Temps et durée dans l’essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (1889) d’Henri Bergson. implication pour l’être-dans-le-monde de l’homme.

Abstract

In these contemporary times, the double question: “What is time and how do we experience time today?” appears very decisive. It's in this reflexive vein that in the Essay on the immediate data of conscience Bergson's decisive and fundamental intuition will relate to the idea of time, to which based on socio-humanist data, it will give a dimension called metaphysics: duration. The present work proposes to treat the spine problem of the distinction between time and duration in Henri Bergson. More specifically, in this research work we are concerned with the question of how the duality of the relation of the man in time, under the dual apprehension of objective time and duration subjective, nowadays impacts his being-in-the-world. From this, he emerges the ambitious question of whether it is possible to reduce this duality from categories of thought and practical action Thus within the framework of these work categories of thought and practical action. To overcome this crucial concern, we use the analytical and hermeneutical approach. This allowed us to develop a conception of time based on the experience of man, that is to say the particularity with which everyone experiences time both privately and socially. Because for man, time is a sensation, a condition of experience to which we are subjected universally, and on which our nature of being conscious can make return. So, the conscience allows us to obstruct the calculation of time, refuse, deplore it or adhere to it. Therefore, in relation to the bergsonian analysis of time developed in the Essay, the daily confrontation between time and duration will allow man not only to grasp his temporal freshness, it is to say its temporal singularity which is duration, But also to stimulate a creative dynamic in its many actions in society.