La dignité humaine à l’ère de la révolution biotechnologique : une lecture de la fin de l’homme : les conséquences de la révolution biotechnique de Francis Fukuyama

Abstract

According to Kant, people do not have a price like things; they have a dignity, that is to say an intrinsic value which makes them an end in themselves and should never be treated simply as a means to an end. It is this approach that Fukuyama shares. To reflect today on the notion of dignity in epistemology is to question the consequences of biotechnology that weighs on this notion, tending to deny it or to clothe it. The indispensability of this progress for modern society is no longer in question, since we cannot think of the world today without science. However, the lamentable observation is that of the “desontologization” of the human being who struggles to survive or live with a technology that skillfully mixes obvious advantages with subtle disadvantages. Therefore, to what extent can we say that, biotechnology, in its dynamic to offer to man a better and a long live, creates more problems and damages than its intends to solve? What should we understand by human dignity and biotechnology? How can we preserve human dignity in the age of biotechnological revolution? Far from thinking in terms of laxist permissiveness or a total prohibition, biotechnology requires more than never a system of political regulation that will be able to draw the red lines and differentiate between the therapeutic use and comfort use of technology.To realize this work, we found it judicious to use the analytical and critical method for a better understanding of the problem raised.