Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules

Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel; Mbih, Boniface; Moyouwou, Issofa

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Élément Dublin Core	Valeur	Langue
dc.contributor.author	Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel	-
dc.contributor.author	Mbih, Boniface	-
dc.contributor.author	Moyouwou, Issofa	-
dc.date.accessioned	2021-02-12T23:38:05Z	-
dc.date.accessioned	2019-02-25T18:09:58Z	-
dc.date.available	2021-02-12T23:38:05Z	-
dc.date.available	2019-02-25T18:09:58Z	-
dc.date.issued	2012-02-21	-
dc.identifier	http://imhotep-journal.org/index.php/imhotep/article/view/24	fr_FR
dc.identifier.uri	https://dicames.online/jspui/handle/20.500.12177/2243	-
dc.description.abstract	Usually strategic misrepresentation of preferences in order to manipulate social choice functions is studied under the standard common knowledge assumption. In this paper, we introduce the completely opposite hypothesis of manipulation under complete ignorance. Our goal is to give an answer to the following question : do there still exist any strategic voting opportunities, even if individuals do not have any information about others' preferences? We provide an exhaustive answer for Condorcet-type and a class of approval voting type SCFs.	fr_FR
dc.format.extent	1-8	fr_FR
dc.language.iso	en_US	fr_FR
dc.subject	Condorcet	fr_FR
dc.subject	manipulation	fr_FR
dc.subject	Social choice function	fr_FR
dc.subject	complete ignorance	fr_FR
dc.subject	approval voting	fr_FR
dc.title	Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules	fr_FR
dc.type	Article	fr_FR
dcterms.bibliographicCitation	IMHOTEP: African Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics	fr_FR
Collection(s) :	Articles publiés dans des revues à comité scientifique

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