L’être et l’identité. Une analyse de « être et temps » chez Martin Heidegger.

Abstract

The problem that is examined in this work is that of Being in relation to Identity. Better, if Being is conceived as the source of all things, and, if Identity is not only unique, unicist, but also the same thing as Being-mine, then, the dualism Being and Identity can be understood as an ontological monism. The further clarify this problem, from what criterion does Being stand out from Identity? To achieve this, the analytic-critical method was used. The answer to said problem made it possible to reach the first part of this work of analysis by demonstrating that, from the dualism Being and Identity, Identity is the conceptual base of the foundation of Being. Hence the idea of permanence that founds the existence of Being-in-the world. The results of this first part have shown that Being-in-the-world is an onto-phenomenological determinacy of Identity of Being. In the second part of this research, it was a question of structuring in the theses on Mineness and Ipseity in Martin Heidegger, in which it emerges that Identity reveals the ontological property of Being. By always being in movement, being resides in the self. In the perspective, Mineness consists in revealing the dualist question of Being. At the end of this part, the related results show that Identity is corporeality, property and Being itself. Without doubt, the analysis of the third part led to the criticism of Heideggerian conception of Being and Identity. Here, the question of the relativism of values, on the one hand, and the scientist theses on the other hand were evaluated. This part has allowed to reveal that the dualism Being and Identity welds a difficulty: that of the deontologization of man and the decline of Dasein. This scientific examination has allowed to arrive at the results according to wich, man conceives himself in-the- world as a Being-thrown. His Identity is henceforth doomed to finitude, hence the awareness of being in a problematic future.