Les renseignements généraux et la lutte contre l’insurrection armée au Cameroun 1947-1971. Cas du pays bassa et l´ouest-Cameroun

Abstract

The history of the decolonization of Cameroon was marked by a series of events, characterized by the upecist nationalist movement, which firmly and decisively opposed the mode of govenance of the French colonial administration of state to harm the nationalists of the Union of the Population of Cameroon (UPC), the colonial administration created the service of general information. Thus, our theme is titled: general intelligence in the fight against the armed insurrection in Cameroon 1947-1971. Case of the Bassa country and WestCameroon. Under the pressure of socio-political events such as the institutional consequences of the Versailles peace treaty of 1919, the external colonial conflict of France, the internal conflicts between liberals and communists in France, the rise of syndicalism and nationalism. At the level of the administrative and military staffs, who are justifiably concerned about the surge in terrorism in Cameroon in general, and Bassa country and West-Cameroon. which has become daily the scene of bloody atrocities and constitutes an armed rebellion against the colonial power. It is with this in mind that by order n°282 of 29 july 1947 of the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Cameroon René Hoffher, the General Intelligence service was established as a security institution. Because it is during the latter that the service has fixed its attributions and its organization in a definitive way. Thus, it is advisable to consider the role of General Intelligence in the fight against armed insurrection in the Bassa country and West-Cameroon? Therefore, for the whiting of this memoir, we referred to two methodical approaches namely the socio-historical and inductive method. We have also consulted a varied and relatively recent documentation consisting of filigree books memoirs, theses, newspaper, articles, reports, journals, oral testimonies and we have arrived the conclusion that, in order to defeat armed insurrection in this region General Intelligence will resort to spinning, and direct observation of suspicious persons in search of informants: their use and protection use of the archives as a strategy of identification and capture of the Upecist guerrillas, interception of telegrams the taking of photos, the use of the confession used by the church, the infiltration into the camp Upecist, to

the torture of the insurgents. These strategies of annihilating armed insurrection will have consequences in the political, economic and social spheres.