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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12177/2243| Titre: | Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules |
| Auteur(s): | Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel Mbih, Boniface Moyouwou, Issofa |
| Mots-clés: | Condorcet manipulation Social choice function complete ignorance approval voting |
| Date de publication: | 21-fév-2012 |
| Résumé: | Usually strategic misrepresentation of preferences in order to manipulate social choice functions is studied under the standard common knowledge assumption. In this paper, we introduce the completely opposite hypothesis of manipulation under complete ignorance. Our goal is to give an answer to the following question : do there still exist any strategic voting opportunities, even if individuals do not have any information about others' preferences? We provide an exhaustive answer for Condorcet-type and a class of approval voting type SCFs. |
| Pagination / Nombre de pages: | 1-8 |
| URI/URL: | https://dicames.online/jspui/handle/20.500.12177/2243 |
| Autre(s) identifiant(s): | http://imhotep-journal.org/index.php/imhotep/article/view/24 |
| Collection(s) : | Articles publiés dans des revues à comité scientifique |
Fichier(s) constituant ce document :
| Fichier | Description | Taille | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24-63-1-PB.pdf | 186.21 kB | Adobe PDF |  Voir/Ouvrir |
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