since 2015, associated with a drastic drop of[283] 28% amid 2000 and 2015.[284] About five countries account globally for more than 229 million malaria world's cases in 2019. All of them are in sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria (27%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (12%), Uganda (5%), Mozambique (4%) and Niger (3%). Close to 409,000, that is 94% of malaria deaths worldwide occurs in Africa.[285] The WHO Global Technical Strategy for Malaria 2016-2030, which the World Health Assembly adopted in May 2015, sets out a number of goals for 2030, including: reducing malaria cases by at least 90%; reducing malaria mortality rates by at least 90%; eliminating malaria in at least 35 countries.[286] However, due to a variety of reasons, including weak health systems, insufficient funding, and inadequate surveillance systems, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not on track to meet these ambitious targets.

After succinctly five years of stalled progress of malaria in Africa, efforts to reignite the previous headway made against malaria are further challenged by the Covid-19 pandemic. The impact of Covid-19 on the functioning of health services has led to a drop in testing for malaria, and, in some cases, a reduction in the number of children presenting at hospital with malaria. Global Lockdowns have disrupted the market supply chains and made it more logistically difficult to run preventive programs and treat populations affected by malaria, especially in remote areas. This could further undermine global efforts to meet the 2030 goals. The latest WHO malaria report suggests that even a 25% disruption in access to effective anti-malarial treatment could lead to an additional 46,000 deaths in the sub-Saharan Africa region.[287] The weak resource devoted to mitigating health risks remained insufficient. They are no global collective action to create a

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[281] *Ibid*
[282] WHO. World Malaria Report 2020. [online] Available at: https://www.who.int/teams/global-malaria-programme/reports/world-malaria-report-2020
(https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/eiu_abbott_malaria_in_ssa_report_1.pdf)
[283] https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/eiu_abbott_malaria_in_ssa_report_1.pdf
[284] WHO. World Malaria Report 2020. *Ibid.*
[285] *Ibid*
[286] WHO. WHO Global Technical Strategy for Malaria 2016-2030. [online] Available at: https://www.who.int/malaria/areas/global_targets/en/
[287] WHO. World Malaria Report 2020. *Ibid.*

vaccine to eradicate malaria in Africa. Rather, pharmaceutical industry sets its prior goal on money and not the health or value of human life. The reason is, it is an African disease and they are no global action to curb it.

Failed global actions and Africa's unpreparedness to establish a research sector to fight malaria and other endemic or pandemic diseases are the results of the continent continuous underdevelopment and dependence on Western aid. Such analysis reveals the fragility in the health system on the African soil. As far as the African Union does not review the crisis on the total health system in Africa, the endemic disease will keep on ravishing the lives of adult and young African population who could be sustainable product to enhance changes within the continent. It is time for Africa to unite and creates a "*United African Health Research Pharmaceutical Organization*" (*UAHRPO*). This organization must be view in collective strength of the Africans to robust their health sector and stop dependence on Western foreign aid tie with strings. The accurate information on the health crisis and on the outbreak has indirect bearing on deaths. The indirect mortality effects of a crisis within a health system that lacks resilience may be as great as the direct mortality effects of the crisis. Above this, there is need for a resurfacing of the Ethico-moral problem of abortion in the global society as a challenge to valorize human life and dignity.

## 3.2 THE ETHICO-MORAL AND EPISTEMIC PROBLEM OF ABORTION IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

Abortion remains a hotly controverted social and moral issue of our society today. In view of the fact today, between 50 and 60 million abortions are performed yearly worldwide. M.A. Monge writes; "Abortion is the expulsion of the non-viable foetus before the twenty-eight weeks of gestation; that is, when surviving outside the mother's womb is impossible."[288] Direct acceleration of death of the foetus[289] is unlawful direct killing. The problem is far more serious than is usually thought. The following question then arises: Is this not a global crisis event? Unfortunately, there have always been abortions worldwide. But in the last decades, as a result of that global policy, the number of abortions has escalated. In the political arena, the national will, the public good requires that we betray and that we lie and that we kill.

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[288]D. Marquis, "Why Abortion Is Immoral," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (April 1989), pp. 188. Or Abortion, Oxford living Dictionaries, Retrieved 8 June 2018.
[289]T. Sylvester, *Understanding Biology*, Volume 1, Green world Buea, 2004, p. 425.

The followers of social Darwinism may regret such action, but coldly defend it by the principle that "there is no alternative." This is as if, abortion was a natural phenomenon that nobody has strategically promoted or imposed and that nobody can stop. Some scholars accept abortion even in the last months of pregnancy, even on this massive scale. What is most striking, is the silence of many scholars in the West; but, the South and East recognize abortion as the killing of innocent and defenseless human beings. We should not descend into apocalypticism; however, to be honest in the face of mass starvation and abortion. The current capitalist globalization systems comprises of killing.[290] This is not new, but the dimensions certainly are. Many philosophers and great thinkers in general realize that one may never be able to present a case for the personhood of the foetus (i.e. in the case of the anti-abortion perspective) or the case against the personhood of the foetus (i.e. in the case of the pro-abortion perspective) that is satisfactory to every position available on the subject.

In line to these moral debates, there are arguments for and against abortion. The pro-life group highlights the argument of preserving human life since conception at any cost, to the point of giving absolute priority to the life of the unborn foetus over the life of the mother. Emphasizes are place by the pro-choice group that a woman should have a right to control her body even to the extent of absolutizing her right over the natural phenomenon of human development[291]of a new being (individual).[292] The actual problem in debate centers on the fact that both sides are extremely defensive and dogmatic in presenting their arguments from one perspective only, but, fail rather to see the whole issue in its psychological, biological,[293]moral, spiritual and societal complexity. The central problem with respect to justifying abortion is the moral status of the foetus. There are principally three types of positions: liberal, conservative and moderate. But our focus will be on the conservative point of view in principle of preserving human life and dignity.

The global view of abortion is with rare exceptions and seriously immoral has received little support in the recent mass of philosophical works. No doubt most 21st century philosophers affiliated with secular institutions of higher education believe that the anti-abortion position is

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[290]O. Blanchette *et al.*, *Philosophical challenges and opportunities of globalization volume* I, in Pablo Lopez Lopez, Old and New Globalization. United States of America, 2001, p. 57.
[291] http://www.socinian.org/files/Abortion.pdf/
[292]See, *M. Hillar, talk given October 19, 1996, at the* Ethics 96, University Humanist Conference*, University of Houston central campus, as part of a forum entitled* Are Traditional Moral Standards Inadequate for Modern Medical Practice?( cf. Published in Essays in the *Philosophy of Humanism,* M. Hillar and F. Prahl, eds., American Humanist Association, 1997, pp. 131-140).
[293] *Ibid*

either a symptom of irrational religious dogma generated by seriously confused philosophical argument. The purpose of this thesis is to undermine this general belief. This thesis sets out an argument that reasons to show, as well as any argument in ethics can show, that abortion is, except possibly in rare cases (i.e. cases of ectopic pregnancy and the removal of a cancerous uterus containing a foetus) is immoral. What makes killing primarily wrong in our world today is neither its effect on the murderer nor victim's relatives and friends, but rather its effect on the victim itself. The loss of one's life is one of the greatest losses or pain one can suffer.

The loss of one's life deprives one of all the activities, experiences, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future. It is *prima facie* morally wrong to kill children and infants, because we presume that they have futures of value. In view of these, we are force to ask: What do most versions or cultures in the world think of abortion? The shock of abortion is destructive. We turn to logic, the usual kind of argument that expresses itself typically from syllogism in movement from premises to conclusions and deductive argument that contains certainty, if the premises are true. We have a syllogism which is dibasic, di-fundamental and simple with a pro-life argument for abortion. It demonstrates the structure of all moral arguments.

The first premise is the moral principle "*thou shalt not murder.*" This entails we should not kill human persons. The second premise is the case of abortion. What is the feotus? It is the fact that the foetus is a human? A foetus is a human. It is innocent and incapable of committing any crime. The purpose of the law is to defend intrinsic natural, basic, and essential rights of human being. There is life and liberty to defend human freedom and happiness. Abortion denies intrinsic natural basic human right. Abortion is immoral as it violates the bases of human right. The second premise is the denial of the object of abortion as not being human. We believe that there is clear scientific evidence that the foetus is a human being, as at the moment of conception, there is a new genetic code. The sperm and the egg are haploid and we have half the chromosome.

From the point of conception to death, is just a gradual development from within. It is not a construction. The growth happens from within by nature, although the foetus does not have a human brain, cannot experience reason or thought until weeks later. But it is growing in a human brain. It does not have two souls for instance, one that keeps it alive and one that thinks. This is seen as scientific and philosophical reason of calling it a person. If we distinguish being a person and functioning as a human person. It is wrong to kill people who do not deserve to be killed. Objectively, either the foetus is a human person with the right to life. And subjectively, you either

know that it is a human person or not. What we have here is a conjunction of two claims. The first conjunct suggests that our lack of epistemic probability in determining the presence of personhood leads us to avoid any action that would otherwise presume the entity to not be a human person. To make that presumption would be to revoke one of the most fundamental rights of persons-the right to life-of the entity in question.

Morally speaking, we also have our intuition that the destruction of an entity that is unknown to be a member of the human moral community (i.e. a human person) is equally wrong. Immanuel Kant, the famous moral ethicist of the 18th century who helped shape western ideas about moral duties, argued for the intrinsic value of all human life by virtue of being a human life. Regarding Kant's views, Lawrence M. Hinman writes: Human life is to be preserved at all costs, for the value of human life is-beyond that of any costs.[294] If we accept that these babies have rights and are protected and it is thus wrong to commit infanticide upon them, how can it be consistent to deny these same protections to foetuses that are more fully developed and have a greater chance of survival? As initial as St. Augustine of Hippo we find a position of epistemic ignorance declared on precisely when someone becomes a person or, in his words, becomes "ensouled":

> "It is not everyone who reminisces his own infancy; and do you presume that a man is able, without any divine instruction, to know whence actually he began to exist in his mother's womb,-especially if the knowledge of human nature has so entirely eluded him as to leave him ignorant, not only of what is within him, but rather of that also which is added to his nature from without? Will you, my dearest brother or sister, be able to teach me, or anyone else in society, whence human beings at their birth are ensouled, Or will you be able to teach me, or anyone else, whence men obtain their souls, when you are still actually ignorant whence bags, when inflated, get the filling?[295] My only wish, as you are ignorant whence souls have their origin, is, that I may on my side know whether such knowledge is attainable by me in this present life to and not to our own."[296]

A similar concern is also mirrored or seen in the charge of "double-standard" often made of those who oppose abortion on demand with the expectation that one's pro-life stance is utterly self-contradictory when we consider the full scope of *all* bioethical issues. For instance: President G. W. Bush and D. J. Trump has defended their opposition to abortion by arguing that every life "is a sacred gift given by our Creator" and ought to be protected, and that abortion "discourages a culture that values life."[297] In a famous article by pro-abortion advocate Judith Jarvis Thompson, she makes it very clear that the prospects for "drawing a line" in the development of the foetus look indistinct (dim). We are persuaded that the foetus has already become a human person

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[294] L. M. Hinman, *Contemporary Moral Issues: Diversity and Consensus*, 3rd ed. (Prentice-Hall, 2006), p. 106.
[295] https://www.catholiccrossreference.online/fathers/index.php/Sir%203:22;%20Sir%203:21.and
http://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf105.xvii.html
[296] St. Augustine, *De Origine Animae* 5. 4.
[297] See K. J. Cook, *Divided Passions: Public Opinions on Abortion and the Death Penalty* (Northeastern University Press, 1998).

(individual) well before birth.[298] This implies for traditional pro-life Africans, fragile life is to be protected and conserved to maturity. At such, any act which threatens life is forbidden while those acts that are actually orchestrated to eliminate human life are considered as cultural taboos.[299]The global crisis of abortion that undermines human life thus ushers us to failed responsibility on the part of China on the health system. As the global society struggles to combat the corona-virus, it thus faces the grim of reality which is not just in developing countries, but more in developed ones that needs to revitalized and better-coordinated health systems. It is now clear that COVID-19 is a deadly contagion that threatens the livelihoods of all, regardless of socio-economic status.

## 3.3 THE PROBLEMATICS AND CERTITUDE OF COVID-19: RETHINKING THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN SCIENCE

COVID-19 being a scientific and social challenge of our 21st century global society has posed an extraordinary threat to global public health. At the end of 2019, what is now known as COVID-19 first surfaced with a novel coronavirus designated as SARS-CoV-2 emerged in the city of Wuhan, China.[300] Researchers mentioned the virus is thought to be of natural animal origin, most likely originated of bats given that bats harbour a wild range of the corona viruses. However, it is assumed to have spread through spillover infection but not clear on how it migrated from bats to humans. To this extent, the leading hypothesis from the research scientific community is that, the virus moved from animals to humans as a result of close contact with human and animal in the Wuhan animal market in Hubei province of china.

The present global health crisis (Covid-19) we are experiencing is different from any that previous generations have experienced. The convocations of the great black plague of 1348 or the Spanish flu of 1918-1919 are interesting in that they allow us to rethink the consequences of pandemics. But they say nothing, however, about the resilience of a society whose economy is globally integrated, and which had lost almost all memory of the risk of infection. If the current crisis is at first glance different, it would be by the speed of spread of this disease. Three months after the start of the Covid-19 health crisis, nearly half of the planet's population is called into confinement. Even if the contagiousness of the virus probably played a role in this shift from the

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[298]J. J. Thompson, "A Defense of Abortion," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1971), p. 47.
[299] T. Mbuy, *The Faith of Our Fathers: New Perspectives in the Study and Understanding of African Traditional Religion*, Archdiocesan Information Service, Bamenda 2012, 61.
[300]Cui, J., Li, F. & Shi Z. L. Origin and evolution of pathogenic coronaviruses. Nat. Rev. Microbiol. 17, 181-192(2019)

epidemic stage to that of a pandemic, globalization marked by the acceleration of the movement of people is at the heart of the propagation process.[301]

The reaction time of developed countries, whose health systems were quickly overwhelmed, should probably also be blamed. It attests to a lack of foresight and an-unfounded-confidence in the ability of health systems to massively protect their population while obtaining supplies of protective equipment and screening tests over the water, from foreign suppliers, mostly Chinese. No doubt this was not fatal. Taiwan, on the strength of its experience during previous epidemics, had protective equipment in quantity[302], production capacity for it and a department dedicated to the management of infectious diseases capable, in particular, of deploying quickly applications for managing and sharing data on infected patients. It is, without doubt, normal that a healthcare system is not designed to deal with sudden and temporary demand. But, in this case, it is important that it be reactive, that is to say capable of redirecting its offer and mobilizing predefined and identified reserves. This agility, it seems that we have been lacking.

The other machine-driven difference between this global Covid-19 crisis and previous crises is its scale. Many people initially tried to put the seriousness of the situation into perspective by recalling the number of deaths due to the seasonal flu, the HIV and Ebola epidemics, and even the health consequences of addictive practices such as alcohol or tobacco. In addition to the above fact, we will only know the lethal consequences of Covid-19 when we have curbed its transmission. Advancing this type of argument amounts to ignoring the global and absolute nature of this pandemic. Global insofar as no geographical area is spared and because the pandemic comes to cross a world demography which is without comparison with that of 1919: the simple number of individuals called upon to stay at home doubled twice as larger than during the Spanish influenza incident. This is absolute because it is obvious that no individual can consider himself to be immune to the risk of contamination. And it is such specificity of the Covid-19 crisis which distinguishes it from all previous episodes: its highly symbolic nature strikes and shocks a world population that had almost forgotten the risk of infection.

In this, it undermines the cozy comfort in which economically developed countries have gradually curled up. Death had not only become remote due to the increase in life expectancy, it

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[301]Jin Wu, Weiyi Cai, Derek Watkins and James Glanz, « How the Virus Got Out », The New York Times, 22 mars 2020.
[302] *Ibid*

had also become intolerable as evidenced by the reluctance to commit ground troops in most recent conflicts. The "value" of human life has increased considerably in the collective unconscious of the richest countries. The rapid spread of Covid-19 and it series of variants (Brazilian, English, South-African, Delta etc.) shows the illegitimacy of the WHO to affirm the origin of Covid-19 as a mystery which constitute a great challenge to the entire global scientific community. This unveils the understanding and limits of scientists that true science is not based on matter but rather on forms (spirit). But today, we are becoming aware of the precariousness of being. This crisis of being will certainly have considerable consequences that it is perhaps too early to address here. When it comes to being (the human person), the essence, rational soul, is completely bound to the existence of the individual. In Christian Aristotelian positions, everything in the natural world is bound together by form and matter. Being among the contingent of things, there is actually no form without matter and actually no matter without form. This is true for human existence as well. But, of course, a body without essence or soul is just only a body, rather not a person. To exist means to be in act through the composition of form and essence.[303]

In this perspective, we see in line with Jean Bertrand AMOUGOU that to grasp an understanding of its history, it is necessary for our global society to hold unto humanity and the crisis of existence, the challenges of living together as a polymorphic consequence of sovereignty of others. The problem in essence hovers on our free option for matter and not science, in the sense to precise true science, science in its full form (i.e. spirit).[304] It is however, the moment to be conscious of the great illusion which anticipates the progress of humanity about three centuries ago. At the metaphysical point of view, SARS-CoV-2 subscripts in the ideological, politico-economical reductionism of humanity. The global confinement in its surfacing and emergence in the city of Wuhan, China caused an outbreak of unusual viral pneumonia. In this perspective, our humanity becomes *de facto* in face of the sanitary crisis with an absence on the collective plain. The logical analysis of the irruption of SARS-CoV-2 and its origin relies on its epidemiology which questions the microcosmic position of man in the macrocosm as constitutively and necessarily link together.

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[303] See, Th. Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica Volume 1. The Great Books of the Western World*, edited by Mortimer J. Adler et al., Vol. 17, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996.

[304] J. Bertand AMOUGOU (dir), *le monde face à la laïcité et au covid-19: Quelles leçons pour L'Afrique*? In J. B. Amougou, le covid -19 : opportunités pour l'Ancrage dans nos ressources Africaines. L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 154.

The year 2020, starts with the blame game as the world experienced one of the most unfortunate times in the history of humanity, when the corona virus hit many nations and changed the fabric of our normal social order and spread unprecedented social unrest.[305] Amidst the challenges face by Covid-19 pandemic, countries all over the globe have been re-examining and re-assessing their pre-Covid-19 ways of existence, and how the pandemic called forth a re-shaping of those modes of existence in the midst of other social problems which have plagued societies for decades.[306] What underlies this claim is that, the pandemic has not only been detrimental to our health but it has rather transformed gradually the socio-economic and religious institutions. It has hut lights on our preparedness as the global society face unforeseeable events and the call for reconsideration of our taken for granted social realities and phenomenon in societies. This revealed the most neglected facts in the global society at the level of the world cultures which needs to complement each other for the survival of all rather than other cultures lining up behind a master.[307] Racism, individualism, discrimination, negligence and others are among the causes why the corona virus spread around the world in a twine of an eye.

In effect, at the peak of problems as compared to the Spanish flu, people would always be abandoned to sort out themselves without any possibility of receiving vital help from anyone else. The western scientific model was a failure to provide the much needed help to the world. No cure was discovered and people were dying at an alarming rate. Undeniably, it became clear that individual nations and persons had only themselves to depend on. Science itself needed help to understand what was happening and how to solve it. Global policies had failed and world leaders were at each other's neck pointing hands and accusing fingers in every direction.[308]

In recent months we have seen considerable form disinformation and misinformation mingling among global partners, limiting the world's ability to effectively and efficiently response to the crisis of humanity. These unequivocally demonstrate that the subsequent exponential growth of the cases in each country was largely, if not exclusively, the consequence of respective failed governmental inaction and responsibility. So, China takes no responsibility of the onset of the

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[305] *Ibidem*, p. 166.
[306] *Ibidem*
[307]*Ibidem*, p. 177.
[308] *Ibid*

global outbreak outside China.[309] Aside from this impact on human life and health, the global economy has been significantly impacted by the virus' spread, and as the international community continues to deal with the myriad psychological, economic, and health-related side effects of COVID-19, it has, understandably, looked for some entity on which to place the blame. Both within the U.S. and the international community, it is the WHO that is receiving much of this blame.

The most visible figure pointing a finger at the WHO at the pandemic's outset was former U.S. President Donald Trump. It is in the midst of this strategy that U.S. President Donald Trump decided to completely withdraw US funding to W.H.O[310] accusing it of working in complicity with China to destroy the world. How did we get here?[311] Trump in his speech refers the corona virus as a "China Virus" calling on China to render an account to the world. This unveils the leak lab theory behind the corona virus. Based on Trumps' analysis, the virus is a laboratory creature with economic and political motives for a robust Chinese economic. The aforementioned hypothesis is classified under the realm of bioterrorism[312] in which classification China is the terrorist. This idea falls under what Tsala Mbani refers to as ontological terrorism.[313] Further, China president move to step up funding to the WHO is being treated as a means to escape the allegation and to continue to buy WHO officials so that they will not initiate an investigation against China.

Per Stat, an American health-related news source, President Trump cited the WHO's protection of China "as the coronavirus pandemic took off" as his rationale.[314] While halting funding and ending the country's relationship with the WHO did not receive bipartisan support- and in some cases not even within the President's party-ire towards the WHO was expressed by

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[309]K. Gilsinan, "How China Deceived the WHO," The Atlantic, April 12, 2020, accessed December 01, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/world-health-organization-blame-pandemiccoronavirus/609820/

[310]A. Joseph and Helen Branswell, "Trump: U.S. Will Terminate Relationship with the World Health Organization in Wake of COVID-19 Pandemic," Stat, May 29, 2020, accessed November 29, 2020. https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/29/trump-us-terminate-who-relationship/.

[311]S. Hameiri, Covid-19: Why did global health governance fail? https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/covid-19-why-did-global-health-governance-fail.

[312] J. Bertrand AMOUGOU, *Le monde face à la laïcité et au COVID-19*, op. cit., p 181.

[313]A. L. Tsala Mbani, *Biotechnologies et Nature Humaine, vers un Terrorisme Ontologique?*, L'Harmattan. 2007.

[314]A. Joseph and Helen Branswell, "Trump: U.S. Will Terminate Relationship with the World Health, *op. cit.*, p 15.

prominent figures in both major parties.[315] One of the most outspoken Democrats at the beginning of the virus' outbreak was New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, whose state has been arguably the most impacted by the virus. In April 2020, Cuomo echoed Trump's misgivings about the WHO's initial handling of COVID-19 stating, "The president says it is the World Health Organization, and that is why he is taking action against them. But he is right to ask the question because this was too little, too late."[316] Current events have made America's involvement in and financial support of the WHO a hot-button issue in American foreign policy circles over the last year.

However, the pandemic has merely served as a sounding board for a debate that has been brewing over the last decade in America.[317] These, heightened sentiments, placing America at a crossroads when it comes to its membership in financial support of the WHO.  In navigating this crossroads, it is important for U.S. policymakers to consider America's role in the WHO both in the immediate and distant futures. As such, foreign policymakers must find a balance between two important factors, each of which carries considerable biblical significance. We must first reflect on the importance of prominent lenient power in the spirit of Proverbs 19:17, of which the first phrase is utmost vital: "Whoever give to the poor, is lending to the Lord, and the Lord will reward you for what you have done" (NIV).[318] In doing so, however, they must also consider implications of financial decisions in the spirit of Proverbs 10:4, which proclaims, "Lazy hands will make you poor, but hard work will bring you wealth."

### 3.3.1 The complexity and logic of global failure to contained COVID-19 pandemics

The complexity of COVID-19 has been drastic with harsh test for public health systems in the global society. The logic of its failure hovers on research and innovation of policy, on the European Union and global governance.[319] But the complexity and failures have also been

[315]P. Sullivan, "Senate GOP Chairman Criticizes Trump Withdrawal from WHO," The Hill, May 29, 2020, accessed December 22, 2020. https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/500205-senate-gop-chairman-criticizestrump-withdrawal-from-who.

[316]M. Fernandez, "Cuomo: WHO was 'too little, too late' on Coronavirus," Axios, April 24, 2020, accessed November 29, 2020. https://www.axios.com/cuomo-world-health-organization-coronavirus-346afe6b50c9-4b11-9154-9431611505c1.html

[317] J. M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy & Process, 6th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2014), p. 525. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1092&context=jspp

[318] https://www.pinterest.com/pin/494551602809997051/

[319]A. Bucher, G. Papaconstantinou and J. Pisani-Ferry, 'The failure of global public health governance: a forensic analysis', *Policy Contribution* (2022), Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/2022/02/the-failure-of-global-public-health-governance-a-forensic-analysis/

significant. They include a lack of preparedness, a muted response to the first alerts, the hoarding of specialized equipment and vaccine nationalism. The influx of the Omicron variant in November 2021 was an unambiguous reminder of the high overall cost of the globally tenacity (persistence) of extremely unequal access to vaccines and treatments.[320] What are the reasons for these failures of global collective action? The observed global failures in prevention, mitigation and alert, equitable and efficient vaccine distribution raises important analytical and policy questions that we want to investigate. It is important for the future to understand whether domestic politics, geopolitical rivalry, surpassed incentives to collaborate with concerns institutional decay, over sovereignty and misplaced selfishness. As the world experience the devastating pandemic eroding the fabrics of human lives and society, the WHO and UN political leadership inability for preparedness of pandemics has failed global health governance policies. The consequences of such are the operation of the political system at the national level. The system that has been developed to provide a global response to epidemics and pandemics since the aftermath of the 1981 influza has failed miserably.

The failed global governance lies in the tendency of the WHO inability to play its central or key role of disease surveillance and rapid response coordination. The COVID-19 pandemic is both a world health crisis and a stress test for global health cooperation, exposing a glaring deficit in global health governance.[321] Richer nations are focused on containing their local out-breaks, but this is a global crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic will forever change the world order. Even the most powerful nations will be unable to meet the unprecedented health and social challenges alone.[322] In his response, he said, we must be frank about one of the primary reasons this outbreak spun out of control, there was a failure by this organization to obtain the information that the world needed, and that failure cost many lives. Azar further opined to the World Health Assembly and the WHO's governing body that the U.S. will upkeep a full review of Covid-19 response organization in the status quo "intolerable."

We saw in an age of technology that WHO failed at its core mission of information-sharing and transparency when member states do not act in good faith. From it outlook, the WHO was simply not fit for this purpose. This stems from its subservience to major funding states, which

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[320] https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74293

[321] https://www.siis.org.cn/Commentary/3436.jhtml

[322] L. Facher, In combative remarks, Azar tells WHO that its Covid-19 response 'cost many lives,' May 18, 2020https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/18/azar-who-failure/

dates back prior to the 1970s. The failed preparedness WHO funds have fallen shortly of its target and expectation, even following the 2014 Ebola epidemic outbreak in West Africa. The America architect and theorist Buckminster Fuller captured this mismatch of global pandemics almost 40years with approximately 150 supreme admirals in one spaceship on Earth.[323] We have the 150 admirals in the 150 state rooms each trying to run their respective stateroom as if it were separate ship. We have the tar board side admirals' league trying to sink the port side admirals' league. The pandemic is in the critical window of January 2020.

As observed from the lens of COVID-19 WHO, there has also been a desire by Western governments to prioritize health sector loans, with string attached, through the World Bank. In his dialogue "The Statesman," Plato develops the idea that God from time to time lets humans alone govern the world, to the point where catastrophe follows excessively indulgent human behaviours. COVID-19 has exposed the well-recognized and deep disorders of this world, disorders that need to be repaired. Nothing will prove more effective than values-based leadership, science, and collaboration. COVID-19 has tremendously expose the political system in the global society operating both locally and nationally to a future world harm.

The global failure to contain the COVID-19 pandemics springs from the locust swarms and discontent in countries worsened by shocks that originate outside its borders. The covid-19 pandemic has exposed economic damage, social and political vulnerabilities within countries as well weaknesses in international cooperation, frustration with quality of public services and inequalities, stress and isolation, culture wars, political polarization, structural imbalance and emergence of locust swarms across East Africa and Asia. In the middle of 2021, with the present US President Joe Bidens' administration and re-commitment to the WHO and Paris climate agreement, the covid-19 pandemic continues to impose a terrible cost on humanity. Millions of lives have been lost amid the worst global health crisis in a century, with hundreds of millions of people contracting the virus. The recent pandemic and surface variance has caused the largest global economic shock in the living memory. The spread of the Virus thus demonstrates a brutal problem in one country and how failed responsibility can disrupt and destabilizes the whole globe.

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[323]https://www.preventionweb.net/news/coronavirus-failure-global-governance-now-world-needs-radical-transformation

The failure of the WHO and other organs goes beyond the virus and focuses on the systemic weaknesses and structural defects and vast inequalities of the world today. As Hotez in 2021 explains that the Covid-19 pandemic was five years in the making. He abruptly identifies some setbacks in the progress against infectious diseases, as well leading to the continuous preventable-vaccine diseases of emergence and re-emergence of both multiple infections in most areas of the world. These actually points to the rise of anti-science sentiment in laboratories prior to the pandemic and the concomitant increase in vaccine hesitancy. Failure to address global covid-19 pandemic starts at the national level, with failure in governance by the Chinese government to prevent the spread of the disease from its borders and symptomatic failure policymakers and politicians in absence good and robust governance both at the national level, in cities and communities.

### 3.3.2 The impact of COVID-19 on people in the global Society

COVID-19 and its history have a costly, long-lasting and regressive crisis. The global health influence of covid-19 has severely compounded the disadvantages being faced by most poor and vulnerable groups. The negative impacts of COVID-19 are being felt harder by certain countries and by groups within countries. For instance, once the health crisis escalated in a few countries in Asia and Europe, developing countries mostly in Africa started to experience the effects of economic contagion before any noticeable effect on public health from the virus itself. Some of the impacts in the developing world hit even before COVID-19 contagion, through different channels:[324] The different channels are three in numbers as follows: The first most affected were the *Financial channels with* short-term capital outflows which have been massive even greater than in the 2008 global financial crisis.[325] The second aspect was the *Trade channels increase* commodity prices (particularly important for developing countries) have dropped. The

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[324]C. Hevia, and A. Neumeyer. 2020. "Un marco conceptual para analizar el impacto economico del COVID-19 y sus repercusiones en las politicas." UNDP LAC Policy Documents Series C19, 1.https://www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/rblac/es/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/a-conceptual-frameworkfor- analyzing-the-economic-impact-of-covi.html.

[325]UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2020. "The Covid-19 Shock to Developing Countries: Towards a 'Whatever It Takes' Programme for the Two-Thirds of the World's Population Being Left Behind." https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gds_tdr2019_covid2_en.pdf.

third aspect was the repercussion on *Migration and remittances*.[326]This pandemic is a challenge for every country.

Affecting acutely the entire food system, this pandemic has laid bare its instability (fragility). The border closures by nation-states, border passports, trade restrictions and confinement measures have been preventing millions of farmers in accessing the accessing markets, consequently disrupting domestic and international customary food supply chains and reducing access to healthy, safe and diverse diets with high nutritional imbalance. It is disastrous in developing countries more precisely in Africa, with some cases from of the Ebola epidemic. The pandemic has devastated jobs and placed millions of livelihoods at risk and intense vulnerability.

In addition to its devastating effects on lives and livelihoods, the pandemic heightened political tensions in many countries. The Covid-19 outbreaks was widely politicized. Differences in opinion as to the appropriate government responses to covd-19 often ran along political party lines like in the US, exacerbating divisions between opposing political groups in already polarized societies. These amplified differences are provoke media coverages. This politicization is thought to have come at a terrible cost in terms of lives needlessly lost. The politicization has not been limited to national politics but put at international relations. The crisis thus develops preexistent social inequalities, distancing and exposing vulnerabilities which are in turn intensifying the pandemic impacts. The above implication provoked the WHO, US CDC and European Centre for preventing diseases to launch into therapeutic measures to fight Covid-19 epidemic. This calls for novel approaches.

### 3.3.3 Way forward amidst COVID-19 health preventive measures in the global society

In designing and implementing measures, it is essential that nation-states or governments work closely with employers and workers,[327]thus, responding swiftly to the pandemic, while ensuring that humanitarian and recovery assistance reaches those mostly in need. Now is the time for global cohesion (solidarity) and support, especially with the most vulnerable in our societies,

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[326] M. Orozco, "Migrants and the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Remittances." Inter-American Dialogue, 18 March 2020.https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Migration-remittances-and-the-impact-of-the-pandemic-3.pdf.

[327]Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. World Health Organization. Available at: https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov

particularly in the emerging and developing world. Only together can the global society, scientific community and the pharmaceutical industry overcome the intertwined health and socio-economic impacts of the pandemic in order prevent further escalation of protracted catastrophe of both humanitarian and food security. The world needs an updated global health security concept to prevent future pandemics and not the absence of effective health cooperation from G20, WHO and UN. In our present era, no continent or country is immune to pandemic. The global health security system in the world is in dire need of an updated system to help overcome panic and the cycle of neglect. Health security for all humanity can only be achieved when nations can act to enhance on an urgent sense of mutual obligations, greater solidarity and shared fate upon future pandemics.

In a world of high proliferating public health threats, it takes considerable legal strategic foresight and political will on the part of national leaders to erect a robust governance architecture in which an extensive and effective health cooperation system can be carried out under the principles of human equality and mutual respect as common goal to humanity social wellbeing. Hence, the leadership vacuum must be filled to facilitate collective action on monitoring, epidemic prevention and response. In the same way, the United Nations and its specialized agencies should consequently increase its technical and financial assistance to developing countries especially in Africa, just as developed countries. On this note, emerging world therefore needs to necessarily overcome their differences to mutually build a healthy global health public system. Such a system should be set up to facilitate rapid responsive and early intervention in the event of a major health emergency.

The world will also need a resilient and reliable global medical product supply network chain. It should be coupled with sound management and logistics to ensure the global availability of urgently needed medical resources (materials) in the event of a health future crisis. The international collaboration should therefore, be increased to facilitate technological innovation in drug resistance research. By so doing, countries should establish a public health technology bank to ensure the reliable supply of vaccines, treatments and diagnostic kits.[328] The present health crisis has confirmed once again that all nations do share woe and weal. More than ever, global decisive action is needed to ensure that the WHO and other specialized agencies, such as the global health system as a whole, need to work intensively with national governments.

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[328]T. Bernes *et al.*, *Challenges of Global Governance Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic*, USA, 2020, p. 33.

Above all, the global contexts need to develop long-term sustainable strategies to address the challenges facing the health and agri-food sectors to prevent such escalating pandemic in the nearest future. There need for the world to necessarily rethink the future of our environment; tackling environmental degradation and climate change with urgency and ambition. This pandemic even when brought under control, will till likely be disparate, as well changing from country to country. This disproportion could supplementary confound national economies because those that have contained the virus will not hesitate to open their borders. The closure of borders amidst the crisis reveals our economy is not globalize. The China's COVID-19 response being an excellent example.

## 3.4 CONTEXTUALIZING GLOBAL CRISIS OF IDENTITY-CONFLICTS AND THE CHALLENGES OF LIVING TOGETHER

The 20th century was remarkably dominated by devastating legacy of global wars, ideological conflicts and colonial struggles, and as well as much efforts put in place to establish an international systems that would necessary substitute global prosperity and peace. In particular, new global threats such as well organized crime, civil unrest, trafficking and terrorism have supplemented continued pre-occupation with conventional war between and within countries. Risks are evolving with new global threats to human life and stability arising from international organized crime and global economic instability. The short and long ripple waves are effects of geospatial, geostrategic, geo-economics, and geopolitical clash of western interest being felt across the European, Asian and African continent.

A conflict of warfare in the global society is opposing between forces, most specifically a protracted and hostile but unpredictable struggle. Conflicts are universal elements in human life. Our global society is based on internal differences in which there is conflict also among its members. The global society involves both likeness and difference. The ontology of such likeness and difference are the logical antitheses but for an empathetic likeness, knowledge of its relation to the other is very essential. The global society in this sense is viewed as web of social relationships. The abstract and invisible relationships are social. Society is therefore abstract.

In this sense, life is not a thing observe but a general process of living. Associating the global society is not just a thing but rather a process of associating with others. Society in general exists only as a time sequence. This time is becoming, not a being but a process and not a product.

To some extent the same is true not only of materiality of man's past culture but even of his immaterial cultural achievements. The global society therefore, provides a system of stratification of statuses and classes in the social structure and position of each individual relatively stable and recognizable. In light of these, we shall further elaborate on the very foundations of the global conflicts provoked by western hegemonic states of interests in Asia and Africa.

In face to overcome conflict and struggle, the most terrible war pursued in the global society is in the name of peace in contradiction to a doomed and fail coordination, the most terrible oppression only in the name of freedom, the most terrible inhumanity only in the name of humanity.'[329]Addressing the ontological root causes of these challenges also needs reexamining the agricultural and energy policies that underpin our global economy. Our interest is to know: what is at the heart of global conflict-identity that has been going on for more than a decade? The clashes of global conflicts are more of geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic interest. Empires such as the Roman and British submerged the world under their control for a period of time, but, they ended up collapsing.

Today, the American hegemony capitalist States and United Nation foreign diplomacy since World War II and manipulation of failed proclaim democracy around the world, risk plunging in the same trend. A backdrop of such manipulative agenda are observed war crimes committed in early 2000s in Afghanistan, 2001 disaster in New York and false declaration of 2003 war against the Iraqis. In addition, 2011 war in Syria, 2014 in Libya, Sudan crisis, Malian crisis, Anglophone crisis in Cameroon since 2016 and the clash of the present Russo-Ukraine conflict of identities and borders security caused by the United States and NATO in 2022. The Russo-Ukraine conflict is a crisis of political identity that unveils the subaltern of one people partition in two identities. Putin and Russia's Imperial Identity and Ukraine are "one people" whose common history implies that they should also share a common political fate today.

Apart from ideological and political reasons, Putin had greatly sought Ukraine's membership in a Moscow-dominated free-trade bloc which was launched in the early 2000. The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) united several ex-Soviet republics and was extensively seen as a first step to reincarnate the former USSR. Having approximately a population of 43 million with a powerful industrial and agricultural, Ukraine in general was hypothetical to be the

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[329]G. Rae. "The problem of political foundation," in Carl schmitts and Emmanuel Levinas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2016, p. 67. DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59168-5

most indispensable part of the EAEC trade next to Russia, but Kyiv refused to join. Ukraine declining Russia's supremacy is rather pledging to join the European Union (EU) and NATO since the 2005 and 2014 revolutions. Being enraged, Putin particularly outlook of NATO centers next to his borders declares Ukraine joining the US-led and transatlantic cooperation would mark the crossing of a red line to special military operation in Ukraine."[330] Moscow critiques of the U.S.'s providing security to NATO's Eastern members are signs of hostile intent, nurturing a rising security crisis concerns in central Europe, as well as an arm race.

The philosophical strata at state is the interplay and inseparably entwined with psychological predilections that have become commonplace in the global society. We borrow from Jean Bertrand AMOUGOU who states that, the chaos threatening the future of the global society and humanity itself-in the twenty first century derives from psychological problems confounded by solipsist complex that has unfortunately been fostered by the primary metaphysical experience of the *cogito* as based on the *ego* rather than on the *cogitamus* as based on the *sumus*.[331] What underlies this assertion is the propensity for the hegemonic behaviour of western politics which finds its psychological and metaphysical foundation of domination in the global society. Perhaps, this is the foundation of the hegemonic problematic, which itself serves as the foundation for the idea that human nature is by instinct predisposed to destruction and domination by humans that maintain the adage we are all suffering from a social illness.

The rhetoric of hegemonic problematic unveils the superior/inferior cultures, clash of civilization, free world/others, good/evil as the basis of the conflict-identity. This presupposes the existential sense of western domination and secularity as a symbolic interpretation of politics, religion (God) and the ethical interpretation of the finite human condition.[332]Putin officially slams Western reckless sanction on Russian; blame US for global food crisis. He delivered a combative speech on June 22th 2022 at St Petersburg international economic forum, saying Russia's economy had weathered Western sanctions imposed after Mosco's intervention in Ukraine. Distancing Russia from the international markets not only affects Russians citizens but also has direct impacts on low-incomes homes globally due to scarcity of wheat, cereal oils and petrol. Those actually

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[330] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589

[331]J. Bertrand AMOUGOU, *Psychological and philosophical dimension of identity*, in George F. Mclean and Andrew Blasko, Globalization and Identity, cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series VII, seminar: culture and values, volume 25, 2010, p. 44.

[332] *Ibidem*

feeling the brunt are the most vulnerable people in Ukraine. The consequences are as a result of the U.S hegemony manipulative tendency of considering other countries as colonies.

The depressed predictions for the Russian economy by NATO and U.S had not been fulfilled. This meant, the European sanction on Russia is reckless and as a doubled-edge sword detailing economic loses the European Union has suffered from imposing sanctions on Russia. It is, in light of this blame that Putin reaffirmed his country's obligation to boost production and increase exports to countries in most need especially in Africa. Amidst the lengthy criticism of the U.S and its allies, Putin clearly affirms that: Nothing will again be as it used to be in global economic and politics.[333] On this note, Putin reiterated the *Unipolar World* era is over, despite the attempts made by the Americans to preserving it. We are now in a multipolar Era. Perhaps, this is the natural course of history and change, that may lead to the collapse of the capitalist hegemony. The USA, having proclaimed victory in the cold war, have declared themselves ambassador of God on earth, who have no obligation but only interest. These interests are declared secret. They seems not to notice that in recent decades on this planet, new powerful centers have formed and are making themselves known more and more loudly (i.e. North Korea, Iran and others).

On declaring such, affirms Asia key to world becoming truly *Multi-polar*.[334] Russia is doing it utmost to provide production to countries that need them. This calls for the elimination of all artificial, illegitimate barriers that prevent the restoration of the normal functioning of global supply chains in order to solve urgent task in food security like many of its partners in Asia. We believe the global society needs change on how the global financial system works, that has- for decades-allowed the self-proclaimed golden billions which has locked up the flows of capital and technology, largely at the expense of others. This shows a backdrop of major changes in global politics and economics. The global society is becoming truly multi-polar, with Asia playing a prominent, if not key role as an emergent new center of power. Asian countries (especially China) are the driving force behind global economic growth.

Even before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the global economy was suffering from the repercussions of several ripple waves of conflicts, man-made climate shocks, and COVID-19 devastating consequences for poor people and rising costs-with low-income developing

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[333] https://globalnews.ca/news/8928138/ru.....
[334] Emerging geopolitics of the Multi-polar world.at Valdai 2022. https://en.Kremlin.ru/events/president...

countries.[335] The socio-economic and political dimension of the war in Ukraine, is generating an alarming flowing special effects to global world economy been battered by climate change, COVID-19 and with particularly dramatic impacts on developing countries. In a global environment of already high levels of socio-economic stress due to the impacts of COVID-19, the violence and rise in food prices threatens knock-on effects of social unrest globally.

As a result, commodity prices failure record highs across the board. Undeniably, impact on exposure is counted in the billions of people living in over a hundred countries, threatened across overlapping dimensions of high vulnerability. The most vulnerable populaces in both developed and developing countries (Europe, U.S.A, Asia and Africa) are predominantly uncovered to these increase price swings, as it dedicates the larger share of income to energy and food. The poorest countries incline to be net food export and importers with a measure imports on trade that can ancillary aggravate the global rising food prices.[336]

The ongoing disruptions in global supply chains and financial markets further complicate current and future outlooks. Since 2019, the number of people experiencing hunger has increased by 46 million in Africa, around 57 million in Asia, and about 14 million more in Latin America and the Caribbean;[337]an additional 77 million more people are living in extreme poverty.[338] School closures have led to losses of up to 17 trillion dollars in lifetime earnings for this generation of students;[339] and more than six million lives have been lost to the COVID-19 disease.[340]The high socio-economic levels of stress resulting from the COVID-19 crisis has relating impacts on climate change, elicit collapse of debt distress, shutdowns and food shortages. Of course, an approximately 1.8 billion people, 556 million are experiencing abject poverty, and 216 million are already starving. The effects of the Ukraine are being felt globally because of the region's substantial food and energy supplies contribution. The widespread impacts are far-reaching, but the consequences for poorer and vulnerable people, will be particularly severe. The effect are certainly going to create market disturbances throughout 2023.

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[335] https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/ukraine-war-deepening-global-food-insecurity-what-can-be-done
[336] https://news.un.org/pages/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/UN-GCRG-Brief-1.pdf
[337] FAO. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021.
[338] Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2022.
[339]The World Bank, UNESCO and UNICEF. The State of the Global Education Crisis: A Path to Recovery. (2012).
[340] World Health Organization. WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard.

Despite the current Russian-Ukraine conflict, the situation in Africa has created tensions within borders and resource exploitation. Biden's U.S-African summit (49 African Leaders) comes amidst at a time when Africa's geostrategic significance is on the rise and at a time when U.S. impact is on a decline and Chinas' influence on a rise in the continent. This shows directly a failed inherited system of democratic stagnancy and exploitation. Biden's express support for African Union to join the G20 and push forth United Nations Security Council to include a permanent member from Africa, unveils a manipulative agenda like in Ukraine NATO Membership at the EU.

The Washington summit comes as parts of Africa contend with crisis that is political instability and climate emergency with the previous years on high coups in Burkina Faso Mali, Sudan, and Guinea.[341] U.S main interest is not to boost health and security in Africa (with $55Billion dollars) but rather to counter the growing influence of China and Russia in Africa which unveils U.S. selfish intent on the continent backwardness. Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries and about 40 percent of Africa south of the Sahara have experienced at least one period of civil war. It is estimated that 20% of Sub-Saharan Africa's population now lives in countries which have low-intensity conflict, are formally endemic at war across many other African states. The more occurrences of political violence we observe in Africa today, the more support for this simplistic and negative perception depriving them of democratic possibilities.[342]

This thesis therefore attempts to investigate the ontological causes of conflicts in Africa as well as looking at some efforts that have been made to solve and prevent such conflicts. It is important to note that the causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. This is because an effective response to African conflict requires agreement on and understanding of its causes. Past responses to conflict have often failed to understand the context within which conflict has address causes. It is however possible to distinguish between the root causes of conflict, the secondary causes that enable and sustain conflict and the tertiary causes or the drivers that hinder resolution. The root causes of conflicts in Africa springs forth from inequality between groups in society.

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[341] https://democracynow.org
[342] E. Ibrahim, and Sambanis, Nicholas. "How Much War Will We See? Estimating the Likelihood and Amount of War in 161 Countries, 1960-1998." Mimeo, The World Bank (January 2000), 3.

Inequality between groups is probably the foremost cause of conflict in Africa. It is inequality between groups-rather than individuals-that increases the prospects of violent conflict in the continent. Unequal access to power perpetuated a similar lack of access to resources, revenue and access to education.[343] This results in social inequalities. Where a society is divided into two pre-dominant groups, growing inequality between them often leads to conflict and security treats (i.e. rise of radical Islamic terrorist group and increased natural resource extraction). Much of this is deep-rooted in colonialism, rather than due to deficiencies that could readily be addressed. Africa currently has experienced greater economic insecurity far more than other regions of the world during last past decade and a half.[344]

African social security systems have the rising tides of income insecurity are the consequences of threat by radical Islamic terrorist group and the trend of natural resource discoveries in Africa. The effects are often felt on the collapse of the state which caused an internal, regional conflict, politics of personality to secure both the political power and control of resources. The state finds it-self unable any longer to provide basic services or security to its people and loses its legitimacy.[345] The collapse of infrastructure completes the breakup of the state with the use of ethnic violence that creates the conditions in which violence becomes evident and self-sustaining form of factional warfare, as has happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone.[346] One faction may predominate over time, but this does not necessarily result in resolution of conflict due to its economic decline and economic shock. Economic decline plays a major role in the collapse of the state and conflict.

Economic shock is a more direct and potent cause. This, therefore, ranges from a natural catastrophe to sudden huge shifts in terms of trade. Other economic shocks have similar effects and history. Conflicts do occur as means in resolving problems of tradition. To an extent, radical violence is deep-rooted as instruments of the state such as the police, army and judiciary that sustains the process. Other historical processes may provoke violence. History in places such as the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Burundi created a state model based on the artificial creation and abuse of ethnicity to maintain power. A past pattern of conflict is one of the best

[343] E. William. "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict," unpublished mimeo, World Bank (January 2000), pp. 7-8.
[344] https://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/sheet_no5.pdf
[345] *Ibid,* p. 9.
[346]E. William, and Levine, Ross. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics.* CXII (4), (November 1997), p. 12.

predictors of future conflict. The region's natural resource wealth is of economic value to western society.

They are practically two types of resource based conflict in Africa: wars of abundance and wars of resource scarcity. In Africa, the most common conflicts is resource scarcity which relates to the control of water rights and grazing for nomadic people. Countries in Africa, whose economies are dependent on natural resources such as oil and minerals, face a very high risk of conflict. In these wars of abundance, groups compete of these resources, which become the "prize" for controlling the state and lead to coups, as in Sierra Leone and the DRC.[347] Unfair exploitation of resource rich regions can lead to secession like the case of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Abundant resources can also attract external intervention. The private sector plays a critical role in wars of abundance, as well military have become more involved in developing their own personal commercial companies. Such wars become self-financing, self-sustaining, and therefore less open to mediation.

Based on the primary causes of conflicts in the African soil, there are also secondary causes like unemployment, lack of education and population pressure. Countries with high levels of unemployment are likely to face a far higher risk of conflict. Throughout the African continent, conflicts of factional has drawn a pool of socially excluded and marginalized young men. Increasing insecurity of land tenure in Rwanda and the high levels of rural unemployment provided a ready group of participants in the genocide in 1994. The conflict in Liberia was fought by socially marginalized young men.[348] The consequences were abuse of ethnicity.

Political leaders in Africa have made increasing use of ethnic hatred. Elements of several African governments have openly provoked ethnic tensions with the intention of destabilizing areas under Rwandan, CAR and Chad influence. Equally elements of the Ugandan armed forces have exploited ethnic differences in order to benefit commercially from the conflict.[349] In both instances community divisions have been deepened and there have been a greater number of fatalities and injury than are experienced in more conventional fighting. Also, the ready availability of small arms in Africa is a major factor in sustaining and fueling conflict.

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[347]*Ibidem,* p. 16.
[348]L. Roy, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *American Political Science Review* 89 (September 1995), 11.
[349]S. Nicholas, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," *World Politics* 52 (July 2000), 23.

In a nutshell, considerable supplies of small arms from previous wars are in circulation. The tenets are ingrained in regional and interlocking conflicts wherein, a large path of Africa from Sudan to Angola, passing through the Great Lakes and the DRC, as well as central Africa is caught up in a series of multiple and interlocking conflicts. The duration of conflict therefore, increases with the complexity of regional intervention, and the interrelationship of one conflict with another, thus, forming the conflict cycle. Parts of Africa have settled into a conflict cycle in which states move from low-level crisis or open war into long-term and protracted conflict and then back to low level crisis.[350] The effects of such are inadequate and inappropriate mediation.

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[350] R. Dani, "Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth Collapses," *Journal of Economic Growth,* 4, no. 4, (December 1999), 385.

# Partial Conclusion

Our global society has not experienced the social indiscriminate and simultaneous health, governance and economic harm brought by the COVID-19 virus in a century. When it comes to the WHO, the questions that can be considered solely are based on a compartmentalized dissatisfaction over HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Ebola, Abortion and most importantly COVID-19. Issues of national security and the global balance of power must be considered to form a comprehensive solution in society. This represents a challenge for many health-care systems and a foundation to rethink our socio-economic systems to be more resilient and equitable. Human dignity must be a key consideration when we think about resilience and how we recovered from covid-19. We need a global programs to fuel the transfer of healthcare and technology. The remarkable facts of the global society that has been overlooked is wars and conflicts. Without exception, they are destruction of rights to human dignity, freedom, property and land justice, or equally, liberation from oppression and exploitation. In the past like in the present, most wars are likened to be that of aggression of the waves of colonial expansion of Western powers, subjugating cultures and tribes in Asia and Africa.

# CHAPTER FOUR: THE METAPHYSICAL APPROACH OF THE ETHICO-MORAL ROOTS OF THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

## Partial Introduction

The more the historical consciousness of a society (humanity) is aware of its eventual capacity to take advantage of its past, the more it is susceptible of being subject to crisis.[351] The extreme consideration of such would consist in seeking a "metaphysics of crisis," which has even been attempted by our contemporary thought.[352] Our personal epistemological approach to this may be qualified as being inspired by a rather positive intention. Only if one can formerly understand what a crisis, any crisis is as to its nature, it will be possible to investigate the specific nature of the global crisis of humanity. However, we are even more prepared to investigate on the dialectical essence of historical crisis, which, due precisely to this preparation, will preoccupy us much less extensively than that of the other parameters of the issue. Each historical crisis appears as the reaction of the historical consciousness of a society, which becomes aware of a menacing interruption of its normal and orderly course towards its self-ascertainment. Such a menace may have its cause either outside or even inside a given society. Already, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Husserl noticed a crisis of the European sciences.[353] In our days, we refer more and more, not only to the prominent economic crisis, but also to environmental and cultural crisis. Keynes' revolution in economy[354] has already been surpassed, like every other revolution. What remains to be defined and understood in such an ocean of global crisis is not the nature of a concrete order of crisis, but that of the very idea of crisis, whose every other crisis is a specific manifestation. It, nevertheless, always gets intensified due to the conflict between the effects of such a society's weaknesses and the effects of its own activity that aims to intensify its presence.

## 4.1 UNDERSTANDING THE CRISIS AND ECONOMIC REASON OF THE CRISIS

To understand the metaphysical and systemic crisis of humanity in the current global capitalism, it must be placed in the history of economic thought. The post-war liberal school based its reflection on a neutral, amoral economic science devoid of any search for meaning. For its

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[351] E. Moutsopoulos, "L'histoire comme tradition: acceptation et dépassement," in *La tradition, Actes du XVIIe Congrès de l'ASPLF* (Abidjan, 1977), pp. 141-143.

[352] Cf. N. Incardona, *Metafisica di una crisi* (Bocca, 1955).

[353] E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaïschen Wissenschaften…*, *Philosophia*, 1 (1936), pp. 77-176; cf. *Husserliana*, Vol. 6 (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 1-104.

[354] Cf. J. M. Keynes, *A Treatise of Probability* (Macmillan, 1921).

theoreticians, economic laws are similar to mathematical laws that govern the mechanisms of the market and the behaviour of its stakeholders: producers, employees, consumers and savers. The distribution of wealth results from a beautiful mechanism that must be left free to evolve without any interference, starting with that of the public authorities. Economics is no longer "political", it is called economic science.

In this vision, this myth, told for more than thirty years, has been taken seriously by all political and economic leaders around the world, including those of former communist countries. Who could have dared to go against the construction of an unimpeded global market for goods, services and capital? In financial matters, hedge funds and tax havens were necessary for this economy-casino, although recognized as places of all perditions and the refuge of mafias of all kinds. They contributed to the general enrichment, while, these speculative systems had no economic basis, not to mention their immorality. The lure of profit has affected all social categories. It is quite unheard of to note that democratic elections have systematically won over the past decades, conservative majorities favorable to this system or "social-democratic" majorities which had gradually abandoned all interventionist policies.

Western societies are affected by a deep evil, where having has supplanted being, where superficial needs have replaced collective ties, where hyperactive individualism no longer leaves room for civic and moral virtues. Greed, this pernicious evil, is part of a period when growing inequalities went hand in hand with an unbridled market economy. Serious economists have demonstrated that the arithmetic increase in Gross Domestic Products (GDP) is not synonymous with improving the living conditions of all citizens, but of a minority at the expense of the greatest number. This is one of the main causes of the crisis. As the philosopher Patrick Viveret often observes, this crisis is characterized by excessiveness. How to explain that two hundred and twenty-five people have an income identical to that of two billion human beings, sixty years after the Declaration of the Rights of Man?

### 4.1.1 Ontology of the present global crisis

What, then, does the term "Crisis" imply for our analysis of the present global society? And what does it imply for the questions of global leadership? Of course, there is no cohesive sense that can cover all treatments; the concept of crisis has overlapping meanings that can be partly traced back to earlier traditions. The ontology of the present time has historical roots, even

when neoliberal mentalities focus upon the immediate and evacuate history into a form of empty time. However, we can trace the roots of the concept of crisis back to two different sources, each of which has different implications for political action. The first meaning of crisis has its origins in medical discourse, and is associated with a turning point in an illness (AIDS, FLU, COVID-19), a critical moment after which a patient is either destined to die or is able to proceed to a recovery. It signifies, particularly in the 21st century global society, a moment of emergency or threat: think of the responses to the global crisis of accumulation and September 9/11 attack, each of which has given rise to states of exclusion, in which extraordinary measures are carried out that, had previously been regarded as impossible.[355] These measures are justified by the need to preserve a 'civilization' of life as defined by its global political leaders. In the most affluent capitalist powers this way of life is consumerist, wasteful, energy-intensive, individualist, ecologically destructive, unhealthy and ultimately unsustainable.

Second, 'crisis' has an eschatological sense. If we think back to the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe, Western triumphalism which proclaimed the '*End of History*',[356] with all possible alternatives to liberal capitalism as strategy of governing seems exhausted. In this sense, the end of history is an idea acted to define the horizon of the past, present and the limits to any different visions of the future. Politics was to be reduced to what James Buchanan calls 'ordinary politics', with all the fundamental political and constitutional decisions about alternative paths and forms of development already excluded.[357] However, if the deep crisis of global accumulation links to society and ecology are structural, it will necessitate much more radical changes than if it is simply a crisis associated with the business cycle remedied through macroeconomic stabilization by G20 governments.

In both senses, therefore, crisis has become central to governing strategy in the global society. The "Ordinary politics" is consistent with support for the extension of market civilization, whether be it in the form of growth in the vast potential consumer markets of new "global middle classes" of India and China.[358] The combination of emergency response and measures framed by the eschatology of the *End of History* discusses the World Social Forum and how its slogan 'Another world is possible' was developed precisely to challenge the eschatology of the 'end of

[355] G. Stephen, *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership.* Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 24.
[356] F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man. op. cit.*, p 15.
[357] J. Buchanan. *The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order*. Michigan University Press. 1991.
[358] G. Stephen, *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, op. cit.,* p. 25.

history' postulate as offering no political alternatives.[359] History poses the question if and whether this discourse can permit ruling forces to argue persuasively that the crisis can be stabilized, so that 'normalcy' can be resumed.

Undeniably, a key political question is the degree to which social forces can conceive of the links between the different moments of crisis, and how they combine to address them through various forms of leadership as an issue taken up in the various contributions, which, in a variety of ways, seek to identify what is distinctive or unique in the present global society. In view of these neoliberalism is seen as a response to the crisis of capitalist profitability that emerged in the 1970s. It proceeds, in part, by turning social goods and social services into marketable commodities whereby it helps in creating of new markets and by sustaining and extending existing markets in the forms of debt and credit mechanisms. Notwithstanding, the fact that worker's real wages have either been in deterioration in many countries, especially in the United States and more precisely in Africa, the indebted hyper-consumerism of contemporary capitalism has, thus far, continued to undermine the welfare of man in (the global) society.

Politically, neoliberalism seeks to preclude a crisis of legitimation via a shift towards "governance" and through an "aesthetic of crisis".[360] The latter presents the market as the most efficient and desirable solution to all problems in a commodity form of global politics and strategies. The paradigmatic shift is seen in the electoral politics of deceptions which is primarily governed by immediacy, that is, in terms of the issues highlighted in fake news television advertising and television provides the main form of political communication, characterized by sound and video 'tastes' in a process determined above all by money. The outcome is observed with the US-trained political consultants and media experts oversees vast and growing electoral expenditures; in other countries, American political operatives often direct the campaigns and election results. This therefore brings us back to the question of leadership, and the relations between rulers and rules on a world scale. Leadership, despite being connected to the immediate mastery of the crisis of humanity in the global society, differs fundamentally from some of the other ontological forms, in that social, political and communicative relations involves power between different elements of a social formation.[361]

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[359]T. Teivo. "Enter Economism," Exit Politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy. Zed Books. 2002.

[360]G. Stephen, *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, op. cit.,* p 26.

[361] *Ibidem,* p. 27.

In contrast, the global ontology of the ecological crisis involves long-term effects, often cumulative and gradual enabling interaction between non-human and human systems. Above all, this does not mean that global leaders should act with no regard to the ecological and social consequences of their actions for instance, if they choose to accelerate the introduction of nuclear energy as a means of dealing with climate change globally. As there may be no direct link between economic crisis and political crisis, a crisis of leadership may have very little to do with a turning point in the relationship between human beings and the biosphere. Definitely, how we understand these questions is often mediated by the discourses and judgments of epistemic communities that define forms of regulation and governance in key sectors of the global political economy.

### 4.1.2 The crisis of global leadership domination

Leadership is the guarantor of the social and therefore political order, but it is external to it. Political power conceived as a condition of the existence of a political space is the founding pact that is called constitution. The crisis of leadership manifests itself in the dislocation of religious structures and by extension, secularism has not replaced the external element of legitimation that they constitute. The decompensation of social ties, a phenomenon of falsification which in turn aggravates the evil in the global society. The concepts of global Leadership crisis entails dominant strategies, which deals with the conceptualization of global leadership crisis, and seeks to identify some of the key elements in the prevailing strategies of rules associated with the most powerful forces in the world order today.

One principal element highlighted is how dominant strategies of rule are combined under neoliberalism with some of the key features of neoliberalism identified as: (1) the deeper commoditization of politics and culture; (2) increases in the turnover time of capital and the widening exploitation of human beings and nature; (3) practices of global governance that extend the world market and facilitate expanded capital accumulation, some of which are shaped by 'experts' who define concepts and strategies of regulation, claim understandings of crisis and provide market-based solutions to global problems; (4) strategies of depoliticization designed to marginalize or discredit political alternatives; and (5),[362] in this context, neoliberalism involves a tendency towards commoditized, undemocratic and charismatic forms of leadership and an

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[362] *Ibidem,* p. 27.

aesthetic of the global crisis that encourages the market as the maximum desirable and efficient solution to all problems.

The subject of global crisis of humanity and the crisis of global leadership domination, refers to crises in the plural, because despite the persistent and important focus on the financial and economic crisis that has preoccupied much of the world over the past decades since the great depression in the 1980s and recently three years (2007-2009) of intense crisis of value. The current global society, faces a diversity of intersecting, but nevertheless ontologically distinct, crises. These crises are located not only within political economy but also in culture, law, ethics, society and ecology, and they all call into question the prevailing models of global development and governance in the 21$^{st}$ contemporary society. The intersecting distinct crisis is with some contradictions associated with the current global leadership history, present global predicaments, neoliberal phase of global capitalism and global economy beyond nation-state. Such are combining in a global organic crisis.

### 4.1.3 The domination of the social in global society: an obstacle to politics

There are many reasons to think that today the economy has taken precedence over politics and that the primacy of the economy induces social disasters whose resolution requires the choice to give back a central weight to politics. We seek here Herbert Marcuse in his essay entitled One-Dimensional Man, a book in which he criticizes communism, the consumer society generated by the industrial revolution carried by capitalism and economic liberalism.[363] Contemporary democratic society prevents social change by assimilating opposing social forces and controlling the needs of individuals. It develops from an economic, cultural and ideological point of view. The strength of the One-dimensional society comes from the fact that individuals sincerely believe that they are free and enjoy great comfort despite the institutions that oppress them and prevent them from realizing themselves. It is a militant work that criticizes the future of modern societies, of which capitalism and liberal democracy are the major features. For Marcuse, modern societies are "closed societies" that integrate all dimensions of human existence, private and public.

Leaders have become prisoners to their own image and are too vulnerable to act positively. They become public relations figures, thus creating a credibility gap in society and broadening the misunderstanding between citizens and their decision-making system. The problem threatening

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[363] H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, *op. cit.,* p xii.

billions of individual in the global society revolves on social disruption and crime whose impact are more in Africa, United States but far less in Europe and Asia. It is observed that the capacity of national government to act and to meet the challenges of citizens' demands has been drastically impaired. Almost everywhere in the global society, secondary education and the universities, metropolitan government, land use, urban renewals are affected. Such impairment of capacities is becoming prevalent in more countries in bargaining among groups, income redistribution and handling of inflation.[364] In order to understand the features of the socio-political systems of the global society, there is need to concentrate on the social, economic and cultural crisis which is impossible to disentangle. First and foremost, the socio-economic context of the global society can be characterized sociologically by the explosion of the social, and economically by the disruptive effects of continuous capitalist growth.

## 4.1.4 The increase of social interaction

In the present global society, man has become much ever more a social animal than before. The tremendous increase of the social pressure has resulted correlatively to an explosion of human interaction.[365]The social texture and management of human life has become more complex. There is dispersion, fragmentation, interdependence making simple ranking replaced by concentration. The ontological nature of the global society social complex and management texture has become more crucial with the problem of social control over the individual. The spark of this has a long record of traditional social control imposed upon the individual be collective authorities, the state and by hierarchical religious institutions. It is certain, these authorities and institutions had been liberalized in decades since the time of totalitarianism. Undeniably, there is a strong social control and hierarchical values that still persist in the 21st century, which means that a basic contradiction tends to reappear in society. The problem may be worldwide, but it is exacerbated in Europe, where social discipline is not worshipped as is still in Japan, and where more indirect forms of social control have not developed as in North America. Consequently, European countries like African borrowed system of education have more difficult problems to overcome and to go beyond a certain level of complexity in their politico-administrative, social and economic systems. There are tremendous differences in the global society, with each one (country) having maintained a very

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[364]M. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy*. Report on the governability of Democracies to the Trilateral commission. New Yoke University Press. 1975. p. 30.
[365] *Ibidem,* p. 20.

distinctive collective system of social control. Perhaps, each one of these systems now appears to be insufficient to solve the present crisis of the time, nevertheless under the same kind of strains.

## 4.1.5 The impact of economic growth

Material progress seems to have exacerbated since the fifties till present. This fact was so overwhelmingly accepted that for a long time the official line of the communist parties denies the reality of the material progress of the working class. They argue that the capitalist development had brought not only a relative but also an absolute decline of the proletariat's income. Three factors account for such a paradox. The first centres on change produce rising expectation, which cannot be made by its necessarily limited outcomes. The global society has been vulnerable since the great depression of the 1930s, 2007s crisis and its unprecedented economic boom had succeeded a long period of stagnation with pent-up feelings of frustration. Moreover, humans have been more sophisticated politically and especially vulnerable to certain basic needs. The second aspect is the role played by radical ideology in the global society working-class politics. The revolutionary and nonconsensual ideologies of the working-class parties and trade unions are associated with economic and cultural gap that does not allow the working people a fair share in society's benefits.

To an extent, ideology is only a partially consequence of frustration as well, a weapon for action. In the global society, it remains the most effective available instrument for mobilization and manipulation. In the meanders, the declines of ideology thus incapacitate trade unions to decline with complex disaffection (alienation). This situation of disaffection is especially strong in many countries, where it can be argued that working-class groups have not benefited from economic prosperity as they should or could have. A third factor is the disruptive consequences of accelerated change which is extremely costly in terms of economic disruption. This disruption affects the lives of billions of people, threatening their ability to survive. People (migrants) are forced to be mobile geographically and occupationally, wherein, it accounts in terms of psychological cost.[366] It makes humans to face a new form of uncertainty, likely to compare their fates more often to the fates of other groups.

Conflicts, tensions, are therefore bound to increase. In the global society where control had traditionally relied on stratification, social barriers to communication and fragmentation, the

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[366] *Ibidem*, p. 23.

disruptive effects of change tends to destroy social barriers, forcing people to communicate and makes it more difficult to govern. Throughout the global society, individuals have lost a great deal of their traditional frames of reference and have not found substitutes in their relationships with the collective group.[367] Almost everywhere in the global society, groups are more volatile and social control systems are growing much weaker. The direct consequence of economic and geographical disruptions requires proper handling. It requires the imposition of collective disciplines, which these disruptions make it impossible to generate on the scale of national politics. No country is invulnerable from general change or collectively demoralized. The present global egalitarianism and mass participation pressures have increased the gap between expectations and promises. This has widened as well, leading to clashes between sectors of general public to poorer and poorer global government performances and to evermore widespread feelings of political alienation and cultural crisis. Cultural crisis is the greatest challenge in the global society, inasmuch as our incapacity to develop appropriate decision-making mechanisms- the un-governability of our society is a cultural failure.

## 4.2 CRISIS OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND THE MAKING OF HISTORY

The crisis of global leadership is therefore a part of a global dialectic that serves to constitute the making of history in the 21$^{st}$ century of disruptions. To understand the politico-social disruption of this process, our theorizations must proceed historically. One way to think about this is to conceptualize the relations between global leaders and led, both within and across states, as depending upon and being shaped by the perspectives, leadership, formation and organization of historical blocs of social forces, including their ethical and political standpoints. A global historical bloc of the crisis of humanity forms the basis for political rule in a particular form of state, since it both encompasses the leading forces that operate within political and civil society. These forces entail a combination of institutional framework, ideas and material potentials that shape the direction of state and civil society both within and across different jurisdictional boundaries.

Global leadership crisis therefore, has to be based in the historical blocs that have substantial harbour in the forces of political and civil society across a wide range of jurisdictions. Indeed, it must involve pedagogical, analytical, ethical and political qualities such as: leaders must not only seek to define what is unique and specific about the current upsurges in their

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[367] *Ibidem,* p. 35.

communications with those they lead and organize, but they must also find ways to justify a course of action and mobilize resources to act effectively on it to shape human progress. There is, therefore, an ethical and moral dimension to leadership that takes seriously, both as an object of analysis and a normative commitment. At this juncture, realistic analysis of the current forms and patterns of global leadership crisis are relative to the world order combined simultaneously with an endeavour to imagine and explore prospects for new kinds of global leadership crisis that might entails a progressive, collective, tolerant, democratic and being consistent with ecological and social sustainability.[368]At hand, is also a belief that a vast collective effort is needed to help shift worldwide development away from the continuation of its currently destructive logic and to prevent more reactionary solutions based on neo-fascism and right-wing populism and authoritarianism. However, the one important respect of today's global society crisis is dissimilar to the 1930s, in that, at least in the global North, the left seems to have offered only limited resistance and few credible alternatives to the neoliberal responses to the crisis of accumulation in the past three years.

According to Gill, the present global world therefore, has specific features such as it forms somewhat different object of analysis from that of the questions of global hegemony and leadership.[369] Before, the focus was on the emerging global order at the end of the Cold War. That moment in humanity progress, formed a key turning point at the end of the long postwar crisis of superpower relations, between 1947 and1991, when the world in the throes of a long economic growth was organized on both East-West and North-South geopolitical axes. This was perhaps, a world order characterized by two rival hegemonies, each with the high capacity to destroy life on the planet. The 'end' of the Cold War posed enormous thread and the question of world-leadership and the future of world order in an acute way.

The grand strategies of the US-led Western international historical bloc were to promote a liberal world order, that is capitalist globalization to marginalize communism and to oppose economic nationalism.[370] The "private" leadership forums within this bloc, such as the Trilateral Commission and its sister organization at Davos, the World Economic Forum, were, in effect, parts of a prototypical global political party of capital, and they have been designed to do two

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[368]G. Stephen, *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership. op. cit.,* p 13.
[369]G. Stephen. *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. Cambridge University Press. 1990.
[370]G. Stephen, *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership. op. cit.,* p 14.

things: (1) to promote strategic initiatives to shift the balance of global forces and geopolitical alignments in ways beneficial to transnational capitalism; and (2) to 'master' or manage the crisis of capitalist development. If these two tasks were performed successfully they would enhance the prestige of leadership and marginalize opposition and alternative frameworks for organizing world order. Notably, the two well-organized forces of capital have been able to define responses to crisis in ways that have intensified market disciplines and privatization, promoted liberal constitutional frameworks and extended private property rights although at the expense of greater social inequality and growing ecological crisis.

Nonetheless, the recent financial crisis had previously been deemed impossible by G8 political leaders, central bankers and the vast majority of mainstream economists likewise the aftermath of economic emergency involving huge bailouts of banks and efforts to stabilize the macroeconomics of global capitalism have raised serious questions about the sustainability and credibility of neoliberal forms of governance. What preoccupied this move was: how far is the crisis a turning point in global leadership? Has humanity reached a moment, or can we foresee a moment, when this type of global crisis of leadership is no longer credible? Has lost its status and is to be made fully accountable for the way in which its actions and policies have been inconsistent with or un-favourable to the rights of human, citizens and other countries.

**4.2.1 Global ontological crisis of neoliberalism in the 21st century**

In this context of neoliberalism, a number of influential analysts have been arguing recently that the global crisis of humanity drives round the ontology of the crisis of accumulation which is also a fundamental crisis of neoliberalism. This ontological argument is also widespread in the global academic and popular literature. The communist philosopher Slavoj Zizek, argues that neoliberalism actually 'died twice': first as a 'political doctrine' after the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 that resulted in the destruction of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon, and secondly as an 'utopian economic project' after the financial breakdown of 2007.[371] Undeniably, the variants of Zizek hypothesis concerning the 'end' of neoliberalism have become the conventional wisdom across various disciplines and theoretical standpoints; for instance, Krugman Paul[372] and Stiglitz Joseph[373] the Nobel Prize winners in economics argues that

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[371] Cf. S. Zizek, *First as Tragedy*, Then as Farce. London: Verso Books. 2009.
[372] K. Paul. *The Return of Depression Economics*. W. W. Norton. 1999.
[373] J. Stiglitz, *Freefall*: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. W. W. Norton. 2010.

the twenty first century economic crisis might bring an end to neoliberalism and market fundamentalism. Krugman, Stiglitz and Zizek all in their different ways, tend to misread our present global state of upheavals. They also entreat in the question: what is neoliberalism and how can we define it? Moreover, how do we know when neoliberalism has ended? Definitely, most economists since the great Depression, treat neoliberalism as if it is simply an economic doctrine and set of policy formulas; but the communist philosopher Zizek seems to treat it as a form of ideology underpinned by relations of violence, clashes of interest and separates its 'political' and 'economic' dimensions, whereas the two are, in reality, collective with denigrating human value.

These, sum general issue on denigrating human value on how basic conditions of existence are increasingly mediated by the world capitalist market system and under neoliberal governance arrangements. Concurrently, the crisis of accumulation has been deep and relatively extensive; it has not provoked a corresponding crisis of legitimacy for neoliberal governance in the global North, where its impact has arguably been greatest. This indicates that the global situation may be in fluctuation. This, therefore, interrogates those moments of crisis and leadership in the global society. It thus, explores and penetrates some of the 21ˢᵗ century national and global ideologies.

More specifically at hand, are issue on how these forms of leadership may or may not identify, understand or response to a range of crisis that is, economic, social, political and ecological that pose deep threats to aspects of livelihood and life on the planet with the combined challenge of an emerging global organic crisis.[374] With such, some scholars might probe whether there really is, actually or potentially, a 'global' organic crisis, since many parts of the world, such as China and India, have continued to grow and develop. The global situation is therefore replete with deep contradictions impoverishing the vulnerable. We hypothesize that the global organic crisis will intensify in all sectors of the global society. Its effects will be felt in ways that will be unequal politically and socially, uneven geographically and materially hierarchical.

Politically and perhaps paradoxically, at this moment the global organic crisis has not been manifested as a crisis of legitimacy in the global North although less so in many parts of the global South.[375] However, the question of interest is: will this situation persist? If not, to what extent can

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[374]G. Stephen. The global organic crisis: paradoxes, dangers, and opportunities. 2010. *Monthly Review*, MRZine 61 (9), http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/gill150210.html (accessed 5 July 2021).
[375]G. Stephen, *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership. op. cit*., pp 39-44.

the prospects for alternative concepts of global leadership and frameworks of rule be practical? To focus more, we address a common set of issues that relates to one or two of the central and interrelated questions: (1) what do the present global crisis tell us about the nature of political representation and the legitimacy and efficacy of regional, national and global institutions in situations of crisis? (2) What is the fundamental relation between consent and coercion, and between force and persuasion, in the theory and practice of global leadership? (3) What is the relation between global crisis and the processes of what Karl Marx called original accumulation and dispossession? How do these relate to basic issues of livelihood, health, sustainability and the integrity of the biosphere? And lastly (4) how is local and global consent to neoliberal governance developed and sustained in situations of crisis? What is the role in this regard of the institutions of global governance (such as the G8 and G20), the media or leadership by experts?

Besides, the organic crisis of neoliberal management is much preoccupied with economic stabilization, accumulation and has made minimal efforts to address the fundamental crisis of social reproduction and livelihood the way in which production is connected to the wider social conditions within which it operates, afflicts a majority of the world's population such as the global health, food, energy and ecological crisis. Also, the intensity of the crisis lies in false narrative of neoliberal political leaders who sought and frequently make 'unholy' alliances with autocratic forces, predominantly in much of the Third World to sustain a condition of political indifference and depoliticization. This, therefore, plunder the state and the economy for themselves and for their business allies while the majority of the masses suffered mass unemployment, poverty, and soaring food prices as well as domination and a denial of basic human rights and dignity. This state of affairs was widely perceived as being orchestrated by the strategic interests of the West, particularly United States and Israel with Arab leaders as its subordinates, despite widespread of prevalent opposition to Palestine and Israeli policies.

The regional uprisings drew on a broad band of spontaneous and organized secular forces in ways that put to rest the Orientalist myth that inheres in the 'clash of civilizations' assumption that Muslim can only be mobilized through religion. What are in fact sweeping across the Arab world today are the good old values of the French Revolution.[376] What these revolutionary changes share is their secularity that is, their materialistic, nonspiritual, irreligious and democratic form

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[376]A. Ahmad. 'Autumn of the patriarchs'. Frontline 28 (4), 2011. www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/201110225280401400.htm

and a repudiation of years of imperialism and neoliberal restructuring. These forms seem to be consistent with an emergent '*postmodern prince.*' However, the principal focused and concerned is to provide 'advice to the prince' as to how to rule his subjects and those of other countries although in an era in which US global power is perceived as being in crisis.[377]

By contrast, neoliberal leadership in the face of the crisis of humanity operates from the 'top-down' Hobbesian approach *seminal 1651 book, Leviathan* to reinforce 'market civilization' and its governing discourse of neoliberalism.[378] This idea (top-down) still resonates strongly in today's global society. Men do agree on a social contract in which they give up some of their freedoms to the state, in the hope that, the state will ensure protection and order. Apparently, we fine debates why Hobbes was mistaken to think that order must be built vertically, and instead asserts that we should keenly look to our local groups and communities to order society, that drive us towards a more just world. Such leadership which operates systematically to favour affluent strata of the population only seeks to stabilize dominant power structures and strategies of rule, although with some marginal modifications under crisis conditions in ways that do not fundamentally challenge the dominant modes of accumulation and power.

Indeed, one of the key features of neoliberalism since its emergence in the 1970s is how, until now, its crises of accumulation that is, debt and financial crises have also provided opportunities for dominant forces to extend and deepen neoliberalism as a geopolitical project in the early 1990s.[379] This imperial practices endorses a premised on inequality that negate the potential and freedom of others. Put differently, it endorses a hypocritical form of global leadership that actively negates the central moral claim of liberal democracy: that it provides the optimum political and economic conditions for all human beings to actualize their potential. In addition, the strata of neoliberalism crisis have an instrumentalist and utilitarian rather than an ethical-political frame of orientation. Referring to 'the present global crisis' the editors of Socialist Register note in their preface that 'the speculative orgy that neoliberalism unleashed' will be followed by severity and 'the possibility of long-term stagnation.'[380]

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[377] Z. Brzezinski, "The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership." Basic Books. 2004.
[378] G. Stephen. 'Globalization, market civilization, and disciplinary neoliberalism'. Millennium 23 (3), 1995a, p. 399-423.
[379] G. Stephen, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. Cambridge University Press. 1990.
[380] L. Panitch, Albo, Greg, and Chibber, Vivek (eds.). *The Crisis This Time*: Merlin Press. 2011.

The fact that this evidence is not forthcoming is perhaps not surprising if one reflects on the realities of the existing state of relations between rulers and rules on a world scale. What is gradually emerging in the global society is a more and more unequal and increasingly hierarchical global political and civil society directed by dominant social forces associated with disciplinary neoliberalism that seek to extend market civilization on a world scale, in ways that will further class (division or polarity) polarization and the ecological crisis alike. Nonetheless, we need to take account of the global changing structures of world order and the reorganization of the global political economy, which has progressively produced a more globally integrated market, although crisis-prone and increasingly global capitalism. Only with a clearer ontology of the global world order can we more adequately begin to theorize patterns of cooperation and conflict associated with global crisis in Africa.

## 4.2.2. Contextualizing the structural perspective of leadership crisis in Africa

The crisis of political leadership is responsible for Africa's underdevelopment and insecurity, and its social and structural injustices. The leadership crisis is trepidation, given the deeply engraved status quo that appeals to political leaders in command power through the benefit in system of semi-authoritarian, authoritarian and semi-democratic regime. The crisis poses enormous challenges to Africa. Bad leadership manifested by persistent human rights violation, manipulation of ethnic differences, patronage, dysfunctional institutions, bad governance, electoral fraud, corruption and personalization of power hinder the prevalence of peace and social justice.[381] Influential radical political elites in Africa, use national resources for self-glorification, feed on the state, prey on the weak and deny citizens of communal things such as medical care, good education and employment.

One of the fundamental characteristics of Africa's leadership crisis above all Sub-Saharan Africa is never to proceeds at systemic evaluation in respect to registered success and failures also in diversifies domains like education, science, agriculture, communication and the socio-political sphere etc. When people's human needs are not met, there are protracted social conflicts and wars which are inevitable.[382] How does leadership crisis come about given that those who assume leadership positions have witnessed only ruthless, violent, power-thirsty and corrupt leaders? What

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[381]Abdul-Raheem, Tajudeen, Biney Ama and Adebayo Olukoshi. *Speaking truth to power: Selected Pan-African postcards*. Pambazuka Press. 2010.
[382] J. W. Burton, *Conflict: Human needs theory*. St. Martin's Press. 1990.

will be the legacy for future generations if African political leadership does not change? However, due to bad leadership in governance, Africa remains politically, mentally, socially and economically underdeveloped, with a legacy of abject poverty and hunger, exploitation of natural resources, civil wars and violent conflicts.[383] Several African leaders lack an ethical commitment to good governance, respect for human rights and rule of law and to responsibility and accountability, all of which could guarantee that Africa's resources are harnessed towards healthy living for all citizens and for 'African renaissance.'[384]

The leadership crisis in Africa is made manifested by lack of respect for the Constitution, trends of corruption, insistent abuse of power and failure to create an atmosphere for the unbroken progress of competence, vision, commitment for succeeding generations of young African leaders with integrity and skills for social justice and peacebuilding.[385] The continent has witnessed a decline in the achievements aggravated by unethical leadership and bad governance.[386] In light of this evident crisis, we would like to delve into the leadership trends that characterise the tarnished African context.

One of the tarnished contexts of Africa is now, in its fifth decade of independence, experiencing 'a chronic state of backwardness' resulting from corruption, personalization of power and authoritarianism. Several nation states in African countries, has had the majority of leadership whom came through military *coup d'états* since the last 50 decades. This political violence is the indicators of Africa's socio-political crisis link to poor governance. These military *coup d'états are* they diabolic in essence, Divine punishment or simply the act of poor election outcomes? The coup d'états have not changed the situation and crisis of Leadership in the African continent, but, it has rather led to the denigrations of the dignity of man in Africa. The consequence of these has destabilized the economic sector rendering the most vulnerable to abject poverty and in constant fled of their home town to neighbouring countries thus, destabilizing the continent.

As such, Africa has been reduced to ruins and has not addressed the distortion inherited from the colonial era. Most Sub-Saharan African States claim to be democratic, whereas, the

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[383]C. Agulanna, Democracy and the crisis of leadership in Africa. *The Journal of social, political, and economic studies*, 31 (3), 2006. pp. 255-264.

[384]P. J. Schraeder, *African politics and society: A mosaic in transformation*. Boston/New York, Bedford/St. Martin's. 2000. p. 2.

[385] P. Mutibwa, Uganda since independence: *A story of unfulfilled hopes*. Hurst and Co. 1992.

[386] L. Adamoleku, Political leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa: From giants to dwarfs. *International Political Science Review*, 1988. 9 (2), pp. 95-106.

regime in place operates or uses dictatorship to oppress man in society. The oppression of man is due to poor governance. Poor governance is one of the major consequences of malpractice by the State towards its citizens and workers. Such malpractice has led Sub-Saharan African leaders to divert the course of society. The idea here is that, many Sub-Saharan African leaders lack an ethical commitment to good governance, respect for human rights and rule of law and to responsibility and accountability, which could guarantee Sub-Saharan Africa's resources and harnessed towards a healthy living for all citizens.[387] These leaders have created "personal rule paradigm", appointing under-qualified personnel in key positions, government departments and state-owned institutions.[388] Such actions created by the states affect the poor, leaving them vulnerable, as they are denied basic necessities such as food, shelter and healthcare. Sub-Saharan leaders have become self-centered, working just for their own interest, using every means to eliminate the Other in order to maintain power: Firstly, they change the constitutions to suit their longevity in power, [389]secondly by favouring the interests of those who put them in power, most especially colonial masters. The Other or man is completely forgotten with less credibility given to his potential and talents in the sub-region.

In the same line, several Sub-Saharan regimes have complete control and rights over the people suppressed, holding their citizenry ransom, ruthlessly clamping down on any opposing voices. The unravelling nature of social organizations and democratic institutions use secret police to crush their opponents. This threatens society with violence, conditioning political passivity and the capacity to incite structural/political instability among citizens themselves. These practices have not only tended to negate civilian participation in government life but have also left many vulnerable to violent overthrows by individuals and groups who see no alternative to exercising political agency. For example, the recruitment of young people by al-Shabaab in Somalia or Boko Haram in Nigeria[390]could be the result of such policies of exclusion, unemployment, repression,

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[387]A. Arieff, *The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa and Global Policy Responses,* Analyst in African Affairs, April 6, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40778consulted online 10/1/2020
[388]K. Brennan, Identifying the multiple causes of poverty in Africa. Retrieved January28, 2018 https://borgenproject.org>causes of poverty in Africa consulted online 1/9/2019
[389]J. S. Kotze, Africa faces threat to democracy: the "constitutional coup" University of the Free State Retrieved February 8, 2017 https://www.theconversation.coma>frica-faces-a new threat to democracy consulted online 1/9/2019
[390]A. Botha *et al.,* M Abdile, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, Paper No. 266, Pretoria, *Institute for Security Studies*, 2014; M Ewi *et al.,*USalifu, *Money talks: a key reason youths join Boko Haram*, Policy Brief 98, Pretoria, *Institute for Security Studies*, February 2017.

and denial of basic rights and dignity.[391] Democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is not rooted in humanness. The practical unorthodoxy nature in Africa is the very presence of unethical politicians.

Dictatorial regime is the source of Sub-Saharan Africa's predicament and Human oppression.[392] It violates social norms, sense of duty and sociality in the society. Autocrats weaken state institutions, especially the judiciary and legislative, thereby, making laws that suit them and caring solely for their partisan members while alienating adversaries. This creates a high level of distrust between the Other and the autocrat in a position of power in most Sub-Saharan African states. In short, our countries become places of group tyranny. African countries are resolutely committed to the path of constitutionalism and democracy. Good governance is not the strong point of African leaders. Fifty years after political independence, it is clear that Africans must revisit their practices of living together in order to prevent coups d'état.

In the light of what has just been said: what can philosophy do without the slightest pretension of usurping the role of politics? According to Kwame Nkrumah the African socio-political revolution necessarily involves: An intellectual revolution, in which our thinking and our philosophy are focused on the redemption of our society. We need to create an intellectual content of philosophy for the emancipation of man. The philosophy that must support this social revolution is what we have said we would call "*philosophical consciencism." Conscientism* is the set, in intellectual terms, of the organization of forces which will allow African society to assimilate the Western, Muslim and Euro-Christian elements present in Africa and transform them in a way that fits in the African personality."[393] In this quote we find a general orientation of the "*sanatio*" of African palavers from *ad intra to ad extra*, from within man to solutions external to man. They must not be heteronomous but autonomous in the Kantian sense; that is to say a solution which "practicing the present state of African consciousness, indicates by which way progress will be drawn from the conflict, which currently agitates this consciousness". This allows us to question the meaning of Africa, under the "tutelage" of the United Nations.

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[391]A. Christopher, Democracy and the crisis of leadership in Africa. *The Journal of social, political, and economic studies*, 2006, pp. 255-264.

[392]J. O. Oguejiofor, *Philosophy and the African Predicament*. Hope Publications Ltd; 2001. p. 25. Consulted online 23/3/2020

[393]K. Nkrumah, *le consciencisme. Philosophie et idéologie pour la décolonisation et le développement, avec une référence particulière a la Révolution africaine*. Payot. 1965, p. 120.

The massive presence of the UN army in Africa is justified by some as a result of heated conflicts in the continent. It looks like a "*recolonization*" of Africa. This situation has revolted not only the intellectuals but also the institutions which rise up against this presence. We believe there are options, peaceful alternatives that have yet to be explored. We need to rationalize politics in Africa. Rationalizing politics means forming politically authentic minds capable of propelling Africa reasonably towards participatory democracy. A politically authentic spirit is one that fights against political evils: the press, selfishness, delinquency, corruption. Positively, this spirit which creates a politically supportive environment, respects constitutional values and all that one seeks. The rational mind is politically objective.

In brief, the political spirit which is both rational and objective is essential if Africa is to realize the constitutional vocation advocated in all the aforementioned constitutions, which is unity and democratic alternation. This spirit wants the African political organization to be built around rules, which must be observed by all. Rationalization of politics also requires political moralization, that is, a radical change in the way she acts and does in politics. In Africa, folklore, manslaughter and belly politics must give way to a new mentality likely to carry the policy to fruition. For example, politicians must regain the spirit of service, which is concretely the servant spirit. The principle of service prohibits agents and managers of political alternation from blocking the road to favoritism, unscrupulous businesses, and undue personal gain in their practice. They must avoid taking the nation hostage.

Streamlining, politics also requires transparency and clarity, and in the context of alternation,[394] clarity in elections. The management of alternation procedures cannot be left in the hands of people without law. The politic of "alternation" in power is against hegemonic and autocratic form of governance. For alternation to be effective in the global society, political actors both in ruling and opposition party must transcend their egoistic interest[395] to be at the service of man (Other). The politics of inclusion should be at the heart of its political agenda. Much more, destitution and vulnerability impose in man a cultural and religious intolerance in the global diversify context.

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[394]F. S. Kizito, Le vivre-ensemble en Afrique aujourd'hui, in F. kizito (dir), *Hannah Arendt et les conditions du vivre-ensemble, Resistance, reconnaissance et réhabilitation politique*, Press de l'UCAC, 2017, p. 51.
[395]*Ibidem*, p. 85.

### 4.2.3 Cultural crisis and religious intolerance in the global society

Man in Contemporary Culture, starts from the idea that the development of any society depends on creative individuals. Hence, the more such individuals there are, the more they are open to new problems. Contemporary society is marked by an increasing pluralism and differentiation in all fields of life, and by a rapid absorption of modern technologies.[396] Increase in mass culture is driven out by popular culture that abolishes the division into high and low culture, forming a great mixture of cultural groups. Today there is also much talk about a rather classic opposition, namely, culture versus technology.[397] The first assures the difference and the second one is seen as an agent of integration. Due to the technological explosion that clutched human community, but also the way in which individuals have changed their priorities and concerns, it came to talking about the decline culture or "cultural crisis".

The term "cultural crisis" could be seen as each person's value of judgment on culture at a given time. Judgment that can be molded, and can be influenced at any moment according to the context. This crisis can be different; in the sense that it can exist at the creator's level, the consumer's but also the culture critic's level. Cultural crisis highlighted two reasons, namely: the rapid increase of the population, which the technological globalization reactivated, according to an ideal of inverse proportionality.[398]The more people in the global society start to resemble, the more individuals try to differ and this last effort is done through local cultures of consumption. Therefore, cultural consumption in this sense does not represent such a recent phenomenon as one might believe. In a global society where almost everything can be quantified, culture and people's adherence to it does not get rid of measurements and industrial revolution. And in recession times, cultural consumption decreases in face of crisis.

The industrial revolution eliminated from people's life the aesthetic dimension that the hand-made world.[399] One cannot say one culture is superior or inferior to another culture, but we can discuss the inequalities, which happened in their development. Therefore, "cultural industry" is organized around various half-learned, who present only a material interest for culture. This material interest goes beyond to exalt multiple cultural difference, identities and conflict. We are

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[396] https://philarchive.org/archive/MIHVOT

[397] E. Agazzi, "The meaning of Diversity in Philosophical and Religious Traditions." *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* 10(3)(1993):1 11.

[398] H. Arendt, *La Crise de la Culture*, Gallimard, 1972. p. 56.

[399] Cf. A. Toffler, *Consumatorii de cultură*, (The culture consumers) Time Warner Books publishing house, 1995.

force to ask: Should cultural differences promote conflicts? To endorse such, it is necessary to demarcate the principles that results to clash of multiple identities in our global society. This principles are founded on relationship (affinity), professional, ethnic, influential, regional, didactic, partisan and ideology. Similarly, a person can identify culturally with his or her clan, ethnic group, nationality, religion, and civilization. The increased extent to which people throughout the global society differentiate themselves along cultural lines means that conflicts between cultural groups are increasingly important; civilizations are the broadest cultural entities[400]in the political sphere. These differences (us) in intra- and (them) extra-civilizational behaviour stem from: 1. feelings of superiority and inferiority toward people who are perceived as being very different; 2. difficulty of communication with them as a result of differences in language and what is considered civil behaviour. This is the ubiquity of conflict. It is human to hate. "The 'us' versus 'them' tendency is," as Ali Mazrui said, "in the political arena, almost universal."[401] In the contemporary world the "them" is more and more likely to be people from a different civilization. But as well creates cultural intolerance which rendered human life unproductive in the global sphere.

Cultural intolerance in the global society has rendered human life unproductive as concerns societal values due to the aspect of considering one religion or culture superior to another. The rise of these actions is the failure of democratic states to maintain ethical norms to harmonize internal policies with religion and culture for coexistence. Gonçalo Laiginhas underpin that: cultural intolerance is when a certain culture does not respect another culture.[402] This cultural intolerance is based on the failure to accept the fact that the cultures (ethical values) of other people are different and equally important. People of different cultural backgrounds think their beliefs are different, better and superior to those of others, and refuse to accept their view.[403] This leads to the lack of peaceful coexistence amongst these cultures. Samuel Huntington predicts the view based on the fact that coexistence of cultures, contributes to a clash of civilizations, and hence leads to wars of cultures if care is not taken.[404]

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[400] S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster. 2002, pp. 128-130.

[401]Ali Al-Amin Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (James Currey, 1990), p. 13.

[402]G. Laiginhas, cultural-intolerance 2019.https://prezi.coms cultural-intolerance online20/8/2019.

[403] D.Temple, cultural intolerance 2016 www.journal-news.net online 14/8/2019

[404] S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. op. cit.,* p 36.

In the same plane, cultural intolerance has been the engine to fight violent wars; tribalism and racism become the order of the day, with people treating others of different cultures as subhuman. This is an attack on the very dignity of man endowed with the principle of life in society. Also, it is clear proof that society does not have humans at the centre of its actions. Each time we failed to understand or welcome the Other we denied his dignity thus making him less of a human being. That is where tribalism comes in. Most often, people impose their culture; others are killed, and eliminated. Hence, refusing the culture of the other is a denial of his identity.

There are tensions and violence observed amongst religious groups in some parts of the world and in Sub-Saharan Africa. These include the tension and violence amongst Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, the Islamic terrorist group in northern Nigeria, like Boko Haram, al-Shaba'ad attacking churches and Universities in Kenya, Seleka rebels in the Central Africa Republic killing civilians, Taliban in Afghanistan resisting western educational beliefs system etc. This cultural intolerance and violence is the result of ignorance of man in society to understand. In spite of the diversity of cultures, there is a common ground that unites humanity. This common ground is based on the ignorance of the fact that different human communities share many ethical values in line with religion. As such, religion remains one of the most significant sources of intolerance, discrimination and marginalization across the globe. In present times, the activities of religions rather than encouraging peace and reciprocal tolerance among their respective followers has exacerbated mistrust, negative feelings and fear.

Peaceful co-existence in the global society has often been jeopardized and threatened by refusal of either religious or non-religious group to tolerate the practices and beliefs of other persons outside their religious affiliations.[405] The shocking and breaking news on daily basis reflects violence related to religion. With the spread of News at the global pace, we observed biased, violence, scenes of hatred and perpetrated intolerance in the name of belief or religion. This unveils religious discriminations and hostilities. As concerns religious intolerance specific social group refuses to tolerate the practices, persons or beliefs on others religious ground.[406] This is principally observed in Sub-Saharan Africa which has failed to democratize its systems of governance and the education of its youth to uphold the dignity of man for a peaceful societal

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[405]Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential. Religious intolerance. (2017). Retrieved from http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/139538
[406]V. Tomek, *Religious intolerance*, https://en.wikipedia.orgs wikis Religious intolerance online19/8/2019

progress. Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced religious violence over the last decades with present interreligious tensions in the West, Central, South and East of Sub-Saharan Africa.

According to Ludovic Lado, *"the key impact on interreligious relations is that high radicalism from one religious group which tends to breed high extremism from other religious groups in society."*[407] Religious groups in Sub-Saharan Africa turn to impose their superiority over one another resulting in constant attacks and dead of human lives. The experience is a precarious situation in the Central African Republic since 2012, plagued by sectarian violence between Muslims and Christian extremist groups.[408] This has led to the ongoing ethnic cleansing, the initial stages of genocide, with a high rate of persecution undermining the Christian community and the value of man's life in the society.

Religious freedom is enshrined in the constitutions of most states but these constitutions are violated with the states acting in a laissez-fair system. Practically, it is used as a physical force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy the other's personality and identity as an individual in the society, to the extent of denigrating him to a second-order position. The crisis of culture is also influence by the crisis of identity which has forge western history on the very notion of the miseducation of the African people to the question of identity crisis.

In this sense, identity means something with its own/private objective reality.[409] In the general parlance, it points to the individuality of a thing or person that is, to what a thing or who a person is. Hence, identity points to a relation: thinking of "own" or private or "objective reality" presupposes the existence of another. One of the features of identity crisis is the fact that it bears a relational character with that very concept, which a thing is identified with. To speak of identity crisis is to have a sense of an African character that is truly African and such character is not individuated like in the western ideas, as it is shared among the same species.[410] What is evident here is the approach of people with those having similar religion, language, ancestry, institutions, values which distance themselves from those apparently with different ones.

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[407]www.Wilsoncenter.orgLudovic Lado,2014Accessed online 21/7/2019
[408]Cf. G. Stephen, *Global crises and the crisis of global leadership*, *op. cit*., p 44.
[409] O. Blanchette *et al., Philosophical challenges and opportunity for globalization*. Vol I. U.S.A. 2006, p. 72.
[410]S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, *op. cit.,* p 126.

A people of no identity are denigrated to a second order position. Because Africans carry an identity that is unknown to them, there is an inbuilt inferiority complex in them. Henceforth, it does not matter whether Africans think, or feel that they are inferior or not, the inferiority is created by the existence of such western institutions that denies to recognize their essence and interpersonal character. [411] The war on race in the global society therefore creates a false biological determinism that makes some races to think that nature has endowed them superior to some others. In terms of achievement, a Negro has no identity of his or her own, but they see themselves through the lens of another (western culture).

In the same lens, the colonial masters knew this very well; they had to destroy the foundation that made this relational character possible. A vivid explanation is given by Awoonor on identity crisis as exemplified in the lives of the black individual.[412] The core concern was the myths, cruel instincts and history taught about the African race. At the discontinuity of civilization, Africans learned that civilization and modernization disclosure are defined in terms total disconnections from the African culture. The debate on who is and who is not rational is the foundation of prejudice.

The Hegelian thesis on Africa being a people without history and a dark past was a mistake on the parts of the colonial masters. However, it was to an extent illogical to conceive of Africans as people without reason. Africans could be therefore worthy of slaves, but they must be slaves of a different kind because slaves of subhuman kind could have neither will nor freedom in relation to their incapacity to reason. The contradiction of their irrationality will be an attempt to bestow on them any knowledge that only humans were capable of grasping. The result of this erosion is the alienation of Africans from themselves and their world.

The constitutive roots of African identity experienced a cruelty from the West in all sectors of life. The consequences of colonialism and missionary activities include diseases of the mind and consciousness. If what happens to persons happens in mind, the conclusion here should be obvious.[413]This is a distortion that was learnt from the colonial masters that still has negative repercussion in African Identity. Conversely, this was not taken into consideration in the denial of rationality thesis to the African people as argued by the Europeans. Africans therefore need to re-

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[411] J. O. Oguejiofor, *Philosophy and the African Predicament*, *op. cit.*, p 69.
[412] Cf. Awoonor, Kofi. *The African Predicament*. Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2006.
[413] O. Blanchette *et al., Philosophical challenges and opportunity for globalization. op. cit.*, p 76.

appropriate their values in context thereby reshaping and rewriting their history and not forced in a race with the rest of the developed world. The impact of such denigrating action thus, influence environmental crisis which man is a part.

### 4.2.4 Global environmental crisis

There is a growing belief that the global environmental crisis which confronts humanity today is one of the most life-threatening turning points that human civilization has ever faced. The environmental crisis is, in fact, spurred by a profound concern for the alarming situation of our common home. It is not a mere environmental issue as it is often presented in the media and in academic discussions. For the first time in human history, the very home that sustains and hosts countless life, including the forms of human life, appears on the verge of a potential collapse.

By global environment, we mean the relationship existing between man and his surrounding (Nature), including the life support provided by the air, water, land, animals and the entire ecosystem of which man is part. We cannot regard nature as something separate from ourselves nor as a mere setting in which we live in.[414] The causes of this inclination are believed to lie in environmentally destructive propensities, that create environmental imbalances. The greatest global challenges of our time is that of environmental crisis as Ogungbemi construes.[415] According to him, it is a *"conjunction of some natural disaster together with man's activity of exploration and utilization of natural resources through the ingenuity of science and technology, which have impacted negatively on the environment.*[416]

Environmental crisis is a global phenomenon which affects the world. In fact, as a global phenomenon, no society is totally immune to the threats and dangers which environmental crisis poses to humanity. Man in our present technological age is born with and into an environment. The environment either makes or mars him depending upon whether it grows into a positive or negative relationship between him and his milieu. The environment is part and parcel of man's metaphysical and cosmological heritage in the medieval era and more particularly in African traditional religion. The environment being part and parcel of his mental, social and political

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[414]https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/summary-of-laudato-si-3173/

[415]Osuntokun cited by Philomena A. Ojomo, in "Environmental ethics: An African understanding:"African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, Vol. 5(8), Lagos State University, 2011, p. 573. https://www.ajol.info/index.php/tp/article/download/64100/51901/0

[416] *Ibid*

psychology positively influences the mind and behaviour of man. Each environment of man has a cultural typology that determines his outlook and religion, leading to a new set of human values, that determine his attitudes towards life, nature and his environment.[417] Religion combines within its theoretical framework a philosophical and psychological tools for explaining man bad behaviour towards nature in the global society.

The socio-economic impact of environmental deterioration on the global society and more particular in Africa continues to pose a major problem to development, stability and daily lifestyles. The western societies are the cause of global warming, with emission of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, that result to ozone depletion. On this miserable pace on the globe, Africa has not contributed to greenhouse gas emissions, nor responsible for global warming but the continent is the most vulnerable to the negative consequences. According to the global 2012 report of climate change, environmental problems constitute one of the key challenges on the global society in the 21st century. Our global ecologic crisis is the product of an emerging, totally novel, democratic culture. The issue at stake, is whether a democratized global world can survive its own implications. Probably we cannot unless we rethink our truisms. What we do principally about ecology depends on our ideas of the man and nature relationship in the present crisis.

In the global society, environmental crisis is incorporated into an overall strategy of sustainable economic development by western, Asian and African societies including deforestation, emission of gases into the atmosphere, soil erosion, desertification, wetland degradation, insect infestation and other precursors in the open air pose a threat to living organisms. The lives of other humans are downgraded. Indiscriminate human actions on the environment by others are to put the life of others in danger and a sign of irresponsibility. It has become increasingly difficult to avoid over exploitation of natural resources and degradation of the environment.[418] The global natural causes as disruptive of environmental purity and harmony as anthropogenic. It is thus safe in our global society to say that renew or new developments in industry and manufacturing are the root causes of environmental dilapidation (degradation) over the past three decades. Two factors strongly increase the threat of environmental degradation in

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[417]V. Kalu, *The Sathya education in human values and the African personality: A cosmology of religion and psychology*. TAISSE Press. (2012).

[418] World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development: A Long Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC, 1989), p. 22.

the global society: 1) Rapid population growth and poverty (i.e. Air, land pollution and hasting fossil fuel) 2 Technology and science.

Concerning rapid population growth and poverty, over the last decade, and more dramatically in the last few years, increasing evidence of major problems in the earth's ecological balance has resulted to ecological problems. Man's behaviour and attitude toward nature could be delineated in the context of many factors. One factor that emanates from the human causative context, is therefore unmanageable population growth in the global society. As global population and human consumption continue unabated with societies more inclined to destructive processes rather than to actively seek solutions, the global population is projected to continue to increase widely from 7 to 15 billion inhabitants by the end of this century. This forecast, will pose enormous treat to the majority of citizens and more precisely in Saharan Africa who live in remote areas, where the people wallow in abject poverty and lack basic amenities such as good water supplies and proper energy use.[419]

One of the most outstanding aspects of the global society and nature relationships in crisis is the dissimilar trajectories of global environmental harms for less-developed and developed countries. We therefore, contend that, the global society stratification of environmental harms has consequences on $CO_2$ emissions, industrial organic water pollution, and deforestation. The effect of population growth on deforestation is larger in size than any of the world polity measures or world economy. The effect of this is leaving man in continuous pain and devastation. Hence, these activities are devastating to the quality of human lives.

The lives of the people are downgraded. Indiscriminate human actions on the environment are putting the life of the population in danger and are the signs of irresponsibility. As such, man is in the world and his ecology is the nature of that Inness. We cannot leave long if we continue to leave as if pollution and global warming are not capable of putting us out of life. The dignity of human beings in the global society is affected through the mistreatment of the environment. Thus, "*as every act of cruelty towards any creature is contrary to human dignity,*"[420] so the irresponsible act on the environment in the global society is a crime against the

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[419]M. Mbeki, *'perpetuating poverty in sub-Saharan Africa: How Africa political Elites undermine Entrepreneurship and Economic Development'. International policy Network*, London, 2005, p. 125.
[420]Pope Fancis, Encyclical Letter, *Laudato Si'of the Holy Father on Care for Our Common Home*, Vatican Press, p. 67.

value of human life. This inhumane irresponsibility is the very roots to the consequences of climate change in the global society.

Climate change is the average rise of surface temperature on earth due to the use of fossil fuels by humanity. Most perceptibly, in the run-up to the Paris climate change negotiations in late 2014, the world's two largest emitters the United States and China made a joint announcement that they would work with other countries in the world in order to achieve an agreement in Paris, as well as announcing respective targets for emissions reductions. Such announcement cannot be underestimated in the global society.

The world is united as one behind climate action, Trump's ascendance Presidency in 2016 and withdrawal from climate change agreements with the Paris Accord, blown the Obama-era climate policies as a potential disaster for the global climate. Thus, the withdrawal from the agreement is a re-establishment of the sovereignty of America. The Paris Agreement pledges all of the world's nations to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases in order to combat climate change.[421] This action has received worldwide attention and strong criticism from other nations.[422] Focus in the global society is gradually shifting from politics, wars, and poverty to environmental issues. Trump's withdrawal, therefore posed threats to human life and its human techno-scientific activities.

More science and more technology expansion are not going to get us out of the present ecological crisis until we find a new religion, coordinated actions to limit global warming to two degrees or rethink our old one. It is obvious that the anthropogenic nature of the crisis is triggered by humans themselves. President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil states "Climate change resulting from human action is one of the biggest global challenges of current times."[423]What underlines this statement is the direct effect of human activities on the environment. Human activities underscore the very inhuman action to human life and the biosphere.

So, we will begin our argument by considering to what extent the contemporary ecological crisis can be attributed to human activities? A probe in to the chaos and distorted nature and human relationship is evident in the ecological crisis. Going beyond this scope, is vital to search for

[421]https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Farber%2C%20U.S.%20Climate%20Policy_%20Obama%2C%20Trump%2C%20and%20Beyond%20%282018%29.docx
[422] *Ibid*
[423] UNFCCC http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/ application/pdf/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_brazil.pdf

aggressive factors that lead humanity into the natural world relationship? The 21st century environmental problems are therefore partly anthropogenic and human-induced, the result of the effect of selfish and corporate chemical and human wastes on all forms of ecological and human life.

As concerns technology and science, human techno-scientific activities in the global society have threatened the ecosystem and human life. Most fundamental in this regard is the uncontrolled nature of emitted gases from nuclear power plant and automobiles (i.e. from U.S, China, Russia, France, Germany, Iran, North Korea and others). Nuclear power plant poses enormous treats to global serenity through the testing of bombs, missiles, chemical weapons. The planting of nuclear power plant to generate energy and its explosion on land through bombs or punctures of nuclear power plants releases radioactive substances like uranium (U) and plutonium (Pt) which causes diseases like skin cancer, blood cancer and hair loss to man and other animals.[424] Its high energy content released during the hydrogen bomb and atomic bomb explosion kills man, plants and other living organisms for instance the case of Hiroshima in Japan. Other mishaps related to this includes, the Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011 Nuclear power plant explosions in Ukraine and Japan respectively, that released dangerous radionuclides into the atmosphere. The net results are relatively environmental damage.

What we are experiencing as damage is the false narrative and dualism of an ecological concept of interdependence and interrelatedness. Such an approach points out that while technological development has greatly increased our ability to have an impact on global ecological processes in society, in every real sense humanity continue as an ecological complex web with other species. It is our perceived separation from nature, a form of environmental alienation that lies at the heart of the ecological crisis. In this sense, it can be argued that humanity have lost sight of its place in the natural world and, perhaps most important, lost the sense of connection, of relationship to the other parts of the web. The current nature of this, matters because if humans do not see or understand their relationship to something, then it is easy to ignore the impact, that our actions might have, and to not recognize or care about the consequences of that impact.[425]

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[424]Cf. J. O'Donnel, Land pollution: causes, and Effects and solution for the future Retrieved 15/5/2018 https://www.conservtioninstitute.orgLand pollution on humans. Consulted online 2/10/2021.

[425] United Nations environment Program. *Global environment outlook: Environment for development (GEO4).* (2007). retrieved February 7, 2022, from http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4

The critical-dialectical discourses are faced with the enormity of the ecological crisis. In the face of the overwhelming global evidence of climate change, it is difficult to argue that humans are having no impact, on the natural world. It is broadly and normally agreed that humans in the present age have reached population levels and technological capacities that mean humans are capable of destroying the fragile ecosystem that sustains humanity. The fundamental deduction drawn by much of the emerging evidence is that, there is a crisis and we are the cause. Many mass recent reports also make the point that environmental problems unevenly (inequitably) affect the world's poorest and operate to further prevent many people from moving from poverty into more sustainable lifestyles.[426] Such a deduction recognizes the centrality of the environmental crisis and the ways in which all aspects of human life are related back to the state of the global ecosystem. This acknowledgment also clearly links issues of global social justice with issues of the environment, a number of authors have highlighted these connections by drawing attention both to broad issues, such as the links between poverty and environmental problems,[427] and to more specific problems, including the exposure of children to chemical contamination.[428]

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[426] *Ibid*
[427] *Ibid*
[428] M. E. Rogge & T. Combes- Orme, Protecting children from chemical exposure: social work and U.S. social welfare policy. *Social Work,* (2003).*48*, pp. 439-450.

# Partial Conclusion

Our focus on this chapter was the phenomenological root sense of the crisis of human which is deeply enshrine in failed practices of democratic values and environmental protection. Humanity has been in the perpetual state of crisis and diverse forms on interest unleash in conflicts and manipulation of the rights of man in society. The unconsciousness of our contemporary world has hindered societal progress. The failed practices of human values are the very causes to the diverse crisis we are experiencing. In what sense can we say the moral crisis is ontological? First it is based on the study of being, i.e. existence. When we talk about existence, we talk about being in the visible. Ontology is the object of the reality of being. Man must become conscious of his world and his very existence. This consciousness entails wholesome values of human dignity and protection in face of violence, cultural and religious crisis, decline of nation state and the end of right of man. As observed, the present leadership in the global society operates on nationalistic interest. The nationalist interest is deeply enshrined in the colonial-postcolonial rule and exploitation of the inferior race. The consequences are rooted in the crisis of global leadership domination and the making of history, with a repercussion on the global crisis of neoliberalism in the 21$^{st}$ century. In this context of crisis, a number of influential analysts have argued recently that the global crisis of humanity drives round the crisis of accumulation, which is also a fundamental crisis of neoliberalism. In face of failed Western inculcated values in the third world countries, the crisis of leadership in the political sphere is practically responsible for the underdevelopment and insecurity in Africa's social and structural injustices. This unveils an imbalance in system between developed and underdeveloped nations. The impact of such denigrating action thus influence environmental crisis which man is a part. The root causes of the crisis of humanity, has repercussions on economic and direct environmental changes. The crisis is central to our lives, especially in a time of conflicts so intense that threatens thought. This ushers us to part two, with a detail analysis on the racial denigration of slavery in Africa and Levinas' holocaust experienced of Western totality of the other as a core to ethics as first Philosophy.

## PART TWO: THE DIALECTICS AND CONCEPTION OF THE OTHER ACCORDING TO LEVINAS AND WHAT BECOMES OF LEVINAS

## INTRODUCTION

*The freedom of men is not achieved by the complacency of its ideological recognition, but by knowledge of the laws of their slavery.*[429]

This part suggests an understanding of the phenomena of slave trade in Africa, colonialism, racism, tribalism and holocaust experience by Levinas is taken into consideration. The argument that is advanced in this part is that Levinas' construction of the holocaust (shoal) was influenced, at least in part, by the interpretation of the slave trade and colonialism in Africa. In order to establish the impact of these historical events on the formulation and articulation of the crisis of humanity in the global society, two major tasks will be undertaken: firstly, a description of the historical facts followed immediately by the second task, a depiction of the perceived consequences and how they fed into Western philosophy of totality. Before considering these historical events and their consequences, however, a precautionary note must be made in order to depict its concrete historical manifestations. Although Levinas experienced the dramatic massacre of the Jews, did not write any essays on the subject of the slave trade and colonialism.[430] The historical narratives described here on slavery in Africa and colonialism, therefore, are not his; rather they are from historians who have commented on the most tragic history of dehumanization in Africa. However, this does not mean that Levinas was uninterested in history or that historical events did not influence his thoughts or that he was indifferent to the slave trade and colonialism. On the contrary, history was very important to Levinas and the Jews experienced of the Holocaust as a dehumanizing tendency of Western Philosophy. Our aim in this part, therefore, is not to describe the origin of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, but rather to simply state the facts as they are recorded by historians and to identify its consequences, at least in part, rooted in those events and subsequently the influence of those consequences on humanity. The purpose of this is not to endorse view of slave trade and colonialism but to demonstrate the conditions on African personality.

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[429] L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays,* trans. Ben Brewster. L'Unità, 1971. p. 25.
[430]Cf. J. Hatch, *Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania*, Henry Regnery Company. 1976.

## CHAPTER FIVE: SLAVERY A HOLOCAUST IN AFRICA NOT RECOGNIZE AS HOLOCAUST INTERNATIONALLY

### Partial Introduction

The UN Secretary General António Guterres On March 25, 2020, in his message for the International Day of the Victims of Slavery and Remembrance of Transatlantic Slave Trade, emphasized that for humanity to move forward towards a flourishing future, it requires us to collectively confront the racist legacy of slavery.[431] The aftermath legacy of Slavery in Africa and UNESCO's teaching on, *General History of Africa* and calling for *global Africa* can be regarded as such an innovative step towards its intention to free the African continent and its peoples from racial embodied prejudices resulting from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans and colonization. More importantly, a deeper understanding of transatlantic slavery and their harmful effects will encourage responsibilities from African leaders whose prosperities have been built upon layers of historical damage done to the enslaved and their descendants.[432] These national governments must properly accept their responsibilities for the historical acts of inhumanity and for addressing the unrelenting economic, political, psychosocial, and spiritual consequences.[433] Our question of interest is: Can we liberate humanity from the prolonged darkness of slavery?, reckoning with our shared dehumanizing history and acknowledging the mass. The chapter outlines the trans-Atlantic slave trade and slavery in Africa. It then discusses these injuries as cultural, traumas, transgenerational and how these wounds are experienced by the present relevant communities. It focuses on colonialism, racism as a significant harm, analyzing different forms of racism that is interpersonal, internalized and institutional as interconnected and mutually reinforcing. This chapter considers challenges in addressing slavery and puts forward tentative ideas for collective healing.

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[431] https://www.un.org/en/rememberslavery/ international/observance/2020

[432] G. Scherto, "Legacies of Slavery and their Enduring Harms." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 15, no. 3, 66-82. https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.15.3.1833.

[433] https://www.academia.edu/65503122/Genocide_Studies_and_Prevention_An_International_Journal_Issue_15_3_ Special_Issue_Mass_Atrocity_and_Collective_Healing

## 5.1. THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INHUMANE HOLOCAUST (GENOCIDES) OF SLAVERY IN AFRICA AND ITS METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS

The metaphysical innumerable forms of slavery in Africa and forced servitude and human labour existed entirely in the world before the development of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the early 16th century. In the global society of today, the socio-economic and political institutions that once legalized slavery remain in place and exert significant impact on African people's experiences of human dignity and well-being in the contemporary world. Regardless of the abolition of slavery in Europe and the Americas at the end of the 19th century,[434] the regime of terror has continued to inflict harrowing stress on many generations of African people and indigenous descent.

To most African people, it is surprising however, that today, more than four hundred years after the first enslaved Africans were violently and brutally brought to the Atlantic shores, the catastrophic wounds of slavery and their harmful effects remain far-reaching in the continent.[435] The immense suffering is not limited to the psychological, physical, and spiritual harms endured by the descendants of the formerly enslaved Africans; rather these harms are also experienced as collective trauma, within an overall culture of institutionalized oppression, the venom of which has contaminated the global societies.

The issues involved here are of the utmost existential harms of slavery in Africa which are manifold, from the tragic and massive loss of human lives, to the irreversible materialistic loss for Africa soul and for the world; from the deprivation of human dignity, to the damage to our personal and collective psyche that has internalized the effects of the harm; from self-alienation, to dehumanizing intergroup and interpersonal, and intercommunal relationships. Without acknowledgement or healing of the historic trauma of slavery, harms have been successfully passed on, continuing to aggravate in successive generations, and extending the wounds and hurts to generations yet to come.

It is therefore, critically important to scrutinize how the traumatic effects of slavery in Africa are lived and transmitted by peoples and communities, and how they inflict wide-spread

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[434] G. Bertocchi, "The Legacies of Slavery In and Out of Africa," *IZA Journal of Migration* 5 (August 2016), accessed April 21, 2021, https://izajodm.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40176-016-0072-0.

[435] Goff *et al.,* Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences. March 2008.*Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo*gy 94(2):292-306.DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.292

harms in the global society of diverse human crisis. Only with such an understanding of the harm of slavery in Africa can global societies and communities begin to address and heal their long-term wounds.

Slavery is first and foremost experienced as a trans-generational trauma amongst Africans, commonly referred to as the transmission of specific stressful and painful elements of historical events within large groups of individuals from one generation to another. As a thoughtful collective trauma,[436] slavery in Africa had a tormenting impact on the enslaved mentally, physically, emotionally, spiritually, and even relationally. Such an unhealed trauma can be passed on through parenting processes and behaviour patterns of communities and societies.[437]Similarly, the wounds[438]can be transmitted through the continued injuries from the psycho-social processes, institutional practices and economic-political systems.[439]The descendants of the mass atrocity including victims and survivors, perpetrators, may share common responses to pain and stress, for instance, denial, avoidance, numbness, and silence, as ways to cope with the profound indescribable experiences.[440]The historical events and policies which have led to contemporary social problems and structural inequalities continue to negatively impact the global society.

The trauma, undergone by the descendants of those traumatized Africans, have effects on the successive generations through inherited trauma reactivity being triggered in similar stressful situations. The human being also transcends the categories of time and space and is not merely a thing. Tremendous symptoms of transgenerational slavery trauma commonly found in people of African descent tend to be both self- and other-directed. On this issue, there is first distorted self-concept, low primary self-esteem, hopelessness, learned helplessness, depression, destructive and risk-taking behaviours, and self-violence are amongst self-directed trauma symptoms; whereas suspicion, distrust, anger, aggression,[441] violence against others, including one's own friends,

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[436]V. D. Volkan, *Large-Group Psychology: Racism, Societal Divisions, Narcissistic Leaders and Who We Are Now* (Phoenix, 2020).

[437]J. DeGruy Leary, *Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome: America's Legacy of Enduring Injury and Healing* (Uptone Press, 2005)*,* p. 4.

[438]See, T. Hübl and Julie Jordan Avritt, *Healing Collective Trauma: A Process for Integrating Our Intergenerational and Cultural Wounds* (Sounds True, 2020).

[439]Cf. Volkan, *Large-Group Psychology*; Rachel Yehuda and Linda M. Bierer, "The Relevance of Epigenetics to PTSD: Implications for the DSM-V," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 22, no. 5 (October 2009), accessed April 21, 2021, https:// doi.org/10.1002/jts.20448.

[440]Dan Bar-On, *The Indescribable and the Undiscussable: Reconstructing Human Discourse After Trauma* (Central European University Press, 1999).

[441]J. DeGruy Leary, *Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome: op. cit.,* p 5.

family, members of one's own and other communities[442] are illustrative of other-directed symptoms of slavery. These behaviours and emotional[443]states adopted by people of African descent in contemporary western societies are directly inherited from their enslaved ancestors, and thus triggered by systemic oppression and structural violence.

Besides, there are also signs that oppression has been internalized and accepted by the communities of African descent who may exhibit a lack in self-agency and feeling of disempowerment. For example, recent mass academic inquiry has found that amongst peoples in the Caribbean, transgenerational trauma has sustained slavery, in the form of "mental slavery."[444] As such, shared traumatic experiences can be far-embedded within a culture, thus becoming a cultural trauma. Like in transgenerational trauma, cultural trauma occurs when members of a large group had been subjugated to horrifying experiences that profoundly impacted upon group members shared consciousness irreversible ways.[445] The symptoms of cultural trauma can often involve both normalized practices and processes of identity-formation. In this way, cultural trauma occurs and increases, distorting and regenerating societal perceptions and resulting in misconceptions and misperceptions of race and colour, a harmful stereotypes and beliefs.[446] As a consequence, unconscious enigmas, values and language built into the global society's memory and remembrance can become cultural customs, which can further extend and prolong the historical trauma.

The cruel effects of both cultural and transgenerational trauma are not limited to the harms to the descendants of the enslaved African people; they likewise have impact on the direct and indirect beneficiaries of slave trade and slavery in Africa, and the contemporary groups who have continued to profit from the dehumanizing history of slavery to undermined the dignity of Africans.[447] For instance, people of the African and indigenous descent experiences of exclusions, political disempowerment, social deprivations, and economic injustice are part and parcel of systemic oppression in the continent. Conversely, on a more practical level, each of these harms

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[442]N. Manwi Nehngwen, *Violence Experience and Coping in Refugees: A Case Study*, Master Thesis Special Education, University of Yaoundé I, 2021. p. 2. Unpublished dissertation

[443] J. DeGruy Leary, *Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome: op. cit.,* p 5.

[444]See, B. Fletchman Smith, *Mental Slavery: Psychoanalytic Studies of Caribbean People* (Karnac Books, 2000).

[445] See, J. C. Alexander, *et al.*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (University of California Press, 2004).

[446] R. Eyerman, *Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[447]M. Banton, "Race as a Social Category," *Race* 8, no. 1. (July 1966).

of slavery can serve as a reminder of internalized social norms and self-identification to reinforce the idea that their black skin is the cause of their sufferings. In other words, when a lowest status is self-imposed on black people, it creates the *Negro myth*, a value system that judges people of African descent to be lacking in social and political worthwhileness.[448] The Black people both free and enslaved relied on their faith to hold onto their humanity under the most inhumane circumstances. The effects of the slave trade had a direct bearing on the origin in the social and economic sphere.

## 5.2 EFFECTS OF SLAVE TRADE IN THE SOCIAL SPHERE

Having described the metaphysical inhumane genocides of slavery in Africa and the global society with its enduring harm, the consequences of slave trade, the effects will be examine on the social sphere. One of the main effects of slave trade in the social sphere was dehumanization of the African parson. The social factor that highly aggravated dehumanization was essentially Loss of Self-Confidence.

### 5.2.1 Dehumanization of the African Person and Loss of Self-Confidence

The dehumanization aspect of many Africans was a crucial factor. During the slave trade, the humanity and self-esteem of the slaves were reduced to a bare minimum if not completely eliminated, for instance, at the time they were captured and during their transportation. According to Walter Rodney, slaves were not only obtained through trade in the normal sense of buying and selling of goods but rather through warfare, trickery, banditry and kidnapping has also noted that on other occasions traders bribed local chiefs to procure slaves, who when unsuccessful through bribery, raided villages and took captives. This method of obtaining slaves is an example that shows the extent to which the humanity of slaves was reduced. Such treatment of slaves reduced them to a level of chattels or commodities that could be bought and sold in a market. This is the back-story conceived against the background of a trade that had reduced many Africans to commodities.

Another factor witnessed in the social sphere that influenced the 'loss of self-confidence' among some Africans are damaging effects of the slave trade that "caused our people to have grave

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[448] D. Hook, "Fanon and the Psychoanalysis of Racism," *LSE Research Online* (2007), accessed April 20, 2021, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2567.

doubts about their own abilities."[449] 'Our people' refers to Africans, since they were the victims of the slave trade and who, accordingly, 'lost confidence in their own abilities.' On this note, Nyerere further argues that, "any dominating group seeks to destroy the confidence of those they dominate because this helps them to maintain their position."[450] This is another backdrop of persons who had totally lost self-confidence in their aptitudes. In contrast to views that continued to undermine the confidence of Africans, Nyerere in *Ujamaa* asserted that a future movement of liberation must have as its "vital task...to restore the people's self-confidence."[451]

## 5.3 THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SLAVE TRADE

Based on the consequences of slave trade in the social sector, we will now examine the economic consequences of slave trade and their influence on Africans. One of the main consequences of slave trade in the economic sphere was poverty.[452] The economic factors that highly aggravated poverty were essentially twofold: inter-tribal (civil) wars and population depletion.

### 5.3.1 Poverty due to civil wars and population Loss

As an impact, inter-tribal-wars during the slave trade era arose out of the desire for wealth and political power. Inter-tribal wars had high devastating consequences for the traditional economy. Accordingly, Alpers affirms: *Famine increasingly became a problem. People were often so badly off that they sold themselves, or their children, into slavery as a way of keeping themselves and their families alive.*[453] What underline this passage is that, the civil wars created chaos, killed, led to the enslavement of many people, destroyed property and seriously stunted the traditional economy by reducing its productivity. As a result such endemic resulted to famine and hunger ensued. These inabilities to meet even the most basic human nutritional requirements are the basis of abject poverty upon the African people. The massive impact of population loss on the economic development of the African society becomes even more apparent when one considers that slave

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[449]J. K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-1965, Oxford University Press,(1966). p. 170.
[450] *Ibid*
[451] *Ibid*
[452] Throughout this thesis, we will be using the term poverty to signify a situation of deprivation, both spiritual and material.
[453]E. A. Alpers, *The East African Slave Trade, Historical Association of Tanzania, Paper No.3*, East African Publishing House, 1967, p. 20.

traders took the most able, strong and competent members of society to foreign countries in Europe and America.

The problems to Africa's economy were not limited merely to the quantity that is the numerical toll of the population loss, but also by the quality of that loss that is the loss of the healthiest and productive members of society. On this note, in Justinian Rweyemamu opinion: *slave trade, which drained the country of the most active section of its population, seriously undermined the traditional economy by reducing its productivity [and as a result] famines increasingly became a problem.[454]* By depleting the continent of its workforce, slave trade triggered low production, which in turn gave rise to hunger, famine and a general lack of basic material goods. It was against this background of material deprivation and poverty as a combined effect of civil war and population loss. In sum, slave trade has set out three conditions which influenced the dehumanization of the African person, the loss of self-confidence in most Africans, material poverty due to civil wars and population loss. Besides aiming at restoring self-confidence, restoring rights and freedom of Africans and eradicating poverty counter the consequences of colonialism and the colonial system that had dominated Africa for more than seventy years. There were numerous effects of colonialism in the social sector of Africa and the global society which had a direct bearing on Africans namely racialism.

## 5.4. CONTEMPORARY RACISM AS A SIGNIFICANT HARM OF SLAVERY IN AFRICA

In modern times, a set of intellectual, ideological, political, scientific and economic changes has taken place in Europe, and more particularly in Western Europe. Reason, that faculty which enables man to know, judge and behave, is given the habit of understanding the essence of things. Thanks to it, modern man will organize, dominate the world of experience and make this transition from the theological state to the positive state of which Auguste Compte speaks.[455] There emerges a techno-scientific humanism which increases the productive and communicative forces of the West, leading to racial socio-political changes. Europe is faced with new needs, to extract / exploit the wealth of new lands on the one hand and, on the other hand, to find a market in order

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[454] J. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, *A Study of Perverse Capitalist Industrial Development,* Nairobi, Oxford University Press, (1973), p. 9.
[455] Cf. A. Compte, *Discours sur l'esprit positif*, Vrin, 1983.

to sell the production of these industries. This greatly contributes to the genesis of colonial slavery and the discourses of its legitimation.

Indeed, from the 18th century, to justify the imperialist enterprise, according to opinions attached to humanist values, "several speeches of truth on the nature, the specificity and the forms of living things, the qualities, the human traits and characters or even the entire populations which are specified in terms of genera or races and which are classified along a vertical line"[456]the West seeks to show no less that the truth of humanity is not to be found outside its borders. The Negro, therefore, is the prototype of a pre-human figure incapable of breaking free from his animal character or of self-production and self-determination. He will be born and gradually build the legend of the Negro man: "the myth of racial inferiority, the right of domination of the most capable."[457] It will take fabulous, religious, ethno-philosophical and ethno-zoological forms. Essentially it will be about saying, as French President Sarkozy will still support in the 21st century, that Africa and Africa have no history. They are then deprived of culture, of civilization, because quite simply incapable of rationality.

Racialism is the basic epistemological position that not only do races exist, but also that there are fundamental differences between them; it distinguishes people on the basis of the colour of their skin. This is to be contrasted with racism which assumes that some races are superior to others; in an altered meaning, refers to discrimination based on the concept of race. In Africa, racialism and racism are both usually traced back to the time of colonialism, when society was divided along racial lines. However, racism, the belief that one particular race is superior to another, did not disappear immediately after independence: racialism inherited from colonialism was one in which the injustices of colonial days survived; in which there was racial discrimination; and from which the degradation and evils which sprang from colonialism had yet to be banished.[458]Both concepts can generally be traced back to the colonial period, when the authority divided citizens along racial lines of Europeans, Indians and Africans. The most harmful aspect of slavery is racism, which involves both conscious and unconscious racism within overt and covert racialized systems in contemporary western societies and Africa in particular.

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[456]A. Mbembe, *Critique de la raison négre*, La découverte, 2013, p. 32.
[457] K. Nkrumah, *La lutte des classes en Afrique,* trad. M. A. Bah-Diop, Presence Africaine, 1972, p. 23.
[458]J. K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, op. cit.,* p 179.

Undeniably, a person's self-concept and desires that is, a black person desiring to be white cannot be separated from the relevant political, socioeconomic, and historical forces that converge and shape them. This worldview gives rise to our contemporary global economic system that legitimizes Western/white dominance over the different *Others*, especially peoples of African and indigenous descent.[459] Thus, within such an economic system that institutionalizes discrimination, "we have therefore all been programmed in the global society to respond to difference between humans and to handle that difference in us with fear and loathing in one of three ways: copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is subordinate, ignore it, and if that is not possible.[460] There have been few patterns of relating that enable people to experience each other as equals across differences.[461]

The African prevalent racist crisis patterns of relating are characterized by inhumanity, domination, discrimination, and reflecting the white-black duality of self- and other recognition. This is the result of such evil *ignorance* of ourselves as spiritual and ethical beings.[462] It is pernicious because the ignorance can cause harm, not only to other people but also to oneself.[463] Socially constructed self-identification is built upon a mutual dependency of different identity groups in recognizing each other's positionality in the societal "game,"[464] which effectively determines how people in each identity group are perceived, valued, received, and engaged with relationally. Racialization therefore, has damaging effects on intergroup and intercommunal relationships.[465] When people adopt an inhumane attitude about others, and worse, when they internalize the inhuman attitude about themselves, they tend to take an indifferent, distancing, and objectifying orientation towards each other. Interpersonal and intergroup relationships thus shaped by racist structural and institutional conditions can have traumatic effects on people physically, psychologically, social-relationally, and spiritually. Therefore, race-based self-identification and its harmful effects on intergroup and intercommunal relationships must be equally understood as

[459]Thiaw and Mack, *Atlantic Slavery, cation, Democracy and Difference* 36, no. e75102, (2020).S148.

[460] https://www.jstor.org/stable/1395343/

[461] A. Lorde, "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference," in *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches* (Crossing Press, 1984), p. 115.

[462]C. I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106, no. 8 (June 1993).

[463]G. Scherto and Garrett Thomson, *Understanding Peace Holistically From the Spiritual to the Political* (Peter Lang, 2018).

[464]G. Herbert Mead, *George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology*, ed. Anselm Strauss (University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[465]N. Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon, "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa," *American Economic Review* 101, no. 7 (December 2011).

historically, socio-economically, and politically defined processes. In a more practical sense is to say that race is not only defined in relational terms within socio-economic and political spaces, it also reflects systemic, cultural, and symbolic negotiations of power.[466]

### 5.4.1 Racist denials

During the 18th century, as ideas of universal equality and freedom spread, great racist rhetoric arose to justify capitalist imperialism. If Reason in the history of Hegel represents the acme of these discourses of denial of humanity to the black, other authors before him and after him will resort to the notion of race to instrumentalize racism. Race is, for these thinkers, the concept of representation of non-European humanities suffering from degradation and ontological defection. A tactic consisted in extending to humans what was done in botany and zoology; that is, the compare anatomy of plants and animals in order to establish a hierarchy. Gobineau's Arthur best exemplifies this racial thinking; he seeks to establish the differences that separate the different human races: white, yellow and black.[467]Mixing scientific assertions and popular prejudices, he presupposes a purity of the race articulated to a hierarchy of races and therefore their inequality. He concludes that a white race alone can produce civilization and, with colonization, it has completed its task.

In doing so it enriches the other races which are the coarse ground, the cotton and the wool, which softens the white race with their silk. Du Noir, he declares: the Melanian variety is the most humble and lies at the bottom of the ladder. The animal character, borrowed from the shape of its basin, imposes its destiny on it from the moment of its conception. Gobineau, in doing so, will give a meaning, a law to human history, "a single law of evolution which transforms racial determinism into a single principle of explanation of general history," a past wherein the Negro did not partake or had anything to do with. Indeed, history and culture, which constitute the symbols by which a people asserts its own identity, have long been defined in reference to written works. History would be knowledge of the past based on the written word. Africa does not have a written tradition, hence the myth of the an-history of the African people. Myth served as the economic and political enslavement of the continent. Hegel's negationist remarks illustrate this better than any other:

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[466]M. W. Hughey and Carol Ann Jackson, "The Dimensions of Racialization and the Inner-City School," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 673, no. 1 (September 2017).

[467] Gobineau J. Arthur, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*, Libraire de Paris, 1933

*L'Afrique est d'une façon générale le pays replie sur lui-même qui persiste dans se caractère principal de concentration sur soi…. Elle n'a donc pas à proprement parler d'histoire….c'est un monde non développé anhistorique, ou est entièrement prisonnier de l'esprit de la société naturel et dont la place se trouve encore au milieu de seuil de l'histoire universelle[468]… . (Et ailleurs il insiste :) il ne peut y avoir d'histoire proprement dite. Ce qui se produit, c'est une suite d'accident de faits surprenants. Il n'existe pas ici un but, un Etat qui pourrait constituer un objectif (et) celui veut connaitre les manifestations épouvantable de la nature humaine peut les trouver en Afrique.[469]*

The same author denies rational aptitude to the black man who finds himself in a state of barbarism and savagery which still prevents him from being an integral part of civilization. In short, the German philosopher perceives Africa as a mass folded in on itself and closed, like one snuggled up to sleep, a true night of the mind. Thus, under Hegel's authority, concludes Nkrumah: It is said that other continents have shaped history and set its course. Africa has remained stationary, held on the ground by inertia.[470] The Negro is denied the brief of humanity, unfit for any rational production, ripe in pre-ethical and pre-political times. The African peoples will undergo during the centuries which followed the lights this challenge originating from the human in them until the beginning of the last century when some of the sons, on the continent and in the diaspora, will undertake an attempt to reconquer this humanity denied by these colonial doctrines and practices.

### 5.4.2 Disappearance of the Attitude of 'Family-hood'

Throughout the colonial period almost all aspects of African traditional culture were undermined but it was the disappearance of the spirit of brotherhood, the spirit that motivated people in community to care for one another. Understood in this way and taking into account Nyerere's understanding of the consequences of slave trade and colonialism, as his attempt to restore the attitude of brotherhood or family-hood, which enabled people to care for one another and which was therefore, the foundation of community in traditional Africa. Nyerere concerns was on rebuilding socialism in Africa towards forming new societies in terms of family-hood.[471]

In addition to the loss of the spirit of family-hood, another factor which influenced disappearance of attitude was the rise of individualism in Africa as a whole. Africans lived in a communitarian sphere before the transatlantic slave. The colonialist distorted the very foundation

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[468] https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/11/Hegel/15275
[469]Toutes les citations qui suivent sur la pensée de Hegel sur l'Afrique, sauf indication contraire, sont tirées de: Hegel, *La raison dans l'histoire*, trad. K. Papaioannou, Libraire Plon, 1965, pp. 245-264.
[470]K. Nkrumah, Discours au congrès international d'études africaines, cite par A. Dieng, *Hegel et l'Afrique noire, Hegel était-il raciste* ?, Dakar, Codesria, 2006, p. 61.
[471]J. K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, Oxford University Press, 1977. p. 8.

of thinking and unity in Africa. The way of living was deeply anchored in their belief systems.[472] Such correlative kept the communitarian spirit in Africa as the foundation of community building. This made them to see their selves as member of a community. He could not, therefore, hoard wealth or let another member of the brotherhood go hungry without sharing food with them. It also did undermined the educational system that was offered. In Nyerere opinion:

> *The education system introduced into Africa by the colonialists...was based on the assumption of a colonialist and capitalist society. It emphasized and encouraged the individualistic instincts of mankind, instead of his cooperative instincts [and] the possession it led to the individual material wealth as being the major criterion of social worth and merit."[473]*

What underscore this view on individualism is the necessary foundation to think future policies in line with *Ujamaa* aiming at sharing and cooperation before the advent of colonialism. In sum the social consequences of formal colonialism shows an attempt to counter racism, and to restore the attitude of family-hood/brotherhood as well as co-operation and sharing.

### 5.4.3 Political Consequences of Colonialism as Loss of Freedom

The political consequences of colonialism and their influence in the political sphere, has one of the direct consequences of colonialism on the loss of freedom or independence. During colonialism Africans lost the freedom to choose and act on their own political will and were instead forced to act on the will of other people, namely, the colonial masters. The list of issues that Africans were forced to accept is long but we shall only mention a few examples here: the first concerns itself with the colonial administration and rule. Thus, one of the political consequences of colonialism on the people of Africans was the loss of their independence, that is, the loss of the power for Africans to govern and plan their future.

This is the structure under which Africans were dominated and which deprived Africans of the power to act upon their own political choices and will. Having lost the power to govern themselves, Africans also lost control of their economy and the power to determine their economic activities. This setting of loss freedom and independence was developed against the experience of a people who during more than seventy years of colonialism were not acting on their personal policies, will and choices. Moreover, those future policies such as *Ujamaa*, must help Africans to realize their own policies, their own course of action without impediments from foreign countries.

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[472]*Ibidem,* p. 14.
[473]*Ibidem,* p. 47.

Furthermore, the policies must help Africans to be masters of their own destiny and not mastered by people from foreign countries. It is enough to state here that lack of freedom or independence was one of the factors that influenced the under-development of Africa precisely Sub-Saharan Africa and that led to the development Nyerere's *Ujamaa.*

### 5.4.4 Economic Consequences of Colonialism

Having depicted the consequences of colonialism in the social and political spheres and their influences on the development Nyerere considered the negative consequences of colonialism in the economic sector, namely poverty and employment discrimination. During colonialism people did not have any official say in the decision making process of the colonial government machinery nor were they called upon to elect their leaders.

### 5.4.5 Poverty and employment discrimination

The rising poverty and employment discrimination in Africa is a result of colonialism, conflict and institutional fragility. In November 2018, the World Bank writes: The number of people living in extreme poverty has drastically increased, raising the risk of political violence and devastating disease outbreaks with an average poverty rate of about 30%.[474] Nyerere affirms that the colonial system impoverished Africans through an unfair balance of trade with industrialized countries.[475] Hence the idea here is the fact that, most states were created by European imperial powers. In line with this, Mbeki claims the rule of colonial states was too served as tools for political oppression and economic exploitation.[476] For example, Africans were exploited as labourers by colonialists to produce raw materials such as cotton, tea, coffee and rubber. These commodities were then exported to Europe where they were processed and sold back to Africans at exorbitant prices.

Nyerere believed that the system was not conducive for the eradication of poverty.[477] In addition, the internal sector of African economy deteriorated leaving the government unable to pay decent salaries, and provide better social services to its people or build solid infrastructures. Africa has become poorer, as a result of the activities of foreign investors who owned more than

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[474]https://www.blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/number-extreme poverty. Consulted online 9/9/2019
[475]J. K. Nyerere, Man *and Development*, Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 17.
[476]Cf. M. Mbeki, *'perpetuating poverty in sub-saharan Africa: How Africa political Elites undermine Entrepreneurship and Economic Development'. International policy Network, London*, 2005, p. 25.
[477]J. K. Nyerere, Man *and Development*, *op. cit.*, p 17.

90% of the monetized sector of the economy for example; in countries like Cameroon, Rwanda, Tanzanian, Sudan, Zimbabwe and South Africa.[478] In short, foreign investors controlled Commercial Banks and manufacturing industries. This resulted in a crackdown on the very dignity of man in society. Instead of creating jobs and profits for African people, rather the system was exacerbating poverty thereby sustaining jobs in Europe and other countries.[479]

The practical result of a stunted economy was a very poor condition of living for the population with corrupt elites serving the interest of the West. The aforementioned affected the population through severe hunger, famine, poor housing, poor health services, poor clothes and poor education for the majority. Consequently, elites in Africa have contributed to driving their economies backwards by misusing their countries' economic surplus resulting to stagnation and underdevelopment. As such, African elites have exploited their position and government as a source of personal enrichment, thereby throwing the population into abject poverty. The dominant social group maintains and maximizes its wealth through the intentional exploitation of economically inferior subordinates.[480] Hence, most African leaders are not loyal in service in spite of the pledge made to defend the vulnerable.

Based on the practice of employment discrimination, tribalism sets in to deplete the workforce of African States.[481] Tribalism is the tendency and practice of segregating people on the basis of their tribes. The workforce of African states depleted and triggered low production, which in turn gave rise to famine and a general lack of basic human material goods. The effects of tribalism on the employment scale were the disruption of human equality and brotherhood in traditional African society. Tribalism became more acute in Africa after the Berlin conference of 1884 that partitioned Africa. The arbitrary nature of partitioning brought together numerous ethnic groups and tribes which, later on crumbled the unity in labour force instilling discrimination. The results of these were tribes with the most educated individuals and intellectuals thought they deserved more privileges and power in government than other tribes. In some African countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, tribal conflicts arising from the desire of one tribe to rule over the

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[478]A. A. Boahen, *African perspective on colonialism*, Baltimore, USA, John Hopkins University press
[479]J. K. Nyerere, *Man and Development*, *op. cit.,* p 110.
[480]A. Arieff, *The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa and Global Policy Responses,* Analyst in African Affairs, April 6, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40778consulted online 10/1/2020
[481]N. Henri Ndifor, *The Levinasian Notion of Responsibility: A Response to the Present Human Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa,* Master Thesis Philosophy, UCAC, 2020. p. 40. Unpublished.

others has sparked material deprivations, thus affecting the manpower of the economic sector.[482] However, after independence, cracks along Sub-Saharan state lines began to show and this was partially a result of unequal employment opportunities. The disastrous effects of employment discrimination in Africa constituted a potential threat to unity. Across Africa and precisely in Sub-Saharan Africa division of this nature toppled governments and sparked civil wars.

In addition, many Sub-Saharan African economies remain reliant on primary commodity exports, rendering them vulnerable to external shocks with a great number of the population impoverished.[483] The effect of this, are a great number of unemployed individuals with governments using the culprits of economic hardship to render man jobless in society. Impoverishment is a growing threat to the lives and welfare of people in Sub-Saharan African states with low *per capita* income. This, has equally, resulted to intense poverty and a poor gross domestic product (GDP) threatening man's existence and social status. The root cause of this impoverishment is the failure of agricultural production, to increase, at a rate that can keep pace with the high rate of population growth.[484] The result of this, is a backdrop in Sub-Saharan commodity exports; both home and overseas, that affects her internal and foreign policy, leading to the disenfranchisement of economic development. In brief, the lack of economic resources and manpower has compounded the risks associated with innovation and efforts to boost agricultural productivity. Hence, resulting from the absence of home based industrial sectors, with a loss of national consciousness towards her citizens. African leaders do not have a spirit of patriotism; they have failed to endorse societal values to uphold man (Other) in society. The consequence of a failed spirit of patriotism is the nature of the sub-continent backwardness and underdevelopment. The problem of Africa is the rejection of their personality and cultural identity and values. The acceptance of western values, individualism has erode their values into a state of crisis. There is need for Africans to be open and accept other values and rationality to structure their context in space and time.

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[482]G. B. N. Ayittey, *African in Chaos*, 2nd edition, St. Martin's Griffin press. 2006.
[483]M. Mbeki, *'Perpetuating Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: op. cit.,* p 17.
[484]E. Miguel, *et al.,* Shanker Satyanath, Ernest Sergenti. *"Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach."Journal of Political Economy*, 2004. p. 112.

## Partial Conclusion

This chapter explores the dehumanizing and historical impacts of the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans and slavery, the continuous harmful effects on peoples, groups, and communities in relevant global contemporary societies. Through an interdisciplinary analysis of a distinction between slavery inheritances and their multi-faceted harms, it has developed an understanding that slavery is a living reality and that its damages are not merely historical, they are simultaneously relational, socio-cultural, personal, structural, and institutional. Our global economic processes, national political systems, and institutional cultures and practices have served to extend the atrocity of slavery and the persistent damage of it. These give rise to key ethical questions in our imagination of ways to liberate[485] global community from inhumanity and antagonism and transcending dialectic in a permanent tension. Similarly, to step outside the black/white binary view of humanity is to give way[486] to subjectivity conceived as intersubjectivity. This conceptual position can help societies move[487] beyond race, and beyond any form of essentialization in defining groups and communities based on skin colors, physical features, or even cultural rituals.[488] A significant approach to addressing the personal, relational, structural, and institutional harms is through the pathway of education. By highlighting the interconnection of slavery and the traumas, the resultant harms, and the systemic root of dehumanization, this chapter invites constructive reflections on how the global societies and communities must act now to address this ill and heal its embittering wounds. It invites to transcend unawareness, triviality, and develop proactive spirit in the global society. The aforementioned precarious experience in Africa usher us to the Levinas' Existential-Ontological experience of war and holocaust.

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[485] P. De Souza and H. Adlai Murdoch, "Editorial Introduction" to "Oceanic Dialogues: from the Black Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific," *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 8, no 2 (December 2005).

[486] P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Trans Myra Bergman Ramos; introduction by Donaldo Macedo.-30th anniversary Ed. New York. 1921. https://envs.ucsc.edu/internships/internship-readings/freire-pedagogy-of-the-oppressed.pdf

[487] Cf. P. Gilroy, *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line* (Harvard University Press, 2002).

[488] Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic. op. cit.,* p 109.

# CHAPTER SIX: THE EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LEVINAS' PHILOSOPHICAL ITINERARY EXPERIENCE OF WAR AND HOLOCAUST AS THE GERM OF HIS THOUGHT

## Partial Introduction

The socio-political situation in the 20th century, orchestrated by World War I and II and the disastrous genocides of the Holocaust[489] perpetrated against the Jews by Hitler, under Nazism influence the philosophy of Levinas. The human and historical situation to which Levinas seeks to cope is that of the aftermath of the two Wars, the rise of Fascism, the horrors of Nazism and Stalinism, the incomparable threat of annihilation associated with Hiroshima, and all the atrocities and catastrophes. Under the Nazi regime, the individual was a being of no consequence. He was used to realize the goals of a racially tainted Movement of Hitler. All these experiences engage Levinas as a philosopher and as a human being. Levinas finds a path to respond to a world plagued by violence and suffering. In the philosophy of Levinas, the philosophical problem arises in terms of ethics and not in terms of ontology. The central question for him is that of knowing the relationship that the self maintains with the Other. And that is why the situation surrounding the existence of being in Western philosophy before and after the Second World War led Levinas to think that we must reinvent the approach of Western philosophy. He will propose that he wants better to go towards being through ethics than through ontology.

## 6.1 LEVINAS' EXISTENTIAL EXPERIENCE OF WAR

Emmanuel Levinas living through the 1917 Russian revolution travelled to France in 1923 to pursue philosophy in Strasbourg. He spend the academic year 1928-29 at Husserl's University in Freiburg, in Southern Germany, where he attended the last seminars given by Edmund Husserl and the lectures and seminars of Martin Heidegger. He is indebted to the phenomenology of both Husserl and Heidegger. Historical violence, as evil came to power in 1933 which disturb the philosophical tranquility of Levinas. Most members of his family were killed by the Nazis. His wife and daughter were protected by his lifetime friend Maurice Blanchot. He states in a rare autobiographical remark that his life had been dominated by the memory of the Nazi horror.[490]

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[489]E. Levinas, *Alterity and transcendence*, Preface Pierre Hayat (Fata Morgana, 1995), p. 166.
[490]Cf. S. Critchley. *The Ethics of Deconstruction*: *Derrida and Levinas*, 3d ed. Edinburgh University Press, 2014. p. 281. DOI: 10.1086/686969

In fact, *"All these experience clearly marked him deeply, one arbitrary held him as a philosopher who never ceased to pursue his question for a world morality following the Holocaust experience."*[491] The Other has been forgotten and totalized, dominated and controlled by the same. Western philosophy has been a source of settled violence. Between anticipated Hitlerism and the imperious responsibility of teaching future generations the duty of memory, Levinas strives to take a look at history without hatred or resentment. For him, surviving feels like a privilege. In this postponement of death, the survivor Levinas has the strange experience of a freedom which discovers itself responsible for the other human being *ad infinitum*.

We begin with the most tragic: the war. Extending Levinas, we can say that if, according to his expression, ethics must be declared "*first philosophy*", and it is war which is the first political reason. This observation is established without appeal from the first lines of *Totality and Infinity*. War does not only rank-like the greatest-among the trials by which morality lives. The art of predicting and winning war by all means-politics-is therefore essential, as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naivety. We can still say it another way. War, politics by way of war, is not a contingency, a regrettable accident or an illness that needs to be cured. To dare to state that war is the exercise of reason implies that it cannot be reduced to nonsense or even to a simple empirical situation that it would suffice to relate to a set of causes and effects.

During the World War II, he was taken as a prisoner to fall in postel camp in Northern Germany; life there was as difficult as might be expected, other prisoners saw him frequently jotting down in a notebook. His philosophical oeuvre can be understood as a grand narrative of person-to-person encounters that prevented a slide into the atrocities of the twentieth-century that he believed were artefacts of failed universality and transcendental concepts. This could not prevent the conquest of instrumentalization and ends-rationality. Levinas' philosophy and worldwide view were highly impacted by the Second World War and philosophical intelligence of his era. This social context affected his philosophy of the Other. Starting from his experience of war, Levinas "dismantles" the philosophy of being (ontology) and proposes a philosophy of the other (ethic). According to Levinas, ethics cannot be capture by reason.

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[491]S. Hand, (ed), *The Levinas Reader: Emmanuel Levinas*, Camelot Press PLC, 1989, p. 2.

Levinas introduces a new temporality to his analysis of our moral responsibilities and how we are to construe them, one which "signifies for me unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, and every contract."[492]Ethics thus can only be woken and established as a response to the call for responsibility from the 'the Other.' Levinas therefore establishes the ontological status. The face of Being concretely shows itself in and war is fixed in the concept of totality which dominates the whole of Western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to bearers of forces who control them without their knowledge. Individuals borrow their meaning from this totality (invisible outside of this totality).

The distinctiveness of each, thus present is constantly sacrificed to a future that called upon to bring out its objective meaning in society. Because only the ultimate meaning counts, but is there no way out? Is not war inevitably followed by peace? Is not the identity of beings found once peace has been concluded? Even if it were only a historical dialectic within the framework of a model of universal political order, the uniqueness of the individual, subjectivity, could retain a place. To an extent, Levinas thus closes this door to us. The peace of kingdoms emerging from war rests on the assumption of war and lost identity of alienated beings. There needs to be an original and original relationship with being.

He who kills is a man, he who commits or suffers injustice is a man.[493] Such a phrase can apply to particularly frightening events in the course of human history, the two great world wars, having broken out after modern industrialization, represented an important occasion to still remember the humanity of man by the testimony of the living and the recording of history. Certainly, war has been continually present throughout the history of humanity. But, the naval combat, the air combat which crossed the intercontinental and the mass destruction through the progress of armament, it was not simply the war. This is how the massacre became the prologue by the motorized troops equipped with the new murderous technique during the world wars. It seemed to signal the end of the human race without leaving any trace, as if "Nothing is therefore outside"[494] of war.

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[492]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,* trans, Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 1998. p. 88.

[493] P. Levi, *Si c'est un homme*, trad., Martine Schruoffeneger, Pocket, 1990, p. 185.

[494]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Trans, Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 6.

However, human civilization and history has barely completed only part of its narrative. For the person who was disfigured in all four limbs by shells raining down in buckets, for the infant who cried out in front of the corpse of his parents, for the young girl[495]who had to undergo sexual abuse which destroyed dignity while being seized with fear every night after being kidnapped while ignoring the cause of his kidnapping, for prisoners of war who had to endure hunger, hard labour and torture in the camp, for the person who became aware of death outside his will by having the intuition that his body is used as the tool for live experiments by drugs, surgery, gas, there remained the reason that life would be useful for all.[496] It is precisely *conatus*. It is perhaps, as such, the "instinct of self-preservation."[497] Surviving the crisis of humanity by the effort to persevere in its being while struggling against death by all means, not only did it rise again through reflection and repentance, but also it strengthened the restoration of the international order, the hope of union and the resumption of the love of humanity. But, one perceives the fact that one is exposed to the danger of collapse peace on the sand without completely getting rid of the dark presentiment of the advent of the Third World War.[498]

In fact, *conatus* is intimacy not only for man, but also for all beings. The spontaneous will that resists suffering, death and external force can similarly occur for living beings and also for things like the object that has a property such as elasticity. The essence of being is nothing outside it actual reality. Essence therefore entail interest".[499] Namely, the essence, except that of being itself, makes all things be within being. Man is, in his fact, which we never doubt, calls into question the essence of the being of the man who continues to be by Levinas. "Is it *fair* to be?".[500] "We must ask ourselves if the conatus is the humanity of man, if the humanity of man is his having-to-be."[501] Remaining in one's own being, clinging, unceasingly and relentlessly to the self-being, encumbered with itself, ultimately, the egocentric attitude that claims only the inevitable right to have it -to-be without leaving the interval to itself is fascinated by getting down in the self. The being that never needs anything else "is absolutely sufficient and does not refer to anything

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[495]Cf. Kyung-Ah JUNG, *Femmes de réconfort : Esclaves sexuelles de l'armée japonaise*, trad., Stéphane Couralet, Youn-sill Kim, Au Diable Vauvert et Six pieds sous Terre, 2007.

[496] *Ibidem*

[497]Z. Bauman, *Modernité et Holocauste*, trad., Paule Guivarch, Complex, 2008, pp. 227-237.

[498]B. Spinoza, *Éthique*, III, proposition 7, Le Livre de Poche, coll. « Classiques », 2011, p. 206.

[499]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,* trans, Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 1998. p. 15.

[500]E. Levinas, « Entretien avec Emmanuel Levinas », in *Entretiens avec le Monde 1. Philosophies*, La Découverte et Le Monde, 1984, p. 146.

[501]E. Levinas, *Dieu, la mort et le temps*, Le Livre de Poche, coll. «Biblio», 2006, p. 27.

else."[502] But, despite such sufficiency of being, the man who fully caresses being undergoes finitude. According to the Heideggerian interpretation of human existence, there is "the tragedy of existence in this finitude and in this nothingness into which man throws himself as he exists."[503]

### 6.1.1 Levinas' thought of the Other in politics and Hitler's upheaval

Levinas' thought has developed over more than eighty eight years and has been constantly deepened, structured and radicalized. The focus of this thought is certainly ethics, sometimes qualified by Levinas as "first philosophy." However, parallel to the deployment of this focus, Levinas continues to formulate certain options that can rightly be described which boils down to "ethical metaphysics" beyond metaphysics and the "political." The object of this study is to highlight the ethical encounter in regards to the face of the Other. One cannot disregard here the double aspect, philosophical on the one hand, anchored in tradition and the Jewish history on the other hand, of the thought of Levinas. His philosophical writings are filled with implicit or explicit references to biblical and Talmudic texts, while his positions and comments relating to Judaism are constantly crossed by the results of his philosophical research.

It would be just as wrong to identify these two aspects as to dissociate them, and their connection appears especially in Levinas' relationship to ethics and politics. This is all the more true since the relationship between ethics and politics is not just a theoretical problem; it goes beyond the reflection of a thinker articulating eternal moral categories in the face of the universal history of States in the global society. As far as Levinas is concerned, one event played an essential role: the Holocaust or more generally the advent of Hitlerism. Note that there is a cause and effect relationship that Levinas' thought can be explained by the Shoah and even less that it can be reduced to a reflection on this event. But the solutions that Levinas brings to the problems he poses take into account the unique event that was the Holocaust. The entanglement that we have just mentioned between ethics, politics, philosophy, Judaism and the Shoah, appears clearly in the following text:

> It is perhaps the most revolutionary fact of our consciousness of the twentieth century - but also an event of Sacred History-that the destruction of any balance between the explicit and implicit theodicy of Western thought and the forms that suffering and its evil draw from the very unfolding of this century. A century which in thirty years has known two world wars, right and left totalitarianism, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the gulag, the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia. Suffering and evil deliberately imposed, but which no reason limited in the exasperation of reason that had become political and detached from all ethics... Among these events, the Holocaust of the Jewish people under

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[502]E. Levinas, *De l'évasion*, Le Livre de Poche, coll. «Biblio», 1998, p. 93.
[503] E. Levinas, *De l'existence à l'existant*, Vrin, 1993, p. 20.

*the reign of Hitler the paradigm of this gratuitous human suffering where evil appeared in its diabolical horror, is perhaps not a subjective feeling. The disparity between misery and all theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with a clarity that watches you in the face. Its possibility calls into question the multi-millennial traditional faith. The death of God by Nethetake is a special significance of a quasi-empirical fact in the extermination camps? Is it any wonder then that this drama of Sacred History had among its principal actors a people who had always been associated with this history and whose collective soul and destiny it would be wrong to understand as limited to any kind of nationalism and whose gesture, in certain circumstances, still belongs to Revelation - even as an apocalypse - which to philosophers "gives thought to" or which prevents them from thinking?[504]*

The stages of Levinas' thought identify the genesis of human suffering in a world of elementary bloody evil and barbarism. The diabolical horror unveils the absence of inhumanity of man in the face of pain and death. The dram of the twentieth century is tainted to man as an abstract entity of no value of consequence and importance to human progress. Such cleansing and drastic extermination of man provoke a question of human life and the transcendent God. As Levinas himself often expressed later, the Hitlerian upheaval was decisive for the orientation of his thought. As early as 1934 Levinas wrote the article Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism, which marked, so to speak, his entry into politics. Levinas wonders about the meaning of Hitlerism and shows that Hitlerism is not to be considered as a banal madness. It is based on a guiding idea that challenges European civilization as a whole as never before. Consequently, Hitlerism is, according to the expression, appallingly dangerous. What is the foundation of European civilization in its various manifestations? It is the idea of freedom taken in its entire dimension.

Political freedoms do not exhaust the content of the spirit of freedom which, for European civilization, signifies a conception of human destiny. It is a feeling of man's absolute freedom vis-à-vis the world and the possibilities that call upon his action. Man renews himself eternally before the Universe. Strictly speaking, it has no history. The idea that man can and must overcome history will never cease to inhabit Levinas' thoughts. When ethics finds its radical formulation, it will be expressed as the possibility of judging history. The thought of Levinas had not yet reached this summit. Levinas analyzes the forms in which the mastery of history is identified or, what comes to the same thing, what are the figures of freedom (i.e. in Judaism, Christianity, liberalism and Marxism as oppose the new phenomenon of Hitlerian doctrine). All the philosophical and political thought of modern times tends to place the human spirit on a plane higher than reality-between man and the world. It substitutes, for the blind world of common sense, the world reconstructed

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[504] E. Levinas, *Entre nous*, Editions Grasset et Fasquelle, 1991, p. 114.

by idealistic philosophy, bathed in reason and subject to reason. Instead of liberation by grace, there is autonomy, but the Judeo-Christian leitmotif democratic ideology that penetrates freedom.

The French writers of the 18th century, precursors of democratic ideology, despite their materialism, confessed the feeling of a reason exorcising physical, psychological and social matter. Man of the liberal world does not choose his destiny under the weight of a History. As we know, Marxism challenged the transcendence of the human subject as well as the ideology of the Enlightenment. Man is subject to material needs. Morality, freedom, the autonomy of reason could well be only illusions imagined to mask the true reality that of the class struggle for the appropriation of goods and the means of production. Does not Marxism constitute a radical questioning of the sovereignty of the mind, the hitherto undisputed basis of Western society? No, replies Levinas firmly, because the individual consciousness retains the possibility of overcoming its alienation by becoming aware of its conditioning.

In the final analysis, the Marxist idea is still a search for freedom. Marxism, for the first time in Western history, challenges this conception of man. The human spirit no longer appears to him as pure freedom, as the soul hovering above all attachment..; ... It is a prey to material needs…Science, morality, aesthetics are not morality, science and aesthetics in themselves, translate at all times the fundamental opposition between bourgeois and proletarian civilizations.[505] However, this break with liberalism is not final. Marxism is conscious of continuing, in a certain sense, the traditions of 1789 and Jacobinism seems to inspire to a large extent the Marxist revolutionaries. But, if the fundamental intuition of Marxism consists in perceiving the mind in an inevitable relation to a determined situation, this sequence has nothing radical about it. To become aware of one's social situation is for Marx himself even to free oneself from the fatalism that it entails. Let us recap the European society, in its various guises, resolutely upholds the idea of the freedom of the human person.

Moral freedom, freedom obtained by grace, freedom of reason, social liberation. This basic idea of Western humanism, Hitlerism will tear it apart. What is the essence of Hitlerism? It consists in defining the life of the spirit by a mystique of the body. It is not only the abstractly affirmed reduction of the spirit to the body as one can find it in this or that form of materialism. Classical materialism perhaps claims to bring the mind back to a natural phenomenon. But it does not

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[505] E. Levinas, *Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism*, Trans by Sean Hand, University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 65.

magnify the body and its dark powers. This reversal is accomplished by Hitlerism and explains its essential structures and in the first place racism. The biological mystique that founds Hitlerism demands racism.

The importance attributed to this feeling of the body, which the Western mind has never wanted to content itself with, is the basis of a new conception of man. The biological with all that it entails of fatality becomes more than an object of spiritual life, it becomes its heart. The mysterious voices of blood, the calls of heredity and the past to which the body serves as an enigmatic vehicle lose their nature as problems submitted to the solution of a sovereignly free Ego... It is made up of them.[506] The essence of man is no longer in freedom, but in a kind of chain. To be truly oneself is not to resume one's flight above contingencies, which are always foreign to the freedom of the ego; it is on the contrary to become aware of the ineluctable original sequence, unique to our body; it is above all to accept this sequence. From then on, any social structure which announces emancipation with regard to the body and which does not commit it becomes suspect as a denial, as a betrayal. A society based on consanguine follows immediately from this concretization of the spirit. And then, if the race does not exist, it must be invented.

Levinas' thinking does not stop there. He will deduce a consequence. No truth, he tells us, even Hitler's truth, can renounce universality. Universality is in the formal nature of truth. What type of universality is compatible with racism? It cannot be the propagation of an idea; it will therefore be the expansion of a force. Hitlerism must necessarily lead to war. It is striking to note how, starting from a purely theoretical analysis, Levinas had, as soon as Hitler came to power, had taken the measure of the gravity of the event. Hitlerism is not a new form of European society; it is not even a form of human society.

Quite simply, concludes Levinas, Hitlerian racism is the negation of the humanity of man. Here the universal order is not established as a consequence of ideological expansion-it is this very expansion which constitutes the unity of a world of masters and slaves. Nietzsche's will to power that modern Germany rediscovers and glorifies is not only a new ideal, it is an ideal which at the same time brings its own form of universalization: war, conquest... Perhaps we have succeeded in showing that racism is not only opposed to this particular point of Christian and liberal culture.[507]

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[506]J. Michel Salanskis, *Levinas vivant : Tome 3, Le concret et l'idéal*, Klincksieck, 2015, p. 176.
[507]E. Levinas, *Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l'hitlérisme*, suivi d'un essai de Miguel Abensour, « Le mal élémental », Payot & Rivages, 1997, pp. 8-9.

It is not this or that dogma of democracy, parliamentarism, dictatorial regime or religious policy that is in question. It is the very humanity of man.

### 6.1.2 The holocaust and God

For history is the most profound limitation, the fundamental limitation. Time, which is a condition of human existence, is above all a condition that is irreparable. The *fait accompli*, swept along by a fleeing present, forever evades man's control, but weighs heavily on his destiny.[508] Beneath the melancholy of the eternal flow of things, Heraclitus's illusory present, there lies the tragedy of the irremovability of a past that cannot be erased, and that condemns any initiative to being just a continuation. Judaism bears this magnificent message. Remorse-painful expression of a radical powerlessness to redeem the irreparable-heralds the repentance that generates the pardon that redeems. Man finds something in the present with which he can modify or efface the past. Time loses its very irreversibility. It collapses at the feet of man like a wounded beast. It endures the legacy of the Holocaust in the 21st century.

The word "Holocaust," stems from the Greek words *"holos"* (whole) and *"kaustos"* (burned), was describe as a historically sacrificial offering on an altar ("burned sacrifice by fire"). The Holocaust was the systematic, state-sponsored persecution with a horrible and new meaning of mass murder of some six million European Jews by the German Nazi regime during the Second World War with its allies and collaborators.[509] The Nazis considered Jews as the deadliest menace to the German *Volk*. To the anti-Semitic Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, he believed that Germans were "racially superior" and that the Jews were deemed an inferior race, an alien threat to so-called German racial purity and community.[510] The Holocaust functioned as evidence of a Euthanasia pilot Program.

Hitler distilled his *Weltanschauung* from the social Darwinism, anti-Semitism,[511] and racialist anthropology where Marx had reduced all of history to social class struggles, in which such revolution[512] was the very engine of progress and the dictatorship of the proletariat[513] thus culmination[514]around it. Consequently, he reduced history to struggle among

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[508]E. Levinas, *Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism*, *op. cit*., p 65.

[509] J. J. Saunders, *The Holocaust: History in an Hour*. William Collins. 2013.

[510] http://www.history.com/topics/anti-semitism

[511] http://www.britannica.com/topics/ anti-semitism

[512] http://www.britannica.com/topics/revolution-politics

[513] http://www.britannica.com/topics/distatorship-of-the-proletariat

[514] http://www.britannica.com/topics/revolution-politics

biologic races. As a fact, the real enemies of the Germans and indeed of history itself, were internationalists who warred against the purity identified with the Jews.[515] The Nazis adopted measures to exclude Jews from German economic, social and cultural life and to pressure them to emigrate. World War II provided Nazi officials with the opportunity to pursue a comprehensive, "final solution to the Jewish question": the murder of all the Jews in Europe. The scientific age of history was the twisted product of a secularize movement of Nazism.

Levinas' experienced of the Holocaust and Hitlerism concept is more than a contamination. It is an awakening of elementary evil. But from this point on, this frighteningly dangerous phenomenon of the Jews becomes philosophically interesting. For these elementary evil harbour a philosophy. They express a global soul's principal attitude towards the whole of reality and its own destiny. They predetermine the meaning of the adventure that the soul will face in the global world. It questions the very principles of a civilization (human civilization). The conflict is played out not only between liberalism and Hitlerism but Christianity itself is threatened in spite of the careful attentions and concordats that the Christian churches took advantage of when Hitler's regime came to power. The work of inhuman degradation, begun by the victorious Germans, had been carried to conclusion by the Germans in defeat. The Aftermath wounds of the Holocaust-known in Hebrew as Shoah, or catastrophe-had an impact on Levinas' philosophy as prisoner of war in Auschwitz.

After Auschwitz,[516] the idea of God imposed itself as a different way-even a "second religion" of presenting God and the meaning of human suffering. In response to the totalitarian affirmation of hatred and its rooting in the depths of the being, Levinas, at the end of the war, worked to deploy an ethic that envisaged suffering from an inter-human perspective, that is to say in a non-indifference towards each other. With Levinas, the notion of transcendence arises from a suffering humanity. It evokes from the outset atheism, that is to say the condition of a separate being. It is neither a question of coming to the aid of the divine nor of denying it. To relate to the absolute as an atheist is to offer oneself to dialogue with the Other and not to reduce him to the object of a discourse. In doing so, Levinas does not seek to present evidence for the existence of God. It indicates how the emphasis of the infinite in the finite is produced. It is not God who is sought in the neighbour, it is the Other who inhabits the consciousness in the proximity of the neighbour and who signifies to him his devotion to others beyond the Holocaust.

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[515] *Ibidem*
[516] http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/auschwitz

Levinas' experience of the Holocaust stems from the conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning.[517] Levinas states that the essential possibility of elemental evil was led by the logic against Western philosophy which had not sufficiently insured it-self. This possibility inscribed within ontology of being concerned with being [*de l'etre soucieux d'etre*]-a being, the Heideggerian look of, "*dem es in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.*"[518] The aforementioned possibility still threatens the global subject which is correlative with being as dominating and gathering together [*l'etre-a'-reassembleret a-dominer*], the subject of transcendental idealism being free and thinks itself free.[519] Could liberalism be all we need to attain an authentic human dignity for the subject? Does the subject arrive at the human condition prior to assuming responsibility for the other man in the act of election that raises him up to this height? This election is from a God (god) who sees him in the face of the other man a site of Revelation.

Indeed, the experience of the Holocaust the "never" is not just a lack of courage of one's life, but it almost seems to be the condition of impossibility. The experience of the camps did not just cause illness or sadness in the heart of Levinas, but almost the loss of the desire to live. The fundamental difficulty in Levinas' thought of the Holocaust implies that we must understand what happened to get as close as possible to this reality to grasp it stake. The Holocaust is indeed, more than a particular experience of the philosopher, something like the "backdrop of Levinas' thought[520] in the sense that it supports a number of intuitions and philosophical concerns that run through western thought of the totality of the Other.

In one of Levinas' major works: *Otherwise than Being* or *Beyond Essence*, He opens with a dedication made *"in memory of the closest beings amongst the six million murdered by the National Socialists, alongside millions and millions of human beings of all faiths and nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, of the same anti-Semitism."*[521]The parallel of the inevitability of evil questions the silence of God, which is also the silence of the one who is murdered. Murder is no small matter; the face of the others has this characteristic of presenting in its very weakness a call for help and support. Such an aggression of weakness could sound like a

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[517] https://oa.mg/work/10.1086/448574
[518] http://www.thesquarecentre.org/2020/06/06/the-philosophy-of-hitlerism-dotphilosophy/
[519] https://www.jstor.org/stable/1343726/
[520] F. Pochen, *Thinking With Arendt and Levinas*, Social Chronicle, 2003, p. 76.
[521] E. Levinas, *Otherwise than being*, *op cit*., p 5.

call in the minds of other prisoners and of a God this time helpless in the face of man's barbarism. Nazism was not only pleased to spread madness in the minds of those they persecuted but rather one of the ideological ends was the extinction of the Jewish race. For instance, the machine was strongly preoccupied in preliminary to make live the maximum of men and women within the horror of the Holocaust, in a collective dehumanization. Hans Jonas, who, like Levinas is Jewish, analyzes as follows:

> *"It was not for the love of their faith that those who died there died (as did Jehovah's Witnesses again); nor was it because of it or some voluntary orientation of their personal being that they were murdered. Dehumanization by the ultimate humiliation preceded their agony; to the victims destined for the final solution was left no glimmer of human nobility, none of this was more recognizable among the survivors, among the skeletal ghosts of the liberated camps. »[522]*

What this passage underlines is the experience of constant dehumanization not only in the mind but also in the flesh marked by suffering and the proximity of massacre in which murder is not the only effect of terror. The question of memory is directly asked after the events. Levinas, in an article called *Unnamed*, raises this dilemma. Should the emptiness and neglect that traumatized the victims be lost? Levinas wonders if we should bring all those who were born later into this dizziness. In the meanders, Levinas thought of those who have not experienced the fleeing of chaos and emptiness will not be able to comprehend it.'[523]The question is important here because it conditions for Levinas the interest of a reflection after the event but especially because Levinas answers in the affirmative.

If one cannot demand for Levinas of newcomers to the world that they participate in this emptiness, it is up to the thinkers who, through this time, to *"draw from the concentration camp experience ... (of) truths transmissible and necessary for new men."[524]*This is undoubtedly the real issue of Levinas' philosophy. Accordingly, François Poiriè synthesizes the ethical report of Levinas in a way that can help us put this issue into perspective. "Faced with the face of another, weak and naked, two feelings arise, contradictory: violence, kindness.[525]Levinas' challenge to western totality of the Other is to rehabilitate goodness in the face of murder, to show the ethical primacy of subjectivity, which is the necessary condition for a rediscovery of justice, making it possible ever again.

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[522]H. Jonas, *Le Concept de Dieu après Auschwitz. Une voix juive*, Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1994, pp. 11-12.
[523]https://books.google.com/books?id=ux8v4kzQQzIC
[524]H. Jonas, *Le Concept de Dieu après Auschwitz. Une voix juive*, *op. cit*., p 143.
[525]F. Poirié, *Emmanuel Levinas, essais et entretiens*, Actes sud, Paris, 1996, p. 47.

To escape the systematic barbarity of the concentration camp is to assume the call to responsibility at the expense of the self and of the whole. Where injustice is applied in the most systematic way possible, a man performs a fundamentally opposite act of kindness in face of murdered. There is obviously an issue for an ethics of responsibility: we see in this act that the obligation towards others only suppresses my freedom in its quality of indifference to others and of preservation. It would then be in a Sartrian sense where freedom is limited by the appearance of others. But it qualifies my freedom in the sense that the act of sacrifice indeed requires from the subject an act of self-abandonment which springs from itself.

The collapse of meaning is first of all ethical for this philosopher and requires an ethical response. Neither metaphysical tradition nor politics (justice) can resist barbarism. Modern metaphysics has too much denied this thought of otherness in the eyes of Levinas. This culminated in Heidegger and his philosophy of being in the world. To say that, for Levinas, metaphysics as well as politics do not suit us to find a heretical path to barbarism requires a deepening of the Levinasian reading of the philosophical tradition.

Indeed, there is not only an experience and a connection to history at the foundation of Levinas' philosophy. All of Levinas' thought is a gesture to reintroduce the forgotten otherness into philosophy. If Levinas had a deep relationship with great philosophical authors of his time, the fact remains that he is a phenomenologist. Phenomenology, through Husserl and Heidegger, is an integral part of Levinas' philosophy, which however exceeds it in a certain way. In the face of genocide, Levinas holds that a reflection on what it means to be human is unavoidable. This is highly important because, in his view, Western humanism has not known how to be a consistent protection against the barbarism that Europe has lived through.[526]

## 6.2 THE ONTOLOGICAL CRISIS AND STUDY OF BEING

The study of Being, the Same, the Other and Infinity in western philosophy in itself is the critical examination of reality. The whole of western background has been considered as what puts reality into question from ancient philosophy to modern philosophy with some philosophers like, Plato, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, who have taken philosophy as the totalization of being in the same. Such a reflection is viewed from the ontological study of being. The thought of Levinas

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[526]E. Levinas, *Positivité et transcendance: suivie de Levinas et la phénoménologie*. Press Universitaires de France. 2000, p. 86.

meets at the crossroads of phenomenology and existential philosophy (Husserlian-phenomenological reduction and Heideggerian Dasien-Being). He questions the foundations of ontology to present humanism as an "ethical place" of transcendence. Looking towards the past (memory) and towards the future, this thought pulls the subject out of the ground on which the latter thinks it is resting (transcendence) to "plant" it in a new way in a humanity that continues to retract itself throughout its history that is, its own history (immanence).

Levinas also takes up the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition, in search of the ineffable. This is particularly visible in the *book Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, whose title already evokes the Platonic Good, described as "beyond essence" in The Republic. In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas evokes Plato's Phaedrus as one of the "five most beautiful books in the history of philosophy," alongside the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), the Phenomenology of spirit (Hegel), of the Essay on the immediate data of consciousness (Bergson), and finally of Heidegger's book entitled *Being and Time*.

During the thirty glorious years, everything that concerns morality is linked to the bourgeois order and rejected as such. The great debates are marked by Marxism, there is a political over-determination of philosophy. Levinas, then in full activity, is not in fashion, which does not mean that the latter is not attentive to the thought of his time. The attention of Marxist thought to history and the subordination of the individual to the political project stem from what Levinas calls "totality" (i.e. "the death of the subject"; which is a montage of discourse for Lacan, Barthes, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss). The return of subjectivity during the recession of the 1970s made it possible to pay attention to Levinas.

At that moment, there is a great need to reclaim active individuality. This is the period of humanitarianism, altruistic morality, even ethical inflation ("we are the world"). Levinasian responsibility seems to be an appropriate theoretical framework at this time. However, is not there a complete misinterpretation here? Levinasian responsibility is an originary determination of the subject, preceding psychological or sociological determinations. The thought of Levinas then runs the risk of being diverted into ideology. In this, our target will be on those who influence Levinas' thought.

### 6.2.1 An outline of Levinas' opposition of Hegel

The method of sublation *(Aufhebung)* that Hegel follows as dialectical movement, led to the development of consciousness into an independent…that show more content…Behindhand the progress towards absolute knowledge lies a dialectical development in consequence of affirmation, contradiction, and further denial into a larger synthesis.[527] It is a crucial movement that occurs when the self turns outward from consciousness to self-consciousness. The dialectic of unsuccessful (unhappy) desire. According to Hegel, self-consciousness exists only through recognition by others, In the Hegelian judgement, self-consciousness only exists through the recognition by others and inter-subjectivity. This recognition is reciprocated. Of course, self-consciousness to him thus faces another self-consciousness. The recognition is symmetrical and attained 'when one is for the other what the other is also for him.' Equally, humans then strive for such recognition and therefore, such desire leads to a struggle for life and existence.[528]

Levinas, critical reader of Hegel despite his opposition to Hegel, acknowledges the importance of Hegel in the history of the Western philosophy. More specifically, he considers Phenomenology of Spirit to be one of the five greatest works in the Western philosophical tradition.[529] During his captivity, he devoted much of his time reading books, with a focus attention on Hegel. It is for this reason that Francois Poirié said the first name mentioned by Levinas was Hegel, Poirié: "What read you during your captivity?" Levinas said: "Hegel of course, countless philosophical books of all predispositions."[530] Truly, he did regards his own philosophy as entirely different to that of Hegel, which he[531] cogitates as a philosophy in representative of totality. Such a task becomes 'ethics as first philosophy' to overcome totality through the principle in alignment to infinity of the Other.

Levinas, in Totality and infinity, focuses his critique on the Hegelian system of totality, totality which means first of all the teleological structure of a history that is described as the development of Reason starting from the perceptual certainty and ends up with an absolute

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[527] https://www.ipl.org/essay/Hegel-Vs-Hegel-Fc59vvyvg
[528] *Ibid*
[529] E. Levinas, *Ethique et Infini* : Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo (Fayard, 1982), p. 28. Other four are Plato's Phaedrus, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Bergson's Essay on the immediately Given and Heidegger's Being and Time.
[530] F. Poirié, Emmanuel Lévinas. Essai et entretiens (Arles: Acte Sud, 1996), p. 95.
[531] http://philogic.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/04_gc_01012018_tb.pdf

knowledge.[532] The history established in Phenomenology of Spirit is understood as a historical movement toward an End. A history which therefore is embodied in World History starting from the (*Morgenland*) Eastern and ending in the (*Abendland)* Western-as a day starts and ends. Hegel in his lectures on World History uses such mode to describe the history of Reason.

Against such teleological idea of history, Levinas further introduces the eschatological idea which goes beyond totality. "Eschatology introduces a relation with being beyond history and totality and this relations is not with being beyond the past and the present."[533] Levinas rightly viewed this concept explicitly in reference to Hegel.[534]It clearly observed that this concept of history that Levinas targets in his critique of the Hegelian philosophy, is that of self-identical consciousness. The idea of the self in Hegel, Levinas asserts as an expression of the universality of the Same (*Même*) which is identified even in essence with the otherness of the perceived objects.[535] The perceived notion of the Same in Levinas' view deprives the perceived diverse objects of their otherness.[536] Husserl, Heidegger and the Hegelian philosophy comes to represents what Levinas thinks in essence of the Western philosophy, specifically, ontology. Ontology in Levinas' view was "a reduction of the Other to the Same which ensures the intelligence of the being either through interference of an intermediate and impersonal term."[537]

## 6.2.2 Levinas critique of Hegel

Against ontology, Levinas opposes his principle of separation,[538] a leading concept in Totality and infinity. This makes it possible for one to think of the relation of the self with the Other otherwise than through the mode of totality. Such a holistic and totalitarian philosophy therefore reduces the otherness of the Other in a systematic neutral structure by mediation and intermediate terms, whereas the relation of separation allows us to show another possible relation to the Otherness of the Other. The ego is interpellated in the ethical situation by the face of the other, appears by this relation of separation.

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[532]B. Tomokazu, Elemental Evil -Levinas Re-Reading Hegel. *Global Conversations: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture Volume I*, Number 01 (2018): 39-58.
[533] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, *op. cit*., p 7.
*[534]Ibidem*, p. 8.
[535] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284381294_Beyond_Inquisitional_Logic_or_Toward_an_An-archaeological_Latin_Americanism
[536] G. W.F. Hegel, *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit tome* II (1941), trans. Jean Hyppolite (Aubier, 1992). p. 25.
[537] E. Levinas, *Totality and infinity, op. cit.,* pp 34-35.
[538] *Ibid,* p. 108.

The ego and the Other are absolutely which are separated without any relation. The interpellation of the Other in this case certainly would have no effect on the ego. The response to the Other enables the ego to reply to the Other because the ego already has in itself something. The idea of infinity is what Levinas call as something. Descartes' idea of God's infinity is the precursor of this concept. Its original theological implication is by ridding of what Levinas has transformed into an ethical concept.

Levinas therefore did clarified his method of philosophy. Separation constitutes the core of Levinas' personal method of reasoning. Levinas opposes to Hegel's method of reasoning. The methodological opposition he articulates to Hegel by drawing much attention to what does not inherently belong to Hegel's method, the whole of this work aims to show a relation with the Other against the logic of the contradiction wherein the other of B is non-B, negation of B, but more fundamentally against the dialectical logic of reasoning where the Same participates dialectically with the Other and thus reconciles with it in the very unity of the system.[539]

The Aristotelian classical logic nor the Hegelian dialectical logic neither for Levinas, accounts of the relation of separation. The separation of the Other in relation can only be understood through the idea of infinity. Levinas as such, therefore introduces an ethical situation, which breaks beyond the holistic background of the Hegelian methodological system. To properly respond to it, he needs and essentially constructs a phenomenology of the "intotalizable."[540] The philosophical and general sense of the theoretical hostility between Hegel's system of totality and the Levinas' philosophy of alterity. This will unveils Husserl radical immanence that is human consciousness which is discovered in its immanence as intentionality.

### 6.2.3 Husserlian Fundamental Ontology

Phenomenology is not, however, a simple study of the acts or experiences of consciousness produced by the individual. It is not a system of philosophical statements but it is a philosophical method which is required by the problems posed by philosophers. What interest the phenomenologist is the general structures of consciousness as such. In this sense, there is a renaissance of the Kantian problem. The question is not just to understand the subjective functioning of consciousness but to know how acts of subjective consciousness can indeed produce

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[539] *Ibid.,* p. 161.
[540] P. Grosos, *Phénoménologie de l'intotalisable* (Cerf, 2013).

any objectivity in the world and in things. We must escape the naivety of realism which is always before the ready-made object without questioning the meaning of its objectivity. This is fundamental for Levinas who will first understand phenomenology as a method of understanding being. Phenomenology is not a body of knowledge but a rediscovery of the way of philosophizing and a reconstruction of philosophy as a rigorous science, an expression which will even be the title of a work by Edmund Husserl.

Phenomenology has a method of escaping this naive realism, set up by Husserl in the *Ideen,* although the spirit of the thing already appears in Logical Research; phenomenological reduction (or epoching). This "term borrowed from the Greek skeptics defines the attitude by which the subject suspends his judgment, by not continuing to take a stand."[541] As we will see in the notion of reduction, phenomenology does not deny the world and object but puts it in parentheses which implies in front of existing reality a radical change in attitude [without being] a negation. It is to put in brackets the world as it is given as existing instantaneously for us-not that the world has no interest as an existing, it is precisely at the source, as we have seen above, from phenomenological questioning in Husserl but in order to examine the meaning of his objectivity. In this sense there is not a closed system for phenomenology. Being a philosophy, it seeks to know the world and to understand it.

However, Jean Greisch underlines in Husserl three fundamental terms used for this movement: put in parentheses but also abstention and restraint. The reduction of the existence of the world leads us to discover the certainty which is at the bottom of the phenomenological movement, the certainty of our consciousness. This certainty is exposed in the Cartesian Meditations, on the Cartesian model which it exceeds however, like an apodictic evidence of the existence of subjectivity. What remains after such reduction is not only the certainty of my own existence but the immanence of my consciousness.

The Husserlian reduction leads us not to base a certainty on which scientific knowledge can be built but to describe the field of radical immanence that is human consciousness. The description of this field of immanence leads to this fundamental notion of intentionality. Consciousness is therefore, discovered in its immanence as intentionality. In fact, Levinas will deploy Husserlian concepts in his own philosophy in a new way of the interest shown for the

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[541] E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, Vrin, 2001, p. 25.

Husserlian notion of intentionality. Levinas talks about this relationship between immanence and intentionality in two places by discovering existence. Thus, thought is aimed and intended.

The intentionality is the act of the consciousness which aims at the given object and, important idea of the phenomenological progress, never ceases to aim at it. An idea that Levinas specifies and particularly likes is the fact that the intentionality of consciousness is the corollary of his freedom. The intentionality of freedom attached to the idea of Levinas therefore becomes in Husserl the very act of liberation of man with respect to the world.[542] This is actually the direction of the phenomenology of Husserl that Levinas retains. According to him, it is thus "the end, inherent in a philosophy of freedom, which is a freedom that is only defined by consciousness and is as such accomplished by it." Further on, it also says "consciousness is the very mode of the existence of meaning." There, a question arises; isn't Levinas' question facing the Shoah precisely relearning to walk in existence despite the collapse of meaning? Does phenomenology then present itself as this means which would allow us to "relearn"? We will see in Levinas, how this is both true and false, that is to say how the latter remains phenomenologist and how it shifts noticeably from Husserlian thought.

One of the problems of modern metaphysics is to have maintained a dualism between subject and object. Husserl, by his philosophy, wants to allow a "return to the very things." Consciousness understood as an a priori conception of the world is not Husserlian. Phenomenology is not an intellectual construction of knowledge; it is primarily a look at the world. In this sense, phenomenology "depends" on evidence, what Husserl calls the original donor intuitions. The material of phenomenology, to put it a bit roughly, is the phenomenon, the intuition, the appearing, which also in fact implies in itself the notion of donation. It is here that phenomenology really presents itself as knowledge to see, which discovers not only the appearing but also the appearance, the gift of the phenomenon to consciousness.

Jeanne Hersch uses a speaking image to explain this relationship to the Husserlian world. We imagine a sheet of paper, with on one side, the objects given in the experience, the phenomena and on the other what is happening in our consciousness; phenomenology is in fact this glance thrown on what occurs in the sheet of paper;[543] it is a method for scrutinizing, piercing meaning and understanding acts of consciousness when it is directed towards objects. Throughout these

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[542]See, E. Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans. P. Koestenbaum, Martinus Nijhof, 1964.
[543]J. Hersch, *L'étonnement philosophique*, Folio Essais, 1993, p. 396.

technical investigations, Husserl multiplies the precautions by saying that his company wants to be purely descriptive. Jeanne Hersch therefore shows well in this effort of Husserl the will to detach from Kant and kantism which, in her eyes still uses elements to analyze the transcendental consciousness which are too much a construction of consciousness such as the concepts of a priori or thing in itself.''[544]Phenomenology is not an intellectual construction of knowledge, it is primarily a look at the world.

Indeed, the phenomenologist wants to place himself as close as possible to the sense of perception, as stated in the 5th Cartesian Meditations, phenomenological research consists in bringing to the complete expression of one's own sense "pure experience and, so to speak, still mute." The constitution of objectivity by Husserl maintains fully an objective apprehension of the object of experience which depends on the basis of its intersubjective constitution. At this level, the spatiotemporal object of my perception may be given with the sense of others and myself being connected to both the virtue of properties of its intentional experience.

In Husserl's terms, the phenomenological analysis reveals a deeper level of international acts of constitution, insofar as the object is constituted as the "intersubjectively identical physical thing,"[545]in this sense it is available to intentional acts by different subjects of experience. The intersubjective identical presupposes my consciousness and sense of other experiencing subjects unlike the experience I have of the objects. In understanding the specific mode of givenness only can one account for the transcendental structures of the objective, the intersubjective world not entirely reducible to the intentional acts in which it is given in reference to point the possible acts of consciousness by the other experience of the subjects. In this, phenomenology is necessarily descriptive.

Descriptive phenomenology is a way to see and know how to see the original datum, the evidence which requires no other evidence than itself. This is what Husserl calls apodictic evidence in the Cartesian Meditations. As Jean Greisch shows, several words in the Husserlien lexicon shows this aspect of phenomenology such as *Aufzeigen* (to highlight), *Aufdechen* (to exhibit), *Entheilen* (to unveil)[546] Levinas shows how the intention of the conscience is in itself "an

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[544]E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, Vrin, 2001, p. 35.
[545]E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy*, First Book, trans. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, §151, p. 363.
[546]J. Hersch, *L'étonnement philosophique*, *op. cit*., p 401.

obviousness which is sought, a light which tends to be made" [547]It is in this sense that for Levinas, "the evidence is not a "*je ne sais quoi*" intellectual behaviour, it is the very penetration of the true."[548] In this sense, phenomenology "depends" on evidence, what Husserl calls the original donor intuitions. The material of phenomenology, to put it a bit roughly, is the phenomenon, the intuition, the appearing, which also in fact implies in itself the notion of donation. It is here that phenomenology really presents itself as knowledge to see, which discovers not only the appearing but also the appearance, the gift of the phenomenon to consciousness.

### 6.2.4 Levinas critique of Husserl

We have seen that Husserl's phenomenology is an effort to extricate oneself from natural knowledge in order to return to things themselves, to the essence of lived experiences of consciousness as well as to the essence of consciousness, an effort of "presentification" of the given world but also an effort to make sense for human existence, a concern that also inhabits Levinas' approach. The question asked at the beginning of this introduction was how to make sense again after the drama of the Shoah. Levinas, who was a phenomenologist long before the drama of war will base his entire process of analysis and understanding on the phenomenological method. However, he will move away from it on certain points such as the question of representation. For Levinas "*To think is for Husserl to identify.*"[549]Phenomenology is in fact a desire to identify and represent even if intentionality is also that of feeling, of desire, of wanted. However, it is no less true that representation plays a preponderant role in the intentionality of consciousness.

If Levinas can claim the spirit of Husserl, it is good that he understands that the hegemony of being is no longer to be preserved against and against all. But where Husserl examines the immanence of consciousness, Levinas wants to further re-found an ethics of transcendence. Suddenly, it is in relation to the question of otherness that Levinas distances himself from his master. All of Levinas' effort, rightly or wrongly, will be to pull phenomenology toward ethics. The effort of Husserl concerning the intersubjective relation is deserving but not sufficient for Levinas because its philosophy characterizes a way of being or the existence is starting from

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[547]*Ibidem,* p. 25.
[548] E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, *op. cit.,* p 50.
[549]*Ibidem,* p. 32.

itself.[550] He therefore, rejects Husserl's construction of alter ego thereby radicalizing it with his notion of alterity. Levinas criticism Husserl's recognition of other people as *alter ego*, like me, in which approaches account reduce other people to my own experiences of them, recognizing others as co-present and equal. The other remains for me an alter ego, whom I only meet like myself. Husserl's approach maintains the primacy of the subject, whereas the Levinas' approach introduces the primary passivity of the subject in front of others in society. For Levinas, the asymmetrical sense of the way in which the other expresses itself that the phenomenological description of intersubjectivity should firstly explain in its constitutiveness: a level of experience that Husserl failed to describe as transcendence.

Besides, Levinas' idea of a transcendence beyond the totality of being and identity of the Same-his insistence that ethics is first philosophy precedes ontology-a call into question not only by Husserl's transcendental analysis of the other but in essence is also the priority of being. The platonic traditional understanding relate to other kinds, which seems as described in the central role and section of the Sophist.[551] Levinas thinking of intentionality of consciousness is deeper than the mere difference between beings that participate in the kind of Being. The radical alterity does not depends on any fundamental quality that would distinguish beings neither does Levinas conceive the alterity of the other, which essentially expresses itself in the encounter of the face-to-face, as apparently an ontological movement. He speaks of a state that is "*Otherwise than Being"* for the alterity of the other is deeper than any sort of ontological mediation, in the sense that the other reveals himself as an absolutely other, irreducible not only to my life in the inner conscience but also to the field of being immanent. In consequence, this entails Husserl's concept of the (Umwelt) "surrounding world".

Concretely, Levinas is not mainly concerned with the philosophical category of "alterity" nor with the transcendental, meaning of impersonal "otherness", but, in its place, the sense of this irreducible relation concrete in the face-to-face experience with the other, that is to say, with alterity as the primordial mode of experience.[552] It is at this level that we recognize Levinas' revision of Husserl's topic of intersubjectivity. He saw the Husserlian intersubjectivity as a mere

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[550] Cf. E. Levinas, *Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-Other*, trans. M. Smith and B. Harshav, Columbia University Press, 1998.
[551] P. Alves, "Lévinas crítico de Husserl e de Sartre sobre a teoria da intersubjectividade e da alteridade", p. 146-147.
[552] E. Levinas, "Philosophy and Awakening" in Id., *Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-Other*, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav. Columbia University Press, 1998.  p. 86

content of consciousness. The recovery of intersubjectivity in and through Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*, are meant to counter what we find to be Levinas' own moral dogmatism and his insistence that the Other is continually beyond the empirical reach of the self in question.

Consequently, Levinas holds that in Husserl's phenomenology, metaphysical exteriority is reduced to the fundamental immanence of the Self. It clear, in this sense that, Husserl's concept of intentionality involves, to Levinas, the reduction of exteriority to the immanence of consciousness, meanwhile the thinking and the thinkable, the correlation between thought and world is given in the unity of my consciousness. [553] The Same rediscovers itself in the Other, which is precisely a sense of the intentional experience that Levinas puts in question. Such a recovering of the self is fundamental in the idea of reading the 5th Cartesian Meditation: seen as an inadequacy essential between the original perception of myself and the analogical-thus "non-original"-apprehension of the other is always operating at the heart of a preeminent intersubjective experience. In the opinion of Levinas, intentionality remains an adequation with the object and does not define consciousness at the fundamental level. All understanding qua intentionality already presumes the idea of infinite, which is pre-extremely a non-adequation.[554]

The intersubjective experience, in line with this, is no longer understood on the very basis of fictional symmetrical and imaginative relation between two egos. It is rather apprehended on the radical difference between myself, what appears and expresses in itself as an absolutely other. This implies, the sense of experience cannot longer be recognized in terms of perceptual suggestion, as stated in Husserl's analysis. Levinas thus revises the sense of the term redefining it as "a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows thought […]".[555] In this regard, the description of the other as an "absolutely other" will henceforth thwart any reduction of heterogeneity to objectivity, which for Levinas was still the Husserlian mode of approaching the other.

According to Levinas, the essence of subjectivity is alterity, in the sense that alterity is its condition of possibility. For Levinas, the other precedes me and the grasping of the other is that which allows me to grasp myself as a subject (infinity). This is the primary core element lacking in Husserl's approach to constituting the other: a specific and irreducible meaning of

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[553] https://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/40559/1/JoaoCarvalho_Philosophica_51.pdf, p. 8.
[554] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*. *op. cit.,* p 27.
[555] *Ibid*, p. 25.

"transcendence-in-immanence" characterizes, at its primary core, the essential structure of subjectivity. Hence, for Levinas, the relation to the non-limited by the Same, the absolutely other, is now an expression of another person that does not receive his sense from me, but who entails, in himself, an ethical resistance to every act of "sense giving" transfer that Husserl describes and failed to recognized in the infinite.

Despite Levinas' generosity of spirit, his disagreement with Husserl is clear. "The claim to know and to reach the Other," applied implicitly to Husserl is the exact failing Husserl's work.[556] In fact, Levinas was enormously influenced by Husserl, he is nevertheless in rupture with him. He himself reports this state of affairs: «I start as always almost with Husserl or in Husserl, but what I say is no longer in Husserl»[557]If Levinas broke away from Husserl, it is even more with Heidegger that an ambiguous link of esteem and rupture will be forged. Does not Husserl admit all the same the superiority of intuition, over grand speeches, or awkward and tentative expressions? From this point of view, once again, it would be too simple to oppose the validity of intuition and the weakness of the world of signs in link with Heidegger Dasien. There is here the negation of the self as a subject a free person in front of his possibilities which is in front of him Dasein has a finitude nature.

## 6.3. UNDERSTANDING DASEIN AND BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

The term *Dasein* was not unique to Heidegger as it had been used by other philosophers before him. For example, the term *Dasein* was used by Kant for the existence of any entity.[558] Heiddegger used the term *Dasein* in a different way. "In ordinary German, *Dasein* means existence in the usual sense: being there in space and time as contrasted with not being at all."[559] It comes from the verb *Dasein,* which means 'to exist' or 'to be there, to be here'. Everything that exists can therefore be called *Dasein*; in the sense that it is *(t)here.* Its thanks to Heidegger *Being and Time*, that he approaches the unitary phenomenon of Dasein and Being-in-the-world in three ways: first, by analyzing the world-hood of the world, secondly, by asking who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness, and lastly by analyzing Being-in as such. It is in the second approach to the

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[556] *Ibidem*, p. 69.
[557]E. Levinas, *Transcendance et intelligibilité*, Cité dans Agatha Zielinski, *Levinas, la responsabilité est sans pourquoi*, Philosophies PUF, 2004, p. 12.
[558] M. Inwood, *Heidegger,* Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 18.
[559] M. Grene, "Martin Heidegger," in P. EDWARDS (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vols. 3 & 4,* 459.

ontological structure of Dasein that Heidegger discusses Being-with and Dasein-with as structures of Dasein, ways for Dasein to be.[560]

Heidegger lays the anthropological foundations of *Dasein. Dasein* has the aptitudes and the faculties to ask questions about the meaning of its existence. This Dasein also has a way of sensing and feeling its presence in the world. He is anxious. The relationship of Dasein with the world is established or is based on the existential that is to say the affection which is the affective way of entering into a relationship with the world. These affections are fear and understanding which a way of knowing is and existing is the world. This comprehension is a way of overcoming the facticity of the mode which is actual, speech, language and the decay of Dasein.

Decline is a certain way that is elsewhere or beside because it is "the mode according to which Dasein daily in the world".[561] Dasein is also characterized by its temporality, calls it to consciousness, resolution, future, past, present and historicity. All these existential show the concern and anguish that dwells in Dasein. We also find according to Heidegger that the "I" is a characteristic of Dasein, so it will be the one that must be interpreted in an existential way. The phenomenological assertion that Dasein is essentially "Being-with" has existential significance.[562] Heidegger thinks that the "I" without the-is not also encountered "from a primordial quality of gaze turned towards oneself".

To say in a few words Dasein which constitutes different structures, we can say that it is an incomplete being which has or which has the power to be and which is capable of going beyond the classical metaphysic which has substantialized being or being. Being, it is capable of splitting. He considered the understanding of being as substance or noun as a notion while it is first and foremost a verb. So Heidegger thinks being-there Dasein as being projected into the world, an existent" man is thrown away, he lacks the senses of being completed but is conscious of a power to be. Dasein is also to be in the world, that is, to say "to exist this being-in-the-world". Heidegger observes in this case the foundation of modern evil, the decay and corruption of the relationship that Dasein maintains with the world.

The orientation for the investigation of the "who" of everyday Dasein is thus taken from the prior analysis of the world. Others are already encountered environmentally, not as equipment

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[560]M. Heidegger, *Being and time, op. cit.,* p. 95.
[561] *Ibidem*, p. 150.
[562] *Ibidem,* p. 146.

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[560]M. Heidegger, *Being and time, op. cit.,* p. 95.
[561] *Ibidem*, p. 150.
[562] *Ibidem,* p. 146.

ready-to-hand, nor as person-things merely present-at-hand, but as like Dasein, as circumspectively concernful Being-in-the-world too. If we simply broaden the view of Dasein as concernfully absorbed in the work-world, for example, we see that Others are those for whom our work  is produced, those who supply materials, those who own property, those who serve us, sell to us, buy from us. This implies that, other Dasein are there with us in the world. Thus Heidegger can say, by reason of this with-like [*mithaften*] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The [*Mitwelt*] world is a world with Dasein.

Being-with Others is Being-in. Being-in-the-world is Being-in-themselves within-the-world which is Dasein-with [*Mitdasein*].[563] According to Heidegger, if we attend to phenomenal facts, we see that Others are encountered from out of Dasein world, as well encountered environmentally. Being-with one another is part of the existential structure of Dasein, but indifference is the most frequent mode of regard for Others. Thus, in our everyday absorption in environmental concerns, Others are encountered in what they do; "*the Dasein-with of Others is encountered proximally and for the most part in terms of the with-world with which we are environmentally concerned*"[564]

Heidegger's project is to re-establish, re-bind and establish the contact that existed between Dasein and Being, which is a way of existing in the world that no longer has utility as its foundation. He thinks that man must account for being and enlighten it. The Dasein which is the being there is also a "substance" being on the level "the existential analytic of being facticity". The being there signifies the being which is Dasein which is immediately without relation to others. This relationship allows him to relate to others. The Dasein which is in the world in relation to other beings requires an analysis, a study and an understanding of its condition and its existence in the world which Heidegger calls ontology. At this level the question itself arises: what is the Heideggerian conception of ontology?

### 6.3.1 Heideggerian Fundamental Ontology

Heidegger finds in the question of *Being and time* a persistent and radical problem for phenomenology in general and for the hermeneutic of Dasein in particular. The inexplicable trace of time in the categorical intelligent of metaphysics and the intuitive intelligent of phenomenology

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[563] M. Heidegger, Die Zeit des Weltbildes. In Holzwege Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, (1977a) [1938]. (pp. 75-113).
[564] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit*., p 163.

both discovers Dasein and time to lie beyond the trace reach of propositional thought. The discovery of this trace proves problematic for phenomenology as a science because the basic concepts of phenomenology cannot be fully grounded until the meaning of being and Dasein nature at least temporarily understood. But the understanding requires both a transparent concept of time and rethinking of the concept as such. Since the discovery of this trace thus interrupts the work of phenomenology on a radical level and moves both thinking and Dasein toward an essential transformation, orchestrate ultimately a phenomenological equivalent of scientific crisis and radical review of phenomenology which must be accomplished before phenomenology can ever realize the end Heidegger envisioned for it in universal phenomenological ontology.

Heidegger finds relatively early in his work that the trace of this other time is linked to the trace of the holy, even though he does not fully explore that link and explicate thereby its ethical implications. Heidegger's essential inadequacy of ontological is thought to the temporal generosity stimulating the dynamic of time which draws along to indicates an attempt in finding a way to think time and the source which grants it from within the exclusive perspective opened by the ontological question of the meaning of Being, while preserving the integrity of time in that attempt. Ontology according to Heidegger is to understand the verb to be, and not to ask questions about the noun and the nature of being.

In *Being and Time*, we realize that "being is the most general and empty concept. As such it resists any attempt at definition, and moreover, the most general concept and therefore indefinable, has no need to be defined.[565] The verb to be and not to understand the noun to be; It is the understanding of existence and not of nature or being as being of beings with which the ontic sciences must deal.[566] Ontology is based on the understanding of human existence or the understanding of being using the phenomenological method to get back to things themselves. To study the existence which, in relation to fundamental ontology, Heidegger uses the phenomenology method, saying in a first introduction to his philosophy that "phenomenology is our way of contact to what is to be the refrain of ontology, if it is ontological possible."

According to Heidegger, the understanding of man's being will become "the existential analytic of Dasein or the hermeneutics of facticity." As he expresses himself in his book Ethics as Philosophy or the Defense of the Rights of the Other Man. This existential analytics of Dasein

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[565]*Ibidem,* p. 146.
[566]*Ibidem,* p. 18.

gave us the chance to study the situation of Dasein in the world. Heidegger had made a difference between being as a verb and being as a substantive. Also in his thought there is a distinction between ontology and ontic sciences. For Heidegger, ontology is the understanding of the verb, the verb as existence, ontology becomes the analysis of the way in which man undergoes his duty to be or existence. It becomes analyzes of everyday life, what he calls "the existential analysis of Dasein or the hermeneutics of facticity". This explains we are aware of our existence, we are also aware of being in a world, through language, which gives us the chance to understand as a whole instrument". This fact of being in a world that Heidegger calls "worldness" influences our outlook on things. My gaze becomes that of prejudgment, that of intention, a gaze that is never pure, a gaze of pre-comprehension of things.

Also we note that in Heidegger the man in being characterized, by the fact appears in front of a set of possibilities or opportunities. The human being is "a project, a power to be". The man already knows his destiny which is that of death. He is a being made for death. This means that the being which can be man is not "a stable entity nor a presence and a thing in itself". This means that being is subordinated to being "from the individual to the people or the race. Indeed man according to Heidegger never shows himself as he is. This existential analytic of Dasein, that is, being-there; Dasein gives us the possibility, in the sense that the life of man is reduced to being born, living and dying. If life is reduced in such a way, it means life equal for all, common, impersonal, that is to say a simple existence. We revealed that Dasein has ontico-ontological priority. The ontico-ontologically essential is not man, in the sense that it might itself be grasped immediately. Ontically, Dasein will not be close to us and also Dasein is nothing other than us.

### 6.3.2 Levinas critique of Heidegger

Louis Févre underlines that "Levinas always underwent a kind of fascination for Heidegger"[567] fascination which was always counterbalanced by its Jewishness and its presentiment of the Nazi horror. Levinas himself expresses it: "*Despite all the horror that came one day to associate itself with the name of Heidegger - and that nothing will manage to dissipate - nothing could defeat in my mind the conviction that Sein und Zeit of 1927 is imprescriptible, in the same way than the few other eternal books in the history of philosophy.*"[568] If Levinas does not

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[567]E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, *op. cit.,* p 96.
[568]L. Fevre, *Penser avec Levinas,* Chronique sociale, 2006*,* p. 35.

follow Heidegger in his philosophy which he nevertheless considers crucial, he will even be against this philosophy.

Even more than against Husserl, it is against Heidegger or rather to get out of Heidegger that Levinas will think and deepen his first intuitions. If Levinas conceives Evil of the modern world as Heidegger, he does not follow his explanations at all. The philosophical distance which separates these two authors is fundamental because, where Heidegger seeks to clarify the Being veiled by metaphysics, Levinas produces a true reversal: he wants to escape from being, to get out of the ontology that he considers not as the science of being but the science of "I" and give priority to ethics.

The ontology by its very nature for Levinas leads to an oversight of the other. Heidegger wanted to denounce the forgetting of being by modern philosophy and metaphysics, Levinas denounces modern philosophy, including Heidegger, as a forgetting of the Other in his transcendence. Levinas likewise criticizes the concept of a return of man to the world he lost through technology and everyday life. For Levinas, this return to the world still constitutes a palliative to the question of the other. Levinas identifies the notion of being there, and of being in the world in Heidegger, with an evacuation of the presence of the other. In Heidegger, "no exteriority is then possible for the subject."[569]As Levinas will show that such an attempt is destined to failure as long as its point of departure is an ontological question. Heidegger's analysis indirectly opens upon the way toward a re-solution of the crisis though it obviously solitary reaffirms the limits of the human finitude deprived of recognizing that opening for what it is.

On the other hand, Levinas seems comparatively disinterested in the critical implications of his work for phenomenology as a rigorous science of being. Levinas clearly recognizes in the concept of time, the opening up of a liberating escape from the finitude of being which paves the way toward an essential rethinking of phenomenology. Levinas, like Heidegger, in time trace the essential break (discontinuity) in existence. But unlike Heidegger, Levinas therefore discovers a way to account for that trace. He to an extent, discovers temporal discontinuity and diachrony as source in the ethical relation.

The transcendent nature of the interpersonal connection with the personal other. The ontic, ontological and categorical differences bring Levinas to the essential relation different from all,

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[569]A. Zielinski, *Levinas : La responsabilité est sans pourquoi*, PUF, 2004, p. 24.

and especially even in phenomenological relations-in other words, different from any of the possible careful conducts of human being. The understanding of Dasein, has appropriately been called by Alphonso Lingis as "death bound subjectivity."[570]This relation demonstrates an unlike any other relation what Levinas calls rapport sans rapport. And yet, this relationship with what is *Otherwise than Being* is a relationship essential to both human nature and the meaning of being.

Levinas later reiterates on Heidegger's argument that the question of time must be understood in relation to the question of human nature and the meaning of being. He then, moves beyond Heidegger in showing precisely how and why: because the ethical relation with the Other fundamentally conditions the possibility of Dasein's existence by granting Dasein a true time in which it can exist as the primordial place of the disclosure of being.[571] In as much as Levinas concludes that the relation of being and time be understood together with the fundamental plurality of the Same and the Other, it successfully opens a way of revision of phenomenology and the resolution of the crisis caused by the basic concepts of ontological questionability. Levinas, like Heidegger, is more concerned with the question of the meaning of being. To an extent, unlike Heidegger, Levinas thus sees the need from the actual foundation to go beyond phenomena and intuition in broaching an answer to that question. Furthermore, although there is no evidence that Levinas explicitly recognizes in this need the indication of a crisis of phenomenology.

Levinas attempts to liberate a meaning for existence beyond that produced by a solitary subject in the intentional freedom and security of knowledge and enjoyment, for whom existence is found to be both ineluctable and tragic and hence, fundamentally senseless. To him, the absolute subject escapes the senselessness of unidentified being by virtue of its definitiveness. But in virtue of the same definitiveness, the subject is immediately condemned to a burdensome, fatal present without a true future-from which there is then necessitated yet another escape. It is only in time that can effect a second escape. But, it is obvious that, time cannot wholly be produced by the subject alone in the definitiveness of the solitary of being. This somehow opened the subject in a moment prior to the moment in which its definitive subjectivity is accomplished-in a moment prior to the moment of being, in other words.

The relationship between propositional and phenomenology thought cannot reach beyond being and phenomena. In order to fully effect that reach and interpretation for time, one must

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[570]Cf. A. Lingis, *Death bound Subjectivity*. (Indiana University Press, 1989).
[571] E. Levinas, *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, *op. cit.,* p 65.

therefore necessarily move beyond phenomenology. Levinas prefaces De *l'existence a l'existant* with the demarcation of a distinction between transcendence and what he calls "ex-cendence."[572] He says the former refers to the act whereby an existent would realize a higher existence, a higher state of being, whereas the latter names the relationship with the Other, a movement toward the Good.

In contrast with this economic transcendence, the movement of ex-cendence does not realize another mode of being; rather, it signifies an escape from being, a radical "dis-inter-estedness what Levinas calls the "*there is [il y a]*". What is the conception of Levinas "*there is.*" In the radio interviews with Phillipe Nemo broadcast in 1981 and published as *Ethics and infinity* the following year, Levinas characterizes *de l'existence a l'existant* the very phenomenon of impersonal being and the upsetting fact that *il y a* ["*there is*" ]:

> My reflection on this subject starts with childhood memories. One sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his bedroom as "rumbling."... It is something resembling what one hears when one puts an empty shell close to the ear, as if the emptiness were full, as if the silence were a noise. It is something one can also feel when one thinks that even if there were nothing, the fact that "there is" is undeniable. Not that there is this or that; but the very scene of being is open: there is. In the total desolation that one can envisage before creation of there is.[573]

The impersonal existence affirms by Levinas, thematized what he suggested in expressions like "it hails" or "it is dark." Levinas saw this as "the play of being endorsed without players".[574] In the preface to the second edition of the French text Levinas says that the turn to the "there is" is a return to "those strange obsessions one remembers from childhood and which resurface in insomnia, when the silence resounds and the emptiness is full".[575] The "there is," he explains, is neither being nor nothingness. At this point, it is neither abundance nor joy. Levinas' understanding of the *"il y a,"* evolves in sharp contrast to his understanding of the Heideggerian expression *"es gibt,"* which evokes generosity and plenitude.[576] Levinas sees only the shadow of dread in the inevitable fact that "there is," and he finds only horror and panic in those experiences which phenomenally open to consciousness a glimpse of this impersonal being.

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[572]E. Levinas*, Otherwise than Being, op. cit.,* p 3.
[573]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, trans. Richard A. Cohen. Duquesne University Press, 1985*,* p 48.
[574]E. Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, *op. cit.,* p 98.
[575] *Ibidem,* p. 10.
[576] Cf. Anderson, Travis Tenney, "Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology: Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time" (1992). Dissertations. 3206. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3206

It is impossible to escape "there is." For one needs an impasse that must not be posed, but overthrown; to make an act of its deposition. In this sense, one therefore speaks of a deposed kings. The ego is the social relationship with the Other deposition of sovereignty by its dis-inter-ested relation. We write it in three words to underline the escape from being it signifies: distrust conceded word of "love," responsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other, appeared to me, to stop the senseless rumbling and anonymous of being.

The major aim of this form is in a relation to the deliverance from the "there is" which appeared to me.[577] This is why a being must be deposed in order to be redeemed, saved from anonymous being, is the startling answer that a subject must be deposed in order to be redeemed because of itself it cannot produce a time with a true future, that is, a time wherein the radically new is possible, and only such a time can be able to influence a restoration (redemption) from the definitiveness of being itself.

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[577]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 50.

# Partial Conclusion

We talked of Levinasian challenge to Western Philosophy as ontology, and the fact that we are duped by morality, as the First and Second World War is an evidence of the failure of western morality. Levinas show that Western ontology has devoted being exclusively to the modality of the Same. It engages, in a violence of the subjective being which leads to war. This is where Levinas demarcates himself from Western Philosophy which totalizes the Other. The face of being which shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality which dominates Western philosophy. Levinas himself acknowledges "discovering the existent with Husserl (and Heidegger)," and does indeed attempt to develop his phenomenology of the face through a criticism of Husserl's phenomenology. Where Levinas' departure from the phenomenological tradition begins is in his account of one particular phenomenon which, by his reading, calls into question the very concept of phenomenality as traditionally conceived. This phenomenality in Levinas' terms is "the face" of the Other which breaks with the continuity of the world in which it looks (appears). Levinas thought to have also provided a more solid ground for the phenomenological study of those questions traditionally associated with metaphysics and theology, among them the nature of ethical action and the source of determinate evil in the world. Levinas shows most effectively that phenomenology is limited in its operation to the world of light-it cannot disclose the other. Levinas is right in asserting that the relationship with the Other is fundamental to our very existence, then a turn toward the Other would be crucial to any ontology, and most definitely to phenomenology. In investigating the concepts of consciousness, Being, Levinas turns towards issues fundamental to human existence and fundamental to any understanding of Being, and thus crucial to as consequences of the understanding of the crisis of humanity in the global society.

# CHAPTER SEVEN: LEVINASIAN ETHICAL CHALLENGE OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

## Partial Introduction

The two great World Wars experienced, "as a consequence of the totalizing dialectic of Hegelian philosophy, Heidegger ascend to the power under Nacism and the western totalization of the other into same, was the very manifestation of the total integration of man in the service of the different figures of universality" which leads Levinas to think about difference by rejecting a philosophical tradition that thinks about the Whole. The mortality of man, the anguish of death, is the movement towards life. This is also the original reality. What interests Levinas is the discovery of being as a life of relationship and the discovery of a thought which is the very life of this being. Throughout the history of warfare, countless have seen the oppression of others by the Same. The mechanical cause for responsibility and quest for an order of reasons thus changes the locus of phenomenology from the site and world to the other (person). It points to the denial of the other's difference that exceeds any reductive attempt and is always more and beyond any idea that one may have or carry from the other, whose distinct narrative, memories and subjectivity my history cannot possibly account for without injustice or prejudice. And this oppression was what is directly or indirectly inflicted by suffering which is not to be inflicted on the other or the weak for superfluous pleasure and unjust profit. Levinas' existential sources of meaning is deformalizing language and communication. The other person to him, lived the existential source of connection to the prophetic call and return to justice and righteousness. Levinas wanted to seek, by denouncing this inhuman action, the meaning that can restore the lost morality of man in useless suffering. It preserves the "otherness" or surprising upsurge of sensibility within. However, it loses the Other without.

## 7.1 HISTORY OF THE FACE IN LEVINAS' EXPERIENCE

> *Starting from the Holocaust, I think of the death of the other man, I think of the other man... I wondered, you may know, what the other man's face means.*
> *Levinas, "La philosophie et la mort"[578]*

Metaphorically, the face in Levinas' sense is the only thing *a priori* that breaks through existence. The face is the site for expressions and dispossession. The face is a source and point of

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[578]E. Levinas, *Alterity and transcendence*, Preface Pierre Hayat (Fata Morgana, 1995), p. 166.

dialogue by extension and discourse. The face, is the original mode of time and interruption[579]the coextensive with substitution. It set a discursive strategy dramatize in the situations of living in the world, facing the other and creating it dwelling. At the heart of the 1961 work was the face, as expression and voice-teaching. Levinas deploys a vast effort to dismantle the tension and to develop a first philosophy *in and as* pre-philosophical experience-both of "Being" as an indeterminate field, and of the Other as a face that addresses me.

Levinas' encounter with a face is inevitably personal; with a seminal anguish whose sources lie beyond criteria of verification and more perhaps even those of demonstrative plausibility.[580] Levinas work outside a demonstrative plausibility that does not reduce to transcendental categories and rationality of norms. This dual stance outside and inside of philosophical plausibility is, we think, inevitable when the question that guides us is: Can we hope for anything from philosophy after the two great wars, slavery, Shoah and the humiliating repetitions of mass genocide-hope for anything beyond the resistance of critique, or local pragmatic nonparticipations? The question "Can we hope…" motivates the philosophy of Levinas. Levinas' task is an enactment set which depends on the phenomenological flow of time and its unconscious form, which integrates interruptions, moments of passion, into a regularity that makes them ultimately "thinkable." As such, Levinas' "Can we hope…" depends on a deliberate rhetorical and interpretative strategy, superimposed on phenomenological descriptions. This overflows consciousness and its philosophical object of truth.

The interpretive descriptions and sustained claim to an immediate *now*, which is both conceptual and performed, depend on an encounter whose own ambiguity lies in its figural and objective qualities: the face moves between a stability of meaning and an activity that elicits passion.[581] The double site of valence and multi-valence (i.e. really-allows) draw out the philosophical *enseignement and* psychological experience about first philosophy, pure logic or metaphysics. The core element is in principles of causality and identity. But the principle of first philosophy is also-necessarily-the lived fact of inter-subjectivity and paradoxically-as generative perception and performance: "institution." This does not mean dualism; it comes to light as a specific kind of recollection. [582] This dual uncertainty and philosophical absurdity opens Levinas'

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[579] See, *The Carnets de captivité*, *op. cit.*, p. 409ff.
[580] Cf. Bettina Bergo, The Face in Levinas, *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 16:1, 17-39, 2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2011.564362*
[581] *Ibidem*
[582] *Ibidem*

originality of the self-conscious hazard against all philosophical failures, especially failures attaching to the lifelessness of formalism, exhausting themselves in hyper-complexity of hope in the under-determination of discursive events to come. Here, there is a philosophical search for origins in Levinas' Face. The face is the only "thing" that metaphorically *breaks through* existence and solitude. This in turn takes us to our next task on Levinas' ethical challenge as the tenor of his philosophy.

### 7.1.1 Levinasian ethical challenge of western philosophy

Since Aristotle, all of metaphysics has begun the search for the first causes starting from being. This is the main task of philosophy. It is to elucidate the causal structures of the beings that manifest themselves to us-to elucidate them as the ontological core of phenomena. As these 'causes' are primary because they originally found beings, and because they make possible, justify or 'save' appearances, metaphysics will also be called 'primary philosophy.'[583] The object of metaphysics is being in itself. And "Being would be a whole. To be where nothing ends and nothing begins. Nothing opposes him and no one judges him.[584] Being is known only from its perspective, only from its side. In other words, this metaphysics is ontology and philosophy comes about only by becoming ontological. Ontology brings the unknown to the known, the foreign to the identical, that is to say the other to the same. Ontology as primary philosophy was therefore from the beginning a "philosophy of power."[585] The Western philosophical perspective of power has been an ontology. The very site of reduction of the *Other* to the *Same* ensures in the intelligence of being."[586]

Western philosophy does not tear the other out of the same. It erases the differences. The other only arises in the same, resting on itself. The other is recognized only to possess, to grasp, to know. What is revealed by the other is what is revealed by the self. The other is only seen through identification as it seems to have been given to me by myself. Regardless of the ethical theories in general and in particular Kantianism that precede Levinas, he wonders in one of his fundamental works *Totality and Infinity* that states: "*Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest*

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[583] J. Hirchberger, *Abrégé d'histoire de la philosophie occidentale*, adaptation fr., Philibert Secretan, Éd. Universitaire Fribourg Suisse, 1990, p. 41.

[584] E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays On Judaism*, trans. Seán Hand. The Johns, Hopkins University Press, 1990, p. 267.

[585] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.,* p 38.

[586] *Ibidem,* pp. 33-34.

*importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."*[587]Levinas' philosophy is a response in contradiction of totality which dominates Western Philosophy that is Ontology.

Levinasian responsibility is a challenge against Western Philosophy which, is an ontology characterized by the tyranny of the Same, by egoism and by the tendency to reduce the Other individual to a mere object of benefits, as a means to an end. For him, Western ontology has devoted being exclusively to the modality of the Same and has never done justice to the heterogeneity and difference of the other but privileged the tyranny of the Same that denies the very dignity and autonomy of the other person. It engages, in a violence of the subjective being which leads to war. The face of being which shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality which dominates Western philosophy. He genuinely shows how knowledge preoccupied Western thinking and how it has done injustice to the heterogeneity and the difference of the Other. To him, Western thought has privileged the tyranny of the Same and has denied the autonomy and dignity of the Other person. Levinas addresses the question of what lies outside of totality, the Other which cannot be reduced to the Same.

Levinas therefore wanted to escape the shadow of being, the shadow of identity. It is a question of reversing the idea according to which ontology would be the first philosophy. In Levinas' arrays, he captive the Greek origin and metaphysics ordered the logic thought of the Same, the site to primacy of identity and substance. But according to him, it is impossible to join an authentic thought of the Other from the despotism of the Same, incapable of recognizing this Other. The dialectic of the Same and the Other, considered "ontologically" under the primacy of self-identity, organizes the absence of the Other in effective thought, suppresses all true experience of the Other, and bars the way to an ethical openness to otherness. The different origin would be ethics for the exit of being. "It is the recognition of 'sanctity."[588]

The concern for the other is openness to the other. We must first come out of being in order to manifest concern for the other. In other words, the revolt of the subject against its absorption into the totality is necessary. We must suspect the legitimacy of our ontological tradition based on the primacy of being. It is also necessary to advance to the point of breaking the logic of being which always reduces the Other to the Same. As the other does not come after the being, the relation prior to ontology must be asserted. Our humanity consists in being able to recognize the

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[587]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 21.
[588] E. Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, Le Livre de Poche, coll. «Biblio», 2008, p. 178.

priority of the other by accusing the ontological absurdity, moreover the self must not limit itself to the recognition of the other. He must question himself in relation to the other "to the point of being able to respond to him only with a responsibility that cannot be limited and which is exceeded without being exhausted."[589] Questioning the subject under the sign of the other, there is no possibility of ethics except on this condition.

While traditional ethics is based on the formulation of rules adapted to actions inscribed in society, Levinasian ethics is established from the other who takes precedence more than anything and our humanity coincides with this recognition of the priority of the other. The Levinasian ethics particularly emphasizes "the awakening of a responsibility for the responsibility of the other"[590]. We are therefore going to see that it appears as responsibility towards the other. And this responsibility would be beyond any ontological condition, beyond the Essence. There is the responsibility of the other before having-to-be. First of all, responsibility does not designate my obligation that I would bear with regard to my own ontological condition. It comes to me from the other. That is to say, it imposes itself invincibly on me. For Levinas, the figure of subjectivity emerges under the sign of responsibility, whereas subjectivity does not merge into the possibility proper to the subject of constituting or reconstituting himself sovereignly because "responsibility for others cannot have started in my commitment, in my decision.

### 7.1.2 The ethics of Emmanuel Levinas

In critically studying the entirety of Greco-Western thought, Levinas states that from Parmenides to Heidegger all the philosophical traditions have been dominated and defined by the ontological event that reduces and overturns the otherness into the same. The philosophical of the philosophical ambition and exploration was simply and strictly a metaphysics.[591] The entire wisdom pursuing novelty has been narrowed down to knowledge, certainty and truth. The entire Western love of wisdom was marked by the primacy of the intellect over the will and more essentially the primacy of truth over goodness. Levinas' conception of *'Ethics as First Philosophy'* is a powerful summary of his methodical and radical move away from the Husserlean transcendental idealism and the Heideggerian hermeneutics towards the fundamental ethical

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[589] M. Blanchot, *La communauté inavouable*, Minuit, 1983, p. 73.
[590] J. Cohen, « Après Levinas, l'éthique aujourd'hui », art. *op. cit*., p 46.
[591] S. Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*. Edinburgh University Press, 2014, pp. 284-285.

question of the very meaning of being, presented in the face-to-face relation.[592]The phenomenological heritage which reveals knowledge was built on an intentionality in contact with concrete reality. Levinas brings us to recognize the closed and circular nature of this self-conscious awareness. Intentionality reduces wisdom to a notion of increasing self-consciousness, in which anything that is non-identical is absorbed by the identical.

In this way, self-consciousness affirms itself as absolute being. The non-intentional for Levinas exists in duration to itself, which cannot be wholly controlled by the will. This non-intentionality is an unhappy consciousness that exists without attributes or aims. In fact, it is passivity which is the *mauvaise conscience*. This passivity affirms one's being by responding to one's right to be. This response preexists any self-consciousness, that is, responsibility for the Other in face-to-face encounter. The question of being then involves the right to be. It is this nexus that Levinas mentioned the face of the Other. I do not hold the Other in order to dominate. I respond, rather to the epiphany of the face. As such, what is produced in a concrete form is the idea of infinity rather than totality. This relation is inherently metaphysical and precedes any forms of ontological program. Prior to a state-of- mind in which one finds oneself, therefore, the infinite vigilance we display with regard to the other, suspending all notion of totality, which justifies being as the being of beings.

This first philosophy shows through the ambiguity of the identical, an identical which declares itself to be I at the height of its unconditional and even logically indiscernable identity, indeed the height of unconditional identity confess as hateful. The ego is the very crisis of the being of a being (*de l'etre de l'etant*) in the human domain. [593]A crisis of being, not because the sense of this verb might still need to be understood in its semantic secret and might call up the powers of ontology, but because I begin to ask myself if my being is justified, if the *Da of my Dasein* is not already the usurpation of somebody else's place. This question appeals to responsibility, which is not a practical measure to console knowledge in its failure to contest being. This responsibility does not deny knowledge the ability to comprehend and grasp; instead, it is the excellence of ethical proximity in its sociality, in its love without concupiscence. The human return to the interiority of non-intentional consciousness and the *mauvaise conscience*. Its capacity is to fear injustice more than death and to prefer that which justifies being over that which assures it.

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[592] E. Levinas, *The Levinas Reader*, edited by Sean Hand, Cambridge, 1989, p. 81.
[593] *Ibidem,* p. 91.

This primacy of the intellect break with the phenomenological tradition where Levinas' departure from the phenomenological tradition begins in his account of one particular phenomenon which, by his reading, calls the concept of phenomenality as conceived traditionally.[594] The face is what Levinas call a phenomenon. The human face in the world alongside other beings in the world. Nevertheless, *otherwise* than those beings; for the face, he argues, breaks with the continuity of the world in which it appears. The face-to-face relation refers to a concept in the Levinas thought on human sociality. His phenomenological import in the "face-to-face" serves as the true basis for his ethics and the rest of Levinas' philosophy. It impasse simple phenomena circumscribed by the world. The face exceeds the "illuminative horizon" of subjective apperception "in its personal light".[595]

As such, the human face, though a discrete phenomenon in the world, nevertheless appears to us as if it came from outside of or beyond the world. The face of the other is thus for him a kind of *an-archic* phenomenon. The presentation of the face in the anarchic nature does not have immediately the structure of intentionality. The absolute Other resists the imprudence of intentionality[596] and is not reflected in consciousness. The paradox of the face functions to put the intentionality of the perceiving ego into question. It is this "putting in question" implied in the enigma of the face that Levinas thinks opens up the possibility of ethical consideration and responsibility. "The face opens my being in the world and reorients my sensitivity of the world and myself." The relation one has to the face of the other "is not therefore ontology" but "religion".[597]

The nudity and defenselessness of the face thus signifies "do not kill me". The nudity of the face is therefore a passive resistance to my freedom. The face of the Other is like a stranger, widow, or orphan. These represent a certain poverty or a lack in the being of the Other's existence. What I give to the other is never enough and what the other give to me is more than what I can contain. Therefore the face splits ethics from morality in its encounter with the Other. Ethics comes before morality in the set of rules emerging in the social situation, where in there are more than just the two people in the face-to-face encounter. This ethical relation for Levinas is prior to

[594]D. M. Dalton, "Phenomenology and the Infinite:" *Levinas, Husserl, and the Fragility of the Finite,* Duquesne, 2014, p. 23-52.
[595] TI p. 71.
[596]E. Levinas*, Basic Philosophical Writings*, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Indiana University Press, 1996.
[597]D. M. Dalton, "Phenomenology and the Infinite:" *op. cit.,* p 23-52.

ontology and ethics goes beyond the state, society, politics, culture. Ontology means the affirmation of the meaning of Being and the essence of being. Levinas grounds his ethics of responsibility in the face of the Other as a criticism of the history of philosophy and more particularly in a criticism that Western philosophical belief is system of knowledge has the germs of an unselfish contemplation of Being, lock up in locus of the intelligible.[598]

Knowing is characterized by active thematization, conceptualization aiming at unity, generalization, totalization, and assimilation. As a result of this, the known or the object of knowledge is stripped off from its uniqueness and otherness, as it were dominated by reason and totalizing Western thought of the Other in its otherness.[599]Levinas' disapproval is granted in Western philosophical tradition that put Being before its existent. Ethics therefore is matter of heteronomous relation in the encounter with Other in the face.

The ontological tradition of western philosophy of totality of the other, he means, reduces the other to the same. In apprehending the ontological Being of the Other supposes that one applies to the other one's own analytical categories what Levinas calls.[600] The ontological tradition reduces the other's otherness as it negates her radical otherness. To an ontological approach, Levinas wishes therefore to substitute a non-allergic relation with alterity,[601] one that caters for the other's infinite otherness. Levinas criticizes in particular how this tradition subordinates the personal relation with someone who is an existent (i.e. an ethical relation), to an impersonal relation with the Being of the existent of the other (i.e. a relationship of knowing).[602]

Levinas calls into question the ambition of philosophy to attempt at a universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience, of all that is reasonable (*sensé*) to a totality wherein consciousness grasp the world in its entire totality and exit nothing outside of itself as well develop an absolute thought.[603] Levinas' objective is to dissuade the priority given in the Western philosophy of Being and Totality, that which breaks outside it, to say infinity.[604] Levinas strives after loosening us from the limits imposed on our understanding by our habits to think of knowledge, the Other or the

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[598]E. Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans, Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 1998. p. 67.
[599]S. Swamikannu, "Ethics as First Philosophy According to Emmanuel Levinas," in *Jnanodaya Journal of Philosophy* 1 (1991-1992): pp. 37-38.
[600] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.,* p 35.
[601] *Ibidem,* p. 38.
[602] *Ibidem*, p. 36.
[603] E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit.,* p 69.
[604] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.,* p 36.

world in ontological terms. His project is to bring us beyond knowledge and essence, beyond essence to the *Otherwise than Being*. And it is through a theory of ethics that he intends to carry out such a project.[605] Philosophy to Levinas is "a pseudoscience wherein, the otherness is transfigured into sameness by means of the philosopher's knowing ego."[606] He invites us to a phenomenological contemplation of the greeting, the face. On the relationship to the face and how it opens on an incapacity to grasp the infinite of the other in its totality, Levinas writes for example:

> The resists possession of the Face, resists my powers. This alteration (mutation) can only occur by means of opening a new dimension. For the resistance to the grasp is not produced as an insurmountable resistance, like the hardness of the rock against which the effort of the hand comes to naught, but my ability for power[607]

In meeting the other stages for Levinas a face-to-face encounter that raises an imperious moral urgency. Ones' humanity is grounded in his subjectivity which in turn is grounded in the face-to-face with the other. The conditions of this face-to-face are also the conditions of my humanity. The face in front of me summons me as a human being, begs me and asks for me. This summons to responsibility destroys the formulas of generality by which my knowledge of the other man re-presents him to me as my fellow man.[608] In the presence of the other in the face, am unique and chosen one who is inescapably responsible. By this freedom, humanity in me (moi)-that is, humanity as me-signifies, in spite of its ontological contingence of finitude and mortality, the anteriority and uniqueness of the non-interchangeable. The others face. Ethics resides in the face to face encounter and in its unthinking transparency and openness where I do find the other as Other, where we share the fate and fact of being members of the same species.

Facing the Other is thus a facing up to the Others transcendence, to his or her refusal to be drawn into the web of the Same, to be alter to every ego.[609] The face is talking to me and "Thou shall not kill" are not only its first words, they are also its first order: we must make these words ours, there goes our moral responsibility. Being ethical is being responsible for the other: for the other, despite oneself, starting with oneself, the pain of labour in the patience of ageing, in the duty to give even the bead translation[610]: This responsibility for the other is immediate and not only a

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[605] S. Swamikannu, "Ethics as First Philosophy According to Emmanuel Levinas," *op. cit.,* p 38.
[606]S. Critchley, "Introduction*,"* in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,* eds. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 16-17.
[607] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit., pp* 197-198.
[608] E. Levinas, *The Levinas Reader*, edited by Sean Hand, Cambridge, 1989, p. 90.
[609]Cf. S. Edward Casey Source: The Ethics of the Face to Face Encounter: Schroeder, Levinas, and the Glance Author(s): The Pluralist, Vol. 1, No. 1 (SPRING 2006), pp. 74-97: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20708851.
[610]S. Swamikannu, "Ethics as First Philosophy According to Emmanuel Levinas," *op. cit.,* p 55.

matter of perception. I am responsible for his very responsibility[611]: My responsibility is thus both without start and endless. It is also non-reciprocal. I neither calculate nor expect reciprocity. *Reciprocity is his affair. It is I who support all. (...) I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility.*[612]

Doing something for the other and giving: my responsibility is the identification mark of my humanity and spirituality. I am indeed totally subjected to it. Levinas undoubtedly departs from Kant. The philosophical signification of responsibility is the central theme in the ethics of Levinas and a recurrent motive of broad theoretical elaboration in his writings. His elaboration on the differences between saying and the said in *Otherwise than Being*-the former resisting its ontological eccentric nature of the latter-which opens for instance on the practical issue of how to concretely take ones' responsibility toward the other and more generally how to define the conditions of one's encounter with the other.

When Levinas establishes ethics as the condition of the human, he also implicitly put ethics aside for humans.[613] Levinas sets very strict conditions for an encounter with the other to be considered as ethics. The ethical metaphysics boils down to the Otherness is not an intellectual abstraction but a concrete reality and reality is uniquely here and now. Otherness is not understood, absorbed by the measure of my knowledge. In other words, the relationship with the other has a structure that cannot be reduced to the intentionality of consciousness that is being *ipso facto* nullify otherness and preserves it."[614] Therefore, the relationship with the other would not begin in a knowing subject. It is necessary first of all to open the subject to the outside in order to communicate with the other. The subject must open up to separate itself from its interiority sticking to the essence.

The openness here has another meaning than the essence of being which opens to show itself and then the consciousness which opens to the presence of the essence open and entrusted to it. Levinas sees a possibility of openness beyond anything that can show the essence of being. It is in the sensibility where bares its skin by offering itself up to suffering. In acknowledging the unique here and now concrete character of an encounter is not being relativistic; it is being aware

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[611] E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit.,* p 96.

[612] *Ibidem,* pp. 98-9.

[613]https://www.academia.edu/28835331/The_impossibility_of_corporate_ethics_for_a_Levinasian_approach_to_managerial_ethics

[614] E. Levinas, *Le temps et l'autre*, PUF, 1994(5ème édition), p. 48.

that the occasional is the condition of our stumbling upon alterity. The concept of alterity is not merely the dichotomy of inside and outside. Levinas' notion of the Other as irreducibly and infinitely other, implies that alterity cannot be understood. Conceptually looking at it, alterity is not just a matter of difference or otherness but rather it accounts for transcendence or singularity which could wholly or separateness of otherness. Arriving at this level, it hopefully goes without saying that alterity is a basis for the ethics of Levinas.

## 7.2 BEING FOR THE OTHER PERSON

A colossal array for Levinas' ethical of interlinked issues and intellectual concepts stem from his understanding of *the Other*. According to him, the other is always a concrete other that is, the needy, the beggar, the unnoticed, the widow, the child. The Other escapes one's knowledge. In his phenomenological ethics, the "*face is the fundamental event.*" Thus, one can reach the unknown other through few means of knowledge like the faces glances, expression, and body language. However, the other communicates by its presence itself. The presence of others puts my *conatus essendi* in question. By striving to move the spontaneity centered around the Subject towards a refocusing around the Other, Levinas is led to think with new facts or new elements the relationship between the Self and the Other by inscribing it in the sphere of what he calls ethics. The Self is no longer first. The Other comes before the Me. This idea of the priority of the Other reverses the pre-existing ontology of the philosophical tradition. It is the transition from ontology to ethics what Levinas is aiming for.

According to Levinas, the subject cannot assert his right to be, that is to say the right to be of oneself before the Other. Because the true meaning of subjectivity does not consist in becoming substance, but in devoting oneself to the Other. For instance, a beggar standing there can influence and affect ones consciousness even without a word. The vulnerable other ought to move one to action.[615] A renewed interest in ethics is caused by this changing conception of the *"otherness."* The term seems to be so ordinary and too general but it also underlies a complexity in it. The other in Levinasian context, as infinite can mean a concrete living other, a person, persons or a category that is totally different from the accepted conventions or general consensus. It can also mean that which is outside, an indefinable thing outside the system.[616] This other, with an authority in the

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[615]S. Mattathilanickal, "Ethics of Responsibility,"in *Jnanodaya Journal of Philosophy 4* , (1994-1995), p. 58.
[616]R. Eaglestone, "The Ethical Turn" in *Continental Philosophy in the 1980s,* Paris*,* p. 206.

face, commands an ethical relation, that is, one's being-for-the-other. It is presented not much as a universal command but it indicates a particular responsibility of mine (the subject) for the other.[617] In short, anything that is ''not I'' is the "″other." The literal French writings of Levinas denote *the other* in three different meanings. One denotes among the other human the phenomenological ethical realm.[618] This other human is the kernel (core) matter of this Thesis.

To put it in a more illustrative way, being for the Other means "After you, Sir!" [619] Each person wants the other human to go first when they meet face to face at a doorway. This opens makes one solicitous and empathical. Here, what is implicit is that, the other person precedes one's freedom and is counted more than oneself. Thus, the other, by the presence, does not restrict one's freedom; rather the appearance of the face is the awakening of one's responsibility.[620] Levinas confirms it, "*I understand responsibility as responsibility for the other... which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as face.*"[621]  "I exist through the Other and for the other... wherein which the self is a hostage persecuted by its responsibility."[622] Here, the word I means Here *I am!* answers for everyone and everything.[623]

The *I* substitutes itself as exposed being-for-the-other, due to the responsibility it bears. Consequently, "Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another."[624] All these conceptions find an irreplaceable starting point as Levinas often quotes from Dostoyevsky' novel Comrades Karamazov, "*Each of us is remorseful before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others.*"[625] We are all responsible for everyone else but I am more responsible than all others in society.[626] Therefore, to conclude at a right view, to be oneself intrinsically implies *to be for the other*. In other words, "I am my brother's keeper."[627] Responsibility as an interruption by the Other.

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[617]A. Pamela Sue, "Emmanuel Levinas." The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism. Edited by Stuart Sim, Routledge, 200, p. 260-261.
[618]S. Poudyal, "Humanitarian Ethics in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas," p. 7. http://internationalseminar.org/XIII AIS/TS%201%20 (B)/13.%20Mr.%20Sindhu%20Poudyal.pdf [accessed 12 January 2021].
[619]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, op. cit., p 89.
[620]S. Poudyal, "Humanitarian Ethics in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas," *op. cit.,* pp 10-11.
[621]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, op. cit., p 95.
[622]E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, *op. cit.,* p 114.
[623]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, op. cit., pp 105-106.
[624]Ibidem, p. 96.
[625]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, op. cit., p 146.
[626]S. Mattathilanickal, "Ethics of Responsibility," *op. cit.,* p 59.
[627]S. Swamikannu, "Ethics as First Philosophy According to Emmanuel Levinas," *op. cit.,* p 40.

Responsibility, in the ordinary parlance, means the accountability for one's free actions. Responsibility is prior to freedom. Responsibility is response itself. Responsibility is the ability to respond towards the other person. He sees in responsibility as a sensible and pre-conscious response to the Other exteriority. But *Totality and Infinity* pursues a more direct, even categorical, otherness-in the sense of encounters that becomes the focus of our intersubjective connectedness; this simply means that the spontaneity of speaking-to another, accounting for oneself and inviting an other to take a place or a thing, becomes the primary sense of Levinas' concept of responsibility. Responsibility is non-innate, non-inborn spontaneity. This means ethics refers to an *ethos* or the character and values of an acting subject.[628]

Responsibility immediately unravels the doctrines of virtues and deontologists, as it corresponds to an ideal or Idea of practical reason only insofar as it is narrated and systematized. For this reason, it stands apart from the concepts that would let us work it into the *schemata* of practical reason and its interests, again into the calculation of well-being for sensuous (affective) subjects. The encounter with alterity is "religion,"[629] before ethics;[630] underlining an interrelation and a contested etymology. In other words, Levinas found, in the prophetic voice, an early "religious" interpretation of the call of the other to one who *undergoes it as a* "me" (the prophet), and of "my" testimony to its embodied meaning.[631] Levinas therefore dismantle the initial intuition about the possibility of the edifice of logicism and conceptual positivism the lived *plausible* conditions that gave rise to a certain writing-but, above all, to a certain voice "Other."

Levinas' intellectual resources and insights define his task as the ethics of responsibility. Levinas' radical thesis states that the self's responsibility for the other is more fundamental than its liberty and decision. Both in a metaphysical and real-life sense, the needs of the other take precedence over one's own, because before the absolutely other, 'I' remains powerless.[632] In his radicality, Levinas states that "responsibility is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous, but it is the original awakening of an "I" responsible for the other."[633]Responsibility as an interruption of the Other ignites a thematic incoherence to

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[628] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., pp 197-200
[629]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 40.
[630]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236757904_Is_There_a_Correlation_between_Rosenzweig_and_Levinas/
[631]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., pp 197-200.
[632]M. Paul, *Being for the Other: Emmanuel Levinas, Ethical Living and Psychoanalysis*. Marquette University Press, 2008, p. 13.
[633]*Ibidem*, p. 20.

establishing values and principles one should apply in the daily encounter with the Other. The subject is in grip of the other and the invisible alterity of the Other is irreducible to comprehension.[634]

The ethical subject in contrast to Levinas exists for the Other with a responsibility that is emanating from the Other. This eventually leads to a new understanding of subjectivity. Subjectivity for Levinas is responsibility of what is not my deed. Subjectivity, to him, is a subjection to the Other who demands a response prior to my freedom and reason. Preceding any theoretical construction, the encounter with the Other is situated in ethics, whereby any thoughts or intentions concerning the Other arise only by virtue of having already welcomed the Other. His responsibility is ontological or fundamental ethics in that it asserts how things are rather than how they should be. He denotes the Other as strange and irreducible to the I, implying the Other cannot be absorbed into the scheme of the Same, in which ethical relation cannot be reduced to the otherness of the Other in the I, as accustomed to do in the latter, but, it rather lets the Other continue to call my spontaneity and enjoyment into question.

Self-responsibility for the Other is before consciousness and more fundamental than its liberty and decision prior to any conceptualization with encountering the alterity of the Other that obligates a responsibility for the Other as an interruption. It implies, no one can escape from this inherent responsibility through "substitution" which implies to be responsible even for the other's responsibility. Being claimed by the other, in ethical existence, one cannot but accepts this responsibility.[635] Hence a responsibility that begins in seeing the face of another human being is a primary philosophical category, rooted within our subjective constitution and this responsibility is a pre-conscious, sensible responding to the exteriority of the Other, provoked or imposed by the presence of the Other human being.

Epistemological, it can be said that the ethical relation challenges famously the tendency of the subject to thematize the Other, as is often done in Western theories of knowledge. Levinas argues that the alterity of the Other, that is the difference of the Other, always escapes the cognitive powers of the knowing subject. The experience of the other does not, however, entail a moment of comprehension, opposition, objectification or integration. The initial encounter entails a visitation

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[634] E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being, op. cit.,* pp 9-10.
[635] D. A. Stalin, "*Levinas on the Vulnerability of the Face and our Responsibility.*"*Divyadaan Journal of Philosophy & Education* 16, no. 1 (2005): p. 62-63.

that precedes or, rather, transcends conceptual significance, meaning that the other remains irreducibly other. This encounter is not a fleeting or neutral one, but it continues to hold the ego hostage.

Responsibility, for Levinas, is practical and existential rather than theoretical. It designates a concrete encounter between the Same and the Other. Thus the encounter between the Same and the Other is grounded in the most fundamental pre-original and primordial ethical "dimension" of human existence in society. Finally, Levinas approaches in the face to face encounter are more polemically as exteriority. The human being is able to give and to receive the other into his space first and foremost. First, the onset of the other, as the expression of the face, causes freedom of will and opens me to goodness. Goodness is transcendence. The first act of dialogue is the subject approach to the other. The dialogical engagement therefore, expands the trace of the encounter with the other. This becomes attenuated to the point where the meaning of justice poses a big question in society. Responsibility as the interruption of the Other is closely related to the Face of the Other as first signification of Transcendence.

### 7.2.1 The face of the Other as the first signification of transcendence

Levinas ethic is systematization and the totalizing logics of metaphysical systems. His responsibility claims that ethics should metaphysics and precedes ontology. It therefore, emanates from the concrete experience of the Other. Ethic is therefore either an affair of inserting particulars into abstract states. Ethics itself speaks out of particularity about the first human particularity: the face to face relationship reveals universalistic principle. For much Jewish thought after Kant, the ethical message of Levinas held a dignity equal to the justice aimed at in Jewish law. Levinas carries this insight into moral phenomenology, starting with a relationship that is secular, yet not finite or out conceptually limitable, because it continuously opens past the ethical immediacy of social occurring, toward a responsibility that repeats and increases as it repeats in a process of infinite regression. The new ethical framework of transcendence as human responsibility involves an extensive exploration of dialogical encounter of the face to face relationship, and it opens onto questions of social existence and social justice in accord with reason.

In an ordinary sense, the face is intimately linked to sensibility and vision, but in the philosophical experience of Levinas, the "Face"[636]emerges as the emblem of everything that fundamentally resists categorization, containment or comprehension. Levinas conceives transcendence as the need for escape and work out a new logic of lived experience of being and time in this project of being. Transcendence in Levinas understanding is continually directed toward something other than ourselves and it suggests that the deep motivation of need is to get out of the being that we ourselves are-our situation and our existential embodiment. Levinas introduced the other by way of time and the relation of time is the relation with the other. Time is described as a now moment and time is part of interruption to the existence of being. Levinas ethics is goodness as transcendence. It reveals the unbridgeable gap between knowledge and ethics. Transcendence is the movement of overflowing consciousness towards human goodness. Levinas revisited Heideggers' approach to *Being and Time*. Levinas question was not why is there being instead of simply nothing.

Levinas believes that humans' failed attempt to get out of themselves is through escape. Escape, he wrote, is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that the I (moi)is oneself (soi-meme). Levinas approached transcendence in the light of humans' irreducible urge to get past the limits of their physical and social situations. Levinas accepted Heideggers' argument that the human being experiences itself as if cast into its world without control over its beginning and ending. This has an existentialist import.

Levinas affirms that Heideggers' concept of existence is historically specific with a disappointed transcendences. Being is existence and it is manifold and it is split into same and other. The economic existence is characterized by need. Need is satiable and human existence is defined by pleasure and enjoyment while fatigue, insomnia, shame and nausea constitute the burden off human existence. From the outset, the fact of exiting refers to concrete human existence. The priority of the present, concentrated into an extended moment is opened up through the continuum of sensibility and affectivity of the human face.

According to Levinas, it means the human face but not thought of or experienced as a physical or aesthetic object. But this indicates that we must first grasp what it is about the face to

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[636]The Other like a face speaks to the Subject in a personal and intimate way. ("Exteriority and the Face") in *Totality and Infinity*].

face encounter that makes it so ethically significant. Only in the face to face encounter, insists Levinas, do we experience human others (autrui) in their true exteriority, their absolute alterity as expression.[637]For Levinas, moral consciousness is primarily *"an access to exterior being,"*[638]which is *"the way in which the Other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me."*[639]That is, the Other goes beyond my ability to evaluate, comprehend, and thematize it. Levinas argues that the real encounter with the Other can only take place beyond the physical appearance of the face that we come across every day.

The relation with the face is dominated by perception, but cannot be reduced to that.[640] This is to say that the face, in Levinas' view expresses the very otherness of the Other, irreducible to anything visible or invisible beneath it. The face of the Other is the face of transcendence which leads/guides us to the infinity of the other. The face thus signifies the philosophical priority of the existent over Being.[641] My presence before the face is, therefore, an epiphany. To exist edict on: *"You shall not kill."*[642] In an important way Levinas holds that the face is *"signification without context"* or that it is *"meaning all by itself."*[643] What he means is that we often encounter a person through a particular context in such a way that the designation of the person is intelligible only when seen within such a context.

The face, on the contrary, is never within a particular context, nor relative to it; it is meaningful in and of itself. It implies the relation to the face is directly ethical. The face is epiphanized in its uprightness and rectitude, nakedness which signifies its exposure and defencelessness before any threat, for instance, *"This nudity which is a call to me-an appeal but also an imperative-I name face."*[644] So the Face is which is nude and obligates one. Faced with death, the rectitude of the Face shows its mortality, namely, the possibility of its murder. It is on the defencelessness and mortality of the face that Levinas' responsibility is based. The ethical meaning of the face, as observes by Edith Wyschogrod, lies in the human face.

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[637]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 66.
[638]E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, *op. cit*., p 409.
[639] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 50.
[640]*Ibidem,* pp. 85-86.
[641]S. Hand, (ed), *The Levinas Reader: Emmanuel Levinas*, Printed in Great Britain by Camelot Press PLC, 1989, p. 5.
[642]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit.,* pp 88-89.
[643]*Ibidem*, p. 86.
[644] E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas.* J. Robbins, (ed). Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 115.

According to Edith Wyschogrod, it is *not as a form apprehended in perception but rather as an ethical datum exuded, from the disclosure and helplessness of the Other."*[645] The injunction of *"thou shall not kill appear here."*[646] This means no violence should be done to the Other humans or any attempt to reduce the other person as objects of satisfaction. The face is also made manifest in *"the face-to-face encounter with the Other which is a true union or true togetherness, togetherness which is a togetherness of the face."*[647] Facing of the Other, provides the irreducible and eventual experience of the ethical relation. The ethical relation is one in which one is related to the face of the Other. The face-to-face encounter becomes for Levinas the source and origin of responsibility, beyond any attempt to formulate the universal moral principles. Only through the encounter with the naked Face can we experience the meaning of ethical transcendence.

In the same line, there are three features of the face (1) directness of exposure to another, (2) the other's way of being and (3) an exhortation that calls out to me and point towards a concrete response. Importantly, the encounter lacks any meditation such as comprehension, reason, language or culture; the face is an immediate experience that reveals the nudity of the other. This nakedness of the face is not actually what is accessible to me because I disclose it, it is to my eyes, to my perceptions, in a light exterior to it. *The face that turn to me is its very nudity and is by itself not reference to a system."*[648]The face reveal the fundamental alterity of the other, a revelation Levinas describes as infinite. Consequently, the infinity of the face is intimately connected to transcendence and reveals the central concepts of Levinas' thinking: the face. It reveals the other's freedom because the face continues to escape the ego no matter how the other is conceptualized or interpreted. Freedom is, hence, revealed through the experience of the other's face and freedom depends upon social relation.

By claiming that freedom is inherently social, Levinas grounds freedom in the ethical relation and so disrupts freedom's previously privileged status, but also departs from a long heritage that locates freedom in egoistic terms; that is, an agent who chooses for himself what he will do.[649] Hence, freedom depends not on the ego's ratification of its wishes, but on acting from

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[645]E. Wyschogrod, "Preface to the Second Edition."*Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics*. Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. xi.

[646]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit.,* p 86.

[647]*Ibidem*, p. 77.

[648]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.,* pp 75-85.

[649]E. Levinas, "Substitution", in Peperzak, A., Critchley, S. & Bernasconi, R. (Eds.) *Emmanuel Levinas. Basic philosophical writings.* Indiana University Press, 1996, pp. 79-96.

the perspective of the other as the Other tries to fulfill his wishes. The transcendence of the other's face brings the individual to recognize the strangeness of the other, a strangeness that reveals the experience of the face's transcendence: the other's irreducible alterity.

Levinas gives a concise account of transcendence expressed in the face of the Other in the ethical relation. In his view, it is only the face, the radical alterity, which can bring the self out of its self-centeredness by putting its freedom into question as a specific appeal.[650] For Levinas, the other's face entails not hostility but hospitality. The face of the Other before me does not remain silent. It speaks, and when it does, my being is interrupted by the Other: *"The face looks at me and calls to me... not to leave it alone."*[651]Levinas opines that it is the face that welcomes the individual, but the individual who experiences the other's face as an infinite sense of responsibility for the other. Hence, the Other issues a call, a command, a demand through which he is bought to a sense of responsibility for the other which issues primarily from the other's vulnerability before him, a vulnerability that spontaneously issues the authoritative command: "*Thou shalt not kill'*"[652]which emanates from that same weakness and a discourse whose first expression is an obligation.[653]

However, we see that the face cannot be reduced to its physical manifestation in objective form, but entails a prior pre-physical "extra-ordinary" signification. The face brings the first signification.[654] The whole description of the ethical above can be summed up in the idea of the face of the Other in which such transcendence is expressed. The idea of the Other is expressed as Transcendence in Levinas' thought. Etymologically it means going beyond. The term is often closely associated with the Divine, but it is also used to designate the ability of human beings to escape from their natural preoccupation with themselves, which is usually called *"self-transcendence.'*"[655]

Furthermore, In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas explicates this notion as a metaphysical movement that cannot be reduced to *"a simple presence of self to self.'*"[656]The encounter with the face is metaphysical relation with the exterior being. *The exterior being is extremely distant from my own reality, without such a distance destroying the relation and without the relation destroying*

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[650]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 181, 197.

[651] E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, op. cit.*, p 127.

[652]E. Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, trans. M. B. Smith, Colombia University Press, 1999, p. 104.

[653]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 201.

[654]*Ibidem*, p. 207.

[655]M. Westphal, *Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the Soul*, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 2.

[656]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 33.

*the distance, that could happen with relations within the same."*[657] Because the Other is strange and cannot be thematized. It is a relation without relation in that it connects me with the reality without either my subjecting it to my power or my subjection to it.[658]

Subsequently, the face cannot be reduced to rationality and is prior to every question. But is prior to every conceptual signification in which, the face grounds all human existence. Here, Levinas is not stating that ethics precedes metaphysics, ontology or any branch of philosophy. He is claiming that it describes the transcendental conditions of any form of thinking. Transcendence is a significant focus of *totality and infinity* coming to pass in the face to face relationship. The idea of freedom becomes the ontological condition of ethics. Ethics, therefore, is grounded on experience that cannot be integrated into the logics of prediction, manipulation and control. Ethics precedes ontology and the social is beyond ontology.

More so, to Levinas, the experience of the face brings the individual to experience a sense of profound and infinite responsibility for the other. Levinas argues that the real encounter with the Other can only take place beyond the physical appearance of the face that we come across every day. The basis revolves on the family which is an institution common to all of humanity. Responsibility becomes the affective moment and immediate experience of transcendence and fraternity, the consciousness of the self and the consciousness of the other. As we know, responsibility is an event that repeats, it even increases as it repeats, according to the logic of expanding significance. This encounter with the Other is observed in the Asymmetrical relation between the I and the Other.

### 7.2.2 The asymmetrical relation between the I and the Other

The asymmetrical relation between the I and the Other commences with the transcendental movement of the I towards the Other, which is the ethical; it involves the act of crossing-over, but also that of ascending and does not take place on a leveling ground or horizontal plane. In such a relation according to Levinas, the "I" does not put itself into question, but is rather constantly being questioned by the Other and called to respond. The call and appeal from the Other thus come openly from an "elevation" and a "height." What, underlines here, is that one must defend the rights of the other person as an individual, and not primarily those of the "I" itself showing the

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[657]*Ibidem*, p. 41.
[658]*Ibidem*, p. 80.

asymmetry. This is only possible when one takes the Other as one's only point of departure and when this occurs from a height. From this height, the face of the Other summons me to my obligations and judges me.[659] That is it calls me to respond. The Face of the Other calls one to responsibility and that is why the event of the ethical occurs precisely when the Other challenges the I and puts it into question in its existence as a being for itself.

The I thus disengage itself from the relationship but does so within a being absolutely separated revealing what Levinas calls the "asymmetrical" relation between the I and the Other. This shows a non-equitable balance with a difference in position between the latter and the former invests in *"After you, sir!"[660]*The I is constantly been questioned by the Other to respond and does not put itself in question. It is, hence, this asymmetrical relation between the I and the Other that enhances and constitutes Levinas' account of responsibility for the Other. Thus, the ethical relation does not arise in reference to the universality of laws but recognizes that everybody is quite different from one another.

According to Levinas, the essence of humanity in an ethical relation is found in the face of the Other that is infinite. The Face of the Other, in its transcendence and exteriority, becomes *"The living refutation of the pretension of the social totality, the economic and administrative structure"[661]*that claims to be self-sufficient. However, Levinas centralized his notion of responsibility on the uniqueness of the other person as an individual.[662]This uniqueness is not based on the different attributes that this person has, or on the fact that the person comes from a different ethnic or religious background.

Instead, "the Other is different because of me. He is unique and in some manner different than the individual belonging to a genus. It is not a difference which makes alterity: alterity makes difference."[663]That is to say, what makes the Other other is basically the very fact that it is an Other. Furthermore, in *Transcendence and Height,* Levinas suggests that the uniqueness of every human being lies in the fact that he or she is an I.[664] For him, transcendence is only possible when

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[659]*Ibidem*, p. 89.
[660]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 215.
[661]E. Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, *op cit.,* p Xxii.
[662]E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, op. cit.,* p 114.
[663]E. Levinas, "The Vocation of the Other," *Is It Righteous To Be: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*, ed. Jill Robbins. Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 106.
[664] E. Levinas*, Basic Philosophical Writings*, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 29.

the I and the Other, as another I, are *"absolutely different, without this differs depending on some quality."⁶⁶⁵*

More so, transcendence opens up the asymmetrical and calls for responsibility towards the Other, as the first fundamental structure or form of the ethical relation, which is to be exercised on a one-to-one basis without any appeal to reciprocity: *"The intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. This simply means one is responsible for the Other without reciprocity. Reciprocity is his affair."⁶⁶⁶*For many of us, this position may be counter-intuitive because we are so used to dealing with a universal law of ethics that is often summed up in the saying, *"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."* Levinas insists that transcendence is only possible when one appeals not to the universal rule but to the call of the Other. This call for the Other demands justice which according to Levinas, justice must be founded upon a one-to-one and asymmetrical relation between the I and the Other. This relationship between the subject and the other, this structural difference of my fundamental non-indifference between them, is called asymmetry.

Asymmetry is the ethical core of a two-person sociality, here there is neither reciprocity nor measure.⁶⁶⁷ The other and I are never in interchangeable positions and my role can never be transferred. The life of the other is more important than mine, and the hunger of the other is more important than mine. His material needs would be my spiritual needs. Neither moral euphoria, since this act is not voluntary, nor expectations of reciprocity are appropriate here. If it was mine, the substitution would only be a moment of the exchange and would lose its gratuity. My business is my responsibility and my substitution inscribed in my-self, inscribed as me.

The other can replace whoever he wants, except me. […] If, instead of substituting myself for another, I expect another to substitute for me, which would be of dubious morality, but, moreover, it would destroy all transcendence."⁶⁶⁸Thus ethics as primary philosophy would ultimately be ruined.⁶⁶⁹ The relationship with others is not limited solely to the relationship with others. The Other poses before us, there are many of us in the world, and also, "the men around

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⁶⁶⁵*Ibidem*, p. 27.
⁶⁶⁶E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit.,* p. 98.
⁶⁶⁷E. Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme*, Le Livre de Poche, « coll ». Biblio, 2000, pp. 104-105.
⁶⁶⁸E. Levinas, *De Dieu qui vient à l'idée*, Vrin, 2004, p. 148.
⁶⁶⁹J. Butler, *Vie précaire : Les pouvoirs du deuil et de la violence après le 11 septembre 2001*, trad. Jérôme Rosanvallon et Jérôme Vidal, Éditions Amsterdam, 2005, p. 73.

me are many".[670] First, the third next to the other is approached, and generally, the other men are referred to as the third. In fact, the third party was not waiting. He appealed to me from the epiphany of the face in the face-to-face. "It is as if the uniqueness of the face were, in its absolute and irrefutable singularity, a priori plural."[671]The relationship between the other and the third cannot be indifferent to me who approaches. The relationship that I establish with the other, I cannot exempt myself from applying it to the third party.Without such a foundation, justice may simply be another form of covert totalization. This usher in what he calls the "third party."[672]

### 7.2.3 The Third *(Le Tiers)* and the search for justice

Levinas clearly does not confine his notion of responsibility, simply to the intimate relation between the I and the Other, but extend it; opens it. Everything that takes place between the I and the Other concerns everyone. According to Levinas, the third points to the fact that the Subject and the Other cannot form a totality as the Subject has to deal not only with its neighbour (Other) but also with the Other who exists beside the neighbour. This implies that, the "I" is in a relationship with a human totality" but not a totality of a unity. He addresses the question of social justice, by introducing the notion of *the third party* to suggest the presence of the *other* Other and in addressing the issue of justice for them.[673]Levinas affirms: "*But we are never, me and the other, alone in the world."[674]*Implying there is always a third: the men who surround me. This third is also my neighbour.

The appearance of the third, indicates the ego obligation and respond to more than one Other. It must decide who to respond to first. This decision leads the ego from the ethical realm to the realm of politics. However, the third does not replace the original ethical relationship but rather, universalizes the anarchical relationship with the Other in the political realm. Levinas makes us understand the value of the world that exists outside us with the I and the Other. To him the *face qua face* relation opens to the humanity between the I and the individual Other. Thus Levinas addresses the issue of justice with the moderation made to the particular Other:

> The presence of third party gazes at me in the eyes of the Other a language which is justice […]
> the locus of the epiphany of the face qua face opens to humanity. The face in its nudity
> (nakedness) as a face grants to me the poverty (destitution) of the stranger, the poor one and; but

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[670]E. Levinas, « Violence du visage », in *Altérité et transcendance*, Le Livre de Poche, coll. «biblio», 2010, p. 172.
[671]J. Derrida, *Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas*, Galilée, 1997, p. 190.
[672]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.*, p 213.
[673]*Ibidem*, p. 114.
[674]E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, op. cit.,* p 116.

such exile and poverty appeal to my powers, address me, do not deliver themselves over to these powers as givens, and remain the expression of the face. The poor one, stranger, presents himself as an equal. The equality within this vital poverty contains in denoting to the third party, which present at the encounter, in whom destitution the Other already (obliges) serves.[675]

Levinas makes us understand that the relation between the I and the third party does not occur after its relation with the Other, but it all happens contemporaneously and simultaneously with the third party present in the Other. The presence of a third party would necessarily be felt in society, thus establishing justice. For justice requires universality, the expression of responsibility for both the Other and the third party, as demanded by the face. Levinas conceives this as the ethical relation which seeks for, and reaches out to those who have been marginalized, to whom injustice has been done. The presence of the third party already draws the plot that binds me both to the other and to the third party.

In other words, I must already think about how my responsibility can extend to third parties, even to the community of all men because, through the third party, the reference to multiplicity and the transition to multiplicity do not limit the presence of the third party to a single person. I deal with a multitude of people, and therefore I have to take into account the relationships between people and all the contexts. For Levinas, "the face-to-face is ethical."[676]And, ethics expresses the infinite responsibility of one for another one in the relationship of two ones.

So ethics are asymmetrical. My responsibility is, face-to-face, without limit towards the other. But the entry on the scene of the third party makes this ethical relationship dual, paradoxical. Ethics according to Levinas applies well to the type of duality without reciprocity or inversion or interchangeability. We must do justice to live in a world of citizens with the third party. "The concern for justice […] is the spirit in society"[677]Society functions according to a rational order which tends towards a system of relations capable of exchange, insofar as they are reversible, symmetrical and commensurable.

In the perspective that Levinas followed, the state also proceeds from the responsibility of one for the other. And liability is precisely a bond without a contract. "From ethical inequality and from what we have called asymmetry of the intersubjective space-to "equality between people", would come from the political order of citizens in a State. The birth of the State from the ethical order would be intelligible insofar as I also have to answer for the third party "next to" my

[675]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 213.
[676]G. Bensussan, *Éthique et expérience : Levinas politique*, Strasbourg, La Phocide, 2008, p. 64.
[677]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit*., p 249.

neighbour. But who is next to whom? The immediacy of my relationship to my neighbor is modified by the need to compare men with each other and to judge them.[678] The state can begin to function according to the laws of being. It is the responsibility for others that measures the legitimacy of the State, that is to say its justice. I can cede my responsibility in the state that makes justice possible. However, what founds this demand for justice, what obliges me to seek justice, is the fact that I am responsible for the other man".[679] Even if justice is constituted in a limitation of proximity, ethics does not disappear in justice.

The category of ethics where placed under the generality of laws, men retain the sense of their responsibility, that is to say their uniqueness of elected to respond."[680] The justice resulting from an initial kindness must trace the path approaching the other who suffers without contradicting its rigorous verdict. For this, Levinas took the authority of a Talmudic apologue where the rabbis comment on two contradictory passages from the Torah. In one, God "turns not his face"[681]and in the other, he "turns his face."[682]  When the verdict of justice is pronounced in the generality of the laws, even if it is everyone's part, there remains, for "the human uniqueness in each of the citizens united as a nation"[683], the possibility of finding something more who attenuates the verdict, who hears the personal appeal. It is charity for the other man that can put the other man's existence ahead of mine.

Justice is the way I respond to the face that I am not alone in the world with the other"[684]. Thereby, if there is justice for me, if my salvation has a meaning, "it is still from my responsibility".[685] To an extent, does not ethical responsibility risk degenerating in social justice, in any social relationship? If it is necessary to moderate the privilege of the other in justice, is not that the asymmetry is removed? Despite this worry, Levinas brushes it off "All human relations as human proceed from disinterestedness." Forgetting oneself moves Justice transcends justice in my responsibility for the other, in my inequality in relation to the one whose hostage I am".[686] The

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[678] E. Levinas, *Hors sujet,* Le Livre de Poche, coll. «Biblio», 1997, p. 62

[679]F. Poirié, *Emmanuel Levinas : Essai et Entretiens,*  Arles, Actes Sud, 2006(2ème édition), p. 138.

[680]G. Petitdemange et Jacques Rolland, *Autrement que savoir : Emmanuel Levinas,* Osiris, 1988, p. 62.

[681] Deuteronomy, 1:17.

[682] Numbers, 6: 25.

[683]E. Levinas, *On Thinking-of-the-Other*. *Entre nous* (trans: Smith, Michael B. and Harshav, Barbara). Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 239.

[684]E. Levinas *et al*., « Le paradoxe de la moralité : Un entretien avec Emmanuel Levinas », in *Philosophie* n°112, 2011, p. 17.

[685]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit.,* p. 250.

[686]*Ibidem*, p. 246.

third calls for justice from the epiphany of the face in the face-to-face. Its sudden emergence somehow interrupts my ethical responsibility for the benefit of the uniqueness of the other because I pass from a term irreducible to the relation to a term reducible to the relation. The experience of the third party is from the first moment inescapable and inescapable in the face; even if it interrupts the face-to-face, it also belongs to him."[687]

The presence of the third party, is the limit of responsibility, the freedom of the question."[688] In the responsibility for the other, I replace myself, sacrifice myself to the first comer who will pair up with me. There is no *ipseity* common to me and to the other. In other words, there is no relationship where I would be the other's other, where the other would be another me. Therefore, I am unique and I am elected as the subject of a privilege of indeclinable responsibility. The other overwhelms me in increasingly close proximity, obsesses me in proximity, never too close and the substitution of one for the other does not mean the substitution of the other for one"[689].

In a shot up, the presence of the third party reveals itself in the face of the Other, what becomes the foundation of "human fraternity." This human fraternity stems from society and involves a double structure that embraces both the unequal and the equal, the asymmetrical and symmetrical, that is the Other and the third party. Such human fraternity, according to Levinas, is to be attained through the mediation of political institutions.[690] The mediation of these political institutions favours the social relation that arises from the face of the Other, and which includes both the proximate and distant Other *which the face is looked at."[691]*

The concern for the other Others already takes place in the immediate concern of the particular Other: *"The others immediately concern me. My relationship with the Other as neighbour gives meaning to my relations with all the others."[692]* The face of the Others opens up proximity and social relation with the other Others as a responsibility for the Other. However, the face simultaneously shows the third party (ies) in the face-to-face. It is a moment which conditions the laws and establishes justice. This is the introduction of the universal dimension. Moreover, the

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[687]J. Derrida, *Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas*, *op. cit.,* p 190.
[688] E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit.,* p 245.
[689]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit*., p 246.
[690]E. Levinas' political view can be gleaned from his numerous essays on the state of Israel, Zionism, the philosophy of Hitler, etc. See *LR*, 235 ff.; *Unforeseen History*, trans. Nidra Poller. University of Illinois Press, 2006.
[691]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit.,* p 158.
[692]*Ibidem*, p. 159.

responsibility as in a most private, intimate relationship is not tempered. Rather, the subject deploys this responsibility for all others, that is, for all of humanity. This is inherently the necessary condition and possibility for justice[693] in the global society.

## 7.3 SENSIBILITY AND THE RESPONSIBLE SUBJECT

According to Levinas, the ethical subject is a sensible being who feels so responsible for the Other that he or she becomes, a hostage of the Other. Levinas approaches human subjectivity by way of sensibility. Human subjectivity animates sensibility and exposure the Other to responsibility. The calling into question of the I and its freedom by the Other is in an asymmetrical relation. In its encounter with the Other, the I finds its calling to take care of and be responsible for the Other's vulnerability and material needs.

### 7.3.1 Sensibility as the basis for human subjectivity

The ethical, is concerned with the questioning of my enjoyment and freedom by the Other, in which, the I as a subject assumes to be questionable in the encounter with the Other. According to Levinas, the I is a subject that is capable of sensing, feeling and responding. The putting into question my freedom is to welcome the Other. The "I" here is not only a subject that seeks for a middle ground encounter between two extremes in order to acquire virtue. It is neither that which, attempts at universalizing its maxim for a justifiable ethical decision.

Implying the ethical relation for Levinas is not an act of reasoning, neither is at the level of consciousness, rather it occurs purely at the level of sensibility. Levinas demarcates himself from the Husserlian conception of the human subject and the rational approach to intentionality that seems to equate "to sense" with "to represent."[694] Levinas says one needs to take into due consideration or account, "an intention which is irreducible to a purely theoretical representation."[695]Levinas does sense our world not only in the sense of an object of theoretical contemplation, but rather in *"a sensed or wanted the world, a world of action, beauty, ugliness, and meanness,"[696]* related to the affective life of the Other.

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[693]*Ibidem*, p. 158.
[694] *Ibidem*, p. 160.
[695]*Ibidem*, p. 58.
[696]E. Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, second edition, North western University Press, 1998, p. 45.

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Levinas ethical philosophy conceives life as concrete and hinges on the interpretation of being and the essence of being. This interpretation of lived immediacy is factical experience and interpretation. It is signification which has its beginning in transcendence. Transcendence is the inter-subjective quality of sensibility and affectivity. Levinas seeks the factical and moral depth in his ethical philosophy. He reminds us that interpreting the fact that essence exposes being and being is exposed through transcendence. Levinas radical reduction aims at the affective meaning of the ethical interruption of being and consciousness.

Life is life despite life. Levinas' first philosophy is neither traditional logic nor metaphysics; however, it is an interpretive, phenomenological description of the rise and repetition of an inter-subjective (inter personal) in the face to face relation. Levinas proposes phenomenological description and a hermeneutics of lived experience in the world of social interaction and language. Dialogue arises through that response. Herein lie the roots of inter subjectivity as lived immediacy. Moreover, Levinas is exploring the meaning of inter subjectivity and lived immediacy in the light of three themes: transcendence, existence and the human other. The fundamental intuition of responsibility is transcendence and par excellence a temporal dimension specific to human experience as the basis of sensibility.

Sensibility allows the human subject to feel the appeal of the face of the Other and to respond to its demand. Critchley *puts it, "is lived in the sensibility of a corporeal obligation to the other."* [697] Levinas' conception of subjectivity is oriented toward a living subject rather than simply a conscious subject that is a surplus of social relation, where subjectivity remains in the face,[698] in the straightforwardness of its welcome and is not measured by the truth. Subjectivity, according to Levinas, is a subjection to the Other who demands a response prior to my freedom and reason. Preceding any theoretical construct, the encounter with the Other is situated in ethics, whereby any thoughts or intentions concerning the Other arise only by virtue of having already welcomed the Other.

Levinas affirms in *Totality and Infinity* that: we live a life of enjoyment, "living from… air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc."[699] He further states in, *Otherwise than Being: "such imminence (proximity) of the sensible is not reducible to the gnoseological role presumed by*

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[697]S. Critchley, "Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity," in *Deconstructive Subjectivities*, eds. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 30.
[698]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 221.
[699]*Ibidem*, p. 222.

*sensation in the exposure to upsetting in enjoyment, but it enables the wound to reach the subjectivity of the subject as a complacent in itself and by the subject positing itself for itself."*[700] Sensibility therefore for Levinas is the basis for subjectivity and the human subject as such makes possible the responsibility it carries for the Other. This shows that, instead of a conscious and thinking subject that often characterizes the modern conception of human subjectivity. Levinas offers us a sensible and feeling subject in which, human subjectivity is manifested in the election of the subject by the Good to be a responsible subject for the Other. Levinas' responsibility is educable sensibility. In this sensibility, the I become Hostage of the Other.

### 7.3.2 The responsible subject: the Self as the Hostage of the Other

We are in relation with the Other inasmuch as we encounter the face. It ascribes a signification by the relation it makes possible despite our negligence; a sensible subject is eager to be in touch with the general other, it is open to the other. In this, transcendence cuts across sensibility, the face's revelation is speech, with an influence of relationality; the subject realizes its loss of complete freedom to constitute the object, as it finds itself already affected by the Other. The subject turns from its function in terms of being and non-being, into signification. The relation with the Other in sensibility alone introduces a dimension of transcendence. This dimension leads us to a relation totally different from the experience in the sensible sense which is relative and egoist.[701] Sensibility opens the mode of enjoyment. Sensibility is not an order of thought but more to that of sentiment; the affectivity in which the egoism of the I pulses (pulsates).

The sensible life is lived as enjoyment with the recognition that enjoyment is endowed with dynamism other than that of perception evinced in the contentment of enjoyment. This is what Levinas calls in *Otherwise than Being* "the break-up of identity."[702] Here the identity of the subject comes from the impossibility of escaping responsibility, from the taking charge of the other. The subject which I am, cannot be generalized; it is not a subject in general. The subject's incapability to register its own constitution suggests apparently a surpassing of its intended consciousness which is *alienating to my identity."*[703] Finding out what this "something" is has become for Levinas part of his exposition of human subjectivity. As such, the subjectivity of the subject

[700]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit*., p 64.
[701]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p. 193.
[702]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit.,* p. 14.
[703]E. Levinas, *Humanism of the Other*, trans. NidraPoller, intro. Richard A. Cohen. University of Illinois Press, 2006, p. 62.

slipped and surpassed its constituting freedom that alienates the identity of the subject. The responsible subject further expressed as subjectivity becomes the Other in the same.

Levinas sees human subjectivity to be structured as the Other in the Same, in which its structure is precisely aided by sensibility. Sensibility, to him, is *"maternity, the gestation of the other in the same,"*[704] The subject is bearing the Other within itself, so to speak. This structure of subjectivity enters the ethical and becomes one for the Other: with the subject opening to the Other within itself; it is for the Other.[705] In fact, for Levinas, it serves as the basis for the ethical relation with the Other. Thus when the subject opens itself to the Other, it is giving itself to the Other. The structure of one for the other that characterizes the human psyche, according to Levinas, is:

> *...the being-for-another in passivity, which makes it possible only in the form of giving the very bread I eat. But to give oneself in giving it has to first enjoy one's bread, and not in the order to have the worth of giving it, but in an order to give it with one's heart and oneself. Enjoyment is an ineluctable moment of sensibility.*[706]

The conjuncture in which a man is responsible for other men, the ethical relationship, which is habitually considered as belonging to a derivative or founded order has been throughout this work approached as irreducible. It is structured as the one for the other. The responsibility for the Other characterizes the human person as such without placing him or her in a particular social category. It is *the original place of identification.*[707] Responsibility for the Other is thus, for Levinas not simply an attribute of subjectivity, but rather the very structure that defines it as such.

The condition of being hostage is not chosen; if there had been a choice, the subject would have kept his as for me. The question here is not whether the subject is to assume or to escape responsibility because there is no such choice. *"Before the Other, the I is infinitely responsible. The Other is the poor and destitute one, and nothing which concerns this stranger can leave the I indifferent."*[708] Thus a human person is unique, and uniqueness lies in "the very fact of bearing the fault of another."[709]

Responsibility goes beyond being. In it therefore, the *cogito* has no *cogitatum*. It continues to respond in obedience to the "unknown." A more radical manner of describing the "responsible

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[704]*Ibidem*, p. 75.
[705] E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit.*, p 25.
[706]*Ibidem*, p. 72.
[707]E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, op. cit.,* p 110.
[708]E. Levinas, "*Transcendence and Height*," *Basic Philosophical Writings*, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 18.
[709]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit*., p 112.

Subject" was when Levinas introduced the notion of "substitution". To *be* a Subject is to *be* for the Other. The *Ipseity*, is in the passivity without *arche* characteristics of identity, is a hostage. For Levinas, the movement of recurrence itself is *"but an 'undoing' of unity,"*[710]which renders intentional consciousness powerless and helpless. Beyond the reach of consciousness, human subjectivity is *"responsibility before being intentionality."*[711]In intentionality, the subjectivity plays itself out as the *ego* that constitutes the object in representation. For Levinas, to be responsible for the Other is precisely what it means to be concretely challenged and put into question by the face of the Other.

The face calls me out to the Other's exterior in the form of responsibility taking the form of substitution. Substitution for the Other originally defines human subjectivity in Levinas' philosophy. Sensibility and substitution*,* for the Other is the subject responsibility and expiation.*"*[712]In contrast, in the subjectivity identified as responsibility for the Other, the subject displays its utmost passivity in being affected and even wounded by the Other. The subject cannot but take the place of the Other, precisely because it assumes the very kind of subjectivity.[713] It finds itself consumed by the Other, ready to suffer and sacrifice itself for the Other.

Put in another way, substituting myself for the Other is my way of being responsible, and there is no other way. Again, it is to be done without any expectation that the Other would do the same to me. It requires an ingratitude of the Other because gratitude would mean *"there turn of the movement to its origin."*[714]I can thus only concern myself with my responsibility and substitution for the Other without any worry about whether or not the Other would ever return the favour:

> *What the other can actually do for me is his personal affair. If it were mine, then substitution would only be a moment of the exchange and would lose its gratuity. My affair is my responsibility, and my substitution is inscribed in my I, inscribed as I. The other in this sense can substitute himself for whomever he desire (will), or except me.*[715]

The issue here is Levinas' emphasis on sacrifice for the Other. His responsibility for the Other must not be reciprocated. It is not his concern whether the Other reciprocates his services. For his very

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[710]*Ibidem*, p. 108.
[711]E. Levinas*, Humanism of the Other*, *op cit*., p 52.
[712]*Ibidem*, p. 64.
[713]Cf. F. Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, trans. Constance Garnett (New American Library, 1957), p. 264, quoted by Levinas in *Ethics and Infinity*, p. 98.
[714]E. Levinas, *"The Trace of the Other," Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy,* here after DC, ed. Mark C. Taylor, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 349.
[715]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 66.

role is to be infinitely responsible for the Other. Nonetheless, this structure, according to Levinas, is different from that of consciousness because it is already in place before the Other appears to consciousness in a perception of a corporeal presence. It is rather defined by *"the restlessness of the Same disturbed by the Other,"[716]* as a sensible being, the subject clearly experiences more than what is yielded from the intentional grasp of consciousness. Levinas speaks of human sociality which conceives of the social relation on the model of fusion. Levinas therefore, cast suspicion on Heidegger's notion that *Dasein* is always already *Mitsein* from the outset, and human beings find itself amongst others in an inherently social world. In contrast, Levinas even claims in *Time and the Other*, there is no subject outside it socio-historical context. As such, his rethinking of inter-subjectivity requires a self-outside of community yet in relation with a radically Other.

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[716]*Ibidem*

# Partial Conclusion

The central issue explored in the course of this chapter reflection is Levinas' notion of responsibility.We talked of the history of the face, Levinasian challenge to Western Philosophy as ontology, and the fact that we are duped by morality, as the First and Second World War is an evidence of the failure of western morality. This critique of western philosophy is based on the centrality of the Other who interrupts the I, thus marks the beginning of responsibility. Levinas further constructs the concept of the Face of the Other as the significance of Transcendence; that is, as a mark of responsibility since the Other is received from an elevated position. The notion of Transcendence, which is a movement towards the Other who is the Most-High[717] and the face of the Other which is imperative to avoid the act of murder on the Other. Also, the I that disengages itself from the relationship but does so within a relationship with a being absolutely separated with a gap and marked discontinuity revealing what Levinas calls the "asymmetrical" relation between the I and the Other. Levinas also attempted to neutralize his notion of "infinite responsibility" by introducing the notion of Third and the Search for Justice, which centres on the maintenance of justice and moderation to regulate the asymmetrical relation. Furthermore, Levinas' view on sensibility and the responsible Subject has to do with Sensibility as the foundation for responsibility and Subjectivity as a substitution for the Other which is responsibility. This is a call for self-sacrifice. It as well, implies Levinas' subjectivity and Alterity takes part in a multi-personal collectivity which does not take the form of a traditional community. But, is Levinas' radical alterity a figure, face, totality, infinity or human singularity?. When dealing with transcendence (beyond totality) it transcend to infinity that is supreme transcendence which is not a reduction. However, this reflection on the Levinasian critique of Western Philosophy will take us to our next task of reflection.

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[717]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 34.

## CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ETHICAL-METAPHYSICS DIMENSION OF LEVINAS' APPROACH AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OTHER IN FACE OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF HUMANITY

**Partial Introduction**

Anyone observing the world since the Enlightenment era and through Western lens has become used to thinking of responsibility as the extension of the synonym for freedom and autonomy. Our focus at this juncture is to study the Levinasian response to the global crisis of humanity as an approach for the Other. A response is essentially a reaction to a question experience or stimulus. The question experience is that of the global crisis of humanity. Central to Levinas' response in the present global crisis of humanity, is responsibility for the Other that is, made manifest in the face of the Other. The face, according to Levinas, opens the existential ethical encounter and human responsibility for the Other. The Levinasian response in the global milieu would give priority to the face of the Other in the ethical relation. With regards to the face, Levinas' responsibility begins with welcoming the Face of the Other who carries the imperative *"thou shall not kill,"* which defines being human as concern for others.[718] The face-to-face according to Levinas means that, ethically, people are responsible for one another in the face-to-face encounter. The face of the Other constitutes three fundamental concepts: responsibility, alterity and intersubjectivity. Levinas uses an ethical-metaphysical approach in the face-to-face encounter as a response to the humanitarian crisis in the global society. Levinas sees a philosophical trap in attempts to elevate responsibility to a moral duty, a sort of categorical imperative that the global society must simply uphold. Levinas cautions against relying on consciousness in the ethical encounter. He criticizes all sorts of violence done to the Other in the socio-political and economic sphere, especially in this contemporary era where human reasoning is basically linked to machines. Levinasian responsibility is rooted in humanness, respect for human dignity, and love for the Other in society. Responsibility for the Other can be as ethically desirable as maintaining social justice. The Levinasian responsibility could further response to the crisis of humanity in the global society upholding social existence in society. Levinas is a springboard to the challenges we face today.

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[718]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit*., p 25.

## 8.1 LEVINAS' EXTERIORITY APPROACH AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OTHER

The Other is the exteriority; the exterior conscience which otherness is located in ethics, "the putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the other." It is an exterior "me" which is not reduced to "I" as "me", the same. It is that calls into question our responsibility. The Other is the central issue in Western philosophy, Levinas places ethics first philosophy by putting responsibility towards the Other on this basis since a human life can only be possible by realizing the Other.

### 8.1.1The Other and Otherness

Levinas uses the term Other to describe the way other people are different from us in society. That is people we keep distant away from us because we are not like them. All our theories, concepts and ideas about what to do, how to live and how to do springs forth in recognizing that we must engage with other people different from us. The Otherness of the other that Levinas thinks from the idea of infinity is never considered in a reciprocal relationship. In other words, the otherness of the Other cannot be reduced to the relation of the familiarity of interlocution between two people, me and the Other. In the otherness of the face, in the other which would be otherness itself, there is no otherness of myself like another. This implies are not responsible for me and I do not need to consider myself ass the other of others. [719] Levinas acknowledges the differences between us and others is the basis of ethics. He believes this otherness which he called alterity was something to celebrate. There is need to recognize another person as a mystery to us in the universe rather than a ground for commonality to ground our moral concern. This, therefore, challenges our ways of approaching and rethink the Other in the crisis of humanity and demands our attention and responsible for our actions. It is much easier to overlook their differences. In fact, Levinas wants us to look the other in the face in doing so, we look upon the face of someone completely different from us. By recognizing our ethical responsibility towards other really seems simple. This draw our attention of a story where someone is about to commit an act of murder until at the last minute he see the eyes of the person they ate going to kill, suddenly, they cannot do it. The explanation of these changes of heart is that, considering the other face, they realized their ethical principle of responsibilities. Such a philosophy of the Other enable us to rethink our altitude

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[719] A. Zielinski, *Levinas : La responsabilité est sans pourquoi*, *op. cit.,* p 115.

towards the real and difference in the global society. Meaning we in the global society should be willing to learn from individual; we come across no matter how much or how little of our selves we see in them.

**8.1.2 The Levinasian approach of Responsibility for the Other: As Response to the crisis of humanity in the global society**

The existentialist overcome by the horror of the alienation between I and world; wherein, the I is contained in the world, and that there really is no I, and thus the world cannot harm the I. This tension between the I and the world reappears in Prophecy and the Historical Hour with the description of another individual in crisis. This discursive expression finds in the old philosophical quarrel between in-deterministic and deterministic views of the world. Both views are therefore, irreconcilable and reconcilable in sides of the same happening, and such a philosophy does justice to the experience life which is the moment of commencement of the action that is illumined by the awareness of freedom and the moment of having acted is overshadowed by the knowledge of necessity. Man's essence is not to be found in isolated individuals, for a human being's bonds with his generation and his society are of his essence."[720] The emergence from determinism, whether philosophical, religious, psychological, begins with the recognition of a type of intentional consciousness that puts the world at the heart of the subject, and it requires that the subject always be engaged in and take responsibility for the task of creation.

Levinas regard for anarchy as positivity reflects his own dismay and distrust of socio-political structures and systems of his own respective home country. He lived under tyrannical socio-political orders of repression for the Other like in our global society. Levinas survived the anti-semitism that was endemic in his time and we can link it to the brunt of colonialism in Africa and exploitation. Levinas' philosophical sense arises from the necessity of giving a philosophical response to the experience of the people (persons) who has not died with "his own people." In the face of violence, genocide and devalorization of man, Levinas holds that a reflection on what it means to be human is unavoidable. This is highly important because, in his view, Western Humanism like African and other humanism has not known how to protect human beings against barbarism, the violence of wartime and exclusion since the colonial period. Instead, one must begin by de-centering the subject. The ethical-metaphysics approach as responsibility towards the Other

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[720]M. Buber, "What is Man?" *in Between Man and Man* (Collier Books, 1965), p. 160.

precedes therefore any philosophical discourse. It precedes our choices and freedom. Responsibility precedes before anything else. It is the very essence of our constitutive subjectivity which is the inescapable part of our being. To be is to be responsible and make one-self available for the service of the Other in such a way that one's own life is intrinsically linked with the Other's life. This means that, responsibility conveys an attitude of outward-looking. It opens an ethical dimension by connecting me to Other. Levinas' face-to-face relationships endorse a means of re-thinking the political more open to justice (the ethical before politics or law) a relation in which the alterity of the Other initiates responsibility and an obligation to care prior to the actualized formation of selfhood experience.

### 8.1.3 Levinasian responsibility to the political oppression of the Other

Although Levinas does not deny systemic and political oppressions and injustices, he is not convinced that the solution to these problems is itself systemic and political, as the political is a problem rather than a solution. Only the ethical can offer a response to the problem of the political. Further, as a problem, it does not contain its own solution, which means that the solution to this global problem must come from a domain outside of politics proper. Levinas' thesis would designate that the self's responsibility for the other is more fundamental than its liberty and decision. Both in metaphysical and real-life sense, the needs of the other take precedence over one's own. Because before the absolutely other, "I" remains powerless.[721] In his radicality, Levinas states that "ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous, but it is the original awakening of an "I" responsible for the other".[722] Levinas' sense of responsibility uncovers much radical and deeper the existential one of active commitment to self. Blanchot in contrasts to Levinas senses of responsibility state two possibilities as thus:

> Being responsible: normally qualifies-in a bourgeois, prosaic manner-a lucid, mature and conscientious man, who only acts with caution, who takes into justification all elements of a given situation, calculates and decides. The term 'responsible' qualifies the positive action of man. But rather in the philosophy of Levinas, responsibility is my responsibility for the other: for everyone without the mode of reciprocity which is displaced. It does no longer belong to consciousness nor an activating thought of process which is put into practice, nor is it even a duty that would impose itself from without or within…Responsibility which is withdraws me from my order-seems from all orders and order itself a responsibility which separates me from myself (from the very 'me' that is a mastery and power, from the speaking free subject) and discloses the other in place of me, which requires that I answer for passivity and absence.[723]

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[721]P. Marcus, *Being for the Other: Emmanuel Levinas, Ethical Living and Psychoanalysis* (Marquette University Press, 2008), p. 13.
[722]*Ibidem,* p. 20.
[723]M. Blanchot, *The writing of the disaster*. Trans by Ann Smock. University Press. 1986, p. 25.

It is this second sense of the word responsibility that concerns Levinas, and it is precisely this that we seek to discuss in this chapter. This sense of responsibility is in the second person" because it does not originate with the subject. It is rather outside of the subject. The subject put its autonomy into question in such a responsibility. Burggraeve terms this responsibility "comes as though from an unknown language which we counter to our heart and to life only speak …[for] it therefore becomes an actual incomprehensible word.[724] In responsibility the subject sacrifices his or her autonomy and agency. This is one of the problematics with Levinas. But, such is more pronounced in non-communitarian societies. "Responsibility" and the "Other" are intrinsically link together. One's own life in service of the Other is intrinsically linked with the Other's life. It links and opens an ethical dimension connecting me or one to another.

Levinas' philosophical insights have relentlessly been devoted to uncovering political violence and human oppression in society. Reviewing choices (slavery and Holocaust) made within ontology and metaphysics of dehumanization, for Levinas, morality and humanity are tested in the global society. First, violence interrupts a person's integrity and forces upon him or her choices he or she would otherwise not make. Secondly, war being the ultimate form of violence thus alleges the introduction of a "new morality" that justify its massacres (atrocities). Yet, this is contradicted because morality cannot be defined solely by ontology or epistemology and needs to account for vulnerability and passivity. It therefore recognizes that moral responsibility conjoined with vulnerability reveals deeper than the logic disseminated by war. This is confirmed by an analysis of Cain's question in Genesis, which shows that evil arises by ignoring the face of the other, by a secondary effort to displace the primacy of being for-the-other. To be responsible means to human. Humanity opens up to ethical and not otherwise an ontological calling. It appears ontological *Sorge* does not revolves in self-annihilating nor trembling before God who desire to experience everything makes one a human.[725] Ethical responsibility does not offer a trivial being in the world; it does not guarantee that its circumstances and demands will be favourable or even convenient.

The crisis of political oppression of man is responsible for humanity's underdevelopment, insecurity, radicalism and its social and structural injustices. Levinas' challenge is to rehabilitate

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[724]R. Burggraeve, "Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 30: 29-30. 1999.
[725] https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/2/185/htm

goodness in the face of insecurity (murder), to show the ethical primacy of subjectivity, which is the necessary condition for a rediscovery of justice, making it possible ever again. Considering, the political arena of human oppression of man in the global society through the politics of exclusion, Levinas' responsibility centres on an ethics of self-sacrifice. Levinasian concept of responsibility can be of help; first in the sense that, we can borrow his idea of substitution. According to Levinas, "substitution" is aptly described by the capacity to take the place of the other that is one in- the-place-of-another. The Other becomes the symbol of hope or ideal of salvation because the Other brings the possibility of time. This other opens the future; the accomplishment of time (in politics), the violation of future is not the fate of the subject alone, but, rather the node of intersubjective relationship.[726]It involves a traces of passivity, which is unlike the very concept of "self-sacrifice". If this aspect is inculcated in our way of thinking and doings things, we can welcome the Other. Welcoming the Other through responsibility would involves the politics of inclusion and not exclusion.

Through "substitution" one is set in the place of the other, where it means to be responsible even for the other's responsibility. To be responsible for the Other is to substitute self for the Other which make it hostage to the Other[727] in the ethical existence. That is, the actions of the Other have no effects on whether the Self obeys the call to be responsible to the Other or not. Therefore, Levinas opines that; "I am responsible for the other even when he or she commits a crime."[728]To him, the self being a hostage and substitute for the other is an infinite responsibility which is at odds with Heidegger's ontology or *Dasein* or *being-the-world* of "an existentiell possibilities"[729]as well as Descartes cogito.  According to Levinas, responsibility for the Other, could not be determined in the *Being* of Heidegger's ontology because *Being* as in Heidegger's ontology is subjective. The self being a hostage for the Other is not subjected to any pre-conditions as the ontology alludes to.

Responsibility that precedes essence in it, is not an accident that happens to a subject for another. In this sense, invoking the language of Abraham in the biblical book of Genesis, Levinas

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[726] E. Levinas, *Time and the Other* (Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 79.

[727]D. Arockiam Stalin. "Levinas on the Vulnerability of the Face and our Responsibility." *Divyadaan Journal of Philosophy & Education* 16, no. 1 (2005): 57-76.  pp. 68-72.

[728] E. Levinas, E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: op. cit.,* p 169.

[729] N. Zuckerman, Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*. Vol 53, Is 4. Dec. 2015. p. 493.

argues that "the word I means "here I am", answering for everything and for everyone." This answering in time would appear not as a permanent position, but rather as a dialectical turning-point-a passage through own-ness towards levels of otherness. Time and politics approaches man's to the absolutely other or God, as well diachronic relation which is irreducible to correlation. 'Going towards God is not to be understood here in the classical ontological sense of a return to, or unification with, God as the beginning or end of temporal existence. Rather, going towards God is meaningless unless seen in terms of my primary going towards the other person. One can only approaches God by being ethically concerned for the other person.

The prophetic faith invites the real working power of the dialogical relationship between divinity and mankind, within which compassion can answer man's turning of his whole being back to God. The religious-not intentionality-is this practical diachronous responsibility in relation to the Other. The sequential global community' is predicated on an interrelationship that is anything but solipsistic or reductive. In fact, the entry into 'world time' is dependent on an encounter with another in the political sphere. Time and the Other is repeated in Face to Face with Levinas: Time and the Other presents time not as the ontological horizon of the being of a being [Heidegger] but as the mode of the beyond being, as the relationship of "thought" to the other, and-through the diverse figures of the sociality facing the face of the other person: eroticism, paternity, responsibility for the neighbour-as the relationship to the Wholly other, the Transcendent, the Infinite.[730] Positively, through Levinasian responsibility, it could ameliorate the need to form political and predisposed democratic men. Its exigent alterity; integration and inclusion, pacific socialization[731] of the Other in society.

In this sense, global Leaders would need to realize that their legitimacy comes from the people, who they should serve, and not the gun. The politics of inclusion should be at the heart of its political agenda. Urgently needed, is responsibility for the Other and the practicing of legitimate political power through democratic processes and not fraudulent electoral processes. The Levinasian responsibility in the face of the Other can be used as a means to the politic of "alternance" in power against autocratic form of governance. For alternance to be effective in the global society, political actors both in ruling and opposition party must transcend their egoistic

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[730] E. Levinas, *Time and the Other, op. cit.,* p 31.
[731]F. S. kizito, Le vivre-ensemble en Afrique aujourd'hui, in F. kizito (dir), Hannah Arendt et les conditions du vivre-ensemble, *Resistance, reconnaissance et réhabilitation politique*, Press de l'UCAC, 2017, p. 51.

interest[732] to be at the service of the Other. That is, the Other is seen as a saviour. Through Levinas' responsibility and approach for the Other, the constitutional provision on the presidential term limit must never be altered without people's consent through a referendum.[733]

The respect for the rule of law and the separation of power between the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive must be fundamentally implemented into leadership. The face of the Other in Levinas' spirit invites political actors to alternate in power. This simply means the Other who comes from a dimension of height can replace the ruling party. The Other, in Levinas' view is not an enemy. The Other is there to propose his ideas or opinion for the smooth functioning of the State. The Other is from the opposition party. Thus, responsibility for Levinas is found in the moralized face of the Other. Responsibility in the face of the Other, according to Levinas terms, reveals a sense of duty re-educating people in the global society that the other has a central place in every human action. The Other is not a means to an end but an end in itself.

In the same line, the global society needs to inculcate the values of democracy and democratic practices that empower citizens to 'choose their government and influence its policies' and to guard against 'sectarianism and opportunism.' Democracy through the Levinasian responsibility for the Other, can embark on a system suitable for healing political divisions, as it facilitates transition from dictatorship to democracy and helps nations rebuild after civil wars. Indeed, the Western form of democracy would enhance new values to sustain global political ideologies. Levinasian Responsibility, however, could be used at the core of global values and every person's contribution. Similarly as stated by the United Nations; 'Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his [or her] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives …the people will are therefore the basis of government authority (United Nations 1948:#21). This means their wills cannot prevail dictators in the midst of dictators. Above all, through Levinas' responsibility, it would be crucial to establish a ministry of peace and social justice to deal with issues of peace building, national security, reconciliation and social justice. The United Nations asserts that 'respect for and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions' (United Nations 2012:§2).

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[732]*Ibidem*, p. 85.
[733]Abdul-Raheem, *et al.,* Tajudeen, Olukoshi, Speaking truth to power: Selected Pan-African postcards. CapeTown/Oxford, Pambazuka Press, 2010.

When I encounter the other in the political, I encounter the transcendence. This transcendence is not necessarily God, it is the Other who infuses or inspires my proper condition of existence, where am called to live what he terms alterity. The face of the Other is an invitation against insecurity. This invitation is not universal but a personal responsibility. This face invites to my response. To face the Other means to be human; that is, taking responsibility for the Other what is beyond my Being. Concerning insecurity, if the global society and precisely is not evolving the reason is simply because the miseries of human beings have no effects, the suffering of man signifies nothing to the government. The conscience of our leaders in government has been anaesthetized. The face according to Levinas cries for help and oblige me to responsibility. It is the face of persons who suffered from injustice. The Levinasian responsibility could be used to overcome injustice in global society, where, man and government officials need an interpersonal relationship of intersubjectivity, a constituent element to one's substitution for the Other.

Based on the interpersonal relationships in the global society, in terms of politics (power), the face of man (opposition) is always at the risk of elimination in order to maintain power by autocrats. The face is a threat to power. At the political level, the face of the Other does not signify any importance or value. The alterity of the Other becomes a means of violence, inhumanity and oppression. The tendency is, it's undermined progress and leads to underdevelopment most especially in third world countries. Based on underdevelopment in Third world countries, Levinas' approach to responsibility for the Other, can be used to enhance development through an intersubjective encounter with the Other. When this intersubjective relation is established it brings about development, justice, but failure to enhance this intersubjective relation results in a degradation of the global society. The Other is not only an alter ego: the Other is rather what I myself am not. This means an intersubjective space is not symmetrical. The Other does not come to steal, but to propose what can help to construct the society. What destroys our society is a lack of dialogue and openness to the alterity of the Other for progress. The encounter with the Other in the face becomes a responsibility. This responsibility commences from the presence of the face that precedes dialogue in the political milieu.

Implying the other face signifies man as an end-in-itself and not as a means to achieve violence. The opposition to such violence is not actually the use of force, but it is rather an ethical resistance: In the presence of murder, there arises the command not to be able to kill. The appearance of the Other is always an imperative because it is the arising of what is provided with

meaning by itself. Responding to the structure of injustice demands an intersubjective encounter in which the Other becomes epitomize for my subjectivity. This means humanity is not rooted in my person solely as an individual. Humanity is co- essentially prearranged upon the Other and me. The Other is both a master and destitute, and the relationship is duty. The asymmetry dogma marks the finally the overcoming of the Western philosophical tradition, in allegiance 'Jewish ethics'.

The face is the trace of the infinite and humanity is the quality I owe to the Other as responsibility. The idea here is that we need others to sustain a firm, prosperous global society. In the trace of the other, justice recognizes the Other my master. This entails justice is the reduction of one's own egoistic desires to the needs of the absolute Other, the alterity that always singularizes and simultaneously transcends the Other as the face. To make justice ethical in its best sense, it needs to be separated from its customary links to the aggressivity of juridical morality in the global society. For Levinas, the moral begins with the renunciation of violence: "the face is what forbids us to kill."[734] With this increase, the Other becomes not a face alone but a living, need-bearing population. Ultimately, Levinas' responsibility in the face-to-face encounter, can affords a response to the political and ethical dislocation of the global society plagued by tribalism, racialism, discrimination, by avarice of Western culture and by selfishness. Levinas' responsibility in this sense is, being responsible for the Other social welfare and existence by overcoming the daily proliferation of social crimes and the unbearable conditions of human life clouded with a future of gloom and bleakness. In a broader sense, it involves being ready to die for them.

The criterion Levinas uses against these tyrant regimes is the presence of the face. The face places the 'I' being for the self (Other) at the centre of the ethical encounter, valorizing the Other as a human being worthy of societal benefits for coexistence. Levinas' tenor of responsibility, therefore, affords the priority of the Other in the society contrary to oppression by Western forms and system of governance thereby re-dignifying the Other in society. Levinas' responsibility to the political oppression of the Other promotes the principle of human equality in terms of dignity. On the principle of human equality, the encounter with the Other emerges deep within the human being and discloses the dependency, a total invasion in the 'I'. 'I' only becomes myself when I find the resource to respond to the Other. Thus, the face of the Other is naked. It "appears to us and demands our response."[735] It springs from ethical reason, 'what we should do' when we

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[734] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.*, p 71.
[735] *Ibidem*, p. 75.

confronted with the weakness and nakedness of the Other revealed in face to face relation. The other, in the eye of Levinas, is "the stranger, the widow, and the orphan"-the archetypes of the needy in the global society. The face thus promotes the moral duty to care about the Other.

We recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery."[736] No one can stay in himself; the humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for others, an extreme vulnerability. We are morally obliged to make ethical responses in the face of this infinite transcendent Other. In contrast, highlighting our moral duty, the egocentric value of the face draws attention to the Other alterity, a moral exigency of the subjects subjectivity against its will in an open and caring way. I am my brother's keeper, your keeper.

Levinas' responsibility to and for the other is similar to Christ sacrifice on the cross of Calvary to liberate mankind. According to him, the responsibility to and for the other should become an ideal (principle). Levinas' approach of responsibility for the Other in the political sphere of the global society simply means consciences should be re-awaken that is, they should be a certain high level of conscience. Levinas' responsibility is like re-educating the global society where man is the criterion of morality. Levinas' responsiveness to the political oppression of the Other would embarks on a process designed to alleviate ignorance, poverty, and construct a process of development and change in the global context. His responsibility would thus, have an important role to play in the moulding of good citizens and humane society where peace and brotherhood will thrive as central focus of policymaking. Likewise societies were all men would live and interact happily without fear of being stabbed in the back. In the spirit of Levinas' responsibility answers prior before any understanding. A debt contracted before any consciousness, freedom and present."[737] Much more, Levinas' responsibility could further entail a response to economic oppression of the Other in the global society.

**8.1.4 Levinasian response to economic oppression and the nexus of nudity**

The global economy is like a living organism that has been mishandled and has experienced deterioration in spite of technological evolution. This mishandling has led to abject economic oppression expressed in terms of economic inequalities and accumulation, which endangers

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[736]*Ibidem*, p. 75.
[737]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 39.

humanity's freedom. Levinas' prior experience and approach in the face of the Other could pay attention to the economic oppression of man, wherein, it would reveal the dynamic processes of human relationship, human sociality and human plurality. Human relation in the global economic sector would commence with the very notion of responsibility for the Other.

The Other is therefore only his face. The face is naked. Nudity is the immediate phenomenon of the face. The nudity of the face in the economic milieu is a stripping without any cultural adornment-an absolution-a detachment from its form within the production of the form. The face enters our world from an absolutely foreign sphere that is to say precisely from an absolute which is, moreover, the very name of fundamental strangeness. The existence καθ'αὐτό is, in the world, a misery. The face in its facial nudity presents to me the destitution of the poor and of the foreigner."[738] The bare face teaches me to recognize someone else's hunger; it subordinates me to their destitution, their misery, their weakness.

The face exposed, is threatened. The face is threatened. The face cries out to me for help through the nakedness of its skin, which is exposed to violence. The face speaks of suffering and death, that is to say the fragility of the sensitive person. In the social relationship, the deep material misery of someone does not depend on indifference but on recognition or acceptance by other men. In reality, the ground core for Levinas' responsibility in the economy milieu is the "genuine concern for the Other"[739] and an ethical stance that rails against that which "would reduce the human to the inhuman." The global economy needs a liberal economic sector which takes into account the Other as vulnerable. The sector should be non-exclusive but with an inclusive economy. By so doing, it will raise the Other dignity in the global society. In view of this, the liberal economy would be inclusive without excluding the oppressed in the global society. Apart from this, liberalism would avoid the gap between the rich and the poor.

However, the Levinasian ethical thought, to a degree, can be used to analyze and interpret the highly problematic, dehumanization of man and racialist encounters in the global economy in the face-to-face ethical relation. In this regard, Levinas' responsibility for the Other in the face-to-face encounter would promotes a "vision of humanism for which the human is central."[740]Hence the dignity of the Other in the global society can be regarded through a Levinasian lens as a way

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[738] *Ibidem,* p. 234.
[739] E. Levinas, *Humanism of the Other*, *op. cit*., p ix.
[740]*Ibidem*, p. xx.

of foregrounding his concern with ethics, as our responsibility for the Other. The encounter with the face is an appeal as well imperative given to one's responsibility a direct order and demand."[741] Among Levinasian ethical concerns is the notion of imminent humanism. This is a philosophy of intersubjectivity and human sociality that is, an attack against "monstrous abstraction" that undermines and "annihilates all values in the face of the Other and opposes the Darwinian social ontology that effaces all traces of human dignity."[742]Human dignity is a concept that is understood as existing in relationships with others. Dignity here involves an understanding of human duties and relationships without individual prerogatives against others. This responsibility for the Other thus presupposes individualism in an asymmetrical relation.

What is destroying our society is individualism, we accumulate riches, whereas the dignity of others has no value, this implies the destruction of the community. From the present economic outlook, the global society is reduced to materialism and man is used as a means to attain material ends. Man is no longer valuable or dignified but reduced to materiality. Through industrialization man is used as an object; the conditions of works most often are deplorable. The wages given to him are not proportional to the amount of work put in. The Levinasian responsibility and approach for the Other, to economic vulnerability, would concretize the leadership of the global society to duly consider the dignity and credibility of others in society. Levinasian responsibility can currently retain legitimacy in the work force of the economy. Through this, national/global governments can bridge social inequality gaps and ensure changes in the decision-making processes which concentrate power and resources in the minority of elites and constrain the majority. This reduction in the face of the Other could limit economic vulnerability.

In the economic sector, Levinas' responsibility can liberate the Other and society from dehumanizing poverty, marginalization, discrimination, war and violence. Levinasian responsibility in the face of the Other can defend the poor and the marginalized were the face of the Other calls, upon political actors, to responds to the Other needs as the face invites one to a responsibility; that is, the calling of one's freedom into action. Levinas' psychotherapy responsibility to the economic oppression of man can affords a restructure or reinforces of government sectors in terms of delivering essential public services and basic infrastructure. In the

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[741] *Ibidem*, p. xx.
[742]T. Sessler, *Levinas and Camus: Humanism for the Twenty-First Century*. New York, Continuum, 2008. Print. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 18 Mar. 2007. 3 June 2010 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/levinas>. Online 30/12/2019.

sense that, taking Levinas' notion of justice to the Other, those taking care of the sector should make it conducive for workers through tax reduction. They ought to be some sort of feeling, sensibility towards the Other in the internal sector.

The physical presence and wages condition of the Other calls, upon political actors through Levinas' responsibility to reduce the dehumanization of the Other in society. The people are put first. The Other is always the priority. Unavoidably, we are then given the responsibility for the Other, from the Other promoting human and social development. The Levinasian responsibility thus, reinforces social safety nets to mitigate the possible adverse effects of some adjustment measures on the poorest and most vulnerable groups in global autocrat states. Levinas like Aristotle saw society as existing to enable the individuals who live in it achieve their goals and aspirations in life. By its very nature, therefore, society is the most complete, most self-sufficing of all communities or political associations natural to human beings. To reiterate, human triumph is possible only as much in the human social and environmental setting. As such, laws pass in the global society will suit the Other and not the rule of men.

In brief, Levinas responsibility revolves all human beings at every stage of life; ethnicity, religion, language and gender, persons of equal and immeasurable worth and of inviolable dignity. Levinas' ethics of responsibility protect human dignity, renouncing all forms of dehumanization of the Other and oppression in every form in the global society. The relation with the Other is not limited (exclusive). The Other is not only sacred, the Other is sociable and needs to exercise his duty and right in social progress, for the common good and well-being of all especially the poor and vulnerable for the holistic growth of the global society. The face of the Other is the site of the social.[743] This takes us to our next task: cultural intolerance and ecological crisis in the global society.

## 8.2 LEVINASIAN RESPONSIBILITY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF MULTI-CULTURAL AND ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

The plurality of cultures has denigrated the Other in the global milieu. This plurality is due to the diversity of cultural identity, the value of human life, erroneous exploitation of the natural habitat and deforestation. In a society that is taking shape ever more in terms of multi-culturality and pluri-linguism, we are urged to overcome the limits of legality characteristic of prejudices and

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[743]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 53.

stereotypes in legislative State to render justice less unjust as a mean of juridical discourse.[744] This complexity in the global society has, as a response in the Levinasian notion of responsibility, to re-equate, adapt and afford equilibrium across the cultural milieu, the ecosystem and valorization of human life worthy of positive societal impact and progress in our contemporary society.

**8.2.1 Levinasian approach for the Other to global social inequalities and cultural intolerance**

Another global crisis of the 21st century is social inequalities and cultural intolerance that stems from the diversity of cultures and is a threat to the dignity of the Other. The Levinasian approach to cultural intolerance in the global society, could ameliorate one's ability to withstand, respect a particular culture, belief and its practices. It can determine a peaceful co-existence of various cultures with intermittent beliefs within a single society. Cultural intolerance through Levinas' responsibility can play a crucial role in bringing people closer who speak different languages, practice different religions, customs and beliefs in different values and therefore hasten or promote harmony and coexistence in the global society. Levinasian responsibility to cultural intolerance would create awareness of being culturally tolerant; that is, not discriminating against people of Other cultures. In the face-to-face encounter, cultural intolerance is a challenge to overcome tastes and disgusts in order to create a space for meeting and exchange between citizens where the violence of social relationships is eliminated. With the Levinasian responsibility to cultural intolerance, the Other in his alterity has something to offer different from mine. The Other needs to be allowed in his difference. The Other is unique and the contact with the Other is a teaching.

Levinas affirms that: one relates to the Other who is not simply a part of a whole, nor a singular instance of a concept. Through the social, one can easily reach the Other through the religious.[745]To him, the meaning of life for the Other find their foundation in the quality of relationships and requires the reign of good relationships in the face of the Other for real life to exist. Therefore, a special effort must be made to build one global society by putting the Other at the centre of all political action. Levinas shows that, in man there is the desire for the invisible, the alterity or the self can only enter into relation with the alterity through the presence of the face.

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[744] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8164826/
[745]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 68.

Materially, the Other is for me a condition of existence. For Levinas, alterity or difference is key in bringing people to feel responsible for others by allowing difference to be a reason to respect another person. Levinas' description of desire for invisible to cultural intolerance demonstrates clearly the relation of disinterestedness. Although desire characterizes sociability, it is not a simple relation. He differentiates "need" from "desire". The latter is describes as the anxiety of me for myself, "the return itself as egoism which is the original form of identification."[746] This implied that the object of need loses its otherness and it becomes part and parcel of the Subject.

In desire, the Subject is relating with the Other, who puts the Subject into question and does not cease to drain the other. In relation to the face of the Other and its need and claims, the subject feels its own exteriority to itself, its fundamental condition. I am only through the Other. It feels this condition in its constitution in the Other's eyes and their ethical demand, and not in egoist separation. Thus it re-established guiding principles to the Other daily life, revitalizing the dropping spirit and basic institutions of exploiting the Other right. With such responsibility as ethics in the face of the Other remains a viable and valid option for social order, harmony and stability to be restored to our contemporary society.

The face of the Other in the cultural milieu is a moral instrument that upholds the *dignitas* of man in the global society. The face-to-face both announces a society and permits the maintaining of a separated "*I.* "[747]The incumbent responsibility of the Other, what is not my deeds, to an extent also co-responsibilizes (La co-responsabilité) the Other. The face that addresses or reveals itself to me is the strange being dehumanized. The face of the infinite is surrounded by many other faces as a chain. It is only in approaching the Other that I attain to myself.[748]But it should not be mistaken that my existence is constituted in others thought.

According to Levinas, being in contact with the face helps to resolve the problem of the other wherein it creates peace, confidence and social justice. The face of the Other in the crisis of humanity invites one to have an open eye to the alterity and voice of the other. The idea here is that man is known through his culture. The face of the Other in the crisis of humanity could be rethought educationally and culturally. In the thought of Levinas, responsibility for the Other rises

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[746] E. Levinas, *On the trail of the Other*. Translated by Daniel J. Hoy. Philosophy Today 10 (1): 1966. p. 38-39.
[747]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 68.
[748]*Ibidem,* p. 178.

against superiority in the cultural sphere and could embarks on cultural tolerance were the encounter with the face opens up the dimension for intersubjectivity. The face of the Other becomes a moralized value with responsibility as a categorical imperative in the global milieu where, every relation becomes essential from the Other's alterity. Alterity simply means the Other is different and unique.

More practically, religious and cultural moral ethical values should be instrumental in educating citizens and building of moral consciences. Thus, Religious leaders in the encounter of the face on pulpits should play a leading role in terms of removing religious prejudices; that is, promoting the idea of solidarity and peaceful coexistence among people of different faiths. This will help overcome cultural superiority and promote mutual cooperation and respect amongst one another adhering to the principle of tolerance. The first major component of Levinasian responsibility to cultural intolerance concerns the tension between individual and universal rights in the global society. This concept has two related components. The first is inalienable rights.

The inalienable rights are possess by every human individual which ought to respected and recognize by all human beings. The second concept is human relationships. Recognition of personhood necessitates the development of human relationships with other persons in society and with society as a whole. Levinasian responsibility to cultural intolerance can be used, as basis of the human face which inspires moral features such as suffering, pain, joy, enthusiasm, hope and the physical features such as a look or smile, which together communicate to us the inter-subjective body language. These features would provide access to what lies deep within the other's culture. The essence of others culture is the very essence of humanity deeply rooted in the relationship with another.

Moreover, cultural intolerance through the Levinasian responsibility can enhance the education of right conscience of man and the confrontation of culture in the face of violence. The transcendence of the Other brings forth development in policymaking and formation of the right conscience to justice and establishes the spirit of sacrifice and voluntary service. The Levinasian notion of the other can reduced the tension in society, as the Other would be seen valuable based on his alterity. As a result, education will play a vital role in conscientizing the values of tolerance above violence. The practice of tolerance is based on the consistent respect for human rights, in which, the principle of tolerance is not social injustice but more of social justice were one is free to adhere to one's own belief, practice and accepting others to adhere to theirs. Levinas'

responsibility to cultural intolerance simply means, accepting humans as naturally diverse in behaviours, appearance, approaches and values closer to instigating love and societal values to uphold the Other and his contribution in the growth of the global society. Thus, through Levinasian responsibility, it demands the global society as a whole to take up responsibility for starting its own rehabilitation and Renaissance. The idea of rehabilitation would be the 'Renaissance' of (global) values that would spread through the global society.

In brief, cultural intolerance through Levinas' responsibility brings out the imperative qualities of the Other value that form the bedrock of the global society in terms of gratitude, love, sincerity and loyalty. The face-to-face relation in the cultural milieu would open up to human sociality.[749] It means that, ethically, people are responsible for one another in a way that is pre-ontological and irrecuperable before my beginning and freedom seen an absolute past that has no subject.[750] This means that for as long as one is one ought to be responsible for another. Levinas' exigency is to rehabilitates humanism and restores its promises in the ethical encounter with the Other. Significantly, Levinas' responsibility to cultural intolerance is an essential aspect of a healthy global society where the Other has the chance to prosper emotionally, economically, socially and thus can feel valued, respected with rooms for their own ideas and thoughts being expressed in the society.

### 8.2.2 Understanding management of the global pandemic and caring for the other in Levinas' approach

The human value of life in the global society is in hostage to a pandemic virus, known as Sars-2 Covid-19. It comes from the Greek word, "*pandemos*", "*pan*" meaning "all", and "*demos* meaning "people", Covid-19, threatening the world population in its totality. More practical beyond the lab leak theory, if the goal is to counteract illness and death and safeguard all peoples of the earth, it seems that immunity must be just as total to humanity health crisis. Health hazards and sickness are plainly manifest in their ideological nature as organico-socio-economic phenomena: social inequalities and injustice in globalization is itself a "viral" disease.

From a global standpoint, anti Covid-19 immunity over the planet is still inadequate both in terms of the production of vaccines and of their circulation, a fact that-in light of Levinas'

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[749]*Ibidem,* p. 221.
[750]*Ibidem,* p. 89.

analyses of the human condition in terms of primordial fear for the other in face of health crisis, responsibility towards the other is antecedent to politics and logic, of the original propensity for care of the other-interrogates world social justice and demands ethical commitment beyond economic industrialize market reason and the ideology of globalism. Not ever before, in a globalized political world closed in upon its own identity, on short-sighted self-interest, is it so urgent to listen to a voice like that of Levinas, thus to overcome the walls of silence and indifference towards the other and of greed. Unlike Levinas, we think that the universal is constructed in dialogue with the singular, unique, particular, and dialogue is that language which presupposes that justice must be recover. Language in the lens of Levinas is proximity with respect to the other, responsibility, substitution, its code is the absolute other, in sociality un-self-interested love and care for the other.

With Levinas' reread in light of global pandemic, we know that values resound throughout the face to face encounter and of life in its totality as well in their singularity, difference, un-indifference, non-interchangeability, each-ness, and where the single individual is implicated, bridled, in spite of oneself, in the condition of responsibility towards the other, impossible to delegate, as Mikhail Bakhtin asserts.[751] If the common global goal is the health of life, of *life overall human and nonhuman*, *at the planetary level,* beyond the walls of indifference, of short-sighted identity ideologies, closed and greedy, it has become ever more urgent to recover the primordial inclination for otherness, *love for the other at the origin of language and communication, of knowledge and legal systems*, and practice social justice in close dialogue with the other perceived, experienced and welcomed in that other's uniqueness as other.

### 8.2.3 Levinasian approach for the Other Identity being dehumanized and marginalized in the global society

The dehumanized and marginalized are the vulnerable whose dignity has been undermined in society via political institution. Since the clash of civilization and identity of the Other, humanity has experienced a crisis of values and meltdown on the financial level with effects felt more by the less privilege in society. The Other in such a state is beyond recognition. Levinas' tend on genocides and holocaust experience like slavery in Africa to recognize the Other in the face. To recognize the Other is to give. However, Levinas offers that there is no reason to respond to the

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[751]Petrilli Susan. The Bakhtinian Revolution and the I-other Relation. *Chinese Semiotic Studies.* 2016; 12(2):215–228. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8164826/

Other. Obligation instead calls for a response that originates in the face of the Other and not through psychological motivational factors within the Self.

Furthermore, the Self responds prior to any interior reflection. The relation with the Other is one of generosity, hospitality, service, peace-ideals that are realized in concrete situational encounters. Responding to the Other's suffering is unconditional. Levinas spoke of the necessity of responds to the ignored in society. More primary, one's ability to know a beggar on the street, for instance, is the way in which that Other calls upon one to respond'.[752] Seeing the Other and responding cannot be separated from being human. The gaze of the Other calls for immediate response of generosity in face of annihilation.

Additionally, what one gives revolves the appropriate response which emerges in each phenomenological encounter, which Levinas describes as being *present*. In approaching the Other, I attend to myself. Infinity, therefore, suggests that the soul can contain more than it can draw from itself through the relation and encounter with exterior Others. The relation with the Other is that that of the transcendence, which immanently questions the destiny of the Self and introducing the Self to what it is not. The Self cannot be in sole control of its identity because the Other can provide what the Self cannot contain. Signification in the sense does not arise from the identity of the same who does remains in himself, but rather it arises from the face of the other who calls the soul … it is to be sure dwells in what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling in the "other".[753] The Other helps in shaping the destiny and identity of the Self. Identity follows response, not the other way around. Through welcoming the face of the Other, the being of the Self passes into another sense and by responding, the identity of the Self emerges.

The Other, is described as higher than the self, located in an asymmetrical distance, commanding each individual to escape their confines of identity and ethically put the Other first. This is a form of teaching. The relation with the Other, is an ethical relation, a non-allergic relation. In its non-violent transitivity, the very epiphany of the face is produced as the basis for responsibility. To serve is to be and 'To be is to be good.' The ethical existence of other than oneself makes ethics existing for another and does not only generates identity. Existence offers that since the Other comes to the Self from a height, identity of the Self is called into question, and responding to the Other forms the identity of the Self. Consistent with Levinas' responsibility for

[752]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.*, p 336.
[753]*Ibidem,* p 180.

the Other, the Self does not think of identity formation prior to responding; the Other 'shapes the identity of the "I" as a by-product'. By starting with the Self, indicates 'we miss the phenomenological reality of human life.' Rather, in the relationship that Levinas imports, the identity of the Self can emerge or be awakened. Identity is not based on 'knowing oneself' but rather 'submitting oneself to an exigency, to a morality.' Identity grows and reshapes as the Self continues to learn; 'it permits constant reshaping of the "I" through meeting of the Other'[754]. If one does not take care of the Other, there is no "I"'.

Levinas invites global leadership to gaze beyond totality into the realm of infinity. Ethics cannot be separated from global leadership and responsibility for the others. This is a guiding premise, which begins with leaders maintaining an ethical attitude of diversity and necessary distance in encounters with Others. During the encounter, the Other provide understanding for leaders to learn what they could not know otherwise and invite appropriate responses from leaders.[755] While each approach and response will be unique to particular encounters, appropriate responses are directed toward positive social change. Through this engagement, global leader's consciousness opens and identity emerges. Additionally, responsible leadership is normative philosophy.[756] However, considering the failure of normative philosophy to stop the genocide that Levinas witnessed firsthand, his phenomenological perspective may provide a better orientation for responsible leadership in the global society.

Levinas' phenomenology in the face of the Other opens up understanding where listening and learning from the Other is primary. It involves de-centering the Self in order to truly experience the needs of Others. This interruption in one's being is necessary to prevent tribalism, violence, colonizing or imposing on another, even with good intentions. Moreover, listening thus creates space between the Self and Other, which is necessary to receive the Other.[757] Listening also involves engaging without interpreting through the Self. In communicating on a global scale, responsible leadership would involves intercultural communication that at times may be quite difficult. The dialogic encounter with the Other, will not only listen for one's radical alterity but will open and make a place possible for it. This means that I do not resort only to what is easy-

[754] R. C. Arnett, 'The responsive 'I': Levinas's derivative argument ' *Argumentation and Advocacy*: (2003) 40 (1) p. 40.

[755] R. C. Arnett, *Levinas's Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics* (Southern Illinois University Press, 2017), p. 243.

[756]T. Maak & Pless N., (eds), *Responsible Leadership*, (Routledge, 2006a). p. 102.

[757] *Ibid,* p. 137.

what I already know, or what we have in common. It means that I listen for and make space for the different, the radically strange the difficult. We are called upon to never lose sight of the otherness of the other that assimilate, or appropriate the other into ourselves. Levinas provides leadership for the edicts of 'advancing humanism on a global scale with an ethical imperative to respect difference and not lose sight of individual human encounters.

## 8.2.4 Levinas' responsibility provide understanding for leaders to learn what they could not know Otherwise

By positioning the Other at a height in the Levinasian sense, leaders develop the leader's identity. They identify that 'having a good character and being a moral person are at the core of being a responsible leader. This identity result from the ethical response to the Other, a recall to what Levinas does not permit in time for internal reflection and introspection in the face. In placing the Other in such a height, responsible leaders could gain 'relational intelligence' being the mode of combination emotional intelligence and ethical intelligence. The dimension of relational intelligence is taught by what the Self cannot know on its own. The face of Other instill how leader ought to be ethical.

The Self pre-occupation in patience breaks through the crust of its egoism and displaces its center of gravity outside of itself, to the will of Goodness and Desire limited by nothing'.[758] If leaders truly face the other who are before them, they will be able to respond more responsibly. Leaders therefore, need real encounters with others, rather than just perceiving them as abstract entities of singular categories. The problem with global leadership is the risk of depriving people of their individual uniqueness and humanity which categorizes them into roles. The temporal and nakedness encounters elicits an appropriate response. Levinas uses the metaphor of nakedness. The impeccable code ethics results to lack of transparency enacted failed leaders. The code of ethics is merely a dressing to hide unethical practices of global leadership. Nevertheless, generosity can be recognize in the presence of the face which is a unique encounter and respond that emerges in stewardship.

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[758]https://www.elgaronline.com/configurable/content/journals$002flath$002f2-1$002flath.2014.01.03.xml?t:ac=journals%24002flath%24002f2-1%24002flath.2014.01.03.xml

**8.2.5 Global Leaders must be directed toward positive social change**

National leaders in the global society are agents for world benefit that calls for ethical responsibility to enact humanness. However, ethical responsibility is focused on this humanness that leads to opportunity. National leaders needs to consider the practice of responsibility instead of the use of agency. In this sense, agency and opportunity focuses on the Self, while responsibility will focuse on the Other. This idea can be correlated to the difference between pursuit and response where 'pursuit suggests a Western view of accumulation, exploitation and response suggests a call of responsibility in misery, burdens, an unfinished world of infinity, and not that of accumulation in a world of totality.[759] Levinas therefore claims that 'the foreign face calls to my fraternity of the human race, my position as brother.'[760] He plainly makes a polemic call for leaders to respond to the suffering of Others.

From this viewpoint, globalization can change from an agency-driven mechanism to building a human fabric of world community while respecting alterity (Other). Through an ongoing intersubjective encounter, a transcendental trace remains, which forms a fabric and basis of an ethical global community. The relations proceeding from me to the Other-the attitude of one person with regard to another-must be stronger than the formal signification of conjunction, to which every relation risks being degraded. Levinas would caution against the use of the term capital in describing social relations which moves the concept of totality towards infinity.

**8.3 LEVINASIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OTHER IN FACE OF "ABORTION"**

Today, in the global society, the life of man is under threat. Life is increasingly being desecrated. The challenges of modernity and materialism are steadily reducing the sphere of respect and sanctity of life. This is manifested in the spate of abortions. Hospital-based studies from most countries confirm that up to 50% of maternal mortality (deaths) is due to abortion.[761] Much attention needs to be given to active education and the involvement of local women's groups regarding fertility, reproduction and moral ills of abortion. Our standpoint is the Levinasian approach of responsibility in the face of the Other against these immoral ills or evils eating up the fabric of the global society. The Levinasian responsibility in the face of the Other defends the

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[759]R. C. Arnett. 'The responsive 'I': Levinas' derivative argument ' *Argumentation and Advocacy*: *op. cit*., p 83.
[760] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity op. cit.,* p 214.
[761]http://www.consciencelaws.org/repression/background/procedures/abortion019.aspx online 6/2/2020.

sacredness of human life. Thus, the ethical encounter in the face of the Other demands an inalienable right to life.

The face according Levinas, addressed to me are children suffering from abortions. Human life has dignity, sanctity and respect. In addition, any action against it is murder and a very serious assault on its dignity. Aristotle and Aquinas both had it that the rational soul is infused at the very moment of fertilization (conception) with life. From that very moment, life becomes an actuality. All human beings deserve equal rights to life and age gives no priority. Expressing this view Pope John Paul II says; *"Every person, who is sincerely open to the truth, can by the light of reason and the hidden action of grace which recognizes the sacred value human life from its very beginning (creation) till its end and can uphold the rights of every person to have this principal value being respected to the highest degree of life."*[762]The human value life is the supreme and basic value of life. This means that no other value is prior or supreme to it. The value of life determines other values.

Levinas, like the pro-life activists, emphasizes that; carrying your pregnancy and bearing your child shows that one is responsible for one's sexual act. Sexual act during fertile periods result to pregnancy, one should know this and be ready to accept the fact. To have respect and dignity, one should take responsibility for one's action. Life is, therefore, sacred and ought to be respected. Human beings are simply custodians and instruments of transmitting life. The Other for Levinas is not the inanimate object of our will, not a thing, but the human Other (i.e. it shows its weakness, misery, vulnerability and inviolable prohibition of murder).[763] The presence of the Other calls for a recognition of the Other person, not superficially but sincerely.

In seeing the face of the Other demands an intimate understanding of the essence of humanity and life. In the same line, responsibility entails the valorization of (the Other) human life where we must worry about the Other, care for the Other and not see human life as a threat because we owe or have a responsibility towards the Other since the result is someone taking care of us. Levinas proposed a humanism of the Other who takes responsibility and responds totally as a human individual in society. Thus, Levinas highlights the importance of being and human dignity in the expression of being-for-the-Other where we pass from the close self (Cartesian ego) to an open self since philosophy, from now on, will not begin in the self but in the Other. To say the

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[762]Cf. John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae*, No 2, 1995
[763]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.*, p 191.

face is nude is pointing to its invisibility which is always the incarnate and visible one. This implies the face cannot be annexed under political markers, become a theme and cannot be assigned to economic and sociological and groupings.

In short, the face is invisible because it speaks; it is a Saying. Epiphany occurs by means of discourse. Jill Robbins, arguably states: The face occurs as a collision between world and that which exceeds world. To the extent that the face is out of world, it appears in the world as naked and destitute. Naked-that is, without covering, clothing, signifies without attributes, outside any categories, not across its generality, but by itself. The face of the Other is political, apolitical, worldly and unworldly. The face of the Other is in the world but not of the world, simply means that it is the invisibility of the visible site. In Levinas' responsibility, man is placed at the centre of human actions.

### 8.3.1 Levinas response to racism

Africans and Afro-Americans are beneficiary of social structures that are grounded in centuries of prejudice and discrimination toward people of colour. They are thrown into and are complicit in the systemic power structures that maintain a racist systems of power, racist stereotypes as well perpetuate social inequalities. Levinas' thought can be constructive to the idea of personal political racism in the global society. Encountering of the face in the eye enter into the humanity of the Other which is prerogative, not comparable and specifies a metaphysical asymmetry."[764]

The obligations and responsibilities I have toward my country and others begins with an orientation and responsibility-based approach. It encourages liberty and right to life, but is more concerned with preserving the liberties and rights of others. The present is built on the past, on a past history of oppression, exclusion, and marginalization of others. The cries of injustice by those who have felt the underside of racist empire contest an "exposure prior to consent". The most incomprehensible suffering and unethical thing I could do in the face to face of the Other is to say that I can comprehend it, can provide a metaphysical description for it.[765] Responsibility entail justice and justice leads to the theoretical. Justice involves comparison, equity and objectivity whereas the theoretical commonly involves verification, knowledge, and evaluation. Justice

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[764] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 53.
[765] E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit.,* p v.

becomes the basis of philosophy and philosophy expresses wisdom that arises from the depths of an un-indifference, love and charity.[766]

At this juncture, philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love. The task of philosophy is both higher than that of being or knowledge. What is fundamental is to point out a critique of an epistemologically based ethics which does not necessarily rendered it inert. This means ethical action precede with epistemological understanding. According to Levinas, moral standpoint precedes and grounds knowledge. In the performance of the command, Levinas inscribes, "Obedience thus precedes any hearing of the command", (i.e. the saying) precedes my full comprehension of the content (i.e. the said) of the command. This does not mean that one ought to act irresponsibly, but rather, it means that right knowledge does not necessarily lead to right action (that is, rejecting the view epistemology being grounded in ethics). We note that, ethics precedes and conditions the basis of epistemology. The good is done before knowing it. Philosophy begins with the ethical call of the neighbour. Ethics precedes ontology. For Levinas, to be human is always already to be responsible for others, such is the very "humanity of the human." The Other is the Most High.

The Other and the "Most High" are beyond totalizing, irreducible to the interiority of the self, not assimilable by the subject.[767] It is thus desire (longing for the Other) that surpasses the egoistic inclinations of the subject. In the presence of the Other, desire moves the self towards that Other, in an encounter which reveals the unconscious and nonintentional affectivity of the self as having been pre-originally meant for and tied to another. The relation to the face is immediately ethical, as it spells the first mode of "knowing", as a facing. It is in speaking or saying that the face renders possible and begins all discourse.[768] It is discourse, and more exactly, response or "responsibility", which begins the authentic relationship with the Other/other. Thus, we respond to our neighbour even in simply recognizing him.

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[766]E. Levinas, "*Philosophy, Justice and Love*", in Levinas, Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. M. Smith and B. Harshav, Columbia University Press, 1998. pp. 103-122

[767] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 39.

[768]*Ibidem,* p. 66.

### 8.3.2 Levinas' approach for the Other as ethics of communication in the crisis of Identity-differentiation

In the Western tradition closed identity has generally prevailed over non-indifference and among singularities. The capitalist world has constructed its socio-economic reproduction system on identity and differentiation, bringing it to the point of hindrance. Capitalist ideology has even exploited the subject's fear of the other-the other object of fear experienced by the subject, ever more attenuating and transforming the propensity for fear for the other, into fear of the other. The essential characteristic of social relations in the world today is that they present themselves as relations among individuals who are ever more indifferent to each other, ever more isolated from each other. The face-to-face conditions imply a relationship of knowledge without tyranny, which is not yet an obedience to an impersonal law, but is the indispensable condition for the institution of such a law?" [769]

Levinas after the holocaust and crisis of identity of the Other, has insisted particularly on the need of re-founding and reformulating humanism on the possibility of a *new humanism* outside the traps of anthropocentrism and egocentrism. Levinas' new humanism is founded on the other, emerging as "humanism of alterity" by contrast with traditional "humanism of identity." But, the human subject in the global society cannot be articulated and reduced to the logic of identity. Humanity transcends and at once subtends the logic of roles and identities of Others. Global communication-production and the expression of advanced capitalism is always ready to invest in "human capital," is remarkable for its "destructive character. Its destructiveness has now reached planetary dimensions, as evidenced on a political level by superficial recourse to war and it logic-military meddling, military interventions of various sorts and so-called "humanitarian wars."[770] The present day globalization system is destructive not only of products, but of the instruments of work which has now become "intelligent machines," of "jobs," as well of the natural environment. But the point of focus is that, it is not the "Other" *per sé* who threatens or destroys identity and difference, but this very global social system that promotes determinate identities and determinate differences, even to the point of self-exaltation, exaltation of identity and identity closed to the Other in whatever form.

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[769] E. Levinas, "Liberté et commandement," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 58 (1953), pp. 236-240.

[770] https//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmc8164826/∗CR108

In Levinas' view, the relation to the "Other in one's otherness" constitutes the foundation of ethics beyond the crisis of identity. The "ethical" relation in Levinas' viewed are neither connected by a synthesis of understanding, nor by a relation between subject identity and object. His conception of responsibility is also radically different in approach. Instead of seeing in that concept another way of inserting the other into our global world, the philosopher raises a much more open relationship in which the *I* is questioned by the presence of the other. Therefore, his responsibility is not to take care of the other, but also a self-questioning of our identity. It is in this aspect where we will also find Levinas' reflection on death: *The other individuates me in the responsibility I have for him. The death of the other who dies affects me in my very identity as a responsible "me"*[771]Although in other philosophers the reflection on death leads to ethical proposals, it is not until Levinas that we can find a more systematic effort. In effect, an ethic in the strict sense of the term that derives from the death of the Other. The Other in Levinas' term is not an enemy that steals my life after I die, but the sign of a responsibility that touches me (existence) at all times.

In Levinas the terms "ethics" and "ethical" connote what in language is an excess with respect to the cognitive global sphere, thematization and ontology. They testify to the condition of "responsibility and substitution," "proximity," of "involvement," "co-implication," "intrigue" with the Other as a characteristic of alterity. Ethics therefore aligns before and after ontology, State, and politics, assumed the consequences of ontology in political realism, but to an extent also "ethics beyond ethics." Levinas, therefore, thematize "ethics as first philosophy" in response to the problem of the relation to the Other identity, to the other's singularity as other.

Ethics for Levinas implies dialogical encounter with the other presence. Such an encounter is made manifest in itself, alterity, the primordial "for-the-other." Apparent such a philosophy questions the meaning of being on the basis of the encounter with the other."[772]The origin of meaning, of rationality, of intelligibility is in the face of the other, in responsibility for the other man, so that ontology, objective knowledge and politics have meaning thus conceived at their foundation. This global world is the result of dominant ideology and is established by the Order of discourse.

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[771]E. Levinas, *God, Death and Time*. Stanford University Press. 2000. p. 12. (https://dialektika.org/en/2018/12/23/emmanuel-levinas-other-responsibility/)
[772]E. Levinas, « Paix et proximité », in *Altérité et transcendance*, Le Livre de Poche, coll. « Biblio », 2010, p. 98.

The subject that inhabits the global World, thus, described as aspires to coherence, security that engages in its own *conatus essendi.* This tends exclusively to its own value of self-preservation. The global subject is therefore of a "clean conscience," in conformity with the rhetoric of fake mass-media and a corrupt political systems. All this is functional to a totalizing global world, to dominant ideology, the "ideo-logic" of a globalized biosphere. The space-time of identity, the space-time of objects, of "closed identity," as denominated in the open self opens the connotation of the question of being in the world and for the world which is lock in the dominant ideology of Occidental reason that leveled onto an equal exchange market values.

### 8.3.3 Levinasian approach of responsibility to the ecological crisis in the global society

The global wider consensus threating sustainability of the planetary ecosystem and its biodiversity. The incontrovertible evidence is the part played by human activity in phenomena, such as climate change and accelerated mass extinction. As specie, we are being *forced* to address "it" at the material level. In particular, a materiality of which we are a part: pollutants such as heavy metals, dioxins, perflouro-chemicals and nano-particulates are not only concepts formulated in our minds; they are essential realities in our global society. The "*there is*" in Levinas' thinking opens a possibility of ethical transferability to questions of the environment, nature and ecology. The eco-philosophical difference and Levinas' approach can be evenly characterized in three comprehensive spheres of approach and interest: these are (1) consideration of the transferability of Levinas' thinking of "the face" to nonhuman entities, especially, in the first instance at least, to nonhuman animals; (2) derivation of a philosophy of nature and ecology in relation to Levinas' philosophy of existence and thinking of immanence; and (3), readings that discard the privileging of transcendence altogether and focus on his radical philosophy of existence and his metaphysics of substance.

Levinas in *Totality and Infinity* uses "*IL y a" or "There is,"*[773] simply entails a possibility of transferability of his ethics of responsibility to the face of the environment (nonhumans alterity). The "*IL y a" or "There is,* is at the core of Levinas' philosophical argument with regards to making the nature relationship between the existent and existence ultimately key to both the transcendence he thinks of as ethical *and* to the substantively of the ethical subject in its proto-ethical, pre-

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[773] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 296.

personal condition and moment of its singular expansion. What we normatively considered as "being" or "nature" is wholly a totality, absolutely in an inert stillness.

Levinas emphasizes "being" and "nature," as the notion of totality which allows for another way of thinking of nature in general. Most challenges to articulate the relevance of Levinas' philosophy to the project of rethinking nature, ecology, and "the environment" in view of the perceived impending planetary crisis focus on his key ethical concepts such as the face-to-face, absolute alterity, transcendence and Infinity. The anthropocentric schema of Levinas is intrinsically found to be a decisive impasse in regards to the question and ethical status of the non-human. This explains why recurrent focus on the ethical relation and "the beyond" should be balanced by attention to Levinas' philosophy of existence; his empiricism; and his analyses of individuation, immanence and Totality.

Nature proximity to absolute otherness is measured to be the zero degrees of its non-difference from nature in the sense of "inside" its empirical realities. Therefore, the absolute Other is revealed in the everyday experience of face-to-face relation between two existents, the "I" and the other are two separate substantive subjects. This simply means existent is what makes the ethical relation possible. The existential condition necessitates an "earthly" dimension in the face-to-face. It is in relation to this that Levinas' thought resounds (resonates) most diversely. That is why when it comes to thinking about how his ethics might be mustered in the service of reevaluating our understanding of a perceived impending ecological planetary catastrophe that is, what could be thematically bigger and more all-encompassing than that?, what fundamentally comes in mind regards the ethical and religious stance of Levinas if such an ethics could be extended to nature as an absolute value regarding the dominant and transcendent prototypical absolute Other.[774]

In line with the above, Benso thinks that: human actions can be carried out in a responsible manner dignifying human health and the natural habitat without the vast exploitative actions of the environmental resources.[775] In his spirit, the humans' erroneous world can be corrected in a way that their habitat and all entities would have a vital role to in the environment. Benso further

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[774]Cf. David Boothroyd, "Levinas on Ecology and Nature". The Oxford Handbook of Levinas, *Edited by Michael L. Morgan.* 2018, p. 10. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190455934.013.46

[775]Cf. Benso, Silvia, "Earthly Morality and the Other: From Levinas to Environmental Sustainability." In *Facing Nature: Levinas and Environmental Thought*, edited by William Edelglass, James Hatley, and Christian Diehm, Duquesne University Press, 2012. pp. 191-208.

ponders that, Levinas' ethical responsibility takes "nature" and "ecology" as its guiding themes in relation to the hazard pose on the biosphere. To an extent, Levinas ethics of responsibility in the face of the Other could be transferable to the face of the environment and to nonhuman animals. Subsequently, human responsibility in, Levinas terms should not dominate or exclude the alterity of the environment. Nonhuman "others" within the environment could, on that basis, be considered deserving of human ethical respect.[776]This simply means one should use the environment in a way that it would not be detrimental to human life. This is to emphasize that one has to preserve nature for human existence and to preserve man's quality of life.

Pope Francis in his encyclical *Laudato Si* affirms that: service to the environment is service to Others.[777] This is because an attack on man through the environment has far reaching repercussions on mankind. Similarly, we solicit Edgar Morin who stipulates that, the natural environment is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the responsibility of everyone.[778] Therefore, the dignity of human being is affected through the mistreatment of the environment. So any irresponsible action on the environment is a crime against the value of other human beings. The preservation of the environment would entail a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.[779] This attempt to protect the environment is the fact that, other human beings occupies the first place.

On this basis we venture that there is indeed, within Levinas' thinking of the elemental, the resources to develop an "ethical philosophy of the environment" by building outward from Levinas' account of the *milieu* as ecology of "co-existents." The elemental *milieu* already has a foothold in the ethical, for it is just as essential to the Levinasian "breach of totality" from the perspective of his philosophy of immanence as is the face-to-face from the perspective of his philosophy of transcendence.[780] Consequently, separation is crucial to "both" events for Levinas: to the separation of the existent with respect to existence and the separation of the Infinite with respect to earthly life. The individuation of existent is always itself and the matter of the "individuation-milieu" preserves the specificity of humans without ever presumptuous

[776]*Ibidem*
[777]Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter *Laudato Si'* Of The Holy Father On Care For Our Common Home, Vatican Press , p. 67.
[778] E. Morin, *Science san conscience,* Gallimard, 1987, p. 213.
[779]A. Yersukim, *Common Framework for the Ethics of the 21St Century*, Division of Philosophy and Ethics UNESCO, Paris, September 1999, p. 7.
[780]J. Llewelyn, *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of Levinas, Heidegger and Others* (Saint Martin's Press, 1991), p. 4.

"supremacy" and "exceptionality" of the human within the *milieu*, thereby allowing it to be identified and acknowledged as such.

Human responsibility with respect to the environment is therefore correctly considered to be empirically real, but this notion of empirical reality does not dominate nor exclude the alterity of the nonhuman others in the environment as the realities of their own. Nonhuman others within the environment could considered deserving of the ethical respect for humans. Implicitly to this also, is the discovery that the privileging of human concepts of Nature is an aspect of ethical failure with respect to that which is un-nameable. The purpose of ecology is to enable us to see the chain or connection among species and how one thing depends on the Other for survival. For instance, grasshopper's feeds on green plant, frog feeds on grasshoppers, snakes feeds on frog, lion feeds on man.[781] This means we must find space or room in "our" world for both animals and plants even for their own togetherness and opposition. Callicott posits, *"We are thinking animals; if not uniquely thinking animals, and then certainly, among all animals, we specialize and excel in thinking." The face of the other is the locus of transcendence in that it calls into question the "I" in its existence as a being for itself.*[782]

Nonetheless, the indiscriminate human actions on the environment are a sign of irresponsibility. Thus, it becomes imperative for mankind to have a universal ethical principle of responsibility to govern one's actions on the environment, to reduce environmental crisis and harm done to the Other. The nonhuman others are viewed in the crisis of humanity terms for the Other is a deconstruction. If the problem of the extension of the face to nonhuman others is viewed in terms of the deconstruction of the boundary between the human and the nonhuman, and what this exposes is the limit of Levinas' anthropocentrism as an insurmountable *philosophical* problem, then deconstruction as a "philosophical method" should be credited, at least, with the demonstration that ethical relation is more essential than a philosophical conception. The face is always referred to real experience and yet this is paralleled by metaphysical remarks such as "the face … is not of the world"[783] and "violence is aim directly at the face of the Other."[784]For the face-to-face relation is a matter of orientation toward the "beyond" of the face.

[781]T. Sylvester, *Understanding Biology*, *op. cit.*, pp 261-264.
[782]E. Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, *op. cit*., p xiv.
[783] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 198.
[784] *Ibidem,* p. 225.

## Partial Conclusion

During the course of the reflection on Levinas' responsibility, the ethical encounter in the face-to-face reveals the existential, humanistic, and the political reality of the global spheres. Human action can only be understood within the complex nexus of social relation and interrelation in a determined social context. The social relation reflects a simple form of political participation in the normative ideals of a social order. Our fragmented global society justice system has become crucial to human relationships. Levinas' notion of responsibility is attentive to the way in which the human Other inhabit the horizon of one's experience with a heart of love and goodness. This heart of love he terms it metaphysical desire. Central to the crisis of humanity is a responsibility to respect people's dignity, to be sensitive to their needs as opposed to egoistic and self-interest, and to create an environment of trust, empathy, forgiveness and reconciliation in the face of the Other. Levinas says, "It is my responsibility before a face looking at me absolutely foreign that constitutes the original fact of fraternity."[785]The crisis of citizenship in the global society thus comes from the fact that the private interest takes the top on the national interest. This caring matter because only with such an ethical commitment can we move from witnessing, to understanding, to developing shared pathways towards addressing the root causes of human suffering[786] in regard to Levinas approach for the Other. Levinas is essentially a springboard to the challenges we face today. The human person is a relational being that cannot be reduce to an object. Part Three carries African moral values beyond the Levinasian notion of responsibility in the face of the crisis of humanity in the global society, which permits us to have a profound study and impossibility of universalizing global justice.

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[785]*Ibidem*, p. 218.
[786] Cf. K. Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (Penguin Books, 2006).

**PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS OF AFRICAN VALUES, CRITIQUE OF LEVINASIAN ETHICS, GLOBAL SECULARISM AND POLITICS, UBUNTU ETHICS IN FACE OF THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY AND AN APPRAISAL OF METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION AS THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF ECUMENISM**

## Introduction

The metaphysical and Ethico-moral meaning of political institutions in the global society is to mediate between human capacity, the Divine and their historical actualization. The political, ethical, moral and metaphysics should however be linked in two dimensions: politics permits to reign a certain social order conform to the Ethico-moral principles and metaphysics to a transcendental moral supreme order. The politician in his-self and action should conform to these principles as well the Divine principles. It is basically this conception of Kant. He therefore, affirms that: "the human being is an animal that needs a master"[787]for in absence of a master, he is incapable to conform ethical and moral imperative. However, to establish such order, the master himself has to submit to the Ethico-moral imperative. This conception of politics and metaphysics reflects in Plato Republic of the nature of the state as well his ideas on the world of forms.

The aim of the state is to lead reign virtue, that is, to establish a just society. A just society according to Plato, is a society that respects four fundamental qualities: wisdom (love and search of knowledge), courage (Ethico-moral strength), temperance (the act to dominate one's passions) and social justice (that signifies each and everyone has his role according to his capacity). But to organize such a system in our global society of diversities seems impossible as societies exists and reign on nationalist interest. The complexity of such a demonstration is the Machiavelli Prince in the global society. The interest of one state over another creates social injustice, inequalities and unstainable imbalance. Beyond the fragmentation of the global society in forms of states without a unify and universal Ethico-Moral principles, the fabrics of societies becomes weaken. The ultimate finality of politics is to maintain order and peace, what is fundamental impossible in our context of today. The tenets are, most of the political regimes today are blood suckers' dictators, where coup d'état are the normal means of accent into power. The public space is more and more a disaster, order and respect of common good are quasi absent. Unfortunately, on the general plan, it is this immorality that makes global justice impossible.

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[787] E. Kant, *Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Moeurs*, Payot, 1990, p. 58.

In the debate on metaphysics and the Ethico-moral crisis in politics, the most widespread thesis maintains that politicians are liars; it is the new orthodoxy almost everywhere in the world. The purpose of politics is order and security, and this conception of politics is based on a particularly pessimistic anthropology. In fact, it is here for us to summon and propose the requirement to think in the face of the banality of evil. In synthetic terms, the problem of the crisis of humanity provides answers to a current problem, namely: that of the right to have rights in the face of the future of not claiming any rights in the new expanding public space: the globalized society. In this order of ideas, we live in an era which has sanctioned the break with the past. We are already in a world, as Nietzsche said, which advocates the transvaluation of all absolutes and all kinds of dogmatism. It is this tendency which Nietzsche lays hold of the metaphysical significance of the "Transvaluation of all values," to remove the curse which morality puts upon life.[788] This is where the true source of authority in society is to be found. Therefore, the ultimate value for life is the only and final test.

The consequence of such philosophy is decadence, and ultimately nihilism in the form of global defencelessness and denial of the worth of the world and of human life. This is the era of nihilism where everything must be questioned. The mind becomes rational and critical. As a fact, there is need to view the contributive dimension of African moral values beyond Levinas' responsibility for the Other, weakness and strength of Levinas' ethics and to analyze other dimensions that leads to the problem of global justice in society, secularism and religion, the global personalist community and its foundation, Ubuntu ethics and appraisal of metaphysics and religion in the foundation of philosophical ecumenism.

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[788] B. M. Laing, The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism. *The Philosophical Review*, Jul., 1915, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Jul., 1915), pp. 386-418. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2178746

# CHAPTER NINE: ON THE CONTRIBUTIVE DIMENSION OF AFRICAN MORAL VALUES BEYOND THE LEVINASIAN NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OTHER

## Partial Introduction

The previous chapter focused on Levinas' responsibility in the face of the Sub-Saharan African humanitarian crisis as a remedy for the politico-economic sphere, revalorizing the dignity of the Other in the face-to-face encounter which is primordial for sociality. Our focus in this chapter is on African moral values beyond the Levinasian responsibility in the face of the Sub-Saharan African crisis. African moral values blend community and religion as a whole and are based on African ethical principles and moral codes that regulate the lives of individuals in the community and society. It establishes stability, law and order, wherein social harmony is maintained and preserved through strict adherence to and observance of the normative ethical principles. African values are principally centred on the welfare of the community and society. Based on social construction, African environmental ethicists like Godfrey Tangwa and Philomena Ojomo act as environmental promoters. After the aforementioned points, we also discuss the weaknesses of Levinasian ethics. It's anthropocentric nature. The Levinasian absolute Other in the face-to-face encounter, is argued by some opponents, like Jacque Derrida, Slavoj Zizek's base on the primacy of the face. Hans Jonas constructs an imperative of responsibility against ancient ethical systems. Levinasian ethics valorizes the humanity of the Other person and acts as ethics of self-sacrifice. This is further articulated from an understanding of African moral values.

## 9.1 AN UNDERSTANDING OF AFRICAN MORAL VALUES

Moral values are driving values which push one to action as a source of motivation. There are sets of rules and customs which govern ones actions as members of a given community or society. African moral values are manifested principally in two main camps. There is the view that African moral values are based on religion. Amongst them we have John Mbiti, Kassanene and Domoka. They uphold god and religion to be the sources of African ethics. While others opine for the opinion that African moral value is not based on god but on human welfare. Here we have Wiredu, Gyekye and Ozumba. But our only interest here is to discuss African moral values beyond the Levinasian notion of responsibility in the face of Sub-Saharan African human Crisis.

### 9.1.1 The Anthropological Foundation of African Moral values

African moral values blend man, religion and community into a whole. The moral values of Africans are moral principles (that are often of the order of duty and this sense of duty depends on our belief systems, our experience, our socio-educational heritage, and our environment) and moral codes that regulate the lives of individuals in the community and society. African moral values extend the moral community beyond anthropocentric concerns by including non-human animals, plants, the unborn, and the supernatural into the moral universe. In the *Philosophy in Culture*, Mbih Jerome Tosam is of the view that, African morals are founded both on theological and anthropological reality that cannot be gainsaid since the African world view is a continuum. There is no separation between the visible and the invisible worlds. That is, it is based on metaphysical-religious worldview where the community extends to the ancestors, the spirits and so forth.[789] This means that moral values are part and parcel of the traditions of and customs of a people. African reality *per se* is also that of ethical diversity as various African settings have their moral or ethical principles that guide actions of human beings.

In this line, Etta and Asukwo quote Prozesky that *"the moral culture of traditional African society" and their "religious beliefs were fused with moral values to form a single whole."[790]* African moral values are a combination of both ethical, religious belief and culture. But Africans need a critical mind in regard to their personality and identity as well the fundamentals of the transcendent Creator. African moral values are communitarian in the sense that; *"It valorizes the moral primacy of the community over the individual which holds that an action is right if it promotes the interest of the community, and is wrong if it does not."[791]* Man, within the context of this ethics, finds fulfillment not as a separate individual but as a participant in a family and a community.[792] So, the welfare of each member in Africa is dependent *"on the preservation or restoration of one's relationship with his…community."[793]* At the same time, individual members do develop their ethics which must not be in contradiction with the societal norms.[794]

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[789]M. J. Tosam, "Theological and Anthropological Foundation of African Ethics ," in Mbih J. Tosam-Peter Takov,(eds.) *Philosophy in Culture: A cross cultural perspective,* African Books collective, Langaa RPC1G, 2016, pp. 65-85.

[790]E. Emmanuel *et al,* Asukwo Offiong, *"The Nature of African Ethics:" An International Online Multi-disciplinary Journal,* Vol. 1(2) June, 2012, p. 57.

[791]M. J. Tosam. "The Philosophical Foundations of Kom Proverbs:'' *Journal on African Philosophy,* 2014, p. 11.

[792]E. Emmanuel *et al.,* Asukwo Offiong,"The Nature of African Ethics*:"op. cit.,* p 57.

[793]*Ibidem*, p. 59.

[794]*Ibidem*, p. *60.*

From this perspective of African moral values based on the community, Motsamai states"…. The source or foundation of morality is some human property and welfare."[795] This means African morality is founded on the welfare of man. That is the humanism of the Other. Humanism is defined as *"the doctrine that takes human welfare, interests, and needs as fundamental and makes up the foundation of African ethics."*[796] In the same line of thought Gyekye upholds that:

> The views of the traditional philosophers indicate that what is good is constituted by the deeds, habits, and behaviour patterns measured by society as worthy because of their consequences for human welfare. Such includes happiness, generosity, the goods, honesty, hospitality, truthfulness, compassion, faithfulness which brings peace, justice, respect etc. Each of these actions or patterns of behaviour is supposed or known to bring about social well-being.[797]

What Gyekye emphasizes is the fact that welfare is the *raison d'être* of human actions in the African ethical worldview. All actions or behavioural patterns that are of use or benefit to the welfare of society is a good action. Actions that contribute to the wellbeing of the members of the society like the acts of being generous, peaceful, just, compassionate, truthful, remind others of their moral responsibilities of solidarity, charitable respect *inter alia,* and are highly welcome. One can say these values are based on altruism also preached by the South African principle of *Ubuntu.*[798] The *Ubuntu* approach, is not destructive of the Other. It articulates on the Zulu maxim: *"A person is a person through another person."*[799] *We can be human only in fellowship. The law of our being is we have been created for togetherness, for communion…"*[800]This is seen when every event, whether good or bad is shared by the whole community. Correspondingly, this maxim illustrates the human person as existential and ethical, promoting and upholding his dignity in society. In the Akan ethical worldview: "*good or moral value is determined in terms of its consequences for humankind and human society….this requires actions that promote interest and good of human welfare.*[801] Thus the foundation of African ethics is based on the concept of community, human welfare and humanism which is beyond the Levinasian responsibility.

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[795]M. Molefe, "A Rejection of Humanism in African Moral Tradition," Theoria, Vol. 62, No. 2 June 2015, p. 59-77.
[796]K. Gyekye, "African Ethics" 2010 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/#HumFouAfrMor accessed 03/12/2019.
[797] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/#HumFouAfrMor
[798]Letseka, quoted by Valentine B. Ngalim in, *Critical Thinking in Education: An introduction to Philosophy of Education in the African Context,* First edition, 2014, p. 48.
[799]Cf. N. A. Gianan, Delving into the Ethical Dimension of Ubuntu Philosophy Cultura. *International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology* 8(1)/2011: 63–82DOI: 10.2478/v10193-011-0004-1
[800]F.G. Nicholas, "The Colour of Sin/The Colour of Skin: Ancient Colour Blindness and the Philosophical Origins of Modern Racism" *The Journal of Religious Thought,* Vol. 46, No. 1. Howard University Press, 1989, p. 52.
[801] K. Gyekye, "African Ethics," *op. cit*., p 10.

The quest for welfare or favourable conditions for man has provoked man through his reason and conscience to recognize or create other means to live a moral life in the society. Such African moral values undertone the Levinasian responsibility as it revolves not just at the Other in the face-to-face encounter but entails the entire community, seen through the family elders and the ancestors. However, it is a clear fact that the expression African ethics, like the expression African philosophy, appears at the same time as a defense and valorization of African dignity and values. This is certainly the defense against the non-recognition of African values in the global society of devaluation, falsification and denigration of African values. By African ethics, we mean an ethics which belongs particularly and principally to the African people. African ethics clearly stands for the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is good or bad as defined by Africans. In the view of Etta Emanuel and Asukwo Offiong:

> African ethics is a science concerned with the question of right and wrong in human behavior with the African mind set. It deals with how men ought to behave, and why it is wrong to behave in certain ways, and right to behave in certain ways. It is the science that studies the reasons why certain kinds of actions are morally wrong and why other kinds of actions are morally right and commendable.[802]

This has to do with the study of the right and wrong from an African perspective. It is out to give reasons for the rightness and wrongness of certain conducts, and the reasons some acts are recommended. Wiredu mentioned that; "*The theatre of moral upbringing is the home, at the parents' feet and within range of kinsmen's inputs. The mechanism is a precept, example, and correction.*"[803]What is implicitly underlined is that the family and the community, the ancestors, the elders are other anthropological sources of African ethics.

Man's quest for welfare in Africa creates norms for him in society to regulate his actions and character towards others. He does this through his cultural moral values like a sense of solidarity and the common good, a sense of community, a sense of humanity, a sense of nature preservation, a sense of duty and sociality. Nkrumah, on the bright side, terms these moral values as the cardinal ethical principle of philosophical *Consciencism* that treats man as an end in himself and not merely as a means.[804] Thus one's problem is another person's problem. We need others in other to exist and be human and the other needs us in other to exist and be human. The community

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[802] E. Emmanuel *et al.,* Asukwo Offiong, "The Nature Of African Ethics:" *op. cit.,* p 55-60.

[803]K. Wiredu "The Moral Foundations of an African Culture," in Coetzee, P. H. & Roux, A. P. J. (ed) *Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings,* Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2002, p. 288.

[804]K. Nkrumah, *Consciencism*: *Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonization,* USA, 1970, p. 95.

is a place suitable for a communal and social lifestyle. It is a place where social ethics which deals with relationships with others flourish, thus African cardinal virtues.

## 9.1.2 The Cardinal Virtues of African Moral Values

African cardinal virtues and values are basically communalistic or communitarian, thus closely interlinked. The communitarian aspect of African cardinal virtues opens up to solidarity and common Good of its members. Solidarity and common good are moral values that celebrate a high sense of humanity. The idea of humanity evokes the idea of the unity of mankind as a whole as perceived by the stoics.[805] This calls for the respect, the value, the importance that is given to the human being not for any other reason but for the sake of the human being itself. With the value of solidarity, solidarity entails the spirit and feelings of sharing, mutual understanding, mutual belonging, and mutual respect for each other in times of joy and sadness. Life is shared together. This is contrary to the Levinasian responsibility which, the self in the face-to-face encounter is subjected to the Other without reciprocity. The individual existence demands subordination and sacrificed to the common good of community. A major issue in contemporary ethical and political theory is to justify the rationality and scope of this subordination and sacrifice.[806]

The spirit of solidarity in African is expressed in the quality of relation with the other person. This means that life is not worth living in the absence of the others or without the help of others. However, solidarity as a cardinal virtue in Africa is also in the Bantu ethics: wherein the nature of actions has an influence on our vital forces, that is, with the nature of our beings. To Tempels, certain actions, the rightness or wrongness of our actions reduce or increase our vital forces, and as he says force is being and Being is force.[807] Tempels meant that, *the 'muntu' knows practically that by living in accordance with his vital rank in the clan, he is a member of the clan and should contribute to the maintenance and increase of the clan by the normal exercise of his favourable vital influence."[808]*This is to bring out the fact that as a member of the community in Africa, doing our duties or our actions affects our vital forces or beings as they ameliorate upon the quality of our existence. Bantu ethics also reveals the sense of common good and solidarity. Mbih Jerome Tosam

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[805]Nicholas *et al.,* Jiyuan Yu, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*, Blackwell, Australia, 2004, p. 331.
[806]J. S. Mbeti, cited by A. Shorter, African Religions and Philosophy, African Affairs, Volume 69, Issue 277, October 1970, p. 214, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a096053
[807] P. Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy*, Collection Charles RattonEsq, 1959, p. 56.
[808]*Ibidem*, p. 65.

affirms: *In the African culture the teleos of moral values is the promotion of an atmosphere of human well-being, peace and harmony and to prevent the disintegration of the society.*[809]Tempels confirms that in other circumstances Africans will be heard to boast that they respect the rights of the person, and of the goods of others.[810] This is the spirit of solidarity and common good which is not detached from the sense of humanity towards others.

### 9.1.3 Core of Humanity

Solidarity and common good are moral values that celebrate a high sense of humanity in the African community. These are ethical values highly prized in the African ethical community. From an African perspective a community is a place where individuals communally and individually define themselves (i.e. place where the spirit of love, charity, and togetherness are experience in the lives of the people). The African have the belief that the community is a natural environment for their existence based on the relationship amongst members. The idea of humanity evokes the idea of the unity of mankind as a whole as perceived by the stoics.[811] This calls for the respect, the value, the importance that is given to the human being not for any other reason but for the sake of the human being itself.

From this perspective Steve Biko supports this idea of man having a special place in live in an article entitled *Some African Cultural Concepts,* the fact that: *"We believe in the inherent goodness of man.…such a deliberate act of God (creator) to make us a community of brothers …. Hence in all we do requires we always place Man first.'"*[812] What is underlined is the fact that man is good inherently as created by God and thus deserves a primordial place in human relations. Kwasi Weridu says that: *"It has often been said that our traditional outlook was intensely humanistic. It seems to me that, as far as the basis of the traditional ethics is concerned, this claim is abundantly justified."*[813] In the same line Mluleki Mnyaka advocates the morality of Ubuntu founded on the fact that: *"Anything that undermines, hurts, threatens and destroys human beings is not accommodated in this way of life but is frowned upon the human person as it affects the*

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[809]M. J. Tosam. "The Relevance of Kom Ethics to African Development:" *International Journal of Philosophy.* Vol. 2, No. 3, 2014, p. 39.
[810]P. Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p 56.
[811]N. Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*, *op. cit.,* p 331.
[812]S. Biko, *I Write What I Like*. Ed. Aelred A. Stubbs. The Bowerdean Press, 1978, p. 42.
[813]K. Wiredu, "The Moral Foundation of African Culture" *op. cit.*, p 6.

*foundation of society…"*[814] *Ubuntu* therefore, stands against destructive actions that will affect man on the basis of the society and the human being. All human beings therefore deserves respect through acceptable conduct that is made manifested by our speech and the way one thus relates with others. And this relation is communal or within the community.

At this juncture a communal life style is the very essence of the African community. Desmond Tutu emphasizes that: *"In Africa a person (we say) is a person through other persons. It is only in fellowship we can be human. The law of our being is that we have been created for togetherness, for communion;…"*[815]This communality is seen when every event whether good or bad is shared by the whole community. Ones' problem is another person's problem. We need the others in other to exist and be human and the other needs us in other to exist and be human. The community is a place suitable for a communal and social life style. It is a place where social ethics which deals with relationships with others flourish, thus African social ethics. The core of African communal life is rooted in the conception of equilibrium and harmony in community. This is the very nature and essence of relational principle and polarities to stability. The principle of equilibrium is consequently a principle of enabling life.[816] It is, therefore in principle that Opuko states:

> The essence of community is not limited to relationships with human beings alone. There is community with environment since man is part of nature and is likely to collaborate with it; and this logic or essence of community with the environment is often articulated in terms of identity and kinship, friendliness and respect ... The need to remain in harmony with nature often takes a religious form when features of environment are personified ... Residual in accord with the environment also means conserving nature, henceforth the concept of taboo as a ritual exclusion intended to protect nature is establish in African cultures.[817]

Such restrictions express African man's responsibility in preserving nature. This simply means Africans depends so much on cosmic harmony. Furthermore, from the African perspective, the community and its members, as well as its environment, constitute a complex whole and there is a moral inter-relationship between social relations and natural events.[818] The community is an environment favourable for Social ethics in African ethics. African social ethics entails the relationship that each and every individual maintains in a given society based on certain norms

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[814]M. Mnyaka- Mokgethi Motlhabi, "The African Concept of Ubuntu/Botho And Its Socio-Moral Significance: Black Theology*:" An International Journal,* Equinox Publishing Ltd, London, 2005, p. 219.

[815]F. G. Nicholas, "The Colour of Sin/The Colour of Skin: Ancient Colour Blindness and the Philosophical Origins of Modern Racism" *The Journal of Religious Thought,* Vol. 46, No. 1. Howard University Press, 1989, p. 52.

[816]H. Rücker, *Afrikanische Theologie-Darstellung und Dialog.* Tyrolia 1985, p. 150.

[817] K. A. Opoku, "African Traditional Religion", in Olupona, J .K., Nyang, S. S., *Religious Plurality in Africa Essays* in Honour of John S. Mbiti, Mouton de Gruyter, 1993, p.77f.

[818] *Ibidem*, p.77f.

and regulations to guide them for the benefit and for well-being of every person in the community. The natural environment of man is the community, thus man is a social being.

Man's nature is that of constantly relating with the others in the community. This means by nature man is a relational being, born to live with other. He cannot do otherwise except to live with others, thus a social animal. Thus, social ethics is this inclination to relate with others. In the same perspective Julius Nyerere upholds, that*, "to be a socialist means that you have to put yourself in relation to the neighbor.'"[819] African social ethics is made manifest in many adages that insist on *"the importance of the values of mutual helpfulness, collective responsibility, cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal obligations."*[820] The social character of morality requires that the individual member of the society, ever mindful of his interests, adjust those interests to the interests and needs of others. This mean the individual person in the African context has a dual responsibility[821] for his or herself and also for members who he or she co-habitat with in society.[822]

The fact that man is a social being, oriented to have relations with others in the community involves obligations. Kwame Gyekye opines: *"relationality is natural since it involves the individual in both the social and moral roles in the forms of commitments, duties and obligations and … to other members of his or her community which the individual must fulfill."*[823] The underlying factor here is based on the fact that relating with others or a relational life is the foundation of the ethics of duty. *Duty comprises the requirements, obligations, or assign-ments ascribed position is… responsible."*[824] This duty or taking charge of others entails portraying a sense of the other. Taking the needs and interest of the other as a moral obligation, thus, it is a sense of altruism.

On this note, Nelson Mandela showed a sense of moral obligation during the fight to freedom for the community of Blacks in South Africa by declaring that: *In life, every man has twin obligations: Obligations to his family...and to his people, his community, and his country. In...a*

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[819] J. Nyerere, cited by Martin Nkafu Nkemnkia, in *African Vitology: A step Fowards in African Thinking*, Saint Paul Communication, Kolbe Press, 1999, p.119.
[820] K. Gyekye, "African Ethics" 2010 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/#HumFouAfrMor (accessed 03/12/2013).
[821] *Ibid*
[822] *Ibid*
[823] *Ibid*
[824] N. Bunnin- Jiyuan Yu, *The Blackwell Dictionary Of Western Philosophy*, *op. cit*., p 196.

*human society each man is able to fulfil those obligations....my commitment to my people ,to the millions of south Africans I would never know or meet at the expense of my people I knew best and love most.*[825] These are the words of a freedom fighter who sacrifices his life for his community, for his nation and for his people which to him is an obligation. Thus he is conscious of his duty to serve his people.

Africans have the belief that, the community is a natural environment for their existence based on the relationship amongst members. It is an environment where individuality is discouraged. This calls for a relational ethics and demands duties and obligations when one relates with others. This is what is expressed in the weaknesses of the Levinasian notion of responsibility (ethics). Furthermore, we debated on African moral values beyond the Levinasian notion of responsibility for the Other in the face of the crisis of humanity. The principal idea focused on African moral values which emphasizes on honesty, justice and concerns with the welfare of Man in society. However, it also had much value for social construction and development based on African moral principles and codes of conduct that promotes reciprocity and solidarity amongst its members of society.

## 9.2 WEAKNESS OF LEVINASIAN ETHICS

There are certain aspects of Levinasian approach of responsibility that have far-reaching consequences in the global society to man and the environment due to its anthropocentric nature. That is, man centre as the only criterion for morality. On a critical tend, Jacque Derrida deconstructed the Levinas' Other, and seeks to reveal that rather than the Other being infinite and absolute as Levinas demands, the Other must be recognizable as "Other than myself." On this note, Zizeks' argues that Levinasian ethics lacks ground based only on the primacy of the face in the ethical encounter. He argues for a cold justice that chooses against the face for the third. Hans Jonas diverts concern and criticizes ancient ethics, constructing the *Imperative of Responsibility* that constitutes man and the preservation of nature (environment). Further, Ricoeur and Wojtyla developed the will, Love and friendship in confrontation to Levinas responsibility as the only criterion in the face. On a more practical sense, Albert Marcus review Levinas' ethics as a critical point of departure for the ethics of discussion and dialogue as the only possibilities in the global

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[825]N. Mandela, *A Long Walk To Freedom: The Autobiography Of Nelson Mandela,* United States Of America, copywright, 1994, p.123.

society. This possibility of dialogue would be the only condition for the Kantian categorical imperative as the fundamental core of reconstructing the global society.

### 9.2.1 Levinasian ethics as hard anthropocentric ethics

In the phenomenological tradition of Levinas, the experience of ethics finds its basis on the self and this experience is inescapable. The Levinasian ethics can be accused of hard anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism is understood here in the sense that moral value is given only to human beings. He says: *"the first word of the face is the 'Thou shall not kill… the face of the other is destitute; it is the poor whom I can do everything and to whom I owe everything ….'I am he who therefore resources to and find respond to the other call."*[826]The distinction lies in the fact that the other person is he who defines the way the self has to relate. The self has to do everything to respond to the other's presence. On Levinasian grounds, ethics is not merely solipsistic in nature, but precisely the experience of the Other. This experience does not just come from the Other but primarily the other itself.[827]Thus, Levinasian ethics is hard anthropocentric, that is, man centered. Etymologically, the word anthropocentrism means man-centred. Its root lies in the Greek word *anthropos* which means man and the Latin word *centralis* which means central. Anthropocentrism is a branch of ethics based completely on the interests of human beings.

So, anthropocentric views consider human beings as the most significant entity of the universe. This perspective holds that human beings are detach from nature and are advanced compared to nonhuman species. Man being the measure of all things in the Protagoras lens is the foundation of all human experience and values,[828] as the moral subject consideration with intrinsic values. Thus, profound anthropocentric ethics takes a prominent place throughout Levinas' thought. To an extent, such perspective of Levinasian responsibility is an equivocation of the human and the ethical, that is, the human, is the ethical and the ethical is the human.[829] The human aligns with the emergence of the ethical relation and with an outstretched hand, all of them have an interesting and compelling ethical appeal. For him, only humans have speech, language, the ability to see and the faculties of reason and justice.[830]

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[826]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit.,* pp  88-89.
[827]R. Eaglestone, *Ethical Criticism: Reading after Levinas.* Edinburgh University Press, 1997. p. 209.
[828]E. Levinas, "Meaning and sense", in Peperzak, A., Critchley, S. & Bernasconi, R. (Eds.) *Emmanuel Levinas. Basic philosophical writings.* Indiana University Press, 1996, pp. 33-64.
[829]D. R. Moyer, *The Priority of the Human in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, 1981, p. 15. https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/10704 Consulted online 4/4/2020
[830]*Ibidem*, p. 38.

So from this outlook, man in general, can be said to be the criterion for morality, thus, renders it anthropocentric. This dimension of the Levinasian ethics can have some negative repercussions in the global society of today as it can lead to the neglect of nature like respect and care for the environment, consequently one has to act indiscriminately on the environment or the ecosystem. The indiscriminate destruction of nature has negative repercussions on humans. Thus this contributes to *"a human origin of the ecological crisis.*"[831] And we all observe how *"Modern anthropocentrism has paradoxically ended up prizing technical thought over reality…"*[832]This means modern times valorizes technological ideas more than reality. Therefore "*To harm the environment is to harm ourselves, and to protect earth is self-defense of ones' self."[833]* It discloses nature can retaliates. This aspect of Levinasian ethics, that is hard anthropocentric and its consequences that it can have upon the environment need or can be moderated or avoided with the holistic approach of African ethics which is soft anthropocentric ethics.

It is the view that: "that human interest is still primary, but argues that human beings should cultivate an attitude of noble obligation toward the environment."[834] This view encourages an attitude of care and respect for the environment as it exploits natural resources. It encourages responsibility towards nature or the environment since there is no difference between the natural and the supernatural world. It encourages a philosophy of "not taking more than one's needs from nature." This has to do with ethics that encourages peaceful coexistence with the environment because man needs the environment to exist.

Jacques Derrida argues that Levinas' ethics is andocentric (man centred). On the notion of alterity, Derrida suggests that it, requires this relational aspect, and is hence conceivable only in relation to the self.[835] To him, Alterity should or must be "*other than the self*." He suggested that dissymmetry would be impossible without some form of symmetry (regularity).[836]Derrida, opposes Levinas' absolute singularity in the encounter with the face. The core element is every

[831]Pope Francis, Encyclical   Letter  *Laudato Si'* Of The Holy Father On Care For  Our Common  Home, Vatican Press, p. 75.

[832]*Ibidem.*

[833]A. O. Philomena, "An African Understanding of Environmental Ethics, *"Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK),* New Series, Vol.2 No.2, December 2010, p. 53.

[834]Osuntokun cited by Philomena A. Ojomo, in "Environmental ethics: An African understanding:" *African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology,* Vol. 5(8), Lagos State University, 2011, p. 573.

[835]J. Derrida, *Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas." In Writing and Difference*, trans by Alan Bass, 79-153. University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 126.

[836]*Ibidem*

Other is absolutely Other.[837] The meaning of this enigmatic formulation will be pursued the moment it is clear that responsibility towards the Other involves both disclosure singularity and secrecy.

In addition, Zizek's argues that grounding ethics in the relationship to the Other's face is *a prior* impossible since the limitation of our capacity to relate to others' faces is the mark of our very finitude.[838]In other words, the limitation of our ethical relation of responsibility toward the Other's face provokes the rise of the Third is to regulates justice in the global society. It is this condition, we find ourselves, in situations not of our making and beyond our understanding. Situations that involving people, which is; the condition of justice and a condition that has to remain abstract, rather than understood in terms of concrete persons. In other words, the denial and postulation of a final translatability of the Third into a relation with Other's face made Levinas remain caught in the vicious cycle of "understanding." Zizek's further argues that Levinas ultimately anchors the symbolic order of norms in the face, which guarantees itself. According to Zizeks, the face does not anchor norms or guarantee itself. It presents itself beyond any intelligibility that I supply. Such a presentation is utterly ambiguous. Thus, to Zizeks, the only access I have to the face is indirect; a trace of the Other appears in the congestion or overcrowding of my conceptual machinery.

Caught in the vicious cycle, Dussel argues that Levinas' philosophical works are Eurocentric-that he never acknowledged how 'the Other' could be an African, Asian or Indian. At such, Dussel seems to mistake Levinas essence of the ethical intersubjective relationship for working at the abstract level without discussing concrete instantiations beyond the Holocaust and the environmental hazards. Another criticism in light with Hans Jonas is that Levinas focuses only on human beings and does not take into account a responsibility to the world where these humans live or to non-human beings. However, Levinas further, describes the complexity of this relationship where the 'I' and 'the Other' are not alone, since there is also a third being or object, by which the laws are conditional and justice is established, since we are obliged to judge, to make judgments and to compare[839] hence the importance of the presence of the global States.

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[837]E. Levinas, "Meaning and sense", in Peperzak, A., Critchley, S. & Bernasconi, R. (Eds.). *Emmanuel Levinas. Basic philosophical writings.* Indiana University Press, 1996, pp. 33-64.
[838]S. Zizek, Critique of Levinas Other, https://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2006/03/zizeks_critique.html online 23/1/2020
[839]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philip Nemo. op. cit.,* p 75.

In a contemporary meander, Hans Jonas' ethics of responsibility is deeply influenced by the insight that classical ethical theories operate on the basis of an unrecognized assumption. Jonas precisely argues that: classical ethical theories restricted the area of human actions to the immediate or local space of physical social interaction. According to him, nature was not an object of human responsibility.[840] Levinas' claims about ethics are anthropocentric in the sense that is viewed in the lens of being human in the world through the phenomenological approach.[841] Thus, anthropocentrism (human concerns) is a core element in his philosophy and all his works are an analysis of the human only. Indeed, it is fair to say that for Levinas *Mitsein*, being-with (the Other) is *prior* to *Dasein* (the being-there of Martin Heidegger).[842] Jonas argues that anthropocentric ethics does not consider the principle of nature except in religion that considers ethics with brotherhood. It was not oriented to nature, it was man centred. It gave power to man over the environment. That is, man created his own feature in nature without any moral responsibility towards the environment. Jonas' ethics was based on sensibility, the disastrous effect of science.

In a new ethical metaphysics, there is hope that human beings will orientate themselves by discovering meaning, making good decisions and reflecting on the meaning of setting limits. This does not mean to the practice of ethics as a system of norms, but to make the ethical effective. Ethics is not based on the domination of regime or perfect will, but rather, on the confidence in human's longing for morals. For Jonas, the situation calls for a practical philosophical extension towards an ethics of responsibility in the direction of the future, which is, the horizon of all existence "humans and nonhuman. According to Jonas, the characteristics of modern technological civilization have changed the nature of our moral obligations. Responsibility now takes a new dimension as in the Kantian categorical imperative: *"Act in such a way that the effects of your actions are compatible with the permanence of a genuine human life."*[843] To ensure "genuine human life," according to Jonas, means to protect the Other and our environment.

In brief, man cannot be fully human without nature; the destruction of nature is a threat to man's own «essence». This implies we are part of nature. Therefore, we have a responsibility to preserve and protect it. As such, one's action should not be destructive of the future possibility of such life and should not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity

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[840]D. R. Moyer, "The Priority of the Human in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas", *op. cit.,* p 39.
[841]R. Eaglestone, *Ethical Criticism: Reading after Levinas.* Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1997. p. 210.
[842]H. Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age.* Trans by David Herr. Chicago university press, 1984, p. 4.
[843]*Ibidem*, p. 11.

on earth.[844] To him, one's choice should include the future wholeness of man among the objects of his will. Human progress remains at the core of Jonas' *imperative of responsibility* that echo the *"Heuristics of fear"*[845] imagining the consequences of modern technology, taken the precautionary measure. The Heuristics of fear springs from the practicality of modern technology with disastrous effects on the environment caused by the Second World War. The fast evolution of science is the consequence of disasters. That is, nature is imbued with life. The responsibility principle calls for a radical ethics. Thus, for Hans Jonas, in today's environmental situation, the ethicist must encourage us to reflect in terms of responsibility, the core of traditional humanism.

Responsibility today needs to care for the future humanity which is the overruling duty of individual and collective human action in the age of a technical civilization that has become almighty if not in its productive then at least in its destructive potential. This brings us to the cardinal point: the loss of reality and there with of human dignity as the dialectics of power over nature. Such apocalyptic perspectives are calculable built into the structure of the present course of humanity. It must be understood that we are here confronted with the dialectics of power which can only be overcome by a further degree of power itself, not by a quietist renunciation of power. As illustrated, modern occurrence of biomedical sciences and genetics are essential for our technological contemporary society of today. This ushers us to Levinasian individualistic ethics and anti-rule principles.

## 9.2.2 Levinasian individualistic ethics and anti-rule

Levinas' individualistic ethics is somehow, detrimental to communal or universal laws that should guide and regulate the actions of individual in the global society. Ethics is therefore *not the setting up of rules that tell us how we ought to conduct ourselves towards others, as in the notion of 'applied ethic.'*[846] This means that, Levinas did not understand human nature; for human nature is the one that also needs external rules to govern human actions. Man's nature is such that he needs to be regulated by rules and regulations to limit the excesses of his actions. But when Levinas dismisses rules or norms to guide human actions, it becomes absurd. That is why we deem it necessary and vital that this individualistic aspect and its consequences need to be corrected to

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[844]*Ibidem*, pp. 77-136.
[845]*Ibidem*, p. 27.
[846]L. D. Introna, *Opinion. Work Place Surveillance 'is 'Unethical and Unfair':* Surveillance & Society, 1(2): 2003, pp. 210-216.

avoid such pessimistic individualistic ethics. It is for this reason that Pope Francis affirms that; *"If we can overcome self-centeredness, we will truly be able to develop a new and different lifestyle wherein, it will bring about significant changes in the global society."[847]*This is because of the disadvantages of individualism which prone self-centeredness.

Levinasian ethics based on the asymmetrical relation can lead to chaos, especially to opportunism. Therefore, it can also lead to exploitation. In that, the obligation to the Other, in the face of the impotence (weakness) of the Self, reinforces the freedom of the Other and entails responsibility towards the Self. Levinas ethics to an extent is frictional. That is, one cannot always please the other than self. Levinas says charity begins with another. The other, to him, is seen from a dimension of height. This implies, we cannot love a transcendental being (God) that we do not see and hate the neighbour whom we come across daily. According to Levinas, rules should be kept aside to guide human actions. To him, society should not have rules. Like ancient morality that was based on principles. Levinas is against any universal rules that should govern human action; to him what should call you to human action is the face of the Other, no rules nor imperative. The only imperative is the face of the Other, which is in script *"thou shalt not kill"*.[848]Levinas criticizes universal ethics of the Other but falls in the fallacy of circular definition. This means, he objects to any system that should guide human actions but, in the end, he creates another system by saying that ethics must only pass through the face of the other.

Levinas to an extent, failed by terming responsibility in the face as the only imperative that commands us. According to Levinas, the only moral conscience is the face of the Other. He dismissed inner will.[849] Therefore, Levinas' ethics is not based on the will and human nature. The responsibility of the subject is not a response to the call of the Other as obedience but as a free act. However, kindness depends on my will. There is a question of free will that Levinas left aside, reducing this will to the sphere of timing.[850] The will is for Levinas a capacity to start which, for him, is exceeded by the an-archic character of the call of others to my responsibility. I am not responsible for my responsibility. This is admissible and justifiable, but this understanding of

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[847]Pope Francis, Encyclical  Letter  *Laudato Si'* Of  The  Holy  Father, *op. cit.,*  p 152.
[848]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit*., p 88-89.
[849]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit*., p 217.
[850]P. Ricoeur, *Ethics and Responsibility*-Texts gathered by Jean-Christophe Aeschlimann Collection "Langages" Neuchâtel, Éditions de la Baconnière, 1994, p. 97.

responsibility which exceeds us remains confronted with indifference (lack of sympathy). No doubt it appears here that responsibility and freedom are inseparable.

At this point of reflection, it seems perhaps that it is necessary to rethink the notion of will as comprising a dimension of passivity and a dimension of activity. Here can be opposed to Levinas the idea that the will of the subject may not necessarily be authentic and that it is possible to consider the will otherwise. It is certain that, the modern concept of subjectivity gives a beautiful even exclusive part to the active man, autonomous in his action. In particular, it presents Kant and his moral of the imperative. It is important to underline here, that after Kant, it might be not easy to accept this seemingly convoluted structure of responsibility as we are used to assuming free moral rational law (autonomous rather than heteronomous).[851] It evident that Kantian subject appears an empty space, while the Levinasian subject ascends the concrete through the encounter with the Other, which does not occurs only in a certain place but also at a certain time.

The Other for Levinas is singular, as am I in such an encounter. I encounter the Other, or not until I encounter the Other, but before, as there is no time without the Other. Undeniably, we must not forget that humans are born not posited, that temporality is generational not merely personal, that neither the ego nor being is the origin of all things. Responsibility for the Other is immemorial and un-representable than any consciousness. The singular character presented by a creature as response to the *sanction* in Genesis, of inquiry in the world beforehand been a world and in the world of the subject autonomy."[852] The subject is autonomous, it determines itself. This is taken up even in personalism with the concept of self-determination, developed by Karol Wojtyla, and Mounier for example. However, an ethics such as personalistic ethics shows us that this notion of self-determination is not necessarily incompatible with the dimension of an ethics founded in the relationship with others, or others appears to be an end more than an ethical object.

We think of the analyzes that punctuate his work of ethics of Love and responsibility, in particular the extension that Wojtyla makes of Kantian morality and which seems to open not only to the ethical singularization, accomplished by Levinas, in the face of others but also to a maintenance of human freedom as an ability to determine oneself in relation to others.[853]Wojtyla

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[851]E. Levinas, *Of God who Comes to Mind*. Trans by Bettina Bergo. Stanford University Press. 1998, p. 166. http/www.//EnactingLevinassinfiniteresponsibilityasanethico-politicocompromise.
[852] *Ibid*
[853]It appears here what is found at other times in the work of Ricoeur, namely the presentation of a similarity between Kant and Levinas, these two authors being distinguished in the fact that one universalizes the command in the categorical imperative where the other distinguishes it in the face of others.

writes: Kant formulated this elementary principle of the moral order in the imperative: "act in such a way that you never treat the person of others simply as a means, but always at the same time as the end of your action."[854]The fact is that the personalistic ethics that: Karol Wojtyla's analyzes are reigniting a concept of ethics no longer based only on an internal law but on the love of others. The question that Levinas excellently posed is to know if this morality is not in fact placed on a primacy of the subject giving itself its own laws, in an indifference to others. Wojtyla offers an interesting alternative here. The command or principle of which Wojtyla speaks is base on Jesus Christ, of course, after Kant is the command of love. The personalist norm finds its value in an estimate of others which presupposes a non-self-determined recognition. This implies that the ethical subject is not just understood as making laws. The ethical subject is first of all a subject for the Other, a subject that welcomes others as an object of love and responsibility.

The will according to Wojtyla can be understood as a welcoming capacity before being a capacity for domination. It would no longer be defined as a capacity for effectiveness and primary freedom (in the modern sense) but for receptivity. This is exactly the case with love and even friendship, which has an ecstatic aspect. Love moves others from the category of means to the category of end. This distinction is what Wojtyla makes between loving and using. It joins Levinas well here, except for this, and it is indeed the interest of our reflection that Wojtyla maintains an effectiveness of the subject in love and in fact, in responsibility.[855] Without brotherly love (i.e. in line with Jesus' teaching), it is not possible to discover the meaning of life in the global society. However, we must go further and say that responsibility depends on the subject's free choice to submit to others, not as a slave but as a friend. In reality, we can agree with Levinas that his extensive use of responsibility goes so far as to make the subject a guilty hostage more than all, hides a deep thought of friendship. However, following Ricoeur, it is necessary to keep in light the need to think of responsibility other than as a duty even founded in a personal encounter with others.[856]

In a certain sense, it is in line with the thinking of Levinas to criticize on the one hand the primacy of freedom in the thinking of the moderns and, on the other hand, to think of the primacy of a passivity which is in the meeting with others, at the foundation of ethics. It appears, however,

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[854]K. Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibility*, Éditions du Dialogue, 1978, p. 20.
[855]*Ibidem*, p. 46.
[856]Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Ethics and Responsibility*, *op cit.,* p 37.

in this encounter with others, Levinas presents others as naked and weak, a character that rightly challenges the subject. At the same time what Levinas may have overlooked is that the subject's love for others is also always personal, it is not unique. "The responsibility is founded on the fundamental experiment of a personal love"[857] which does not engage in any way the freedom of the subject and precedes it but it is not reduced to that. Responsibility requires a passage to pass from an "affective" union to an "effective" union. Moreover, this passage requires the subject to make a free choice. Levinas seems, in this analysis, to miss this moment of the passage understood as a free, subjective and personal act. At least he does not develop this free effectuation of responsibility, if not in the "here I am" but which appears more as an obedience to a duty than a free choice.

In fact, Levinas is conscious (i.e. he has later been criticized by postmodern thinkers) for the difficulty of this overwhelming responsibility for the Other which gets under ones' ability or sticks to you like the shirt of Nessus. It is not by free choice, even if "To be without a choice can seem to be violence only to an offensive or swift and imprudent reflection. To support the universe is a crushing charge, but a divine discomfort that is imbuing for human progress. It is rather, better than the merits and faults and sanctions proportionate to the freedom of one's choices"[858] Each person's responsibility for the Other, as exigency, is not limited by capabilities or abilities, not exempted (excused) by our limitations or those of the situation. The responsible person is guilty before the Other, has never fulfilled all the incumbent obligations, definitely, but the responsible person is also without excuse. You cannot evade being responsible for the Other.

The ethical act then appears here primordially in the global society as a capacity to welcome others in a fundamental experience or the Other becomes the one I love. Responsibility finds its source in the experience of a personal encounter with others and the birth of a personal love for others. But this act and this ethical will is also the capacity to make this intention of goodness an effective ethical position, a commitment, a dedication for the Other, according to the expression of Levinas. Responsibility as presented by Levinas is like one vowing to another. It appears devoid of any notion of reciprocity. In this sense, friendship is diametrically other than responsibility. It seems that to Levinas, reciprocity is linked to profit-sharing. Reciprocity would be the prerogative of equality and equity, concepts which are more suited to political and factual

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[857]K. Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibility*, *op. cit.*, p 66.
[858]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*. *op. cit.,* p 122.

justice, as presented in *Totality and Infinity*. What I give you, give it to me in turn, such is the profitability that Levinas fights and which seems to be of the order of reciprocity.

To an extent, Wojtyla opines: "the need for reciprocity to an extent does not completely exclude the impartial (disinterested) atmosphere of love. »[859]However, it seems that reciprocity is like the sign of a will to think first of yourself and to base the love we have for others on what they bring us and not on what they are.  In this sense, the desire for reciprocity would therefore be completely at odds with the idea of a responsibility which determines us to worry about the other for free. Wojtyla's purpose therefore appears to be contradictory since it unites two realities which in themselves oppose each other. To understand his thinking, we must try to better understand the necessary relationship between love and reciprocity. We were talking about personal love above. We must go further by showing the interpersonal aspect of love and therefore of responsibility. The idea supported here is that responsibility finds its most complete form in friendship.

What has to be recognized after Wojtyla is that not only love but also responsibility can only be realized if there is reciprocity. From the point of view of friendship, the relationship can only develop if not only one but two people make the free choice to make the Other their friend. From a responsibility point of view, reciprocity seems necessary by the simple fact that our responsibility always lies with a friend. However, it is important to know if it is possible to have a more extensive responsibility for its interpersonal basis. The challenge here is to be able to think that political questions going beyond the interpersonal framework can be nourished by ethical responsibility. In fact, the question is not whether, in our ethical actions extended beyond the interpersonal sphere such as political, social or humanitarian action, the nobility of our acts is marred by a search for interests that would improperly grant the name of reciprocity.

To come back to the objection, it should be clarified: responsibility is always exercised in relation to a person whom we consider good for us, in a word, whom we love and whom we esteem. The ethical act would not only be based on a recognition of the call that the Other makes us to serve him but also the recognition of the capacity of others to become for us this responsible person whether in interpersonal relationships, social or political. The Levinasian subject bears witness to the infinite in the sense that, for Levinas, it represents the transcendence which commands us to be responsible. What Levinas says is not that others testify to the infinite because it commands us.

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[859]K. Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibility*, *op. cit.*, p 77.

A testimony, an attestation of the infinite appears in others because it is in front of others that the subject, for Levinas, finds it obligatory and says "here I am". The subject does not undertake responsibility for any other object, he only knows it.

According to Levinas, institutions have failed to protect the sacredness of the Other in the society. They have made us forget the concrete reality of the Other. They have reduced people to subhuman beings. Levinas is against theoretical thematization of the face of the Other. Levinas says; we have been given the impression that God is far, while God is found in the face of the Other. Thematization is the way in which *anything* appears as a phenomenon. The face of the Other is infinite, while the very presence of the Other to him is the only thing that should pull our attention. Levinas thoughts were not the only means for ethics.

Above all, for man to be balanced in the global society, we need rules and regulation. It is for this reason that Levinas talks of the "third party." However, Levinas realizes that the third party needs to come in and regulate one's actions in the face-to-face encounter. It would also seem that the presence of the third party adds more load on the Subject. The Subject is face with many others and the third party is always ontological. The Other and others therefore emanates different ontologies. However, to some extent, Levinas' thought has struck a triad (chord) with certain elements of post-colonial global discourse. Deleuze, on this note, name this encounter in the face with the appearance of the third as a political face.[860]

Deleuze offers an ethics which does not compromise with transcendence (not limited to the subject or human), but which does articulates itself in immanence. As such, he renders difference as a presence rather than as an absence. Therefore, ethics begin necessarily from ontology: it is both how we work with the given, and how we become adequate with it. Deleuze's ethics are tied to the concept of ontology, wherein, there is evidence of an epistemological imperative to his ethics. Besides, subjectivity is absent in Deleuze's ethics because he did not want to confer on it metaphysical primacy which would make it a transcendent principle.

Deleuze describes subjectivation as a process of enfolding both the ontological and the social. The result is a concept of life which may describes as at once both the metaphysical and political reality of our global society. His politics is that of localized interaction based on understanding the affective capabilities of bodies in particular arrangement. Our contention is that,

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[860] A. Pearson. Keith. Ed. *Germinal life: Difference and Repetition of Deleuze*, Routledge 1999, p. 13.

Deleuze subject is capable of political action precisely because it is embodied in relational networks with both others and its environment and its therefore not individualistic but collectively constituted that differentiate his ethics from Levinas' individualistic ethics. The Other must exist independently of its function in subject/object relations: that structure is thereby made redundant.

To him, it is *a priori Other* which is the possibility of the Other in the structural sense, from the concrete Other, which he describes as I for you and you for me. Such desire is social. Conversely, Deleuze position the Other structure as social rather than metaphysical a priori. Thus, he sees the Other as the expression of a possible global society. The Other annihilates its own possible world every time it encounter the one presented by the Other, the self is never more than the past world. The ethical relation is not between self and Other, subject and object or subject and subject: it is the relation between expressive individuals. Expressive individuals are in context of perspectivism. To speak of the Other (Subject), is to speak of the custom, duration, habit and anticipation. This means that the experience of the other does not happen already to an established constituted mind. On the contrary, what constitutes the mind are experiences themselves, registered as the idea that reflect the encounter of sensation. Whenever we encounter an individual, we come in contact in the way another person affectively engages with their experiences of the world.

To an extent, the subject is able to transcend the given by its own ability to believe in things which are beyond its own very experience which is not exterior to the influence of its world. The Deleuzian subject is therefore a product of its own world. He does question the relationship between what is known about knowledge and what is known about the other (being) in the history of philosophy.[861] We therefore contend that the way Deleuze theorizes subjectivity provides new resource for a politics of difference (alteration), in as much as it precludes identity as foundational category. Our imperative is therefore to allow ourselves to be made or rather unmade with those differences we encounter and facilitate in the global society. Hence there is need to construct a new ontological and metaphysical image of thought and a new ethics and politics towards a thought worthy of the events that befall the crisis of humanity in the global society. Deleuze's ethics is contrary to Levinas' ethics which functions in absence of religious discourse.

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[861]A. Pearson. Keith. Ed. *Germinal life: Difference and Repetition of Deleuze*, *op. cit.,* pp 13-16.

In brief, Levinas is more of conscientizing people in another way of life. On the contrary, to Levinas, philosophy should be a way of life contrary to those who preceded him by reducing ethics into moral systems. To him, those moral systems have failed to take into reality the concrete human being. Levinas is re-educating people that our moral systems have failed because we have had systems of war "the First and Second World War" to him if we have had all these atrocities is because our moral systems have not been effective because they have remained only in the air. In Jacque Derrida positions: *looking at the face of the other person reminds me of my own death that is the face makes me think of my weakness."* To him, one is exposed, one can decide to kill the Other, but the face of the other reminds me of the very fact that am also a human being like the Other. For Levinas, the face is the impetus that drives one to kill the Other while at the same time, it should ethically prevent one from killing the Other through a recognition of "the one for whom I am responsible."[862] While perhaps Levinas puts forth the idea that ideally killing should not occur, he does not dismiss the fact that it does. What Levinas does here is put forth an ethical stance that is more ideal than real. This leads us to the strength of Levinasian ethics.

## 9.3 STRENGTH OF LEVINASIAN ETHICS FOR THE OTHER

Levinasian ethics finds its strength in the face of the Other for socialization in the crisis of humanity in the global society. To him, the face does not belong to any special individual; it is a universal face of ethics and transcendence. It expresses itself. That is; the face is the universal visage in the face-to-face encounter with the Other, "to see a face is already bearing you should not kill" and to hear you should not kill is to hear "social justice." For Levinas, justice well done to an individual is justice done to the whole of humanity. Hence the face opens up the world as an experience of possibility. According to Levinas, the face precedes life experiences in terms of either significance or subjectification. The face is derived from the transcendent Other, that is, *"Otherwise than Being"* and the face, thus, gives priority to the concept of justice and responsibility.

### 9.3.1 Valorization of the Other person as a categorical requirement in the global society

The welfare of a human being is the reason why an ethical life has to be lived. Human actions that do not contribute to the welfare of the other human being are considered unethical

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[862]E. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, op. cit.,* p 166.

while those that contribute to the humanity of the others are considered ethical. Levinasian responsibility focuses on the humanity and the dignity of others as it advocates for the non-violation of the intimacy of the others because they are unique human beings. Others should not be used as a means to an end but as an end in themselves. Intrinsically, Kant further states: *"act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."*[863]The other should be treated with respect. Levinas valorizes the welfare of the Other as the kernel of every human relation. This is done by objectively relating with other humans.

The human face inspires ethics as in it there are the moral features; pain, the feelings of suffering, joy, enthusiasm, hope and the physical features such as a look or a smile, which together communicate to us the inter-subjective body language.[864] It thus provides access to what lies deep within 'the Other's' being. 'The Other', is what makes one a human. The essence of the human and what makes him genuinely so, lies in his relationships with the Others in society. This is the grand mystery and core of humanity. A true dialogue and conversation between people of diversity-the transcendence, the exit from oneself-is the human as is the relationship with the other people. The encounter with the other reveals the self. This encounter with the other ruptures and disrupts the possibility of totalization.

Levinas is not out to construct an ethical system or code of conduct but he is out to restore the dignity of the Other. He thinks that, there is a need for ethical relations with others as men experience reduction and violence.[865] Ethics is found in the human face. A look into the face of the Other determines the awareness of basic human responsibility and its ethical meaning.[866] So what about the ethical systems? The pressing issues here are to derivate moods of more fundamental foundations based on lived experience. Our lived experience is what provides solid grounding or foundations upon which issues like dignity and equality can occur or manifest themselves. The foundational experience which is ethical happens between me and 'the Other.' This reveals we are actually very different. The reality is what strikes and surprises me as the subject is that the 'Other' and my-self in the global society are different.

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[863]E. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason and other works on the Theory of Ethics,* Longman's Green Co., 1954, p. 47.
[864]M. A. Millán-Atenciano, y Tomás y Garrido, G. M. Persona y rostro, principios constitutivos de la bioética personalista. *Persona y Bioética*, *16*(2), (2012). p. 173.
[865]Cf. D. H. Moyer, "The Priority of the Human in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas", *op cit.,* p 11-12.
[866]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 87-89.

The 'Other' speaks to me differently, and acts different from how I act. Such difference Levinas calls alterity. This difference in the global context tells me, what is going on when I encounter 'the Other' and whether I am expected to initiate some form of discourse or response with him/her. This, therefore, changes the way I think now and it opens me to another world of sociality and harmony. I therefore have to change my thought because I have encountered the 'Other' who is questioning me. It is this difference that makes me question what is going on before reason to his humanity. As mentioned earlier, for Levinas, the face of the other sanctions is moral law even before reason comes into the picture. It is the face of the Other that encounters me profoundly and directly. The face discloses itself, propelling an ethical stance. In valorizing humanity, Levinas says, *the "I" cannot reduce the other; the other is beyond intentionality, and escapes the contextual horizons.*[867] In other words, the face we encounter in the face to face encounter with the Other persons reminds us of the existence of the absolute Other.

More apparently, in *Difficult Freedom*, Levinas state: *"to look at a look is to look at something which cannot be abandoned or freed, but something which aims at you; it involves looking at the face."*[868]Levinasian ethics guarantees subjectivity as the well-being of humanity in the global society and defends the economy and vulnerable been marginalized. His conception of subjectivity as responsibility has a significant appeal in the global society to the marginalized, the poor and the excluded people of the world. It is no wonder that Levinas' philosophy has influenced and is continuing to influence a movement called the "Philosophy of Liberation", especially the type that emanates from Latin America. Levinas thought is closer to political, even geopolitical thought. The Philosophy of Liberation, like Theology of Liberation, thus accords a privileged place to the excluded people in the global society, and therefore criticizes discourses that legitimize current hegemonic global systems or ideologies.

More precisely, the general characteristics of such Philosophy of liberation are: 1) It thus acknowledges the importance of people excluded from global systems and thinking with them in communally rather than individualistically. 2) It develops the metaphysical and epistemological categories rooted in emancipating praxis, grounding theory in transformative activity and 3) It hence attempts to change relationships in the global society to create more just societies guided by an ideal (utopian) vision of a global future and common good. These approximately issue a rising

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[867]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 166.
[868]E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom, op. cit*., p 8.

from the periphery, from the oppressed (dehumanized), from the shadow that the light of Being has not been able to illumine for decades. Our thought contends to set out from nothingness, non-Being, otherness, exteriority, to the mystery of no-sense.

Nevertheless, the Philosophy of Liberation thus borrows its method of social analysis from Marxism. Like Marxism, it seeks to integrate "knowing" and "doing" in one's daily living.[869] Levinas' thinking calls to the Philosophy of Liberation and while not mental decolonization of the black race. Nonetheless, we think his conception of subjectivity as responsibility requires an extensive analysis influenced by the Philosophy of Liberation to ethics of self-sacrifice.

### 9.3.2 The ethics of self-sacrifice for the Other

Levinas' description of the ethical encounter with the absolute infinite Other reveals the ethical dimension of sacrifice from the self to the Other as responsibility. The human face in the Levinasian perspective "orders and ordains" us. It therefore, appeals to the subject into "giving and serving" the Other.[870] As such, the calling into question by the Other reveals the absolute infinite Other and the response of the "I" towards the Other as ethics of self-sacrifice in the ethical encounter. Levinas says: *"The other concerns me in all his material misery; it is a matter, eventually, of nourishing him, of clothing him."*[871] It is asserted further that the human person treats one's self as an-Other (self)-the Other, capable person. This assertion gives rise to an existential-ethics.

Levinas' ethics of self-sacrifice reveals my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely foreign that constitutes the original fact of fraternity. In view of this "feeling responsible for the Other" the human person is driven to fundamentally understand oneself, so that in the process of recognizing the presence and affirming the primacy of the Other-"the Face"-one can become ethical. To become ethical is to affirm the primacy of the Other. For Levinas, this Other is another person. Other persons 'overflow comprehension' and embody what he calls infinitude, mystery, enigmas, transcendence, the uncontainable, the ungraspable, the unforeseen and the absolute Other.[872]Levinas proposes a fundamental substructure that, prescribes a rationale to

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[869] http/www.//EnactingLevinassinfiniteresponsibilityasanethico-politicocompromise.pdf
[870]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity,* 1985, pp. 95, 98, 119. Or Paul Marcus, *In Search of the Good Life: Emmanuel Levinas, Psychoanalysis and the Art of Living,* Karnac Books, 2010, p. 16.
[871]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.*, p 52.
[872]Joshua Shaw *et al., Emmanuel Levinas on the Priority of Ethics: Putting Ethics First*, Cambria Press, 2008, p.31.

construct positive obligations such as, developmental change towards another person, even in the event of having no prior knowledge of that person.

Levinas further introduces a new temporality to his analysis of our moral responsibilities and how we are to construe them, one which "signifies for me unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, pact, every contract."[873]His anti-reciprocal ethics is emphasised when he contend that: *"The intersubjective relation is a non- symmetrical relation."*[874] This is, genuinely as in the second maxim of Kant that stipulates one should treat the other person not as a means to an end but as an end in itself.[875] The ultimate structure of humanity does not necessary lie in reciprocal and egalitarian relation, but, it is rather in the infinity of the face of the Other. Levinas situates and labels the inter-subjective origin of the encounter with another person as the site of ethical rapture as opposed to relying upon principles that have long since been preoccupied with the immediacy of the face-to-face encounter. It challenges our understanding of subjectivity, especially the one that emphasizes independence, self-development and autonomy, and opens another perspective in which the Subject is ready to sacrifice its freedom for the good of the Other.

The face-to-face encounter therefore assumes the fundamental locus human beings in the questions of ethics. This relationship is precisely ethical in its very nature, not merely situated at the locus of ethical consideration as with the account of Heidegger. According to Levinas, thematization is inasmuch as it is anarchic that lose sight with the absolute passivity nature of self."[876] He holds that the ethical relation is beyond being, is also beyond thematization. Experientially, thematization is unavoidable. However, sociality leads to the interconnection between the *'I'* and the *'Other'*.[877] The *'I'* makes self-sacrifices to care for the '*Other*' without causing harm. In other words, the *'I'* ceases to exist and can only be found in the consciousness based on needs of the *'Other'*.  Therefore, there is the interlocking for the '*Other'* with me in benevolence.

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[873]E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, *op. cit*., p 59.
[874]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, *op. cit*., p 98.
[875]E. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *op. cit*., p 47.
[876]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 155.
[877]E. Levinas, *Humanism and An-archy*. In Collected Philosophical Papers. Springer Netherlands. (1987). pp 127-139.

### 9.3.3 Ethics for the 'Other' is benevolence

Levinas ethics approaches benevolence for the Other as a subjective entity when approached from the aspect of sociality.[878] That is, the consciousness is the foundation of conceiving social relations, traditional norms and social norms are ordered by recognized (formal) structures and reciprocate the shape of those structures different from utilitarian principle.[879] The principle of benevolent originates from the senses. Levinas contends that "intuition remains the source of all intelligibility."[880] But how can sense be justified as the true meaning of benevolence? It has a meaning in the absence of pure receptivity and pure sensible.[881] Levinas contends that meaning is bound to language and culture is assimilated to language thus, meaning cannot be perceived as defective intuition.[882]

The intersubjectivity of benevolence and autonomy is depended on responsibility. Responsibility determines in choice of individuals[883] make the global society. Equally, the subjectivity of "responsibility overflowing choice, of obedience prior to the presentation or the representation of the command that obliges to responsibility, is nullified by the goodness of the Good that commands."[884] Responsibility for other is a relationship between the self and the Other that must not only occur but will occur regardless of *us*. Levinas makes us believes that; "To discover in the *I* such an orientation is to identify the *I* and *morality* which is the very grounds benevolent. The *I* before another is definitely responsible".[885] This, inherently, shows that there are no limits to the responsibility from the self to the Other because the Other is always present and there is nothing that I can do but to always be ready to encounter the Other.

Consequently, responsibility from my-self to the Other is that as the self, I am always responsible to another person in the global society and/or my community without making any demands for the same to be done to me. As a fact, there exist no symmetry to the relationship in the encounter of the face….the *I* in relationship to the Other without any return to the *I*".[886] For

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[878]E. Levinas, *The Ego and the Totality*. In Collected Philosophical Papers. Springer Netherlands. (1987). pp. 29.

[879] *Ibidem*, p. 29.

[880] *Ibidem,* p. 76.

[881] *Ibidem*, p. 77.

[882] *Ibidem,* p. 81.

[883] *Ibid*

[884] E. Levinas, *Humanism and An-archy. op. cit.,* p 137.

[885]E. Levinas, "The Trace of the Other" in Mark C. Taylor (ed), Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. (Trans: A. Lingis). University of Chicago Press. (1986) pp. 353.

[886]R. Kearney, "Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers": The Phenomenological Heritage, Manchester University Press. (1984). p. 63.

Levinas, the self being a substitute for the Other is an infinite responsibility which is at odds with Heidegger's ontology as well as Descartes cogito. Heidegger affirms that *Dasein* is defined not by *what* we actually are, but by our *way* of existing, that is, our "existential possibilities."[887] According to Levinas, responsibility for the Other, could not be determined in the *Being* of Heidegger's ontology because *Being* as in Heidegger's ontology is subjective with self. Whereas, the self being a substitute for the Other is about serving the Other in the global society and this is not subjected on any pre-conditions as the theory of ontology refers (alludes) to. As an alternative, Levinas accepts"…responsibility as the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity…."[888]

In criticising the Heideggerian notion of *Dasein*, Levinas rejects both the Heideggerian and Sartrian *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*. This return is beyond the Heideggerian and Sartrian being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Sartre believes that "man is condemned to be free…".[889] Levinas denies the Sartrian view of man and posits a radical turn: "Existence not being condemned to freedom." but mediated and devoted as a freedom. Freedom does not appear naked. Freedom constitutes an investiture of moral life itself, through a heteronomy."[890] It is evident that both philosophers disagree on the notion of freedom. This implies freedom for Levinas is not reflected in the responsibility of self to the Other. Instead, freedom means the self has the free will to choose to be responsible for the Other in the global society. The Sartrian position centres on the essence of man through existence and freedom tied to that freedom.[891]The universality of benevolent is based on meaning, experience, and social language. In every society, similar meanings are based on common perception that guides social norms and values. Levinas argues that the perception of reality is based on the identity of its meaning.[892]

As mentioned, the perception of benevolent as an imperative obligation is limited due to meaning, which is distinct. As fundamental, understanding is different from perception. In the meanders, the universality of benevolent limits the role of intellectualism as meaning is reduced by the contents outlined by the consciousness. The meaning of benevolence also thus originates

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[887]N. Zuckerman, Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*. Vol 53,Is 4. Dec. 2015. p. 493.
[888]E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 95.
[889]J. P. Sartre, Man is Condemned to be Free: From the lecture: Existentialism is Humanism by Jean-Paul Sartre (1946). Trans: Philip Mairet (1948). Accessed @ https://umpeople.um.edu/asset/index/cvance/sartre
[890] E. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers. (Trans: A.Lingis). Kluwer Academic Publishers. (1993). p. 58.
[891] Tangyin, "Reading Levinas on Ethical Responsibility", *op. cit.,* p 161.
[892] E. Levinas, *Meaning and Sense*. In Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 75.

from sensible qualities that are conveyed in language and justified through reflection. It is quite challenging to justify benevolence through intellectualism, but from a moral perspective, Levinas notes that "in a global social setting, meaning can be inferred and it is almost impossible to draw a common meaning in a global social setting as individuals reflect differently as the meaning is ascribed."[893] What underscore this point is that, the meaning of benevolence is based on intuition as opposed to intellectualism. Levinas to this extent notes that "intuition is the origin of meaning, the meaning is based on senses and sense is straightforward, a common character between the noema and the noesis."[894] Thus "intuition remains the source of all intelligibility."[895] But how far can sense be justified as the true meaning of benevolence? Most fundamentally, there is the absence of pure receptivity; thus, there is the absence of "a pure sensible without any meaning."[896] Benevolence is part of *'Being'* and the *Other*, thus it is inseparable from them.

However, benevolence is also based on experience. Levinas is supporting benevolence from a utilitarian perspective that consciousness evaluates the consequences of behaviour when pursuing goodness. For instance, in the medical field, benevolence is practicable in the unique relationship between the medical practitioner and the patient in healthcare settings and benevolence is governed by moral obligations of responsibility for the '*Other*' (that is, the patients). Here, Being is central to Levinas' ethics and emphasizes the endless responsibility for the *'Other'*. The responsibility for the '*Other*' is a conscious experience where the ontological *Being* for the '*Other*' is applicable in the judgemental category. Thus, relating to the '*Other*' involves bringing the '*Other*' to oneself, or "turn otherness into a same."[897]

The responsibility is beyond intellectual capacity and is linked to the experiences of the '*Other*'. Responsibility for the '*Other'* is beyond the infinite of the '*Other*' without conceding.[898]This relationship involves catering for the infinite of the '*Other'*; thus, benevolence is grounded on the ontology of the '*Other'*. The relationship is characterized by greetings, the face, and sexuality which open the understanding of the infinite nature of the '*Other*' in its totality. Levinas says: At this point, benevolence (object) becomes perceptibly a meaningful element of the lived experiences. In this circumstance, sociality leads to the selection of suitable words that are

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[893] *Ibid*, p. 76.
[894]Https://Www.Academia.Edu/37600408/Levinas_Ethics_In_Societys_Beneficent_Responsibility_To_The_Other
[895] *Ibid*
[896] E. Levinas, *Meaning and Sense*. *op. cit.,* p 77.
[897] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 177.
[898] *Ibidem*, p. 35.

based on specific use. Observing the facial expressions of the '*Other*' would creates a relationship that will motivate immediate responsibility for the '*Other.*' Positively, we will say that since the Other looks at me in the global society, I am responsible for him, without even having taken responsibilities on this regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me…. I am responsible for his very responsibility.  Such a responsibility for the '*Other*' is in totality, endless and non-reciprocal. Reciprocity is the Other affair. It is I who support all.[899] Such a collectivity of responsibility Levinas supports it in his principle of the encounter between *'I'* and the '*Other.'*[900]Levinas claims subjectivity as responsibility is depended "on determinism servitude alternative"; hence, responsibility is important in determining the moral choice individuals make.[901]

The responsibility for the '*Other*' in the global society is an unexceptionable responsibility which is not by choice. Benevolence as the responsibility for the '*Other*' is an unexceptionable responsibility which is not also by choice. Therefore, it is governed by social norms exhibited in the language of the Good. The subject and the *Good* always exhibit anarchical union between the *Good* and the subject in the ethical encounter. Thus, benevolence is a moral obligation. However, this bond cannot be based on assumptions which characterize social norms. Responsibility for the '*Othe*r' helps in establishing professional and interpersonal working relationships with the Other in the global society. The '*Other'* and the '*Same'* are so interconnected such that the '*Same'* is absorbed into the '*Other*'.[902] Tracing the *Same* and the *Other* is an eternity as "no memory could trace the past".[903]

The expectations of the '*Other'* from the *'I'* in a global social group helps in understanding the internalization of the reactions of the self to be beneficent.[904] Such an internalization of the '*Other*' offers meaning to the '*I*', a product of culture illumined in the appearance of the '*Other*' as expressed in totality in a context. The global society at large is the *'I'* while the other personal other than me is the '*Other.*' The global society needs to respects the *Other'*s autonomy and makes decisions that do not breach their desires. Therefore, the global society must make sacrifices of benevolence to achieve the maxims in Kantian approach. The decisions are to be made based on the provisions of ethics.  Some decisions are made by making tremendous sacrifices.

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[899] E. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*: Conversation with Phillipe Nemo, pp. 98-99.
[900] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit*., p 39.
[901] E. Levinas, *The ego and the totality*, *op. cit*., p 34.
[902] *Ibid,* p. 36.
[903]E.  Levinas, *Meaning and Sense, op. cit*., p 103.
[904]E.  Levinas, *Humanism and An-archy, op. cit*., p 135.

**Partial Conclusion**

The central issue debated in the course of this reflection centres on African moral values beyond the Levinasian notion of responsibility in the face of the crisis of humanity in the global society. What role can place Africans and Africa in the perspective to adjustment of the understanding and orchestration not only of philosophy but also the knowledge of human on himself, and his knowledge of the world and his relation between him and his Creator? And which is absence in modern understanding of man and technology of his knowledge. One has come to the realization that African moral and cultural values emphasizes on honesty, solidarity, justice and the welfare of man in society. These elements are vital for protecting man and preserving nature. It also, has as much value for social constructionism and development based on African moral principles and codes of conduct that encourages reciprocity, solidarity, his relationship with the Creator and responsibility amongst its members of the society. It is conceives that the socio-cultural is not the overarching horizons against which all human life takes place. From the above, the weaknesses of Levinasian ethics were studied based on its anthropocentric nature as the only criterion for morality. It was illustrated that: man cannot be fully human without nature; the destruction of nature is a threat to man's own «essence». Levinas' ethics is individualistic and anti-rule stands against any universal rule that should govern human action; to him, what should call you to human action is the face of the Other, not rules nor imperatives. To an extent, Levinas' individualistic ethics is needed in the global society because of his advocacy for the centrality of the place of the human being when it comes to moral issues. The vulnerability, the defenselessness, the strangeness, the exposure of the face of the Other is what should call us to responsibility. Levinas' ethics further finds its strength in the fact that justice well done to an individual is justice done to the whole of humanity. On the bright side, valorizing humanity, Levinas says that; I cannot reduce the other, the Other is beyond intentionality, and it escapes the contextual horizon. In other words, a face we encounter in the face-to-face relation with the Other persons reminds us of the existence of the absolute other. In a nutshell, Levinas' ethics of self-sacrifice and ethics for the 'Other' is benevolence reveals my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely strange and constituting the original fact of fraternity in the global society. We think unlike Derrida resonates in *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* that, the reverberation of the thought of Levinas could have changed the course of philosophical reflection in our time and of our reflection on philosophy, because his notion of responsibility remains an actuality ordered according to the absolute anteriority in the inter-human encounter in the face to face relation.

## CHAPTER TEN: SECULARISM AND RELIGION IN CAMEROONS POLITICS

## Partial Introduction

This chapter is based on the transition of secularism and religion in the West which has now become a global phenomenon.[905] The rising trait of a new world order is gradually enshrining in the sphere of religion and in conformity to secularization in Cameroon. The tenet of this is embedded both at the level of religion and politics that intertwined. Secularism is deeply enshrined in the Cameroonian constitution. The secular nature of the Cameroon state, points to the paradoxes between the declared claims of state secularity and the strong influence of religion on state and society relations, as well with politics in particular. The emergence of secular politics is complex and misleading. It thus, goes beneath the rhetoric of secularity to explain the evolution of religion. This perhaps marks a significant instrumentalization of religion at various levels and by members of a government operating under a "secular" constitution. However, apart from providing a critical analysis of religion and secularism, Cameroon political elites instrumentalize religion for political and personal gain, with adverse consequences for social democracy, development, cohesion and peace. Indeed, religion has become embedded in Cameroonian politics. But in everyday life, we see that politics and religion are strongly intertwined through interference, with the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis the religious segment. The main argument is that efforts should be directed at reducing the tendencies to "politicized religion" through the detachment of religion from politics in a multi-ethnic society such as Cameroon.

## 10.1 GLOBAL OUTLOOK OF SECULARISM AND POLITICS

In the present global society, respect for individuals as autonomous, equal and sharing in a common plight of humanity has been increasingly grounded in a secular humanism as distinguished from the spiritual (religious) realm. Rather than in the sense of respecting persons out of duty to God, several modern philosophers, notably Immanuel Kant, have attempted to ground ethics in human reason rather than faith. Yet, present-day struggles for recognition of difference have opposed such conceptions of humanity on the grounds that they subordinate difference under a kind of universalism that is not actually neutral (politics) but rather represents

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[905] See Article on, J. Bertrand AMOUGOU (dir). *Le Monde Face à La Laïcité et au Covid 19 Quelles Leçons pour L'Afrique* ? in Henri N. Ndifor, *Secularism and Religion in Cameroons Politics,* L'Harmattan, 2021, pp.119-145. http://www.editions-harmattan.fr

the interests of the dominant group or groups. As well, the secularism of modem global liberal states has been accused of implicit antagonism towards religion. Undeniably, the recognition of individuals and groups as existing apart from the universal, neither subordinated under it, nor merely antithetical to it, becomes a pressing concern in global society. In order to address this problem in context, there has been, in the case of many contemporary continental thinkers, a turn towards religion (like the state of Cameroon). Besides, this has been both a return to religion and a turning away from it, because while it re-examines the tradition of religion in order to bring to light new insight, it does not completely abandon the modern tradition of universalism and secularism in state affairs but unveils the sociological studies of a society.

Our contemporary and sociological studies of a society and a global world reveal a polemic of religion and secularism as a fundamental paradigm. The fundamental paradigms are express based on religion and secular clash of society.[906] The clash on religion and state unveils a logical argument on it wholesome values towards the right of its citizens. The right of its citizens emphasizes the moral worth of the individual. This moral worth involves the right of the individual to freedom and self-realization. Therefore, the combination of individual rights and obligations of the citizenry, especially in relation to the history of secularism as the end of religious rule, is the backdrop around which the modern state gains its authority.

Aimed with the development of the modern secular state, the religious system and foundations of governance in contemporary liberal democracies were first replaced by the concept of "human nature" through which systems of natural morality, natural law, natural religion and a natural theory of government took shape. The social significance of religion has not declined as expected by secularization theorists, and the separation between religion and secularism in the state appears to be more complicated than once assumed. Secularism, then, arose in modern Europe and America as a political doctrine, and although it is often defined as the separation of the religious from secular, today, it represents new articulations of "religion," "politics" and "ethics."[907] What underline this assertion is that, it makes the modern state involved in the redefinition of religion as belief and, therefore, distinctively private and outside of the public realm of politics. It also became clear that the particular religious tradition that dominated in a specific

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[906] S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. *op. cit.,* p 204.
[907] W.C. Gilpin, Secularism: Religious, irreligious, and religious. *The Religion and Culture Web Forum, March 2007*. http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/webforum/032007/secularism.pdf (Accessed on 01/04/2021.)

context (Protestant or Catholic) had a major impact on the way in which the relation between religion and secularism in the state was institutionalized in Cameroon (most societies).

Religious sentiments, beliefs and identity became personal matters that belonged to the newly emerging spaces of private life in society. It is therefore important for us to apprehend the constant interactions between the religious and the State in the multi-confessional context in particular of the Cameroonian political society. In general, it is most probably applicable to all the religions, and more specifically to the three main religions in Cameroon (Islam, Christianity, and Indigenous Religious practices), our reflections in this chapter are biased towards Christianity solely because we are more familiar with this religion. By religious, we must understand that which relates to religions, insofar as they are a constellation of groups of organized individuals who, through rites and dogmas, claim to establish a bond of belief between the individual and one or supreme supernatural forces called divinity. As for the state, it is perceived as state power, i.e. "*the value of social subsection feeds a fearful claim to colonize the entire social arena.*"[908] The core of such an assertion, should/must be well-known as issue of rapport between the spiritual and the temporal, the religious and the political is present in all global political societies and involves cultural relativism.

In Cameroon, the principle that enshrine in the structures of interactions between religion and politics is secularism. Secularism resonates with development, and challenges us to think anew about the role of religion in society, about the relation between religion and law and religion and politics in the Cameroonian society. At the highest political level of hierarchy of state norms, this principle suggests a twofold dimension: the neutrality of the State towards religions and the non-interference of religions in the activities of the State. The place of enunciation of this principle is in itself, metaphorically, an indicator of value and importance which rendered to it from the theoretical point of view. In fact, an analysis shows that the sociopolitical reality has profoundly watered down the principle of State secularism in Cameroon. Consequently, the State is well aware of the role played by religions in the moral upbringing of citizens, and also in their general education. In same line, through the initiatives taken by religions in the country, to a certain extent affect State neutrality with regard to religion. This will explains the thematic cooperation between the two powers: religious and secular, a relationship all the more necessary as social peace does to

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[908] G. Lerroux, La civitas gallo-romaine des Riédones: le milieu rural, Rennes, 1989, p. 123.

some degree depend thereupon. Thus, the current process of globalization coincides with the humanistic project of religions. From aforementioned, the interpenetration of politics and religion cannot be denied as feature of Cameroonian political life. In the context of the proliferation of religious groups of Cameroon, the State has preference for certain religions without making them state religions. The praxis of such a situation tends towards the zero neutrality of the state towards religious groups.

Far beyond this hypothetical expression, the scope of secularism in Cameroon can question in reality. How pragmatic does the state in Cameroon regulate its religious activity without making any preference for certain categories of religion? Is religion far from the political concerns of the day-to-day life of the state? Or to an extent, what are the concrete expression of the connections between religion and politics in the context of Cameroon marked by the multiplicity of religions? Are these multiplicities of religions beyond legal priorities in the secular state of Cameroon? These fundamental questions are of great importance in the past as crossed by world humanitarian ideologies such as good governance and sustainable human development that penetrated the Cameroonian political society as a whole. These are the big questions that we will try to answer in the following developments. To do this, we will examine the legal expression of secularism in the State of Cameroon and the status and political foundation of religion in Cameroon and the way in which the principle of secularism and religion is affected by the socio-political reality of Cameroon.

### 10.1.1 The expression of secularism in the legal State of Cameroon

Of what thematic foundations is the principle of secularism enshrine in the State of Cameroon? This is an essential question that arises from the outset of secularism in Cameroon politics. Nonetheless, we will not be able to circumscribe the legal state of Cameroon framework if we are not enlightened by the legacy and expression of colonialism in the history of Cameroon.

### 10.1.2 The Legacy and expression of Colonialism

The current relation of religion and secularism in Cameroon politics has to be seen against the background of colonialism and independence of Cameroon in 1960. The principal reason for this is not to persuade/induce some kind of guilt amongst the "colonizers", but because many of the aspects that today influence religion, the relation between religion and secularism in Cameroon politics, have their roots in the colonial period. However, there is a vast literature on the "legacy"

of colonialism. Furthermore, it is of course impossible to give a gestalt of the social, cultural, economic, political and religious "legacy" of colonialism. The purpose is also not to give an evaluation of both the "positive" vs. "negative" features of colonialism and its legacy. Though the principal focus of the colonizers that is the Germans, French and British in Cameroon was mainly on the development of the Cameroonian colonial territory for their own gain, one can argue that colonialism also contributed to the modernization of Cameroon through the formation of administrative and governmental structures, the development of infrastructure such as transport and communication systems, and as well the development of its educational and health institutions.

In the general perspective, there is, however, consensus that colonialism to a great extent disrupted and even destroyed the traditional values, cultural, social, economic and political structures that existed before the colonial period. For the sake of this paper we would like to point out two major "legacies" of colonialism that influence the relation between religion and secularism in Cameroon politics, namely the capricious creation of state boundaries and the role of the missionaries. Therefore, there is need to consider the formation of the Cameroonian society, and the legacy of the Christian missionaries with a view to the role of religion and secularism in the political history of the country.

At the Age of Discovery of Africa from the early 15th to the 18th century by the European explorers was followed by the period of European imperialism (1880-1960).[909] After this strategic period in history which ended with the signing of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin of 1885 on 26 February 1885. The United Republic of Cameroon, as of the former Federal Republic of Cameroon is now called, and passed through the hands of the Germans, the British and the French from 1884-1961. The political evolution of Cameroon is very complex on account of the differences in the culture, social and political thinking of the three countries which ruled it. The Germany ruled Cameroon from 1884-1915 as a colony and in 1916 Cameroon was divided between Britain and France following the defeat of the Germans in Cameroon in 1916…Britain and France then ruled their respective portions of Cameroon as mandated territories of the League of Nations from 1919-1945.[910]

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[909]See articles on the "History of Africa", the "Berlin Conference", the "Scramble for Africa" and the "Decolonization of Africa" in Wikipedia (2007)

[910] https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3936

After the aftermath of Second World War, France governed her portion as a trusteeship territory of the United Nations Organization until it was granted independence in 1960; Britain did controlled her portion as a trusteeship ground of the United Nations until in 1961 when it was granted her independence. This division was done without regard for the three governed territories of Cameroon that is, their cultural, historical and religious differences. These differences, therefore, brought traditional enemies under the same government and at the same time divided communities that belonged together. This, however, has caused tensions and problems, also with regard to religion and the secular nature of the state up to our present time.[911] The second fundamental aspect of the legacy of colonialism that is important is the relation and role between religion and secularism played in Cameroon politics at the colonial times.

In regards to the role played during the colonial times, Sindima affirms, missions were one of the three "agencies of the colonial machinery", the other being commerce and government.[912] The history of the colonialism of Cameroon testifies often to the symbiotic relationship between religion and the governmental administration. Religion via missionaries were seem very important for the government for a number of reasons, among them in order to legitimize the colonial rule, to educate people for service in government, and to break down the Cameroonian value systems and ritual practices such as ancestor veneration.[913] Religion, also did contributed to the educational and health centres, establishment of government structures,[914] and thus contributed to the secularization of the Cameroonian society.

In turn, the government of Cameroon provided security for missionaries and missions. Consequently, the State and religion, government and church, more precisely, also shared the same belief, namely that they had to civilize the backward people of Cameroon through true religion and principles of civilization. There was thus, with some exceptions, a harmonious relation

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[911]D. Koeller, The Berlin Conference 1884, 2003. http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/Africa/BerlinConf.html (Accessed 06/04/2021.)

[912] See, J. D. Van der Vyver, Religious freedom in African constitutions. In: An-Nai"im, A.A. (Ed.) *Proselytization and communal self-determination in Africa*, Maryknoll, Orbis. 1999, p. 7. (The transformation of the religious domain by the missionaries played a central role in colonialism and nationalism).

[913] See, Sindima has the following to say about the mission school: "The mission school was a critical institution for both missionaries and the government...Fear and hate for African values, customs and the past-attitudes that became characteristic of educated and alienated Africans."(Cf. H. J. Sindima, *Africa's agenda: the Legacy of Liberalism and Colonialism in the crises of African values*, greenwood press, 1995, p. 2.

[914]Cf. W. J. Samarin, "The Gbeya Language": Grammar, Texts, and Vocabularies. (University of California). 1966, p. 295.

between religious and governmental institutions in Cameroon. To a certain degree, one can question the Legacy of the colonial era with regards to religion and secularism in Cameroon politics. First, religious activities became involved in the country political struggle, and tried to make the churches important actors in this struggle.[915] Secondly, churches became energetically involved in ethnic politics and the establishment of fixed ethnic identities. This was part of the missionary approach to target as well "political elite" for conversion, and on the basis of the contemporary conceptions of race they divided the different groups in rigid racial categories. A third principle that was established during the colonial period was that religion via churches did not only provided spiritual resources to converts, but also cultural and economic resources.[916] It, however, Converts and benefited from the educational and health care provided by the churches, and many of them eventually also became employed by the churches. The church resources also created power struggles within the churches. The significance of these principles lies in the fact that they influence state secularism in colonial eras till present day.

## 10.2. STATE OF SECULARISM IN COLONIAL ERAS

The value of history has weighed heavily on the secular destiny of the state of Cameroon. However, only two stages deserve to be analyzed here: the colonial era and the era of independence. Two great legacies resulted from the colonial period: the legacy of the German administration rule and that of the Franco-British administration.

### 10.2.1 The German administration rule

The German administration has always displayed unequivocal desire and interference in religious affairs. Two circumstances explain this attitude. First and foremost, Germany had found the Baptist Churches on the spot which expressed its reluctance to the English presence: it suppressed the English Court of Equity four days after the signing of the germano-douala treaty, just as she never ceased to show her hostility towards the English missions to the point where Baptist missionaries were obliged to sell their title deeds to the Basal mission. Then, the colonial enterprise imposed a real complicity between the Whites which called upon to manage both the

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[915]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237404462_Religion_And_State_In_Postcolonial_Africa_Challenges_And_Opportunities

[916] Meyer writing about the socio-economic motivations for and consequences of conversion says: "Indeed, the Christian religion was attractive because it offered the material means to achieve a prosperous and relatively high position in colonial society" (1996:207).

minds and material goods of the colonized. The confusion of both the temporal and spiritual powers therefore proceeded from the colonial logic.[917] Two missionaries will therefore sit on the council of government which will know all the problems of the colony.[918]The installation of churches is subject to prior authorization from the government. In practice, the German state grants special privileges to the Basal mission, in particular the subsidies; she forbids Islam and will oppose until 1889 the installation of the Catholic Church.

## 10.2.2 The Franco-British administration

With the Franco-British administration, the situation will change slightly. Article 438 of the Treaty of Versailles provides that "the properties of Germans missions on territories entrusted to the Allied and Associated Powers will be provided to appointed or approved Boards of Directors by the government". Article 7 of the London Agreement of July 22, 1922 specifies: The mandatory power shall ensure, throughout the territory, the full freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all cults which are neither contrary to the order public or morality. She will give to all national missionaries of any member state of the League of Nations, the right to enter, move and reside in the territory, to acquire and own properties there, to erect buildings for religious purposes and to open schools there, it being understood, however, that the agent will have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good administration and to take, for this purpose, all necessary measures. In other words, churches will have to deal with religious and spiritual things, and the administrative power will have to facilitate this company. France, for its part, will stick to the spirit of this text.[919] We could also be affirmative in the case of the British administration for which religion is a "state datum." Regarding Great Britain, there is therefore a natural link of the legal principle of secularism in the state.

## 10.3 THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF SECULARISM IN THE STATE

The lawful principle of the state could define the state as unequivocal in the minds of jurists, which the same cannot be said of secularism. Undeniably, the accepted idea is that the State is a human collectivity or a stabilized political society and organized, having a monopoly of force.

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[917]H. R. Rudin, Germans in Cameroon (1884-1914), *The Case Study in Modem Imperialism*, New York, 1968, p. 336.
[918] Cf. Decree of November 14, 1904, Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Cameroon; see also L. NGONGO, History of institutions and social fatts of Cameroon, 1884-1945, coll. "World in the making", n ° 16, Éditions Berger-Levrault, 1987, p. 57 et seq.
[919] Cf. Decrees of February 28, 1926, Decree of April 24, 1930 and Decree of March 28, 1933, relating to the regime of worship in French territories.

Based on recent mass sociological academic work, the state is a group of human being fixed on a specific territory and over which authority is exercised exclusively by policy.[920] The origin of the principle of secularism can either be traced in a French history or either in the Bible.

Definitely, the notion of secularism was first sketched out by Jesus Christ himself who said: Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar's, and to God what belongs to God.[921] In this line, Secularism then went through four historical stages, according to Emile Poulat, 4:- "sacral" secularism, when quarrels between Church and State arise take place within the Christian space; "enlightened" secularism which began after the Revolution of 1789 and continued characterized by the recognition, by the Pope, of the achievements of the Revolution and state recognition of the "necessity" of religion;-"radicalized" secularism in the second half of the nineteenth century; "recognized" secularism, when the Law of 9 December 1901 consecrates legally the principle by providing that "the Republic is secular, democratic, social and indivisible."[922] This formula has since been taken up by the various French constitutions. It implies that the Republic is neither nun, nor ecclesiastical. Thus, the religious fact is external to the State. The latter adopts an attitude of impartiality towards churches and religions, neutrality.[923] Consequently, the secular state is not content exclusively with recognition. It therefore proclaims its active role; he himself respects the freedom of conscience, it assures it, that is to say it obliges itself to prevent the violations of its principle.

In Cameroon, as in other African states, the presences of traditional religions remain as alive as that of revealed religions, that is to say, the Christian religion with its divisions and Islam. In these conditions, it appears that the State of Cameroon could not claim to play its role of policeman of the dynamics of the insertion of the religious movement in order only on condition of being placed at an equal distance from a different religious groups; the principle of secularism thus appears as the only formula that can allow the State to avoid compromise. This is what the Head of State recognizes when he says: "If the principle of secularism imposes itself on any democratic state, it imposes itself even more in a country marked by religious diversity like Cameroon."[924] The principle of secularism then consecrates the separation of the spiritual and the

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[920] J. Gicquel, *Constitutional law and political institution*, Montchrestien, 1988, p. 60.
[921] Gospel according to Saint Mark, chapter 12, verses 13 to 17.
[922]Cf. É. Poulat, "The four stages", in Colloquium on religious freedom and secularism, 1994.
[923] J. Rivéro, Cours de Libertés Publics, Les Cours de droit, 1972, p. 291.
[924] P. Biya, for community liberalism, ABC, 1987, p. 38.

temporal. By so doing, the secular state is neither a Christian state nor an atheist state, but "a democratic, constitutional State respecting a certain pluralism of beliefs." Secularism is therefore both a democratic principle and a principle of political balance. Subsequently, the effectiveness of a principle of law can only be measured by relation to the reception it receives from the environment it is called upon to govern thus unveiling the imperatives of Cameroons' secular state.

### 10.3.1 The imperatives of Cameroonian secular state

Since the independence of Cameroon, the socio-political context will undergo certain changes. On March 4, 1960, Cameroon gave itself the legal status of a sovereign state. Such a political act was to define among other things, her policy towards religions. This will be all the more necessary as the head of state at the time, Muslim by conviction, is suspected of wanting to Islamize all the country. Already when he was only Prime Minister, Mr. Ahmadou Ahidjo tried in vain to reassure Christians by declaring: "The Government, faithful to the tradition of the guardian power, will observe towards all faith-based organizations the same spirit of neutrality for a liberal evangelization of the Cameroonian masses."[925] The Constitution of March 4, 1960 then followed as well as the judiciary will reflect upon concern.

From the pre-colonial to colonial era, Cameroons' history is marked by four constitutions, namely those of March 4, 1960, September 1, 1961, June 2, 1972 and January 18, 1996. However, it is under the mandate regime that the principle of secularism will be extended in Cameroon, in application of article 7 of the Mandate Convention, then of the Decree of March 28, 1933. These texts furthers established the principle of free exercise of all cults not contrary to public order and good morals. Having become an independent country, Cameroon will systematize the principle through the preamble to the Constitution of March 4, 1960: the principle of secularism under the guidance of which the Cameroonian people place the Republic as understood by the separation of Church and State. Affirming, furthermore, in article 1, that "Cameroon is a one and indivisible, democratic, secular and social," the Cameroonian constituent unequivocally displays its option for the secularism of the state. It is true that questions may arise as to the apparent lack of logic of a people who, at the same time as they place themselves under the protection of God, also proclaims secularism.

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[925] A. Ahidjo, speech quoted by F. Mbomé, *op. cit.,* p 180.

From the above, the Constitution of September 1, 1961, establishes the federation and presents in it a drafting legal curiosity. It is characterized by the absence of a preamble, which raises a question for jurists: what are the fundamental principles of law and the political philosophy that should/must guide the Republic? In addition, the Ordinance No. 62-0F-18 of March 12, 1962 repressing subversion was going to place the principle of secularism in a kind of hibernation without denying it. Despite of this gloomy, fragile and tense environment, the 1961 Constitution also seals the principle of secularism: *"The Federal Republic of Cameroon is democratic, secular and social* [...] it affirms its attachment of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of human rights and the Charter of the United Nations."[926]

The constitutions of June 2, 1972 and January 18, 1996 reaffirm the principle in the same terms as the previous ones. And, along with this affirmation, Cameroon ratifies the African Charter on the Rights of the man and the peoples who, in articles 2 and 8, proclaim the freedom religion and its practice. Conversely, the effective adjustment of the principle of secularism of the State is the fact of ordinary laws, especially those relating to freedom association. They do not have the specific purpose of the meeting regime, but they devote a number of articles to them. Thus, Law n ° 67 / LF / 19 of June 12th, 1967 on freedom of association reserved for them a title of 7 articles of the 40 it included. Law n ° 90/053 of December 19, 1990 which repeals the previous one gives them a title of 10 articles out of the 36 that understands.

Outside the fact that religious associations come under the regime of authorization and that they are subject to strict respect for public order, the state affirms the essential element of secularism: it neither subsidizes nor pays no worship; this is why the expression "religious associations cannot receive public subsidies."[927] In short, the fundamental law in Cameroon has never ceased to proclaim secularism of the state. This constant datum is firmly affirmed and taken up by derived standards; case law, which is scarce in this area, follows Law n ° 61-24 of September 1, 1961 on constitutional revision.[928] As a protector of the law and of citizens' right, the judge plays an important role in regulating life in society. Enshrine with such a constitution, let's look at the position of the judge on the secularism of the state in Cameroon. Often, certain laws are rare,

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[926] J. Rivéro, Cours de Libertés Publics, *op. cit.,* p 291.
[927] Law n "90/053 of 19 Dec. 1990 relating to the law of association, art. 25, al. 1.
[928] Law n ° 61-24 of September 1, 1961 on constitutional revision and tending to adopt the Current constitution to the needs of unified Cameroon, Official Journal of the Republic Federal Government of Cameroon, Sept. 30, 1961, p. 1090/1, art. 1.

but a few judgments given indicate to us the perception of a judge. For instance, the conviction of Monseigneur Albert Ndongmo in 1970 can just as much illustrate this way of understanding the secularism of the State.

The judge seems to say "yes" to religious freedom and "no" to the intervention of men of the Church in political affairs. The Cameroonian episcopate recognizes when he says: "The Church of Cameroon is going through the most difficult moments in history [...] a bishop is called into question. But the charges are not religious. The case to our knowledge is at the stage of police investigations; we hope she will follow its course according to law and justice."[929] The State, a sovereign company, has the competence to determine the status of all the groups and corporations that constitute it. To this end, it "has a power of action over people and things by limiting their capacity autonomous action through legislation and regulation, punishing their failure to respect established rules."[930] Besides, the principle of secularism also means that when a man is invested with priestly dignity, the state ignores this dignity: the priest, the pastor or the Iman are citizens like the others eligible voters. This maintains the state dignity and conscious freedom.

### 10.3.2 Secularism in the State and the public sphere

In the globalization era, the guarantee for security depends on social norms of the state via its citizens. State respect for freedom of worship, freedom of conscience and any other form of religious manifestation cannot generate a disorder that would plunge the country into social chaos. As such, social conflicts between citizens of different convictions would undermine the development of State. Also, the state must plan his interventions in religious affairs in order to safeguard and maintain public order within its society. It must, however, guarantee individual and public freedoms for all citizens, while maintaining public order and the general interest for the common good of all. Furthermore, the state can do so, under the pretext of safeguarding of public order, to deliberately interfere in the sphere of religious competences, which will then constitute a principle of violation state of secularism.

### 10.3.3 The political foundations of religions in Cameroon

As society undergoes evolution, the actions of human beings, like those of institutions, are rarely free. The opposite is surprising when everyone knows that an institution, in essence, only

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[929]Episcopate Camerounais, "Communiqué", Essor des jeunes, n ° 185, September 5, 1970.
[930]P. Manin, Droit international public, coll. "Law - economics", Masson, 1979, p. 196.

exists insofar as it pursues a specific goal. Its principal action is determined either by the political or economic goal. Even in Christianity whose founder, Jesus Christ, affirmed the separation between the temporal and spiritual powers,[931] the delimitation of their respective spheres of action is difficult to establish with certain precision. The interference is inevitable. Religions are aware of the paramount importance for the salvation of humanity that the responsibility before God is the action of political parties and organizations.[932]

Cameroon thus has a multiplicity of religious beliefs, and many individuals combine these beliefs and practices of world religions with those of their own culture groups…Approximately 53 percent of the populations are members of Christian denominations, about 25 percent practice mainly "traditional" religions, and approximately 22 percent are Muslim.[933] Christian churches and Muslim centers of various denominations operate freely throughout while the traditionalists operate in their shrines and temples, which are also becoming popular today. Furthermost, several Christians do live in the southern areas and several Muslims in the north. The Christian missions in Cameroon constituted an informal second layer of colonialism with a religious backdrop. In Cameroon, religious and certain religions do not hide their hegemonic aims. These groupings are numerous. Their most common denominator is certainly the harmonization of their missionary action, but also their more or less perceptible impact on the political life of the country.

Indeed, religions seem convinced that minorities of numerically groups impose themselves less on political power. Four examples suffice to illustrate our point. The first example is that of the Episcopal Conference, a meeting which brings together all the Archbishops and bishops of the country.[934] The decisions taken through this conference, taking into account the personalities who constitute it, have a very big effect on political power in Cameroon. The conference always takes care to publish its views through the radio, press and television. These decisions can be political, as revealed for example by the Easter Episcopal Letter 1955 relating to the open opposition of the Catholic Church against the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC)[935] or the press release from the Cameroonian episcopate relating to the affair of Bishop Ndongmo. Some have moreover

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[931] See, Gospel according to Saint Mark, chapter 12, verses 13 to 17.
[932] E. Dobers and others, "Development and solidarity, common responsibility among Muslims and Christians, Germany", Hase & Koeller, 1985, p. 13.
[933] https://www.coursehero.com/file/185905104/culture-nightdocx/
[934] See, Episcopate Camerounais, "Communiqué", Essor des jeunes, n ° 185, September 5, 1970.
[935] R. A. Joseph, The nationalist movement in Cameroon: the social origins of the UPC, Éditions Karthala, 1986, p. 272.

accused the episcopate of having "renewed Pilate's gesture" by making a pact with the State to isolate the prelate.[936]

The second example is that of the Federation of Churches and Evangelicals Missions of Cameroon (FEMEC), which is a religious association, which authorized gathering of ten Churches and three observer members. In reality, these Churches have only come to agree their points of view in relation to the political and social audience that this harmonization can bring: a claim from thirteen churches united would retain much more the attention of public authorities that the request made by a small Church size of the African Protestant Church. The third instance is that of the Islamic Cultural Association of Cameroon (ACIC), which was created in 1961. As the only national structure of the Muslim religion, it is undoubtedly a very powerful force that does not hide its political ambition, especially as for Islam there is no distinction between the religious and the politician. The Quran appears very explicit on this subject.[937]

Finally, let us quote the fourth and last example, that of the Federation of the Pentecostal Churches of Cameroon (FEPC). Pentecostal religions, aware of their crushing by the old religions, understood that they had to stick together to find a place more important in society. Thus, all religions today are in a certain conquest of a political space. However, this conquest or at least the success of such a mission requires the formation of large groups. This principle is true both in economics and in politics. Moreover, the political role played by certain religious communities such as the Catholic Church or Islam deserves to be highlighted. By their stature and their actions, they plunge the notion of the secularism of the State in a legal formalism. These are groups that bring together many members. Thus, the Catholic Church has more than 2,500,000 members and Islam has more than 1,000,000.[938]

Islam is a religion founded in 622 by the prophet Muhammad. However, in his doctrine, he ignores the distinction between politics and religion. Most often, religious rules are apply in civilian life. It encompasses all aspects of life, from the rules of hygiene to the intricacies of

[936] F. Maspero, Union of the populations of Cameroon, Paris, 1971, p. 80. In a letter from October 28, 1970, the Archbishop of Conakry, W Raymond Marie Tchidimbo, reproaches Mgr Zoa the position of the Cameroonian episcopate in the Ndongmo affair.
[937] Quran, sura 4, verses 59, 91 and 101.
[938] F. Etoga Eily And J. Zoa, Aimer et Serve, coll. "Les Grands Humanistes", Publication of the Clavis circle, 1986, p. 15.

right.[939] In Cameroon, in the north of the country, there is Muslim proselytism and Islam is tolerant.[940] On the other hand, the former President of the Republic belonging to this religion influenced the secularism of the state. There is no doubt that President Ahidjo, as well as the Muslim community was aware of nature of proselytism, with a strong Islamic convinced base in the North, which will refuse to divide into several provinces despite its imposing size.[941] This strategy and policy enabled him to maintain cohesion among Muslims, essential to its political support. Moreover, as in Africa the religion of chief is often the religion of the people, "religious communities constitute a non-negligible electoral clientele.[942] The appointment of a Minister Delegate to the Minister of External Relations in charge of relations with the Islamic world in December 1997 would proceed from concerns of obvious strategies.

The Catholic religion has a long origin and it is said to be the oldest of all the branches of Christianity, who recognizes the authority of the Pope with it seat in Rome. It has an apparent unity that it presents. Divided into seventeen dioceses and four ecclesiastical provinces, the Catholic Church is today the largest religious community in Cameroon. His hegemony is not legal but *de facto*. The Catholic Church has an administrative organization and legal complex. She is a Church and a State. She embodies temporal and spiritual power. So, we can, with reason, speak of a "Catholic Republic" whose capital is in Vatican, with the Pope as Head of State. It is in this context that the Vatican maintains diplomatic relations with the states of the world, including Cameroon, with all that this entails, in particular the respect sovereignties, reciprocity.

The apostolic nuncio is the ambassador from the Vatican state to Cameroon. The appointment of a cardinal among the Cameroonian clergy has further increased the weight of this Church which enjoyed already from a political and religious audience like no other. Most senior officials of the administration being Catholic are often heard with kindness. The political weight of religions sometimes poorly conceals the socio-economic weight which makes them obligated partners. Historically, religions and most especially Christian ones have developed parallel to their spiritual enterprise of another material and intellectual activity. The latter thus, consists of the

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[939] On this question, see V.T. LE VINE, Cameroon, from mandate to independence, Paris, African Presence Publishing, 1984; F. MBOMÉ, The State and the Churches in Cameroon, thesis State doctorate in political science, University of Paris I, 1979; L. NGONGO, History of religious forces in Cameroon, Paris, Éditions Karthala, 1982.
[940] F. Etoga Eily and J. ZOA, Aimer et Serve, *op. cit.,* p 15.
[941] On August 22, 1983, President Paul Biya will break this unity by dividing the old province of the North into three provinces.
[942] A. Glele, Religion, culture and politics in Black Africa, Éditions Economica-African Presence, 1981, p. 141.

creation of plantations and other economic farms, hospitals and schools for the common welfare on man in society. Conversely, in France, as in Germany, University education has long remained the prerogative of religious missions.[943] In fact, the task of all religion is to lead human beings to salvation. However, the latter must be total. She must encompass the whole being, that is, body, soul and spirit. In this perspective, the action of religions is well finalized. It certainly has a spiritual purpose, but also social and economic value to instill development.

## 10.4 THE RELIGIONS STATUS OF CAMEROON

Religions are a group like any other within the state. They must therefore have their own status which distinguishes them from other groups and the state institution. The principle of secularism would not be observed or violated only in relation to this status. In reality, the latter is little enlightened in Cameroon. It is deduced from the constitutions, from the Law of December 19th, 1990 on freedom of association and especially of practice. Therefore, there is a difference between recognized and unrecognized religious sects.

### 10.4.1 Recognized religious sects in the sphere of Cameroon

Recognized sects can practically be understood in a passive sense. However, the State confirms and acknowledges its licensing aspect thereby granting a free recognition. In regards to its recognition, religious associations come under the authorization system in Cameroon.[944] The "recognized" sects are those authorized by virtue of the law. Therefore, the secularism of the State in principle only comes into play with the associates. Consequently, all religious associations must be authorized, same with congregations. The recognition is pronounced by the President of the Republic, after opinion motivated by the Minister of Territorial Administration.[945]In the absence of such authorization in the state of Cameroon, there is non-existence. The gratitude of "second hand motivation"[946] is also a current practice: the unauthorized Churches can be considered as recognized by interposition when a legal religious congregation accepts that another, whose the authorization request was refused, can work under cover. The status of religions thus appears very

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[943] A. Boulanger, *The History of the Church*, Paris, London Press, 1987, p. 512.
[944] Regime of declaration and regime of authorization are opposed in these two cases; cf. Law n ° 90/053 of 19 Dec. 1990, Art. 5, al. 2 and 23 on the law of association, detailed, note 16.
[945] *Ibidem*., Art. 24.
[946] A. Bisaga, The principle of the secularism of the State, Master's Thesis in public law, Yaounde, UY / FD, 1989, p. 47.

complex. Religions, well whether they are associations, want to place themselves at a particular level, which the state implicitly admits, at least in practice. The exercise of control of religions sheds more light on this complexity.

In Cameroon, as in most African countries, the ministry of the Territorial Administration ensures the control of religions. In the organization chart internal ministry, religious affairs are the domain of the Directorate of Political Affairs and which report to the Office of Worship and games. The latter ensures respect for secularism both by the State itself than by different religions. In exercising control over religions and its values, the Ministry of Territorial Administration relayed on its branches and the administrative districts scattered throughout the country. Closer to religious activities, divisional officials and sub-divisional officials play a very significant role in the relations between the State and religions: on reception of authorization of public meetings, authorization requests and settlement of various conflicts between religions.

On the one hand, the practice of controlling religions is also exercised by other ministries in the sectors of their respective activities: thus is it for the Ministry of National Education in the sector of education and the Ministry of Public Health in that of health. Besides, administrative control is also exercised that which relates to the financial and material management of the Churches. Alongside giving religious full autonomy over the management of their property, Cameroon has intended to provide the best proof of his secularist option; indeed, the buildings of worship centre are not a dependency of the public domain as in France. The works maintenance of the mosque or the church is not work public. The municipality cannot request the decommissioning of a religious building in ruins; it cannot dispose of the building even if worship is no longer professed there.

On the other hand, the State seems to watch with particular attention on the financial domain of religions. In this perspective, the Law of 19 December 1990 relating to freedom of association provides that associations and religious congregations cannot obtain public subsidies; however, they can receive necessary donations and real estate donations to the exercise of their activities. They keep a statement of their receipts and expenditure and draw up each year the financial account for the past year as well as the inventory of their movable and immovable property.[947] The leaders of religious associations are required to present, upon request to the

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[947] Law n "90/053 of] December 9, 1990 on the freedom of association, cited above, notte16 Art. 26.

Minister of Territorial Administration or his delegate, the accounts and statements referred to in article 26, under penalty of criminal sanction as approved by the secular constitutions of Cameroon.[948]

## 10.4.2 Unrecognized religious associations in Cameroon

Legally, without decree of authorization, an association or religious congregation does not exist. However, practice confirms the existence indeed for some of them; and the importance of religious associations in Cameroon suggests that in this matter this existence de facto would be the rule, while authorization would be the exception. It is known that Cameroon is home to more than a hundred religions and unrecognized sects,[949] some of which seem to enjoy among public authorities of a certain audience. The semi-clandestine nature of the existence of religions and missions unauthorized would constitute a simple substitute for the State seeking to reconcile its authority and respect for the fundamental freedoms of person, in the case of freedom of conscience. The text of the law on freedom of association carries within itself the seeds of an ambiguity, less semantic. In reality, some religions escape the definition of what the law gives. The Catholic or Presbyterian Church or the Muslim religion in Cameroon cannot be confused with simple religious congregations, if not reduced to this definition. The human volume of these religions does not allow them to apply article 27 of the Law of 19 December 1990 relating to freedom of association which obliges every religious congregation to present each year, at the Ministry of Territorial Administration, the complete lists of their executive members.

The problem with recent religions or sects is that they have a questionable organization and absent leadership. When it exists, it is regularly contested by members and very often gives rise to threats of split.[950] The frequent disturbances caused by these sects have led the authorities more suspicious of the possibility of granting them a legal and official recognition. At present, it is the fall in provisional but unofficial disuse of the granting of this recognition by the head of state that performs.[951] However, recent religions and sects, aware of their specificity, do not intend to dissolve in another religious body or even give up the game. They put themselves automatically

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[948] *Ibidem*, Art. 27 and 28.
[949] D. Waffo Mongo Tagne, Young people facing the proliferation of sects in Yaoundé, graduation thesis, Yaoundé, ESSTI, 1984, pp. 34-52.
[950] This is the case with the True Church of God, for example ... on the occasion of the leadership struggle among pastors.
[951] As of July 15, 1989, according to statistics collected at the Ministry of Administration territorial, 77 requests for recognition were rejected.

under the status of "unrecognized" cults and missions, when they have not carried out second-hand recognition.

In Cameroon today, it is difficult for the layman to distinguish religions recognized from those which are illicit. This confusion is maintained by the State itself through the freedom of action that it grants indifferently to all these religions and sects. Religious associations not recognized have worship buildings and organize religious services public. They create schools, dispensaries, hospitals carrying their denomination; they receive state subsidies for the realization of social works. However, their situation remains precarious due to their legal non-recognition which can also result from internal religious conflicts disturbing public order and likely to lead to a harsh reaction from the state. It is nevertheless, necessary to decry the ulterior intentions of the State which wishes to hold a very broad power to "strike" anytime, from when his opinion of a religious community or sect becomes negative.

In the same, the state is always in a position of strength. In reality, it is supervised or simply trapped by freedom which is left to unrecognized cults and missions.[952] In fact, religions, often aware of their social and economic weight intend to negotiate with the State, or even impose themselves on it, to share also political power. This dualistic attitude influences the evolution of relations between the two institutions. Therefore, subject to the hard test of socio-political reality, the secularism of the State becomes a principle of mortgage. This would lead us to the action of churches in the field socio-economic development.

### 10.4.3 The action of Churches in the fields of education, health and economic in Cameroons' political sphere

The commitment of Church's in Cameroon to education can find its foundation in these words of the Bible: "Train the child according to the way that he must follow; when he grows up he will not turn away from it." By framing thus a large number of Cameroonians, the Church intends to control long-term politics at the top, because many of his students today will be the executives of tomorrow and developmental transformation. In 1989, the Federation of Churches and Evangelicals Missions of Cameroon (FEMEC) had grown with an estimated educational formation of the young growing Cameroonian population with 685 schools which supervised

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[952]The cases of Eitel Mouette Koula v. Federal Republic of Cameroon and Nana Tchana Daniel Roger v. Federal Republic of Cameroon, cited above, note 17, illustrating amply.

About 46,738 pupils and 4,397 national trained and competent teachers. The general expenses incurred by FEMEC during the year 1988-1989 amounted to 3,507,096,658 CFA francs intended mainly to the payment of salaries granted to teachers and to other service agents in its training establishments. Besides these huge expenses, the Catholic Church on it parts counted 1,270 schools with 386,170 pupils in 1989 and nearly 9,113 national teachers across the nation. Secretly, Muslims also developed the Koranic schools. Consequently, FEMEC institute already had nearly 200 schools in the country, but Islam remains absent in the field of education in general.

Based on the medical level, the weight of the Churches in Cameroon is as important as in denominational education. Undeniably, the Catholic Church alone counted, in 1983, 8 hospitals, 54 maternities, 117 dispensaries and 5 leper hospitals. To the same period, the Protestant Church had 18 hospitals, 57 centers dental facilities, 6 leper hospitals, 4 orphanages and 3 educational paramedical establishments. In 1988, FEMEC brought together 22 hospitals, 67 health centers developed, 8 elementary health centers, 3 training schools, 4 leper hospitals and some dental centers. At the level of economic action of religions, in Cameroon, as elsewhere, Christian religion plays a very important role in the economic development of the country. Christian religion opens up the regions of the country by improving the main roads access, restore the internal road network to service and create new tracks intended to break the isolation of most of the large production to facilitate the movement of people and goods, ensure the disposal of agricultural surpluses and promote economic development. This operation has been effective the construction roads project and the agricultural project across the country territories. The Christian religion has only a moral role, all responsible being appointed by the state. The current trend of churches in the field of education, health and economic in Cameroon, has tremendously expand with high religious and moral value inculcated in the mind sets of the young educated population, and affordable expansion of health facilities at the service of the vulnerable in society. This has greatly impacted positively the lives of Cameroonian towards societal values and creative skills towards progress and emergence of the State.

## 10.5 SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS RELATION IN CAMEROON POLITICAL SPHERE

The rise and moral value of the state of Cameroon unveils a radical move in state emergence. The core value enshrine in the constitutional law of the state embodied the secular and

religious sphere for the moulding of her citizens and maintaining security and cohesion of social peace within it territories.

## 10.5.1 The Cameroon secular constitutions and religious freedom in public sphere

The secular and religious backdrop of Cameroon, highlight the significance and adoption of postcolonial secular constitutions and religious values in promoting harmony, social cohesion and peace. This development must be seen against the background of the political developments in Cameroon since the colonial times. What actually proceeds is of course a very simplified description of the political developments within the Cameroonian public sphere. The drive for independence of Cameroon from their colonial masters already started in the early 20th century. Freedom from the authority of European imperialism and colonial rule became the major driving force of resistance in those decades since the 1960s of independence from their colonial masters. However, as noted, the freedom from colonial masters quickly turned into subjugation from the new rulers. Since the 1960s independence, Cameroon has witnessed an increasing democratization, with elections being held and new initiatives to hold governments accountable.

In the Constitutive Act of Cameroon, the Heads of State and Government say that they are determined to consolidate democratic institutions and culture, to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, to ensure good governance and the rule of law, and that they are further determined to take all required measures to enable and strengthen the discharge of respective mandates effectively in our common institutions that provides them with the necessary powers and resources.[953] The above developments indicate the way in which Cameroon has become part of the global political world. Human rights discourses thus reflect the idea that the world is increasingly becoming a "global world" in which the sovereignty of nation-states is relativized. Accordingly, An-Na'im states that "normative propositions about human relations are now made on behalf of all human beings as such, rather than as citizens of particular states." Within certain confines of a nation state, the relation between religion and politics is no longer decided only by an institution. If the principles of human rights are violated, the international community has the right to step into the situation.[954] It is thus important to consider religion and politics in Cameroon against the background of these global developments. The reasons for the growth of religions in Cameroon

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[953] https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf
[954] J. D. Van der Vyver, Religious freedom in African constitutions, *op. cit*., pp 14-17.

seem to respond to the economically induced and survival anxiety that characterizes the processes of globalization.[955]

With the developmental process of globalization the perspective between religion and state in Cameroon are not politically neutral, and thus often provide opportunities for becoming part of a struggle for political power. Norris and Inglehart writes for example that in many poor societies, where religion is central to society, authoritarian rulers have a direct interest in promoting or controlling religious institutions in order to maintain their power and legitimacy.[956] What is the relation between religion and the secular state of Cameroon? One principal important indicator of religion and secularism in Cameroon is whether there is a secular constitution that legally guarantees religious freedom in the country.[957] What is therefore a secular constitution? Observing the nature of secular constitutions, Jacobsohn defines secular constitutions as a polity where there exists a genuine obligation to religious freedom that is visible in both the legal and political safeguards put in place to enforce that commitment.[958] The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom is thus seems to be the core of a secular constitution in a democratic country like Cameroon.

Appropriately, a country can enshrine religious freedom in its constitution without really putting it into practice.[959] Thus we cannot only rely on the constitutions of the Cameroonian state in order to determine whether religious freedom actually exists in the country. Therefore, referring to religious freedom in its constitution gives some weight to the importance of this freedom for the of Cameroon state. According to the constitutional expert Van der Vyver, Although the same legal protection afforded to an aspect of religious freedom by the constitution of a particular state may also be found in legislation other than the constitution of another state, having afforded constitutional protection to that aspect would indicate the special significance attached to religious

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[955] *See,* Karner & Aldridge, Theorizing Religion ina Globalizing World. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 18(1), 5-32, 2003; P. Norris, & R. Ingehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 25. (This also lends some support to theory of existential security and secularization which links secularization and human development).

[956] P. Norris, & R. Ingehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and politics worldwide*, *op cit.*, p 45.

[957] A constitution is a very important document for understanding the role and place of religion in a particular society because it is legally binding and it sets out the "ground rules" for dealing with religion in a specific state and of the people of that particular state.

[958] See, G. J. Jacobsohn, *The wheel of law. India's secularism in comparative constitutional context.* Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003. Karner, C. & Aldridge, A. Theorizing Religion in a Globalizing World. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 2004. 18 (1), 5-32.

[959] J. D. Van der Vyver, Religious freedom in African constitutions, *op. cit.*, p 109.

freedom in the first mentioned state.[960] The promise of religious freedom in the constitutions of Cameroon does not necessarily imply that religious freedom is also put into practice as we indicated above.[961] Religious freedom thus seems to be generally respected by the governments of Cameroon. In almost a quarter of the state freedom of religion is partly respected, with some restrictions on specific religious groups or specific religious practices. Despite the adoption of secular constitutions in Cameroon and the principle of religious freedom, they are as well religious intolerance and state intervention.

### 10.5.2 Religious intolerance and state intervention

From the outlook, it appears that all action of the State is oriented by the concern of construction of the Cameroonian nation. Though, this construction goes through the guarantee of social peace, and conflicts that sometimes arise within religious associations or between religions do not help to establish peace. Cameroonian authorities have always adopted a cautious attitude towards religions to avoid living the unhappy experience witnessing fratricidal heartbreaks. This is seen after the destruction in 1975 of certain Christian buildings by Muslims in Ngaoundéré and its surroundings, among others in Belel, the State has opted for detente by ordering the reconstruction of some of these chapels, in particular that of Belel. In addition, the Evangelical Lutheran Church was compensated up to 3,000,000 CFA francs.

By adopting these measures, the State wanted to put an end to a conflict which could have gone beyond the regional framework to take on national dimensions and perhaps plunge Cameroon into a tragic situation. Let us recall the Mgr Ndongmo affair during which, in the North, some Catholic religious authorities and chapel suffered, Muslims having believed that it was a conflict between theirs and Christians. This situation led President Ahidjo to declare that the trial of Mgr Ndongmo will be neither that of an ethnic group nor that of a religion. Moreover, when a conflict exists within the same religious congregation, the State appreciates in what way it can, while observing the principle of secularism, trying to reconcile the parties involved. Usually, the State initiates a negotiation operation in order to seal the reconciliation of the parties.

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[960] *Ibidem,* pp. 109-143.
[961] Lipton writes in the Preface of the book *Religious freedom in Africa*: "Human rights, of which the freedom of religion is a central component, are promised by most governments on planet Earth. But promises are promises, are promises.

## 10.5.3 Relationship between public authorities and religions in Cameroon

The foregoing developments have shown that religions, in conquering such a large social and economic space, have thereby posed the foot in the political field. They now present themselves as real political forces. Also, aware of their importance in the spiritual and material development and given its limited means, the Cameroonian State intends to cooperate with religions to achieve its political, economic and social objectives. But, does such collaboration to some extent alienate the freedom of action of one and the other? Because, as Professor Georges Burdeau asserts, secularism is the doctrine which considers religions and cults as phenomena foreign to the State and which it does not have to deal with for so long that public order is not disturbed.[962] In reality, this relationship is to the advantage of religions in order to that the action or activities of the State do not interfere with those which are religious, but it is also useful: the State needs social peace to carry out its work of building a strong and prosperous nation.

The relationship between the State and religions has a legal character and unofficial.[963] Legal because the Cameroon State, out of respect for the principle of secularism, defines the framework of action of religions, their role and their status. Without claiming to list all the forms of cooperation, it is important to emphasize the state's respect for religious holidays and religious education in the various state institutions. Equally, note that, the presence reciprocal of both the State and the religious in the different manifestations organized by one or the other. Indeed, since the introduction of Christianity in Cameroon, respect for religious holidays has become a tradition.

Today, Cameroon has inserted religious-inspired holidays among the legal holidays celebrated as such throughout the territory of Republic. They are governed by an ordinance of 1972 fixing the regime legal holidays in Cameroon.[964] Next to civil legal holidays, in this case January 1, February 11 (Youth Day), May 20 (National Day), Article 1 of the Ordinance includes the holidays Christians and Muslims such as Good Friday, the Assumption (August 15), Christmas (December 25), the feast of Ramadan and the feast of the Sheep.[965] Articles 2, 3, 4 and 9 state that if a holiday falls on a Sunday (holiday religious week) Monday can be declared a holiday and unemployed by decree of the President of the Republic. For the sake of balance benefit of Islam,

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[962] G. Burdeau, Public freedoms, 4th ed., LGDJ, 1972, p. 344.

[963] J. Rivéro, *op. cit.,* note 5, p. 292.

[964] Cf. Ordinance n ° 72/15 of September 16, 1972 fixing the regime of legal festivals in Cameroon.

[965] https://www.stopblablacam.com/culture-and-society/1912-3170-no-dec-26-2019-is-not-a-public-non-working-holiday-in-cameroon

a modification of this ordinance occurred, removing certain Christian holidays such as Easter Monday, Pentecost. Anyway, the inclusion of religious holidays in the calendar national law is a legal limit to the principle of secularism of the State of Cameroon.

Indeed, the religious are always invited to all major official ceremonies and in large receptions. In terms of protocol, some religious, the example of the cardinal or the archbishop, come before many highs administration executives. Equally, the latter, through its representatives, is also present at major events of important religious. The Cameroonian head of state often sends of its personal representatives at the funerals or coronations of high authorities ecclesiastics or nuns. Throughout the Pope's visit to Cameroon in August 1985 it was difficult to distinguish to whom (state or church) this visit was intended, so much the cooperation between the two institutions was effective and real. In the final analysis, let us specify that the life of Cameroon institutions is marked by this constancy: collaboration dominates all relations between politics and religion. This is even more noticeable in the political, economic and social fields. This undoubtedly translates a fact: the state considers religions as partners in full-fledged. The partnership between the two powers is therefore a matter of realism. This element is characteristic of degree of collaboration that may exist between the two institutions.

Another less important aspect that characterizes the State and religions puts the secularism of the State to the test: it is undoubtedly the influence of the latter on the social works of religions. In law, secularism supposes that the State no longer invests in the religious domain, even indirectly. However, through the system of subsidies, donations of land and other forms of transactions, the State provides proof that today effective and strict secularism is impossible. It is widely found like this negotiated by socio-political reality. Observers are amazed at the substance and value of the subsidies granted to Muslim and Catholic pilgrims. In fact, during pilgrimages to Mecca, Lourdes, Rome or Israel, the State of Cameroon significantly assists religions. In addition to the sums of the money spends on these trips, she assists them with his staff, including gendarmes and doctors, and also supplies products such only drugs.[966]

In fact, the State cannot do without religions in Cameroon without compromising its own existence and experience has shown that no diet politics did not emerge honored from a fight

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[966]In 1989, Muslim pilgrims were entitled to a state subsidy worth of 15,200,000 CFA francs covered by the budget of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, with two doctors, four nurses and an ambulance ... them, received 5,200,000 CFA francs of subsidy and benefited from the services of a doctor and two nurses ...

against religions. In any case, the legal principle of the secularism of the State is found mortgaged by socio-political reality. As Michel Prouzet says, religions in Cameroon form a sort of state within a state.[967] The latter controls in a very interested way the activities of religions, for these can bring peace or create trouble. The state is therefore, obliged to regulate in advance the limits to religious freedoms, in particular to protect public order.

## 10.5.4 The implementation of religious policy and powers by public authorities

It is primarily of value and responsibility in society for religious authorities themselves to ensure the police or the security of their worship meetings in their public areas determined and known to the administrative authorities. However, it is up to the State to monitor respect for public order by religious authorities and/or on the occasion of religious activities. Farther, state control irritates and appears to some as a technique of restriction of religious freedom. Yet, these are often preventive measurements, justified for the general interest of religious associations themselves, the application of which does not necessarily depend on an attitude of authoritarian on the part of the public authorities. What are the different modes of police control? Or better still what are the various bans on religious freedoms inspired by public order? The use of a particular control method depends on the circumstances.

On a permanent and routine basis, the authorities responsible for maintaining the order inquired about the activities of religious congregations. It's about in fact for the administration to inquire about the general situation within religious associations, especially during awareness campaigns and parties. It then adopts an attitude of sustained vigilance in relation to particular manifestations of religious associations such as pilgrimages. Indeed, these activities are likely to disturb sometimes public order.  In addition, the State maintains a file of religious associations in order to be able to unmask them and recognize them when the order is threatened by these. The control which is felt on foreign religious is to this very significant regard. The State ensures the nationality of religious foreigners working in Cameroon; it also checks their number, their function and the events in which they take part. The use of foreign aid within religious communities is of equal interest to the state. It is necessary to avoid that, under the cover of religions, the organizations subversive actions of destabilization orchestrated from abroad and supported inside.

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[967] M. Prouzet, "How they are governed", Cameroon, LGDT, Paris, 1974, p. 103 et seq.

All these measures are motivated by the concern of maintaining order for the general interest. Also, the prohibition decision taken by the authorities of public vis-à-vis underground associations appears to be a moral sanction for the illegal practice of worship. For recognized religious entities, it should be noted, for the most part, that the organization of large-scale religious awareness campaigns scope outside the chapels, conferences of a national or international nature likewise quests and trips abroad cannot be held ex officio and by the sole will of the religious authorities. Their outfit is subject to prior agreement from the public authorities. In such events, the requesting religion must specify the purpose of the activity, the members who take part, location, duration, etc. Safety in this case, especially for public campaigns, is in principle provided by the police and not by pastors.

On another level, for reasons of public order, the public authorities are required to prevent the connection or continuation of the activities of religious movements protesting against the political order or those whose teachings undermine the core values of the state and populations, especially national unity, peaceful coexistence. The presumption of legality is acquired when it comes to demonstrations of religious traditions such as some sacred processions and the funeral convoys. The intervention of the police in these cases can be analyzed a second action, i.e. this one never acts on its own initiative, regardless of the degree of disturbance to public order. In others terms, even in the event of religious demonstrations or disputes over the public road, the public security police station cannot order on his own the dispersal of the demonstrators. Its action is imperatively subject to an express requisition by the administrative police authorities.

# Partial Conclusion

In Cameroon, secularism and religion is marked by a double concern in its politics. On the other hand, secularism is marked by the efforts of religions in order to gain the support of the incumbent political power. Secularism is dominated by the specter of strengthening powers of the state, very suspicious of freedom of expression and eagerness to win religions to its cause. By thus approaching the political power, religions benefits from the good graces of the State, which is to say of an individual, the Head of State, and of a policy, that which is conveyed by him. Eventually, according to our analysis, the socio-political reality has profoundly watered down the principle of state secularism and religion in Cameroon politics. The state has realized the role of religions not only in the formation morality of citizens, but also in development itself. The evident of this situates on the "grassroots level," wherein religion thus plays an important role in the lives of millions of Cameroonians on a daily basis, which has become part of global networks. Religion does play a very important role in the current secular state of Cameroon. In primarily gaining the favors of religious leaders who enjoy a regime of specific immunities, the State thus secures the support of religions for its politics and even a potential electorate. Religion in a modern and secular state of Cameroon does, however, also provide opportunities to be exploited in power struggles based on religion, class, race, gender and all those boundaries in continually seeking of power. By the investment they make in the country, religions are shifting less to limit the neutrality of the State towards them. This is what justifies the collaboration between the two powers, all the more necessary as social peace depends on it to some extent. They cannot, therefore, be removed from the state-building enterprise and, therefore, there is no more spheres reserved for this or that power. Both the state and religion fits into the whole life of man involved in the family, politics, profession and union. The three aspects highlighted, demonstrate that secularism and religion is highly applicable in Cameroon politics and evolution. The challenge is for us to think beyond secularism and religion in Cameroon politics, and to search for new, creative, and contextual ways of handling progress and emergence of the nation without violating the principle of secularism in the State.

# CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE GLOBAL PERSONALIST COMMUNITY AND ITS FOUNDATION

## Partial Introduction

The fulfillment of the human person only takes place within a community or the society. However, the only true community that can fulfill this mission is, the personalist community whose bases rest on a metaphysical-theological principle: love (unity). Its realization is the fruit of a long spiritual revolution involving a permanent process of personalization and a revolution of social structures grafted on its condition of life. Our intention is to present the conditions and principles of such a community where each person can fully fulfill them-selves and live their development in harmony with others in dignity. Therefore, we will first try to present the necessity and the principles of the global personalist revolution; then, on the basis of these revolutionary principles, we will show that the learning of us constitutes an act of founding a community; we will present the status and foundation of this community intrude in the global society. Further, we a view on Levinas and the Ethico-moral vision of global dialogue, the fear of western humanism in face of the crisis of humanity in the global society, the decline of nation states and the emancipation of the rights of man in the global society, and finally, on the humanity and inhumanity of human rights in the global society.

## 11.1 THE NEED FOR GLOBAL PERSONALIST REVOLUTION

Faced with the crisis of humanity in the twenty first century, also called the crisis of the human person, we have the ambition to remedy it by instigating a spiritual revolution, which is both personal and community. This revolution will have to simultaneously transform the things of men and find its philosophical inspiration in a personalist conception of man and his relationship with nature and society, since the evil is total. The purpose of such a revolution will have to result in the profound changes in all areas of human existence as well as the advent and construction of a new order: the foundation of a true global personalist community, beyond individualism and collectionism, oriented towards a "federalist" organization, that is to say personalist and global community of social relations. This is what explains the demand for such a revolution in the face of the crisis of humanity and more fundamentally the crisis of the person. The question that can be asked is what is the character of this global revolution? Does it follow spiritualist logic or a materialist logic?

### 11.1.1 The spiritualist and materialist approach to the global revolution

It is important to make a radical break with the established disorder in the global society and to rediscover the true meaning of man after four centuries of individualism, capitalism, slavery and exploitation of the human. But change must happen in all areas of life and the society. The approach to this revolution is neither simply abstract materialism nor pure spiritualism. Rather, it aims to reconcile the global society to build an integral revolution that touches all aspects of human existential life. However, understanding this revolutionary approach requires us first to present the two approaches highlighted above.

Faced with the crisis of humanity in the twenty first century, two doctrines are opposed in their proposal for a solution to this evil. These are the materialist approach and the spiritualist approach. The first is represented by Marxist theory and the second by moralists. Faced with this crisis, "the Marxists said: it is a classic economic crisis and a structural crisis. Operate the economy, the patient will recover. Moralists opposed: crisis of man, crisis of morals, and crisis of values. Change the man, and societies will heal.[968] Indeed, the moralists favour the transformation of *mores or values* to remedy the crisis from which societies are suffering. Starting from this moralistic consideration, Mounier writes about spiritualists:

> You have allowed the fate of man to be confused with spirit-on-spirit chatter, and the very strength of the spirit diverted to the artificial paradise in the service of all evil deeds. You haven't seen it, that's what condemns you […]. We felt the gulf that separates good words from good words; and that we could not announce, almost without self-righteousness, the ways of the spirit until all had from their conditions of existence sufficient leisure and interior availability to engage in them.[969]

However, the revolution must "rehabilitate the solid world, restore nature in its poetry, in its friendship with man",[970] since the spirit is defined by union with the body and not by separation. The revolutionary in the global society assault on the forces of depersonalization of man broken into two tracks: - one by S. Kierkegaard who reminds modern man of his awareness of his subjectivity and his freedom; - the other by K. Marx who denounces the mystifications into which social structures grafted onto his material condition lead and reminds him that his destiny is not only in his heart but in his hands.

On the other hand, the Marxists proposed a material revolution which did not take absolutely into account the spiritual aspect of man, that is to say a structural, economic and socio-

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[968]E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?*, *op cit*., p 13.
[969] *Ibidem*., pp. 14-15.
[970]J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, *op. cit*., p 73.

political revolution. This is the reason of the materialist philosophy as "a philosophy which precisely insist on humanism of work and of the manufacturing function, considers as illusory other dimensions no less essential of man, in particular the human being interiority and transcendence."[971] In this logic, Marxism had given as the ultimate goal of the revolution" the 'liberation of the individual', the 'reign of freedom' and the disappearance of the State "130[972] in the face of the collective and majority dictatorship of the proletariat in the global society. The essential gap in this Marxism comes from the fact that it ignored the intimate reality of man, that of personal life.

Consequently, "there remains, in fact, at the base of Marxism, a fundamental negation of the spiritual as an autonomous, primary and creative reality."[973] For Marxism sees in the spiritual reality only ideological reflections, at least a second state of being. In his organization of the world, through his communist vision, he leaves no room for this ultimate form of spiritual existence that is the person and his own values: freedom and love. Of course, he recognizes a specific action of the spiritual, of ideologies and wills, on the dialectical march of history; but, if the ideas and wills that social structures set in motion exert an influence, which reflects on the entire evolution of society, and even on the economy. Nevertheless, they remain under the influence of economic development. Thus, faced with the alienation of man under capitalism, Marxism proposes a material revolution whose immediate object is this transformation aimed at the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a new economic infrastructure in which man will become a subject. Starting from these two oppositions, the personalist and community revolution attempts to unite these two sides in an unprecedented novelty, the integral revolution.

As a theorist of "the personalist and community revolution", Mounier was therefore, neither satisfied with materialists nor with traditional spiritualists; because, all "seemed to participate in the same modern error, the one which, following Cartesians doubt, arbitrarily separates body and mind, thought and action, *homo faber* and *homo sapiens*."[974] However, we see this crisis as both an economic crisis and a spiritual crisis. A crisis of structures and a crisis of man. This is one of the reasons why we wanted to deal with the crisis of the person, because it allows us to analyze this evil in all its dimensions, at the heart of our current global world. Indeed, "the

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[971]E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?*, *op. cit.*, p 14.
[972]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.*, p 29.
[973]*Ibidem,* p. 30.
[974]E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?*, *op. cit.*, pp 13-14.

'Material Revolution first', just like the 'Moral Revolution first', can cover an individual flight from the global requirement of a revolution of the total man."[975] The moral revolution will be economic.

The Economic Revolution will be "moral" or not.[976] The synthesis of these profound changes in all fields can be summed up under the term *"Refaire la Renaissance."*[977]Therefore, this proposes a total revolution integrating the spiritual revolution and the material one (the revolution of structures). Thus, by integrating these two dimensions of the revolution, it seeks to break out of the antagonism between materialism and spiritualism for a spiritual realism. One thing is certain, there is no fruitful material revolution that is not rooted and spiritually oriented.[978] This approach ensures that the material revolution is rooted in the spiritual one so that it is deep and effective. It is this global requirement of the revolution that would lead, the spiritual revolution which takes into account all the dimensions of human life structuring the universe of the person.

The spiritual revolution is a personalist and community revolution, that combines progress with the spiritual. It is based on two complementary and inseparable axes: the personalist revolution and the politico-social revolution. First, the personalist revolution consists of a personal and permanent fight against individualism and metaphysics of dehumanization, totalitarian collectivism. The fundamental characteristic of this revolution is the personalist dialectic that we will have the opportunity to analyze in a future point. We call personal revolution this process which is born at every moment of a revolutionary bad conscience, of a revolt first led by each against himself, on his own participation or his own complacency in the established disorder, on the gap that "he tolerates between what he serves and what he says he serves-and which blossoms in the second step in a continued conversion of the whole person in solidarity, words, gestures, principles, in the unity of the same commitment.[979]

In other words, it is akin to permanent conversion according to Christian doctrine. It is therefore, a permanent struggle that each individual must wage in order to be fully accomplished, that is to say to realize his person. It must be operated without ceasing, until death, because "of the

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[975]*Ibidem,* p. 15.
[976]*Ibidem*, p. 14.
[977]See Presentation of P. Mounier in the preface of E. Mounier, *Oeuvres Tome I.* (1931-1939), Seuil, 1961, p. 7.
[978]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 34.
[979]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 164.

person, it is only a question towards the end."[980] That's why it is an ongoing quest. It presupposes a duty of commitment, the first spiritual means of which is to learn to be a person. This immediately implies "a continuous works of stripping against the obstacles, coming from the individuality or the personality, which paralyze, become, dupe of the work of personalization.[981] This fight therefore has as a global enemy, all anonymous forces, collective or individual. The individual is seen here as a fragmentation of the anonymous, not a step towards the person.

The socio-political revolution includes those which are turned towards the institutions or the structures when the latter obstruct the development and the achievement of people. It aims to organize concern in order to anticipate the internal growth of the community and global society at large. However, we cannot expect all men to agree to become people to build a city.[982] Indeed, the men who make up our societies are sometimes mired in the matter of their individuality. Societies are themselves more or less inorganic and far removed from a perfect community. Those with totalitarian regimes, who think to eliminate the inner tension of each individual, do not know the explosive resources which are at the heart of man and which will one day turn against them. They will have to be transformed so that they are not a means or places of fragmentation of man in his being himself and his being towards others and Transcendence.

In other words, respect for the human person or for the humanity in every human being is paramount compared to material necessities. This principle refers to respect for private life and the dignity of the human person. This is the principle of the inviolability of life. However, in our technical world, a hyper connected world punctuated by social networks, this respect for human dignity is in crisis. The human person is neglected in favour of gain, superficiality, the responsibility and the decentralization.[983]It is an orientation which aims to define the human person as a free and responsible existence. This responsibility commits him to the process of his personalization and that of his community. His responsibility engages at the same time his personal life and his community.

According to Jean-Marie Domenach, this revolution constitutes the first step of the spiritual revolution because it clears a path for it to achieve its purpose, that is to say its full achievement. In this regard, we must insure the material, rationally organize the economy of the city;

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[980]J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, *op. cit*., p 66.
[981]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 172.
[982]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, p. 52.
[983] *Ibidem*, p. 59.

incompetent politicians will give way to responsible delegates assisted by inventive technicians.[984] This is how the foundations of the global society will be created which will allow the person to flourish through education, culture and the mediation of liberated communities: family, church, union, youth movement, etc. By integrating the political revolution with the spiritual revolution, the latter becomes integral. This is because the biological or economic solution to a human problem, however close to basic needs, is incomplete and fragile without taking into account the deepest dimensions of man. The spiritual is also an infrastructure.

The psychological and spiritual disorders associated with an economic disorder can long undermine the solutions obtained on the economic front. And the most rational economic structure, if it is established in defiance of the basic requirements of the person, carries with it its ruin.[985]In other words, we must ensure the solution in terms of spiritual, biological and economic infrastructure if we are to make other measures taken in other areas viable. Personalism grasps the whole problem of man on the whole breadth of concrete humanity, from the humblest material condition to the highest spiritual possibility. Moreover, if the environment transforms man, the latter, surely, transforms him in turn. However, the explanation of human problems by instinct (S. Freud) and by economics (K. Marx) constitutes an approach just like spiritualism without taking into account the extent of all the dimensions of human life. However, how should this revolution come about?

The personalist and community revolution is carried out by reminding man of the awareness of his subjectivity, of his responsible freedom and of his communication dimension with the world, with others and with Transcendence. It is a revolution that takes place through direct action by protecting the person of illusions discourse and collective myths. It thus addressed to a free man, first in the minds (intelligence and reflection) and hearts. But we must not wait until all men agree to become people to build a city because, "we cannot wait for the spiritual revolution to be over in people's hearts to begin institutional revolutions which can at least save people. Catastrophe thus in the external mechanisms impose a certain institutional discipline on the failing individuals."[986] This would mean that the spiritual revolution begins with personal transformation before reaching the institutional level; because, it is the men who organize the institutions (bottom-

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[984] J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, *op. cit.,* p 97.
[985]E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme? op. cit.,* p 27.
[986]P. Mounier in the preface of E. Mounier, *Œuvres Tome I*. 1931-1939. *op. cit*., p 540.

top approach and not Top-Bottom approach on Hobbes' sense). This is the meaning of the personalization movement, which only begins with men. This revolution is achieved by rebuilding a humanism based on the person, while recognizing human precariousness and frailties, reducing our share of unavailability to others and to the world. It is a revolution that takes place by fighting any materialism, that expresses a separation, because, it reintroduces the spirit that re-establishes the union. This revolution lets emerge the revolt of life against scientism or rather against the government of techno-science or precisely of techno-science.

Revolution is also made by learning from the political and spiritual errors of faceless societies such as vital societies which are based on an exaltation of the forces of life or a further rationalization of the earthly city within nature. According to Mounier, the spiritual revolution constitutes, for this purpose, the matrix for the transformation of the socio-political and economic structures necessary for the development of community personalism, because "the spiritual controls the political and the economic. The mind must keep the initiative and the mastery of its goals, which go to man above man, and not to well-being.[987] In this, man will regain the lost contact with others and with nature. The communities will then not orient themselves not towards comfort but towards justice, love and creation. This assumes that the revolution is fundamentally about living together and not just the satisfaction of needs or the infinite accumulation of goods. This is what Africa or the world needs to achieve the ideal of community that Mounier proposes. Besides that, the spiritual revolution takes place through the education of the person in the man.

In this logic, the personalist education that Mounier presents does not consist in helping to make (by training) the person but in awakening him by call. Its mission is "to awaken people capable of living and engaging as people".[988] It should not reproduce the errors of school education at the time of Mounier, which consisted in: devoting oneself primarily to training a citizen and a producer; impose on children a condensed version of the adult's perspectives, that is to say, to mold the child to the conformism of a family, social or state environment or to restrict oneself to adapting the child to the function or the role that as an adult he will play; replace the discernment of characters and vocations with the authoritarian formalism of knowledge.

Personalist education concerns the whole man. Thus, a personalistic civilization is one whose structures and spirit are oriented towards the fulfillment, as a person of each of the

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[987] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 15.
[988] P. Mounier in the preface of E. Mounier, Œuvres. Tome I. 1931-1939. *op. cit*., p 550.

individuals who compose it. Personalism conceives of the individual and the community as two fundamental aspects of the person. The community constitutes the place of the experience and of the fundamental act of the person. And to get the individual out of his isolation and collective tyrannies, Mounier proposes a revolution aimed at the restoration of the human person. The main reason for such a requirement is found at the heart of the purpose of this Revolution.

### 11.1. 2. The revolutionary requirement: the restoration of the person and the creation of a new community of people

To understand the finality of the personalist revolution in the global society, we must first understand personalism as a total effort to understand and overcome the whole human crisis of the twentieth century.[989]This same effort can be deployed in the current context to understand and overcome the crisis of the person that we have attempted to analyze. This assumes that the personalist revolution has as its foundation the study of the condition of man in its context. This is why personalism is first of all an effort to diagnose the evils that undermine (global society) societies before proposing alternatives to get out of the crisis.

In reaction against individualist and community decadence, one is tempted to denounce the ravages of liberal capitalism and state collectivism in the global society. And if Jean-Marie Domenach does so, like social Christians, "it is not in the name of an old order that knows dead, it is not from a perspective which, however generous it may be, remained 'organic', corporate, pre-industrial, that is to say reactionary […]. He will call himself a socialist because he is a Christian, never a Christian socialist […]."[990] Its reaction is therefore against individualism and collectivism which are factors of the evil suffered by the society of its time, and which continues in our time in various forms, in order to save the image of the person and of the community.

Faced with the conflict between individualism and collectivism, between a particular and a universal exasperated against each other, Mounier brings out a focal point, like an absence, a need, a stain and a continuously creative tension: it is the person. These denunciations are still the reasons for the moral battle in our contemporary societies for the defense of human dignity in the face of all forms of threat and violence: the principle of the inviolability of life or the principle of respect for the sanctity of life. This personalist ethic is at the very heart of the personalist

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[989] E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme? op. cit.,* p 37.
[990] J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, *op. cit*., p 139.

revolution. What may be the implications? The necessary revolution, the personalist and communal one, aims at the restoration of the person in each man with a view to building a community (global society) in which one can flourish and be fully fulfilled. This restoration of the person must constitute the very heart of any civilization.[991]

On this subject, "a personalist civilization is a civilization whose structures and spirit are oriented to the fulfillment as a person of each of the individuals who compose it."[992] In other words, the necessary revolution seeks a civilization which defends the primacy of the human person and his integral development. The point we are aiming for is not the happiness, the comfort, the prosperity of the city, but the spiritual development of man. If we pursue political good, it is not in the illusion that it will ensure a life without risk, without suffering and without thirst. Disorder shocks us less than injustice. What we are fighting is not an uncomfortable city, it is an evil city. But all sin comes from the spirit, all evil from freedom. Our political action is therefore the organ of our spiritual action, and not the other way around.[993]

In other words, what interests us is the integral realization of man in all his dimensions. This is why personalism places the human person at the heart of all revolution and development. Today, this perspective is still relevant as the progressive ideologies of sustainable development (a concept of the UN) continue to advocate for development that takes into account economic, ecological, ethical and future generation progress. However, this development leaves man aside. Development is much more focused on the material to the detriment of the spiritual dimension of man, hence the personal crisis in our contemporary societies. However, the personalist position clearly shows the goal of the revolution: the spiritual controls the political and the economic, hence the spiritual revolution, the fight of which is the defense of the human person and his development within the community.

In this logic, natural communities can be recognized in their reality and in their own purpose, different from the simple sum of individual interests and superior to the interests of the individual materially taken. However, the ultimate end of natural communities is to enable each person to be able to leave as a person, that is to say to be able to access the maximum of initiative,

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[991]C. Alvlami and Olivier Remaud, "Civilizations. Back to words and ideas" in *Review: Volume 128*, 6th series, n ° 3-4, 2007, p. 2.
[992]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.*, p 38.
[993]E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit.*, p 141.

responsibility and spiritual life. Among these communities, it illustrates the family as a model in the sense that, "the family environment is the most natural environment for the development of the child."[994] The mission of the family is nothing other than that of guardian of the vocation of the child. It is therefore a natural community of people, which gives it superiority over the State, which is only "a power of jurisdiction."[995] However, as the steward of the nation,[996] the State, and possibly the legal representative of the international community, limits this natural community, to the fullest extent, and only to the extent that it and its members are not with regard to these societies as individuals, parts of a whole. This is why one can often quickly end in the state of totalitarianism.

Moreover, the revolutionary requirement makes the personalist and community revolution a concrete and spiritual revolution. First, it is concrete because it "starts from the concrete, the everyday, and must return to it."[997] It is inscribed, in fact, in the time, the context and the daily life of human life. Man is the center of this revolution. Second, it is spiritual because its philosophy derives from the Gospel. But, faith "is immediately a faith in the dignity of men, in their power to act, to create, to make a story."[998] Man is in the world to leave there and to fight there; he will not let go of the temporal. The person is therefore, the matrix of this revolution. This is why the political and economic revolution must be spiritual to be effective. Mounier accompanies this revolution by "the transmutation of values - moral conversion, which is identically philosophical conversion."[999] This brings us back to the dialogue with Nietzsche, who also speaks of the transmutation of values.[1000]

In Mounier's sense, this transmutation is a transfiguration of values.[1001] It is a reintegration of morality into being and a way of being. This person is at the heart of the revolution and of philosophy. It therefore, elaborates an anthropocentric ethics, an ethics built around the person. It

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[994]E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 76.
[995] *Ibidem,* p. 77.
[996] *Idem.*
[997] J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, *op. cit.,* p 29.
[998]*Ibidem*, p. 30.
[999]*Ibidem,* p. 29.
[1000]Concept resulting from his work entitled The Will of Power. Attempt of a transmutation of all values and in the work Beyond Good and Evil, § 47, 203 etc.
[1001]In Christian vocabulary, this word applies to the scene from the life of Jesus related by the three Synoptic Gospels (Matthew 17, 1-9; Mark 9, 2-10; Luke 9, 28-36). Mounier is inspired by this Christian meaning "the fact of passing (figure) from one aspect to another" (cf. Theo, p. 1166c.) - but not necessarily that of theophany - to characterize the meaning of the moral revolution. Transfiguration refers more to transformation or perfection.

is an ethic that emphasizes the primacy of the person in his culture, identity and communion, subjectivity and objectivity, the singular and the universal. It is an ethic of authenticity and qualitative identity. In short, it envisions the search for a civilization which affirms that the human person is first in relation to socio-economic structures and material necessities. In this sense, the personalist revolution aims not only to awaken in each man the consciousness of his oppression, of his impersonal life and of his loneliness but also to create a framework favourable to the integral fulfillment of each man, that is to say of his person.

In the same vein, a deep revolutionary work is not then to awaken in the oppressed man the conscience of his only oppression, thus turning him to hatred and to exclusive demands, as a result of a new escape from himself. It is to show him first as the ultimate goal of this revolt, the acceptance of a responsibility and the will to go beyond, without which, all the devices will not will only be good tools in the hands of bad workers; and to educate him now for responsible and free action instead of dissolving his human energy in a good collective conscience and in the expectation, even outwardly active, of the miracle of 'material conditions.[1002]From this affirmation, we can retain that personalism joins Marxism in its rejection of liberal individualism and in its search for a man reconciled with nature, with others and therefore with himself, with a being for which communion is first. At the heart of this spiritual revolution, we find a momentum of personalization which constitutes a major act in the formation of the personal universe and the community of persons: the dialectic of I and you / us.

### 11.1.3. The dialectic of "I" and "we": the personalist ontology

The restoration of the meaning of the person in our contemporary societies must be done through an exercise of personalization established by the dialectic of I and us. This is what constitutes the objective of the personalist and communal revolution. It also takes into account all the dimensions of the person: the structures of personal life, namely incarnation, vocation and communion. If you push on one side, you risk the worst.[1003] Through these dimensions, the human being realizes the meaning of his person and forms with other people, a community that takes the figure of a higher value, the person of people. This considerable element of truth in conception of the person is inspired by materialist analysis, but which is not unprecedented. As the incarnation

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[1002] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 34.
[1003] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 45.

is the place of the impersonal and the purposeful, it is also a permanent occasion for alienation. This refers, for instance, to the overwhelming of poverty as well as of abundance because man is as if surrounded by one and the other. On this point, like Mounier, we agree with Marxism, which thinks that "the end of material misery is the end of alienation, and a necessary stage in the development of humanity. However, such an end to misery cannot be the end of all alienation, even at the level of nature. This is what gives meaning to the spiritual revolution that we presented above. Should we reduce man to a natural being, an entire being immersed in nature?

In this relationship to others and to the world, it is first defined as a movement of commitment. Indeed, the person, as a movement towards others, recognizes the reality of the human being as a being in relation to others. It is in this sense that "the concrete man is the man who gives himself, thanks to his incarnation the person constantly throws himself outside himself. The body induces this continuous movement of exteriority. By this relational nature of the person, personalism denies solitary affirmation and separation. Because this reciprocity is so fundamental, we could define the person as "dialogue" by virtue of his openness to the world, to others and to God. Man therefore, escapes any mechanistic conception, impersonal conception: materialist or spiritualist.

The goal of Christian personalism is to account for humanity, while grasping it in its living exercise and in its global activity. The experience of personal life is therefore characterized by a triple movement which tears the person away from determinisms: movement of commitment, movement of interiorization and vertical or transcendental movement.[1004] This triple movement is likewise characteristic of the personalist dialectic, which brings into play the dimensions of the personal life mentioned above (incarnation, vocation and communion). Therefore, the absence of one of these elements characterizing the person would constitute "the real evil of the century." Personalization, in this process, therefore constitutes the very meaning of the dialectic of the I and the we which is at the basis of the personalist ontology.

### 11.1.4 The dialectic of "I" and "we" as the founding act of the community (bottom-top approach)

What we want to show through this point is that the person is a learning process, that of the community before the global society. You can only be a person in a community by becoming

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[1004] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit.,* p 43.

it. Through his experience of transcendence, the person carries out a movement of personalization and communication, which necessarily passes through an experience of the second person, the learning of you and us. The dialectic of I and we thus constitute the meaning of this realization of personal and community life. It consists of a work of deepening oneself and of exiting. To this end, through the movement of transcendence, the realization of personal life constitutes "a constant effort of going beyond and of stripping away, therefore of renunciation, of dispossession, of spiritualization. It is a process of spiritualization, a process of decentralization of the ego, which characterizes personalist ontology.

At first glance, the movement of personalization constitutes the very heart of the dialectic of the "I and the we", where the learning of the "we, in fact, cannot be without the learning of the I."[1005]This dialectical movement of personalization constitutes the first founding act of the community of persons. This act in fact involves the recognition of the Other as "Other than myself", that is to say a neighbour. But when I begin to take an interest in the real presence of men, to recognize this presence in front of me, to learn the person reveals to me, the you offers me, to no longer see in he/she "a third person," anyone, a living and foreign thing, but another myself, so, I took the first act of community without which, no institution will have solidity.[1006]This learning of you and us involves the recognition of the Other seen not as a stranger, an enemy, but as a person with whom, we perpetually build peace and unity. Learning is the movement to understand our neighbour (charity in the Christian sense). The person comes out of himself to dis-appropriate himself in the Other is the first act of peace. Because "peace, like any order, can only spring from the spiritual person who alone brings to cities the elements of universality.[1007]This does not mean that peace is a visible and avowed absence of war, and "the state of peace" a mere interval between two wars.

Peace in this perspective rests first of all on the internal order of the person. Peace is not a weak state either, but "the state which demands from individuals the maximum of stripping, effort, commitment and risk."[1008]In other words, the act of peace requires the liberation of individuals and communities from the oppression of money and the totalitarian state. "The problem of peace is not primarily a diplomatic problem," this is why Mounier thinks that, it is first and foremost a

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[1005] *Ibidem*, p. 52.
[1006] *Idem.*
[1007] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 129.
[1008] *Ibidem*, p. 130.

moral problem, an economic and social problem. This is where the experience of the second person is an act of peace and community. But there is also the dimension of communication in this experience of the second person. The relation between the self (I) and the other (you) is a relation of reciprocity which is not totalized by thoughts nor reduced to the physical manifestation of the body.[1009] Mounier presents the person in his tension towards others as a communicative face. He states to this effect:

> The person is an inside who needs the outside. The word to exist indicates by its prefix that to be is to flourish, to express oneself. This very primitive tendency is the one which, in its active form, pushes us to externalize our feelings in mimicry or speech, to put the imprint of our action on visible works, to intervene in the affairs of the world and of others...[1010]Better yet, "the person exposes himself, he expresses himself: he faces, he is a face."[1011]

This dimension of openness and expression of the person configures a fundamental aspect of the phenomenology of the face in Levinas: facial expression. The face, in Levinas as well as in Mounier speaks. And to speak is precisely manifesting itself by remaining outside its manifestation.[1012] This means that language is an expression of the other man's otherness. It is in this wake that Levinas writes: "The Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign, - but his face, where his epiphany takes place and which appeals to me, breaks with the world which can be common to us and whose potentialities are mutually exclusive are part of our nature and that we also develop through our existence."[1013] The concept of the face in Levinas is even the expression of transcendence, the place of the epiphany of being as an "Other" which does not give itself and does not totalize itself.

Furthermore, this intuition of the primitive experience of the person in this transcendental movement can be understood through two arguments: the deterministic argument of the person and communication (dialogue). What should be remembered by these arguments is that Mounier bases his thinking on the fact that, man carries others within him from birth, charged that is his inheritance and language. This supposes that, the development of the person through this dialectical movement, consists in relying on the social by

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[1009] *Idem.*
[1010]E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme? op. cit.,* p 62.
[1011]*Ibidem,* p. 63.
[1012]S. C. Mintoume, "*L'éthique comme philosophie première ou la défense des droits de l'autre homme chez Emmanuel Levinas*", L'Harmattan, 2011, p. 29.
[1013] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.,* p 168.

deconditioning it, by transcending it, by organizing it, by increasing it, in order to substitute for the order of determination, that of choice and free love.

Also, he notes that, man is a being of his word. It is obvious to him that the word does not take its starting point in the monologue but in the dialogue. The essence of language is therefore plural because, it is between the I and you or the us. I discover myself by speaking and discovering the Other, or rather I discover myself and others in and through speech. But this manifestation of the Other breaks with the totality, because the Other does not give himself totally unlike things.

At this level, Levinas will say that the face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be understood, that is to say, included.[1014] The otherness of the person or of the Other does not depend on his quality which would distinguish him from my person, because a distinction of this nature would imply, precisely between us, this community of gender which already cancels out otherness. According to Levinas, the relationship with the other man is like the relationship of man with God in the Talmudic tradition. Because the face of the other man is, of all phenomena, the one that does not exhaust itself in its manifestation, the one that does not give itself, the one that is irreducible to the idea that I have in me, the one who breaks the correlation.[1015] In other words, the face of the Other translates, in Levinas' thought, the transcendence or exteriority of the other man who speaks because the face signifies expression. This implies the impossibility of reducing the Other to an idea or the impossibility of understanding and totalizing him since the person, in the Mounier sense, is a movement, an infinite being of possibilities. From this analysis, several ethical implications can be deduced.

From this philosophical perspective, otherness and the dignity of man constitute fundamental ideas of the philosophy of the person. The analysis of the existence of the Other, translates this act of recognition of the Other in the founding act of the community of people, where each is treated as a value, that is to say-a community where everyone has dignity and rights. This existentialist phenomenology of otherness involves respect for the otherness of the other man, who manifests himself (i.e. not totally) through his words. The realization of

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[1014] *Idem.*
[1015] S. C. Mintoume, "*L'éthique comme philosophie première ou la défense des droits de l'autre homme chez Emmanuel Levinas*", *op. cit.,* p 29.

the person therefore, requires this effort to recognize the Other, an effort to go beyond or transcend.  It is this movement of personalization that opens the person not only to him-self but also to others. And that is why it is fundamental to get out of interiority to nurture interiority.[1016] Thus, the transcendent movement of the person is an anchor which produces a balance between his inner life (i.e. source of unpredictability and creation) and his outer realization (i.e. his incarnation, his belonging to the communities).

The person, as a whole of man, more than consciousness and body, is formed in transcendence in the relationship with the Other and in the relationship with morality. Therefore, the presence of others enriches our experience of personal and community life; because the others do not limit the person but make him be and grow. What we want to show through this movement of the person is that I can only be myself with the help of others. And in this experience of learning I and we, communication begins only with the sense of the Other which is respect for others. This is why to have the meaning of others, is to accept another who is different from myself, who by the attention and respect I have for him becomes my neighbour, another myself. So to exist is to exist for others and, ultimately, to love.

In this, understanding and accepting the character of the Other in the global society is the necessary path to lead us to our mystery and that of the Other. It is also a way to break our egocentricity and establish between us the lasting foundations of a common life. This is the result of a long apprenticeship to human progress in the global society. Nonetheless, this movement of engagement also allows man to carry out a perpetual review of his engagement to the Other in society. It is not a question of contemplating oneself, but, of making a movement of interiorization and a transcendent or absolute anchoring. These last two movements are linked by the fact that the relation to God establishes and maintains a dialectical relation between the movement of engagement of exteriorization and the movement of interiorization as a core of the existential cogito.

## 11.1.5 The existential Cogito of the personalist community: Love

The global personalist community is based on a metaphysical-theological principle. It is about Love. The latter constitutes unity just as vocation constitutes the unity of the person. Unlike

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[1016] E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme? op. cit.,* p 62.

Sartre, who only wanted to know the gaze of others as a gaze that fixes and freezes, and his presence as an encroachment that strips and enslaves me,[1017] Love is a form of being with others. Indeed, the act of love is man's strongest certainty, the irrefutable existential cogito: I love, therefore being is, and life is worth (worth living). It does not only confirm me by the movement in which I pose, but the being who gives me to others.[1018] Through this affirmation, the author poses love as the principle which must govern interpersonal relationships within the community. It is this ontological Cogito of each person that puts him in communion with others. But what is love?

Love is a polysemous concept. It includes three dimensions: sexuality, eroticism and intellectual-spiritual interests. By love, we generally designate sexuality, which is a fundamental dimension of human beings, or more specifically the sexual appetite or the erotic feeling. Besides, love also designates a common spiritual and intellectual interest. What is clear is the exact connection of love to a person and the general love of mankind.[1019] The love Mounier speaks of does not fall within the realm of sexuality or erotic passion. It is a principle of unity inspired by the universal love of neighbour highlighted in Christian doctrine and Judaism. Within a community of persons, love is that principle which governs the relation of I to you, by which my person in some way becomes decentralized and lives in the other while possessing himself and his love. In this, he constitutes "the unity of the community as vocation is the unity of the person."[1020]Without this principle, people cannot become themselves.

Indeed, Mounier defines Spirit by union, a primary stain of unity which constitutes the philosophical ambition of his personalism and which guides his thinking. The vocabulary reuniting, linking, bringing together, joining, etc., translates, for him, this concern for the One and which is found in love. "This One," writes Jean-Marie Domenach, "felt as a will, a passion, but still unspeakable, the place where it will anchor it will define personalism".[1021] Mounier thus seeks a fixed and radiating point capable of accounting for a unity which is neither that of the concept nor that of feeling. The point found in love is understood as "a unity which takes place while sparing the degrees of being; which projects and brings together existences, which is found in each

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[1017]*Ibidem,* p. 41.
[1018] *Idem.*
[1019] O. Höffe & Coll., Small Dictionary of Ethics, Cerf, 1993, p. 12.
[1020] P. Mounier in the preface of E. Mounier, Œuvres. Tome I. 1931-1939. *op. cit.*, p 193.
[1021] J. M. Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier, *op. cit.*, p 76.

individual and links them at the same time."[1022] We can therefore deduce that the philosophical ambition of personalism is this concern for the One. This One, this love translating the union of people coming closer to charity and openness to others.

In addition, love as a principle of unity constitutes a strain on others. It is an effort of communion with the neighbour. It is not an instinct of solidarity but the communion of two Persons. The person, is defined by this communicational dimension. It is not the being but constitutes from the beginning a "movement towards others, to be-towards."[1023] Better still, it is "an existence capable of detaching itself, of dispossessing itself, of decentering itself in order to become available to others."[1024] This transcendental dimension in terms of coming out of oneself and opening towards the other makes the person a presence of mind to others.

It is a link by which my person in some way becomes decentralized and lives in the Other while possessing himself and his love.[1025] To this end, communion is con-substantial with the human person, because it is inserted in the very heart of the person, integral to his very existence.[1026] This implies that love, as a bond that unites people in a community, constitutes an existential principle of personal life. It is openness to others and to oneself. To love the Other is to recognize the existence of the Other within oneself as a value and not as a means. It is this internalized recognition of the existence of the Other that forms the basis of all openness to others in the global society. This is the reason why "to be is to love."[1027]

The isolation of the person closes the door to this existential value, this experience of openness. In love, conceived as the existential Cogito of personal life, I also recognize myself as a being that needs the Other to fulfill the meaning of my person. And I also exist inside Other people, where it is possible to create a community of people, thereby, forming a global society of unity. Moreover, "the fundamental act of the person," said in December 1949, "is not to separate, it is to receive communion."[1028] This is the reason why love is located in the ontological and existential framework. It is part of our being and needs to be maintained by the dialectical

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[1022] *Idem*.
[1023] E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme? op. cit.,* p 51.
[1024] *Ibidem,* p. 39.
[1025] *Ibidem, Révolution personnaliste et communautaire*, *op. cit*., p 55.
[1026] *Ibidem, Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 48.
[1027] *Ibidem*, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?*, *op. cit*., p 69.
[1028] Quoted by Paulette Mounier in the preface of E. Mounier, Œuvres. Tome I. 1931-1939, *op. cit.,* p 7.

exercises, that we have developed above through the dimensions of the person and the personalist dialectic. Without this effort of personalization, we fall back into closed individualism.

Furthermore, this reciprocity, this openness towards others and to oneself, constitutes a fundamental value for the construction or the realization of the personalist community, community of persons in the global society. This is why the first act of a community is to recognize and open up to the Other as "Other than myself." It is characteristic of love. Now in societies of impersonal types, faceless societies like the technical[1029] global society, we observe complacency in security, mistrust, fear of foreigners or of others and refusal of others. We see hell in others, as Sartre puts it: "Hell in others."[1030]Our contemporary societies are characterized by a normalized indifference. This is what can also justify the fear of certain nations in the face of the problem of immigration, the fear of being invaded by "foreigners." This feeling of fear therefore explains this complacency in the security and defense of national interests or of a people in the global society.

At the end of this path, we find the hero who is "the supreme culmination." There are several branches or types of heroes such as, the Stoic, Nietzschean, Fascist, etc. The second path to the abyss of the authentic person is the "saint." This path "also integrates heroism and violence, spiritual, but transfigured: let us say that it is the way of anyone who first assesses a man by his sense of real presences, his capacity for welcoming and giving."[1031] The person is place where there is tension and passivity, having and giving intersect, struggle, and respond to each Other. And through his dimension of openness and communion with others, man becomes capable of love, which is infinitely more. He is therefore linked to others in a community by this principle of love-communion. In other words, love is the relationship between the "I" and the "you" in a community of people[1032]that forms the global society.

## 11.2 LEVINAS AND THE ETHICO-MORAL VISION OF GLOBAL DIALOGUE

The Ethico-moral vision of universal dialogue vis-vis Levinas' ethics in face of the crisis of humanity in the global society, is endorse through the encounter with the Other, with the face of the Other, a person discovers his inability to understand reality in its totality. The Other in the global society introduces a person's consciousness to his own limitations and the infinite

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[1029] J. Ellul, La technique ou enjeu du siècle, Economica, 2008.
[1030] J. P. Sartre, Huis Clos, Gallimard, 1947, Act I, Scene V.
[1031] E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personnalisme*, *op. cit*., p 47.
[1032] *Ibidem,* p. 23.

possibilities that lie beyond his knowledge and his world. The encounter with the face of the Other, is an encounter with that which lies beyond him, with the infinite, a dialogical encounter. From a clear standpoint, Levinas goes much farther, advancing a strict claim that totalistic thinking can lead to an oppressive regime in both the political and the social sense.

In this way, Levinas suggests a structured deterioration of culture from the positivist quest for a worthy global society, to behaviour that seeks to coercive seemingly worthy behaviour on another person, to the establishment of an oppressive regime. The constitutive debate of the meaning of dialogue in the global society must emerge from the ethical position defined by Levinas. Dialogue between a person and the Other in the global society, must be conducted based not only on a recognition of the (identity and) dignity of the Other but on the ethical imperative that gives precedence to the Other and obligates the I to behave responsibly toward him.

In this sense, Levinas advocates that, dialogue is not constituted by the language of rights, in which a person with rights encounters another person with rights. It is, relatively, facilitated and required by the language of obligations in which the I asks itself about its obligations and its responsibility toward the Other. Therefore, the foundation that makes dialogue possible is ethics, in the sense of recognizing the alterity of the Other and the obligation to protect this alterity[1033]in an unjust world.

In countering the wordlessness of our times, Hannah Arendt addressed the problem of rights and the need to rethink the ethical foundation of rights at the time when liberal politics about natural rights has lost it credibility in the global society. We moderns have lost the clarity of this distinction of rights to human existence. Of course, Hannah Arendt grounds a commitment to human dignity on the inevitable laws on human existence which consists of the life or death struggle between collectivities-races or classes-whose motion is the real meaning of history.[1034] The human imperative must "come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality" through social understanding.

It obvious that, the essence of humanity also takes part in interminable dialogue. More practically, these trains of thought thus concerns our relation to the human world of civilization and to nature. The fragility of the human world and the danger of losing its setting and its limits

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[1033]M. S. Dolson, "The Role of Dialogue, Otherness and the Construction of Insight in Psychosis": Toward a Socio-Dialogic Model, *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 36, (2005), pp. 75-112.

[1034] H. Arendt, *Cambridge companion*. Eds. Dana R. Villa. Cambridge University Press. 2000. p. 28.

links this theme to another cluster of reflections, this time on contingency and novelty, freedom and necessity. In a concrete view, other optimistic humanists and Arendt suppose that what is gained is an increase the development and collective human power. This implies, "everything is possible," and we can remake the world to suit ourselves. In the face of human plurality, there is need for collective subject to exercise such power to "humanity." The dialectic of rights is more radical and is the vital importance of politics as the arena of initiatives and agreements among plural human beings in view of Levinas' vision of dialogue.

The Levinasian global vision of dialogue should be conducted in accordance with the ethics of responsibility that Levinas establishes. The dialogue in the face of the Other must therefore place the subject to the initial imperative: you shall not kill.[1035] This, therefore, appears to be self-evident as when one person encounters the Other and seeks to conduct a dialogue. He must accept the basic rules of respect and life and must certainly not take the life of the Other in the course of the dialogue. The imperative 'you shall not kill' used by Levinas in its deepest sense, is to say, entering into dialogue with the Other endangers the I and poses a risk of violence between the I and the Other.[1036] As such, the encounter with the face of the Other thus engenders this initial imperative which precedes the conversation between them in society.

In this perspective, the imperative 'you shall not kill' is meant first and foremost in relation to consciousness and personality. In a more practical sense, it means do not eliminate the alterity of the other, do not integrate it into your world; do not turn it into your object. The imperative 'You shall not kill' signifies to the individuals their responsibility to protect the dignity and the uniqueness of the Other, and cautions against the human tendency to incorporate the Other into the world of the I. It is indeed on this point that Levinas' thinking deviates from the Buberian dialogue.[1037] As far as Levinas ethics is concerned, the dialogical conversation can also be totalist in its failure to recognize the alterity of the Other. From this approach an innocent conversation between two individuals, each of whom desires the well-being of the other, can also represent the subjugation of the Other for the benefit of the I.[1038]

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[1035]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, *op. cit.*, pp 232-239.

[1036]Many have understood this use of the directive 'you shall not kill' as evidence of the trauma of the Holocaust burned into Levinas' philosophical writing. (And Levinas may have been the first among them to do so).

[1037]E. Levinas, *Hors Sujet* (Fata Morgana) 1987, pp. 13-66.

[1038]P. Atterton, Calarco, M. and Friedman, M. (eds.), *Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Difference*, (Duquesne University Press). (2004).

To clarify this point, we offer a more extreme depiction of the Buberian dialogue, with a focus on the concept of 'I-Thou'.[1039] To underscore, Buber makes a well-known distinction between two ways in which a human relates to his surroundings, spiritual entities and other people alike: one that can be characterized as 'I-it' (*ich und es*), in which a person relates to his surroundings as distant objects to be known and experienced; and another that can be characterized as 'I-Thou' (*ich und du*), in the sense of a person's direct encounter with the Other, and the resulting relationship between two people which, according to Buber, results in the collapse of barriers and separateness into 'we.'[1040]

The 'I-Thou' relationship can be manifested in the relationship between a person and spiritual entities or in the relationship between two people.[1041]The ethical dialogue in the global society is not a product of the quest for dialogue but rather of the depth of responsibility toward alterity assumed by the individual and the collective in the ethical encounter. Relative to this, Levinas' concern is that, the quest for dialogue, for spiritual achievement and for the mystery of human relations in the global society could leave the person closed within him-self and subjugating the Other. Dialogue that involves the act of empathy is dialogue that does not recognize alterity and that actually leaves the person closed within him-self.[1042]

Besides, Levinas view the significance of the Buberian dialogue of the subject betrothed in dialogue with the Other, lies deeply in the establishment of a relationship of unifying partnership in the construction of a broad common foundation in which they both take part. The global ethical concern regarding this dialogue has to do with the possibility of its being conducted in a manner that incorporates the Other into the 'expanded I', or rather the view of the world that the person has constructed for himself.[1043]

It is essential that, such a dialogue is conducted from the global vantage point of the I and almost necessarily eliminates the alterity of the Other by creating a common language using his concepts. But the uniqueness of the Other, who recognizes his alterity, lies in his lack of desire to be part of our (my) worldview. The Other does not wish to be an object of consciousness and/or

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[1039]M. Buber, *I and Thou*, trans.: R. Gregor-Smith (Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. (*I and Thou* 2e). (1937).

[1040]H. Ben-Pazi. Ethics Responsibility Dialogue, The Meaning of Dialogue in Levinas's Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 50, No. 4,* 2016, p.1-15.

[1041] M. S. Friedman, *Buber: The Life of Dialogue* (University of Chicago Press). (1955).

[1042] C. E. Katz, The Presence of the Other is a Presence that Teaches: Levinas, Pragmatism, and Pedagogy, *Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy*, 14, (2006), pp. 91-108.

[1043]H. Ben-Pazi. Ethics Responsibility Dialogue, *op. cit.,* pp 1-15.

even an object of dialogue of the I. Relatively, the Other wishes with all his might to preserve his alterity and his own image of the world, which is essentially different and separate from mine. Dialogue that is faithful to ethics is one based on a conversation between two different individuals who do not seek to create one identical platform for the exchange between them.[1044]

Dialogue for Levinas is an ethical demand that emerges from: respect and responsibility. Respect of the Other, can be expressed in the imperative 'you shall not kill'. In other words, the ethical demand demonstrates absolute respect for the alterity of the Other, respect that must not be limited, diminished or appropriated. As concerned responsibility for the Other, is to say, the infinite responsibility that the individual bears toward the Other. This responsibility is to hear a voice. To hear a voice speaking to you', we again refer to this key sentence curbed by Levinas, 'is ipso facto to accept obligation toward the one speaking.'[1045] This responsibility in the global society is exceedingly difficult to shoulder, as it requires the ethical guarantee of the alterity of the Other present before the I. It is a tension that is almost impossible to resolve, but it is the ethical tension that determines the meaning of teaching in general.

## 11.3 THE FEAR OF WESTERN HUMANISM IN FACE OF THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

Western humanism and ethics has never recognized the value of a culture man in the global era. The problem with Western culture is that, it has ignored its theological roots to claim rational neutrality that continues to depend upon a spiritual understanding.[1046] The proclaimed western values and ideologies beyond other civilization is a call for concern. Is the new face of man a reduce expression of human existence? The emancipation of the human is a global concern for responsibility and dialogue in a deteriorating sphere of diverse culture. Responsibility and dialogue is directly related to the culture in which we live and operate in society.

Dialogue with the world of humanistic values represents the high cultural context in works. Levinas' inquiry into the meaning of responsibility and dialogue is based on his deep respect for French culture as representative of humanistic Western culture. On the one hand, Levinas sees a world whose worthy values include human dignity, liberalization, liberty, art and science. On the

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[1044] J. T. Nealon, "The Ethics of Dialogue": Bakhtin and Levinas, *College English*, 59, (1997) pp. 129-148.
[1045] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, trans.: A. Aronowicz (Indiana University Press). (1994), p. 48.
[1046] G. Rae. "The problem of political foundation" in Carl schmitts and Emmanuel Levinas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 2016, p. 67. DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59168-5

other hand, as inhabitants of the twenty first century, we are also closely familiar with the low points humanity has known in humanistic cultural life.

Dialogue stemming from humanistic culture, are actually the product of what appear to be its highest and worthiest principles. In a broad sense, humanism signifies the recognition of an unchanging essence of 'Man', which is the assertion of this central place in value and in his economy of the real engendered in all values,[1047]as possible a domain for private life, on the threshold of which the law stops.[1048] From here, it is clear that a limit to law is necessary to humanism, for humanism can perhaps see no laws other than those of the State and of nature. In a narrower sense, humanism signifies the worship accorded to the very principles.

Levinas' disapproval is aimed directly at both the definition of humanism itself and the manner in which it is realized. Seemingly, Levinas appears to maintain that dialogue guided by the principles of humanism will cause the global society in which we live to become more ethical. Conversely, the deteriorating of enlightened humanism is fundamental and located at its very foundation, not to mention its realization. The same favour that leads to the desire to build a worthy and ethical global society, contains at its core an internal forgetting of ethical responsibility. The inner illumination of humanism is reawakened on contact with certain work and by the study of certain books in which these principles, these humanities, were expressed for the first time, and through which they were transmitted in society.[1049]

In a wider sense, the human had to realize itself through the human world and as if human were not only to realize this failure but were already at the connection in which all causes were assembled, humanism wishes to become an action in the guise of a beautiful language. Humanism would thus, adopts a certain style in half-artistic, half-preacher, wholly generous, the language of belles-lettres which states these values in the global society in harmony with the Other. Through this, humanism becomes permissive as though they were acts, and from this point on it progressively forget these noble principles which are lost in rhetoric and ideology.[1050] In this analysis of Levinas, we find an accurate description of humanistic dialogue and perhaps the foundations of the dialogical itself.

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[1047]H. Ben-Pazi. Ethics Responsibility Dialogue, *op. cit.,* p 26.
[1048] *Ibid*
[1049] *Ibid*
[1050] E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom, op. cit.,* p 277.

Still, humanism, which we must nonetheless not reject, is also what led the twenty first century into the greatest crisis that humanity has ever known. We are compelled to ask, 'is it a basic inability to guarantee the privileges of humanity of which humanism had considered itself the source?' Western humanism in general was never able to doubt the power of victory. However, in light of the atrocities of the two great World Wars, the Russian Revolution and Nazism, slavery and colonization, many humanists felt the need for serious contemplation, ensuing in the need to be skeptical of what has been described as western humanism and humanism in general.

The resulting criticism from Levinas' view can be characterized as a dispute (protest) against declamation, against pleasant sounding rhetoric, and against what Levinas refers to as 'the decency that covers 'hypocrisy' that governs the global society. The kernel of these friendly words was suspected as anti-humanism at the heart of humanism. Dialogue that is no more than obsequiousness, global dialogue that is no more than cultural deviation. It is difficult to this extent for us to hear such argument from Levinas. This questions the very foundation of humanism. How can the humanistic position become anti-humanistic? How can pleasant sounding, high language become a tool for subjugating the Other?

The Levinasian dialogue is a shift in observation from the relationship between the 'I' and the 'thou' in the Buberian dialogue to the ethical meaning of the encounter between the 'I' and the 'Other', which imbues the subject in the global dialogical situation with responsibility. The global diverse cultural context facilitates a rich, deep understanding of the different aspects of the ethical meaning of dialogue. The dialogue proposed by Levinas is the unique product of the ethical global context in which the Other find his/herself. This uniqueness can be depicted through a consideration of the different dimensions of time.

Leaders are the representative of the past, not in the sense of being a person who has lived in the past, but in the sense of someone who brings the memory of the past into resolving the present global crisis. In this context at hand, the past assumes great significance in society. Though a person cannot live in the past, he can remember it and reshape his own world accordingly. The memory of the past determines the paths of the past in the present-that is, the meaning of these traces from the past that the leader brings into the living, active present. On this note, Levinas affirms we should not talk of the *forgetfulness of Being* but rather the *forgetfulness of the Other*, the very starting point as source of true life and social sense of meaning.

## 11.4. THE DECLINE OF NATIONS, STATES AND THE EMANCIPATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

Man, in the twentieth and twenty first century has become just as emancipated from nature as eighteenth-century man was from history. The history of humanity is also a history of cruelty, slavery and the violation of the elementary dignity of man. Just as today, there were despots in every age who abused their power and persecuted their subjects with brutality and cruelty. Although human dignity was trampled underfoot by torture and slavery, the hope and commitment of many personalities who fought for a more just social order, more worthy of man and guaranteeing each individual his freedom and the opportunity to flourish were never completely suppressed.[1051] Similarly, the idea of the virtuous and just man seems to be part of the common heritage of humanity. The birth of the idea of genuine human rights is an event peculiar to the history of Europe and its intellectual currents.

The idea of human rights gained much importance in the late Middle Ages, with the progressive secularization of power. As long as power came from God and went back to Him, it found its limits in supernatural law, but as soon as the sovereign enacted his own law, it was necessary to set certain limits on him, so that he did not act arbitrarily and without any restraint, but that he took into account the rights of his subjects. In doing so, the idea of the original and inalienable rights of man to the power of the state was born. A retrace the historical evolution of the idea of human rights confines to the European history of intellectual currents, closely linked to the genesis of the secularized state.

In this context, however, we must never lose sight of the fact that the fundamental idea of just power at the service of the good of men is surely peculiar to all the peoples of the earth and that cruelties, abuses and violations of the law are everywhere considered and felt as an evil, with the exception of the enslavement of enemies. On the one hand, the concept of human rights is a collective concept that encompasses various kinds of fundamental rights, individual freedoms, political and civil, but also economic and social rights. Since our approach will consist above all in answering the question of whether or not man possesses original, inalienable and limiting rights of the power of the State, we will first of all be satisfied with this collective notion of human rights

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[1051]C. Mutwa, *My People*, 3ᵉ éd., London, 1977.

and fundamental freedoms. By human rights, we mean above all supra-state rights containing moral requirements that limit the control of the state.

On the other hand, when we use the concept of fundamental rights, we think first of all of the realization of human rights within the State itself and in its constitution and that theology. The basis of theology provided the background for all political and philosophical problems, but which long ago caused Plato to say: "Not man, but a god, must be the measure of all things." This is contrary to Pythagoras view as man being the measures of all things, of the things that are, and of the things that are not.

In the abstract nakedness of being human, the world found nothing sacred. And in view of objective political conditions, it is hard to say how the concepts of man upon which human rights are based-that he is created in the God's image.[1052] The Christian image of man has contributed much to the development of a conception of man on which human rights are based. In this respect, understanding man as a creature in the image of God was decisive.[1053] Understood logically, the creation of man in the image of God leads to the equality of all men before God. However, from equality before God to the universal right of equality in society.

The false global version of equality negates the Divine principle. The dark background of mere given-ness, the background formed by our unique and unchangeable nature, breaks into the political scene as the alien which in its all too obvious difference cannot act and change at will, that is, the limitations of the human artifice.[1054] It is by no means certain whether this is possible with the pace of the global society. Contrarily, to the best-intentioned humans' attempt to obtain new declarations of human rights from international organizations, it should be noted that, this idea transcends the present sphere of international regulation.[1055] Furthermore, this predicament of the twenty first century would by no means be eliminated by the establishment of a world government endorsed by the idealists.

The immaterial openness of being nothing seems the greatest danger in our time. Because of it men are regarded as savages and, afraid that they might end up being considered beasts. They insisted on their nationality, the last sign of their former citizenship, as their only remaining and

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[1052]*Ibidem,* p. 300.
[1053] Th. D'Aquin, *Somme théologique,* Livre I, question 93, art. 6.
[1054] H. Arendt, *Origin of Totalitarianism*: *op. cit.,* p 299.
[1055] https://courseworks2.columbia.edu/files/582837/download?download_frd=1

recognized tie with humanity and the declarations of such general rights provided. Actually the reverse is the case. It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man. This is one of the reasons why it is far more difficult to destroy the legal personality of a criminal.[1056]And in view of objective political conditions, it is hard to say how the concepts of man upon which human rights are based-that he is an animal species, called man. The great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural given-ness, on their mere differentiation. Man therefore, identify and specify himself-and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression are the conditions of savages.[1057]

## 11.5 ON THE HUMANITY AND INHUMANITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

Levinas' thought on ethical-metaphysics has never been too far detached from a concern with ontology and the political. Levinas' philosophical itinerary was indelibly discernable both by the metaphysics of being and political events which needed to formulate a thinking that moves from the ethical to the political and beyond ontology. It is not surprising for this reason that, Levinas found it quite compulsory to write some essays on the topics of the Humanism of the Other and Human Rights. Humanism as mentioned above signified the recognition of an invariable essence named 'Man', the affirmation of this central place in the economy of the Real and of his value which engendered all values.[1058] Its thus signifies the worship accorded to very principle of life. Meanwhile, Human Rights constitute a discursive space within which ethics and politics co-appear. It can seem clearly that both ethics and politics cannot be reciprocally independent. Rather, the question that revolves on ethics and politics is: what is the precise character of the linkage between the ethical and the political in our global society? Is their encounter a peaceful-harmonious co-existence between gratis philosophical discourses? Or is their supposed encounter a conflictual relation that masks a fundamental illogicality in society?

To be more perceptible in reality, we can point to a constitutive uncertainty that institutes itself at the very heart of the discourses on Humanism and Human Rights. As long discussed above

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[1056]*Ibidem,* p. 302.
[1057]http://www.slug.directory/3-1-the-perplexities-of-the-rights-of-man-by-hannah-arendt/
[1058]H. Ben-Pazi. Ethics Responsibility Dialogue, *op. cit.,* p 26.

on the fear of western humanism, our so concern will gear towards the universal Right of Man in the global society of crisis. On the one hand, it can be said that the very existence of Human Rights after World War II, expresses a moral disbelief towards the political. Human Rights would not be crucial, if not the case that the politics of nation-state is considered inadequate for the protection of the people within its borders. More adequately, is this not what the UN declaration of Human Rights from 1948 attested to, a direct reaction as it was to the "barbarous" acts of World War II.[1059]

One could argue that the very notion of Human Rights relies on a trust in political action. The trusts in political action are an expression of the belief that one can fully legalize and institutionalize ethical values; as the prelude to the declaration of Human Rights prescribes. These values should be protected by the rule of law in societies. Contemporarily, whether, in the discourse of Human rights in the global society, this relation between the ethical and the political is to be understood either in terms of a clash or an appeal, a disjunction or conjunction is a question for which no immediate solution is to be offered. What we hope to show is that Levinas can help us see the lineation of this dilemma more clearly in the global society.

Our contention is not to claim that the discourse of Human Rights is more important than other political discourses in the history of philosophy. Rather, it is to show that Levinas' philosophy of the human (ethical-metaphysics) opens up the possibility of reframing the way in which Human Rights in the global society can be protected. Accordingly, Levinas' central contention in all of the aforementioned essays on human right is that, Human Rights must be seen in terms of the rights of the Other. The Other must be at the centre of every action in society. This is condensed as follows: "Their original manifestation as rights of the other person and as duty for an *I*, as my fraternal duty-that is the phenomenology of the rights of man.[1060] It is evident that, the rights of man cannot be developed from the viewpoint of the subject claiming its right in a challenging context of crisis.

Bernasconi has developed this point in "Toward a phenomenology of Human Rights."[1061] He argued that: "Rights do not become manifest when I make demands on my own behalf. Therefore, such demands in society are on the surface indistinguishable from egoism. This simply means that, I demand something for myself does not establish my right to it. The rights of the

[1059] *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [Accessed Oct. 11, 2010]
[1060] E. Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, *op. cit.*, p 151.
[1061] "Toward a Phenomenology of Human Rights", *Revue internationale de philosophie moderne*, Special Issue, 2008, p. 89.

Other in the ethical encounter always exist in conjunction with the duties of some I. This prerogative does not mean that Levinas refuses to see freedom in the I as an original human right. The freedom in the I is "invested" by the duty for the Other, by the other's appeal to my responsibility in the face. Levinas' notion of investiture suggests that it is on account of the subject's duty for the Other, that freedom rises to the dignity of an Idea that must be protected as a human right.

In this sense, human Rights are, from the point of view that Man in the sense of the rights of individuals belongs to the category of the human pertaining to a defined entity, which in virtue of being the image of God or the rational animal, has a right to be protected in society. Consequently, they cannot be anthropologically grounded, but rely on the generalization of my responsibility for the Other. A more common way to philosophically approach the question of Human Rights has been to argue that Human Rights have been threatened and as such show itself in need of protecting. Human Rights are incumbent upon philosophy to provide with the surety of a philosophical foundation. We are force to interrogate on how can this foundation be furnished in the global society?

In a broader perspective, it can be approached at both the Christian and secular level. The Christian response to the above question was that human beings have a value since they are created in the image of God; the secularized response has often been that since all human beings share the faculty of reason, they are to be valued, and protected by rights in society. After the criticism of humanism, this very way of reasoning seems less influential. The above provides grounds to Levinas' response to the crisis of humanity and its modern predicament. Rather, in order to see how Levinas approach the problem of Human Rights and its impact on the contemporary debate, let us attempt to give voice to some of the most significant positions staked over recent years, and thus put them into dialogue with the Levinasian understanding on Human Rights.

To retort in concrete way to the demise of rationalism is to view Human Rights as founded in the "transcendental dilemmas" of the present global human society. One of the most well-known philosophers arguing for such a foundation in our global society is Ottfried Höffe. Höffe attempt is to find Human Rights on the "transcendental interest" in "life," which is common for all human beings transculturally.[1062] He viewed reasons along the lines of the contractualist tradition. It is

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[1062]O. Höffe, "Transzendentaler Tausch. Eine Legitimationsfigur fur Menschenrechte?" in Gosepath, Stefan/Lohmann, Georg (Eds), *Philosophie der Menschenrechte*, 1999, p. 31.

important that all parties agree not to threaten the lives of others in society. The legitimacy of rights is founded in an original situation of "exchange."[1063] It should be noted that, it is by no means evident that the interest of one's own survival exceeds that of all other interests for each and every one in society. This entails, there can be ideological, cultural and historical reasons for valuing many other things higher than life. This is merely evidence of the existence of differing opinions not actually in itself an argument against the foundation of Human Rights.

The problem with this foundation is simply uncertain whether the interest of survival must surpass all other interests in society. Perhaps, the claim that survival is an interest transcending all others not only denies the possibility of self-sacrifice, but also the possibility of moral bravery. It would therefore be in everyone's interest, to preserve a State which protects the interests of the weak. As for the wellbeing of one's actual self, concern for the weaker can of course lie in the interest of one's own self-preservation. This is one of the many cases where we can see that, the notion of transcendental exchange does not necessarily support Human Rights. The support Human Rights would depend on how the society chooses to value the risks and chances, profits and losses of the exchanges involved. This restriction does not seem to satisfy the idea of universality.

Subsequently, the idea of exchange plays an important part in the formation of laws and conventions in a rationally ordered global society. To an extent, one has to add many ad hoc premises in order to show how the rights after the transcendental exchange would cover also the weak in society. From the aforementioned, Höffe first goes out of his way to show that, one's concern for the Other in society can be reduced to self-interest, but that on closer inspection this self-interest is not really my concern for myself, but for a fictional self in a fictional world. Thus, implying a concern for an Other.

Höffe is much conscious that Levinas' position provides a threat to his own. This might be the reason why Höffe in his *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*[1064] claims that, Levinas is unsuccessful in his attempt to understand Human Rights and human dignity starting from the face of the Other, failing to find the dignity of the Other in my moral effort. To better comprehend, Höffe allows no other foundation than the self-interest of the subject, as well as, exchanged for the

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[1063] *Ibidem,* p. 36.
[1064] O. Höffe: *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*, Verlag C. H. Beck München 1999, 476 S. (68 DM).

self-interest of the Other. The implicit logic behind this thought is: if it is not reducible to an original egoism, then it is not rational.

Levinas to an extent approaches Human Rights different from the construction of metaphysical realm. To him, rights should not be based on defends of the subject interest. One ends in the war of each against all, based on the rights of man. Wherever Human Rights cannot be legitimized with thoughts of reciprocity and balancing of injustices, one could ask oneself if it is possible that, perhaps, it is a case of human interests, and not really of Human Rights.[1065] The universality of rights must be reducible to the universality of interests; the interests that are only the interests of some would be the foundation of a right. With Levinas we can think Human Rights from the point of view of universalizing responsibility.

Höffe, therefore, situates himself within a certain Kantian tradition. It is a tradition to understand rights as a protection from a state of nature in which human beings mutually recognize each other as posing a threat to their own existence. Höffe explicitly enters in dialogue with the Kantian discussion of the limitation of the will. Levinas starts with a discussion of the Kantian concept of respect, which Kant defines as a value. Value that creates a disruption with my love for myself. Kant sees an auto-affected feeling through the concept of Reason. Levinas is more skeptical about the glories of auto-affective practical reason than Kant, and does not think that by itself a rational order is something to be trusted. The State develops its own rationality, and arguably a totalitarian state is such because it only recognizes an auto-affective rationality. Of course, such a rationality is not worthy of its name. The limits lie especially in the believed self-sufficiency of reason.

The justice that is not to be avoided requires a different "authority" than that of the harmonious relations established between wills that are initially opposed and opposable. These harmonious relations must be agreed upon by free wills on the basis of a prior peace that is not purely and simply non-aggression. Its dis-interestment is suggested by the idea of goodness, a dis-interestment emerging from love, for which the unique and absolutely Other can only mean their meaning and in oneself. This might sound dangerously close to building a politics on a religiously inspired love of humanity[1066] which is not Levinas' objective. When Levinas speaks about love in

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[1065]O. Höffe, "Transzendentaler Tausch. Eine Legitimationsfigur fur Menschenrechte?," *op. cit.*, p 31.
[1066]S. Zizek, who suspects this of Levinas, quotes the DDR Chief of Police as saying: "But I love you all", translating this very acutely as "I hate the enemies of socialism". ("Smashing the neighbour's face" http://www.lacan.com/zizsmash.htm [Accessed May 19, 2022].

this context, it is always a non-reciprocal, disinterested love, which he calls proximity. It is not a question of sympathy.

The sympathy can be there but the responsibility for the Other is there as well. Levinas performs a deduction of sorts from Human Rights to the rights of the Other, and from the rights of the Other to proximity, now laid out as the duty before the neighbour. This deduction Levinas calls the phenomenology of Human Rights. As fundamental, Kant review respect for persons in terms of law as real object.[1067] Often Levinas refers to himself not so much as a critic of Kant, but as an interlocutor and interpreter, or someone thinking in the spirit of Kant.

The relation to the Other is for Levinas not a sentimentality that can be satisfied by "good deeds", but the relation to the Other is in a sense of law. One of the most renowned and eloquent promoters of Human Rights today is the Canadian political theorist Michael Ignatieff. He does not try to defend Human Rights with an account of an ontological view of the human, nor by a transcendental exchange of interests. Rather, Human Rights are good for pragmatic reasons. Human Rights lay emphasis on the rights of the free individual to live and express herself freely in the social mileu.[1068] In order for the culture of Human Rights to be efficient in communication with non-democratic culture, we must limit ourselves to a "defensible core" of Human Rights that promote this freedom, lest we are to risk "rights inflation-the tendency to define anything desirable as a right."[1069] Rights are needed for people to help themselves to social and economic security, as well as, freedom to articulate and express political opinions.

The strength of his view is that Human Rights should be thought not so much as the Rights claimed by politically and morally isolated subjects pursuing their own freedom, but as the Rights of the Other. This means that rights are conceived firstly as duties, emanating from a responsibility for the Other. The extent of human rights argues Levinas, makes freedom, education, political participation, concretely possible: the right to health, happiness, work, rest, a place to live, freedom of movement, and soon. But also, beyond all that, the right to oppose exploitation by capital (i.e. the right to unionize) and even the right to social advancement (i.e. utopian or Messianic) to the refinement of the human condition, is required unreflectively.

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[1067]E. Kant,, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Sammlung Philosophie, Band 3,Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2004 [1785], p. 401n.
[1068] *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 57.
[1069] *Ibidem*, p. 90.

The rights of freedom cannot have superiority over rights to life and security as Levinas does. This means that Human Rights never constitute a complete doctrine, a fixed and limited set of principles, prescriptions, and declarations, applicable for all time. Such dynamic reveals the consequence of new principles and practices attached onto the current set of rights. The discourse on human rights is subject to supplementation, to expansion, to re-articulations and otherwise unforeseen possibilities. In Richard Rorty pragmatism, he argues that since rationalist support for Human Rights does not seem to have anything to do with the Human Rights movement, there is no need to bother with Human Rights philosophically.[1070] In a broader perspective, the human rights of culture will further a strengthened empathy and sentimental education, from those "different" to us. One might think that this critique of the rationalist defense of Human Rights is similar to that of Levinas. Rorty finds the strength in the Human Rights culture in it nurturing sympathy for foreigners and strangers.

From a Levinasian perspective his position is questionable for at least three reasons: First, this defense of Human Rights relies on their usefulness, on Human Rights working for a good. The second aspect is, Rorty does not define the concept of Good in a fundamental way of self-critique while for Levinas, the essence of Human Rights are tied defense for philosophy. Rorty third point is constructed on sympathy right close to Levinas view on openness for the Other as a mode passivity more resilient than passivity.

If one were to identify Levinas' position in that way, it would leave him open to the criticism of Slavoj Zizek, who comes close to arguing that the philosophy of the Other is nothing more than a sentimentalism. Zizek, who worries about this being the consequence of Levinas' position, rightly answers that such sympathy only leads to charity, which may serve to sooth the conscience rather than provide the possibility for a serious critique.[1071] But this is not Levinas' concern; he writes about a duty and a responsibility towards others, whether I am moved by them or not.[1072]The global outlook on culture of rights seems ethically superior to other worldview

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[1070]R. Rorty, "Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality". In S. Shute & S. Hurley (eds.) On Human Rights: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, Basic Books, 1993.

[1071]S. Zizek's critique of Levinas in "Neighbors and Other Monsters", *The Neighbor. Three Inquiries in Political Theology*, University of Chicago Press, 2006.

[1072]W. Stegmaier, "Die Bindung des Bindenden. Levinas' Konzeption des Politischen.", In: Hirsch, Alfred and Delhom, Pascal (Eds) Im Angesicht der Anderen. Emmanuel Levinas's Philosophie des Politischen, Diaphanes, 2005, pp. 25- 44

cultures. Moreover, his unfounded certainty that the European and American cultures are better at bringing up people capable of sympathy seems to be a performative self-refutation.

Furthermore, Giorgio Agamben central claim is that Human Rights presently serve as the most fundamental example of how modern bio-power operates.[1073] Agamben presents this claim as an interpretation of Hannah Arendt's descriptions of the plights of Rightless refugees in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Agamben present as if she had been demonstrating that Human Rights were the paradoxical cause of the absolute rightlessness of the refugees in the global society of conflict. However, Arendt shows how inefficacious Human Rights were when they were most needed.

The millions of stateless refugees after World War I and II were never protected by them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.[1074] The immaterial openness of being human,[1075] falls on the fumbling feebleminded of hypocrisy.[1076] The lesson that Arendt draws from this is that, the nation-state and similar institutions are necessary for the protection of Human Rights otherwise the sphere of Human Rights is reliant on politics (communal space). The plurality of the public space can make one find the identity essential for human dignity[1077]in the global society. As we have already noted, Agamben takes her claim of the ineffectiveness of the bare humanity in another direction.

Man's right is an impression of a bare natural life in the nation state and legal political order.[1078] We borrow from Agamben view, where he sees no hope emanating from within the present political order in the global society, but sets his hope to the figure of the refugee. The refugee is central[1079]in the way to envision a life liberated from the oppression of bio-political power in a diverse global society. Even so, the Rights of Man opened up the possibility for the excluded (refugee) to set up a two-fold demonstration, showing the rights of those who have not the Rights that they have and have the rights that they have not. Human Rights can signify the

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[1073] Cf. A. Giorgio. *Beyond Human Rights*. trans. Cesare Casarino, in Radical Thought in Italy, ed. Paolo Virno & Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota Press (Theory Out Of Bounds series), 2006. p. 287.
[1074] *Ibidem,* p. 291-292.
[1075] *Ibidem,* p. 299.
[1076] *Ibidem,* p. 269.
[1077] H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 181.
[1078]A. Giorgio, *Beyond Human Rights*. trans. Cesare Casarino, in Radical Thought in Italy, ed. Paolo Virno & Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota Press (Theory Out Of Bounds series), 2006, p. 16.
[1079] *Ibid.*

possibility of previously excluded subjects acquiring civil rights. They actually become humanitarian rights.

In contrast, allowing humanitarian consensus on Good and Evil, shows a drama of "Infinite justice against the Axis of Evil" to unfurl.[1080] Politics is replaceable with ethics. The recent emergence of this ethically inflected discourse in Jean-Francois Lyotards' on "*The Other's Rights,"* this "reign of ethics" might lead to a "closure of all political intervals of dissensus. The Rights of the other anchor Levinas' position in the contemporary debate. It is of urgency to point out here, a difference between Lyotards' and Levinas' conceptions of the rights of the other. Lyotards rather stands for an ethics of otherness in the sense of an "other than" (for instance, a respect for everything that is different, and the opaque otherness of that which we do not understand, and which cannot make it-self heard). This is very close to the interpretation of Levinas. The rights of the other as described by Lyotards' understanding might indeed be the consequence of a global society of consensus. What Levinas means by the rights of the other is the first step from the singular responsibility for the other to the need for its universal expression. Our renew interest also actualizes a kind of balance in the modern human person understanding of his existence in nature, his relation and horizons that ties with technological advancement in relation with the Other. The question that follows is: Can we accept a kind of balance between modernity or technological development of modernity or ethical and moral development of human being in our Age and mainly in Africa context?

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[1080]This is referring to the two more colourful expressions conjured up by the Bush administration in relation to the War on Terrorism: "Infinite Justice", the first name for the attack of retaliation on Afghanistan shortly after September 11 (soon to be renamed "Enduring Freedom"), and "The Axis of Evil" the expression naming the countries that, according to the US government, supported terrorism. (p. 309).

## Partial Conclusion

We have previously underscore that the philosophical ambition of personalism is the concern for the One experienced as will and passion. This concern for the One is therefore, the concern for Christian love which is a feeling, an energy that cannot be demonstrated because it is not a structure. Our human mind is spiritualize. This spiritualization of thought constitute our ascending footsteps unto where we reach Divine science. Christian Science takes Divine reality beyond human science to proceeds the universal acceptance of the Divine and community. This principle makes the personalist community an ideal to be realized for our contemporary societies, where, the human person is increasingly losing its meaning and value. Since man can face several obstacles in his daily experience of communion with others. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas with focus on the crisis of humanity in the global society uncovers the ethical import that Levinas ascribes to the meaning of dialogue, and thus to the priority of the ethical command *vis-`a-vis* an analysis of the relationship between the I and the Other. The Buber 'I-Thou' relationship is a partnership of unification between I and Thou, wherein, Levinas highlights difference and alterity as a basis of dialogue. The face is the trace of the infinite of God. The fragile face is an author of transcendence and infinite. It is melting of the transcendence that is absolute which is paradoxical that makes my response unique without identity that is a reverse of phenomenology to transcendence and infinite. It is actually the separation between the I and the Other-the distance that allows the existence of both subjects, that Levinas regards as the facilitative foundation of dialogue. The Levinasian dialogue is based not on the act of identification and imagination but rather on ethics that respect the Other's otherness and commits the subject to the Other. The research expressed here seeks to give content to the aspects of ethical dialogue and environmental responsibility.

**CHAPTER TWELVE: ON THE ETHICO-MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL CHALLENGES AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE PROSPECTIVE CONTRIBUTION AS FOUNDATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ECUMENISM**

**Partial Introduction**

In regards to the global emancipatory values to human challenges and progress, man has ever more become destructible, a manipulator of science and politics as well as to his own detriment. The consequences are the failed responsibility to preserved nature which he makes a part. Beyond the underline principle, the problem of global justice and cosmopolitanism in the crisis of humanity in the global society, are the very roots and limits to the Ethico-moral challenges and impossibility of global justice as a political conception. Intrinsic is the role play in the history of depoliticization in the global society with the problem of justice and the ethical state in the political foundation of the global society. In a fragmented context, other vectors can supplement the Levinasian approach for the Other with *Ubuntu* ethics as prospective contribution in the Ethico-moral resolution of the global crisis of humanity. The tenets of Ubuntu unveil an appraisal of metaphysics and religion as foundation of philosophical ecumenism in resolution to the crisis of humanity in the global society as the basis in orientating the globe to human rights and dialogue.

**12.1 THE PROBLEM OF GLOBAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY**

To live in a state of tranquility and in harmony with others, man does not cease to spare efforts in his know-how and know-how in society. However the question of global Justice occupies a preponderant place addressing in what condition man conducts his relations, and how he behaves in the social milieu, in order to direct his action towards the good of all. We do live in an unjust world. Justice on a global world scale might mean the domain of global institutions in the policies of states that are in a position to affect the global world order. The perplexing undeveloped state of global justice and domestic political theory, are with multiple highly developed theories proposing alternative solutions to well-defined problems in society.

The principles of global justice are still in the early stages of formation. The need for an effective ideas about global justice presents political theories with its most important current task,

and even perhaps with the opportunity to make a practical contribution in the long run.[1081]The practical questions at the theoretical and normative level are closely related to pressing challenges that we now face about the legitimate path forward in the global policies and governance of the world. The inevitably questions about global institutions do not yet exist. The locus of political legitimacy is the notion of nation-state and in pursuit of global justice. This is one of the advantages of domestic political theory that nation-states actually exist at the national level.

The intrinsic nature of justice at the global scale can evaluates the different aspects from criminal law and the market economy. In a broad sense, the international requirements of justice include standards governing the justification and conduct of war and standards that define the most basic human rights.[1082] Great standards and measure of the international requirement of justice have achieved recognition over the past half-century. They both define certain types of criminal conduct, usually done by states against other states or ethnic groups or against individuals for self-interest. In reality, this is not our core concern on global justice. Our principal focus in face of the crisis of humanity is not with war crimes (terrorism) or crimes against humanity (genocide) but with socio-economic justice with respect to any possible solution to be made on a global world scale.

Socio-economic justice focuses on the question of application to the entire world. It has two essential issues of traditional political theory: the scope/limits of equality as a demand of justice and the relation between justice and sovereignty in society.[1083] This suggests two pressing issues which are related and wherein, both are of crucial importance in determining whether we can even form an intelligible ideal of global justice or not. The issue of justice and sovereignty was unforgettably articulated by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes opined that: although we can discover the true principles of justice in society by moral reasoning alone, actual justice in society cannot be achieved except within a sovereign state. What is clear here is that, justice is seen as a property of the relations among human beings which requires government as an enabling condition in exercise. Hobbes further illustrated an evident consequence for the international arena, where he

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[1081]T. Nagel, 'The problem of Global Justice', Blackwell Publishing, Inc. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33, no. 2 2005.p. (1) 113. https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty documents/nagel/Nagel_Global-Justice.pdf
[1082] *Ibidem,* p. 114.
[1083] *Ibidem*

saw separate sovereigns states in society inevitably facing each other in a state of war, from which both justice and injustice are dramatically absent.

On the issue of justice and injustice, Rawls contended that the liberal requirements of justice in society include a strong component of equality among citizens. But that this equality, is a specifically political demand which applies to the basic structure of a unified nation-state. It is to an extent does not apply to the non-political (personal) choices of individuals living in such a global society, neither does it apply to the relations between one society and another, or rather between the members of different societies. The politics of egalitarian justice is a requirement on the internal socio-political and economic structure of nation-states and cannot be inferred to different contexts, which require different standards in the global society. These issues of justice and equality are autonomous of the specific standards of egalitarian justice found in Rawls' theory.

Whatever, being the standards of equal rights and equal opportunity in the global society, apply thus domestically to the question whether consistency requires that they also apply universally. If Hobbes to an extent is right, then the idea of global justice without a world government is fictional. If Rawls also is right, possibly there can be something in the global society that might be called justice or injustice in the relations between states. But if it bears only a distant relation to the evaluation of societies themselves as unjust or just for the most part, then the ideal of a just global in Rawls' view should be internalize as collective in just states.

However, Hobbes defended absolute monarchy as the best form of sovereignty. But it should be noted that, the relationship between justice and sovereignty is a separable question. In line with this, Hobbes' position can be defended in connection with theories of justice and moral evaluation very different from his in our global society. What actually creates the connection between justice and sovereignty in society is something common to a wide range of conceptions of justice. Both justice and sovereignty depends on the synchronized conduct of large numbers of people in society, which cannot be attained without regulation backed up by a domination of force.

We therefore, interprets the principles of justice and moral law as a set of rules and practices that would serve everyone's interest in society if everyone obeyed to them. This might only be realize if each an everyone has assurance of communal self-interest and the autonomous motivation of self-interested individuals. Such an assurance therefore requires the external inducement provided by the sovereign, who sees to it that individual and collective self-interest

coincide for the wellbeing of the state or society. At least amongst a good-sized population, it cannot be provided by voluntary conventions reinforced solely by the mutual recognition of a common interest.[1084] If one construes the principles of justice and attributes to individuals a non-self-interested motive that leads them to want to live on fair terms of some kind with other. The core value of this is to eliminates morally subjective inequalities. The protection of rights to liberty and the existence of a just order still depend on consistent patterns of conduct and persisting institutions that have a pervasive effect on the shape of people's lives in the global society. It is only in the operation of such a system that one can judge to be just or unjust in society.

We can borrow from Hobbes view that, in the absence of the enabling condition of sovereign power in society, individuals are famously thrown back on their own resources which is led by the legitimate motive of self-preservation to a defensive posture of war. The situation in our global society is structurally not very different for conceptions of justice that are based on much more other-regarding motives in the globe. The other-regarding motives make us discontented with our relations to other human beings or are perplexed and left without an avenue of expression but for the expression of moral frustration in the global society. The appearance of this problem in the international situation seems that, the essential aim of justice, collective security and self-interest, could be effectively provided for individuals through the sovereignty of separate states.

In a more practical sense, this position is more problematic to the Hobbes's foundation of justice which is collective self-interest and attachment of any individual to just institutions which is based solely on his own good and economic order. The crucial tenet of justice curtails moral reasons that are entirely condensed to self-worth and interest.[1085]The institutions of a just society treat its citizens, not only politically but economically, religiously and socially. It is with line to this last element that creates unease over the complete absence of any analogous standards of equality of opportunity from the practices that govern our relations with individuals in other societies and the global sphere. The most effective humane assistance from the well-off to those in extremist is clearly a called for any demand of justice in the global society, if we are not simply ethical egoists.

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[1084] *Ibidem,* p. 115.

[1085]T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*. Chapters 13-15. Chapter XIII-of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery.1651 http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-c.html

In spite of the obstacles often presented by malfunctioning state sovereignty: in this sense, justice as ordinarily understood requires more than mere humane assistance to those in desperate need, and injustice can exist without anyone being on the threshold of starvation. As earlier discussed, it should be noted that, Justice, by contrast, is concerned with the relations between the conditions of different classes of people and the causes of inequality between them in society. Remarkably, our core interest on this note focuses on the question on how to respond to global inequality in general from the interpretation of justice and injustice rather than humanity alone. The response to such question will depend crucially on one's moral conception of the relation between the value of justice and the existence of the institutions that sovereign authority makes possible in different cosmopolitanism societies.[1086]

## 12.2 THE PROBLEM OF COSMOPOLITAN VIEW IN THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

Cosmopolitanism is concerned with figuring how to live with each other and it is positioned as a moral, ethical and political endeavor. We will summon what Hannah Arendt call the human condition that describes the condition of human existence, based on plurality, action, natality, and the significance of shared humanity. The idea here, is that, this fact should shape the way people live with each other. In this perspective, humanity represents a set of human conditions that together represent an overall condition of shared humanity. There are two paradigm and primary conceptions of cosmopolitan to be considered in regards to the crisis of humanity. The first paradigmatic conception, is usually called *cosmopolitanism*, which demands of justice is derive from an equal concern or a duty of equality that we owe in principle to other humans. The instruments are in fact only selectively accessible. One (we) might be able to live on just terms only with those others in societies who are fellow members of sufficiently healthy (robust) and well-ordered sovereign states. Justice in this sense, is a share world view with anyone.[1087]

In regards to the cosmopolitan view, one therefore views the existence of separate sovereign states as an unfortunate obstacle, though perhaps for the predictable future of an insoluble one, to the pursuit or even the establishment of global justice. But to an extent, it would be morally inconsistent not to wish, for the global society as a whole, a common system of

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[1086]T. Nagel, 'The problem of Global Justice', *op. cit.,* p 118.
[1087]P. Singer, *One World New Haven*, Yale University Press, 2002. p. 65.

institutions that could attempt to realize the same standards of justice or of equal opportunity that one wants for one's own society. The cause is being born into a poor rather than a rich family in the same country or society. Subsequently, in the absence of global authority we (one) might not be able to describe the world order as *unjust*, but rather as the absence of justice which is a defect all the same.

Unlike the first paradigmatic conception on cosmopolitanism, the second conception of justice can all be the political conception. This can be seen in view of Rawls's justice that should be understood as a specifically political value, rather than being derived from a comprehensive moral system. The sovereign states in political conception of justice are not purely instruments for understanding the pre-institutional value of justice to human beings in society. The existence of the political conception gives precisely values of justice and its application to fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity. This unveils institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of justice and equality that fill out the content of justice in the global society.[1088]

In the same line, we can borrowed from Ronald Dworkin political conception of justice which expresses: A political community that exercises dominion over its own citizens, and demands from them loyalty and compliance to its rules.[1089]What underscore this assertion is simply the fact that, every state has the boundaries and population it has for all sorts of accidental and historical reasons. However, given that it exercises sovereign power over its citizens and in their name, those citizens have a duty of justice toward one another through the legal, social, and economic institutions that sovereign power makes possible in society. As such, it is "*sui generis*" duty which is not owed to everyone in the global society, nor is it an indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to everyone in the global society, such as a duty of humanity.

From a broader perspective, justice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation in society. Besides, the obligations of justice in society arise as a result of a special relation. We see practically a state of distress as absence of global justice. On the cosmopolitan or the political view of the 21$^{st}$ century, global justice would require global sovereignty. The problems of global dominion pose a serious moral problem in the global society. However, we should keep in mind that different views about the

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[1088]T. Nagel, 'The problem of Global Justice', *op. cit.,* p 120.
[1089]R. Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue,* (Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 6.

content of justice can be combined with either of these two conceptions. In line with the two views, most of what we will say is independent of the main disagreements over the content of domestic justice, the political, economic, or social. Subsequently, Rawls seems famous for insisting that different principles apply to different types of entities: that "the correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing."[1090] The most noted instance of this is Rawls' contention against utilitarianism, which he criticizes for applying to a society of individuals the principles of accumulating and exploiting net benefits minus costs that are appropriate within the life of a single individual in society, but unsuitable for groups of individuals.

According to Rawls "Utilitarianism," does not take seriously the distinction between persons."[1091] We see from this idea that even if the basic structure supported by law in society satisfies the difference principle by arranging social inequalities to maximize the expectations of the lowest class in this sense, individual choices in the global society are not expected to be governed by that principle. Inherently, those choices will certainly result in substantial social inequalities in actual outcomes among individuals within each socio-economic class, in addition to the social inequalities in (*ex ante*) society. Egalitarianism in Rawls' view, does not apply to individual morality as constraints of democratic[1092]state.

As a matter of fact, the moral units of the order are peoples, not individuals, and the values have to do with the relations among these collective units rather than the relations of individuals across the world. At the global level, what we owe to other inhabitants of the world through our society's respect for the societies of which they are citizens, is different both from what we owe to our fellow citizens and from what we as individuals owe to all our fellow human beings at the global scale. The issue is the choice of moral units. This choice is based on committing to act for what one beliefs to be right or wrong. It therefore, sets standard for ethics. The basic constituency of the monist idea for all morality must be individuals, not peoples or civilization and that whatever moral requirements apply either to social institutions or to global relations must ultimately be justified by their effects on individuals and by a morality that governs the treatment of all individuals by all other individuals.

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[1090]J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 25.
[1091] *Ibid,* p. 24.
[1092] *Ibid,* p. 22.

From this point of view it seems natural to conclude that any such morality must count all individual lives as equally valuable or important, and that in particular it must not allow global boundaries to count at the most basic level in determining how one individual should take into consideration the interests of another. The consequence seems to be that if one wants to avoid moral inconsistency, one should favour a global difference principle, which is perhaps backed up by a global original position in which all individuals are represented behind the veil of ignorance. Socio-economic justice to an extent is different at the global scale. It depends on positive rights that we do not have against all other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we are joined together with certain others in a political society under strong centralized mechanism. It what constitutes a sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage, but rather, the societal rules determining its basic structure are coercively imposed. It is not a voluntary association. It necessitates voluntary association without being given a choice in society, we are assigned a role in the collective life of a particular society.

As such, only the philosophical requirements of equal treatment will be embodied in principles of justice, including equality of opportunity, political equality and distributive justice in a contingent way.[1093] Political institutions will need to create and enhance contingent and selective moral relations in the global society. Conversely, the normative force of the most basic human rights in the global society against enslavement, violence, coercion, and of the most basic humane duties of rescue from immediate danger, depends only on our capacity to put ourselves in other people's shoes. The Kantian principle of universalizability clearly supports such interest. This means, it is based not on a utilitarian calculation but rather on the great importance to each person of the kind of inviolability conferred by rights.

Rights are therefore a guarantee to each of us of a certain protected status, rather than a net benefit to the collective. This minimal altruistic morality governs our relation to all other persons in the global society. What is fundamental is that, humane morality does not require us to make their ends our own, but rather in a more concrete way, it does require us to pursue our ends within boundaries that leave them free to pursue theirs, and to relieve others (them) from extreme threats and obstacles to such freedom that if we can do so without serious sacrifice of our own ends for the common welfare of all.[1094]

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[1093]T. Nagel, 'The problem of Global Justice', *op. cit.*, p 18.
[1094] *Ibidem,* p. 19.

In a cosmopolitan society, everyone may have the right to live in a just society, but we do not have an obligation to live in a just society with everyone. This simply means that, the right to justice is the right that the society one lives in be justly governed. Is this unambiguous division of levels of responsibility morally acceptable? Or rather, is it too radical an exclusion of humanity at large from full moral anxiety? The answer from the global point of view of the political conception must be that there is no single level of full moral anxiety, because morality is essentially complex (multifaceted).[1095] The whole point of the political conception of morality is that social justice itself is a rise in exclusive obligation, wherein, a more broader and associative range shows from a lower moral baseline than the personal obligations. This moral principle depends on the contingency of involuntary rather than voluntary association. In the sense, Hobbes and Kant thematic are fundamental in that all humans have to create and support a state of some kind to leave and stay out of the state of nature.

It is not in principle an obligation to all other persons. It has no clear boundaries and it is rather merely an obligation to create the conditions of peace and a legal order in the global society, with whatever community offers itself to its citizens. This moral requirement is based not on a comprehensive value of equality in the global society, but rather on the imperative of securing basic rights, which can be done either more or less locally. But it should be noted that, once the state exists, we are in a new moral situation, where the value of equality has acquisition. The practical difference between the political and the cosmopolitan conceptions in the global society is that the latter sees the formation of the state as answering also a universal demand for equality, even if as a practical matter it can be realized only locally and not globally.

The logical analyses are therefore to some standard of universalizability which underlies even this conditional requirement. It is part of a multifaceted conception of morality, which is shaped by the Kantian ideal of a kingdom of ends whose members do not share a common set of ends in society. The universality of this tenet of morality consists in it applying to anyone who happens to become a member of our global society. This implies, no one is excluded in advance and in that sense all persons in the global society are regarded as morally equal. In fact, such a morality in the global society will also leave space for voluntary combinations and inclusions of the masses in the pursuit of common ends, which are not in general sense governed by standards

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[1095]*Ibidem*, p. 20.

of equality. But the political institutions in the global society are different because adherence to them is not voluntary.

The moral units of this global morality are not individual human beings but separate societies, or "peoples," and it is equality among these collective units should be the basis of the political conception in society. According to Charles Beitz, our obligations as members of a liberal society toward the members of other societies are not direct, but are rather filtered through the relations between our societies (i.e. social liberalism in difference with cosmopolitan liberalism).[1096] That is, because, societies have a "moral nature," which deserves equal respect, provided they meet the basic conditions of civility (decency).

To note, individuals in the global society *per se* are not entitled to equal treatment globally. We agree that, the requirement of equal respect for other peoples is strong enough to impose on liberal societies a kind of tolerance for non-liberal states that meet a minimal condition of decorum, so that the foreign policy of a liberal state should not have the aim of moving all other societies toward liberalism. This is analogously to the restraint liberalism imposes internally or against the use of state power to promote a particular comprehensive moral or religious view in the global society.[1097] In a broader perspective, the political conception of justice in the global society need not be based on the strong embodiment of peoples and need not imply the principled toleration of non-liberal societies.

The problem of cosmopolitanism and global justice revolves on the implications of the political conception for world politics which tend to be conservative relatively to power. The praxis is not the end of the story, but rather the conservatism which comes under pressure from powerful forces in the other direction. The source of the problem and pressure lies both in existing global or intercontinental institutions and in the progressively felt need to reinforce such institutions and to create new ones, for three types of purpose: the provision of humane aid; the provision of global public goods; and the protection of human rights that benefit everyone; such as collective security, free trade and environmental protection. Therefore, institutions that serve these purposes in the

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[1096]C. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1999); pp. 214-16; and "Rawls's Law of Peoples," Beitz's discussion in *Ethics* 110 (2000): pp. 669-96.
[1097] G. Rae, *The Problem of Political Foundations in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas*, Madrid, 2016, p. 134.

global society are not aimed to extend democratic legitimacy and socio-economic justice, but they clearly give rise to claims for both in respect to their systems of design and functioning.

At this space, mere economic interaction does not trigger the global standards of socio-economic justice. But current global rules and institutions may be the thin end of a block (segment) that will eventually expand to seriously remove the dominant sovereignty of separate nation-states, both morally and politically, but for the moment they lack something that according to the political conception is crucial for the implementation of standards of justice for individuals and collectives. Global institutions, therefore, act not in the name of individuals, but in the name of the states (for instance, state instruments) and agencies that have created them. Henceforth, the responsibility of those institutions toward individuals in society is filtered through the states that represent and bear primary responsibility for those individuals.

In reality, worldwide governance do share newer prospect in relation to individual citizens and morally significant.[1098]All these interconnections of networks bring together representatives not of individuals, but of state functions and institutions. But a more comprehensive criterion of global socio-economic justice is not part of the picture dilemma stemming from the need for more current global institutions to deal with our collective problems, stemming from global warming to free trade. It simply means; it is not only the fear of despotism but also the resistance to expanded demands for legitimacy, expanded democracy, and expanded scope for justice. According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, well-off nations, at any rate, fear such evolutions,[1099]that reveals in part a conviction that they are not morally obliged to expand their moral vulnerabilities in this way to other societies.[1100]

Our conclusion, though it presupposes a conception of justice in spirit: the path from anarchy to justice must go through injustice. It is frequently unclear whether, for a given global problem, international chaos is preferable to international injustice. But if we accept the political conception in the global society, the global scope of justice will expand only through evolutions that first increase the injustice of the world by introducing effective but illegitimate institutions to which the standards of justice apply, standards by which we may hope they will eventually be

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[1098] A. Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2004).
[1099] G. Rae, *The Problem of Political Foundations in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas*, *op. cit.*, p 143.
[1100] *Ibidem,* p. 144.

transformed in the long term. Perhaps, it is an example of the cunning of history and until politics is globalize beyond the national interest the crisis of humanity would be inevitably.[1101]

## 12.3 THE HISTORY OF DEPOLITICIZATION IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

The European, Asian and African mind has moved over the last decades as the political has been downgraded and, increasingly, neutralized leading to what we call the age of depoliticization. These past decades have each been responsible for a unique stage in the process that proceeds 'from the theological to the metaphysical domain, from there to the humanitarian-moral, and, finally, to the economic domain.'[1102] Three things need to be emphasized about this. First, the analysis to European history, second, the successive stages does not constitute an unbroken progression nor was the 'development' as 'clean' as a simple movement from one to the other. History is understood in terms of transitions, not leaps, meaning that past histories will continue to influence those that come after. Third, each stage of history is pluralistic.[1103]

The past decades shows an alteration of metaphysics and politics subsequently impacted on its dominant 'convictions and arguments. In other words, the convictions revolve on the dominant politics and metaphysics of each historical epoch to chart a historical movement of humans. The questions on how humans should act and what they were capable of doing were at the foundation of the political. The theological and cosmic view, did turn unto rationalism as reformed awareness in morality. Morals was hitherto understood from metaphysical grounds and humanist foundations.[1104]

Indeed, with Marx, economics comes to be 'the basis and "foundation" of everything intellectual and spiritual'.[1105] By subordinating the political to the economic, put differently, thinking the political from the economic, not only has the question of the political been forgotten, but politics itself has developed a germ-free discourse on techno-manipulative thoughts on financial value.[1106] The great failing of this understanding is its abandonment of the theological underpinnings of the political. While the secularization process thinks it has overcome the

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[1101] *Ibidem,* p. 147.
[1102] C. Schmitt. 'The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations', trans. Matthias Konzeit and John P. McCormick, in *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab, University of Chicago Press: (1996), pp. 80-96.
[1103] G. Rae, "*The Problem of Political Foundations"* in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas, *op. cit*., p 61.
[1104] *Ibidem,* p. 62.
[1105] C. Schmitt, 'The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations', *op. cit.,* p 84.
[1106] *Ibidem,* p. 82.

theological, the theological cannot be overcome. There is need for practical theology and faith of the human cognitive limits to implicitly rely upon it.[1107]

To do so, the secularization and depoliticization processes must be overcome. The aim to combat the depoliticization process was by showing that the essence, of the political cannot be collapsed into other disciplines, but must be revealed in its distinctiveness. The object of politics is a process of reverse depoliticization. In other words, the political serves two purposes, in that it aims to reveal: the essence of the political and so secure a place for the political among other disciplines, and how the political, and politics, must be thought and structured so as to reverse the depoliticization process[1108]in the ethical state. Depoliticization process is leading to increasing violence in society.

## 12.4 THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF JUSTICE AND THE ETHICAL STATE IN THE POLITICAL FOUNDATION OF THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

The ethical state is a *complexio oppositorum*, existing between the Greek rationality of the political and the ethical *pathos* of the Bible. Both aspects are required, that the Biblical must take precedence to guide the Greek. We need the political to resolve the paradoxes and problems that result from the multitude of ethical relations encountered every day, 'politics must be held in check by ethics'[1109] With this, the notion of politics is orientated, not from ontological concerns or egoistic premises but from the ethical relation that places the Other as the 'foundational' point of reference.

The political is thought from the ethical relation, it cannot take the form of a totality. The ethical relation feeds the political state. The just state is, therefore, always one that needs to be re-made. Rather than create an imposing political state, the just state is one that is not only orientated from the ethical face-to-face relation but is also continuously disrupted by the specifics of the face-to-face relation. The ethical acts not as a counter-weight to the political but as a disruption to the totalizing tendencies inherent to the political. This is because of its transcendent nature in the face-to-face relation which exceeds any attempt to totalize it. In reality, when put differently, the ethical acts as the restrainer not because it stands opposed to the political but because, by existing at the 'heart' of the political, it disrupts the political. The ethical state cannot, however, be justified

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[1107] G. Rae, "*The Problem of Political Foundations*" in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas, *op. cit.,* p 69.
[1108] *Ibidem,* p. 64.
[1109]G. Rae, "*The Problem of Political Foundations*" in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas, *op. cit*., p 232.

because it is, in reality, a normless decision and, as such, is rooted in faith that those values are most important in society. Levinas endorsed an ethical state. Perhaps, there is an *aporia* here insofar as whether the individual in the global society, adequately meets his ethical obligations for the Other depends on an individual decision regarding whether and how to respond to the Other. This *aporia* is an essential aspect of the ethical state insofar as an aspect of the ethical relation concerns the ego's responsibility for the Other.

In view of the global society, there is a logical outcome on the insistence that the ethical relation grounds the political with the face being a non- quantitative relation. As a matter of fact, the political needs to be guided by the ethical means that the ontological fixation with objective quantity must be replaced by a culture focused on qualitative measures. Related to this structure, the laws of the political in the global society must be orientated around the face of the other and take into consideration each on its own terms. From the global outlook, there cannot be a universal, a priori law determining how to judge a face for breaking a law and/or from the other perspective, determining how the individual is to be judged in society. It is clear from this analysis that, one can necessarily consider each individual as a living individual and as a unique individual who can find, in his very uniqueness, what a general consideration cannot find.

Conversely, the just state must respect the alterity of each ego and spontaneously devise actions that affirm the welfare of all in society; actions that, because they are concerned for all, are universal in orientation. In contrast, such universality would ignore the extent to which contemporary forms of sovereignty operate through anonymous and diffuse power structures. The ethical inform the political in the way that requires an ethical openness to the Other to be adopted by sites of sovereignty that are instead characterized by inaccessibility, anonymity, pervasive control over life and most crucially, the sublation of all difference. Levinas' notion of the ethical therefore, demands a personal relationship which is absent and impossible in contemporary bureaucracies.

Accordingly, we can see here that Levinas is actually following Hegel's conclusion that 'the state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and hence in the spirit of arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects.'[1110] Although we typically expect and demand that political solutions be perfect in the global society, Levinas and

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[1110]G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the philosophy of right* (H. B. Nisbet, Trans.) Cambridge University Press. (1991). p. 258.

Hegel remind us of the aporetic nature of the political in society. The political is about discussion, compromise, ordering and judgement, all of which occur in relation to ethical relations that are continuously changing. More concretely in the global society, this does not mean that we should not expect solutions from the political nor does it mean that we should not demand anything from the political. It simply means that whatever is demanded is always a work in progress.

Levinas' justice, like Hegel's ethical life,[1111] is 'something' that is always worked towards, can always be perfected, and always needs to be re-affirmed in each instance. For this reason, what constitutes justice in the global society is a question that must be continually asked.[1112] This is why in the global society, the political must be orientated from and continuously disrupted by the ethical relation. Because it is constituted by totality, politics has a tendency to petrify into objective, ahistorical conditions. Consequently, in placing the ethical at the heart of the political in global society is to think the latter from the former counteracts this by disrupting these petrified structures so that they focus on the uniqueness of each other in society. Only this approach can it fight against unjust political states that think (the Other) from ontological premises.

Prominently, such a fight orchestrates 'a revolt for a society that is Other, a revolt that recommences as soon as the other society is established; a revolt against the injustice that is founded as soon as order is founded-a new tonality, a tonality of youth, within the old Western progressivism.'[1113] This is to remind us that, Levinas thus, introduces the notion of *justice à venir* (justice 'to come). The notion of Justice 'to come' is important because it brings to our attention the aporetic nature of the political, the diachronic underpinnings of the ethical-political relationship, and, by asking us to accept that justice always 'anticipates a justice which is more just',[1114]recognizes that the political solution to the ethical is not and cannot ever be perfect. This identifies the difficulty of creating a politics from the ethical relation. The challenge of the just state is an ongoing one in the global society of diverse crisis.

There are counter-debates (controversy) raised against Levinas' notion of 'justice-to-come', with particular emphasis being placed on the implications for the sense of responsibility

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[1111]G. Rae, *Realizing freedom: Hegel, Sartre, and the alienation of human being*. Palgrave Macmillan. (2011). p. 224-226

[1112] G. Rae, "*The Problem of Political Foundations"* in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas, *op. cit*., p 236.

[1113]E. Levinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind* , trans. Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press (1998), p. 12.

[1114] E. Levinas, *Is it Righteous to Be? op cit*., p 51.

owed to the other.[1115] One of the opponent to Levinas' appeal to a futural justice to-come is Oona Eisenstadt[1116] who is at odds with Levinas' understanding of the infinite responsibility experienced from the immediate encounter with the Other. It should be noted that, the experience of infinite responsibility brings a tremendous weight that spurs the ego into action to safeguard the other's welfare. Accordingly, Eisenstadt is concerned that by focusing on the future, Levinas opens up the possibility that the ego's present responsibility for the Other can be indefinitely put off until the future, a future which is always 'to-come' and, as such, never does. This implies, the notion of 'justice-to-come' to an extent is a dangerous one because, it opens a gap that can be used by the ego to avoid the infinite responsibility experienced in its immediate relationship with the Other. Therefore, in averting this possibility, it presumably depends upon the decision of the populace in society, specifically whether it chooses to affirm justice.

Levinas holds that, although dialogue is not part of the ethical face-to-face relation, it is a key aspect of the political. The different positions of both authors must be respected, heard and debated to ensure that justice is improved in the global society face with diverse crisis. Without such a dialogue, one faction (hegemony states) may be chosen to rule over all others, thereby reducing the Other to the same. We content that, the Levinasian ethical state must continuously interfere in personal relations to order and improve the justice of the state with the consequence that they violate the anti-state, egoistic individuality of liberalism. On the one hand, this analysis seems to reduce liberalism to an asocial individuality that forgets that liberalism, in both classical and modern forms, engages with the key question of the individual's relationship to society. Therefore, liberalism entails a spectrum which cannot be reduced to a pure individuality completely divorced from the socio-political. On the other hand, the ethical and political are co-constitutive. The political in some sense, is a corrupt field that must be corrected continuously from and by the ethical.

Subsequently, Levinas does not think the ethical and political in terms of an opposition, but rather much less one that opposes a pure aspect to an impure aspect. One of the most significant contributions Levinas makes is to bring to our attention to the entwinement of the ethical and political in society. This connection causes problems for Levinas' attempt to think the alterity of

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[1115] G. Rae, "*The Problem of Political Foundations"* in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas, *op. cit*., p 236.

[1116] O. Eisenstadt, "The problem of the promise:" Derrida on Levinas on the cities of refuge. *Crosscurrents, 52*(4), (2003). Pp. 474-482.

the ethical relation. But otherwise, Levinas would presumably respond that this is the challenge he poses on: how to recognize and think the intertwined nature of the Ethico-political relationship in a way that recognizes and respects the absolute alterity of the Other in society.

More fundamentally, in the global society is a response to this crisis of humanity,-need the rationality of the political, but also maintains that the diachrony of the ethical relation requires that any political affirmation of the Other must be continuously challenged and re-thought within the global society. Consequently, this means that the political is always linked to failure in that it never satisfies the ethical demand of the Other, the diachronic nature of the notion of 'justice to-come' means that the possibility of political redemption is always present in a secularize world.[1117] This entails the necessary foundation of the religious intertwined with the political to overcome the neglects of God in the affairs of man in society.

## 12.5 UBUNTU ETHICS PROSPECTIVE CONTRIBUTION IN THE METAPHYSICAL-ETHICO-MORAL RESOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF HUMANITY

The spiritual dimension of African *Ubuntu ethics* is believe to influence various aspects of a person's life and sense of purpose which is seen as a vector which can complement Levinas' responsibility for the Other[1118] which focuses on humanness, which is a reaction against (moral decadence) human dehumanization which is not completely different from what Levinas proposes. Ubuntu is a word out of Africa context. It has gain grounds and increasingly become a truth in the West that this word means "humanity," and is especially linked to forgiveness and reconciliation. The main focus of *Ubuntu* in this thesis will be to see through the political and everyday life, as well as a wider interconnectedness global approach for the Other. Interconnectedness is an important context to understand *Ubuntu*, and it is within this that *Ubuntu* manages to exist. This interpretation of *Ubuntu* as a resolution to the Ethico-moral crisis of humanity in the global society focuses on human rights, utilitarianism, communitarianism and personhood existence.

*Ubuntu* is presented in resolution of this crisis as something infinitely good and helpful, as well as representing all what people in the global society wish they had and how the world ideally should be. *Ubuntu*, in this universal form, represents the best of humans and the human situation and challenges. We would all want to be kind, generous, patient, considerate and forgiving in face

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[1117] E. Levinas, *Entre Nous: Thinking of the Other*, *op. cit.*, p 239.
[1118] M. Thaddeus, "Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Right South Africa:" *African Human Rights Law Journal,* 2011.

of the Other. *Ubuntu* in the African word literally means humanity to others. It is valuable in mainstream philosophical thinking *as* it entails the comprehension of the human individual or human person as an existential and simultaneously ethical being. We are bound to know: what can be the possible moral value of *Ubuntu* ethics in the crisis of humanity? From this*, Ubuntu* is conceived as a philosophy that is thought to be universal and universalizable. This conception of African *Ubuntu* as a philosophy thus rings a bell in other cultures in the global society.

Other cultures in the global society have attestations to the fact that every human person is to be treated as a moral end or as a value, of the values and not as a means to an end. This is essentially in view and reflects of a Kantian perspective, which is claimed to be universal and universalizable. This is an appraisal that should be learned and understood by all those in the global society who make use of other people literally as means to achieve their selfish ends. *Ubuntu ethics* espouses well-meaning cooperation and participation within and among human individuals in a society, and within a certain culture in relation to other cultures. Remarkably, with *Ubuntu* philosophy, the "well-educated" (learned) should serve as models of the right values in the society. The "*I am because you are or we are"* mentality of *Ubuntu* emerges at this point, in view of the fact that the "well-educated" must exhibit and epitomize every respectable act anywhere and anytime.

One aspect of the universality and universalizability of *Ubuntu* philosophy in the global society can easily illustrate its treatment of the human person. This aspect is recognized in its Zulu maxim: "A person is a person through other persons."[1119] According to Ramose, this maxim exposes an ethical dimension of *Ubuntu* philosophy emanated from the Bantu-speaking African peoples. *Ubuntu* focuses on sharing, friendship (togetherness) on the common worth values of all human being. This implies all interacting forces, internal and external forms the person. As such, human dignity is linked to the relation to the others where one becomes a person by treating the others well for example by sharing and respect. One cannot be a person autonomously as in the individualistic thinking where the self is conceived as private. This is in contrast with the egocentric view something being reachable, visible and public to all.

Subsequently, human dignity is linked to the relation to others. Ignorance about others in the global society would result to ignorance in one's own personhood because individuals and

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[1119] P. Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy*. Trans. Colin King. Présence Africaine, 1959 : 1ff.

others are intertwined. It implies, caring about others for the sake of oneself, one has to develop a great sense of empathy to realize the need of others in the global society. By doing so in the global society, one gets an open mind for diversity, within the main idea that despite people's difference in society, they are all humans being sharing and creating wholeness together. The spirit of togetherness is the most important quality in society and in accordance with the theory of socio-centrism. Desmond Tutu has articulated anxiety of expressing Ubuntu in terms of collectivism because it does not acknowledge the individual and can therefore easily be used in purposes of dehumanization and oppression of the Other in the global society. Here, the individual is not just part of the community but also viewed as the partial wholes with reference to the others, what make difference becomes viable for European collectivistic thoughts.

In a more practical sense, the individual is not only a part of the world, but rather the individual is the world. Every single person both represent the world and is part of it, which make it very easy for an individual to relate to the world or another person for the reason that is to relate to oneself.[1120]Here, to find oneself in the global society, one must therefore look for the Other. *Umuntu ngumuntu (a person is a person)* therefore, implies that, each person has a self-worth and defining value. By adding *ngabantu* (through other persons) one has an individual who cannot be taken out from its context the wholeness as an autonomous being.[1121]*Ubuntu* can be understood by looking at the daily life of the community where the values are built in within the family, friends and works, where people share and assist each other in society.

Life in *Ubuntu* aimed to find the greatest true form of happiness. The secret is to seek cohesiveness in relation to others for the reason that people can only grow in a community before forming an orderly society. The individual is seen as the centre force, who finds him/herself in interaction with others, which creates her virtue to humanness and personhood. We can borrow from Broodryk who calls Ubuntu a '…comprehensive ancient African worldview.' This worldview is based on values trying to ensure a '… happy and qualitative human community life.'[1122] This qualitative human community life will be based on family, focusing on humanness, caring, sharing, respect and compassion. Therefore, a community in this perspective is in a sense a set of 'others.' They make the person aware of their own existence.

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[1120]S. Augustine, *Ubuntu, an ethics for a new South Africa.* Cluster Publication. 2001. 26f
[1121]M. John Bhenghu, *Ubuntu. The essence of Democracy.* Novalis Press. 1996, p. 2
[1122]M. Ramose. The Philosophy of *Ubuntu* and *Ubuntu* as a Philosophy,' in P. H. Coetzee and A.P.J Roux (eds.): *The African Philosophy Reader*. Routledge. 2003. pp. 230-231.

In separating oneself from the community, the 'others' will no longer be available in order to make the person aware of his own existence, and therefore become a fuller human being. On this note, Broodryk and Mnyandu affirms and a person's view not only in positive terms, but in essence of being *abantu,* which in short means becoming a humanized being in society. About becoming a humanized being in society, Mnyandu writes that people live in a world of self-expression in order to create harmonious relationships in their community, and the world beyond. The tenet of Ubuntu is the essence itself; it is the basis for a religious expression in African societies outward to resolution of the crisis of humanity in the global society. It is part of that which wishes to enable the human being to take responsibility for the well-being of others outside of oneself in regards to friendship.

Tutu preaches that Jesus taught humans friendship, to which the basis is a mutual understanding of each other. To him, Ubuntu can be sidelined with this teaching. Ubuntu breaks the racial classification of peoples in the global society, which in turn breaks the relationship of oppressor and oppressed.[1123] Tutu view is that losing the foundational thought that humans are created in God's image as well as finding what we need in God, turns into '*secular prosperity*.' On account of this loss we judge others as if they lack the inherent human value. This materialist understanding creates a society where racial difference translates to fear and exclusion. Michael Battle states that in order to understand Tutu's theology one must view it through Ubuntu, as he believes we can only be human in community.[1124]

According to Tutu, being a 'self-sufficient human being is subhuman…God has made us so that we will need each other…to be is to participate…persons are ends in themselves only through the discovery of who they are in others.'[1125] Tutu therefore uses the genesis of the Old Testament to explain how we humans, from the beginning, were meant to live in communities with each other. In his view, God felt Adam must be lonely and therefore created Eve, another human being, for them to exist and live together.[1126] What makes Tutu's viewpoint unique is the merging (melding) together of the Christian faith and traditional African beliefs as a resolution to the crisis of humanity in the global society. He is attempting to bring the West, particularly Europe, Asia and Africa together. In Africa, one learns best to know oneself through others. However, in the

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[1123] M. Battle. Michael. *Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu*. Pilgrim Press. 2009. p. 5.
[1124] *Ibidem,* p. 40.
[1125] Desmond Tutu quoted in Michael Battle 2009, p. 35, 39, 43.
[1126] M. Battle. *Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu*. *op. cit*., p 67-68, 41-42.

conception of balancing African communalism with the thought of the human being's 'inalienable uniqueness', will therefore entails that the West's view be balanced with the human's need to connect.[1127]Tutu therefore questions on a person's characteristic identity, emancipating the person from an inflexible community view, which is commonly found in African religion and communitarianism.

The core project is therefore, for each individual to unite these roles to create one person with the same face towards it all in a spirit of togetherness in the global society.  This is because the onto-cosmological worldview of the African is intrinsically entangled with the socio-cultural worldview of the people and provides the basis for most of the belief systems. Placide Tempels maintains that metaphysics is the study of reality, existing in everything and in every being in the universe. In African metaphysics and to be in the spirit of *Ubuntu,* the self is conceived essentially towards others, that is, a *being-with-others.* This means that it is the community which makes the individual, because of his relationship with the community. In this context, one's identity is closely tied to their social roles, family lineage, community affiliation, and spiritual beliefs. The person is defined by their relationships with others and their responsibilities towards the community. The person is also viewed as a spiritual being who is connected to a higher power or divine force. The person is seen as a vessel for spiritual energy or life, which animates their existence. This communal perspective shapes the understanding of a person's identity, rights and obligations.

Human existence in *Ubuntu* philosophy will most revolves on values, dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, belief, worldview and profession.[1128] Agreeably, through this kind of treatment, *Ubuntu* philosophy develops and sustains the spirit of humanity to others.[1129] It thus pushes the idea that humanity means more than just the ability to care for the human Other as much as one cares for oneself. It further entails a voluntary self-offering, which requires the Other to duly and unselfishly reciprocate as well in society. Consequently, Ubuntu ethics conveys mutual human recognition of one another. By recognizing the Other as another self, true peace becomes attainable, and violence can be easily avoided.[1130]

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[1127] *Ibidem,* pp. 38, 144.

[1128] N. A. Gianan. Delving into the Ethical Dimension of Ubuntu Philosophy Cultura. *International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology* 8(1)/2011: 63–82. DOI: 10.2478/v10193-011-0004-1

[1129] https://help.Ubuntu.com/6.06/Ubuntu/about-Ubuntu/C/aboutUbuntu.html.

[1130]This view calls on all "suicide bombers" and all those with malicious intent: stop any plan/action to eliminate or harm other humans. Violence is neither an answer nor a solution to world problems.

Ubuntu philosophy integrates Levinas', Ricoeur's and Asian philosophies. It seems that being ethical is a prerequisite to being moral. The human person aspires to accomplished life, achieve is the good-an ethical life. This aspiration with respect to the ethical life is not to be done in isolation of self from others. Each human person in the global society should aim at the good life with and for others in just institutions. In this context, human action is supposed to be always directed toward the good of all. The human aim of the good becomes the impetus for doing something in society for the welfare of the Other. The human person is also considered to be capable of recognizing the Other as another human person on the same level as oneself. A human being becomes truly a human being through other human beings. The human person treats one's self as an-Other (self)-the Other, capable person.[1131]

Ubuntu culture is centred and geared towards the promotion of life of the Other. This justifies the fact that, human rights are well respected in the Ubuntu culture as life is the greatest preoccupation of the African. Thus, everything is centred on the communication of life, participation and its conservation. Ubuntu recognizes and respects the rights of human beings happen to be inherent in ethics. The tenet of Ubuntu is that, one does not need to make extra effort to respect human rights if he is truly an Ubuntuist and respects the otherness and uniqueness of the others in society. Even the right to life for the unborn, implies the duty to generate life is at the centre of Ubuntu ethics. Human rights are rights which human individuals have simply by virtue of being human.[1132]This simply means human rights protect the value of welfare but not only to the extent that this corresponds with our authentic needs in society. In so doing, Ubuntu protects and promotes human life is right otherwise it is wrong. It is on this note that, some scholars have argued that Ubuntu ethics is so anthropocentric (like Levinas' Ethics) and communitarian that individual rights are overshadowed and destroyed by communities right.

The centrality of Ubuntu in the global society appropriate ways of promoting and maintaining life precedes any individual interest. The unethical, unjust, antisocial and inhuman action towards others in the global society has left a number of destitute people and a sign of moral immaturity. The outcome is a decaying society in decadence. Thadeus Metz overlooks the outcome of neglecting other people will signifies in the global society. According to him, this decadence of

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[1131]P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*. The University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 169.
[1132]Sundman Per, Human rights Justification, and Christian Ethics, Ph.D. Dissertation, Uppsala University, 1996, p. 183.

others violates communal norms as opposed to acknowledging others in society. It is rather a way destroying not just the global society but one's own happiness. With Ubuntu in a pace of the global village, duty should become the very foundation of human rights. In the meanders, it emphasis on the empowerment of the minority anchored on a deep rooted understanding of human equality[1133] which is based on the idea that human beings are neither self-sufficient nor perfect. What is clear is the fact that human needs each other for the perfection and self-actualization. More inherently, if one is able to empower the minority, then he will be able to achieve his own fulfilment as well as that of the society.[1134]

The self-actualization at the individual's level depends on one's ability to help other people in the global society in which he lives. To be human in Ramose view entails a look into humanity and for others in terms of social existence,[1135] particularly in times of crisis and needs. Such teachings of Ubuntu ethics in the global society therefore aggress with Biblical teaching on "there is more joy in giving than in receiving."[1136] Thus, human equality opens, facilitates care and creates a global society. The communitarian aspect of Ubuntu is embedded in a social context of relationship, interdependence and never as an isolated and atomic individual.[1137]Ubuntu philosophy is a perfect antithesis to provide a global and coordinated platform that stops a society problem from affecting the next society. By helping one society with its problem, you indirectly solve your own future problem and that of the global society. This view can be expressed in the *Bambui* proverb as follows "*if you sleep comfortably while thief's breaks in your neighbour's house, be sure you are well armed because your door might be next*." This doctrine of Ubuntu is needed in the global society in order to promote a harmonious workable and social platform to coordinate global actions and responses to the crisis of humanity and ethical challenges.

The African Ubuntu approach tackles the socio-economic, political and environmental phenomenon and frustration in the crisis of humanity in the global society. It illustrates a high sense of morality in the Ubuntu culture as well a highly developed concept of leadership, justice, responsibility, fairness, economical, technological and human development towards equality in

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[1133] Ngwang Ernest Tanto, *African cultural Beliefs and Practices in Global Bioethics: A Critical Analysis in View of an Axiological Metonymic Universalism,* Ph.D. Dissertation, Yaounde I University, 2019, p. 201.
[1134] *Ibid*
[1135] M. Ramose, *African Philosophy Through Ubuntu*, Harare, Mond Books, 2002, p. 42.
[1136] Acts, 20: 35
[1137] K. Gyekeye, "Person and Community in African Thought" *in Philosophy from Africa: A text with Readings,* ed. P.H Coetzee and A. P. Roux, Durban; International Thomson Publishing Southern Africa, 1998, p. 318.

society. With Ubuntu, it attacks the cause of the crisis and not treating the effect; that is, the plight of illegal immigration and brain drain becoming a global concern under dehumanizing conditions. Thus, a global concern will consist in making life comfortable for the Other politically and economically. Ubuntu can be seen in the sense of a new human rights-oriented society. However, the fact than Ubuntu can be located in 21$^{st}$ Century speaks to its relevance, authenticity and resilience. Ubuntu has evolved and is now found in a modern democratic state, utilized to benefit the progression and well-being of the all those living with inspires values in the global society. Ubuntu can be located in people's lives and it has a clear function. The Ubuntu ethics is anti-egoistic as it discourages people from seeking their own good without regard for, or to the detriment of, other persons in the community.[1138] It is on this premises we see in Ubuntu an ethical, ontological, metaphysical, social, religious and psychological obligation that hopes to participate in the building of a better global society through intercultural dialogue.

## 12.6 AN APPRAISAL OF METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION AS FOUNDATION FOR PHILOSOPHICAL ECUMENISM IN RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS OF HUMANITY

Faced with the immanence of the plaques resulting from the crisis of humanity, *Metaphysics* is considered to be one of the greatest philosophical works. It reviewed a broader scope beyond the Aristotle's view. Previous problems remain the core subject-matter. Every problem in philosophy has an ontological foundation. The upshot of our dialectical analysis on the ontological problems in metaphysics of the crisis of humanity is that, it is metaphysics which is concern with the analysis of those everyday life problems. In this sense, we are equally learning of the ontological problems in metaphysics, in the sense that it is ontology which appears as the foundation of all that is concern with the human knowledge.  Metaphysics therefore deals with the ontological problems of life.  It benefits for the human mind to be acquainted with metaphysical principles used on the questioning of man in crisis. Therefore, the ontological nature of philosophy appears vital in other to instruct unity in the chaos of life.

Being in metaphysics, we can say that, is one of the basic ways that philosophy employs in looking problems of existence with the aim of founding solutions. In order not to lose sight on our focus, we will say that, those problems of metaphysical philosophy can be group in two big

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[1138]D. Tutu, "Ubuntu and Indigenous Restorative Justice", http://www.africaworkinggroup.org/files/ubuntu briefing3.pdf febrauary 15, 2012.

groups. Those groups are the ontological problems and the anthropological problems. So, the metaphysical conclusion draw from this is: the world is such that, matter is governed by philosophical laws. It, therefore, demarcates Kantian reality. Kant in his *Critic of pure Reason*; by assigning a fundamental question to metaphysics "what is man" give us the possibility to talk of metaphysics on the human reality (crisis). The metaphysics of human reality being at the base of metaphysics is therefore this fundamental ontology which is at the base of this metaphysics of the human reality. Being is then a fundamental and propounded base of all things even metaphysics.

We have seen that those ontological problems examined before, have make us to say that ontology constitute the base of metaphysics or philosophy. This foundation is inherent because its takes the human. Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that studies being as such. It deals directly with existence questions. It is the task of providing for a set of reality and metaphysics therefore builds from there. If metaphysics is the core of philosophy, then ontology is fundamentally the heartbeat of metaphysics. Reality in its most general and abstracted sense is being. It regards to the essence, attributes and the relation of being. In the meanders, metaphysics is study of the nature of reality and the core of what sorts of things are real (foundation, dependence relations and fundamentality). It therefore, temporarily secures both ontologically (onto-theology and theologically) the intelligible order from the inside-out, and the outside-in, thereby supplying the ultimate standards of legitimacy for each of history's successive epochs. In the upshot of the crisis of humanity, ontology is circumscribed to problems of existence, problems of the first order and of the higher-order. The epistemology of ontology and metaphysics have increased. It is mind into the depth of that can exist.

In our opinion, those ontological problems that we encounter in ontology, metaphysics, religion and philosophy are that which gives meaning to the existence of humankind. The role of ontology, metaphysics, religion and philosophy in the crisis of humanity is a radical reflection without any restriction in order to realize the full possibilities of humanity. This implies that we not be metaphysically speaking to living the illusion of the world. Therefore, religion has an inherently grounds on the transcendental reality between man and the Divine in crisis of humanity. Religion is an existential relationship between man and a transcendent absolute which surpasses him and constitutes in his eyes the supreme reference.[1139] It is the vertical relationship that man

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[1139] M. Meslin, *l'experience humaine du divin*, Cerf, 1988, p. 37.

establishes with transcendence. Here, then, there is an ontological reality, with recognition of the ontological superiority of the transcendent pole, for "every religion tends to similar presentiments of something exterior and superior and superior to humanity. Therefore, openness to transcendence therefore becomes an existential and natural necessity of man from which he cannot escape because he is condemn and is bound to submit to it insofar as it authenticates his existence. This ontological finitude in existence resides first of all in the fact that he discovers himself in existence without anyone telling him why he is there. This is the dilemma of the phenomenological school of thought explored by Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. The Problematic of being in crisis is nothing other than the dialectic of being-nothingness. This is not a mere academic discussion on the crisis of humanity; the future of humanity in the global society is at stake. It is inherently, the choice between supporting the birth of a new threshold of the conscience of humanity.

Our dialectical analysis is not only the problem that humanity faces in this age, but the metaphysical questions of actually choosing a new way. If we are to succeed in the "solutions of the crisis of humanity or the re-solutions", then we must make choosing a new way explicitly in the reformulation of the symbolic universe that has tremendously sustained the history of humanity up to this millennium, that of philosophical ecumenism.[1140] The renew interest in metaphysics is the foundation of religion (God) and philosophical ecumenism that looks into the crisis of humanity. In the present ecumenical century, separation among churches are tremendously narrowing as Christians of all communion seek a common and distinctive core of faith. However, our world is shrinking with many people merging their differences as well religious differences in a common world of culture. It is in line, with these two trends that raise the problem of religious syncretism. Syncretism means the combination of religious and cultural beliefs or the combination of religious beliefs.

The Webster's Dictionary defines ecumenism as a movement "promoting cooperation and better understanding among different religious denominations." In order words, the Oxford Dictionary states that ecumenism is "the doctrine, or quality, of universality (that is, especially of the Christian church). Ecumenism suggests a kind of unity where, despite the differences among communities, all can live and work together in the global society.[1141] It therefore aims at Christian

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[1140] O. Blanchette *et al.*, *Philosophical challenges and opportunities of Globalization*, in H. Daniel DEI, *Identity and Globalization: The metaphysical Question of the 21st Century*, Vol I, United States of America, 2001, p. 394.
[1141]*Ibidem,* p. 432.

unity though, in fact, it has come to extend beyond that. As a religious movement, philosophical ecumenism professes to try "to know, understand, and love others as they wish to be known and understood."[1142] What is explicit is that, it seeks to avoid confrontation, to find what is shared,' but also to locate where, exactly, individuals or groups disagree in society, to find ways of bringing the parties together to live and work in harmony and perhaps discern new truths.

Though philosophical ecumenism is, admittedly, a western practice, it acknowledges the fact and legitimacy of diversity, that one need not search for a neutral territory, independent of one's basic beliefs and commitments, for discussion with others to begin.[1143] This reminds us that no one has a complete exhaustive knowledge of the ideas and values of one's own tradition, and it notes that it sometimes through contact with others in the global society that we may come to be able to arrive at a more complete understanding. Philosophical ecumenism in response to the crisis of humanity in the global society requires that the Other deals with another in a spirit of humility. Accordingly, while respecting differences, philosophical ecumenism is not just harmony or cooperation, but finding what unites. It presumes that the Other actually do or can share something fundamental as it sees it range in the global society. It is neither relativistic nor an approach that is ultimately conventional. It therefore aims at the mutual recognition of unity, but this unity is not identity or uniformity.

From the aforementioned, though ecumenism is not just an inter-Christian activity, but inter-religious; one sees Christian-Buddhist, Hindu-Christian, to a lesser degree Muslim-Christian, Judeo-Christian and even Christian-atheist, for instance Christian-Marxist exchanges.[1144] But to an extent, it has at least some measures of success which is worthwhile for philosophers to question what it is about philosophical (moral) ecumenism that has enable to succeed deprived of contingency (relativism) or subjectivism. Undoubtedly, philosophical ecumenism success depends on the respect of others in their difference. A central factor in the success of philosophical ecumenical dialogue, we would suggest, is that those involved accept that there are interest, values, and concerns among people of different religious, political and cultural tradition that all share.

On the theoretical plane, these values, interest and concerns are shared because there is a fundamental non-arbitrary relationship between them and how the world and reality is. More

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[1142] See, Decree 12 of the Mission of the Society of Jesus, General Council 34, 1995.
[1143] O. Blanchette *et al*., *Philosophical challenges and opportunities of Globalization*, *op. cit.,* p 435.
[1144] *Ibidem*, p. 434.

fundamentally, these values are shared because they reflect something basic about what it is to be human person. For instance, the kind of being, physical, mental, moral and spiritual that humans are and the kind of needs such humans have in society. We are force to question these basic interests and values of ecumenism as openness. Initially at this level, there is the recognition of the nature and value of life itself. To have human life, there must be certain objective and material conditions. For instance, presence of shelter, food, security, water, related resources, as well as possibility of satisfying not only fundamental physical needs, but also intellectual, moral and spiritual needs. More practically, to recognize these interests, needs and goals, have to share discourse and sets of practices with others that enables these interests to be pursued.

In short, these implies our basic interests and values are rooted in something fundamental that accounts for what we are and what we need, explains the relevance of these values to the sets of presently existing human individuals. Ecumenism therefore recognizes that, religious beliefs is not just about a transcendent reality, but is also about this world *concreto* reality[1145] that discussion and dialogue among those of beliefs of different religious denomination can begin. This simply means, the success of philosophical ecumenism that is able to go beyond a superficial level of coexistence and cooperation requires not only that there must at least be a mutual readiness to be open to others, but also a mutual recognition of others as human beings with whom we share certain dominant ideas.

The reflect on ideas centres on a common understanding of what human beings objectively are and at least some of the things that, are necessary for such beings to live and flourish in the global society. Philosophy therefore reminds us that, given such open-endedness of human life, we will inevitably be called out from where we are, that we have much to learn, that what we have to learn is not simply arbitrary or purely subjective, and that this learning involves entering into relations with those 'not like us.' Faced with the multiple existential choices, this manifestation of meaning in relation to being, therefore, necessitates beyond the scientific, moral and rational concerns of existence. In a broader perspective, ecumenical dialogue which has these features can therefore be a plausibly model for an exchange that can lead not just to consensus, but to the mutual recognition of a course of action as objectively best for the global society.

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[1145] *Ibidem,* p. 436.

# Partial Conclusion

Our upshot focused on man being the most social being on earth is because he is able to co-relate with his own kind, others, with God, his creator and the surrounding world. For this reason, man is always a member of a society, without which he loses his value and meaning of life. As a result of the multiplicity of the others, of the individuals, the meaning of life is hidden within the dialectic of the collective or the community.[1146] The reflection of man within the context of collective experience of life leads to a direction of one's research and the whole of reality for man. The welfare of every society depends on the collaborative and coordination actions of its members. It is commonly said that the community makes up a nation and a society at large. This saying goes a long way to emphasize and encourages the global society to place the Other at the centre of every political action. For a global society where individuals are distant but interconnected in terms of crisis, trade and environmental hazards, it is even more imperative to take serious care about the political systems responsible for the crisis of humanity that affects the sanctity of human life and the whole global society. This chapter took interest in exploiting the Ethico-moral challenges and impossibility of global justice prospective contribution as foundation of philosophical ecumenism towards the building of a better global society with responsibility for the Other. Some of the cardinal points focused on the political conception as a negation to the possibility of global justice and the ethical state as the political foundation of the global justice. The chapter ended on the note that Ubuntu ethics could be extended to the entire globe so that every individual and every nation in the global society feels and bears the pains of each other in face of the crisis of humanity. It is the attempt to explain the relationship between what humans experience in their interactions with the visible and the invisible world around them. This world is a dynamic relationship between what was, what is and what will be, meaning the past, the present and the future. With this, the human being transcends the merely physical and material world. The human life is the highest form of created life on earth. It is sacred. If this is done, it will be easier for nations to engage in coordination actions that do not harm the Other in society. This would be a resolution to the crisis of humanity in the Third world countries (Africa) and other developing nations where dialogue becomes the foundation in value of the Other. We need a new culture way. The evolution of human race and humanity depends on the One absolute Supreme Being (God).

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[1146] M. Nkafu, *African Vitalogy*, Paulines Publications Africa, Nairobi 1999, p. 109.

# GENERAL CONCLUSION

The ambition of this Thesis was not to carry out an exhaustive study on the crisis of humanity and the Levinasian notion of responsibility for the Other, but rather to bring out the Broken (dehumanized) man from the philosophy of Levinas in the global society. Our question of interest was; can the Levinasian ethics of responsibility, which posits the Other as an other, whose being I cannot appropriate as one does an object, can offer ways of solving the crisis of humanity in the global society? The crisis of humanity in our upshot dialectical approach is viewed or understood in the meanders of the vertical breakdown of trust (the relationship) between us (man) and the Creator. It concerned with reasserting the restoration with the fracture relationship with God that empowers us to live ethically from God. In line with this, our research constituted three parts with twelve chapters. However, critical concern with the question of moral responsibility for Other constitutes the heart of the 'post-rational' ethics developed by Levinas. At the Ethico-moral level, the face of the Others' existence immediately reveals the basic phenomenological import "ought" in ethics. It awakens me to a moral responsibility that would enable me as a subject to be able to choose or to refuse. The Other is the true starting point of philosophy which is a more palpable infinity that surpasses one's curiosity.[1147] The metaphysical obsession of philosophers had risked trailing sight of the Other person. In order to transcend the nihilistic metaphysics of our age, Levinas give us an understanding of 'being as such' 'Alterity.' In relation to this, it is clear that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, must forcefully provide an answer to this loss and collapse of meaning of human life, purpose and fragmentation of the global society. This search for the true meaning of human life and purpose through the category of responsibility; that guided us throughout this journey with Emmanuel Levinas allowed us to be taught by the radicality of his philosophy, but also, to enter into dialogue with him. The questions which conclude this Thesis sometimes seem too incisive towards him, nevertheless, it remains dependent on philosophical choices, which appreciably stand out, from the path taken by Levinas.

Levinas, unlike Heidegger, posits a different kind of ethics, one that opens up a "new framework of transcendence as human responsibility and that which involves human solidarity and our shared humanity as an extensive exploration of the face-to-face relationship between

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[1147]S. Critchley, "*The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*". Edinburgh University Press, 2014, pp. 285-287.

people and which opens up to questions of social existence and justice."[1148] To him, Western philosophy is based on an idea of the human being that does not respect Alterity. Consequently, it made peace impossible. In this perspective, Levinas therefore, brings out a new sense of ethics. The isolated selfish ego is questioned in its happiness to live by meeting others. The idea inspiring the dialectics in the crisis of humanity is that ethical-metaphysics of Levinas assumes an open sphere can help remedy our socio-environmental crisis by uprooting and replacing socio-environmentally destructive ethical and metaphysical presuppositions inherited from modern philosophy. This transcendental reality is the true source of meaning and not totality.[1149]The transcendental ethical-metaphysics leads to a more 'humanistic' philosophy which emphasizes the cultivation of distinctive traits of Dasein social existence. This is why, in Heidegger's metaphysical trajectory, being-in-the-world is strange to a technical-pragmatic construct that alienates its presence on earth as an inhabitant.

The problem of crisis goes beyond metaphysics and ontology to have a clue or foundation on the main political basis. The crisis must not be reduced only on the dimension of ethics or economical poverty or vulnerability of the people, but the main problem is the human crisis. What is human crisis? This is because the question of human crisis brings us on the dimension between the nature and relation of man and its horizons (visible and invisible). Crisis is important to mention on the metaphysical and ontological dimensions as it is the loss of the true meaning of human life. Therefore, crisis is the operative movements of scientific view of the truth of the world and the absence of the community which can gives meaning to life. The crisis will appear in the case when we do not have the domination of the nature or fundamental nature of human and its horizons. When it fails the horizons of the crisis appears. Of course, the consequence can be on the social since it involves our daily life and human existence cannot be reduced to daily life because after that life, we have another level of life which constitutes a spiritual awakening.

The complex nature of crisis revolves on ontological, social implication, cultural, ethical and moral, metaphysical and spiritual implication. This requires a new approach of the problem of the political bodies, because politics only cannot be reduced to the social, since human aspects are not limited to sociality. Man created in the image of God becomes being of transcendence. Man must be regarded as an absolute value. That is to say, there are three dimensions of man: rational,

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[1148]Cf. M. L. Michael, *Discovering Levinas*. Cambridge UP, 2007.
[1149]https://philpapers.org/rec/THOOAE

capacity to be free and relational with the other. The nature and sense of the human person is absolutely spiritual that means the quality of his existence spiritually on the way of the quality of values we give him or promote in his given life and common existence in society. The relation between the death and living is not a visible relation but it is similar to religion, secularism, power of State on the church. If any is absent it will lead to ethical and moral implication, because we will not have again the common basis on what we can imagine or engage our life. God is the common and ultimate foundation who can be recognized by everybody. So, the crisis of humanity cannot be definitely resolved by man without certain negotiation in relation with the transcendent being. At the level of human is relative.

Equally, we solicit Samuel P. Huntington, who spoke of the western world evacuation of God. He further thinks of the economic development of the western world and its imposition on other nations. The cultural aspect gives him the ability to finance other cultures irrespective of difference. As a fact, Nietzsche is in moral crisis, because he was the first to pose the fundamental question of crisis by meta-analyzing the prominent ruptures of man and the transcendent God is death. So, if God is death, what do we place our moral values on? This brings man out of all load of transcendent being. Global technological society presents irrational relations between human beings and their many social and cultural problematic features. At the ontological level, modern civilization from a philosophical viewpoint, demonstrates that the current crisis of humanity is rooted in deeper ontological situation which show the situation of the ontological impasse in the current global socio-cultural situation. In what sense can we say the moral crisis is ontological? First it is based on the sense of the rupture relationship that man creates with God. This result to crisis of man in every dimension and society. His technical products compares on the top position which is of the main basis of man in crisis. That is crisis of his culture, scientific culture, positivist culture and theological culture. Only God as absolute can place an impasse whether singular or particular. Individuals have lost themselves as thinking entities and education has lost its value as means of realizing the potential of a person's spiritual and cognitive transformation. To overcome such situation, there is need for a deeper existential and ontological shift to human solidarity.

In a world where materialism is gaining more and more minds, the greatness of man is measured by material goods. Being is forgotten, either it is entertained in pseudo-values, or it is identified with *etantic* realities. This reflection fundamentally poses the dialectic of being and having. Ernest Menyomo therefore, viewed this as a denatured human nature, a dehumanized

humanity which undermine the sanctity of human dignity.[1150] Through its devastating effects, predicts an immanent disappearance of our human nature leaves room for the technically desontologized man. Assessing the living and evolving body, brings between the increasing civilizational crisis and the disturbances in the process of both informative and cognitive exchange in society (i.e. learning about the universe and learning to become civilized in a world of chaos).

The global society of technologies and consumption of existence is a version of mass media metabolism which is accompanied by fake informative and metabolic diseases. Many of this western medias are well-known: degradation of understanding, cognitive deficiency, global horde of the intellectual space, addiction to information and images, competence crisis, overproduction of signs and texts that will never be read and running away from thinking.[1151] At the global pace, humanity has sufficient experience of knowledge, direct interaction with reality, not alienated understanding and the being in all the human rationality; since understanding is the state of an existential personality which is grasp by the essence of human existence.

The general process of civilizing is tied to the processes of secularization, alienation, materialism, consumerism, simplification and the rise of desacralization. The global over learning system is redundant to human being which affects their thinking and understanding as subject of a spiritual, multidimensional, thinking and creating dweller of the Universe. Spiritual tradition is not a social institute and the spiritual experience leads humans to the horizon of their existence. The human being is a being capable of transcendence. In other words, it is a being that strives to transcend itself, to step beyond the limits of knowledge, its worldview, life and opportunities. The very process of transcending certain actions of material and physical meaning of production not necessarily implies however, the very attempt to transcend higher quality of self-awareness, changes of consciousness, world-image, awareness and self-manifestation that exposes the authentic foundation of human existence which is fundamentally based on the creative reshaping of being and wonder. It is, in reference to this that Jean Bertand AMOUGOU stipulates that: existence is therefore existing in the series of stratifications and phenomenalizations of its (in)finite, veiled of essence. In other words, Existence is the state of what exists.[1152]Accordingly,

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[1150] E. Menyomo, Vers une compréhension de l'etre-dans-le monde: perspective de Jean-Yves Lacoste, in J. B. Amougou, *Existence et sens. Peut-on Exclure Dieu?,* Société Africaine de Metaphysique /L'harmattan, 2021. p. 186.
[1151] Cf. O. I. Tarasova, *Antropologicheskiy krizis i fenomen ponimaniya*. Volgogradskoye nauchnoye izdatel'stvo. 2009.
[1152]J. Bertrand AMOUGOU, *Existence et sens. Peut-on Exclure Dieu?,* Société Africaine de Metaphysique /L'harmattan, 2021. p. 219.

the philosopher posits that humans are thinking beings that are open to Being and the human alone. Being open to Being, therefore allows Being to approach it in its very presence.[1153] The resulting global phenomenon of information overload leads to the loss of awareness.

Therefore, this leads to an important conclusion that mass production of new knowledge does not automatically produce social improvement. The only key to moving forward is use and application of knowledge. As such, knowledge will be based on symbolic relationship that arises in a certain state of consciousness. And being in such state, it becomes possible to think the nature of the world and to understand the foundations of Being. Conversely, man can only enter this special state of consciousness freely and voluntarily. Within the rational tradition and computer-generated world-picture teaching such state of consciousness is to an extent impossible. This state cannot be probably reproduced within the global system that functions as mass media. It is does not transmitted. As such, ontology therefore is a privilege for those who disclose and not packet the meanings of thinking.[1154] It does implies that creativity and awareness are on the brink of projective thinking to the future knowledge in the global society. The core will be a technological and informational revolution in turn of an ontological paradigms thinking shift in the anthropological global sphere, to the creation of the new global world Image and the new Human global World.

More equally, the current global crisis coincides with the realization by humanity of our planet risks disappearing if we continue to produce exchange and consume at the same rate as that of the last fifty years, not to mention the consequences of the demographic evolution. Getting out of the global crisis of humanity therefore implies profound variations in the role of political and economic actors. However, the end of the crisis cannot be achieved without profoundly modifying consumption patterns. We must reconsider our needs for food, leisure, comfort, transport and energy. This means a different type of standard of living based on a certain sobriety which does not deny the search for pleasure and happiness. The excess of individualism will have to be compensated by an additional collective link. The upper middle classes will have to agree to reduce their superfluous consumption so that the poor suffer a little less during this period of profound transformations. Such a consumer revolution involves questioning the advertising that today

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[1153] M. Heidegger, *Zakon tozhdestva. Razgovor na proselochnoy doroge*. Vysshaya shkola. 1991. p. 74.

[1154] A. O. Karpov, Ontologizatsiya, "ontologizatsiya" i obrazovaniye. *Voprosy filosofii,* issue 9, (2013). pp. 31-42. Retrieved March 11 2019 from http://vphil.ru/index.php? Option=com-content&task=view&id=817&Itemid=52.

shapes the most intimate desires and creates questionable needs. Advertizing in its playful and educational form is a marvellous tool for supporting a New Economic Development that respects the real needs of people and the protection of the planet.

Politics must regain its prominent place at local, national, European and global level. The business of the century will be to link a policy of income redistribution to a policy that respects the environment. The social policies that will accompany the ecological policies will have to take into account the most deprived, the marginalized, the unemployed and the precarious, even if these citizens do not as such form political majorities. Much more serious, the billions of people who are below the poverty line in the world. Saving the planet through a powerful social and environmental policy is conceived by recognizing that every human being has a dignity equal to that which we conceive for ourselves and for our loved ones. This is the basis of our secular, universal morality, beyond religions, beliefs and different spiritualities: a vast utopia of the 21$^{st}$ century. Without God there is no moral truth but only moral opinions. Our moral choices have direct and immediate spiritual impact. That is, a direct and personal relationship with God is necessary for appreciating what is primarily a spiritual, rather than physical, reality.

Chapter one question on how we are to construe an Onto-existential crisis of Being and the condition of politics (difference) as a metaphysical one; that is, it is not a question that can be settled by appeal to a tangible state of affairs in the global society. It further exposed the form of misrecognition, destruction which established a sense of 'consciousness of injustice' that is based on experiences of disrespect of man's existential condition. More particularly, the original insight about the affinity between the existential (metaphysical) conditions and political action seems complex in the world. This, therefore, represents a force in opposition to all metaphysics and politics that degrade human beings (totalize to the Same) so that they are treated as redundant. Only then, will such a metaphysics and politics not exclusively be about a shared humanity, but also about an actual recognition of a life of equal human dignity in the global society. Accordingly, it is therefore, crucial to note a double view regarding metaphysics and the political which maintains that in the crisis of humanity, human beings are free to act on the basis of a humane politics as well on the transcendental basis. The political sphere in the global arena must as such be grounded existentially in the struggle for recognition of human beings shared irreversible bodily vulnerability and dependency. This reveals the existential tendency to curtail the domination of human by human in nature.

Chapter Two took interest to present the existentialist and diagnostic conditions for the crisis of the human person in line with the decadence as well as the faceless societies that result from the global society. It permitted us to perceive the crisis, that of decadence at times personal, decadence of the individual and community. In our times, compare to the crisis of civilization we diagnose the contemporary society on the prism of the human person. This is made manifest in the inter-human relation in the entire planetary society. As a phenomenon of depersonalization, we have thus been able to note a real degradation of interpersonal relations mainly due to the crisis of the notion of person and the erosion of the community. This impersonal world does not the integral happiness of man. It is however, closed and fragmented to its individuality. It is only by opening to the Other and We that the community finds its paths and means to development in all direction to the quest of the person as well, in the context of the African person. It is the site of reactualization of certain crucial points to the personalist perspective in our context and more particularly to propose a path to the construction of a unify African community. The core objective, centre on the basis and necessity to construct a society of values base on the human person. But, to an extent, the realization of such community at the level of our daily existence does not ignore resistance which could prohibit the process of reciprocity amongst persons. This resistance could be link to the nature of man, the weight of history and social structures.

Chapter three probes into a health crisis and identity crisis of power. This is perhaps the most worrisome issue in the global society which constitutes a crisis of sovereignty. It is due to the autonomy of States in a world where multilateral institutions are struggling to organize the necessary decision-making on a global scale. A crisis of representation, it also affects the exercise of power, the guarantee of public freedoms and the legitimacy of the authorities, particularly in democracies. But it is not the health crisis and the Covid-19 epidemic that are creating these crises. They only reveal already largely existing weaknesses in the global system. The crisis sheds a harsh light on the relativity of our sovereignty. It highlights a technological dependence that, through ignorance or national pride, we tend to underestimate. This obviously applies to the health sector. But this health dependence refers to a broader technological dependence. The health crisis feeds old nationalist impulses with exposure to border passport closure. To escape it, we cannot content ourselves with traditional lyrical flights about the horrors of fascism, in one sense, and the universality of the human condition, on the other. The gradual return of national selfishness is slowly killing the dream of the global society. In the health sector as in the economic field, the

absence of political vision has prevented any preventive action and the power of national selfishness is delaying the necessary measures.

Chapter four took interest on the phenomenological root sense of the crisis of humanity in the global society. It illustrates the philosophically dense relation of crisis with morality. However, the crisis is adequate without taking into consideration the genesis of a new type of capitalism on the global society, which demands a revised critical stance in the metaphysical debate on crisis from both historical and systematic perspectives. To better face the challenges of our time, there is need for a dialectical (phenomenological) clarification on the different and diverse spirit of manifestation that inhabits human cultures and traditions. This, actually, includes a determined shift from already existing ideas and pre-conceptions to approach the complex dialectics of crisis. The focus here is directed to the elaboration of the philosophy-crisis of humanity in a continuum differential accounts of "crisis," both in terms of individual and social knowledge that reveals the *kairos* of things producing a breach in the long historical process.

In this perspective, humanity has been in the perpetual state of crisis with a diverse form on interest which unleash in conflicts and manipulation of the rights of man in the global society. Inherently, the failed practices of human values are the very root causes to the diverse crisis we are experiencing. The human person, in society must become conscious of his world and his very existence. The consequences of the crisis of humanity are deeply rooted in the crisis of global leadership domination and the making of history with a repercussion on the global crisis of neoliberalism in the 21$^{st}$ century. In this context of crisis, failed western inculcated values have affected third world countries with the crisis of political leadership seen as responsible for Africa's stagnancy, insecurity, underdevelopment, and its social and structural injustices. This critically reveals an imbalance in system between the developed and underdeveloped nations. The impact of such decadence and denigrating action thus, influence environmental crisis which man is a part.

Chapter five took interest in understanding the harm of the holocaust (genocide) of slavery in Africa not recognize internationally. It points to racial prejudices. Unfortunately, the colonial harm made Africans not to see their contribution to world history or civilization. To a greater extent, slavery and colonialism has never been a form of blessing in Africa; it has been the worst form of curses, ill luck and a storming block to the authentic progress of Africa. Africans lost their purpose with the arrival of colonialism. Africans are not grounded in culture. The culture of a people is known through people. Implying man is known only through his culture. The colonizers

and our governments do not have the will in the face of the Other. Their minds are anesthetized. Africans need to let go the colonial mindset of oppressing the people. Thus, they need to be taught to take up responsibility.

Chapter six was interested to circumscribe the phenomenological-existential-ontological foundation of Levinas' philosophical itinerary experience of war and holocaust as the germs of his thought. The elaboration of the aforementioned method in politics implicates the authentic existential political phenomenon that is irreducible to other processes which the political is just that of a superficial appearance. If phenomenology could appear as a political resistance, it carries in it the germs of denial on the historical form of political resistance. This is the exigence of western philosophy for Levinas which has been the totalization of being in the Same. Western ethical theory has concentrated on the object of morality, to the neglect of the subject. Levinas criticizes Heidegger's notion of Dasein which, according to him, is presented as an ego who uses his/her self-consciousness to give meaning to the Other. In fact, Being is for the Other not put in the world. The notion of being cannot fundamentally be grasped ontologically, but metaphysical through ethics; the calling into question of the ego's spontaneity. As such, philosophy should involve the Other in the discourse of ontology, metaphysics and politics. Levinas was influenced by Husserl's phenomenology, the work of Heidegger particularly Being and time. For Levinas, the phenomenological method exposed by Husserl is only self-reflective and self-experience. It lacks an ethical and moral discussion of the responsibility of a subject towards another person in society. Faced with such ontology, he thinks the primacy of the Other as necessary to ensure his transcendence and the maintenance of his dignity.

In addition, faced with the drama of the Shoah and more deeply with the possibility for man to carry out a murder on his neighbour, Levinas has updated the radical precedence of others over my good will, in the sense that I am not responsible for him only because he calls my responsibility. The ethical value comes from others, and, like the ethical value, the value of my subjectivity. In this sense, there is something eminently true. I am not the measure of what others mean to me. I am rather received from others, in my capacity to be the guarantor. It remains to be seen what the subject, if received from others, receives from others. To be for the Other implies to forget oneself, to be hostage of others, without first freedom. Justice before freedom. This is linked to Levinas' conception which one can think of as restrictive of the philosophies of being as being philosophies of separation and totality.

Chapter seven showcased the Heideggerian thought of Dasein and time, we notice that the other is to be determined by Dasein. Heidegger said Dasein is a being that gives the essence to other being in the world. This makes Heidegger to give the primacy of ontology on metaphysics. Equally, Husserl will constantly be linked to the primacy of others in the ethical relationship that Levinas wants to maintain against a royalty of the ego. Levinas conceives others in the mode of a radical exteriority, irreducible to the same and to the whole. From the point of view of others then, Levinas challenged any relationship of knowledge in the ethical relationship. This is the whole dimension of ethics as a primary philosophy where the Other is not first known or apprehended but where the subject experiences his passivity. In the relation to others the whole bursts. But for Levinas, this will not enable the ethical consideration of the Other. He will then take over the phenomenological study of the Other through the metaphysical desire which does not reduces the other to the same, but stimulate the desire for the other in which the Infinity is revealed through the face. Ethics precedes epistemology and "if ethics is not a priority over epistemology, any moral relationship would be compromised." The relationship with others is subject to this scheme. The only way which therefore remains open is to constitute the meaning of the Other` in and from the meaning of me.

However, Levinas' transition from ethics to primary philosophy finds no possibility in Husserl's philosophy. His philosophy maintains the primacy of consciousness in relation to others through an analogizing grasp of others as their own body in the mode of an alter ego. In this sense, this transfer is at the origin of the ego sense of others but not of the alter sense. We can therefore, clearly see the singular contribution of Levinas for whom otherness is not based on the egological sense of the self but on the contrary gives it its meaning. Levinas locates radical otherness diametrically opposed to an egological constitution. Levinas' project is asymmetrical to that of Husserl and Heidegger. It is no longer a question of drawing the egological constitution of others but its otherness. Otherness is not the correlate of self-awareness but it is the place of the subject's passivity. Nourished by the neo-Platonic privilege granted to the good more than to being, the relationship to others as conceived by Levinas precedes being.

Chapter 8 examines and protect the Other from ontological violence in the global society. Levinas makes nothing better than an ontological exchange by prioritizing the alterity of the Other

over the repressive self and its metaphysical machinations.[1155] Levinas denies an exploitation of radical immanence of the self as prisoner and posits the infinite transcendence of the Other that is uncontrollable, undefinable, and unnameable. During the course of the reflection on Levinas' responsibility, the ethical encounter in the face-to-face reveals the existential, humanistic, and the political reality of global spheres. Human action can only be understood within the complex nexus of social relation and interrelation in a determined social context. The social relation reflects a simple form of political participation in the normative ideals of a social order.

Our dehumanized and fragmented global justice system has become crucial to human relationships. Levinas' notion of responsibility is attentive to the way in which the human Other inhabit the horizon of one's experience. According to Levinas, there is a need for the welcoming of the face with a heart of love and goodness. This heart of love he terms it metaphysical desire. Central to the crisis of humanity is a responsibility to respect people's dignity, to be sensitive to their needs as opposed to egoistic and self-interest, and to create an environment of trust, empathy, forgiveness and reconciliation in the face of the Other. Levinas says; "It is my responsibility before a face looking at me absolutely foreign that constitutes the original fact of fraternity."[1156]The crisis of humanity in the global society thus comes from the fact that the private interest takes the top on the national interest. 'Humanity' is collective rather than individualistic.[1157]Accordingly, inequality is the worst blasphemy against the sanctity of humanity, because it privileges peripheral qualities of humans over their universal essence.

In the thought of Levinas, responsibility demands a strong and solid institution, where we find men animated by goodwill, new ideas to get out of these anthropological crisis. To achieve a global society where justice and peace prevail, men should constantly develop the value of friendship. In other words, it is the love we have for Others that determines the true love we have for ourselves. The unique ethical tenor of Levinas' thought has a direct bearing on how we can and should re-think central issues like the justification for a culture of human rights, social responsibility and retributive or distributive justice, poverty and hospitality, finding a balance between civil unity, cultural diversity and the regeneration of public morality. It also takes into account the principles of protecting the human environment and the right to life of Others. The

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[1155]http://cityofgod.wordpress.com/2007/01/26/i-and-the-other-levinas-and-the-violence-of-ontology/"I" and the "Other" *Levinas and Ontological Violence « Homilia Anglicana.htm diakses: 28 Augustus 2010.*
[1156]E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, op. cit.*, p 218.
[1157]Y. Noah Harari, *A Brief History of Humankind Sapiens.* United Kingdom. 2014, p. 205

philosophy of Levinas is psychotherapy against any form of violence, of injustice done to the Other and the dehumanization or disfiguration of man in society by moral oppressive systems. The face prohibits my conscience from murder.

The Other is beyond elusive categorization and my ability to identify, since being everything and nothing. In fact, as opposed to the traditional way of approaching the Other and having me with it, the only way I can contact the Other necessarily is to intrude into my world and perceptions a trace of itself-in the "face." The dignity of the subject is a dignity not of being separated but of being elected. This means a dialectical terrain in reality which manifests the ethical necessity of one for the Other. However, the relevance of Levinas remains in this self-denial that implies the holding of responsibility, understood precisely as disinterestedness, original charity. The moving point is that this charity is not understood in Levinas as a gift of self in the sense of a free and spontaneous act but only as the reception of an injunction within passivity. The question of responsibility is then linked more to another question which is that of our relationship for or with others in the global society.

Indeed, as was pointed out above, Levinas' philosophy forces a first question on this subject. It is a question of questioning the value that the epiphany of the face takes as an injunction to responsibility and hostage of the subject within a framework of ethical philosophy. Meeting with others is not always the corollary of an order's understanding. The problem is, as Levinas knows, that this experience is not phenomenological. It is not literally intelligible. It is lived without being thematic. The counter argument lies precisely in the experience that everyone often makes of the indifference experienced. These are the very image of the violence of the totalizing ontology which lives in separation and indifference. The sense of ethics is found in others. Freed from the selfishness of a moral thought which does not give its place to others, he showed how this responsibility which we assumed towards our contemporaries was the very foundation of a good life, a life ethics.

Chapter nine furthermore, debated on African moral values beyond the Levinasian notion of responsibility in the face of the global crisis of humanity. The principal idea focused on African moral values which emphasizes on honesty, justice and concerns with the welfare of Man in society. Man in this perspective, is not subject to purely abstract discussions. As a fact, a person is a self as he consider himself as the other of the Other in society. The reality is man as a complex whole has the Other in mind. However, man also had much value for social construction and

development based on African moral principles and codes of conduct that promotes reciprocity and solidarity amongst its members of society. Equally, the weaknesses of Levinasian ethics were studied based on its anthropocentric nature as the only criterion for morality. The ethical developments accomplished from a confrontation with Levinas, Derrida, Deluze, Zizeks, Ricoeur, and Wojtyla shows a new dimension in approaching the Other. Jonas seem to engage in a philosophical reflection on the capacity of the person to let himself be given to the Other, to dedicate himself to him in a complete way, but by remaining in a human relationship. There is a tension between an ethics of interpersonal relationship joining responsibility, will, Love, friendship and reciprocity and an ethics of self-sacrifice and the preservation of the environment.

Also, as we have tried to show, it is necessary to reintroduce the dimension of freedom and choice into the act of taking action and going further. We have shown that the obligation arising in the face of others should be replaced by the experience of love and will for the other, which requires a free choice and a passage to the act of the subject himself. The sense of ethics is found in others. Ethics would then become a leap into the unknown, or what matters is no longer my life but that of others. There is neither a mechanical formula nor an independent theory to respond to the crisis of humanity in the global society. But an application of Levinasian responsibility in the socio-economic and political context would likely entail a peaceful 'mental and structural revolution' to alter the system that enables unethical people to assume political leadership.[1158]

Chapter ten overlooks on secularism and religion in Cameroons politics. The secularity and religious value of history has weighed heavily on the secular destiny of the state of Cameroon. This defines the separation of the religious from secular today and it represents new articulations of "religion," "politics" and "ethics." It makes the modern state involved in the redefinition of religion as belief and therefore, distinctively private and outside of the public realm of politics. The secularism of the State in principle only comes into play with the associates. The current process of globalization coincides with the humanistic project of religions. This intertwine religion and politics as fundamental characteristics of the political life of Cameroonian.

In the context of the proliferation of religious groups of Cameroons, the State has preference for certain religions without making them state religions. As society undergoes evolution, the actions of human beings, like those of institutions, are rarely free. The opposite is

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[1158]S. Abiodun, The paradigm of ethical development for civilized leadership in Africa. *op. cit.,* pp 17-27.

surprising when everyone knows that an institution, in essence, only exists insofar as it pursues a specific goal. In fact, religions, often aware of their social and economic weight intend to negotiate with the State, or even impose themselves on it, to share also political power. This dualistic attitude influences the evolution of relations between the two institutions. Both the state and religion fits into the whole life of man involved in the family, politics, profession and union. The challenge is for us to think beyond secularism and religion in Cameroon politics without violating the principle of secularism in the State.

Chapter eleven analysis the global personalist community and its foundation. It is a type of community which fulfill the personalist community which rest on the principle of love and existential cogito as a mission. We demonstrated that the accomplishment of the sense of the person is only realize at the level of the community. It is the fruit of the process of personalization and the radical revolution of social structures on the condition of human life. The principle was to present the personalist revolution and the bases of the community, a community in which the person is in communion with others in their dignity. This is only possible through an open exercise to the other or the apprentissage of the We. We have presented the principal axis and the personalist paradigms which has serve as the bases to think of solidarity in its exclusive character in order to establish a unity of men. The objective of such unity is to overcome the fear of western humanism, the decline of the state and the right of man and on the humanity and inhumanity of human rights in the global society as concern for the Other. The concern for the One is therefore the concern for Christian love which is a feeling, an energy that cannot be demonstrated because it is not a structure. Therefore, this principle makes the personalist community an ideal to be realized for our contemporary societies where the human person is increasingly losing its meaning and value, since man can face several obstacles in his daily experience of communion with others. The research expressed here seeks to give content to the aspects of ethical dialogue and environmental responsibility in face of the global crisis.

Chapter twelve circumscribe on the Ethico-moral and metaphysical challenges and impossibility of global justice prospective contribution as foundation of philosophical ecumenism. In reality, it views social justice and welfare as the core of every society which depends on the collaborative and coordination actions of its members. This chapter took interest in exploiting and interconnected in terms of crisis, the political systems responsible for the crisis of humanity that affects the sanctity of human life as well as the Ethico-moral challenges and impossibility of global

injustice towards the building of a better global society with responsibility for the Other. The cardinal points were centre on the political conception as a negation to the possibility of global justice and the ethical state as the political foundation of the global justice. The chapter ends on the note that, Ubuntu ethics could be extended or universalize to the entire global society so that every individual and every nation in the global society feels and bears the pains of each other in face of the crisis of humanity. As such, it will be easier, for nations to engage in collective responsibility and coordination actions that do not harm the Other in society opening up the space for global solidarity, dialogue and communication.

Apart from the Levinasian notion of responsibility, there are other vectors that can complement Levinas' responsibility like being in the thoughts of African *Ubuntu* ethics.[1159] To be in the spirit of *Ubuntu* is to relate with one another in the community. It emphasizes the communal aspect of human existence and highlights the importance of relationship, mutual responsibility, empathy, and interconnectedness. Human beings are seen as spiritual entities with both physical and non-physical aspect. This highlights the idea that one's humanity is realize through relationship with others. At the eschatological level, *Ubuntu* transcends the material order of things in the universe to the metaphysical reality (God). The tenet of such lies in the genesis of man in God's creation. Man made out of matter (earth) with the spirit of God in him, out of this invisible reality, the death of man is a return to nature which unveils the social link between the invisible and visible. The real is both dimension which link absolutely and necessarily in the social. It uphold human life and dignity, and regard human life as the highest form of created life on earth. It, therefore, unveils the presence order of harmony and equilibrium for human life and other forms of life to survive but also for the will of the Divine (God) to be respected. As a fact, it is the will of God that there should be harmony and equilibrium in the universe. The absence of such since the declined of metaphysics[1160] and the exaltation of the Nietzschean superman and the death of God has resulted to series of human crisis. At the ontological level, this is the reason why we believe unlike Jean Bertand AMOUGOU that the total rejection of all transcendence cannot allow predictive medicine to turn the human being into a techno-scientifically manufactured gadget.[1161] The crisis of humanity, whether ontological and metaphysical to an extent, seeks peace, love, unity,

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[1159] M. Thaddeus, "Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Right South Africa:" *op. cit.,* p 25.
[1160] G. Vattimo, "The Crisis of Subjectivity from Nietzsche to Heidegger," *Differentia: Review of Italian Thought:* Vol. 1, Article 5. (1986). https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol1/iss1/
[1161] J. Bertrand AMOUGOU, *Existence et sens. Peut-on Exclure Dieu?, op. cit.,* p 133.

harmony and the values of being. The ontological questions, the question of this being-there poses the question of being. Man is a metaphysical reality. Metaphysics must start from sensible experience. The ontological begins with the observation of the phenomena that are given to us, in other to instruct unity in the chaos of life. This tension towards transcendence pushes it to seek a truth to meditate on, to question and to unveil. It is a question of descending the new model of man beyond the different products of humanity. Can man be reduce to the new movement? That is socially, industrially and economically. Socially, there are the different products of humanity. But, this rises beyond the destructive technique of the world to connect the Ethico-moral and spiritual values. At this level, moral rises beyond ethics. Moral brings us to the dimension of the Divine.

The meaning of being in metaphysics, brings out the deep meaning of the universe beyond empirical knowledge. Man was supposed to transcend this prejudiced of the barbarism of culture with a human face. On this view, Onah affirms: equilibrium, order and harmony in the social milieu are established divinely to maintain religious obligation.[1162] Thus, when the order is upset, there is no ontological, religious, social and economic equality among human beings. At the epistemological level, if men are trained in *Ubuntu* philosophy to value, valorize and prioritize every person in our society, they will become revolutionary leaders who will spearhead economical, technological and human development. All these can be founded in the education of our values, values of responsibility in reconsidering the Other, that is, the Other is important. This value of *Ubuntu*, based on social constructionism can be practical or inculcated in our way of thinking most especially through short and long-term strategies for inculcating responsibility through families, primary and secondary education as values from childhood that's through the media; we should always conscientize the Other. Education, would however, go with mental decolonization through a gradual and passive process. This will enhance the knowledge of the Other in the academic milieu as responsibility; as well it will aim at the transformation of mankind knowledge towards the Other, for the good of the society and protection of the environment.

Until citizens are included in development projects, state programs will not be people-centred. We need an overhaul of our current "democratic" system. There's need for the political will and will of liberty. We need a Polycentric humane politics in the global society which is man-centre. Politic that is not based on nationalist interest but actions that gear towards man in society.

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[1162]G. Onah, The meaning of peace in African Traditional Religion and Culture, 2012, http://www.afri-kaworld.net/afrellgoddinah.htm.

It will be a new form of rethinking the humanistic inclusive action. Such a humane politics will need a revisit of rational metaphysics to ethical metaphysics of responsibility for the Other and the environment. The global society needs a polycentric humane politics as an open moral system that embraces rationality and traditional values strongly embedded in the sphere of its multi-cultures to reconstruct the geopolitical arena based on its diverse ideologies. The core logic would be a philosophy of wisdom towards a profound change in our world. This will allow the necessary tension of man as his phenomenalization in the world, as emergence of solidarity and an inclusive collective responsibility of the global society where everyone counts and guarantee social justice and economic freedom.

At the same time, all of our efforts so far have been geared toward producing knowledge with little or no concern regarding its application to real-life situations. We need to bring about a global revolution in science, in academia and more broadly so that the basic aim becomes proto-wisdom (Divine), and not just knowledge. Proto-wisdom base on anthropology that can connect to God. Human history trace to the transcendent. In the meanders, the role and deposition of the man in front of God must be clarify, because modernity is the result or fruits of a kind of revolution that is Cultural Revolution that appears in history. Modernity has put out God as the Creator. Modernity decided to rejects the thesis of the existence of God. But in Africa culture and cultural traditions, it is possible and necessary to get inside some values and moral values which can help humanity and not just Africa to correct mans' wrong or bad choices since the last past two centuries. The adjustment of the view theoretically will bring a positive change on the practices of the daily existence of man. In spite of the Levinasian notion of responsibility and its applicability, man still needs a mental reformation on how to valorize the Other. We need to believe in ourselves. The interest of this question on the crisis of humanity is not only the speculative knowledge of a movement of being, to remain in this ethical-metaphysical reflex established by Levinas, but the possibility of an unceasingly deployed reflection giving the sense of existence ethics of man and committing man to seize this meaning. From there, it is clear that these paths to take will not lead anywhere, to borrow Heidegger's expression. If our society has to change, the ideal is the Levinasian notion of responsibility as a means of change. Ultimately, responsibility as cornerstone of the ethics of human solidarity and shared humanity must be the new paradigm, the key to opening a new ethical door that will allow sustainable development with new ethical values. Responsibility of share humanity conceive as universal family of humankind, enables us conceive of value and sight. As an academic work, we do not pretend to have given lasting solutions.

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