La problématique de l'intersubjectivité dans l'épistémologie de Karl Raimund Popper

Abstract

Karl Raimund Popper's intersubjectivity arose from his reaction against subjective epistemology. The proponents of subjectivism are in search of the ideal of scientific objectivity based on certainties. The present reflection analyses the problematic of intersubjectivity in Popperian epistemology. The notion of intersubjectivity in Popper's work leads to a central question: that of the stakes of an intersubjective epistemology. In other words, scientific objectivity resides in this principle dear to Popper, who wants to elaborate a knowledge free of all subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is then possible when scientific theories can be publicly debated. Epistemology thus becomes a valid communicable and intersubjective knowledge. Popperian critical rationalism is essentially open. It is based on the notion of fallibility and escapes the dogmas of modern dominating reason. It emphasises the idea that human understanding is fallible. In turn, experience or the thing in itself is not absolutely knowable. This is because Popper's critical rationalism considers that certainty is unattainable. If truth is an ideal, the work of reason is reduced to a critical debate, a rational discussion. If people can only conjecture because of their finiteness, then intersubjectivity at the end of the open rational discussion appears to be the royal road to revealing the truth. The constitution of objective knowledge is therefore dependent on the other, on the intersubjective test.