The question of truth in immanuel kant’s critique of pure reason

Abstract

This thesis sets out to test the relevance of the Kantian conception of truth in our contemporary era. In order to seek an appropriate, constructed relationship between our knowledge and its object, we argue that the contemporary epistemological debate on nonconceptual content inevitably takes us back to Kant. This is because though concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind, there is a nonconceptual angle to the Kantian theory of knowledge which implies that ―blind intuitions‖ constitute a primitive level of rationality or ‗proto rationality‘ which cannot be considered irrational because conceptualisation will no longer be the only criterion of rationality. This view makes Kant not only a proponent of conceptualism but also and above all of nonconceptualism. We argue that the nonconceptual angle of the Kantian theory of knowledge is consistent with the conceptual angle thereby taking us back to the noumena to show that we can no longer be contented with unknowable entities. Supplementing conceptualism with nonconceptualism in the Kantian theory of knowledge makes the theory flexible thus giving us more chances of grasping the reality in its complexity. To prove that a return to Kant is not anachronistic, our research work has carried out an uncompromising critical analysis of two contrasting but complementary angles of the relationship that Kant conceives between concepts and intuitions to make his theory more adaptable to the epistemological needs of our era in which the truth is no longer a discovery but a construction with extensions in metaphysics, natural science, morality and religion. To construct a more appropriate relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge that can give rise to truth in our era, our analytical, critical and adaptive study of Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason has obtained results at three levels. Firstly, in the construction of the truth, the Kantian transition from speculative to practical reason can only be epistemologically useful if contemporary religion gets the necessary moral foundation that will rid it of conflicts, servitude and illusions in the denominational multiplicity of our era. Since denominational multiplicity has become an obstacle to the establishment of an ethical community, the goal of the expansion of the field of truth from speculative to practical reason will remain utopic unless the Kantian rational religion becomes a reality in our era. Secondly, contemporary natural science becomes apodictic, acquires universality and necessity from the Kantian reformulated version of metaphysics when all dialectical illusions are eliminated. We argue that the Kantian critique of metaphysics is a destructive – constructive process to make metaphysics more applicable as part of the foundation of a science worthy of the name. Thirdly, given the complexity of the reality in our era that has given rise to an expression of disappointment in a problematic ‗post – truth‘ era, a contemporary reading of Kant‘s theory of knowledge has to take into account the nonconceptual representation of the object which has to complement the conceptual angle to make the Kantian theory more flexible to cope with the multidimensional and multidisciplinary needs of our era in search of truth